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PCGG vs. Pena 159 SCRA 556

ISSUE:

Nature of quasi-judicial function A body exercising quasi-judicial function is co-equal with the RTC Rationale for prohibition on split jurisdiction The rule on prior exhaustion of administrative remedies HELD:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the PCGG

FACTS: This is a case about the Presidential Commission on Good Government, created through E.O. 1, charging it with the task of assisting the President in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses, including the power to issue freeze orders or sequestration of all business enterprises owned by them upon showing of a prima facie case. March 25, 1986

The Supreme Court held that RTC and the CA for that matter have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Art. XVIII, sec. 26 of the Constitution and therefore may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission. Under section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all cases of the Commission regarding "the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees" whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. Powers of the PCGG

PCGG issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two export garment manufacturing firms: American Inter-fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation. June 27, 1986

PCGG designated the OIC, Saludo, and Yeung Chun Ho as authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations. Sept. 4, 1986

E.O. 1 created PCGG, charging it to assist the President in the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses, including sequestration and provisional takeover of all business enterprises owned by them as well as conduct investigations, require submission of evidence by subpoena, administer oaths, punish for contempt. Freedom Constitution (Proc. No. 3) mandated the President to recover ill -gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime. Quasi-Judicial Function

PCGG designated Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in the absence of Yeung Chun Ho and Marcelo de Guzman, in the absence of Saludo. Feb. 3, 1987

Saludo, in a memorandum, revoked the authorizations previously issued upon finding that Mr. Yim Kam Shing was a Hong Kong Chinese national staying in the country on a mere tourist visa. The PCGG Commissioner approved the memorandum. Shortly, thereafter, Saludo withdrew funds from Metrobank against the accounts of the two corporations for payment of the salaries of the stuff. Yeung Chung Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan instituted through Yim Kam Shing an action for damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the said bank, PCGG, the Commissioner and OIC Saludo with the RTC, questiong the aforesaid revocation of the authorization as signatory previously granted to Yim Kam Shing. RTC issued TRO. PCGG filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to Yims prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the case. RTC judge denied PCGGs motion to dismiss and granted Yims prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Hence this petition.

As can be readily seen, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a coequal body with regional trial courts and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other. However, although under B.P. 129, the CA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgmentof regional trial courts and quasi -judicial bodies, E.O. 14 specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and originaljurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court. Prohibition against Split Jurisdiction

The law and the courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of actions. To paraphrase the leading case of Rheem of the Phil., Inc. vs. Ferrer, et al.: to draw a tenuous jurisdiction line is to undermine stability in litigations. A piecemeal

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resort to one court and another gives rise to multiplicity of suits. To force the parties to shuttle from one court to another to secure full determination of their suit is a situation gravely prejudicial to the administration of justice. The time lost, the effort wasted, the anxiety augmented, additional expenses incurred, the irreparable injury to the public interest are considerations which weigh heavily against split jurisdiction. In addition, the case against PCGG and its Commissioner is clearly barred by the immunity provision of E.O. 1, as buttressed by section 4(b) thereof which further provides that: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Executive Order No. 1 thus effectively withholds jurisdiction over cases against the Commission from all lower courts, including the Court of Appeals, except the Sandiganbayan in whom is vested original and exclusive jurisdiction and this Court. Early on, in special civil actions questioning challenged acts of the Commission, its submittal that the citedExecutive Order bars such actions in this Court was given short shrift because this Court, as the third great department of government vested with the judicial power and as the guardian of the Constitution, cannot be deprived of its certiorarijurisdiction to pass upon and determine alleged violations of the citizens' constitutional and legal rights under the Rule of Law. Primary Administrative Jurisdiction and Administrative Exhaustion of Remedies proper time, the question of ownership of the sequestered properties shall be exclusively determined in the Sandiganbayan, whose own decisions in turn are subject to review exclusively by the Supreme Court. It should be emphasized here, as again stressed by the Court in the recent case of Republic, et al. vs. De los Angeles, et al., G.R. No. L-30240, March 25, 1988, that "it is well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary function may not be interfered with by the courts. In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. There should be no thought of disregarding the traditional line separating judicial and administrative competence, the former being entrusted with the determination of legal questions and the latter being limited as a result of its expertise to the ascertainment of the decisive facts." This is specially true in sequestration cases affected by the Commission for the recovery of the nation' s plundered wealth that may affect the nation's very survival, in the light of the constitutional mandate that such sequestration or freeze orders "shall be issued only upon showing of a prima facie case" and the settled principle that findings by administrative or quasijudicial agencies like the Commission are entitled to the greatest respect and are practically binding and conclusive, like the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts, save where they are patently arbitrary or capricious or are not supported by substantial evidence.

The Court recently had occasion to stress once more, in G.R. No. 82218, Reyes vs. Caneba March 17, 1988, that "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Acts of an administrative agency must not casually be overturned by a court, and a court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within the perimeters of its own competence." Applying these fundamental doctrines to the case at bar, the questions and disputes raised by respondents seeking to controvert the Commission's finding of prima facie basis for the issuance of its sequestration orders as well as the interjection of the claims of the predecessor of American Inter-fashion and De Soleil Corporations, viz. Glorious Sun Phil., headed by Nemesis Co are all questions that are within the primary administrative jurisdiction of the Commission that cannot be prematurely brought up to clog the court dockets without first resorting to the exhaustion of the prescribed administrative remedies. The administrative procedure and remedies for contesting orders of sequestration issued by the Commission are provided for in its rules and regulations. Thus, the person against whom a writ of sequestration is directed may request the lifting thereof, in writing; after due hearing or motu proprio for good cause shown, the Commission may lift the writ unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may deem necessary, taking into consideration the evidence and the circumstances of the case. The resolution of the Commission is appealable to the President of the Philippines. The Commission conducts a hearing, after due notice to the parties concerned to ascertain whether any particular asset, property or enterprise constitutes ill-gotten wealth. The Commission's order of sequestration is not final, at the

Sanado vs. Court of Appeals 356 SCRA 546

Legal effect of a decision rendered by an administrative body in a case filed in the regular courts

FACTS: Sanado was issued by the now defunct Philippine Fisheries Commission an Ordinary Fishpond Permit covering an area of 50 hectares. On July 16, 1973, Sanado executed a contract with Nepomuceno wherein the latter agreed to develop 30hectares of the 50 hectares covered by Sanados fishpond permit. Two days later, the parties modified this earlier agreement by excluding the area of 10 hectares already cultivated and fully developed and providing that the contract is renewable on terms acceptable to both of them. Sept. 28, 1979

Director of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources recommended to the then Ministry of Natural Resources the conversion of Sanados fishpond permit into a 25-year fishpond loan agreement which covered a reduced area of 26.745 hectares. Accordingly, a Fishpond Lease Agreement was issued. July 17, 1981

Sanado filed a complaint against Nepomuceno with the RTC for recovery of possession and damages, alleging that Nepomuceno failed to deliver Sanados share of the net harvest among other things. While this case was pending, the then

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Minister of Agriculture and Food canceled the Fishpond Lease Agreement, forfeiting the improvements thereon in favor of government. Later, said order was reconsidered to the extent that Nepomuceno was given priority to apply for the area and that his improvements thereon were not considered forfeited in favor of the government. Sanado elevated the matter to the Office of the President but appeal was dimissed. Meanwhile, the trial court rendered a decision over Sanados complaint for recovery of possession in his favor. ISSUE: approval, rejection, or revocation of applications therefor (Manuel vs. Villena, 37 SCRA 745 [1971]). Such respect is based on the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers and on the fact that these bodies are considered co-equal and coordinate rank as courts. The only exception is when there is a clear showing of capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, which we find absent in the case at bar. The reasons given by the Office of the President in dismissing petitioner's appeal are quite clear. Transferring or subletting the fishpond granted to a licensee without the consent or approval of the administrative body concerned, as well as the failure to develop the area required by the fisheries rules, are definitely solid and logical grounds for the cancellation of one's license. Withal, if petitioner disagrees with the decision of the Office of the President, he should have elevated the matter by petition for review before the Court of Appeals for the latter's exercise of judicial review. Nowhere in the record do we find such action on petitioner's part. Understandably, to restore petitioner to the possession of the fishpond area is to totally disregard the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President which can hardly be described as an unrelated matter, considering its patent implications in the result of both Civil Case No. 2085 and CA-G.R. CV No. 23165. For how could the appellate court award possession to the very same party whose license has been cancelled by the executive or administrative officer tasked to exercise licensing power as regards the development of fishpond areas, and which cancellation has been sustained by the Office of the President? Petitioner must remember the essence of the grant of a license. It is not a vested right given by the government but a privilege with corresponding obligations and is subject to governmental regulation. Hence, to allow petitioner to possess the subject area is to run counter to the execution and enforcement of the July 31, 1989 decision which would easily lose its "teeth" or force if petitioner were restored in possession. The trial courts decision did not attain finality. It was appealed within the reglementary period. If the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory (David vs. Court of Appeals, 316 SCRA 710 [1999]) and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it (People vs. Gallo, 315 SCRA 461 [1999]), what more if the judgment has not yet attained finality? It is thus plain in the case at bar that the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is a substantial supervening event which drastically changed the circumstances of the parties to the subject fishpond lease agreement. For to award possession to petitioner is futile since he has lost the fishpond license. In point is our ruling in Baluyot vs. Guiao (315 SCRA 396 [1997]) where we held that judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also covers those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. For example, where the ownership of a parcel of land is decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it appearing that the defeated party's claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of

Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President has any legal effect on the civil case for recovery of possession Whether or not the judgment of the trial court has attained finality

HELD: What is the nature of the July 31, 1989 Malacaang decision and what is its effect on the resolution of Civil Case No. 2085? The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasijudicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities determined. As such, the July 31, 1989 decision of the Office of the President is explicitly an official act of and an exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Executive Department headed by the highest officer of the land. It thus squarely falls under matters relative to the executive department which courts are mandatorily tasked to take judicial notice of under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Judicial notice must be taken of the organization of the Executive Department, its principal officers, elected or appointed, such as the President, his powers and duties. The rendition of the subject July 31, 1989 Malacaang decision is premised on the essential function of the executive department which is to enforce the law. In this instance, what is being enforced is Presidential Decree No. 704 which consolidated and revised all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries. Such enforcement must be true to the policy behind such laws which is "to accelerate and promote the integrated development of the fishery industry and to keep thefishery resources of the country in optimum productive condition through proper conservation and protection" (Section 2, P.D. No. 704). Further, the issue of whether or not petitioner is still entitled to possession of the subject fishpond area is underpinned by an ascertainment of facts. And such task belongs to the administrative body which has jurisdiction over the matter the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. The policy of the courts as regards such factual findings is not to interfere with actions of the executive branch on administrative matters addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies. This policy is specially applicable in the grant of licenses, permits, and leases, or the

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ownership. By analogy, the July 31, 1989 decision, is not confined to the validity of the cancellation by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food of petitioner's Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 3090 for violation of the terms thereof and/or the fisheries rules. The right to possess the subject fishpond area is necessarily included in the decision. The cancellation or revocation of petitioner's license necessarily eliminated his right to possess the same since the new licensee would then be the one to enjoy this right.

Francisco vs TRB, G.R. No. 166910, October 19, 2010

-In this case, the Court states that no public bidding was required as the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement ( STOA) were only statutorily authorized transfer or assignment of usufruct of PNCCs existing franchise to construct, maintain and operate expressways and thus not covered by the BOT Law. The BOT Law does not squarely apply to the peculiar case of PNCC, which exercised its prerogatives and obligations under its franchise to pursue the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the tollways with chosen partners. The tollway projects may very well qualify as a build-operate-transfer undertaking. However, given that the projects in the instant case have been undertaken by PNCC in the exercise of its franchise under P.D. Nos. 1113 and 1894, in joint partnership with its chosen partners at the time when it wa s held valid to do so by theOGCC and the DOJ, the public bidding provisions under the BOT Law do not strictly apply. For, as aptly noted by the OSG, the subject STOAs are not ordinary contracts for the construction of government infrastructure projects, which requires under the Government Procurement Reform Act or the now-repealed P.D. 1594,[149] public bidding as the preferred mode of contract award. Neither are they contracts where financing or financial guarantees for the project are obtained from the government. Rather, the STOAs actually constitute a statutorily-authorized transfer or assignment of usufruct of PNCCs existing franchise to construct, maintain and operate expressways.[150] The conclusion would perhaps be different if the tollway projects were to be prosecuted by an outfit completely different from, and not related to, PNCC. In such a scenario, the entity awarded the winning bid in a BOTscheme infrastructure project will have to construct, operate and maintain the tollways through an automatic grant of a franchise or TOC, in which case, public bidding is required under the law. Where, in the instant case, a franchisee undertakes the tollway projects of construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the tollways under its franchise, there is no need for a public bidding. In pursuing the projects with the vast resource requirements, the franchisee can partner with other investors, which it may choose in the exercise of its management prerogatives. In this case, no public bidding is required upon the franchisee in choosing its partners as such process was done in the exercise of management prerogatives and in pursuit of its right of delectus personae Thus, the subject tollway projects were undertaken by companies, which are the product of the joint ventures between PNCC and its chosen partners. Petitioners Francisco and Hizons assertions about the TRB awarding the tollway projects to favored companies, unsubstantiated as they are, need no belaboring. Suffice it to state that the discretion to choose who shall stand as critical JV partners remained all along with PNCC, at least theoretically. Needless to say, the records do not show that the TRB committed an oversight as an administrative body over any aspect of tollway operations with regard to PNCCs selection of partners.

Odchigue-Bondoc vs Tan Tiong Bio, GR 186652, October 6, 2010 Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011 (Admin Law, DOJ Secretary, Prosecutor, Quasi-judicial power) Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate Secretary, herein respondent. Petitioner denies the allegations. The DOJ, by resolution signed by the Chief State Prosecutor for the Secretary of Justice, motu proprio dismissed the petition on finding that there was no showing of any reversible error. The CA set aside the DOJ Secretarys resolution holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondents petition for review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution (No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based). Petitioner asserts in this present petition for review on certiorari that the requirement in Sec. 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution applies only to decisions of courts of justice, and it does not extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such as the DOJ. Respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not limited to courts as it extends to quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary investigations conducted by these tribunals.

Issue: 1. Whether or not a prosecutor exercises quasi-judicial power. 2. Whether or not the DOJ Secretary exercises quasi-judicial power. Held: 1. No. A prosecutor does not exercise adjudication or rulemaking powers. A preliminary investigation is not a quasijudicial proceeding, but is merely inquisitorial since the prosecutor does not determine the guilt of innocence of the accused. While the prosecutor makes the determination whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasicourt, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused. 2. No. The Secretary of Justice in reviewing a prosecutors order or resolution via appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-judicial proceeding since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Sec 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary.