Using trade as a driver of political stability

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Volume 2 July - Sep. 2007 Number 3

Using Trade as a Driver of Political Stability: Prospects in the Indo-Pak Context

(Moeed Yusuf)

Pakistan: On or Off? Examining the Future of U.S.-Pakistan Relations in the War on Terror and Beyond (Farhana Ali) The Parliamentary System in South Asia Fundamentalism, Extremism and Islam OIC Retrospect and Prospects The Shia of Iraq and the South Asian Connection Turning on the Faucets of Thought (A.G. Noorani) (Prof. Dr. Anis Ahmad) (Tayyab Siddiqui) (Khaled Ahmed) (Anjum Niaz)

34 58 89 106 129 141

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Founder S. Iftikhar Murshed Publisher and Editor-in-Chief S. Mushq Murshed Executive Adviser Riaz Khokhar Adviser Aziz Ahmad Khan Editors Muzaffar Abbas (Executive) Navid Zafar (Research) Printers Lawyersown Press 28, alfalah Askaria Plaza, Committee Chowk, Rawalpindi. Contact Editor The Criterion House 225, Street 33, F-10/1, Islamabad Tel: +92-51-2210531 Fax: +92-51-2297206 Criterion is a quarterly magazine which aims at producing well researched articles for a discerning readership. The editorial board is neutral in its stance. The opinions expressed are those of the writers. Contributions are edited for reasons of style or clarity. Great care is taken that such editing does not affect the theme of the article or cramp its style. Quotations from the magazine can be made by any publisher as long as they are properly acknowledged. We would also appreciate if we are informed. Subscription: Pakistan, Bangladesh & India Rs. 195 (Local Currency) Overseas US $ 15 The Subscription Price is Rs. 700 & US $ 50 plus postage Price: Rs 195 US $ 15

Using trade as a driver of political stability

USING TRADE AS A DRIVER OF POLITICAL STABILITY: PROSPECTS IN THE INDO-PAK CONTEXT (Moeed Yusuf)*
Abstract (While countries all over the world are fast harvesting the fruits of open trade policies, Pakistan and India, in spite of sharing a common history of thousands of years, have failed to reap the benets from the new trade openings. The message that these two large countries in the region have given to the world is that no condence building measure will prove effective, unless a political solution of Kashmir creates a feeling of relief for the entire region. In the present state of political stalemate India, being the bigger country remains the major loser.Editor) 1. Introduction1 The last two decades are marked by signicant progress in terms of attaining a globalized economy. Barriers to inter-state trade have come down drastically. Pundits of free trade continue to promote economic liberalization not only as a means to accrue economic benets, but also as a tool for peace building. The contention is that economic integration can raise the opportunity cost of conict to prohibitive levels, thus leading to political stability among trading partners. Recent literature has argued for the potential of utilizing economic integration to address conict between the two South Asian giants, India and Pakistan. The two countries, by virtue of their enormous populations, sensitive geo-strategic locations, and nuclear weapons capability maintain signicant leverage in statecraft. Yet, the two have been held back from realizing their true potential due to historically turbulent bilateral relations. Periodic conict and crises have impacted all aspects of their relationship. Economic interaction has been one of the casualties, with trade ows remaining minimal. This is despite the fact that Pakistan and India (including Bangladesh) were a common economy merely sixty years ago. While efforts at political reconciliation have continued over the years, the conict resolution paradigm has never allowed out of the box thinking from either side. Resultantly, both sides have remained intransigent, rendering their stances on key contentious issues irreconcilable. In this backdrop, peace theorists have been arguing for Pakistan and India
* Moeed Yusuf is a research fellow at the Strategic and Economic Policy Research (Pvt. Ltd.) in Islambad.

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to adopt the economic interdependence course by working towards developing robust trade ties as a means to ameliorate conict. Indeed, progress on this front is already underway as Pakistan and India are currently in the midst of a composite peace process, whereby they have agreed to allow simultaneous movement on all contentious fronts, including trade. The ongoing bid for rapprochement has raised realistic hopes of attaining a positive spin-off from enhanced economic interaction in terms of political stabilization. While the euphoria around the possibility of economic interdependence providing an answer to Indo-Pak political tensions remains alive, hardly any concrete analysis has been conducted to examine the realistic potential. This paper seeks to ll the void by analyzing the potential for enhanced economic interaction between Pakistan and India to impact bilateral tensions positively. The rst question to address is whether trade can be raised to meaningful levels. If so, can trade ties be congured so that they raise the cost of conict prohibitively and nudge both sides towards political normalization? Section 2 sets out the conceptual framework for the analysis. Section 3 provides a background of political and economic relations between Pakistan and India. Section 4 evaluates the potential for Indo-Pak trade to increase to meaningful levels. Section 5 discusses the various barriers to enhancing bilateral trade. Section 6 establishes the linkage between trade and conict in the Indo-Pak context in order to determine whether a positive spin off from trade is realistic. Section 7 provides a prognosis for the future. 2. Conceptual Framework2

Extensive literature exists on the multi-faceted impact of trade liberalization on inter-state relations. The economic theory of interdependence- the theoretical debate which examines the relationship between trade and peace- has matured considerably over the past decade. Two major schools of thought have emerged. The current drive towards employing economic interaction as a means of ameliorating conict is grounded within the liberal theory of economic interdependence, proponents of which argue that trade is inherently benecial as it brings efciency gains for producers, consumers, and governments.3 The argument is that trading arrangements bring about political stability by increasing interdependence. By enhancing the economic incentive for peace, interdependence leads to amelioration of inter-state conict. Empirical evidence from across the world suggests the liberal theorists remain more relevant to countries where conicts are minor or in cases where conict mediation has already progressed to a certain degree through political or diplomatic means.4 More relevant to the context of countries with long-standing conicts that

Using trade as a driver of political stability

are highly complex in nature and where little tangible progress has been possible is the international relations theory. Theorists subscribing to this school suggest that trade by itself is not sufcient to ensure the absence of conict. Proponents argue that the decision to trade depends on the potential returns from trade and the future expectations of the level of trade within a foreseeable time frame. Copeland (1996), arguing along these lines, suggests that high interdependence can be either peace-inducing or war-inducing depending on the expectations of future trade.5 In essence, theorists subscribing to the international relations theory contest that a states choice between conict and trade would be based on relative trade benets, and not absolute gains as trade theory suggests. If a country perceives the other to gain much more from trading, it would deem it in its interest not to liberalize trade. Matthews (1996) puts forth this argument contending that it is essential for states to look at relative gains from trade before entering into trade arrangements.6 An extremely important nuance to the debate is the issue of trade reaching a critical level. Indeed, even liberal trade theorists do not expect a positive spin-off from trade by the mere presence of trading relations between states. As Andreatta, et al (2000) argue, for the liberal contention to work, there needs to be a certain threshold of economic interdependence that must be achieved.7 Extending the argument, Andreatta et al, suggest that a certain level of institutional development is necessary if such a threshold is to be achieved. The latter can be translated into the need not only for interaction in terms of volume, but also for integration of production processes and economic structure between countries which would develop an intrinsic link between production of a particular product or provision of a certain service. In other words, process integration is a key variable which ought to complement interaction in volume terms for the trade-to-peace causality to function. In the subsequent discussion, we situate our argument within the economic theory of interdependence, applying the conceptual premise to the Indo-Pak context to explore the trade-conict linkage. We shall focus on the international relations school of thought given its greater applicability to situations fraught with inherent complexities, and ones where virtually no tangible progress has been made over an extended period of time. 3. 3.1 An overview of Pakistan-India relations8

Political relations Pakistan - India political tensions date back to a bitter partition which divided the Indian sub-continent into two independent states, Pakistan and India at the cost of widespread violence and tremendous loss of civilian life. The two countries continued on the path of hostility after partition, and were involved in armed conicts

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in 1948 and 1965, the underlying cause being the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which has undoubtedly proven to be the most consequential contention between the two sides over the years. Both conicts ended in a stalemate, without either side gaining a decisive advantage.9 In 1971, a secessionist movement in East Pakistan was actively supported by India. The short Indo-Pak war that followed resulted in the dismemberment of East Pakistan.10 Since 1971, the two countries have found themselves in the midst of several near-war situations. At least four crises of note occurred in 1986-87, 1990, 1999, and 2001-02.11 The last two took place under the South Asian nuclear umbrella, thus underscoring the potential dangers of Indo-Pak hostilities. The history of conict between the two sides is also extended beyond purely inter-state conicts. Both sides have continuously blamed each other for internal strife within their respective borders. The most serious intrusion by Pakistan was in the ongoing insurgency in Indian occupied Kashmir where Pakistan allegedly provided material and training support to the insurgents.12 India also claims ISI involvement in the Khalistan movement a Sikh drive for independence in Indias Punjab province during the 1980s.13 Moreover, Pakistan has remained a strong critic of the plight of Indian Muslims.14 Although no direct Pakistani involvement in Indias communal problems has been alleged, Hindu-Muslim riots do lead to tensions between the two countries. The fact that communal incidents have been commonplace throughout Indias history has ensured that diplomatic tensions on this count have been permanent. Pakistan, on its part, has not been shy of pointing to Indias hand in strife within its borders. Indian involvement in the 1971 affair has already been alluded to. Pakistan also blamed India for supporting acts of sectarian and ethnic violence across the country in the 1990s, especially in the troubled city of Karachi.15 RAWs hand in bomb blasts across the rest of the country have also been established in several cases.16 In fact, Global Security has listed a long list of terrorist activities within Pakistan in which Indian involvement is believed to be present. At present, Pakistan is alleging an Indian role in the ongoing Baloch insurgency.17 Table 1: Chronology of India-Pakistan tensions
Inter-state conict Inter-state crises Intra-state conict relevant to the adversary Pakistan 1948-49 1965 1987 1990 East Pakistan (1971) Sindh violence (1990s) India North-East insurgency (1950s) Khalistan movement (1980s)

Using trade as a driver of political stability

1971

1999 2001-02

Balochistan insurgency Kashmir insurgency (1989-present) (2004-present)

Source: Compilation from various sources [originally prepared by the author and presented in Khan et al., Managing Trade, 2007].

Reasons for Indo-Pak conicts are many and complex. While some attribute conicts solely to territorial and possession disputes through rather simplistic arguments, more substantial variables have been at play in exacerbating political tensions over time. First, Pakistan and India were born with irreconcilable ideologies. Although no Indo-Pak conict has been spurred due to ideological reasons, these have surely exacerbated mutual animosity. Perhaps the most negative role has been played by the states themselves who over time have consciously attempted to twist facts to expose the negative elements of the adversary.18 Second, governments on both sides have raised mutual hatred as a politically opportune tool. A dominant argument particularly relevant to Pakistan is the militarys use of anti-India rhetoric in a bid to maintain its clout in Pakistani policymaking. Indeed, the military has always ensured that the India-centric national security paradigm remains sacrosanct. Although it would be absurd to argue that the entire anti-India perception is a construction of the Pakistani establishment, there is certainly a strong lobby that continues to play up the Indian threat for institutional gains.19 In India, Hindu nationalist parties and activist factions have played an equally negative role. Within India, they remain irritated by Pakistans nuisance value and have used the anti-Pakistan rhetoric for political gains. At the same time, they have exposed Pakistans tactics of asymmetrical warfare as proof of Pakistans hostile designs and have thus justied their right to pursue coercive policies vis--vis Pakistan. Finally, Pakistan and India have historically been aligned to opposing blocks of power.20 The inuence of external actors on Indo-Pak hostilities has been mixed. On the one hand, external actors have assisted both sides in building up tremendous military assets. On the other, countries like the US have also restrained crises between the two sides by exerting diplomatic pressure. Nonetheless, external inuence on regional stability, which is intrinsically linked to the IndoPak equation, have been extremely negative off late. A glaring exampling is the severe internal backlash Pakistan has had to face, rst due to the Afghan Jihad and now due to the ongoing War on Terror campaign in Afghanistan. In the nal outcome, persistent tensions combined with the negative role of both states have led to an atmosphere of mistrust, where virtually no constructive interaction in any realm has been possible. In fact, nationalist voices on both sides portray any move to show leniency to the adversary as a sell-out, thus making the

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price of rapprochement politically prohibitive. 3.2 Trade relations The state of trade relations between the two sides is equally dismal. Interestingly, at the outset in 1947, by virtue of being a common economy before independence, Pakistan and India remained the single most important trade partner for each other. Till 1949, 32 percent of Pakistans total imports originated in India, while 56 percent of its total exports were destined for India.21 However, in 1949, once Pakistan refused to devalue its currency to reciprocate Indias move, mainly to prevent higher import costs, trade ties were abruptly slashed. Economic interaction between the two sides has remained minimal ever since. For much of the past decade for instance, despite some positive movement courtesy of the South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), Indo-Pak trade has remained stagnant at less than one percent of their total global trade. Only in the last two years has the proportion increased somewhat. The overall balance has favored India consistently. Major trade items include petroleum products, yarn, chemicals and cotton by way of Pakistani exports, and chemicals, rubber, animal fodder, plastics, and iron and steel, by way of imports.22 Table 2: Indo-Pak trade statistics
PAKISTAN-INDIA TRADE STATISTICS YEAR EXPORTS IMPORTS (million US $) (million US $) 36.23 90.57 173.66 53.84 55.41 49.37 70.66 94.00 288.13 293.31 204.70 154.53 145.85 127.38 238.33 186.80 166.57 286.90 491.66 634.91 TRADE % OF TOTAL % OF TOTAL BALANCE EXPORTS FOR EXPORTS FOR (million US $) PAKISTAN INDIA (168.47) (63.98) 28.81 (73.74) (182.92) (137.44) (95.91) (192.9) (205.53) (341.60) 0.43 1.04 2.39 0.62 0.60 0.54 0.63 0.76 1.99 1.77 0.61 0.44 0.43 0.34 0.53 0.42 0.31 0.44 2.71 2.49

1996-97 1997-98 1998-99

23

1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06

Source: Foreign Trade Pattern of Pakistan, Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Trade Development Authority of Pakistan; Directorate General of Foreign Trade, India

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[originally prepared by the author for and a modied version presented in Khan et al., Managing Trade, 2007].

While dismal, formal trade patterns between Pakistan and India only provide a partial picture of overall trade ows. Both countries engage in substantial informal trade as well. The existence of informal trade is important not only to determine the true level of trade owing between the two sides but also because informal trading mechanisms often rely on robust integration patterns which institutionalize communication channels. The state of integration within these informal institutions could point to the potential of such integration being transferred to the formal ambit, should legal trade between Pakistan and India reach meaningful levels. Prior to a relatively recent comprehensive study by the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), conjectures of informal trade between the two sides grossly exaggerated the trade potential. Guesstimates oating around ranged between USD 0.5 billion and USD 10 billion, with the majority approximating the upper end of the spectrum.24 Findings from the SDPI study however pointed to a total informal trade volume of merely USD 0.54 billion. Bulk of the trade is conducted through smuggling routes across Afghanistan and not through quasi-legal routes through third ports as was previously believed. This has implications for gauging the potential for trade creation, as a mere switch from quasi-legal to formal channels would not have any impact on overall trade volumes of either Pakistan or India. In that sense, the nding of the above mentioned report is optimistic. However, the estimated volume only conforms to the lower end of the existing guesstimates. Thus the overall increase in formal trade predicted due to a switch from informal to formal channels is lower than what most proponents of Indo-Pak free trade predicted in the past.25 Another important fact revealed is that an overwhelming majority of informal trade ows from India to Pakistan. Pakistani exports to India constitute a mere USD 10.3 million. Even these are concentrated in commodities like cloth, dry fruits, and bed sheets, all items which have limited viability in terms of integration of production patterns between the two sides.26

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Table 3: Value of Informal Imports from India (000 USD)

Items DubaiBandar AbbasBara Cloth Livestock Medicines Pharmaceutical and textile machinery Electroplating chemicals Cosmetics and Jewellery Herbs and spices Ispaghol (husk) Big elachi Black hareer Betel Blankets Rickshaw/ Motorbike parts Tires Paan ghutka, Paan parag Indian razor blades Biri (cigarette) Others Total Value Sigma Total 156,850 119,376 1,000 72,282 3,306 2,225 8,572 5,070 95,700 97,500 55,440 534,516 480 7,150 500 2,500 5,000 5,000 250 20,000 6,250 1,350 8,500 3,825 2,880 40,280 1,600 18,250 75,000 128,000 Informal trade routes Dubai- DubaiDubai Sindh Delhi- Singapore- Total Bandar Karachi Karachi cross- Lahore Karachi value Abbas(In (Third border by item Chaman formal) country) 1,066 45,350 2,500 7,800 33,340 10,400 500 2,000 1,280 185,996 33,340 32,750 75,000

15,000 2,600 1,300 960 800

15,000 63,840 8,350 1,350 8,500 3,825 2,880 5,000 5,250 73,282 3,306 2,225 8,572 6,050

Source: Khan et al., Quantifying Informal Trade, 2005.

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Table 4: Source, Destination and Value of Informal Exports from Pakistan

(USD 000)
Items Dubai Karachi (Third country) Cloth Cigarettes Dry fruit Video games, CDs Footwear Prayer mat Bed Sheet Others Total Value Sigma Total 6,800 375 2,525 375 6,800 Informal trade routes Sind cross-border 1,775 Delhi-Lahore Total by item 520 100 52 100 52 52 135 30 1,041 10,366 52 52 135 405 9,095 100 427

Source: Khan et al., Quantifying Informal Trade, 2005.

Apart from trade in goods, there is hardly any economic interaction to speak of on either side. Virtually no trade in services has taken place thus far. Moreover, while there has been some recent talk of joint ventures and direct investment in each others country, no consequential progress has been achieved on ground. Recently, some measures to facilitate presence of each others banks and corporate ofces have been taken.27 However, again, there is not much to show for in terms of tangible gains. 4. The potential for enhancing trade: Reaching the critical level?28

The single most important prerequisite for the economic theory of interdependence to function is attaining a critical level of trade ows, both in terms of volume and integration of the economies in question. Both the liberal and the international relations schools of thought acknowledge the need to have sufciently robust trade ties. In the Indo-Pak context, existing literature is divided on the extent to which trade complementarities exist. Majority of the analyses point to high level of complementarities, suggesting that the present trade volume between the two sides is miniscule as compared to the true potential. Wickramasinghe (2001) and Burki (2004) indicate signicant trade complementarities.29 Not only do they point to the possibility of macro-level gains, but they also argue that increased trade

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ows are likely to bring about technical efciency, improve resource allocation and allow countries to create niches by specializing in different products or focusing on a particular stage along the value chain within a given industry. The latter points towards the possibility of integration of production structures. As for quantitative estimates, Mukherjee (1992) identied as many as 113 items for intraregional exports and a 110 items for intraregional imports within the SAARC region.30 Bulk of these are likely to be captured by Indo-Pak trade. Frankel and Wei (1997) indicate that trade between Pakistan and India is 70 percent lower than the levels two similar economies would be expected to have.31 A study by the World Bank suggested that an Indo-Pak free trade arrangement could increase bilateral trade ows nine-fold within a decade.32 Other optimistic estimates fall within the USD 5-10 billion range. Quite to the contrary, some equally convincing analyses point to a much more pessimistic picture. Aggarwal and Pandey (1992) point to an almost identical pattern of comparative advantage between Pakistan and India, albeit within a narrow band of commodities that have similar production structures.33 Pessimists argue that there are strong structural similarities in both economies that act as constraints to trade. Both sides exhibit a lack of capacity to generate exportable surpluses of products in accordance with regional specications and requirements. Decient capital for expanding on high value added exportable products has reduced both sides, especially Pakistan, to dependency on industrialized nations for capital goods and technology. Trade being tilted in this regard complicates efforts to integrate and increase regional self-sufciency, a fact that reects the current scenario in South Asia. A comprehensive set of studies conducted under a World Bank commissioned project provide the latest forecasts for some of the sectors traditionally believed to be potential drivers of Indo-Pak trade. The outlook is far from optimistic. Studies of the sugar, chemicals and light engineering sectors either point to a number of barriers that may restrict trade or underscore the lack of price competitiveness on either side.34 The study on textiles and clothing (T&C), perceived to be one of the key areas for future trade, suggests low trade potential in intermediate T&C. While the prognosis in nal consumer T&C is better, the study cautions that the outcome would depend on the amount of investment Indian rms are willing to make in Pakistan. Moreover, it points to the fact that under free trade conditions, Indo-Pak trade in T&C is likely to signify trade diversion rather than trade creation.35 4.1 Estimating trade potential Given the varying interpretations of the potential for Indo-Pak trade to grow,

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we have conducted a rudimentary statistical exercise ourselves. The analysis is not meant to accurately predict volumes. Instead, we simply seek to come up with a broad estimate to highlight whether Indo-Pak trade can reach meaningful levels.36 4.1.1 Potential for Pakistani exports Table 5 contains the current items and volumes of Pakistans exports to India as well as the calculations for the potential for trade, were trade ties completely liberalized. To do so, we take into account the maximum tradable volume. This is equivalent to the lower of the gures for Pakistans total exports to the rest of the world and Indian total imports from the rest of the world for each commodity (column 5). We do not take the higher of the two gures since that would reect a volume that is either greater than what the exporting country can produce or the importing country demands. Also important is to note that in the case of Pakistani exports, there are no formal bans on any commodities, which implies that all items with export potential are currently owing (although at a much smaller scale). Only two commodities, footwear and bed linen, are not exported formally but were recorded as major informally traded commodities. They have thus been included in the analysis. Table 5: Pakistani exports to India
USD million Items Current volume Total Pak. exports to ROW Total Indian imports from ROW Maximum exportable volume from Pakistan (smaller number between 3 and 4) 5

3 Formal trade

Petroleum products Yarn Organic chemicals Cotton Edible fruits, nuts Leather and articles thereof Synthetic textiles

96.87 80.53 36.48 28.12 27.88 20.22 13.83

825.65 1,382.87 432.83 2,108.48 229.41 945.63 200.30

20,500 438.09 5,144.21 438.09 787.09 332.73 127.33

825.65 438.09 432.83 438.09 229.41 332.73 127.33

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Edible Vegetables and 11.78 roots Fish and sh preparations 0.43

42.79 194.15 Informal trade

637.64 24.20

42.79 24.20

Footwear Bed linen, sheets Total

0.07 1.67 317.8837

142.22 2,038.06 8,542.39

92.61 107.06 28,629.05

92.61 107.06 3,090.79

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan; Directorate General of Foreign Trade, India; Trade Development Authority of Pakistan; State Bank of Pakistan [originally prepared by the author for and presented in Khan et al., Managing Trade, 2007].

From table 3, the total potential for trade (if all Pakistani exports in tradable items were channeled to India keeping in mind the latters demand) comes to USD 3090.79 million. Now, given that expecting all of the Indian demand in these commodities to be met by Pakistani exports is unrealistic, we take a benchmark of 25 percent of this total exportable surplus to come to a more reasonable estimate. While our benchmark is notional, we have selected it given the fact that the proportion of total tradable volume exported from Pakistan to the US, which is its largest export destination, approximates the same percentage. This brings the predicted volume of Pakistani exports to India to USD 772.69 million. 4.1.2 Pakistani imports from India The case of Indian exports to Pakistan is more complex, as unlike the reverse ow, there is a ban on a large number of items to ow into Pakistan. Therefore, the liberalization of trade is likely to ow in three steps. First, the bans would be removed by providing India MFN status but tariff and non-tariff barriers will remain. Under this scenario, items currently traded informally would come within the formal ambit, and arguably the volume of these commodities would increase by a factor that is impossible to estimate. At the very least, a switch from informal to formal trade would bring the total trade volume to USD 1473.10 million, which is the total trade ow between the two sides at the moment. Table 6: Combined trade (2005-06)
(USD million) Total formal trade 928.22 Total informal trade 544.88 Combined trade 1473.10

Arguably, in the subsequent phase when a free trade environment ensues, the potential would be much higher. To estimate total trade potential, we follow the

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same methodology as in the case of Pakistani exports to India. However, here in addition to accounting for items traded informally, we also include commodities which are suggested to have high potential for export from India but are neither traded formally or informally at present. These constitute the items whose import is formally banned by Pakistan and are either too bulky or sensitive to be traded informally (capital machinery for example).
Table 7: Pakistani imports from India
USD million Items Current volume Total Indian exports to ROW Total Pakistani imports from ROW 4 Maximum importable volume from Pakistan 5

3 Formal trade

Organic chemicals

205.66

4,857.09 1,034.96 1,122.88 2,160.51 3,813.47 168.53 567.87 846.94 4,452.61 421.35 905.11

1,224.97 219.00 49.65 1,792.90 320.06 87.87 142.57 187.05 50.46 1091.14 222.55

1,224.97 219.00 49.65 1,792.90 320.06 87.87 142.57 187.05 50.46 421.35 222.55

Rubber and articles thereof 115.89 Animal fodder, waste from 54.01 food industries Plastics and articles Iron and steel Sugars Edible vegetables, roots Tanning and dyeing extracts Ores, slag, ash Oil seeds, Fruits, Grains, Medicinal plants Tea, coffee, mate, spices 44.89 32.63 30.48 30.47 20.55 19.90 13.63 12.01

Informal trade + commodities identied as potentially tradable Light engineering, machinery Cosmetics and Jewellery Buffaloes 75.00 63.84 33.34 2000.55 764.93 6.00 2601.00 123.98 2000.55 123.98 6.00

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Pharmaceuticals Chemicals (apart from organic) Auto parts Blankets Value-added textiles, silk TOTAL

32.75 15.00 5.25 5.00 751.96

38

2444.18 1079.06 252.92 87.56 11399.75 38,386.16

292.15 1365.80 N/A N/A 320.79 10,091.94

292.15 1079.06 252.92 87.56 320.79 8,881.44

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan; Directorate General of Foreign Trade, India; Trade Development Authority of Pakistan; State Bank of Pakistan [originally prepared by the author for and presented in Khan et al., Managing Trade, 2007].

The total importable production in items which Pakistan would potentially demand from India comes to USD 8,881.44 million. Using the 25 percent benchmark, which again approximates the proportion of total tradable volume imported by Pakistan from its largest import partner, the UAE, our estimates for Indian imports to Pakistan come to USD 2,220.36 million.39 Our notional estimates put the potential for total Indo-Pak trade at USD 2,993.05 million. Proponents of Indo-Pak free trade could argue that data discrepancies and the rudimentary nature of the analysis may have induced a signicant error percentage, thus underestimating the true potential. Be that as it may, the entire point of this exercise was to rule out the concern about the potential for trade being low enough not to allow ties to reach meaningful levels. In absolute terms, even the estimated volume will make India one of Pakistans top ve trading partners. This would imply a robust enough relationship to satisfy the precondition for the economic interdependence theory to function, at least in volume terms. However, while prerequisites in terms of volume may end up being satised, what such a quantitative exercise fails to capture is the issue of integrated economic structures. Even a substantially high trade level like the one predicted above may prove futile in terms of impacting political tensions if sufcient integration of economic structures is not achieved. While existing literature is largely silent on this issue in the Indo-Pak context, an examination of the list of tradable items between the two countries (table 5 and 7) does not present an optimistic picture. Virtually all products are either primary goods (especially in the case of Pakistans exports) or nished products that allow for little integration in terms of production processes. Only a handful of input items such as textile machinery (included under light engineering, machinery in table 7) could create mutual interdependence. Moreover, most other projections of potential for integration, for instance through trade in services, joint ventures and investment in various sectors, remain idealistic.

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In reality, the Indo-Pak context is fraught with multiple technical and political barriers to trade, which are unlikely to allow the theoretical potential for trade to be realized on the ground. Barriers would impact both the potential for trade ties to progress in volume and integration terms. We turn to a detailed discussion of these barriers in the next section. 5. Barriers to enhancing Indo-Pak trade40

Several barriers confront Indo-Pak trade. The contention, as should be clear from the following discussion is that even if a consensus to enhance trade is reached in principal, there are signicant barriers that would dampen the potential for trade growth. We limit our discussion to barriers which have a bearing on trade potential to address political instability. 5.1 Barriers specic to the trade protocol To begin with, substantial formal barriers exist with the bilateral trade regime. Although both countries have liberalized their economies signicantly in recent decades, some undesired anomalies still remain. This is especially true for India. An IMF study rated Indias trade restrictiveness at 8 (on a scale from 1 to 10), while Pakistans index stood at a relatively better 6 (IMF, 2004). A World Bank study on trade regimes in South Asia found India to be in the top 10 percent closed economies on the basis of unweighted tariffs.41 Pakistan-India CEOs Business Forum alleges the Indian trade regime to be the least transparent in the region.42 Indeed, Indias nontariff barrier ratios are the highest in South Asia. India is also known to have used specic duties and high tariff peaks to protect a number of sectors. These include agriculture, textiles, and garments, among others.43 Moreover, India also maintains a convoluted domestic tax and subsidy structure which has caught the attention of trade experts not just within Pakistan, but across the region.44 Indias restrictive trade regime neutralizes any potential benets that Pakistan could accrue by virtue of the fact that New Delhi has accorded Pakistan MFN status. Pakistan, on its part, has negated any possible gains to India by virtue of Islamabads relatively more liberalized economy by its persistent refusal to grant India MFN status. Pakistans decision has deed trade logic and is situated within the realm of realist politics. Currently, Pakistan maintains a formal ban on imports of all Indian items except those on a 773-item strong positive list.45 Apart from formal trade barriers, both sides suffer from acute inefciencies in the implementation of their trade protocols. The result is a highly inefcient bureaucratic structure that causes inevitable delays in executing transactions. Indias protocol exhibits greater bottlenecks. Average transaction cost levels remain extremely high in both countries.46 The existence of high transaction costs increases

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the cost of trading signicantly, not only nancially but also in terms of additional time required to complete trade related formalities.47 Trade optimists could of course argue that the formal barriers merely require a consensus within decision makers to be removed. As for the procedural hurdles, they would contend that these too can be addressed once trade ties begin to show promise. While that may be so, one must consider that issues of procedural barriers and domestic subsidies, especially in Indias case are underpinned by deep structural anomalies in the Indian economy, and thus cannot be addressed immediately. That is why Indias trade protocol presents these barriers not only to Pakistan, but to the rest of the world as well. It is unrealistic to expect India to overhaul its subsidy structure in the short run, given its political ramications.48 Banking on changes over the long-run however, has implications for the likelihood of the economic theory of interdependence to function. As already mentioned, the international relations sub-set of the theory emphasizes the importance of relative gains and future projections within a foreseeable time period. Were Pakistan to grant India MFN status without any reciprocity from the Indian side in terms of removal of trade distortions, India is likely to benet disproportionately in the interim period. Given existing trends which point to a signicant positive Indian trade balance vis--vis Pakistan, this could imply a trade equation overwhelmingly in New Delhis favor. International relations theorists would predict that such a situation may prompt Pakistan to pull out of the trading arrangement. 5.2 The political economy of trade The fear of disparate gains for India is intrinsically linked to Indias overbearing economic size and is shared by the entire South Asian region. SAARC countries perceive themselves to be bound by a hub and spoke model, with India at the hub dictating intra-regional ties. India accounts for almost 76 percent of South Asian GNP, 64 percent of the export trade and 73.6 percent of the regions population.49 Given the sheer size of the Indian economy and its relatively advanced technological and industrial base, India undoubtedly stands to gain the most from intra-regional trade. Other South Asian countries, including Pakistan, fear their markets being ooded with Indian exports, and thus are wary of opening up to India. Existing literature on Pakistan and India points to a near-consensus on the fact that Indias export potential to Pakistan is much higher than the other way round. The current trade trend between Pakistan and India bears out this concern. Despite absence of an MFN status, Indias exports to Pakistan have grown as a percentage of its global exports, but its imports have remained low in comparison. Even the improvement in Indo-Pak ties over the past two years has

18

Using trade as a driver of political stability

assisted the Indian case disproportionately. Pakistans trade decit has grown from a mere USD 95.91 million in 2002-03 to USD 341.60 million in 2005-06.50 Our statistical exercise in the previous sections also pointed to a higher Indian export potential under a completely liberalized trade scenario. Another good proxy of Indias overwhelming advantage is the trend in informal trade. This is an important proxy since informal trade is conducted in items that are otherwise banned or too costly to trade, but have a potential market on the other side. As already mentioned, Pakistans current role in informal trade is miniscule compared to that of India.
Figure 1: Pakistans balance of trade with India Pakistan's balance of trade with India
50 0

USD millio

-50 1996-97 -100 -150 -200 -250 -300 -350 -400

1998-99

2000-01

2002-03

2004-05

Year

In addition to the above, there is a need to account for the fact that Pakistans exports are likely to remain much lower than its theoretical potential in the initial years. This is so because Pakistans manufacturing industry is set up to cater for small-to-medium sized markets, and in most sectors is functioning near full capacity. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, Pakistan would not be able to utilize its advantage even in products in which it has a competitive edge. To the contrary, Indian exports to Pakistan could begin almost instantly, given the much larger production potential and ever growing capacity that allows India to adjust to new markets quickly.51 This implies a huge short-term impact on some of Pakistans less competitive industries. The impact would lead to closures/buy outs of inefcient (mostly small) units, with direct impact on employment, and in turn poverty. Notwithstanding vested interests, this is the ultimate fear of those opposing trade with India. Granted, the scenario could improve from Pakistans perspective if the country invests in key sectors for trade with India. However, this would require a

19

Criterion

virtual transformation in the production structures across various sectors, which is no mean feat to achieve in a scenario where government incentives are curtailed to a minimum due to resource constraints and where a rules based global trading regime seeks to limit government support. Moreover, reorienting production structures and sectoral priorities to complement the other side would also imply that a number of input industries would be rendered uncompetitive. This could lead to a loss of integration in the domestic value chain which has been painstakingly achieved by both sides over the years. To expect either side to compromise to this extent simply in the hope of a successful outcome a la the economic theory of interdependence is unrealistic. In any case, even if the momentum generated by the impetus to enhance trade nudges Pakistan to contemplate a move in such a direction, the contention of disparate gains and negative future projection in the interim period will act as a barrier. Another point is relevant here. The entire discussion thus far about trade potential between Pakistan and India in essence reects bilateral gains through trade diversion. No trade creation is envisioned in the short run. Even over the long term, the potential for trade creation from Pakistans side is questionable given the lack of surplus production capacity. With regard to trade diversion, prospects remain bleak in a scenario that is clearly fraught with mutual distrust and where past experiences point to unreliability of the adversary in terms of fullling trade obligations. Arguably, switching from current customers to trade with India (even if it entails slightly higher prots) is a high risk proposition in the current environment. The argument is substantiated by Pakistans bitter experiences with over-reliance on India in the past. Pakistan recalls the Indian move to cancel coal shipments during the 1965 Indo Pakistani war, a time when Pakistan was heavily dependant on India for its coal imports. Similarly, the potential for disruption of exports such as cotton in 1999 following the hijacking of an Indian airlines passenger jet (accusations of contaminated cotton from India prevented Pakistani cotton exports) also worry Pakistanis. The fear is also manifested on the Indian side. Indo-Pak discussions on the IPI gas pipeline are constrained by fears of Pakistan turning off the taps. Assurances from Pakistan that the pipeline will be isolated from bilateral tensions have been ignored.52 Even with the inclusion of stakeholders such as the World Bank, the Indian position has remained virtually unchanged. Business communities on both sides do reect the mutual mistrust. In Pakistan, the business community remains divided on whether Pakistan should open up trade ties with India. Personal discussions on the subject with inuential stakeholders suggest that they seem keen on establishing trade links only in areas that would benet them but remain extremely wary of allowing across-the-board

20

Using trade as a driver of political stability

trade.53 For example, an overwhelming majority supports allowing imports of raw materials from India but opposes trade in nished goods. Trade specialists realize that such a scenario is difcult to materialize if the MFN status is implemented in letter and spirit. Interestingly, most businessmen with prior experience of direct dealing with Indian counterparts reect a much higher level of suspicion.54 During our interviews, we were told of Indian authorities discriminating against Pakistani consignments. Indian customs authorities apparently delay Pakistani consignments as a means of neutralizing the formal MFN status India has granted to Pakistan.55 5.3 Extra-regionalism The prospects of Indo-Pak trade are also dampened somewhat by a concerted drive from both sides to look towards extra-regional states as principal partners. In part, this has been induced by lack of meaningful intra-regional trade. The attention of Indian policy advisors has been conveniently turned to more lucrative markets (the look East policy) abroad In fact, some Indian policy makers have promoted the argument that the structural similarities between India and Pakistan do not allow for signicant amounts of trade. Rather, India would be better off by opening up trade with East and South East Asia. It is thus not surprising to note that Indias major trading partners are ASEAN + 3 (China, Japan and Korea) accounting for 19.9% of merchandise trade, and EU and North America with 19% and 12.9% share respectively.56 India is also a member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperative Organization, Bangkok Agreement, KUNMING Initiative, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperative, and East Asia Summit, and enjoys a healthy relationship with the Association of South East Asian Nations. Pakistan, while having been less successful in its look West policy in terms of approaching Middle Eastern and Central Asian Republics, still maintains bulk of its trade ties with the North. Its major partners are the EU and the US, accounting for nearly half of its exports.57 The extra-regional focus implies lack of any serious compulsions on the part of either India or Pakistan to pursue bilateral trade with vigor. The intra-regional trading arrangements also present an interesting picture. Despite its primary focus on extra-regional sources, India has carefully crafted sub-regional alliances with South Asian states. Consequently, trade related subregional arrangements are peculiar in that Pakistan is left out from almost all of them. The Sub- Regional Cooperation in the East South Asia Sub region (ESAS), South Asia Sub Region for Economic Cooperative (SASEC), and South Asia Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) all involve India, but not Pakistan. In essence, subregional groups threaten to ostracize Pakistan further. Under such a scenario, Pakistans hopes of continuing to play a major role in South Asian economic

21

Criterion

affairs lie in the recently implemented South Asian Free Trade Agreement for the most part. Again, there are doubts on SAFTAs ability to provide comparable gains. The India dominance syndrome is very much apparent and is forcing all other regional countries to negotiate hard on the composition of the sensitive lists that would allow protection of commodities included in the list.58 Pessimists also raise concern about SAFTAs impact on trade complementarities between member states. The contention is that trade complementarities would be further reduced given that SAARC countries are pursuing extra-regional exports and inviting FDI from Trans-national Corporations (TNCs). The export oriented industries while generating additional complementarities with the rest of the world are in fact causing additional competition within SAARC member states.59 Others, while acknowledging the potential for SAFTA to have a positive impact within the region still hold that SAARC countries would benet more from unilateral trade liberalization rather than functioning within an RTA, which gives preferential treatment to RTA members.60 Moreover, the argument about South Asian states competing for foreign investment to the region also partially questions the optimism surrounding intra-regional investment potential. Again, the only country that may be able to venture in cross-border investment in South Asia is India. The concerns about disparate gains, and in the case of sub-regional groupings, of Indias designs to isolate Pakistan again make international relations theorists on economic interdependence relevant. 6. Exploring the trade-conict linkage61

Thus far we have established that while theoretically the potential for robust trade ties exists, there are serious challenges to attaining tangible positive change both in terms of increasing trade volumes as well as fostering integration of economic structures. However, the chicken-and-egg problem we started with still remains. Is it trade that will help in ameliorating political tensions, or do tensions need to be resolved through other means before trade can take-off. In this section, we try to establish the linkage between trade and political tensions within the IndoPak context. We conduct a qualitative analysis along a time-line to decipher our answer by establishing the timing of various efforts at political rapprochement versus that of trade agreements. While the most obvious way to test the relationship between political events and trade ties would be to document major bilateral political developments and trade volumes in the corresponding periods, there is an inherent problem to this approach. The foremost concern is that while political tensions can be tracked in real-time, trade volumes often reect lagged impacts of moves made in the past. In a scenario as volatile as the Indo-Pakistan bilateral relationship,

22

Using trade as a driver of political stability

pinpointing the correlation between two specic events would be virtually impossible. In order to make the analysis more meaningful then, we track political relations at a point in time against formal moves towards enhancing economic ties. The latter are signied by trade agreements. These would provide a better proxy to reect the mindset of the two countries at a particular point in time. Below, we mention the major agreements (also including those relevant to trade facilitation) and highlight the political context in which they were concluded, as well as the political events that followed. Indeed, an analysis along a timeline establishes a strong relationship between political rapprochement, positive trade related movements, and tensions that stymie any potential impact of developments on the trade front. The trend has been for political conciliation to lead to positive movements on trade, but for recurring political tensions to stall the possibility of any potential economic benets from such movements. Inevitably, the two countries have landed back where they started from each time. 1.1 Documenting the events Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation of income between the Government of the Dominion of India and Pakistan (December 1947). As already mentioned in section 3.2, Pakistan and India were major trading partners at the time of independence in 1947. The agreement to avoid double taxation was signed in that spirit. However, just months after independence, the two countries found themselves embroiled in an active conict over the disputed territory of Kashmir. The conict left no doubt that the two sides were unlikely to be able to reconcile differences over the short-run. Political tensions manifested themselves in the trade ambit, when in 1949, using Indias devaluation of its currency and Pakistans refusal to do so as the basis, trade ties were severely curtailed. Indo-Pakistan Trade agreement (January 1957) The 1957 agreement was the rst in a decade. The agreement was made possible by the absence of active conict after the cease-re in Kashmir was reached in 1949. In between, good will agreements seeking to safeguard places of worship (Pant-Mirza Agreement to prevent border incidents and protect places of worship) and prevent mass exodus of minorities induced a thaw in tensions. Moreover, while the Kashmir dispute remained unresolved, Pakistan and India had managed to nd an uneasy truce after a decade of co-existence. However the mutual distrust still remained deeply entrenched. Therefore, while a trade

23

Criterion

agreement was concluded, it was limited in scope and only valid for a period of three years, reecting a cautious, test-and-see approach on both sides. Agreement with Pakistan on trade (March 1960) In 1958, a military coup in Pakistan brought the Chief of the Army to power. The overt absence of democracy, which in any case had been fragile in Pakistan ever since independence, did not allow the distrust to disappear. In fact, Pakistan strengthened its hard-core realist view of the Indian State, which automatically kept the two sides from negotiating on Kashmir in a spirit of compromise. Despite this however, there was no overt change in the ofcial India policy from Pakistan. Consequently, the 1957 agreement was extended, but only for another three years. Trade Agreement with Pakistan (September 1963) The status quo remained between 1957-60. The trade agreement was again extended for three years, albeit for the last time. Developments after the event clearly point to the linkage between political tensions and trade. The military regimes realist view and utter frustration with lack of tangible progress on Kashmir, for which Pakistan by and large continued to muster international support, Pakistan sought to force the issue militarily. In 1965, Pakistan and India were embroiled in a military conict courtesy of Pakistans intervention in Indian occupied Kashmir and New Delhis exaggerated response on the international border. The result was a virtual stalling of trade ties and the de facto expiry of the 1963 agreement. Agreement on Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan signed at Simla (July 1972) Relations between Pakistan and India reached their nadir after the 1971 IndoPak war and the dismemberment of East Pakistan. All trade relations, the little that continued after the 1965 debacle, were instantly halted. However, left with little choice but to accept the nal outcome as permanent, Pakistan and India signed the 1972 Simla Agreement. The Agreement was holistic in nature and stressed the need to reinitiate trade ties.62 However, political relations remained cold. Protocol on the resumption of trade between India and Pakistan (November 1974); Protocol on Resumption of Shipping Services between India and Pakistan (January 1975); Trade Agreement with Pakistan (January 1975). Within two years however, the impetus gained from the Simla Agreement led both sides to reach out in various areas. That Pakistan and India ofcially signed a new trade protocol in 1974 and signed a shipping protocol and a fresh trade agreement a year later is thus no coincidence. Both sides agreed to reinitiate trade ties, and by virtue of these protocols actually managed on-ground progress in

24

Using trade as a driver of political stability

commercial exchanges. Interestingly, political tensions remained, but were pushed to the backburner. This situation was not affected even by a fresh military coup in Pakistan in 1977. Creation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) (1985) Once the immediate fallout of the 1971 debacle had withered away and trade ties were restored, Pakistan took a more realistic stance on Kashmir, even signing an accord on Kashmir (which did not amount to much) in 1975. Absence of active conict, Pakistans outright focus on Afghanistan at the time, and the potential losses of staying out of a South Asian regional forum led to both agreeing to be included in SAARC, which was created in 1985. Some commentators have also argued that both sides saw SAARC as an opportunity to gain regional prominence at the expense of the other, and thus agreed to the idea as a move in their respective countrys strategic interests. While SAARC came into existence, the progress in integrating regional states was minimal. Pakistan lacked democracy as well as a consensus on the countrys approach towards India. The two sides found themselves in the midst of a crisis in 1987, which all but stalled relations again. However, towards the end of the military rule in 1987, and especially with the return of democracy to Pakistan in 1988, efforts towards a composite relationship were reinitiated. Agreement between India and Pakistan for the Avoidance of double taxation of income derived from International Air Transport (December 1988) This trade facilitation move was a result of the attempts by the respective leaders of Pakistan and India at the time, Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Ghandi to attempt rapprochement. As mentioned, their effort was in part prompted by a severe crisis- the Brasstacks- in 1987 which brought the two sides to the brink of war as well as the fact that democracy had returned to Pakistan after 11 years. The Lahore Declaration (February 1999) It is striking to note that during the 1990s, when Indo-Pak relations remained tense on various counts, not a single trade agreement was signed. Rather interestingly, this is despite the fact that elected governments remained in power throughout the 1990s, albeit with frequent military interventions behind the scenes and almost persistent political turmoil. The Lahore Declaration signed in 1999 was largely a result of an attempt to remove political differences and suggested that cooperation in all spheres would be achieved. For the rst time in a decade, the region was euphoric about the possibility of openness in relations. However, the

25

Criterion

effort was stymied even before it got off the ground by the 1999 crisis in Indian occupied Kashmir and the resultant mini-war between Pakistan and India. Another crisis followed two years later once the Pakistani military took over the reigns of the country yet again. The Pakistan-India Composite Dialogue Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayees Hand of Friendship speech in April 2003 led to the initiation of a fresh peace bid, the effort in 1999 having been stalled by two major crises in 1999 and 2001-02.63 Trade ties form an important pillar of the current Composite Dialogue that grew out of Vajpayees invitation for reconciliation. The Dialogue has for the rst time taken a parallel approach to discussing all issues of mutual interest. Pakistan has nally agreed to move away from its Kashmir rst stance and discuss issues such as commercial ties concurrently. As part of the Dialogue, Pakistan and India are now regularly exchanging Commissions and holding meetings on various aspects of trade and trade facilitation. Some of the important exchanges are listed below: Meeting of Foreign Ministers of both countries at the ASEAN Regional forum where Pakistan is formally accepted as a member of the ARF after India drops its objections (June-July 2004). Meeting of commerce secretaries in Islamabad to discuss economic and commercial cooperation (August 2004). Pakistan accepted 25 tons of food, medicine, tents, blankets, plastic sheets from India after the earthquake (October-November 2005) Pakistan-India resumed train service at Khokhrapar-Monabao after 40 years (February 2006) Agreement to revive trade in Kashmir (May 2006) This agreement signies the efforts taking place on both sides specically to redress the plight in Kashmir. Subsequent to this agreement the two sides agreed to trade raw products between divided regions of Jammu and Kashmir. No manufactured items have thus far been allowed.64 Both countries agreed to sign a Revised Shipping Protocol (October 2006) South Asia Free Trade Agreement Signed (SAFTA) (January 2004) One spin-off of the composite dialogue was that SAFTA was nalized signed in January 2004. The agreement which had been agreed in principal a decade ago and was supposed to be implemented by 2001, continued to be delayed in the wake of Indo-Pak tensions.65 The thaw in relations nally gave an opportunity to the regional members to ink the deal. The timing of SAFTA in relation to the state of Indo-Pak relations also underscores the geo-political weight the two countries

26

Using trade as a driver of political stability

carry in the region. The above discussion presents a clear trend in the linkage between political and trade related events between the two sides. Without exception, each trade agreement between Pakistan and India can be traced back to positive movements on the political front. In fact, even the scope of trade agreements in part has been a result of the kind of political atmosphere that existed at the time. This was clear from the narrow scope and periodic short-term extensions of the 1957 trade agreement. By the same token, the Indo-Pak history shows that political tensions emanating at a time when a trade arrangement was operational invariably ended up directly impacting trade ties, in some cases stalling commercial exchanges completely. Such a cyclical relationship has continued unabated. Clearly, the direction of the linkage ows from conict-to-trade, quite the opposite of what is required for the economic theory of interdependence to function. 7. Searching for hope

Our analysis presents a bleak picture with regard to the potential of enhanced trade ties to ameliorate Indo-Pak political tensions. First, trade growth is impeded by substantial barriers, some of which may lead to a bilateral trade regime which by its very nature undermines the potential for any positive spin-offs (due to disparate gains and negative future projections on Pakistans part). Second, the direction of the trade-conict linkage ows from conict to trade, implying that easing of political tensions would have to precede meaningful trade. In other words, it is trade that has been held hostage to conict over the years rather than the other way round. As is being widely portrayed, the future of the Indo-Pak relationship to a large extent depends on the outcome of the ongoing composite peace dialogue. Indeed, this is the rst time both sides have allowed all contentious issues to be discussed simultaneously with a seeming resolve to make progress irreversible. Trade optimists draw hope from the fact that the two countries, de facto, have ended up employing the liberal theory of economic interdependence. In other words, the perception is that trade is being accorded a chance to play a role in overall rapprochement. Such optimism is misplaced not only because of the reverse direction of the trade-conict linkage, but also because the Dialogue framework contains within it a serious structural anomaly, one that calls for parallel movement on political and trade issues but without removing the linkages between the two. The fact remains that while Pakistan has agreed to experiment with a parallel approach, it has been categorical in maintaining that the progress on Kashmir must be comparable to that in other spheres.66 Pakistans insistence on linking trade with other outstanding issues distorts the trade theory model, a formulation which

27

Criterion

is inherently sequential in nature as it requires a reasonable level of economic facilitation to have taken place before any impact on conict-ridden issues could be realized. Moreover, while trade volumes are being raised, structural impediments and institutional barriers to trade are not being addressed. In that sense, the gains have deliberately been kept narrow. Furthermore, the political front is completely stagnant. Increasingly then, one is beginning to witness tensions resurface. Certainly, if progress is not made on political issues, which in all likelihood seems to be the case, progress on trade might also be reversed.67 This ows directly out of our nding that political tensions historically have impacted movements on the trade front negatively. For the Indo-Pak equation to have any chance of improving in tangible terms, the formulation of the composite dialogue framework must be reoriented. What is required is a bottom-up trust building exercise that would gradually build a mass momentum in support of bilateral normalization. It is only then that vested interests would be undermined and tangible progress could be expected on all counts. Key in this regard is the presence of an enabling environment. Specically, this includes unlimited interaction between the two peoples, an atmosphere of trust between them which would ow from such interaction and predictability in relations over the long run. Interestingly, the Indo-Pak peace process began on the right footing. There were substantial overtures from both sides to enhance people-to-people contact. The idea was to build a constituency for peace to create trust and give condence to the masses of the permanence of the relationship. In retrospect, however, while interaction may have increased, the focus has skewed. The emphasis has remained limited to holding concerts, fashion shows, cricket, and other sporting events. No doubt, these are positive developments. However, they only allow a select number of people to interact, for the most part the elite, and that too with numerous restrictions. Their impact on creating a mass constituency for peace is marginal. Given the lack of interaction at present, there is no question of any trust developing between the two sides. The current state also implies lack of predictability, which makes any long-term relationship nearly impossible. This is especially true for trade ties, as business communities almost inevitably tend to shy away from unpredictable environments.68 The upshot is that genuine compulsions to improve ties exist on both sides. Therefore, were a reorientation of priorities to take place within the Dialogue framework, a number of exogenous and endogenous factors may well nudge the two sides towards a historic breakthrough. Economically, both sides share need for natural resources. Both Pakistan and India remain heavily decient in energy and an even greater shortfall is predicted for both sides in years to come. While

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Using trade as a driver of political stability

projects such as the IPI have hit roadblocks, in an environment that has managed to foster a reasonable level of trust, such projects could well become the drivers of structural integration between the two sides. The benets of cooperating within the larger energy sector are also tremendous. Similar is the case of water resources and the need for both sides to nd amicable arrangement to continue sharing water channels. Politically, from Indias point of view, moving forward on Kashmir will build condence of its neighbors. There is also increasing realization in India that its quest for global status is unlikely to be realized if its conict with Pakistan continues unabated. The excessive defense expenditure, the reluctance of the international community to offer India a permanent Security Council seat without prior resolution of disputes with Pakistan, and other similar factors act as visible impediments to its ability to move from a regional to a global status. Domestically, there are heavy pressures on Indias political leadership to sustain economic growth, which if anything is held back due to resources being diverted to sustain the conict with Pakistan. Pakistans motives have been analyzed as being indicative of a need for respite having endured years of conict and deterioration in its own security environment. Pakistani literature on development is increasingly being couched in the guns versus butter argument, with the development enclave increasingly imposing its views on policy makers. While it has not changed the stance of the military elite, one is beginning to see tremendous importance being accorded to economic growth and development sector needs. Moreover, past policies of cross-border subversion have become excessively risky in the post-9/11 geo-strategic scenario confronting South Asia. A return to the past is unrealistic for Islamabad to contemplate. From the perspective of Indo-Pak relations, this implies absence of the traditional sticking point of cross border subversion, and thus improved chances of peace. The role of the external actors is also important. In the aftermath of 9/11, India and Pakistan have shifted the focus of their foreign and defense policies from self-serving, unilaterally motivated stances to supportive and cooperative efforts for the global ght against terrorism. This policy shift has been largely due to the necessity of political cooperation and assistance, but also due to the large amounts of economic aid that are being invested in countries that are key participants in the new security order. By virtue of its objectives, the war on terrorism will continue to require increased transparency, trust, and collaboration, particularly in Afghanistans neighborhood. In an area with such a history of prolonged conict and turmoil, it will be fundamental for India and Pakistan to advance their relationship beyond the stalemate over Kashmir and the terrorism that has proliferated within their borders. This complements the objectives of the

29

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international community, which is desperate to see the two nuclear armed rivals move away from conict.

REFERENCES
1 This paper draws heavily upon two research undertakings that the author has co-authored previously. These are (i) Shaheen Ra Khan, Faisal Haq Shaheen, Moeed Yusuf, and Azka Tanveer, Regional Integration, Trade and Conict in South Asia, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), August 2007; (ii) Shaheen Ra Khan, Faisal Haq Shaheen, and Moeed Yusuf, Managing Conict Through Trade: The Case of Pakistan and India, Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), February 2007. Arguments extracted from these papers have been explicitly attributed throughout the text. However, since the author has co-authored these papers, individual citations in the present undertaking have been attributed to their original sources. The author originally contributed a modied version of this section to Khan et al., Regional Integration, Trade and Conict, 2007. For a succinct discussion of the theoretical premise, see Peter Robson, The Economics of International Integration (London: Routeledge, 1998). Also see, S. Akbar Zaidi, Issues in Pakistans Economy (Karachi: Oxford University Press,2004). The liberal approach is substantiated by developments in Europe and Latin America for example. Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1996. John C. Matthews III, Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Commutative Relative Gains Matter, International Security, Vol. 21, No 1, 1996. Filippo Andreatta, Pier Giorgio Ardeni, and Arrigo Pallotti, Swords and Plowshares: Regional Trade Agreements and Political Conict in Africa, paper presented at a workshop on New Forms of Integration in Emerging Africa, Geneva, October 13, 2000. The author originally contributed some of the arguments in this section to Khan et al., Managing Conict through Trade, 2007. Devin Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998), pp.67; 69-70. Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), pp.221-234. For a brief overview to the crises, see Moeed Yusuf, Stabilization of the Nuclear Regime in South Asia, South Asia Journal, Vol. 7, January-March, 2005. Stephen P. Cohen, The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2003, vol. 26 no. 3, 2003. R.J. Kozicki, The Changed World of South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India after September 11, Asia Pacic Perspectives, Volume 2, No. 2, May 2002, University of San Francisco Center for the Pacic Rim; S. Bhatt, Chronicle of Terrorism Now Told, Rediff Special, Rediff Online, 8 October, 2002. Pakistan has direct relevance to the communal problem in India, given that protection for minorities was a formal part of the spirit of partition. Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan signed the famous Nehru-Liaqat Pact in 1950 which obligated protection of minorities in both countries.

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Shereen Mazari, Subversion and its Linkage to Low Intensity Conicts, Ethnic Movements and Violence, Defense Journal, Vol. 3 No. 4, April 1999. The latest proof is the death sentence upheld by the Supreme Court of Pakistan against a RAW agent for having engineered bombings in various Pakistan cities in 1990. The defendant pled guilty. See Pak SC Upholds Death to RAW Agent, Hindustan Times, August 19, 2005. <http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/7598_1466178>. Proofs of RAWs Involvement in Balochistans Mayhem Delivered to India, Pak Tribune, June 1, 2006. <http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=145447>. Ahmed Saleem and Zaffarullah Khan, Messing Up the Past: Evolution of History Textbooks in Pakistan, 1947-2000, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, 2004. For a discussion of the Pakistan militarys role in playing up the Indian threat, see P.R. Chari and Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Defense Expenditure in South Asia: India and Pakistan, RCSS Policy Studies 12, Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Colombo 2000. During the Cold War for example, Pakistan and India were members of opposite camps, with Pakistan choosing to become a Western ally and India, while keeping an ofcial non-aligned stance tilting towards the Soviet block. Pakistan signed a Defense Pact with the US in 1954. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was concluded in 1971. Ijaz Nabi and A. Nasim, Trading with the Enemy: A Case for Liberalizing Pakistan-India Trade in S. Lahiri (ed), Regionalism and Globalization: Theory and Practice. (London: Routledge, 2001). Trade Development Authority of Pakistan. < http://www.epb.gov.pk/v1/index.php>; Directorate General of Foreign Trade, India. < http://dgft.delhi.nic.in/>. The gure for Pakistani exports for this year stands out as an anomaly and may well be result of misreported data. Shaheen Ra Khan, Moeed Yusuf, Shahbaz Bokhari, and Shoaib Aziz, Quantifying Informal Trade Between Pakistan and India, The World Bank, 2007. A number of optimistic projections of the quantitative potential of Indo-Pak trade relied heavily on the belief that informal trade was worth a few billion USD. Khan et al., Quantifying Informal Trade, 2005. SAARC Teachers Exempted from Tax, The News International (online version). <http://www. jang.com.pk/thenews/> (accessed on May 5, 2007). The author originally contributed a modied version of the initial discussion in this section to Khan et al., Regional Integration, Trade and Conict, 2007. A statistical exercise similar to the one presented here was conducted by the author for Khan et al., Managing Conict through Trade, 2007. U. Wickramasinghe, How can South Asia turn the new emphasis on IT provisions to their advantage?, South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and Environment (SAWTEE), 2001; Shahid J. Burki, Prospects of Peace, Stability and Prosperity in South Asia: An Economic Perspective, 2004. N. Mukherjee, Regional Trade, Investment and Economic Cooperation among South Asian Countries, Paper presented at the International Conference on South Asia as a Dynamic Partner: Prospects for the Future, New Delhi, May 25-27, 1992. Jeffrey A. Frankel and Shang-Jin Wei, The New Regionalism in Asia: Impact and Options in The Global Trading System and Developing Asia (Asian Development Bank, Oxford University Press, 1997). Burki, Prospects, 2004. Quoted in Bandara, Jayatilleke S. and Wusheng Yu Jayatilleke S. Bandara and Wusheng Yu, How Desirable is the South Asian Free Trade Area: A Quantitative Assessment, Global Trade Analysis Project, May 30, 2001.

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34

See Analyzing and Quantifying Potential Economic Costs and Benets of Pak-India trade: A Case Study of the Chemical Industry, presented to the World Bank, Islamabad, July 11, 2005; Sugar Sector of Pakistan and India: A Brief Overview, presented to the World Bank, Islamabad, July 11, 2005. 35 Gary Pursell, Pakistan-India Trade: Impact on textiles and Clothing Sector, presented to the World Bank, Islamabad, July 11, 2005. 36 It is to be noted that there exist severe data inconsistencies across sources from India and Pakistan and even within the two countries. The level of disaggregation of data also varies and while we have attempted to consider disaggregated data at the commodity level, in some cases such extensive data was not available and thus had to be implicitly determined using statistics at higher level of aggregation. 37 This gure is higher than the formal trade gures reported in table 2 due to data discrepancies among various sources. 38 Ibid. 39 We do not use a benchmark of Indian exports and imports given that Indias much larger trade volume would have presented a gure much higher than Pakistans total trade potential. 40 Some of the arguments in this section were originally contributed by the author to Khan et al., Regional Integration, Trade and Conict, 2007 and Khan et al., Managing Conict through Trade, 2007. 41 The World Bank, Trade Policies in South Asia: An Overview, Volume II, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, South Asia Region, September 7, 2004. 42 Pakistan-India CEOs Business Forum, Barriers to Trade in India, presented to the World Bank, Islamabad, July 11, 2005. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Amiti Sen, Pakistan refuses to give MFN status to India even after Safta ratication, Financial Express, March 28, 2006. 46 Examples of transaction costs include port clearance time for cargo, extent of cargo movement required in the port, sanitary standards, bribes, documentary requirements for trade transactions and the amount of time spent, on average, in fullling these requirements, other procedural delays such as absence of staff, excessive department clearances (signatures), limited vehicle access, inefcient rail links, and transport through third ports (quoted from Khan et al., Managing Conict Through Trade, 2007). 47 Khan et al., Quantifying Informal Trade, 2005. 48 The author originally made this argument in Moeed Yusuf, Pakistan-India Trade: Short-term Vs Long-term Impact, March 25-31, 2005. 49 Saman Udagedera, SAPTA Negotiations: Constraints and Challenges in Saman Kelegama (ed), Impediments to Regional Economic Cooperation in South Asia (Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka and Coalition for Action on South Asian Cooperation, December 2001). 50 See gure 1. 51 The author originally made this argument in Yusuf, Pakistan-India Trade, 2005. 52 See T. Siddiqi, An India-Pakistan Dtente: What It Could Mean for Sustainable Development in South Asia and Beyond, Analysis No. 75, East-West Center, August 2004. India has been ambivalent of its commitment to the pipeline project. Regardless, the mistrust vis-vis Pakistan has been obvious in its proposal that the section of the pipeline passing through Pakistan have no control taps to remove any possibility of Pakistan sabotaging gas supply to India. New Delhi has also asked Iran for guarantees of supply of Liqueed Natural Gas (LNG) if Pakistan ever disrupts gas supplies to India, a demand Iran has agreed to in principal. 53 These sentiments were recorded during interviews with the Pakistani business community

32

Using trade as a driver of political stability

54 55 56 57 58

59 60 61 62 63

64 65

66 67 68

in connection with research for a SDPI project on informal trade [Khan et al., Quantifying Informal Trade, 2005]. Ibid. Ibid. Directorate General of Foreign Trade, India. < http://dgft.delhi.nic.in/>. See export statistics released by the Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan and the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan. The issue of sensitive lists was by far the most contentious and led to considerable delays in SAFTA taking off the ground. There is still a great deal of speculation about the future of sensitive lists, as they are to be shortened in phases. Bandara and Yu, How Desirable, 2001. Ibid. This section has been extracted from Khan et al., Managing Conict through Trade, 2007, for which the author had originally conducted this analysis. For a text of the Simla Agreement, visit <http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/documents/simla. html>. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee made his now-famous Hand of Friendship Speech on April 18, 2003 during his ofcial visit to Sri Nagar. This was the rst ofcial statement that hinted towards Indias desire for reconciliation amidst the military stand-off at the time. Mubarak Zeb Khan, Pakistan and India to Allow Trading of Raw Products Only, Dawn, May 31, 2006. SAFTAs nalization faced persistent delays since the 1990s. Originally all countries had agreed to nalize it by 2001. For a discussion, see Dilip K. Das, Integration of South Asian Economies: An Exercise in Frustration?, Asian-Pacic Economic Literature, 21 (1), 2007. Pakistan has repeatedly communicated this stance publicly through ofcial statements. The author originally made this argument in Moeed Yusuf, Analyzing the Peace Process, The Friday Times, September 30-October 6, 2005. Ibid.

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PAKISTAN: ON OR OFF? EXAMINING THE FUTURE OF U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS IN THE WAR ON TERROR AND BEYOND (Farhana Ali)*

Abstract (Pakistans alliance with the United States was cemented six years ago to ght the global war on terrorism. The fatal attacks in Washington in September 2001 forced Islamabad to yield to U.S. demands to sever its historic ties with the Taliban, root out indigenous religious extremists, and choke al-Qaedas lifeline in the region. Determining Islamabads success in mitigating the terror threat necessitates a deeper look at the tools Pakistan uses to measure its credibility as a reliable and trustworthy ally on the war on terror. To this end, this paper examines the current challenges and obstacles to sustaining a U.S.-Pakistan strategic relationship for years to come. While a strong ally today, the future of Pakistan is less predictable and precarious. Therefore, keeping the alliance rm will depend on several key factors, including Pakistans domestic stability, and Washingtons ability to move beyond the war on terror to strengthen its ties with a frontline ally. - Author) Introduction Over the past two years, the rate of suicide bombings in Pakistan has increased. From January to March 2007, sixty-seven percent of fatal civilians casualties have been due to suicide bombings compared to forty-one percent in 2006, and more than a dozen Pakistani security forces have died.1 The number of injured persons is much higher, though an unintended consequence. In neighboring Afghanistan, the death toll is much higher. In 2006, alone, suicide attacks [had] quintupled. Killing more than 200 Afghan civilians, 115 attacks occurred that year and more civilian deaths in 2007 is likely to fuel greater resentment of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. That resentment is also felt in Pakistan, where the authors interviews in 2005, 2006, and 2007 reveal a growing disenchantment with U.S. foreign policies in the Muslim world, including the war in Afghanistan. Islamabads trust decit with Washington exists for several reasons, one of which is attributed to the two countries historical on and off relationship. One reason for the lack of trust is a knowledge decit, according to one Pakistani Senator, which has over time weakened Americas political position in South Asia.2 To put
* Farhana Ali is a scholar and author of several internationally published research papers.

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Pakistan: On or Off?

it bluntly, the U.S. and Pakistan strategic partnership is a client-patron relationship that has been convenient, expedient, and focused on a single issue: the global war on terrorism. A senior Pakistani ofcial indicates that Pakistan is concerned that U.S. engagement is a one time contract rather than a long-term commitment. Mounting international pressure on Pakistan to eliminate the presence of alQaeda, the Taliban, and local jihadi groups in the country that threaten American and Pakistani interests continue to exacerbate tensions between the two allies. The existence of indigenous religious extremists and an al-Qaeda presencearguably stronger than beforeraises additional concerns of Pakistans ability to curtail terrorism. The combined threat to Pakistan by al-Qaeda remnants, sectarian groups, and religious extremists pose signicant challenges and risks. The publication of a myriad of violent jihadi and right-wing news and magazines and their circulation to hundreds, if not thousands, of supporters and sympathizers in the northern areas and urban centers such as Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad conrm the importance of extremists rhetoric, allure, and ongoing activism.3 The strength of the militants lies in their ability to propagate their message, maintain a steady level of recruitment, and position themselves as anti-state so long as Pakistan is perceived as backing the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan.

Ironically, Pakistans alliance with the U.S. during the Afghan jihad and shortly after 9/11 has been forged in reaction to a larger terrorist/ violent threat. To counter terrorism and sectarianism inside Pakistan, the military junta has taken signicant steps to stem the tide of terror by launching a country-wide crackdown against some religious extremists and their networksan effort that has won favor with the U.S. The authors interviews of numerous Pakistani ofcials agree that Islamabad has made great stridesread sacriceto prove to U.S. policymakers that Pakistan is a committed partner. An inescapable conclusion told to the author from Americans and Pakistanis is that no other country has provided more intelligence support, committed more troops, and captured more al-Qaeda operatives than Pakistan.4 Even Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf is quick to remind his country and the international community we [Pakistan] have broken the back of al-Qaeda in Pakistan.5 Islamabad is also proud of its 80,000 troops deployed to the tribal belt, another sign that Pakistan is taking seriously the terror threat seriously.
Apart from its positive and important contributions to the war on terrorism, Pakistan faces many setbacks and enduring obstacles. The spread of insurgency, widespread lawlessness in its frontier province, a low level intelligence proxy war with India, and the potential growth of al-Qaeda supporters in the urban and rural centers of the country represent major threats to Pakistans security. According to

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the Pakistani leader, the problem and solution to al-Qaeda and the Taliban lies with Kabul.6 He noted, The war has to be won on the Afghan side.7 Other factors such as Indias meddling in Kabuls affairs, Iranian support to Baluchi insurgents, and the Kashmir conundrum deepen Islamabads apprehensions about how best to secure peace with neighboring states, who have in part contributed to Pakistans growing terrorist and sectarian threat. That external actors have played a role in strengthening Pakistans Islamist radicals complicates Islamabads efforts to improve bilateral cooperation with its neighbors. This paper will examine Pakistans perceptions of U.S. intentions in the region and the dangers ahead for Pakistan as it continues to mitigate both internal and external threats. To help counter these threats, this study concludes with policy recommendations to improve misguided perceptions and help the two countries move beyond the war on terrorism to sustain a long-term partnership. Perceptions Matter In Pakistan, and across the Muslim world, the war on terrorism invokes suspicion, contradiction, and controversy. The lack of U.S. policy direction in Iraq has further exacerbated the perception, rightly or wrongly, that the war on terror serves American interests rst. High-ranking Pakistani ofcials indicate that the U.S. approach to terrorism is counter-productive. One politician suggested that the U.S. talk to its enemies, a strategy that would counter Americas no negotiation with terrorists. Secondly, recent visits to Pakistan by U.S. ofcials carry the message of do more, a phrase Pakistani ofcials, including a senior diplomat, say are unbalanced. In a discussion with the author, the ofcial asked, what is the limit? What more does the United States expect of Pakistan?8 To reverse the question, another politician asks, what can Pakistan expect of the United States? With no easy answers, these questions direct blame on either side for failing to understand the historical legacy of engagement and U.S. irtation with Pakistan to achieve the best results.9 How much more Pakistan can do given its internal security threats from extremism, obscurantism, and religious bigotry and external challenges from neighboring countries will depend on the governments standards and policies in the region.10 One former Pakistani Ambassador and retired General agree that instability is the core problem in Pakistan. The country needs a secure internal environment11 or Pakistan risks diminishing returns in its development projects and social sector reforms. Third, the authors interviews of numerous Pakistanis during several visits to the country in 2007 indicate a widening rift in the attitudes held towards Americans. The perception that U.S. expectations of Pakistans counter-terrorism

36

Pakistan: On or Off?

cooperation are unrealistic is based on Americas failure to understand the pyramid of jihadi groups. A high-ranking Pakistani ofcial, who is now nearing retirement, told the author that the United States needs to delink the threat of al-Qaeda from the Taliban. The two are not always related. That the threats Pakistan faces are multiple and complex means that Islamabad ought to consider multiple policies against violence.l But the policies the country will select leaves many questions unanswered. For example, how long will Pakistan remain cut off from the Taliban? Without the Taliban, can Pakistan stabilize Afghanistan? For the U.S., the enduring question is what role will Pakistan play in the war on terrorism, with or without Musharraf? Furthermore, an equally powerful perception by many Pakistanis is that the militarys alliance with the United States is terrorism-centric. A former Pakistan Ambassador and special envoy to Afghanistan indicated in his book on Afghanistan that a Bin-Laden-specic policy risked putting a dent in the U.S.-Pakistan partnership. In several meetings with Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, the Pakistani ofcial observed:
Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network thus became the one point agenda in Washingtons Afghanistan policy. The erroneous perception in the U.S. was that Pakistan wielded considerable influence on the Taliban and enormous pressure was exerted on Islamabad to convince the authorities in Kandahar to hand Bin Laden over to the Americans.13

The term terrorism and the enemies of terrorism continue to be the center of debate in the U.S. and Pakistan. Many Pakistanis disagree with the United States war on terrorism, a three - word phrase they say has nurtured a culture of suspicion of U.S. intentions and fostered the growth of anti-Americanism across the Muslim world against U.S. foreign policies in Pakistan and elsewhere.14 As one former Pakistani ofcial noted, the war on terror is not our war. Others shared the view that U.S. policies feed anti-Americanism and unresolved conicts in the Islamic world further the perception that the U.S. is following a destructivetrack policy.15 No simple denition for terrorism accepted by the different United States government agencies or among U.S.-based academics has stirred an open-ended debate over what constitutes terrorism and what tools, methods, and strategies are appropriate to counter the threat. Varied interpretations further complicate efforts of law enforcement, police and intelligence agencies to combat terror. This term is particularly controversial in the Muslim world, many of whom hold different criteria for terrorists. Thus, the age-old maxim, one mans terrorist is another mans freedom ghter, continues to resonate with Muslim populations. The catch all-term, terrorism, has increasingly become meaningless to Muslims who

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associate with it all evil doers.16 Therefore, waging a war on terrorism is controversial in Pakistan. According to the Chairman of a Karachi-based think tank, you can not wage a war on terrorism; such a war will have a limited application. Part of the problem is that terrorism as a concept and term is not universally accepted. Thus there is a distinction between good versus bad jihadi, or as Pakistani authorities now prefer to call the latter disgruntled jihadi element (dje). This includes al-Qaeda operatives and religious extremists who have attacked the Pakistani elite with violence and threats. Many of these extremist groups might be considered privileged Islamists because they are able to sustain their movements within a legitimate political space permitted by the current regime. While several militant groups have been declared illegaland are on the US Governments list of terrorist groupssome organizations are able, even encouraged, to campaign for political ofce, gain access to the media, and enjoy the governments hands-off policy. So long as militant groups do not strike at Pakistani or Western interests, they continue to thrive. Jamaat ud-Dawa,17 formerly the banned Lashkar e-Taiba, is a case in point. This and other groups extensive social services project, from housing to education, enable them to win the support of a largely illiterate society and disallow the government from taking punitive measures against them.18 That the Pakistani Government is unaware or unable to shut down the groups that enjoy privileged access to the print media is an unanswered question. It remains unclear if, and the extent to which, an alliance between some of these groups and the Pakistani military exists. Of the groups the government is pitted against, it would be a tall order to expect that Islamabad could eradicate all sectarian and militant groups without assistance from regional allies and outside support. Thus, mounting domestic pressure by political Islamists, including the neo-conservative oppositionists, could impede Pakistan from strengthening its ties to the United States. Afghan scholars Barnett Rubin and Abubakar Siddque maintain that Pakistans arrest of al-Qaeda leaders and a crackdown on the Taliban and local militants has led to tensions with the Islamist-military alliance.19 Tensions between the religious class and the military elite have many questioning whether Pakistan will embrace democracy. Senior Pakistani ofcials perceive their country to be on the democratic track; as one individual noted, Pakistan is the freest Muslim democracy in the world today, in part because of its free press (i.e., with over forty private television stations); an independent press able to criticize the government without fear of arrest; and political and public space afforded to diverse religious groups and sects. Remember, Pakistan is not Algeria, he noted, referring to the Algerian governments harsh crackdown on Islamists in the early 1990s to silence opposition and preclude the rise of an

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Islamic-style government, thereby weakening the militarys largess. Finally, mullahs or religious leaders of mosques interviewed across the country, from Karachi to Quetta, echo an outlandish perception that the worlds high-prole and most dangerous terrorist leader, Usama bin Laden, is hiding in the White House. Putting conspiracy theories aside, this view reects the growing perception that, according to one imam in Karachi, the West is not serious about catching Usama.20 Several Americans question Pakistans denial that Usama is not in the country. An intelligence ofcer, who wished to be unnamed for security reasons, indicated that some in Pakistan knew of his whereabouts. Whether Islamabad can capture Americas most wanted fugitive may be a non-issue, particularly since securing stability and peace in Afghanistan and Iraq are the U.S. militarys top priorities. Correcting these radical and often shaky perceptions requires a concerted effort to re-educate, re-engage, and redene the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Failing to do so has dire consequences. First, the militant Islamist surge that has upset the countrys freedom of thought, by controlling certain mediums of behaviorsuch as banning the Ajoka Theaters satire, Burqa-vaganza21could also undermine a government keen on courting its Western and regional allies to achieve global recognition as an emerging power in South Asia. Second, misperceptions sustained by negative imagery, press reporting, and attitudes towards the West will affect Islamabads willingness or capability to advance political reform and resolve outstanding conicts in the region, including Kashmir and stability along the porous Afghan-Pakistan border. Third, the legacy of historical betrayal and anti-Americanism can only multiply in the absence of a strategic dialogue and exchanges between U.S. and Pakistan publics. The Dangers Ahead In February 2007, Musharraf openly declared that terrorism and sectarianism stymie development in the country. Over time, since at least the Afghan jihad, the deeply entrenched militant network has spawned the development of multiple enemies of the West. Several challenges to Pakistans internal and external security will force Islamabad to continually rethink its policies and posture in the region. With new and old threats able to undermine the government, Pakistan will need to consider alternative reforms to curtail the danger of empowering militant Islamists and their supporters from exerting their inuence in the country.

Internal Threats
Identifying the myriad of threats inside Pakistan has never been simple, especially with the rise of new jihadi groups who are as determined and motivated

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to ght its perceived enemies as were the former mujahideen. Since the end of the Afghan jihad, the greatest challenge to Pakistan is arguably the rise of militant Islam, both as an ideology and political force. The exact number of organized and ad hoc groups in Pakistan that fall under the umbrella of radical political Islam is unknown. Among its supporters are ultra-conservative and separately, militant women. They are represented by right-wing womens groups, either as members of extremist organizations22 or leaders of a new educational class that has emerged in the last ve years. This could include the Al-Huda Organization, a conservative Islamic educational institute for girls, with establishments in Karachi, Islamabad, and some rural areas. While not supporters of terrorism, neo-conservative, right wing womens groups arguably are more susceptible to extremist ideology than liberal, secular organizations. Different radical Islamists also hold a wide range of religious ideas that appear to contradict one another and highlight the sources of friction among them.23 For example, the Barelvis respect for a spiritual guide, or pir, is rejected by the Deobandi tradition of subscribing to only the Quran and the Prophets traditions, or hadith.24 The combined threat to Pakistan by al-Qaeda remnants, sectarian groups, and religious extremists pose signicant challenges and risks.25 That the Pakistani Government is unaware or unable to shut down the groups that enjoy privileged access to the print media is an unanswered question. It remains unclear if, and the extent to which, an alliance between some of these groups and the Pakistani military exists. Of the groups the government is pitted against, it would be a tall order to expect that Islamabad could eradicate all sectarian and militant groups without assistance from regional allies and outside support. Thus, mounting domestic pressure by political Islamists, including the neo-conservative oppositionists, could impede Pakistan from strengthening its ties to the U.S.26 The strength of the militants lies in their ability to propagate their message, maintain a steady level of recruitment, and position themselves as anti-state so long as Pakistan is perceived as backing the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. Placing the varied groups into various categories with labels does little to help understand the linkages between them, and their shared goals. However, a broad classication can be used to understand the aims of the various groups by placing them into ve broad networks. Based on publicly available literature and authors eld work since 2005, ve broad groupings emerge: Groups divided along sectarian lines. Many of these groups are inuenced and organized by religious afliation, to include the anti-Shia, Sipah e-Sahaba, and its Shia equivalent, Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistanboth operate openly despite a brief period of hibernation.27 Other groups have an ethnonationalist orientation, such as the insurgency in Baluchistan, supported

40

Pakistan: On or Off?

by Iran and with active support from Pashto-based tribes. While sectarian afliation plays a major role, some groups share an ethnic bond. For example, The Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM), founded by its leader Altaf Hussain represents the muhajir (or migrants from India to Pakistan) and is based in Karachi. Hussain, an icon of the movement, represents the citys martyrs and prisoners and is today a compnant of the ruling coalition.28 Many sectarian groups are often supported by external actors, such as neighboring countries in South Asia, and Arab states, thereby enabling them to inuence these groups with their Wahhabi and Deobandi traditions.29 Groups supporting the Kashmiri jihad. Under this umbrella are a wide range of extremists, such as the Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harakat-ul-Ansar, Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Hizbul Mujahideen, and other Deobandi organizations. Though the primary goal is to liberate Kashmir from Indian control, some of these groups share a sectarian afliation with other groups. Having fought the Soviet Union during the Afghan jihad, these groups are well-equipped, well-trained, and resource rich, relying on support from Pakistans intelligence agencies to wage a war of attrition against the Indian army.30 The Taliban and its afliates. Members of these groups are Pashtun nationalists and operate in the fadrally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), along the Afghan-Pakistan border, as well as inside Afghanistan. Their aim is to overthrow the ruling elites of Kabul for an Islamic-style government that would be led by the Taliban. Inuenced by Paktunwali, the traditional Pushtun code of honor, and a village Islam,31 the Talibans supreme leader Mullah Omar would likely resume power. Groups based in Peshawar, Pakistan include a mix of conservative and moderate parties: Jamiat-e-Islami, Hizb-e-Islami (Hikmatyar Group), Hizb-e-Islami (Khalis Group), Itehad-e-Islami, Harakat-e-Inqilab-e-Islami, Mahaz-e-Milli, and Jubba-e-Milli.32 Religious political parties with a hard-line and ultra-conservative posture. Of particular importance is the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, a coalition of six fundamentalist parties led by Qazi Hussein Ahmads Jamat-i-Islami33 and Fazlur Rehmans Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islami. The party is anti-Musharraf, rejects secularism, and strongly advocates an Islamic government as dened by the partys leadership. While advocating change by using the political process, they have and are sometimes linked with jihadi / extremist groups. Their narrow, literalist view of Islam could silence the voice of secularists and liberal Islamists. New jihadi groups. Over the last six years, the crackdown on sectarian

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groups and well-known jihadi groups involved in terrorist activities has likely forced the creation of a new generation of jihadis with a virulent anti-Western outlook. A researcher in Karachi told the author that the young male students, who may be afliated with the Jamiat ud-Dawa, are ready to kill the U.S. President. So strong is their hatred that these men are ready to wage jihad, he indicated.34 An updated book by Indian scholar Amir Rana also highlights the emergence of new groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Umar, who view the overthrow of Musharraf a religious duty.35 Other groups include Al-Mansuria and al-Intiqam. Of growing concern is the exploitation of radical women, as is evident in this years recent Jamia Hafsa casewhere women of the seminary were used by the maulvis to protect their interests and threaten the government with suicide attacks.36 Evidence of the various groups overlapping membership, shared goals, and close afliation with the Taliban and al-Qaeda is an open secret, dating back to the Afghan jihada period when Pakistans active support of the mujahidin contributed to the jihadi culture that exists today. For decades, the Pakistani government courted and managed Islamist groups to advance its political and foreign policy goals. The United States also courted the jihadis for their national security interests; both Pakistan (under the Zia ul-Haq legacy) and the U.S. exploited the mujahideen during the Cold War era without much consideration to the impact of the Afghan jihad on either country. Today, the Afghan jihad continues to dene the starting point from which Pakistanis view the fall-out of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and the legacy of bitterness that has followed.37 Therefore, the legacy left by Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq38 during the late 1970s and through the early 1990s further solidied the governments ties to extremist groups. A senior Pakistani editor denes the 1980s as a period when Pakistans intelligentsia exploited the fanaticism of the jihadi warriors to ght Pakistans proxy wars for it in Afghanistan, and later in Kashmir. In pursuing this strategy, the military acted as a midwife, giving birth to a murderous jihadi culture which went on to consume it.39 Pakistan was not alone. The United States, and other Gulf countries, similarly beneted from the Soviet withdrawal of Afghanistan and contributed to the Kalashnivkov culture that emerged in Pakistan.40 The large inux of Afghan refugees, who brought with them their weapons, drugs, and militants to Pakistan, contributed to the rise [of] Pakistani militancy and terrorism.41 Therefore, religious conict remains a key source of tension in Pakistan. In recent years, Pakistans religious parties have been revived and organized along sectarian afliation. While the Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistans largest Islamist party, eschews sectarian violence, the partys call for an Islamic state is its ultimate

42

Pakistan: On or Off?

objective. Other Islamist parties are organized along various schools of thought, representing key Barelvi or Deobandi political aspirations, which are reected in at least 25 percent of Pakistans religious seminaries, or madaris.42 According to a Pakistani Islamic scholar, the religious class in Pakistan yields enormous power. He indicated their nancial contributions from the population, including Pakistani government ofcials, support a booming madrasa system which is the fabric of Pakistani society. Even the Pakistani army supports the ulema (religious scholars)43 in the madaris, thereby afrming the importance of dawa (i.e., the propagation of Islam) across the country. Finally, both U.S. and Pakistani authorities express concern that the al-Qaeda leadership continues to exploit and depend on its networked relationship with Pakistani militant groups to survive as an organization and spawn a new generation of violent jihadis that threaten the regions precarious stability.44 Al-Qaeda also has exploited the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan and Iraq to motivate Pakistani youth to wage jihad against the West and perceived secular regimes, such as in Pakistan. Widening support for the message of Bin Ladenthe James Bond that never dies45exists within the countrys select mosques and religious schools. The authors interviews of Deobandi and Barelvi imams in Karachi, for example, suggest that so long as Bin Laden is alive, Pakistani youth will be inspired and radicalized by the movement he has spawned.

Emerging Domestic Challenges

Since the start of 2007, two events in Pakistan, the removal of Pakistans Supreme Court Chief Justice, Iftikar Mohammad Chaudhry and the Jamia Hafsa case, have caused alarm in the international community, generating concern that Islamabad is vulnerable, weak, or unsure of its political position. The latter involves protests by women clad in black burqas of the Jamia Hafsa seminary in front of the Laal Masjid46 in the capital city of Islamabadan unprecedented move in Pakistans history.47 The womens illegal acts include seizing a childrens library, kidnapping an alleged brothel owner and demanding her repentence and forcing the closure of video shops for selling movies deemed inappropriate to a Muslim audience.48 Threats to the state have captured international headlines: We are ready to give our lives for our religion. If any commando action is taken, it will be retaliated. We are ready for Fedai (suicidal) attacks.49 Included in their demands is the release of terrorists as they shout slogans praising Usama bin Laden and Mullah Omar.50 That the women of the Jamia Hafsa madrasa have violated the law by illegally encroaching on public land and threatening the Government of Pakistan with suicide attacks should the state refuse to comply with the Shariah or Islamic

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law has stunned most Pakistanis. Daily editorials from mainstream Pakistani newspapers reect the publics distaste with the governments inaction. In an oped in early April in the Daily Times, the writer indicates, no other country in the world [except Pakistan] lets its citizens take the law into their own hands and becomes [the] accusers, judges and dispensers of justice.51 A senior Pakistani journalist indicated to the author, The Ghazi brothers who lead the Hafsa show are very old and known assets of some of the Sala fanatics in our [Pakistan] intelligence agencies. They were often found harboring al-Qaeda at their mosque and seminary and are actively engaged with Taliban leaders.52 Another journalist points to the male custodians of Laal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa seminary as having broadcast the message that Pakistans mosques and seminaries raise terrorists and not scholars.53 Related to the Jamia Hafsa case is madrasa reform. The militarys push to reform the former Pakistans Madrasa Ordinance Act has come under great scrutiny by Western and Pakistani observers. According to a former Pakistani civil servantwho conducted a thorough study of madaris in one Punjab locale years agothe registration of madaris is a failed project.54 While seminaries that registered under the new law received a slush fund to teach mainstream education, it was unclear whether the government followed through with this proposal. The Pakistani source added that Pakistan appears not to be committed to madrasa reform, given the widely held perception that, as long as religious schools do not threaten the government, they are permitted to operate. The trouble is, however, that many madaris administrators act above the law. While some encroach on public land and teach an austere form of Islam, they also provide a social welfare system that the government is unable to currently replace. Furthermore, Islamabad continues to stress to the international community that madaris are not linked to Londons 7/7 attacks. The Minister for Religious Affairs Ijazul Haq told BBC Radio in early May that there is no such activity in any madrassa in the country. It might have taken place in Afghanistan,55 thus shifting blame onto its neighbor. Of particular note is the Ministers condence in the madrasa registration process, which he claimed had enabled 98 percent of all seminaries in the country to register with the government. A former Pakistani civil servant, however, refutes this claim. According to him, Pakistan had never taken seriously the issue of madrasa reform and therefore is a failed project.56 The second crisis the government now faces arose after the suspension of the Supreme Court Chief Justice in March 2007. Since the incident, the government has faced mounting opposition, including exiled leaders; a well-known Pakistani writer Ayaz Amir in late March called the episode Musharrafs biggest blunder

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whose fallouts will be far [more] dangerous than Kargil.57 An Urdu slogan inscribed on the Pindi chapter of the High Court Bar Association, tumhari aik naan, tumhein amar kar gai58 (your one negative response has made you immortal) accurately reects the idea that the government will pay a high price for its actions against Chaudhry. Furthermore, the riots and protests in the country in support of the Chief Justice and respect for the judiciary as an independent body make it clear that the military will be held accountable for manhandling Chaudhrys forced removal against the wishes of the legal community and the media.59 Coincidentally, the two incidents occurred this spring. The timing of the two events within weeks of one another not only weakens the governments position but will force Islamabad to quickly resolve the crises. A popular opinion voiced in the Pakistani press is the governments intention to allow anarchy created by the radicals of the Jamia Hafsa case to divert attention [away] from the judicial crisis.60 These events could cast a shadow of doubt on the governments intention to uphold free and fair elections later this year. The events could further prompt the international community to question Musharrafs ability to move Pakistan towards an open political system that stymies corruption, mismanagement of resources, and nurtures a liberal religious movement capable of diluting the loud voices of right-wing maulvis, jihadi politicos, and their supporters. How Islamabad resolves this incident will be a test of Musharrafs policy of enlightened moderation. What matters now is how the government will resolve the two crises while holding onto power.

External Threats
Of the many challenges ahead, a resurgent Taliban using Pakistan to maneuver, regroup, and rearm destabilizes not only Pakistans internal security but damages Afghan-Pakistan relations. Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashids recent statement, Taliban bases and sanctuaries in Pakistan are at the heart of the problem, point specically to Quetta as the Taliban base and safe haven.61 The exploitation of the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which Ahmed considers the worlds [new] terrorism central,62 inhabited by Pashtun tribes, has refocused attention in Washington and Islamabad.63 The penetration of the tribal belt by al-Qaeda and the Taliban is publicly acknowledged by the Pakistani military. According to Pakistans military spokesman, Major General Shaukat Sulat, We dont deny the Taliban come and go, but that is not the entire truth.64 Whatever the truth may be, greater U.S. engagement in Afghanistan creates risks for Pakistan. After the U.S. assumed control of NATO forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban said 2007 will be the bloodiest year for foreign troops and have indicated a ready supply of at least 2,000 suicide bombers for their spring offensive against

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the United States.65 Concerns about the Talibanisation of Pakistan66 presents enormous challenges ahead for the multiple countries engaged in Kabul, whose future is linked closely to Islamabads actions. The Talibans rise also bedevils Pakistans relationship with Iran, who gained from the collapse of the Taliban before 9/11.67 A reemerging Taliban once again puts the Iran and Pakistan relationship at risk. Islamabads fear of an Iranian inspired Shia subversion inside Pakistan,68 rooted in the 1979 Shia revival, may be unfounded as regional stability serves Irans interests. However, Iran is keen not to provoke the rise of a militant Sunni regime in Afghanistan and is particularly on guard that Saudi-sponsored Wahhabism does not become ascendant.69 While a crackdown against the Taliban suits Pakistans immediate interests, it is not clear how Pakistan will be able to sever its ties completely with Kashmiri separatists. On its eastern border, India is perhaps the most signicant threat. A U.S. researcher noted Indian intelligence services clandestine operations against Pakistan in Afghanistan.70 Despite a composite dialogue with India, the core issue between Islamabad and New Delhi remains the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.71 As a senior Pakistani scholar notes, the conict in Kashmir is the unnished agenda of the Partition of the [Indian] sub-continent and as an issue of granting the right of self-determination to the Kashmiris.72 Pakistans original plan to drive India out of Jammu and Kashmir by then ISI Director-General Hamid Gul has since evolved, although observers suggest that Islamabad will continue to support Kashmiri separatists so long as India remains the dominant power in the region.73 Several studies examining the ISIs heavy-handed role in Kashmir and Pakistans Kashmir policy are of considerable importance, but few have addressed alternative solutions to a systemic problem between India and Pakistan.74 Most South Asian experts would agree that Islamabads support for the Islamic militancy remains [the countrys] most successful strategic weapon against Indian regional hegemony, including its penetration into Afghanistan.75 Hence, an unresolved Kashmir conict could complicate Pakistans efforts to curtail terrorism and sectarianism for years to come.76 Of course, the Kashmir crisis may not be the only dispute that prohibits Pakistan and India from long term cooperation. An American expert on Pakistan makes it clear that even if Kashmir is resolved, in the long term India will continue to develop economically and militarily in ways that Pakistan cannot owing to the vast differences in resources and national potential of the two states.77 Still, a resolution on Kashmir could open the doors of opportunity for both countries. How and when a resolution to the crisis takes place is a question no one can yet answer.

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Looking Ahead With Pakistans history of surprise politics, it is uncertain whether national elections will take place this year, as promised by Musharraf. Rule by a military junta is undesirable for the West, and former U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker has emphasized on numerous occasions to Pakistani audiences the need to hold free and fair elections in order for democracy to take root. At the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar in March, the Ambassador emphasized the theme for this years discussion group, known as Democracy Dialogues, to promote a prime U.S. foreign policy initiativethe spread of democracy.78 How likely democracy will take hold in Pakistan, given its immediate and long-term threats, is an open question. Arguments that Pakistan could have taken a different course, by inviting back two key opposition leadersBenazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharifare met with resistance. But so long as Pakistan continues to keep former leaders out of the country, the more the current elite will be judged by its apparent unwillingness to tolerate dissident voices. In the near term, commitments in Pakistan mean improving its counter-terrorism cooperation with U.S. intelligence agencies and other Western authorities. Attuned to American interests in the region, Pakistan has demonstrated an effort to engage the Afghan leader. The two leaders met recently in Ankara, Turkey to renew their determination to ght terrorism. According to a U.S. ofcial, the meetings between Musharraf and Karzai reected a willingness to work together on counterterrorism issues [for] both countries security interests as well as the stability of the region.79 But an Afghan economic ofcer in the U.S. Embassy in Kabul doubts that cooperation will last. In a discussion with the author, he noted the growing mistrust between the two countries.80 Other observers in Pakistan have indicated a worsening of Afghan-Pakistan relations, and one individual noted that Afghanistan is now an alien country to Pakistana shocking observation given the two countries familial, tribal, ethnic, and religious ties. As a senior Pakistani diplomat accurately stated, we are children of the same parents. Recent reports of tit-for-tat violence and Pakistans alleged support for the Taliban reinvigorate the mutual distrust and interference that has now dened Pakistans relations with its neighbor. With no guarantee that the Ankara meeting would afrm progress between Musharraf and Karzai in eliminating seemingly unassailable jihadi networks, like the Taliban and the warlords, the international community can expect growing ferocity and disenchantment between Afghans and Pakistanis. The ultimate question remains: what is the political future of Pakistan? While no one can predict Islamabads political outcome, a few core assumptions are likely to hold true in the near-term. First, any future political system will need to confront

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the dynamic communities in Pakistan as they relate to one another and the state. The ground realities of sectarian strife, varied ideological groups, and conicting interpretations of political Islam set in motion an ongoing process of conict and cooperation that could either be integrated into the mainstream political system or cause a political explosion. The likely competition for scarce resources, the distribution of skills, knowledge, and religious dominance means varying political Islamists, as well as religious extremists, might struggle vociferously for public support and political power. Second, inuential militant Islamists, some linked to terror networks, will maintain a grip on the population for legitimacy, credibility, and independence from the state structure. Varied militant groups, both sectarian and extremists, have for years operated within a political space afforded them by the state which has permitted them to rmly establish themselves as free agents, even though previously they were instruments of coercion and of convenience. Not feeling bound to Pakistans state policies, these groups will likely undertake action within their own rules, norms, and principles to harness their strengths and goals. The JUI-F militants failure to abide by the recently signed treaty with the government is an example of the militants strength to act with impunity and disregard the center of power in Islamabad.81 Third, Pakistan will unlikely be able to monitor all trans-boundary activities, creating the need for greater reliance on collective security and collective burdensharing with the people. Using a central, activist, and effective participatory approach that require the cooperation of the Pakistani public in centers of terrorist activity, such as select neighborhoods in the cities or known areas in key provinces, can help ensure a national effort to address particular issues or specic regional concerns. In exchange for public support, the state should consider making available state-funded and organized social and welfare programs to scores of Pakistanis, who currently receive such aid from militant and sectarian groups. (i.e., JUI uses its provision of social services to win the publics support and fulll a religious duty.)82 Conclusions / Policy Recommendations Bearing in mind Pakistans regional realities and imperfect partners, U.S. choices in Pakistan will be viewed in the context of Americas broader foreign policy portfolio in South Asia. Washington will need to reconsider how to best develop policies towards Pakistan within the backdrop of current threats and regional instability. Providing Pakistan with the necessary resourcespolitical, economic, and militaryto undertake the momentous task of rooting out terror groups and their sympathizers should be contingent on Islamabads performance

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within a realistic timetable. Likewise, Pakistans desire to cement closer ties with Washington should be aligned with the peaceful settlement of outstanding disputes to reduce the longterm spillover of extremism and radical Islam into the region. Two key points: need to be kept in mind: rst, an increased U.S. diplomatic presence in Pakistan can be stabilizing. This would convince Pakistanand regional allies, such as Afghanistanthat America is genuinely interested in promoting stability among uncertain neighbors and will act as a mediator to reduce the seeds of conict among the New Delhi-Islamabad-Kabul axis. Second, increased U.S. engagement with Pakistan and its allies opens several routes for a vigorous dialogue within Pakistan, particularly among the conglomerate of Islamists, on key issues, such as Kashmir. Reform in Pakistan need not be restricted to the political realm. Washington can further aid Islamabad in investing in its public and religious education sector, thus helping to improve the countrys high illiteracy rate. U.S. nancial assistance to Pakistan must be delivered to educators, community activists, and local NGOs, such as al-Mustaphaa charitable organization offering health services managed by a former Pakistani politician. Aid should also be funneled to democratic / liberal womens groups, rural development projects, shelters for the underprivileged, and select religious leaders. While Western aid can be contentious, as it creates suspicion that U.S. aid comes from its intelligence service, there are creative ways to ensure that U.S. aid to the Pakistani government reach grass-roots organizations and needy communities. Specic recommendations for the United States and Pakistan to help elevate Pakistans posture in the global market and guarantee long-term stability in the country can include the following: improve Pakistans administration of public schools, offer teacher training programs, increase the standards of primary school education, broaden the scope of education in madaris, and encourage the expansion of private educational institutions. While the benets reaped from these initiatives will be realized in the long-term, the countrys transient political actors should consider investing heavily in education today to guarantee the countrys survival in the future. This will require refocusing the countrys resources, time, and energy into the educational sector, both secular (public) and religious institutions. Without making some changes, Pakistan will not be able to tap into and nurture the countrys expertise, such as the youths technical aptitude. Second, Pakistan needs to reform its judicial system to win the publics condence in law and order maintained by the police, local law enforcement agencies, and the intelligentsia. Replacing the system of patronage within the services and other governmental agencies is a prerequisite to having an accountable and

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legitimately sound institution of justice. The government should consider allowing highly qualied civilians to hold senior positions, based on their knowledge, skills, and abilities to encourage the public to take part in the countrys political future. Pakistan also needs to prosecute individuals for corruption, including elite family businesses and military personnel. Needless to say, for institutions to be functional, the countrys feudal lords must be replaced by local governments who can represent the needs of the people rather than manipulate them. Third, Pakistans willingness to settle old scores with its neighbors in a realistic political timetable helps to set expectations and push the government to address more consistently the high politics of peace and security with neighboring countries. Pakistan must create incentives to resolve peacefully the Kashmir crisis, the festering conict in Baluchistan, tensions with the radical religious groups such as the Taliban and other militias in the NWFP and FATA, as well as nd creative solutions to the Islamabad-New Delhi-Kabul axis of power. Pakistan should increase its diplomatic inuence as an alternative to military might to reduce signs of an aggressive posture towards its neighbors. Addressing concerns that affect all neighboring countries, such as the threat of terrorism, can help to improve Islamabads bilateral relationships with other South Asian states and diminish longstanding international rivalries. Additionally, a key to stability in Pakistan is to increase its bargaining power against violent political Islamists, to avoid intense competition between them and the state, and to undermine their overall inuence in Pakistans civil society. While Washington can push Islamabad to disarm various militant groups operating in remote areas and along the border, only Pakistan can determine the right strategies for weakening the extremists resolve. As it remains a sensitive subject, Pakistans open attacks against violent political Islamists could create a backlash and facilitate further violence against the state. A more feasible strategy would be to accept all forms of expression and dissent within Pakistani society to avoid the appearance of autocratic rule. Dissent in Pakistan, however, has to be managed in such a way that it does not threaten the stability of the state nor force the state to take repressive action against opposing parties. Any successful engagement policy must take into account improved relations between the states and its citizens. As Ambassador Crocker indicated, there is a need to broaden people-to-people understanding. There is a need to understand perceptions, realities, and complexities. Improving understanding can only be possible through exchanges, visits, and scholarships for the younger generation. As the students of Islamabads Quaid-i-Azam University made clear to the author during a visit in February 2007, the failure to recognize and meet Americans as a people will increase deeply-held views of the Other as a monolith who do not

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question its governments foreign policy agenda. Nothing could be farther from the truth, as Americans, like Pakistanis, are a diverse mix of peoples, cultures, faiths, and identities. Through long-term engagement with Pakistan, negative perceptions on both sides can be replaced with positive experiences and interactions. Long-term U.S.Pakistan engagement will also reassure Islamabad that the risks it has taken for siding with America will outweigh the negative consequences of having to ght extremists at home while keeping violent political Islamists at a distance. So long as the United States keeps Pakistan engaged, Islamabad can be an enduring partner in the war on terror and beyond.

REFERENCES
1 2 3 Data collected from multiple sources. Remark by Pakistani Senator before a U.S. and Pakistani audience in February 2007. Some of these publications include Tayyabat, Akhbar-e-Jahan, Al-Qalam, Ummat, Jasarat, Kahmir ul-Yaum, Al-Haq, Ghazi, Sangat, Nida-e-Millat, Zarb-e-Taiba, Nannay Mujahid, Ghazwa Times, Naqqara, Takbeer, Wadi, Talo-e-Islam, Nawai Waqt with circulations that range from 2,000-200,000. This statement is based on authors professional experience in the U.S. Government, as well as discussions from 2005-early 2007 held with Pakistani Government ofcials in both Pakistan and the United States. Pakistani ofcials include former and current intelligence and military ofcers. Also see work by Christine Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India for additional data. Statement made at an international seminar organized jointly by the Institute of Regional Studies in Islamabad and the Hanss Seidel Foundation in August 2005. Also see Global Terrorism: Genesis, Implications, Remedial and Countermeasures, op. cit., p. VII. Musharraf made this statement on February 3, 2007 in reference to constructing the Kalabagh Dam by 2005. Within this context, he indicated that the eradicating terrorism and extremism were prerequisites to development of the country. Thus far, the dams progress has been stalled by national separatists in Baluchistan. During authors visit to Quetta in late December 2005,the issue of the Kalabagh Dam was contentious. Local militant groups called a strike in the city to thwart the governments efforts to move forward with building the dam. Such strikes are called in advance and printed in the paper to warn the population to remain indoors. Most of all, the strikes offer the local militants some form of bargaining or political power/inuence against the government. To this day, Baluchi nationalists remain a thorn in Pakistans ability to exert full control over Baluchistan. Nasir Jamal and Ahmed Hassan, Taliban: An Afghan issue, Dawn, November 20, 2006. Discussion with the author in April 2007. Remark made by a Pakistani Senator. The News, April 17, 2007 The Pakistani General presented his paper regarding global threats to stability at the National Defense University in Islamabad, February 21, 2007.

7 8 9 10 11

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12 13 14

15 16 17

18

19 20

21 22 23

24

25

Interview conducted in March 2007. Mursheds book, Afghanistan Statement made by retired Pakistani General at a conference held at the National Defense University (NDU) in Islamabad in February 2007. He also noted the existence of weak governance and the growth of radical Islam as a potential future challenge to the existing regime. Finally, the General indicated that there exists no clash of cultures between the West and Islam; rather, U.S. policies feed anti-Americanism [and] are seen as a destructive track policy. A retired U.S. Army ofcer also shared this view; at the conference, he publicly noted America and Pakistan are growing apart, [and partly because] U.S. channels are anti-Pakistan. Statement made by a high-ranking Pakistani military ofcer, now retired. Statement made to the author by a senior RAND policy analyst, May 3, 2007. The power of the JuD should not be underestimated. Authors discussions with Pakistani independent journalists, former military and intelligence ofcers, all agree that after the Pakistani army, JuD is the most organized group in the country. The key difference, noted one Pakistani journalist, is that JuD does not rely on Western support to sustain its popular base. Groups such as the JuD and the Al Rashid Trust immediately responded to Pakistans earthquake crisis in October 2006. Regarded in part as humanitarian organizations, the government is hard pressed to take action that would tarnish the image of these groups for fear of backlash and reprisal. Rubin and Siddique, Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate, USIP, October 2006, p. 14. Discussions with both Barelvi and Deobandi imams believe Usamas capture has been diverted by the war in Iraq and Afghanistan; a few told the author that his capture does not suit Americas interests at this time. November-December 2005. The play opened in May 2007 but pressure from religious right-wing parties prevented the Ajoka Theater in Lahore from showing the satire. Several militant groups have a womens league, such as the JuD while other political Islamists also have a separate party for women, such as the JI. The term Islamist is used widely in the West and the Muslim world. A broad denition of the term is anyone from the Muslim faith who participates actively in the social, economic, or political realm. Hence, an Islamist is a neutral term and is not associated with violence. Attaching the term political to Islamist implies that a Muslim either holds political power, is vying for political inuence (i.e., the leader of a party not yet elected into power, such as the Muslim Brotherhood), and/or someone who believes in the active role of Muslims in a given polity or governance system, which could include the Caliphate. One need not be an extremist to believe in the return of the Caliphate, but the likelihood of an Islamic renaissance today is an open-ended question. Pakistani scholars of Islam, to include the late Maulana Mawdudi and Dr. Israr Ahmed, wrote extensively about the need for an Islamic renaissance, or nahda, rooted also in Arabic literature, in order for Muslims to coexist peacefully and under the rule of Gods law, or hakimiyya. There is a wide range of Islamic views and practice in Pakistan; it is a unique country where Muslims are free to express religious opinion, particularly since Musharraf has opened the space for religion. The states open/secular policies permit the population to express liberal, nonIslamic beliefs, for which the radical or neo-conservatives have strongly condemned publicly and privately. Some of these publications include Tayyabat, Akhbar-e-Jahan, Al-Qalam, Ummat, Jasarat, Kahmir ul-Yaum, Al-Haq, Ghazi, Sangat, Nida-e-Millat, Zarb-e-Taiba, Nannay Mujahid,

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26

27

28 29 30

31

32 33

34 35 36

37 38 39 40

41

Ghazwa Times, Naqqara, Takbeer, Wadi, Talo-e-Islam, Nawai Waqt with circulations that range from 2,000-200,000. South Asian experts Barnett Rubin and Abubakar Siddique indicate that Pakistans position as a front-line ally on the GWOT has led to tensions with the Islamist-military alliance. Tensions arise over the arrest of al-Qaeda leaders and a crackdown against the Taliban and local militants. Resolving the Pakistan-Afghanistan Stalemate, USIP, October 2006, p. 14. See Kanchan Lakshman, Deep Roots to Pakistans sectarian terror, Asia Times, July 9, 2003. For a more detailed analysis of Pakistani militant groups, see Amir Rana, Gateway to Terrorism, (India: Minerva Press, 2003) and A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (India: Mashal Books, 2004), and Mariam Abu Zahab and Oliver Roy, Islamic Networks: The Pakistan-Afghan Connection, (UK: C Hurst and Co Publishers, 2004). For a detailed analysis of the MQM, see Oskar Verkaaik, Migrants and Militants, pp. 56-136 (New Delhi: Manas Publications) 2005 See Muhammad Amir Rana, (translated by Saba Ansari) A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan (Lahore, Pakistan: Mahsal Publishers) 2006 With improved relations between India and Pakistan, Musharraf has banned many of these groups and a few remain on Pakistans watch list by the ISI, such as the Jamaat ud-Dawa (formerly the Lashkar-e-Taiba). For in-depth background and rst-hand account information, see the book by former Pakistani Ambassador, S. Iftikhar Murshed, Afghanistan: The Taliban Years, (London, England: Bennett & Bloom) 2006. Ibid. Political Islam has always been a reality and tour du force in Pakistan since its birth in 1947. The clearest manifestation of political Islam is within the creation of the Jamaat al-Islami, Pakistans rst and largest political party founded by the late Maulana Mawdudi, whose work on Islamic resurgence and doctrine dene the groups activities and membership. This article is not intended to address the evolution of political Islam and its various manifestations throughout Pakistans history. The important point is that political Islam likely exhibits greater inuence on the countrys overall Muslim population than the myriad of extremist groups combined. Discussion with a researcher in Karachi who is studying terrorist and extremist groups in Pakistan; December 2005 Rana, p. 283 This incident was reported widely in the Pakistani press. For background, see Dawn, March 31, 2007; Daily Times, February 2, 2007, March 26, 2007 and April 8, 2007; South Asian Analysis Group, March 30, 2007. The women have demanded the release of Khalid Khawaja, a former Pakistani intelligence ofcer with links to the Taliban and Usama bin Laden. He is currently in a Pakistani jail for instigating the women of the Jamia Hafsa seminary to speak against the state for demolishing mosques and madrasas built in Islamabad on government property. Comment made to the author by a retired Pakistani military ofcer, April 2007. See M.S. Korejo, Soldiers of Misfortune, Pakistan under Ayub, Yahya, Bhutto and Zia, (Lahore, Pakistan: Ferozsons, 2004), pp. 154-210. See Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan. Many scholars have given this subject due attention; for background, see Stephen Cohens The Idea of Pakistan (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press) 2004; Steve Coll, Ghost Wars ( (New York: Penguin Press) 2004; Musa Khan Jalalzai, The Foreign Policy of Pakistan, (Lahore, Pakistan: Ariana Publications), 2003; and For background of the Afghan jihad on the tribal areas, see Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges

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42

43 44

45 46

47 48 49 50

51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

59 60 61

and Responses, eds Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, (Islamabad, Pakistan: Islamabad Policy Research Institute) 2005; Ch. 4, pp. 129-150 See Barbara Metcalf, Traditionalist Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis and Talibs, and Mandavi Mehta and Ambassador Teresita C. Shaffer, Islam in Pakistan: Unity and Contradictions. For background on the madaris and their inuence on Pakistani society, see Robert W. Hefner and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Schooling Islam: Modern Muslim Education (Princeton: February 2007), and a forthcoming book by Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam, (Princeton University Press, March 2007). A Pakistani female academic in Islamabad calls the religious local leaders (or maulvis) the VIPs of the local masses. Comment made to author during November 2005 visit. The links between Pakistani militants and al-Qaeda are mostly found in Urdu literature. See Amir Rana, Jihad-e-Kashmir Aur Afghanistan (The Jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan). The English publication, Pakistan Media Monitor, produced by independent researcher, Muhammad Shehzad, provides some information of the ties, but the extent of their relationships is not publicly available. Statement made by a Pakistani researcher in a private discussion with the author. Laal Masjid or Red Mosque is known for training and funding the holy warriors of the Afghan jihad. Firebrand pro-jihad clerics Maulana Abdul Aziz an Maulana Abdul Rasheed manage the Laal Mosque. South Asian Media Net, April 1, 2007 and Dawn, March 31, 2007. The News, April 13, 2007 Dawn, March 31, 2007; Online International News Network, April 14, 2007; Daily Times, March 26, 2007 Daily Times, February 2, 2007 South Asian Analysis Group, March 30, 2007. The women have demanded the release of Khalid Khawaja, a former Pakistani intelligence ofcer with links to the Taliban and Usama bin Laden. He is currently in a Pakistani jail for instigating the women of the Jamia Hafsa seminary to speak against the state for demolishing mosques and madrasas built in Islamabad on government property. Daily Times, April 8, 2007 Discussion with a former high-ranking Pakistani ofcial and now senior editor of an Urdu newspaper; interview took place in Karachi, April 2007. Op-ed by Kunwar Idris, Surrendering to the militants, Dawn, April 15, 2007 Ofcial now resides in Islamabad and works on other issues. Discussion took place in April 2007. The Pakistan Newswire, May 3, 2007. Meeting occurred in Islamabad in April 2007. See Ayaz Amirs op-ed in Daily Jasarat, March 16, 2007. Literally, this translates into your one piece of bread will be remembered for all times. Figuratively, this phrase suggests that the governments suspension of the Chief Justice will be stamped in history; the slogan is likely meant to remind the army that it will not be forgiven for its harsh actions against the Chief Justicean act for which there is internal opposition against Musharraf and external disfavor with the military ruler for disregarding the writ of the judicial institution. Editorial in the Urdu daily Islam, April 11, 2007 The News, April 16, 2007 See Ahmed Rashid, Letter from Afghanistan: Are the Taliban Winning? Current History, January 2007, pp. 17-20, and A Taliban comeback, Yale Global Online, May 23, 2006.

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62 63

64

65

66

67 68 69 70

71 72 73

74

75 76

Noted in January 2007, Maj. General Shaukat said, they [insurgents] do come for rest and recuperation. Washington Post, January 1, 2007, A20. Ibid, Letter from Afghanistan. Authors discussions with a senior U.S. Government ofcial, who spent weeks along the Afghan-Pakistan border, noted that a solution to the problem requires more than military might. He strongly advocated the need to understand the cultural and human terrain; that is, to better understand the tribal belt, the U.S. Government would need to spend time with the Pashtun tribes to learn about their deeply rooted cultural history and beliefs as well as become familiar with the people currently supporting the insurgents. See Pamela Constable, Pakistan Denies It Harbors Taliban, Washington Post, January 21, 2007, A20. According to the Major, 75 percent of [the problem] lies on the Afghan sideof four known top Taliban commanders, three are Afghan and one is Pakistani. Reuters, February 4, 2007. The Talibans seizure of several towns and villages in the past few years has dampened Western euphoria; some express disappointment with Kabul, the international community, and neighboring countries, to include Pakistan, in countering the rise of terrorism. See Alastair Leithead, Afghan analysis as general bows out, BBC News, Afghanistan, February 2, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk A common phrased used to indicate the Talibans inuence in certain areas of Pakistan. The inux of Afghan refugees and the mujahidin, with military and weapons training from the Afghan jihad, into Pakistan has created what many Pakistani academics and policymakers call the rise of the Kalashnikov culture. Authors interviews of Pakistani scholars at Islamabad-based think tanks and at Quaid-e Azam University in late 2005 indicate that Pakistans state policy to support the large numbers of Afghan refugees has had long-term negative consequences for the country. See Mahan Abedin, Iran: Understanding the Relationship with Pakistan and al-Qaeda, in Terrorism Monitor, Volume II, Issue 17, Jamestown Foundation , September 9, 2004. Ibid. See Marvin G. Weinbaum, Afghanistan and its Neighbors, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 162, June 2006, pp.12-13. U.S.-based researcher has done extensive work on Afghanistan for years; his interviews, meetings, and discussions with Afghan and Indian ofcials and security forces lead him to conclude that Indian meddling in Afghan-Pakistan relations could stymie counterterrorism progress between the two countries. For background, see Ashraf, Fahmida, Models of Conict Resolution and the Kashmir Issue, Pakistan Horizon, vol. 56, no. 2, April 2003, pp.119-133. Ibid. Private discussions between the author and senior Pakistani ofcials indicate that Indias continued control over Kashmir with an overwhelming military forcein comparison to other South Asian countrieswill remain a thorn in Indo-Pakistan relations. Until Kashmir is resolved, cultural exchanges, for example, between the two countries might be ineffectual. The literature on this subject is expansive and well-documented. A few studies worth mentioning are: Sean Mitchell, Pakistans ISI: The Invisible Government, International Journal of Intelligence, Volume 16, no. 3; Kashmir articles in Pakistan Horizon, Volume 56, no. 2, April 2003; Rubin and Siddique, p.14. This article excludes an important discussion of Pakistan-Indian cooperation since 9/11 to reverse its aggressive posturing in Kashmir. Briey, both countries have made considerable progress

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77 78 79 80 81

in improving bilateral ties; Musharrafs historic visit to India for a cricket match is evidence of Pakistans efforts, as well as Musharrafs recent talks with the Indian High Commissioner in January 2007 stressed the need to resolve the Kashmir issue if relations between the two counties are to normalize. (See The News, January 10, 2007). Pakistan and India rst began talks on Kashmir at the Foreign Secretary level in 1990 and between 1990 and 1992, six rounds of talks were held, which resumed in 1994; both countries agreed to establish working groups. After a period of silence, the two countries resumed talks in late 1999, with slow progress since. Also worth noting is that Kashmir is not a national problem; that is, Kashmir is and has been a concern for the Punjab-dominated military and province. Other provinces, such as Baluchistan and Sindh, for example, do not have this siege mentality. Remarks made to author by a Rear Admiral of the Pakistani Navy. Fair, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India; also see U.S. Department of State webpage, http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/h07030701.html. Accessed on April 4, 2007. The Pakistan Newswire, May 3, 2007 Discussions with an American Embassy Islamabad ofcer, May 2007. For background, see ICG Report from December 2006, Pakistans Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants. A summary of the report follows: The Musharraf regime concluded the treaties with Pakistani Taliban/militants in South Waziristan in April 2004, and North Waziristan in September 2006. For various reasons, the government and FATA-based militants agreed to sign the treaty. Militarily, the war in the FATA was worrisome for Musharraf. (a) It tied up 80,000 soldiers and levies at its peak, diverting Pakistans resources away from maintaining its military posture against India; (b) security forces losses had been mounting in the region, and civilian casualties had also been occurring regularly, leading to further alienation of the population; (c) the violence had shown signs of spreading out of the FATA to the PATA areas of NWFP, and increasing radicalization of settled areas of NWFP was of mounting concern. (d) It can also be said that strategically, the Pakistan states interests in limiting Pashtun violence in Afghanistan were conicted. While responsibility towards the ISAF and international obligations indicated interdiction of the cross-border movement of Taliban (both Afghan and Pakistani) and Hekmatyar forces, strategic considerations of keeping a hostile regime in Kabul on the back foot indicated otherwise. (e) It may also be that Islamabad realized the paucity of tools at its disposal to limit the violence in the FATA, given its limitations in promoting the rule of law in these areas (which is a major focus of the ICG report). (f) The growing coordination and alliance of antigovernment forces (Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, Tajik, Arab and Chechen al-Qaeda elements, Hekmatyars Hezb e-Islami, and the Sipaha-e-Sahaba/Jaish-e-Mohammad elements from Punjab/NWFP) in the FATA areas was also worrisome when the Islamabad regime was pushed by sectarian violence internally - the pressures to negotiate to ease the organizational motive of multiple Islamic groups was therefore ever-present. Even though the treaty language bound the parties to mutual non-aggression, it also included an agreement from the militants to stop crossborder attacks. Therefore, the treaties themselves were not a threat to ISAF/Kabul interests; it was the fact that the militants ignored the spirit of the agreement by continuing if not increasing cross-border movement. Therefore, the question one should ask is - what gave the militants this strength to act with impunity, despite the treaties? What is striking is the growing power of the JUI-F in being a broker between the government and Islamic militants, and the inability of the state to exercise full authority in this remote area. Based on the reports nal assessment, one could reach the conclusion that violence continues to ensue in the region, especially in other agencies such as Bajaur, and PATA parts of NWFP such as Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. The

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Pakistan: On or Off?

82

activities of militant leader Baitullah Mehsud (of the Mehsud tribe of S. Waziristan) are of concern, considering a Jan 15, 2007 strike against his forces by the military that killed more than a dozen people. His network is implicated by Islamabad in the latest violence in NWFP in 2007. Tribal tensions may be at play - though the Wazirs in North and South Waziristan may be holding to non-aggression against the security forces, the Mehsuds are not (given multiple suicide bombings in 2007). Two years after the accord, violence in South Waziristan has been high, no high-value al-Qaeda targets have been found, and movements across the border continue. Meanwhile, in the Waziristans, Talibanization of local customs and control over the structure of society continues, with the Political Agent method of governance employed by Islamabad losing its traditional sway. Deobandi parties and factions are indoctrinating the local tribal areas into their philosophies and will be able to use the undereducated foot soldiers from FATA in their future challenge to the state. More information of the JuDs welfare programs can be found on their webpage: www. jamatuddawa.org

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Criterion

THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM IN SOUTH ASIA

(A.G. Noorani)*
Abstract: (Parliamentary form of Government was opted in unison, by all the South Asian countries after gaining independence. Yet there have been deep scars in the respective experience of each country. While Pakistan and Sri Lanka briey experienced Presidential form of Government and Prime Minister Indra Gandhi of India tried to strengthen her authority, through emergency powers, the letter and sprit of parliamentary democracy prevails. Never be less the parliamentary form of government is often under assault and needs to be consolidated. In a situation, when political intolerance rides high, the author offers some constitutional remedies. -Editor) Signicantly, not one of the Founding Fathers of the countries of South Asia ever advocated the presidential system for the country to adopt on its attainment of independence from British rule. All were committed to the parliamentary system, based on the British model. Cries for the presidential system were rst heard in India in 1964 after the death of its rst Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, but subsided before long. They were renewed in 1975 after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi imposed an emergency and set about recasting the constitution and again in 1980 on her return to power after her massive defeat in the general election to the Lok Sabha in 1977. No one talks about it these days. Pakistan had a brief experience of the presidential system which President Mohammed Ayub Khan established by a Proclamation on 28 February 1962. It gave way to the Interim Constitution which, was replaced by the Constitution of 1973, avowedly to re-establish the parliamentary system as the Constitution of 1956 did. Sri Lanka established a presidential system on the French model by its Constitution of 1978. It has not been a signal success. It was reported on 14 May 2007 that the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party led by President Mahindra Rajapakese seeks to restore the parliamentary model of government on which the Constitution of 1948 was based.1 The parliamentary system is deeply rooted in the psyche of the people. British rule brought in its train the only political system known to South Asian countries. The top leaders of the freedom movement were all English barristers Mohandas
* A. G. Noorani is an eminent Indian scholar and expert on Constitutional issues.

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The Parliamentary System in South Asia

Karamchand Gandhi, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Jawaharlal Nehru, Liaquat Ali Khan and Vallabhbhi Patel. Beginning with the Indian Councils Act, 1861 right till the Government of India Act, 1935 successive doses of reforms whetted the appetite for the system entire. The political elite took to it as duck to water. Its successors do not regret the choice. The system is entrenched in the popular mind as a model to be worked and perfected. However, understanding still eludes the political class on three crucial points the political basis on which alone the system can work; its essential spirit and its tacit, unwritten conventions; and the rules of the parliamentary system. This essay suggests that understanding can yet be acquired; not least in India where people tend to be smug and complacent because it has been spared the upheavals that rocked Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It concentrates on the Indian and Pakistani experiences. It is a sobering thought that, as recently as in 2004 and far more so in 2006, the President of India, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, created constitutional crises which the Prime Ministers tactfully averted. The fact that British sceptics have been proved wrong in all the three states India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka is no reason to brush aside, now that we are free and self-assured, the caveats they uttered; still less ignore the dicta of British constitutional lawyers and, indeed, those of our jurists. Uniquely, all three have antidefection laws unheard of in other democracies. All three are experiencing deeply split politics with unbridgeable political divides whether based on personalities or ideologies based on religious revivalism. All three have seen their leaders assassinated and thrown up dynastic rule. What the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of Indias Constituent Assembly said on 4 November 1948 rings true today: Constitutional morality is not a natural sentiment. It has to be cultivated. We must realize that our people have yet to learn it. Democracy in India is only a top dressing on an Indian soil which is essentially undemocratic; feudal, he might have said.2 The British uttered dire warnings of Indias untness for parliamentary democracy. The Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Session 1933-34) doubted Indias ability to work an unqualied system of parliamentary government. It said: Parliamentary government, as it is understood in the United Kingdom, works by the interaction of four essential factors: the principle of majority rule; the willingness of the minority for the time being to accept the decisions of the majority; the existence of great political parties divided by broad issues of policy, rather than by sectional interests; and nally the existence of a mobile body of public opinion, owing no permanent allegiance to any party and therefore able, by its instinctive reaction against extravagant movements on one side or the other, to keep the vessel on an even keel. In India none of these factors can be said to exist today. There are

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Criterion

no parties, as we understand them, and there is no considered body of political opinion which can be described as mobile.3 It was a motivated assertion. But how true or false is it as a statement of the realities in 2007 ? When emergency, a euphemism for dictatorship, was imposed in India, ironically not a few Conservatives and Labourites defended it. Professor W.H. Morris-Jones, Constitutional Adviser to the Viceroy of India in 1947, and a scholar of high repute, refuting Mr. Eldon Grifths defence of the emergency in a letter to The Times (London) on 25 June 1976, wrote: (the) jibe about exhibit A of the Westminster model abroad misses the point that it had become a specically Indian achievement; it only adds insult to the injury already suffered by Indian democrats. Such denigration has long been a sport in which high imperial Tory and revolutionary Marxist could nd common enjoyment. Even your own leader (June 21) chose an odd time to point out the limitations of democracy under Congress; for an incomplete democracy is diminished further, not remedied, by illiberalism. Nor can one easily detect any clear and consistent signs that the elite-mass gap which you deplore is being closed by the present regime of Mrs. Indira Gandhi? And just how may the change accord better with indigenous habits? Are habits never modied? Had not growing numbers of Indians begun to make the habits of liberal democracy indigenous? Surely it is a massive loss when damage is done to a way of political life which in two decades had already converted into citizens so many who had been subjects beyond the political pale Moreover, the grains are doubly suspect. In origin they are at best uncertainly attributable to Mrs. Gandhis dose of autocracy. In their effects they appear too fragile to endure. Unitedly, Indian democracy had freely mobilized demands and grievances; in its place is put none of the usual alternative. Parliamentary democracy has struck roots in South Asia; but dangerous signs persist. In the last decade, Indias Parliament has been repeatedly prevented from proceeding with its business whenever the opposition decided to block them. However patronizing it might seem we must bear in mind the former British Prime Minister, A.J. Balfours, words in his Introduction to the Second Edition of Walter Bagehots classic The English Constitution. Constitutions are easily copied, temperaments are not; and if it should happen that the borrowed constitution and the native temperament fail to correspond, the mist may have serious results. It matters little what other gifts a people may possess if they are wanting in those which, from this point of view, are of most importance. If, for example, they have no capacity for grading their loyalties as well as for being moved by them; if they have no natural inclination to liberty and no natural respect for law; if they lack good humour and tolerate foul play; if they know not how to compromise or when; if they have not that distrust of extreme conclusions which is sometimes misdescribed as

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The Parliamentary System in South Asia

want of logic; if corruption does not repel them; and if their divisions tend to be either too numerous or too profound, the successful working of British institutions may be difcult or impossible. It may indeed be least possible where the arts of parliamentary persuasion and the dexterities of Party management are brought to their highest perfections Let the political parties be reduced to two (admittedly the most convenient number for Cabinet Government), but let the chasm dividing them be so profound that a change of administration would in fact be a revolution disguised under a constitutional procedure.4. To his niece, Blanche Dugdale, he was more forthright in a conversation on 25 April 1925: I doubt if you would nd it written in any book on the British Constitution that the whole essence of British parliamentary government lies in the intention to make the thing work. We take that for granted. We have spent hundreds of years in elaborating a system that rests on that alone. It is so deep in us that we have lost sight of it. But it is not so obvious to others. These peoples Indians, Egyptians, and so on study our learning. They read our history, our philosophy, and our politics. They learn about our parliamentary methods of obstruction, but nobody explains to them that when it comes to the point all our parliamentary parties are determined that the machinery shant stop. The Kings government must go on, as the Duke of Wellington said. But their idea is that the function of opposition is to stop the machine.5 The constitutional lawyer, Ivor Jennings said in his famous work Cabinet Government: The function of parliament is not to govern but to criticize. Its criticism, too, is directed not so much towards a fundamental modication of the governments policy as towards the education of public opinion the government governs and the Opposition criticizes. Failure to understand this simple principle is one of the causes of the failure of so many of the progeny of mother of parliaments and of the suppression of parliamentary government by dictatorship (p.16). The great statesman, Gladstone, held that the British Constitution presumes more boldly than any other, the good faith of those who work it.6 One has only to recall the fundamentals of the parliamentary system to appreciate the truth of his aphorism. First and foremost it requires a Head of State powerful enough to check a wayward Head of Government, the Prime Minister, but not so powerful as to subvert the system and make himself dictator; and vice versa. The PM must be powerful enough to resist such a design but not so powerful as to reduce the President to a cipher. When it is remembered that it took India 42 years since the enactment of its Constitution to establish a fair balance, one begins to appreciate the dangers that lurk once the balance is disturbed Indira Gandhis constitutional dictatorship from 1975-77 thanks to a supine President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad. The British monarch has not refused assent to a Bill since 1707, nor dismissed

61

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a Prime Minister since 1783; nor refused to dissolve the House of Commons on the PMs request for more than a hundred years Jennings wrote in 1959.7 It is now well settled that assent can never be refused. But if a Bill, subversive of the Constitution, is enacted, the Crowns only recourse is to dismiss the ministry and dissolve the House of Commons. These two powers are powerful weapons in the hands of a principled President; but dangerous in those of an unscrupulous one. Both powers indubitably exist to this day in Britain. On dissolution the locus classics cited by every work on constitutional law is a letter by Sensex published by The Times, London on 2 May 1950. He was none other than Sir Alan Lascelles, private secretary to the King. It bears quotation in full: It is surely indisputable (and common sense) that a prime minister may ask not demand that his sovereign will grant him a dissolution of parliament and that the sovereign, if he so chooses, may refuse to grant this request. The problem of such a choice is entirely personal to the sovereign, though he is, of course, free to seek informal advice from anybody who he thinks t to consult. In so far as this matter can be publicly discussed, it can be properly assumed that no wise sovereign that is, one who has at heart the true interest of the country, the constitution, and the monarchy would deny a dissolution to his prime minister unless he were satised that: (1) the existing parliament was still vital, viable, and capable of doing its job; (2) a general election would be detrimental to the national economy; (3) he could rely on nding another prime minister who could carry on his government, for reasonable period, with a working majority in the House of Commons. When Sir Patrick Duncan refused a dissolution to his prime minister in South Africa in 1939, all these conditions were satised, when Lord Byang did the same in Canada in 1926, they appeared to be, but in the event the third proved illusory. A Prime Minister whose advice to dissolve is rejected, can resign and force an election in which the Crown becomes a party issue. Likewise the Crown can force a dissolution if the public opinion is to be ascertained. On dismissal, every work on the law says that the Crowns power does exist; it has not been exercised since 1783 but it has not become extinct either. Prof. Geoffrey Marshall writes: Dismissal would be appropriate if a government, by illegal or unconstitutional administrative action, were to violate some basic convention of constitutional behaviour. Even then it would be necessary for the breach to be a profound one for which no other remedy could be found. In a great many cases in which it is alleged that Ministers have acted unconstitutionally (in the sense of violating constitutional convention or practice), the questions in issue are in any case debatable and usually a matter of controversy between the political parties or between government and opposition. The remedy for alleged

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The Parliamentary System in South Asia

convention-breaking is generally recognized to be, in the main, political. Either the government can be shamed by publicity and political debate into conceding error or changing its course of action, or its misdeeds can be made the subject of argument at the next General Election.8 Prof. Vernon Bogdanor asserts that the former can be used at the point at which the constitution itself, which determines the role of the head of state, appears to be under threat. At that point, it may be suggested, the sovereign has the right to exercise his or her discretion, to act as a constitutional guardian, to ensure that the values which lie at the foundation of a constitutional system are preserved. In such circumstances, some would suggest that the sovereign has the right, and perhaps indeed the duty, to act as a guardian of the constitution. The doctrine that the sovereign is required to act on the advice of ministers presupposes that ministers themselves act within the framework and presumptions of constitutional government.9 In South Asia there is little awareness of another weapon the head of state does not dismiss the Government but demands that it seek a new popular mandate for a course it seeks to adopt. Prof. Eugene A. Forsey writes: It is probably safe to say that under modern conditions forced dissolutions will take place only if the Crown considers them necessary to protect the Constitution or to ensure that major changes in the economic structure of society shall take place only by the deliberate will of the people. In other words, the power to force dissolution is now likely to be used only negatively, preventively; never as a means of bringing about some positive end desired by the King himself or his representative. If a Government won an election by means of agrant and notorious fraud, corruption, violence or terrorism, or some combination of these, the Crown could properly dismiss such a Government and call to ofce a new Government which would hold new elections under proper conditions.10 Forseys work, written in 1943, remains a classic still. Sufce it to say that the parliamentary system provides ample checks to ensure both stability and democracy, provided there is a will to work it and the political class values the system more than its immediate gains. If politicians in the opposition welcome improper intervention by the head of State against the government of the day, it in turn, is not averse to using him, with equal impropriety against the opposition. This has happened in India as well as in Pakistan. Disenchantment with the parliamentary system has driven some to opt for the presidential system as the stronger of the two. The fallacy is obvious. A legislature can yield a government the Cabinet. But an executive cannot legislate by itself. It needs a legislature. This can lead to a deadlock as the U.S. experienced in 1993 when the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, was

63

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out to confront President Bill Clinton. The other aw is far more dangerous. Prof. Karl Loewensteins warning must be borne in mind: It is hardly an exaggeration to describe the American pattern of government as the most difcult of all in actual operation, particularly if coupled with the complexities of federalism, an equally difcult arrangement of conicting power interests. That it worked at all is a near miracle, explainable only by the abundance of a nation that could afford a cumbrous and wasteful governmental system The centre of gravity shifted to the President without forcing him to resort to illegality, and Congress always voluntarily submitted to presidential leadership. No wonder that, when transplanted into a foreign environment, American presidentialism failed to take rootsEither the primacy of the presidential position became a power device for an ambitious individual supported by the armed forces, landed oligarchs, and the church, or, in line with the recent political climate, it acquired a quasi-plebiscitary hue, catering to the masses revolting against agrarian feudalism. More often than not a military junta dominates without any ideological pretenses. It appears in pseudo-constitutional disguises or struts about without constitutional trappings as naked power.11 In the light of these fundamentals, it is instructive to study how India and Pakistan went about working the parliamentary system and, indeed, the kind of that system they initially established. The Parliamentary System in India. The Indian Constituent Assemblys Drafting Committee prepared an Instrument of Instructions to the President, as a Schedule to the Constitution, to codify the convention of the parliamentary system.12 It was however dropped on 11 October 1949 just a month before the Constitution was enacted because it has now been felt that the matter should be left entirely to Convention.13 Dr. Ambedkar acknowledged on 30 December 1948, that the President would enjoy some discretionary powers: Under a Parliamentary system of Government, there are only two prerogatives which the King or the Head of the State may exercise. One is the appointment of the Prime Minister and the other is the dissolution of Parliament. On 11 October 1949, a member, Mr. M.V. Kamaths query prompted Dr. Ambedkar to assert that the president shall follow the advice of his Ministers. Mr. Kamath persisted: If in any particular case the President does not act upon the advice of his Council of Ministers, will that be tantamount to a violation of the Constitution and he will be liable to impeachment?14. The Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950. Dr. Rajendra Prasad was elected President of India. Less than two months after assuming the Presidency, Prasad sent Nehru a note dated 21 March 1950 in which he sought to reopen the very issues on which,

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The Parliamentary System in South Asia

in his presence, the Constituent Assembly had decided. His main query was: Does the Constitution contemplate any situation in which the president has to act independently of the advice of his Ministers? Related to it were a host of other queries concerning the Presidents powers over the armed forces, his powers of appointment to judicial and other high ofces; the power to seek information and to return Bills to Parliament for reconsideration. The Prime Minister referred the queries to the Attorney-General M.C. Setalvad, for his opinion. The opinion, tendered on 6 October 1950, could not have pleased the president. It is true that this view of the Presidents functions reduces him to the position occupied by the King in the Constitution of the United Kingdom. That, however appears to be the basis of our Constitution. Prasad did not stop at that. On 15 September 1951 he wrote to Nehru on the Bill for the reform of Hindu law enclosing a note darkly hinting that he might withhold his assent to it. To the Prime Ministers hints about the limitations on Presidential powers the President retorted, on 18 September, that the Constitution does not admit of a wholesale importation of all practices and conventions of the British Constitution. The ones that were to be adopted were there in the text, he said. Nehru rejected, in his reply of 21 September, the Presidents claim that he could address Parliament at his discretion. Once again, the Presidents queries were referred to the Attorney-General and, now, also to Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy, a constitutional lawyer who was a member of the Drafting Committee. Setalvads opinion of 24 September and Sir Alladis 20 September and 8 October 1951 pronounced against the President.15 It is hard not to agree with Granville Austins comments: Had his rst attempt to ignore conventional restrictions and to play the part of his own Prime Minister not been foiled., parliamentary government in India would have disappeared before it was two years old16 The Supreme Court upheld the view the lawyers had taken. The ofce of the President of India suffered a decline in prestige and authority, by a slow process; the cause was intense political warfare that gripped the country after the Congress Party split in 1969. But even before that, decline had set in. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan was elected President in May 1962 and soon developed ambitions. Chinas attack on India in October 1962 inicted grave damage on Nehrus prestige. The President did not help him by what was an unprecedented criticism of the Government near the front. What was worse, the President began talking against Nehru. The American Ambassador, Chester Bowles, records in his memoirs: On several occasions he expressed to me in a half joking manner the wish that somehow after Nehrus death or retirement the whole country could operate under Presidents rule for a few months. This, he said, would enable him in his role as President to ease some of the cumulating political conicts and make

65

Criterion

some of the difcult but necessary decisions before turning the Government over to a new Prime Minister and Cabinet.17 With Nehrus successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Presidents relations were never more than correct. He was free in his censures both in private and in public. Relations with Shastris successor, Indira Gandhi, began well in January 1966 but she was hardly the person who would suffer an uncle in the Rashtrapati Bhavan (Presidents House). She got the Vice-President, Dr. Zakir Hussain, elected as President in 1967. Mrs. Gandhis self condence received a boost. The new President soon discovered her growing assertiveness. The opposition did not forgive him for winning and kept up a silent campaign of denigration (a rubber stamp President). In the course of one of his interviews to this writer in 1967, in connection with his biography, Dr. Zakir Hussain digressed to comment on contemporary matters. He remarked that what the opposition really wanted was a President who would ght with the Prime Minister. That would be a disservice. The President is bound by the Cabinets advice. But he added the signicant reservation except in regard to his emergency powers. What Dr. Hussain clearly meant was not so much the emergency provisions of the Constitution, but the ultimate reserve powers which very properly belong to a constitutional head of state.18 In his memoirs, The Story of My Life, Mr Morarji Desai, then Deputy Prime Minister, revealed that he found Dr. Zakir Hussain: worried about conditions prevailing in the country. He discussed these conditions with the Prime Minister some days before his demise and when I met him I found that he was feeling very much worried. He told me that whenever he asked the Prime Minister about the conditions in the country, she told him there was nothing to worry about. The President told me that while the country was in a condition which caused him concern, the Prime Minister did not seem to be worried. The ne gentleman that he was, he could not speak disparagingly about anybody. It was clear that he was feeling uneasy about the dangers facing the country.19 Dr. Zakir Hussain died in ofce on 3 May 1969 when the Congress Party was breaking apart. It broke over the nomination of the Presidential candidate though the split was nally sealed a few months later. At the Congress Parliament Board meeting in July 1969, Mrs. Gandhis candidate, Jagjivan Ram, lost by three votes to ve to the opposition candidate, N. Sanjeeva Reddy. She signed Reddys nomination papers as proposer only to back out on the ground that in view of her Partys colleagues confabulations with the opposition parties, a conscience vote was required. The Vice-President V.V. Giri threw his hat in the ring and resigned from ofce to ght the election as an independent, at her insistence. On 20 August 1969 the election results were announced. Giri won a majority

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The Parliamentary System in South Asia

only on the second count 420,007 votes to Reddys 405, 427. Indira Gandhi defeated her opponents decisively in the mid-term elections to the Lok Sabha in 1971, the rst of its kind. The communiqu that was issued on 27 December 1970 served to establish a vital principle the President is not bound by the Prime Ministers advice to dissolve but enjoys, like the British Crown, a measure of discretion. It is set out in full: The Prime Minister met the President on 2 December and conveyed to him the proposal to dissolve the Lok Sabha. She said that the sole consideration for making this request was the Governments desire to seek a fresh mandate from the people to enable the Government to effectively implement the socialist and secular programs and policies. Subsequently, on the same day, some Opposition leaders also met the President. The Prime Minister again called on the President in the evening and conveyed to him the Cabinet decision to recommend to the President the dissolution of the Lok Sabha. After careful consideration of the matter, the President has accepted the recommendation. When he retired in 1974 the Presidency had become a gift for the Prime Minister to offer. The opposition had lost as badly in the elections to the State Assemblies in 1972 as it had in 1971 in the elections to the Lok Sabha. After the split the Congress Party had become an instrument of the Prime Ministers will. (No organizational elections have been held since 1972 to this day.). Mrs. Gandhi decided to offer the gift to the safest person she could nd. Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, her fathers contemporary at Cambridge. On 25 June 1975, when asked to sign a Proclamation of Emergency on grounds of internal disturbance (Article 352) which he knew to be false, Ahmed did not inch. The excesses that followed saddened him as did the indifference to which he was subjected. Indira Gandhi had the Constitution amended while the opposition leaders were behind the bars. Section 13 of the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment)Act, 1976 added the italicized words to Article 74(1) of the Constitution: There shall be a Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the Head to aid and advise the President who shall in the exercise of his functions, act in accordance with such advice. Ahmed died of a heart attack and the Vice-President, B.D. Jatti, was sworn in as Acting President on 11 February 1977. In the elections to the Lok Sabha the following month, Indira Gandhi was defeated. The opposition combine, the Janata Party, came to power. It secured the enactment of the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 which left intact the amendment to Article 74 but added a proviso: Provided that the President may require the Council of Ministers to reconsider such advice, either generally or otherwise, and the President shall act in

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accordance with the advice after such reconsideration. In the 1977 Presidential election N. Sanjeeva Reddy was supported by all the political parties, including the Congress. His memoirs reveal tensions between the President and Prime Minister Desai. The former was inevitably drawn into controversy when in July 1979 the Janata Party broke up. Reddy could not be faulted for inviting Mr. Charan Singh, Leader of the breakaway faction, as Prime Minister. But he insisted and set a precedent that has been followed since that the PM secure a vote of condence of the Lok Sabha : I trust that in accordance with the highest democratic traditions and in the interest of establishing healthy conventions you would seek a vote of condence in the Lok Sabha at the earliest possible opportunity, say by the 3rd week of August 1979.20 On Reddys retirement in 1982, Mrs. Gandhi selected her Home Minister, Giani Zail Singh, as Congress Candidate. He had been Chief Minister of Punjab earlier and had been a politician all his life. The Opposition was in disarray. He was elected with ease but differences soon arose over Punjab. Zail Singh readily swore in Mr. Rajiv Gandhi on Mrs. Gandhis assassination on 31 October 1984. That did not prevent differences arising between them in a form and manner for which there are few precedents. On 12 June 1982 the Congress General Secretary, Mr. G.K. Moopanar had said that the Party wanted a President who would see eye to eye with the Prime Minister. That and the fact that the candidate was a Sikh were the main considerations for his nomination. It did not work. The President returned the Indian Post Ofce (Second Amendment) Bill, 1986, on the ground that it enabled mail interception.21 On 28 March 1987, the President and the Prime Minister met to resolve their differences on constitutional issues. The President was no longer being sent copies of dispatches from Ambassadors. The Prime Minister had stopped calling on him let alone consulting him. Their second meeting on 8 April marked a further advance. They decided to ask two senior ofcials, the Cabinet Secretary, B.G. Deshmukh, and the Secretary to the President, S. Varadan, to trash out the constitutional issues. The President had no remedy short of dismissal. On 16 April 1987 the Befors scandal was out in the open. The President began demanding information on this, as he had on earlier matters; but to no avail. Parliament was of no help to a wronged President. On 4 November 1992 Zail Singh revealed that he had contemplated dismissing Mr. Gandhi from ofce in 1987 on grounds of corruption and negligence. I ought to disclose an interest. My opinion was sought at this stage. Present that late afternoon of 3 May 1987 on the lawn of the Rashtrapati Bhavan in the consultation with the President were a couple of aides. I expressed the emphatic opinion that

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The Parliamentary System in South Asia

he had, under the Constitution, no right or power to dismiss Rajiv Gandhi in those circumstances however valid his grievances or true the disclosures. I specically cited Ghulam Mohammeds dismissal of the Nazimuddin Government in 1953, and pointed out that Pakistans democracy never recovered from the blow and Ghulam Mohammeds name is ever recalled with revulsion. I drafted a brief statement in his presence, disclaiming any intention of sacking Rajiv Gandhi. It was released to the press immediately. Rajiv Gandhi played safe in nominating the Vice-President R. Venkataraman as Congress Candidate in the July 1987 Presidential elections. He won handsomely. His quiescence was due to Prime Ministerial authority, not to lack of ambition. He had served as Minister for Defence and Finance under Mrs. Gandhi and was a Congress veteran from the Nehru era. Mr. Venkataraman said on 25 July 1987: When the Government is functioning smoothly, the President has no political function. When there is a breakdown in the administration, then the President has to restore the Constitution.v On 13 July 1992 the Vice-President Dr. Shankar Dayal Sharma was elected President as the Congress (I)s candidate in succession to Venkataraman. He was selected as candidate by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and enjoyed the backing of the two communist parties, CPI and CPM. He won 675,864 votes (65 percent0 against 346,485 (33 percent) polled by G. G. Swell, supported by the National Front and the Hindu revivalist Bharatiya Janata Party. He asserted his independence within a short time. On 6 December 1992, the day the Babri Mosque at Ayodha was demolished, the Press Secretary to the President issued a statement which read: The President, Dr. Shankar Dayal Sharma, has strongly deplored vandalism that has caused damage to the Masjid in Ayodhya and has observed that such acts are absolutely against the doctrine and practices of Hinduism and all other great religionsThe President has requested the Prime Minister to initiate appropriate expeditious steps to uphold the rule of law, the maintenance of public order and protection of all law abiding citizens.23 The President took good time to accord his assent to the terms of the Reference of the dispute at Ayodhya to the Supreme Court for its advisory opinion, under Article 143 of the Constitution, on 7 January 1993. He raised important queries and accorded assent only after they were answered. The Presidents objections were widely reported in the press. It is no exaggeration to say that it was only in 1992, forty-two years after the Constitution went into force that the ofce of the President of India and, therefore, parliamentary democracy came to acquire the stature which the framers of the Constitution intended it should. Rajendra Parasad, Radhakrishnan and Zail Singh were ambitious and would have subverted the system if the political checks were

69

Criterion

absent. Zakir Hussain held high promise but died after a mere two years in ofce. Giri, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed and R. Venkataraman were rubber stamps as the expression goes. Sanjeeva Reddy was clumsy and inept. It must, however, be pointed out that bar his ambitions, Prasad proved to be a good President and set high standards of scrutiny of Bills, appointments to judicial and executive posts besides letters of caution on matters of policy. He was against arbitrary imposition of Presidents Rule in the States and abuse of Article 370 of the Constitution in respect of Jammu & Kashmir. His Note of 6 September 1952 to Nehru exposes the illegality of subsequent Presidential Orders whittling away Kashmirs autonomy. President Shankar Dayal Sharma had no ambitions, but was determined to do his duty strictly as constitutional head of state, keeping an eye on the doings of Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao whose lack of scruple was well known. Sheila Kaul was censured by the Supreme Court for improprieties when she was Union Minister for Urban Development in what was called the housing scam. By then she had become Governor of Himachal Pradesh The censures warranted interrogation by the Central Bureau of Investigation. The President issued a statement on 20 April 1996 virtually reprimanding Rao but with perfect propriety. It quoted from his letter to Rao in which he asserted that the correct course was for her to resign, without further ado, adding properly but tellingly You may like to advise me in this regard. The statement complained The president is yet to receive any advice of the Union Cabinet relating to the Governor of Himachal Pradesh.24 Ambedkars dicta warranted her dismissal by the President even in his own discretion. He did not wish to set that precedent. His public censure, the rst of its kind, led to her resignation. The nation would have supported him had he dismissed Sheila Kaul Sharmas successor K.R. Narayanan strengthened this tradition. He made it a practice to issue detailed explanatory statements whether on appointing a Prime Minister or on accepting his advice to dissolve the Lok Sabha. (Vide The Hindu December 5,1997 on dissolution; March 16, 1998 on appointment of A.B. Vajpayee as PM, and of 27 April 1999 on dissolution. There were brief announcements on 13 May 1996 and on 20 April 1997 on appointments of Vajpayee and I.K. Gujral respectively as Prime Ministers. These documents constitute useful precedents in the parliamentary system). Narayanan twice used his prerogative under Art. 74 (1), Proviso to ask the Council of Ministers to reconsider its advice to impose Presidents (i.e. Central) Rule in Bihar, on 22 October 1997, and 25 September 1998. He nally relented on 12 February 1999. A debacle ensued because the Rajya Sabha refused to ratify the action.25 When the Australian missionary Graham Staines and his two sons,

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The Parliamentary System in South Asia

aged 9 and 6, were burnt to death in Orissa on 22 January 1996 by the afliates of the ruling BJP, Narayanan issued a statement denouncing the crime as one which belonged to the worlds inventory of black deeds. During the pogrom of Muslims in Gujrat under the BJP Ministry headed by Narendra Modi, who was protected by the BJP dominated Government at the Centre headed by A.B. Vajpayee, President Narayanan by letters and in person expostulated with him about the centres neglect. Currently the Central Information Commission, established by the Right to Information Act, 2005, is seized of a petition for disclosure of those letters between 28 February and 15 March 2002. Narayanan demitted ofce that year and was succeeded by A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, the BJPs candidate who quits in 2007. However, in March 2005, Narayanan disclosed in a press interview: There was governmental and administrative support for the communal riots in Gujrat. I gave several letters to Prime Minister Vajpayee in this regard on this issue. I met him personally and talked to him directly. But Vajpayee did not do anything effective. Had the military been given powers to shoot, the carnage in Gujrat could have been avoided to a great extent. I feel there was a conspiracy involving the State and Central Governments behind the Gujrat riots.26 Abdul Kalams record has not been without scars. He appended a qualication when giving his assents to the Right to Information Act, 2005. Vir Sanghvi revealed on high authority that when in 2004 Vajpayee advised dissolution of the Lok Sabha, as it neared expiry of its term, the President gratuitously and improperly advised him to resign because it would be wrong for the government to continue in ofce while elections are being held. Vajpayee rightly refused. Abdul Kalam blinked.27 The President showed crass ignorance of the Constitution which requires a PM in ofce at all times. Dr. Manmohan Singh became Prime minister on 22 May 2004. In July 2006 a crisis arose as Abdul Kalam threw hints that he would withhold assent to the reenactment of the ofce of Prot Bill. He accorded assent, eventually. The record from 1950-2007 establishes the following eleven principles: First and foremost, it is now rmly established that the President is entitled, in exercise of his own judgment, to question the Governments bills, appointments, and policy proposals. Secondly, within limits, Presidents can comment on affairs of the State in public. Criticism of the government must be muted, though it should be more in the nature of sounding an alarm. In rare cases, public expression of disquiet, even censure, is proper. Thirdly, the President is entitled to admonish and even censure the Prime Minister in private.

71

Criterion

Fourthly, the Presidents right to know, embodied in Article 78, is not challenged. Fifthly, the practice is now established of the President receiving leaders of opposition parties singly or in a delegation to lodge a protest against the Governments action. He offers no comment but forwards the protest to the PM and speaks to him, if he so decides. Sixthly, it is established that the President is not bound to accept the Prime Ministers request for dissolution of the Lok Sabha but is entitled to exercise his judgment and consider the alternatives before accepting it. Seventhly, the power of dismissal of the Government cannot be exercised except on the extreme grounds mentioned in text books. There was universal criticism of Zail Singhs intentions in 1987 and again of his admission of them in 1992. The best course is to have an explicit provision on the lines of Articles 91(5) and 130(5) of the Pakistan Constitution, respectively for the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers of State. They say that while the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers hold ofce during the pleasure of the respective heads of state, the latter will not exercise their powers unless satised that the Head of Government has ceased to command the condence of the House. There follows this crucial constraint in which case he shall summon the National Assembly and require the Prime Minister to obtain a vote of condence from the Assembly. An identical expression is used for Governors. This paper is conned to the Centre. Eighthly, not only the opposition parties but Chief Ministers of States also invoke the Presidents moral authority as guardian of the Constitution, in their case specically, to safeguard its federal character. Ninthly, in 1977, the acting President, Mr. B.D. Jatti was extremely reluctant to sign the proclamation under Article 356 imposing Presidents rule in certain States. The Governments threat of resignation induced him to sign the documents. The Postal Bill is of far less consequence. The fact remains that two successive Presidents, Messrs Zail Singh and R. Venkataraman declined to sign it. They returned it for reconsideration in exercise of their own individual judgment. It is well settled that assent cannot be withheld; only reconsideration can be sought. If re-enacted assent must follow. Tenthly, the question whether the President can assert a right, under Article 86, to address Parliament or to send messages to either of its Houses in his own discretion, is open. In 1950 the Attorney-General opined against it in the face of the Presidents challenge on a host of issues. His opinion on the point gave no reasons. At the least, the matter is open. It is unthinkable that in an extreme case a President would inch from taking his case to Parliament. Lastly, the President is entitled to insist, when appointing a PM that he obtain

72

The Parliamentary System in South Asia

a vote of condence from Parliament within a stipulated short period. Furthermore, the existence of the Presidents power of dismissal has not been seriously challenged. There is near unanimity on fears of its abuse. No responsible politician has sought such an intervention by the President against his political opponents. In 1987, some carpetbaggers did. In June, Zail Singh was tempted; but wiser counsel prevailed. He would have come to grief. Indias democracy has functioned for sixty years, bar the interlude of the emergency. But the parliamentary system came into its own only in the last fteen years; since 1992. The Parliamentary System in Pakistan. Sadly, in contrast, the parliamentary system functioned in Pakistan, only tfully in brief interludes either with a hostile President or a pliable one. The system did not fail the nation. It was never given a chance. A common notion is that it would have been rmly established if only the founder of Pakistan, Quaide-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah, had lived longer. Recent archival disclosures prove that it was he who impaired the parliamentary system in its infancy, if not at its very birth. The Indian Independence Act, 1947, while conferring complete independence to both India and Pakistan, provided that pending the framing of a Constitution by the Constituent Assemblies of these countries, they shall be governed as nearly as may be in accordance with the Government of India Act, 1935 subject to such adaptations as may be specied in orders of the GovernorGeneral of each country (Section 8 (2). The last Viceroy and his acolyte, Alan Campbell Johnson, spread the falsehood that while Indias leaders sought to adapt the Act to establish a parliamentary democracy, Jinnahs adaptations as Governor-General sought to make him a virtual dictator. Prof., Khalid B. Sayeed exposed the lie in his pioneering work Pakistan: The Formative Phase 1857 1948.28 However, after a meticulous survey of the law and practice, Sayeed concluded that in actual practice the description of Jinnah as King Emperor, Archbishop of Canterbury, Speaker and Prime Minister rolled into one was not an exaggerated description of Jinnahs powers. He was GovernorGeneral, President of the Constituent Assembly and of the Muslim League. In India, when the Assembly acted as an interim Parliament, it was presided over by a person other than its President, Rajendra Prasad who was also Food Minister namely, G.V. Mavalankar. Jinnah presided over the Assembly when it acted as a Constituent body and also as legislature and accorded assent to Bills as Governor General. He presided over the Cabinet and retained the portfolios of Ministry of States and Frontier Regions,. Evacuation and Refugee Rehabilitation. Dawn of 25 August 1947 announced his appointment as Legal Guide to the Assembly. The

73

Criterion

Governors sacked two Chief Minister, Dr. Khan Saheb of NWFP on 22 August 1947 and M.A. Khubro of Sind on 26 April 1948, on the Governor Generals directions. He not only appointed members of the Cabinet but himself allotted their portfolios, usurping the prerogative of the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan.29 In 1996 was published Allen McGraths book, The Destruction of Pakistans Democracy (Oxford University Press), based on archival material and interviews. He records: In July 1947, while engaged in negotiations for dominion status, Jinnah jotted a note to himself: Danger of parliamentary form of government (1) it has worked satisfactorily so far in England and nowhere else (2) Presidential form of government more suited to Pakistan (p.35). The rst proposition was demonstrably untrue. It worked in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and in Europe. The second was an ipse dixit. Jinnah undermined the status of the Prime Minister as well as the Cabinet. Both abdicated readily in favour of the Governor General on the policy on Kashmir, to cite one striking instance.30 His decision would be nal and binding. Far more ominous was Jinnahs speech to the ofcers of the Staff College at Quetta on 14 June 1948: I want you to remember and if you have time enough you should study the Government of India Act, as adapted for use in Pakistan, which is our present Constitution, that the executive authority ows from the Head of the Government of Pakistan, who is the Governor-General and, therefore, any command or orders that may come to you cannot come without the sanction of the Executive Head. This is the legal position.31 This was a palpably wrong. It is the Prime Minister, not the Governor General who is the head of the Government. It is anyones guess as to why he felt the need to speak to the army as he did. Understandably, nor was Liaquat Ali Khan free from insecurities given the treatment he had received. He was not a model of tolerance after Jinnahs death. McGraths survey bear quotation in extenso: Liaquats approach to party politics was direct and forceful. Those who would form other parties were traitors, liars, and hypocrites. Words like dogs of India were part of his vocabulary when discussing opposition. He equated opposition to the Muslim League with opposition to Pakistan itself, and made it clear publicly that he would not tolerate the existence of an opposition party as long as he lived. When the East Bengal members in the Constituent Assembly planned a protest day in opposition to Liaquats proposals for a new constitution, he declared that the government shall not tolerate these activities any longer and shall put an end to them in the interest of the existence and stability of Pakistan. On one occasion his voice reached an emotional pitch while addressing a crowd and declaring that Pakistan was the child of the Muslim League. Those who joined mushroom organizations were enemies of Pakistan

74

The Parliamentary System in South Asia

who aim to destroy the unity of the people32. But he was, nonetheless, a mass leader. As the scholar Ayesha Jalal perceptively remarks The murder of Liaquat Ali Khan (on 16 October 1951) removed the one politician with the will and the ability to lend an ear to popular opinion and turn it to positive advantage.33. She adds By the time Pakistans rst prime minister became the target of an evidently hired assassin, the institutional balance had begun gravitating away from the political centre in Karachi to military headquarters in Rawalpindi. It was to take a few years and the unfolding of yet more painful domestic political and economic crises before the central government itself was forced to make the shift..34 Ayesha Jalal describes the rot that set in when Khwaja Nazimuddin succeeded Liaquat as Prime Minister (p. 140). But she renders service to the truth by her well documented thesis.. The system did not fail, because of the incompetence or misdeeds of politicians. It was deliberately undermined by a cabal. She questions interpretations which place the responsibility for the 1958 coup solely at the door of inept and corrupt politicians. Instead her book investigates how the military and the bureaucracy railed and eventually broke down the political system to ward off challenges to which the state, dominated by these non-elected institutions, was still vulnerablethere was nothing preordained about the collapse of political structures in Pakistan. Those who are content to attribute the dominance of the Pakistan army to weaknesses in political organization or to a poorly developed political culture are justifying a phenomenon without fully understanding its origins. Undeniably, the League was never more than tottering political machinerythe political process in Pakistan went off the rails long before the military takeover in October 1958. Liaquats failure to frame a constitution and hold elections, however deplorable, was a consequence of the massive dislocation following partition and the very real fears of those entrusted with the task of constructing the state. But the rst four and a half years of Pakistans existence had at worst tarnished the political process. It was during Nazimuddins tenure in ofce that the decisive blows were dealt Nazimuddin had neither skill nor vision to withstand the tests. As a result, decision-making fell increasingly to the bureaucracy and, in the last resort, the governor-general.35 Nazimuddin became Governor General on Jinnahs death on 11 September 1948 and Prime Minister on Liaquats assassination on 16 October 1951. The elevation of Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed, a notoriously ambitious man, as Governor General was a fateful choice. Nothing in his record revealed commitment to democracy or to norms. Faith in his readiness to work the system was ill-founded. He did not share Liaquats commitment to non-alignment or to democracy. With Zafrullah Khan, M. Ikramullah he was part of the cabal that,

75

Criterion

in concert with the army, sought a pro-Western orientation. Less than two years in ofce he struck a blow at democracy under which it still reels for the simple reason it was never given a good chance fully to recover. On 17 April 1953 the Governor General sacked Prime Minister Nazimuddin and replaced him with the pliable Mohammed Ali Bogra, former Ambassador to the US. M. Ayub Khan the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan army, became Defence Minister. The very next day the Law Minister A.K. Brohi, who became a stellar gure in the Congress for Cultural Freedom and International Commission of Jurists and a champion of human rights, justied the action criticizing dutifully undue emphasis on certain conventions as they are known to the British Constitutional practice.36 This was to be but the rst of the coups to which he readily lent his support. However, in the brief phase of democratic rule, Brohi produced a tome of 1017 pages entitled Fundamental Law of Pakistan (Din Mohammadli Press, Karachi), a commentary on the Constitution of 1956, in which he asserted the direct opposite (p. 3): Over and above the law of the Constitution, is invariably to be found a set of rules, rules which are habitually obeyed by those who are concerned in the administration of public affairs, and these are called conventions of the Constitution or, what comes to the same thing, the political understanding and they form the hard core of the ethics of constitutional behaviour or constitutional morality. Published in 1958 the book was overtaken by the rst military coup that year. Brohi prospered under that and subsequent regimes. McGrath holds that not a voice was heard in protest to (sic.) Nazimuddins dismissal.37 When Bogra began to assert himself, the Governor General. dissolved the Constituent Assembly on 24 October 1954. Bogra consented to it, albeit under pressure.38 H. S. Suhrwardy lauded the action. By then the draft constitution had already been prepared. The President of the Assembly, Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, successfully moved the Sindh High Court. McGrath describes how his counsel, the English Q.C. D.N. Pritt, entered Pakistan via Colombo by a ruse that he was a doctor.39 The High Courts judgment was scorned by the Chief Justice of the Federal Court M. Munir and the Governor Generals action was upheld; Justice A.R. Cornelius alone dissented. McGrath records on the strength of an interview: According to a private secretary of Ghulam Mohammad, while the case was pending before the Federal Court, Ghulam Mohammad communicated with Munir by coded written messages on a regular basis. Delivery was allegedly made between the two men by one of Ghulam Mohammads private secretaries. Ghulam Mohammad also made at least one visit to Munir at his home. He drove to Munirs residence in his ofcial car with ags ying and escort. With Tamizuddin pending at the time, this was effective notice to Munir and the political community of the Governor-Generals

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The Parliamentary System in South Asia

involvement in the issues which were pending before the courtlater years, Justice Cornelius was to comment that the Governor-General had been effective in inuencing not only Munir but also the other Justices who voted in the Tamizuddin majority. It is easy to understand what Munir meant when he said years later that Tamizuddin Khan came to court with a case he could not win..40 Ayub Khans Diaries published in 2007 contain at page116 clinching evidence of Munirs complicity. There followed the army coup 27 October 1958. Mohammad Asghar Khan writes in his memoirs: I was at that time the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, a post to which I had been appointed in 1957 by Suhrawardy, at that time the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. I was summoned by the President at about 9 p.m. on 7 October. When I arrived at the Presidents House, I found Ayub Khan and a number of other army ofcers, amongst them Brigadier Yahya Khan, present there. I was told by Iskander Mirza that he had decided to abrogate the Constitution, marital law had been declared and the army was moving in to take over the government. I had no prior knowledge of such a plan and was told that I should stay there for the next couple of hours presumably till all moves had been completedThe following day or the day after, I attended a meeting presided over by Iskander Mirza at which Ayub Khan, the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the newly appointed members of Ayub Khans cabinet were present. At this meeting the Chief Justice, Mohammad Munir, was asked by Ayub Khan as to how he should go about getting a new constitution approved by the people. Justice Munirs reply was both original and astonishing. He said that this was a simple matter. In the olden times in the Greek states, he said, constitutions were approved by public acclaim and this could be done in Pakistan as well. Most of those present laughed and Ayub Khan laughed the loudest.41 To resume, after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly a new Assembly was established. It framed a democratic Constitution based on the parliamentary system the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which came into force on 23 March 1956. Iskander Mirza, who had become Governor General after Ghulam Mohammeds forcible removal, was elected President. On 7 October 1958 Mirza himself was forcibly removed and Ayub Khan proclaimed himself President. This brief study of the working of the parliamentary system will not attempt a detailed survey of the events of the last nearly half a century. Bearing in mind the principal theme only the main landmarks will be indicated. The writer has no hesitation, however, in stating here his own conclusions. The Quaid-e-Azams practice was unfortunate but people cherish his valuable precepts and attribute the practices to the pressures of an abnormal period. The political class did not stand by those precepts; but they have struck roots in the popular mind. It is nonetheless

77

Criterion

a fact that every coup was welcomed by politicians opposed to the politicians over thrown by the coup Ayub Khans of 7 and 27 October 1958; Yahya Khans of 25 March 1969, Zia-ul-Haqs of 5 July 1977; President Ghulam Ishaq Khans arbitrary dismissals of Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif; President Farooq Legharis sack of Benazir Bhutto in 1996 and General Pervez Musharrafs coup of 12 October 1999. The system mattered less than the immediate gains; with one qualication. Every politician in power Z. A. Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif rode roughshod on the fundamentals of the system. This writer holds that, despite all this rather because of it there is a deep yearning for parliamentary democracy but its full restoration requires much more than the cooperation in this enterprise of President Pervez Musharraf and the armed forces. It requires a revival of the political process freed of the intrigues of those who created the situation that preceded the coup of 1999. Of this there is no sign. But if the bases of the parliamentary system are borne in mind they are, as will be pointed out later in this paper, compatible with the concerns voiced by President Musharraf. A National Pact re-establishing the system in full force with the consent of all, the army included, is a constitutional possibility which only politics can make a political possibility as well. (There are able studies of constitutional developments in Pakistan; to wit: Pakistan; A Study of Its Constitutional History (1857 1975) by Justice (R) Masud Ahmad; Research Society of Pakistan, University of Punjab, Lahore, 1978 Pakistan; A Modern History by Ian Talbot: Oxford University Press; 1998; and Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan; by Hamid Khan: Oxford University Press, 2001; a formidable work of 959 pages). Ayub Khan discovered the need for political support and a Constitution suited to his needs. The Report of the Constitution Commission (1961) recommended, predictably, in favour of a presidential form of government. It was promulgated by his at on 28 February 1962; martial law was lifted on 8 June 1962 and political activity was revived. In 1965 elections were held to the ofce of President and to the National and Provincial Assemblies. Ayub Khan defeated his rival Miss Fatima Jinnah in the election to the Presidency Ayub Khans rule ended when on 25 March 1969; the Commander-in-Chief, General Yahya Khan, proclaimed himself Martial Law Administrator and President on 30 March (retrospectively from 25 March) when the Legal Framework Order was promulgated. Under it, general elections were held in August 1970. The subsequent tragic course culminating in the establishment of Bangladesh need not detain us. Sufce it only to say that Zulkar Ali Bhutto took over from him as Chief Martial Law Administrator on 30 December 1971. He won a vote of condence from the

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The Parliamentary System in South Asia

National Assembly which also adopted the Interim Constitution. It established for the second time in Pakistan, a presidential system on 21 April 1972 and he became President. It was no small achievement for Bhutto to have got enacted by the Assembly in April 1973 a new Constitution based on a national consensus. To this day, it provides common ground. Zia-ul-Haqs coup of 1977 invested it with nostalgic appeal obscuring its serious aw it made the Prime Minister all powerful and crippled the President. He was shorn of discretion on dissolution of the National Assembly (Art.58) and the power to dismiss a wayward Prime Minister (Art. 48 [1] ) All the orders of the President had to bear the countersignature of the Prime Minister (Art.48[3]).. The Cabinet system was undermined by empowering the Prime Minister to act directly (Art.90 [2]). He became the Chief Executive of the Federation Art.90[1]) A pliable Fazal Elahi Chowdhry was elected President.. There were two salutary provisions. The Prime Minister was to be elected by the National Assembly (Art. 91 [2]}. Germanys constructive note of no condence was emulated. A motion of no-condence must name the successor (Art. 96 [2]}. Zia-ul-Haq disclosed (Urdu Digest, September 1977) that he had decided to stage the coup in the last week of June He struck when he did because Bhutto had succeeded in arriving at a pact with the opposition Pakistan National Alliance as Asghar Khan admits.42 That he wrote, as he did, to the armed forces in May 1977 soliciting their help reected his commitment to democracy (p.116). As with political trails a g leaf of legality is used to give a veneer of legality to a military coup. It is the Provisional Constitution Order. Yahya promulgated it is Chief Martial Law Administrator on 4 April, 1969 and Zia in the night of 2425 March 1981. The Constitution is held in abeyance; for the rest it remains in force. To be sure, Zia suspended the fundamental rights. On 2 March 1985 came the Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order. On 23 March, Mohammed Khan Junejo was nominated Prime Minister. This followed the party-less elections in February 1985 to the National and Provincial Assemblies. His exertions secured a unanimous enactment of the notorious Eighth Amendment to the Constitution by the Majlis-e-Shoora on 9 November 1985, as a compromise with Zia. The Eighth Amendment did away with its grosser features but made concessions to the President in order to pave the way for the Proclamation of Withdrawal of Martial Law which he made on 30 December 1985. He secured the total deletion of Article 152A inserted by the Presidents Order of March 2, 1985 which provided for the establishment of a National Security Council to make recommendations on matters concerning the issue of a Proclamation of Emergency, the security of Pakistan and any other matter of national importance that may be referred to it by

79

Criterion

the President in consultation with the Prime Minister. The core of the Eight Amendment lay in these changes it made in the rules governing the relationship between the Head of the State and the Prime Minister. (1) Article 46 was an exact replica of Article 78 of the Indian Constitution on the duties of Prime Minister in relation to President, specically the Prime Ministers duty to keep the President informed of the affairs of the country and to furnish such information relating to it as the President may call for. As originally enacted in 1973, Article 46 simply required the Prime Minister to keep the President informed on matters of internal and foreign policy and on all legislative proposals. (2) The English Amendment retained the provision in the 1973 Constitution which enjoined the President to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister. As in India, the President can ask the Prime Minister or the Cabinet to reconsider the advice. But he is bound to act in accordance with the advice rendered after such reconsideration. (Art.48 [1]}. But Article 48 now deleted the emphatic part of the original provision that such advice shall be binding on the President. (3) The Presidential Order of March 1985 which conferred on the President the power to hold a referendum on any matter of national importance even without or contrary to the advice of the Prime Minister. The Eighth Amendment retained this obnoxious provision as also the Presidents power to dissolve the National Assembly in his own discretion and appoint a caretaker government. (4) Article 58 of the 1973 Constitution made the Prime Ministers advice to dissolve binding on the President unless the Prime Minister was facing a motion of no condence. The March 1985 order retained this but gave an extra power to the President to dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion if he felt an appeal to the electorate is necessary. By the Eighth Amendment, the President was empowered by Article 58 (2) (b), to dissolve the Assembly of his own sweet will if, in his opinion, a situation has arisen in which government of the federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary. These words are borrowed from the hated section 93 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which enabled governors to sack ministers and take over the government. A similar provision exists in the Indian Constitution enabling the Centre to sack state governments and take over the government (Article 356). No such provision exists in India for Presidents rule at the Centre. (5) Article 91 of the 1973 Constitution left it entirely to the National Assembly to elect the Prime Minister. The Eighth Amendment meekly retained the

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The Parliamentary System in South Asia

change made in Gen Zias Order of March 1985 conferring on the President the power in his discretion to appoint as Prime Minister one who, in his opinion, is most likely to command the condence of the majority of the members of the National Assembly. (6) However, on the crucial power to dismiss the Prime Minister, the Eighth Amendment was better than the Presidents Order. Article 91(5) as then enacted restrained the President from dismissing the Prime Minister unless he was satised that the latter had lost the condence of the Assembly. The Eighth Amendment deleted this. It obligated the President to summon the Assembly and empowered him to require the Prime Minister to seek its condence. (7) Unfortunately the Eighth Amendment, following Zias Order of March 1985, did away with a very salutary innovation in Article 96(2} of the 1973 Constitution the constructive vote of no-condence based on the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. A motion of no-condence must name the successor Prime Minister. There cannot be a vacuum after the ouster of a PM in which horse-trading can ourish. (8) Finally, the Eighth Amendment enabled the President to appoint the governors of the Provinces in his discretion. He is bound to consult the Prime Minister, but no more than that (Article 101).Under the 1973 Constitution the President, like the Indian President, was bound to act on the Prime Ministers recommendation. He was entitled to object, to seek reconsideration but except in a gross case he was bound by advice. Sure enough on 29 May 1988 Zia invoked the Eighth Amendment, in popular parlance, but precisely Art 58 (2) (b), to dismiss Junejo and dissolve the National Assembly. Only on 9 June was a caretaker government appointed but with no prime Minister, in breach even of Art 48 (5). Following Zias death in an air crash on 17 August 1988, general elections were held and Benazir Bhutto was appointed Prime Minister by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on 1 December 1988. As leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party she had promised to support his candidature to the Presidency. It was a deal.43 The Eighth Amendment survived to blight relations between the President and the Prime Minister: (1) Benazir Bhutto was dismissed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on 6 August 1990 invoking Art. 58(2) (b) (2) Her successor, Mohammed Nawaz Sharif who won the elections that followed was dismissed by the same President, invoking the same provision. (3) Benazir Bhutto returned to power in the 1993 elections and was dismissed on 5 November 1996 by the colleague she had got elected as President, Farooq Ahmed Khan Leghari. Nawaz Sharif returned to power as Prime Minister in the general elections

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of February 1997 and promptly secured the repeal of the Eighth Amendment by the Thirteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment barred defections. Nawaz Sharifs majority was frozen. But it was suspended by a bench headed by Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah who, Hamid Khan writes, was a benefactor of the ruling PML (N) and had paved the way for its coming back to power. The Judges autobiography Law Courts is a Glass House (Oxford University Press, 2001) reveals unwittingly that he was a politician on the Bench. Nawaz Sharif fell foul of the Court by his speeches and was charged with contempt of court. On 28 November 1997 the Court was stormed by a mob led by Ministers, Members of Parliament and politicians. The crisis intensied. Parliament passed the Contempt of Court (Amendment) Bi1l which fairly made an order of punishment appealable to another Bench. Leghari withheld assent saying he needed the Courts permission. Taking the cue, the Court restrained him from giving assent. Both actions were unconstitutional; brazenly. Hamid Khan traces the techniques by which the Chief Justice was ousted.43 He had gone so far as to suspend even the Thirteenth Amendment without adequate hearing. The Court broke up into two rival parts on 2 December 1997. Sajjad Ali Shah was de-notied as Chief Justice and Justice Ajmal Mian appointed in his place by the Government on 23 December 1997. Meanwhile, Leghari resigned as President. Mohammed Raq Tarar was elected President. Less than a year after he became Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif had secured the ouster of the President and the Chief Justice who were themselves no small players in the game of power. The nuclear tests in Chagai in May 1998 buttressed his popularity. In July 1998 the Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat was obliged to retire for expressing views which were unexceptionable.44 Lt. General Pervez Musharraf (as he then was) was appointed Chief of Army Staff. It was a matter of time before differences arose between them. The Kargil crisis in May-July 1999 only made them public; they were well known even before that. Hamid Khans work is more than a study of constitutional developments. He also describes the political context in which they occurred. Parliamentary democracy was maimed at birth and starved of nourishment by successive heads of State and Governments since 1947. Aggrandizement of power, personal and political, was pursued relentlessly and unchecked. The judiciary proved a feeble reed to rely on when it was not actually complicit. Experience of two military regimes (1958 1971) did not instil caution. Z.A. Bhutto (1972 -77), Benazir Bhutto (1988-90 and 1993-1996) and Nawaz Sharif (1990-93 and 1997-99) were particularly culpable. The last was the worst. By sacking the army chief in 1999 and preventing the landing of his plane he all but virtually constrained the army to take over.45 It was an institutional move by the army and was widely welcomed as

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a temporary measure; but disenchantment set in with the passage of time. It is unnecessary to narrate in detail the subsequent constitutional developments. Emergency was proclaimed on 14 October 1999, followed by a Provisional Constitution Order which held the Constitution in abeyance. Fundamental rights were continued in force in so far as they were not in conict with the proclamation of emergency. The Army Chief became the Chief Executive. Another break from the past was freedom of the press. The Supreme Court validated the military takeover, as it had the ones of 1958 and 1977, on 12 May 2000. It ordered the Chief Executive to appoint a date not later than 90 days before the expiry of three years after the militarys take over to hold a general election to the National Assembly and Senate and the Provincial Assemblies. On 17 October 1999, the Chief .Executive. announced establishment of a National Security Council. On 26 June 2002 were published Proposals of the Government of Pakistan on the Establishment of Sustainable Federal Democracy. Public comment was solicited by the end of July. They were drawn up by the National Reconstruction Bureau headed by Lt. Gen. Tanvir Naqvi. On 21 August 2002 the Legal Framework Order was promulgated as a forerunner to the proposed elections. The 1973 Constitution was revived with 29 Amendments. Art. 58 (2) (b) was restored. The elections resulted in a Government headed by Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. The set-up failed to win general acceptance. After he assumed power on 12 October 1999, President Musharraf made three propositions. What Pakistan has experienced in the recent years has been merely a label of democracy not the essence of it. I shall not allow the people to be taken back to the era of sham democracy but to a true one. And I promise you I will, Insha Allah. This was perfectly true. His two other propositions were that checks and balances must be restored and military rule rendered impossible. Both are laudable aims, but the Legal Framework Order does not secure them. Consider the background. In 1985, the Eighth Amendment put undemocratic curbs on the Prime Ministers power and tilted the balance in favour of the President. In 1997, Nawaz Sharif secured the repeal of that Amendment through the Thirteenth Amendment and restored the 1973 imbalance in favour of the Prime Minister. It reected a national demand and was passed unanimously by the National Assembly - thoughtlessly without the checks of the 1956 Constitution. The Eighth Amendment was the other extreme. It empowered the President (Article 58 (2) (b) to dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion where, in his opinion a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary. Article 48 (5) empowered the President to appoint a caretaker Cabinet on the dissolution of the Assembly as also to order a referendum

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on any matter of national importance even without the Prime Ministers advice. On 12 July 2002, President Pervez Musharraf posed the question whether the check on the Prime Minister under Article 58 (2) (b) was effective. I think it was not effective and failed to provide good governance. Article 58 (2) (b) of the Constitution, he said, each time caused confrontation between the President and the Prime Minister and every time, the Chief of the Army Staff, was dragged into the confrontation.46 The Supreme Court of Pakistan took a short-sighted view in Mehmood Khan Achakzais case (1997) when it said, In fact Article 58 (2) (b) has shut the door on martial law for ever which has not visited us after 1977. It did not because successive Presidents abused the power to sack Benazir Bhutto (1990 and 1996) and Nawaz Sharif (1993).It did not restore a proper balance between the Prime Minister and the President. Neither did Nawaz Sharif in 1997, which he would have were he a statesman. However, in its judgment of 12 May 2000 the Supreme Court of Pakistan was less than fair to the record, and indeed, to itself. It quoted Chief Justice Hamoodur Rehmans note of 24 September 1977 to Zia-ul-Haq pointing out that the 1973 Constitution had reduced the President to a rubber stamp. One wishes the court had quoted also the note of 4 January 1978 by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, then SecretaryGeneral, to Zia. It was written on a summary submitted by the Ministry of Law on the judges retrograde proposals and bears quotation in full so prescient it is: CMLA (Chief Martial Law Administrator) may kindly see, apart from opinion of the Attorney-General, that except for the provision relating to the restoration of constitutional safeguards to civil servants, the other amendments proposed by Justice (R) Hamoodur Rehman would not be upheld by the courts under the doctrine of necessity. It would also not appear politically advisable to change the basic structure of the Constitution in such a radical manner by a Martial Law Order. The need for checks and balances is no doubt there; but what other checks should be and how this balance be struck requires a political consensus which will not be forthcoming in the present circumstances and if it is imposed from the top is not likely to prove enduring. Even otherwise, some of the proposals, particularly the arrangements envisaged for carrying on the administration of the affairs of the Federation and the provinces when the Assemblies are dissolved, are debatable and are likely to give rise to a different type of problem. Personally I am also not in favour of getting the armed forces involved, as a permanent feature, even if such a course be politically acceptable, as in the long run it will politicize the armed forces themselves and result in weakening of the defence of the country. The best that can be done is to try to educate the political parties on the need of some checks and balances which would avoid repetition of

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the happenings in the near past in the hope that, when elected, they would on their own bring about the required constitutional changes. These documents were disclosed by Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, on 19 September 1991 following an exchange in the Supreme Court on 15 September, with Raja Mohammad Anwar. Article 58(2( (b) was thus not necessary to prevent derailment of democracy. To repeat, under the conventions of the parliamentary system, recognized in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, to go no further, the head of state has the following rights: (1) to be consulted; (2) to demand information; (3) to select the Prime Minister if the elections yield a hung Parliament in which no party has a clear majority; (4) the discretion to dissolve a House; and (5) albeit in the last resort, to dismiss the Prime Minister. These add up to a President and a Prime Minister each powerful enough to prevent the subversion of the Constitution by the other, but not powerful enough to be able to subvert it himself. What precisely could and ought President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed have done on the night of 25 June 1975 when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi advised him to proclaim an Emergency on manifestly, demonstrably false grounds? Was Indias democratic system incapable of meeting her challenge? The answer is that the President could have, and ought to have, sacked her; invited the Leader of the Opposition to form a government; dissolved the Lok Sabha; ordered fresh elections and revealed to the nation the reasons for the action. After the dismissal of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam by the Governor General in 1975, the labours of the Joint Select Committee of the Australian Parliament on the republic referendum yielded in August 1999 its Advisory Report on Constitution Alteration (Establishment of Republic) Bill 1999, and Presidential Nominations Committee Bill, 1999. It is very instructive. The fact that the people decided not to have a republic does not minimize its value. Its remit was to consider what powers the President should have. It decided to retain those of the Governor-General; no more, or less. The Republic Bill sought to insert Section 59 in the Constitution of Australia Act, 1900. Its clause (3) read thus: The President shall act on the advice of the Federal Executive Councilbut the President may exercise a power that was a reserve power of the Governor-General in accordance with the constitutional conventions relating to the exercise of that power. Prof. Greg Cravens characterization was apt: You are taking the existing jewel of our Constitution from an 1890 setting and you are putting it into a 2000 setting. The jewel remains the same. Para 4.10 of the Report spells out those reserve powers explicitly: It is generally accepted that there are probably only four such powers; namely, the power to appoint a Prime Minister, the power to

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dismiss a Prime Minister, the power to refuse to dissolve Parliament and the power to force a dissolution of Parliament. If the labours of the various Constitutional Conventions held in Australia from 1975 to 1985 are followed, it should be possible to codify the conventions and rules of the parliamentary system. In the context of Pakistan, a fair course is to restore the Presidents powers under the 1956 Constitution and to codify the conventions of the parliamentary system in the Constitution itself to prevent abuse of power by both the Prime Minister and the President. The reports of the Australian Conventions can help in this exercise. President Musharrafs censures of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto are justied. Both disgraced themselves twice over as Prime Ministers. Benazirs party would not abandon her and her capacity for vengeance is notorious as is her disdain for democratic governance. Would she ever agree to forge a consensus? The best course would be nonetheless to formulate and publish a package of constitutional reforms based on a national consensus between the parties and between them and the army on agreed amendments to the 1973 Constitution which would establish a genuine parliamentary system with checks and balances, as the Australian Report suggests, and invite the political parties to accept it. A parliamentary system so devised fully meets the criteria President Musharraf laid down. In 2007 as in 1947 the question facing Pakistan is whether its political class is prepared to work the parliamentary system in its true form. All of which brings up to the crux of the matter which is not the mechanics of the parliamentary system but its very heart the quality of the political process. Consider the Indian situation. Instead of dismissing it summarily the Supreme Court xed 9 July 2007 as the date on which to hear a public interest petition seeking judicial intervention to ensure that the government does not sign the nuclear agreement with the United States until the same is thoroughly examined by a committee appointed by this Honble Court in respect of its immediate need and essentiality and its implications on national security, sovereignty, dignity and honour and till the matter is thoroughly discussed and passed in the Parliament. This is utterly unheard of. On 17 May 2007 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh lamented that 44 per cent of the time was lost in the Rajya Sabha and 34 in the Lok Sabha; all because the BJP refuses to accept its defeat in the 2004 election and is prepared to destabilize the system. The Supreme Court has latterly encroached on the legislative sphere drawing strong, repeated protests from the Speaker of the Lok Sabha Somnath Chatterjee. The situation in Pakistan is, if anything, more critical. As Judge Learned Hand sagely observed of split polities. A society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save; a society where that spirit

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ourishes, no court need save; that in a society which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish. What is the spirit of moderation? It is the temper which does not press a partisan advantage to its bitter end, which can understand and will respect the other side, which feels a unity between all citizens real and not the ctitious product of propaganda which recognizes their common fate and their common aspirations in a word, which has faith in the sacredness of the individual. If you ask me how such a temper and such a faith are bred and fostered, I cannot answer. They are the last owers of civilizations, delicate and easily overrun by the weeds of our sinful human nature; we may even now be witnessing their uprooting and disappearance until in the progress of the ages their seeds can once more nd some friendly soil.

REFERENCES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 The Hindu, 15 May 2007. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 7, p. 38. Volume 1 (Part 1) Report, HMSO, London, 1934, HL 6 (I Part I); HCS (Part xi); p.11. The English Constitution: The Worlds Classics Oxford University Press; pp. xxii-xxiii,, Blanche E.C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, London, Hutchinson, p.364. Gladstone, Gleanings of Past Years, 1879, Vol. I, p.245. Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government, 1959, pp. 6, 400, 427. Constitutional Conventions, Oxford University Press, 1986, p.27. Vernon Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution, Oxford University Press, 1995, p.65. Eugene A, Forsey, The Royal Power of Dissolution of Parliament, Oxford University Press, 1943, p.170. Karl Loewenstein, Political Power and the Government Process, University of Chicago Press, 1965, pp. 114-5. Vide B. Shiva Rao, The Framing of Indias Constitution,, Select Documents, Vol. 4, pp 67-68 for the text. Constituent Assembly Debates,Vol. 10, pp. 114-116. Ibid, pp. 269-270. For the texts see Dr. Rajendra Prasad Correspondence and Select Documents, V.Chaoudhary ed., Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 1989, Vol. 12, pp. 278-286. Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution,, Oxford University Press, p.140. Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep, 1972, p.496. A.G, Noorani, President Zakir Hussain, 1967. Morarji Desai, The Story of my Life, Macmillan, Vol I, p.281. N. Sanjeeva Reddy, Without Fear or Favour, 1985., The Week, 8 February 1987. The Telegraph, 26 July 1987. The Hindu, 7 December 1992. The Hindu, 21 Aprl 1996.

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25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47

A.G. Noorani, Constitutional Questions in India, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp.265-281. Mainstream, 18 March 2005. The Hindustan Times, 3 June 2006. Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Years 1857-1948, Oxford University Press, 1968, pp, 236-237. Ibid. Chapter 8. A.G. Noorani article in Criterion quarterly , October-December 2006, pp.32-33. Jinnah: Speeches and Statements 1947-48, Oxford University Press, 2000, p.225. Allen Mcgrath The Destruction of Pakistans Democracy, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.67-68. Ayesha Jalal , The State of Marital Rule, Cambridge University Press, p.33. Ibid., p. 135. Ibid, pp.6 and 139-140. Dawn, 19 April 1953. Allen McGrath, The Destruction of Pakistans Democracy, p.97. Ibid., p.134. Ibid., p.159. Ibid., p.196. Mohammad Asghar Khan, Generals in Politics: Pakistan 1958-1982, Vikas, New Delhi, 1983, pp.6-7. Ibid., p.142, Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 712. Ibid.,pp.824-829. Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army, Oxford University Press, Third Edition, 2006, p.303. Ibid., p. 335. The Nation, 13 July 2002.

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Fundamentalism, Extremism and Islam

FUNDAMENTALISM, EXTREMISM AND ISLAM

(Prof.

Dr. Anis Ahmad)*

Abstract To call Muslims as fundamentalists and extremists is not a post 9/11 spillover. The basic concept of the term Fundamentalist has been changed for the Muslims, from the one who strictly adheres to the traditional orthodox belief of any kind, to an imaginary set-up of backward, primitive, uncivilized people who appear warlike, barbaric and cruel. It would be nave to ght this false perception with themes of soft image and enlightened moderation through vulgarization of the electronic media. The only rational solution in this perspective is a massive education programme, through which masses may practice and project an image of their true faith to the alien audience. -Editor) The terms extremism, fundamentalism and terrorism evoke images of Muslims. Whether they are Palestinian liberationists, Afghan mujahideen or Kashmiri freedom ghters; the worldwide perception of a Kalashnikov-wielding Muslim as a symbol of jihad is consistent. The global media has played its role in the development and projection of a stereotype image of Muslims and Islam as espousing violence, extremism, intolerance and dislike of non-Muslims. Violence anywhere in the world is, prima facie, considered an act inspired or acted upon by Muslims. The point of reference, for instance, for the term suicide bomber invariably falls on freedom ghters in Palestine, Kashmir or Iraq. They are portrayed as inventors of suicide bombing. No news coverage traces its origin to the heroic act of the Kamikaze, the World War II Japanese air-force suicide pilots, or the Tamil suicide bombers. Freedom ghters are never projected as human rights activists and heroes but as crazy terrorists. The viewers and listeners of global networks are never reminded of the atrocities and inhuman acts of religious madness committed earlier in Northern Ireland in the name of Christianity nor about the violence perpetrated in Sri Lanka by the Tamil Tigers. Historians and journalists never refer to the Tigers as Buddhist or Hindu suicide bombers. The French and American nuclear bombs are not given the title of Catholic or Protestant bombs but the term Islamic bomb is used without any hesitation. Muslims alone, unfortunately, are in focus when violence is reported. This perception of Muslims and Islam is not recent or a spill-over of the 9/11 episode. Over two centuries of a Euro-centric vision of history and
* Prof. Anis Ahmad, is a social scientist and Vice Chancellor of Riphah International University, Islamabad.

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civilization, colonization, imposition of western educational systems on the Muslim world and Christian missionary propaganda have cumulatively played a crucial role in the development of deep biases and distorted images of Islam. The onus, however, cannot be placed entirely on external factors. Some Muslims are equally responsible for this confusion. Four major trends can be identied over the past two centuries amongst Muslim intellectuals and leaders in the sub-continent that have contributed to the confusion. They are: (i) The successors of Shah Waliullah of Delhi (1703-1762) responded to the aggression against Muslims in the form of a jihad movement. Shah Waliullahs son was a famous scholar (and not the political authority of the time). Shah Abdul Aziz (1746-1824) issued a decree for jihad, which translated into a vibrant movement by the known heroes of the Muslim ummah or community, namely the grandson of Shah Waliullah, Shah Ismail Shaheed (1781-1831) and his murshid (spiritual guide), Syed Ahmad Shaheed (1782-1831). This movement, after the fall of the Peshawar Khilafat, was further extended by Haji Shariatullah (1770-1840) who founded the Faraidi movement of Bengal. The overall effect of this approach in the sub-continent was an armed struggle (jihad), against the oppressors and aggressors as a means to attain social change. Consequently a mindset developed which preferred jihad over other methodologies of change. The Balakot movement of Shah Ismail and Syed Ahmad Shaheed was, for some unknown reasons, referred to as a Wahhabi1 movement by western orientalists and writers. As a result, all jihad-related movements that followed were referred to as fundamentalist and extremist movements rather than movements for liberation from oppression and colonial rule. (ii) Muslim apologists tried to present an image of Islam as a mix of Christian, Buddhist and Jain pacism with focus on individual spirituality and religiosity. They interpreted jihad as a temporary and defensive method used in early Islamic history which was, in their view, no more needed nor was it relevant in the so called age of enlightenment, moderation and peace. While writing during European colonialism in the subcontinent and other places, these Muslim scholars sought to down-grade armed struggle or jihad and emphasized instead the spiritual dimension and mystical methods of purication of soul, as the essence of Islamic teachings. They questioned the viability of an Islamic political order. They also tried to underscore religious tolerance, observance of justice and fair treatment in the policies of the overseas imperialists and colonizers.

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(iii) An approach developed under the inuence of Shah Waliullah and Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938) emphasized a fresh interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet) through the process of ijtihad (systematic reasoning), in order to discover the Quranic and the Sunnah foundations of a new political, economic, social, legal and cultural order. This approach, based on the dynamic principle of ijtihad, tried to steer the Muslim community toward revival and resurgence of an Islamic polity and social order. This innovative and revivalist approach was led by Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) who is considered by some western writers as the most inuential Muslim personality of the twentieth century.2 This movement for islah (rejuvenation) and ijtihad focused on social, economic, political, legal and educational reform leading to the revival and re-assertion of the Muslim ummah. (iv) The traditionalists focused on a rather narrow religious view of Islam, i.e., observance of ibadat (worship), rituals and ceremonies. Political activity, being a worldly activity, was considered undesirable. They easily reconciled with the overseas colonisers so long as they were free to observe their religious rituals. The tableghi (teaching and propagating) Jamaat of Maulana Ilyas (1885-1944) represents this traditionalist approach. Iqbal ridiculed traditionalists in one of his couplets by saying that since the mulla (the cleric) is allowed to pray in India, the simpleton thinks Islam is free. The traditionalists and apologists have been considered as moderate and enlightened representatives of Islam by western authors, while the activist, revivalists or the ijtihadi movements, due to their desire for social change, have generally been categorized as fundamentalists and extremists. The Meaning of Fundamentalism The term fundamentalism is generally dened as strict adherence to the traditional orthodox belief of any kind.3 If we accept this rather general, therefore not so appropriate denition as valid we can easily call the believers in western liberal democracy and those who adhere to the capitalist world order as fundamentalists. Similarly, those who consider secularism as the only just social order may also fall into this category. Leaving the issue of denition aside, let us try to understand its origin in the context of history. The term fundamentalism historically originated in a purely Christian theological context. It was used in eighteenth century western European Christianity in reference to the Protestant churches such as the Evangelicals and Charismatic sects. Their basic doctrines included inerrancy of the Bible and the doctrines of a

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virgin birth and atonement. They believed in taking the Bible literally and rejected Darwins theory of evolution.4 Rapid development of the fundamentalist approach and its concomitant impact on society and state took place in the early twentieth century in the U.S. The Pentacostals, Presbytarians and Baptists heralded this movement. Several gatherings of Believers Meeting for Bible Study, were held between 1878-1914 at different places in the U.S. These included major cities like New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston and other places like Niagra and Northeld. In 1886 Dwilight L. Moody established a Bible Training School in Chicago. In 1908 a Bible Institute was founded in Los Angeles. In 1919 an international conference of Christian fundamentalists was called in Philadelphia, over 6 thousand participants resolved to establish the Worlds Christian Fundamentalists Association (WCFA). Institutional networking followed, and the Dallas Theological Seminary was founded by W.H. Grifth in 1924. The Independent Church of America was established in 1930. The Presbytarian Church of USA was established in 1931.5 The basic doctrines included four major beliefs: (i) Inerrancy of the Bible which implied literalism; taking the words of the Bible literally without any rational interpretation or exegesis. (ii) The doctrine that belief is a matter of dogma; one has to accept matters of faith without scientic and rational arguments. (iii) History has entered the sixth dispensation or church age in which, Jesus will re-appear. A precondition for his second coming is the reconstruction of the Temple of Solomon. This was only possible with the establishment of the state of Israel. Consequently, Christian fundamentalists, became lobbyists and advocates for the birth of the Zionist state of Israel by displacing the Palestinians who are even mentioned in the Old Testament as Philistines or original residents of the land before the Jewish migration into Palestine. (iv) Their conservatism did not allow them to welcome modernity. The rejection of modernity became their fourth outstanding character. In the American context they emerged as a sect that proudly called itself fundamentalist, but soon the term acquired a negative and pejorative connotation. Its impact on American politics and society is obvious. Today, it denotes an aggressive and condent religious movement which, in coalition with conservative political forces, seeks to combat what is regarded as a liberal take over of the state, family and church since the days of Roosevelts New Deal.6 Recent developments in U.S. foreign policy, particularly during Reagans and Bushs presidency, are evidence to the ascendancy of inuence and control of the neo-conservative or

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Christian fundamentalists. In this backdrop a scientic study published in an encyclopaedic work on fundamentalism claims that today 72 percent of Americans subscribe to the basic doctrines of Christian fundamentalism.7 Nevertheless, neocons are more vocal and critical of Muslim fundamentalism as a global threat to world peace. They fail to understand the danger of their own evangelical dogmatism. Use of the term for Muslims It is interesting to note that the term fundamentalism, with reference to Muslims, was used for the rst time in 1957 in The Middle East Journal. It soon became associated with conservative elements in Muslim society. Western orientalists, being well aware of Christian fundamentalism, without trying to discover the truth, emphatically interpreted any appeal for going back to the Quran and the Sunnah as a call for conservatism, a backward movement of history, a nostalgia for the past and the rejection of reform and modernity.8 Concurrent socio-political developments in the Muslim world, particularly the demand on the part of a majority of the people in newly liberated countries, for the introduction of Islamic Shariah (Divine commands) and for establishment of Islamic states further confused many who equated the call for Islamic state with fundamentalism. Sami Zubaida refers to this phenomenon as, modern political movements and ideas, mostly oppositional which seek to establish, in one sense or another, an Islamic state.i Any direct or indirect reference to Islamic states has been, therefore, generally interpreted by western scholars as a theocratic, despotic, authoritarian and undemocratic politicoreligious set up and, therefore, fundamentalist and extremist in nature. Use of the term fundamentalism for the Muslims and Islam became more common after the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979. Ayatullah Khomaini was projected as a blood thirsty cleric and the introduction of Islamic principles in a state was regarded as a retrogressive movement. Western media played a major role in building a negative image of Muslims and Islam as enemies of western culture and civilization. Even people such as the former Secretary General of NATO, in an interview, argued that, Muslim fundamentalism is at least as dangerous as communism once was. Please do not under estimate this risk.at the conclusion of this age it is a serious threat, because it represents terrorism, religious fanaticism and exploitation of social and economic justice.9. If the post 9/11 image of Muslims and Islam is examined in this backdrop, one can see a continuity in the biases, misconceptions and a systematic dissemination of negative propaganda by the western media from decades prior to 9/11. The projection of Islam and Muslims as a threat and no less a peril than communism soon became a common misgiving. Some scholars went a step further in attributing fundamentalist,

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terrorist and extremist tendencies not to some jihadi Muslims but to Islam. The underlying problem for the west is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of superiority of their culture and are obsessed with inferiority of their power.10 Western perception of Muslim fundamentalism is perhaps, also due to the claim made by an insignicant number of Muslims, who call themselves sala or followers of salaf al saleh (their pious elders). They consider the observance of a traditional ritualistic view of religion as a valid sign of religiosity. Presence of a marginalized group of persons who adhere to this understanding, however, does not mean that call for going back to the Quran and the sunnah, as such, means traditionalism. There is hardly a page of the Quran where it does not reject traditionalism and blind following of the elders. It invites all humans to use reason, observation, critical thinking, innovation and creativity. The Quran strikes at the mind-set of traditionalists who blindly consider the behaviour of their elders as ideal. Islams anti-ancestor worship and anti-traditionalism approach is also reected in its emphasis on ijtihad or nding new solutions for emerging problems. Christian fundamentalists imply, through their doctrine of inerrancy, that the scripture should be taken literally. They insist that meanings of the Bible are unchanging and, therefore, do not require exegesis or interpretation. The call to go back to the Bible, in its Christian context, therefore, means following the Bible literally. If for example the Bible refers to the creation of the world in a specic time-frame or if it declares God as Father or Jesus as Son, these words are not interpreted by them allegorically or metaphorically. With this cultural and intellectual background, when a researcher nds modern Islamic revivalist movements inspired by the Quran and the sunnah, this is interpreted as reversing the cycle of history and trying to go back to pre-industrial society. In actual fact, the Quran has not been taken literally by Muslims for at least the past fteen centuries of their history. An example may perhaps illustrate the point. The Quran in Surrah al Maidah says for the thief male and female, amputate their hand (5:37). If these clear, unambiguous and judiciously stated words of the Quran are to be taken literally then any person being robbed may take the law into his or her own hands. However, under Islamic law, even if the culprit is caught red-handed the victim cannot apply the Quranic command on at least three counts. First, execution of the Quranic legislation takes place through the courts and no individual can take law into his/her own hands. Second, the court, after thorough and proper investigation, has to establish that the theft was actually committed. Third, even when theft, prima face, is committed by the accused the court is required to determine the motive and circumstances which led that person to commit the crime. If there is

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even a slight doubt in the mind of the judge, the prophetic command is that it is better to err on the side of leniency and to give the benet of doubt to the accused rather than impose a harsh punishment on him. This shows that all Quranic commands are subject to rational interpretation, and a legal process. This is why some scholars of the Quran have elaborated its meanings from a purely legal view point; while others from a philosophic stance; and still some others from a literary view point. Some of the major libraries in the Muslim world contain hundreds of such tafasir (commentary). This shows Muslims have not only a highly developed tradition of exegesis but also that they do snot take the Quran literally. These exegesis, to mention only a few, include tafasir: al-Tabari, Ibn Kathir, al-Qurtabi, al-Baidawi, Zamakhshari, al-Mazhari etc. Modern tafasir include tafsir al-Manar, tafsir al-Johari, al-Bayan, Tafhim al-Quran, Tadabbur al-Quran, Muarif alQuran, Fizilal al-Quran, etc. Existence of these tafasir is evidence of the fact that by going back to the Quran a person does not become fundamentalist but learns how to approach the Quran rationally and scientically, from various points of view and by use of different methodologies. Despite this dynamic approach, Muslims and Islam are still projected as being inclined towards fundamentalism. It appears that most western scholars and some Muslim intellectuals, educated and trained in western educational institutions, have built their perceptions of Islam on a number of wrong suppositions. The secular capitalist societies of the west have developed their own social, economic and political institutions, substituting a number of traditional institutions which included the religious ones. As a result, the traditional role of religion ceased to exist. Consequently, anyone who adhered strictly to religion was considered retrogressive. Viewed from this perspective, people who believe that Islam is relevant and can be used to resolve contemporary issues, are categorized as fundamentalists, traditionalists and conservative. One major misgiving has been the nature of the Quran vis--vis Christian scripture. The Quran claims to be the divine revelation (wahi) or Allahs (S.W.T) speech (kalam), in other words, He is the author. The Bible, on the other hand, is a collection of twenty-seven books, written by different scribes who were inspired by their God. These books contain the history of Christianity and a record of hardly three years of the ministry of Jesus. The Bible, being a human creation and compilation, has also been subjected to a process of biblical criticism, demythologization and hermeneutical process.12 The Quran, however, is not a book of history and Allah is its author. It is not a collection of the Prophets assertions, mental projections, ideas, or teachings either. It is unique in the sense that every single word of the Quran is preserved and pronounced in its original form. Therefore, it is inappropriate to compare it

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with the Bible, or other religious scriptures like the Upanisads or Avestas. Being wahi, and not an inspiration, it is in a category of its own. Treatment of the Quran in the same way as Biblical criticism treats the Old and the New Testaments is, therefore, incorrect. An invalid premise can only lead to a wrong conclusion. Very few western writers have been able to understand this crucial point. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, is one such exception. He, very correctly, points out that if one is drawing parallels in terms of structure of the two religions what corresponds in the Christian scheme to the Quran is not the Bible but the person of Christ it is Christ who is for Christians the revelation of God.13 Bibilical scholars question the source of the Bible. The text has been revised several times and has gone through a process of evolution. The Quran on the other hand has one single source and that is Allahs revelation (wahi), preserved without gaps or a break in the chain of communication for the past fteen centuries. The Book itself calls its readers to use reason and critical and analytical methods in understanding and applying its principles, commands, directives, instructions and legal decrees. The Book directs its followers to always have a group of experts who involve themselves in deep understanding, tafaqquh, of its teachings in order to educate others. This leaves no room for dogmatic and literalist approaches. The more a person is aware of the meaning and message of the Quran, the more he or she becomes open-minded, critical and progressive. This unique aspect of the Quran is totally ignored when it is compared with the Bible. The third major misgiving which has inculcated a general bias about Islamic revivalist movements is the interpretation of their call for establishment of Islamic states. An Islamic state is usually visualized by western scholars as theocratic with no room for modernity. Where ever a demand is made for establishment of an Islamic state, or a reference is made to the glorious period of the Prophet or that of the rightly guided Khulafa (caliphs), the westernized mind assumes that it is a call for a backward movement of history. A question often raised is how a socioeconomic and political system developed in the seventh century can be applied in the twenty-rst century. The establishment of an Islamic state, consequently, is interpreted as an effort for revival of a pre-modern way of life. The west considers itself the ideal modern liberal society. This has generated the belief that non-westerners constitute a potential threat to western civilization. Scholars such as Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington tried to prove that in the western secular liberal democracy and in the capitalist economic order mankind has reached the end of history and climax of culture and civilization. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union is interpreted as an ideological victory that placed capitalism as the ultimate world order. It is also claimed that progress and development can only take place when the western model is adopted. In a

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supposedly post-modern age, a Muslim discourse on revival of Islamic society and state is interpreted by the westernized mindset as a revolt against the west. This dogma of the perpetual supremacy of the secular capitalist order is emphatically expressed by Huntington: only when Muslims explicitly accept the western model will they be in a position to technicalize and then to develop.13 Muslim fundamentalism has also been closely linked by the west with the economic backwardness in the Islamic world. The impact of Marxian and Freudian views on religion, as a transitory phase in the evolution of human society is visible, according to Huntingtons analysis, in the Muslim mind. He considers Muslim fundamentalism only a symptom of a more serious problem, namely Islams assertion as a movement for an ethical paradigm shift. Huntington assumes that the major reason for the clash of Islamic people with the west is the perception that they have been deprived of economic and political power. He is of the view that besides economic and political frustrations prevalent among the Muslims, Islam as a faith and culture is responsible for this clash. The underlying problem for the west, he believes, is not Islamic fundamentalism but Islam because Muslims are convinced of the superiority of their culture but obsessed with the inferiority of their power. This shift of emphasis from Muslim fundamentalism to Islam is a typical western exclusivist approach which divides humanity into two watertight compartments i.e., the west and the rest. It will be naive to think that this western perception of Islam and Muslims, as political rivals and a serious threat is a post-9/11 phenomenon. It has a long historical background. Martin Luther (1483-1546), the sixteen century reformer, had a similar vision of Islam as a violent and fundamentalist religion. He is reported to have called it a movement of violence in the service of the anti-christ it can only be resisted by the sword, and even that with difculty.15 The end of the Cold War generated speculation among policy planners and think tanks in the U.S. on the next rival of the sole superpower in an emerging unipolar world. The two obvious candidates were the yellow threat and the green threat. A study, entitled The Green Threat, done by Leon Harder, Bureau Chief of the Jerusalem Post, was published by the Cato Institute in Washington D.C.16 It suggested that militant Islam was knocking at the doors of Washington and London. The Economist invented the term fundie17 for the breed of Muslims who, inspired by the Khomeni model of revolution, were prepared to wage war against western civilization. They were also described as home grown terrorists implying that extremist violence is endemic to Islamic teachings. The thesis advanced by Huntington, considered by some at that time as science ction, gradually took tangible shape as a war between Christianity and Islam. The latter was publicly declared the new enemy of secular liberal democracy, the United

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States and the west. The sequence of writings in the European media on the subject is intriguing.18 One can see how a fear syndrome develops into a justication for pre-emptive strike against the ctional genie of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. When viewed in this larger context, the two U.S. invasions of Iraq, and the World Trade Centre and Twin Towers debacles appear as episodes of a strategic plan and has given rise to conspiracy theories. The emergence of Islamic movements, in the post-colonial period, and global Islamic awakening, at an intellectual level, was construed by the west as a fundamentalist, militant and revolutionary movement similar to those of Bolshevism, Fascism and Nazism in Europe during the rst half of the twentieth century. The erroneous perception of a so-called green threat emerged. The former Secretary General of NATO, in an interview, regarded it similar to the threat previously posed by communism.19 The message conveyed was unambiguous. Western writers and the media projected Islam and the Muslims as a great threat to democracy, secularism, western cultural values and civilization. This implied that if Muslim masses are allowed to realize their vision of Islamic society and state, the west and, by implication, the whole world would be in turmoil. Therefore, the United States had a prime moral responsibility to pre-empt this danger.20 Edward Saeed had foreseen the emergence of this mindset more than two and half decades ago when he spoke of the misconceptions of the US and the west about Islam and the Muslims as .a resurgent atavism, which suggests not only the threat of a return to the Middle Ages but the destruction of what is regularly referred to as the democratic order in the Western World.21 It is not easy to assess the extent to which misconceptions of Islam and Muslims played a role in repeated violations of international law, the occupation of territory through war and the massacre of hundreds of thousands of civilians. It is unfortunate that in a globalized age in which instant communication facilities, high-tech systems and on line access to information are readily available, both ordinary citizens and the policy makers in the west and the US, know very little about Islam and Muslims. Michael Suleiman, in his scientic study of how Arabs and Muslims are presented in high school textbooks in the U.S, brings to light a hidden dimension of misinformation. He concludes that Arabs and Muslims are projected in text books as .backward, primitive, uncivilized, people who. appear warlike, powerful, barbaric and cruel22 This early impression of Muslims and Islam, fed through the education system, is not easy to erase. The lack of authentic information or conscious misinformation about Islam and the Muslims, re-enforced by a media war, helped create a belief in the west that the world of Islam has a terrorist infrastructure; a global network of Islamic

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jihad which has declared a holy war against the west. The truth, however, is that in the Quran and the sunnah there is no concept of holy war or Harb almuqaddas. The term harb al Muqaddas does not appear even once in the Quran or the sunnah. Many inuential Muslims believe that historically the US policy in the Middle East is directly responsible for the violent reactions in the region. Added to it is the fanciful portrayal of Islam as a potent, capable and vigorous enemy by the Neo-con policy planners of the US.23 An assertion, repeated ad nauseam, is that fundamentalism leads to extremism and terrorism. It has already been noted that Islam, which in essence is the Quran and sunnah, rejects fundamentalism and inculcates a critical, rational and balanced approach to all aspects of human existence. Then why is the religion unthinkingly blamed for instigating extremism and terrorist violence? The historical roots of this problem are generally traced back to colonization, during the 18th and the 19th centuries, of a signicant portion of the Muslim world by European imperialism. The struggle for independence from colonialism was, by and large, non-violent. Nevertheless during the post-independence period several Muslim states at the behest of the west were engaged in armed conicts in the Middle East and South Asia. The US supported the armed struggle to drive the Soviet occupation forces out of Afghanistan. This perhaps provided an incubating ground for people who were at rst lauded as mujahideen heroes by the White House, but later castigated as militants, jihadis, Taliban and alQaidah.. The success of the irregular mujahideen over the properly trained Soviet troops gave them condence in their ability to struggle against what they perceive as illegitimate, oppressive and corrupt regimes within their own societies and also to combat the occupation of Islamic territories notably Palestine, Kashmir, Iraq and Afghanistan. The governments in Kabul and Baghdad are seen as surrogate puppet regimes supported by the US and the west. The possible fragmentation of Iraq along sectarian fault-lines, as demonstrated by the increasingly recurrent violence created between the Shiias and the Sunnis, is considered a consequence of the invasion and occupation of the country. Furthermore concepts such as preemptive strike and regime change to promote democratization are construed as interference and constitute a major cause of extremist violence. The perpetrators believe that they are the victims of aggression. This does not, however, imply hatred of the west, Christianity or any other faith. Richard Nixon observed in his tenth and posthumously published book, Beyond Peace, that a clash between Islam and the west was not inevitable but could become a self-fullling prophesy if the Muslims believe that the world has double standards in instances in which they are the victims of violence and aggression. He

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cited the example of Serbian shelling of Sarajevo in 1994:

It is an awkward but undeniable truth that had the citizens of Sarajevo been predominantly Christian of Jewish, the civilized world would not have permitted the siege to reach the point it did on February 5, when a Serbian shell landed in a crowded market place. In such an instance, the West would have acted quickly and would have been right in doing so.24

The US-led west has been strangely wayward in its declaratory policy of promoting democracy. Authoritarian regimes and absolute monarchies in the Muslim world have been supported for no better reason than their secular pretensions. Oppressive rulers who do not draw their legitimacy from their own people, help in increasing the gap between the poor, the middle class and the rich. Economic and social injustice and non-representative regimes create frustration and sense of alienation among the youth. This gives rise to violence and extremism in society. Unless a meaningful and substantial shift is made in the prevailing policy of the west and those patronized by it, terrorism and extremism will continue to grow. Terrorism and the Right to self-determination The contemporary western discourse on terrorism usually does not draw a line between the inalienable right of those who are denied their freedom and security. The struggle for liberation of their land for example, cannot be compared with terrorist acts. An ad-hoc committee of the United Nations General Assembly, in 1973 commissioned three groups to dene terrorism. The Non-Aligned group dened terrorism as acts of violence committed by a group of individuals which endanger human lives and jeopardize fundamental freedom, the effects of which are not conned to one state. This should not however affect the inalienable right to self-determination under the colonial and racial regimes.25 In 1987 the Secretary General of the U.N. convened an International Conference to dene terrorism and to differentiate it from freedom struggle. The conference made a clear distinction between terrorism and a freedom struggle against racist and foreign rulers and exempted freedom movements from committing any crime of terrorism.z The history of freedom struggles shows that use of brutal force against freedom ghters has only produced more violence and terrorism. Unless the root cause, i.e. denial of right to self-determination, is removed, violence and use of force cannot be eliminated from society. On the contrary, use of brutal force by the US, NATO or any foreign powers against natives of Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan will only increase violence in society. Fundamentalism and Extremism, appear to be closely related, but in general

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these terms are used in the context of religious extremism and dogmatism. Their use has become more frequent with reference to Islam and, more specically, contemporary Islamic revivalist movements although the essence of revivalism lies in ijtihad or rejection of conservatism and traditionalism. Nevertheless the call for going back to the Quran and the Sunnah by the revivalist movements is mistaken by their critics as a call for traditionalism. In the context of Pakistan, Iqbal and Maududi, complemented each other in their concern for ijtihad in the socioeconomic and political realms. They shared a desire to reconstruct the methodology for social change. They were critical of traditionalism and conservatism. How to ght fundamentalism and extremism in Pakistan In view of the specic situation in Pakistan, introduction of so-called liberal enlightened moderation through vulgarization of the electronic media, or holding of fashion shows in the name of promoting a soft image cannot serve the purpose of defeating extremism. On the contrary, it has the potential of generating a stern populist backlash. This is because 97 percent of the countrys people are Muslims and will not countenance what they perceive to be a violation of their religious norms. This obscurantism is largely due to the failure through the decades of the countrys leadership, whether civilian or military, in realizing the Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnahs , dream of building and Islamic state based on religions teachings of social justice, economic equitability and a just political order. Pakistan, therefore, is essentially an ideological state in which religion occupies centre-stage. Successive governments since Pakistans independence in 1947, have exploited Islam for no higher motive than the dictates of political expediency. Thus it was none other than a mainstream secular political party, when it faced a public outcry against poll rigging and its autocratic rule, that prohibited liquor and prostitution, declared Qadianis as non-Muslims, introduced Friday as a holiday and included articles 227 and 230 in the countrys constitution. Similarly the so called Islamization under a subsequent army ruler was basically motivated to ensure political survival. This demonstrates that the people of Pakistan attach enormous importance to their ideological foundation and can even be exploited when Islam is in focus. While we must condemn the political use of Islam by the civilian or army dictators, the fact remains that in Pakistan, Islam is a central factor in the life of its people. This is why the card of sectarianism has been exploited through the decades by the so-called religious parties under state patronage. The rulers, irrespective of being civilian or otherwise, have supported and protected these sectarian parties for their own survival. In other words sectarian violence and extremism in

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the nal analysis, is not theological or religious but essentially political and often motivated by self-interest of the rulers. The question remains how to resolve the interrelated issues of extremism, sectarian violence and fundamentalism. The analysis in this paper makes it abundantly clear that, at a conceptual level, fundamentalism has no place in the Quran and sunnah though it may exist among some Muslim groups. We have also looked into the historical origins of fundamentalism in European and the American Christian sects resulting in the rise of the Neo-con, Christian fundamentalists in the U.S. Islam in essence does not welcome fundamentalism or ghulu i.e. extremism. Nevertheless the ground realities are that Muslim societies are projected as intolerant, extremist and fundamentalist. Can the use of force whether in South Waziristan, Baluchistan or any where else eliminate the threat of a fundamentalist take over of Pakistan. Has brutal force anywhere in the world including Iraq and Afghanistan, been able to bring peace and supremacy of the law? T h e solution, in my view, lies is a long term educational reorientation of the people and rulers of the country. An educational strategy alone can help in solving the problem. The above analysis shows that besides certain historical biases, one major cause of lopsided U.S. policy toward the Muslim world, is its lack of proper understanding of Islam and Islamic movements. In the case of Pakistan too, the lack of proper Islamic education, misinformation about Islam, and the political exploitation of the religious sentiments of the masses are major negative factors responsible for extremism. This is why an educational methodology, though long term, is the key to the solution of the problem. This can bottle the genie of extremism and fundamentalism gradually but surely. We are convinced that limited and distorted knowledge of Islam as communicated by different interest groups is a major cause of sectarian tension in Pakistan. If we only expose our coming generation, directly, to the Quran and the sunnah, we can bring a change in the community. The answer is very simple. The coming generation in Pakistan should be required to have a complete cover to cover, reading of the Quran and its meaning in the Urdu and English languages, along with translation of one of the six canonical books of hadith. This will provide every citizen of Pakistan the knowledge of the basic Islamic teachings of honesty, love, social justice, fair play and tolerance. Once they directly understand the message of the Quran and the sunnah, no emotionally charged speeches of Imams or mujtahids will be able to persuade them to act violently. It will bring a qualitative change in the attitude and behaviour pattern of the people. They will discover how to live with dignity and respect for others. Only then can genuine cultural pluralism be established and accepted. Since the 97 percent of the people in Pakistan are Muslims, it would only be

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democratic and logical to let them understand directly what they claim to believe. It is also important to understand that the 3 percent population which may not believe in Islam, should also know the basic belief of the 97 percent people with whom they have to interact and deal with. It should be borne in mind that the teachings of the Quran are not particular to Muslims. The universal teachings of the Quran and the sunnah have relevance for all human beings though they are not obliged to practice and follow them strictly. The Quran claims it is for the whole of humanity and that it contains teachings which are universal and shared by earlier religions. One major cause of religious extremism is exclusivism, which generates selfrighteousness, a bias against others, and a sense of superiority. This can be easily resolved if extensive interaction takes place among the teachers and students of our deeni madaris (seminaries) through educational visits and activities. Mutual interaction will widen their horizon and allow them to discover that the so-called differences are minimal while commonality is enormous. It is also important that instead of trying to secularize the deeni madaris, trust and condence is built and they contribute in the effort to minimize sectarian tension and conict. Any attempt to secularize the madaris is bound to cause serious reaction, which will strengthen the forces of extremism. A culture of research and investigation, on the other hand, should be encouraged among their students and faculty members. This will water down the rhetorical and theological approach and encourage the coming generation to use tools of rational analysis and develop a critical mindset. The media too has to play an educative role and act responsibly. It should not conne itself to entertainment. While focusing on the common bond of Islam, the media should encourage an on going dialogue between the various sections of society including madhhabi madaris (sects). An open discussion on issues such as violence, extremism and fundamentalism will ultimately allow participating scholars and their viewers to develop a balanced approach and attitude toward others. These few steps can bring a behaviour change and create respect and understanding within the members of society in Pakistan. It needs to be emphasized that religion for centuries, has played a vital role in creating love, harmony and tolerance among people of differing faiths. While some persons could, by choice, become fundamentalist, extremist or violent, religion remains a source of love, respect and ethical and moral behaviour. The true teachings of the Quran and sunnah, when properly internalized will enlighten the followers and make them moderate and balanced. Lack of knowledge of the Quran and the sunnah will only make people vulnerable to emotional calls

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and half-truths in the name of sectarianism. Our major problem is a lack of knowledge and morality. If we only develop a knowledge-based society with a commitment to global Islamic ethical values we can easily overcome and minimize our biases, sectarian conicts, extremism and fundamentalist tendencies. Islamic revivalist movements, being educational in their essence, have a moral and ethical responsibility in the development of a strategy to achieve this objective.

REFERENCES
1 An euphemism for an orthodox interpretation of Islam attributed to Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab (1703-1787) the ideological guide and source of inspiration for the present Saudi Arabian rulere. Charles J. Adams, Mawdudi and the Islamic State, in John L.Espasido ed. Voices of Resurgent Islam, New York, Oxford University Press, 1983, p.99. The Readers Digest Great Encyclopedic Dictionary, London, Oxford University Press, 1962, Vol. I, p.353. David A, Martin, Fundamentalism, in William Outhwaite and Tom Bottaman ed. The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth Century Social Thought, London, Blackwell, 1993, p. 238. Nancy T. Ammerman, North American Protestant Fundamentalism, in Martin E. Marty & R. S. Applby ed. Fundamentalism Observed, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1991, Vol. I. pp. 20-29. Lionel Caplan, Studies in Religious Fundamentalism, London, Macmillan, 1987, p.1. Nancy T. Ammerman, North American Protestant Fundamentalism, in Martin E. Marty et. al. Fundamentalism Observed, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1991, Vol. I, p.2. W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity, London, Routledge, 1988, pp.23. Sami Zubaida, The Quest for the Islamic State: Fundamentalism in Egypt and Iran, in Lionel Caplan, Studies in Religious Fundamentalism, London, Macmillan, 1987, p.25. Willi Claes, Secretary General of NATO, TV interview reported by Inter Press Service, 18 February 1995. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, London, Penguin, 1006, p.217. Albert J, Nevins, ed. The Maryknour Catholic Dictionary, New York, Dimension Books, 1965, p.556; also William R. Farmer, The Synoptic Problem, New York, Macmillan, 1964. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, p.26. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, London, Penguin Books, 1996, p.7. Albert Hourani, Europe and the Middle East, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980, p.10. Ahmad Moussalli, Islamic Fundamentalism Myths and Realities, Reading UK., Garnet Publishing Co., 1998, p.5. Fear of Fundie, The Economist, 15 February 1992, pp.45-46. See David Ignatius, Islam in the Wests Sights: The Wrong Crusades? Washington Post, 8

2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

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19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

March 1992; Muslim Militant Big Concern, New York Times, 1 January 1992; The US Fears Sudan Becoming Terrorist, Washington Post. 31 January 1992; Timothy D. Sisk, Islam and Democracy, Washingto DC, US Peace Institute Press, 1992; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 No. 3, Summer 1993, pp 22-49; Judith Miller The Challenge of Radical Islam, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.2, 1993; Bernard Lewis, Islam and Liberal Democracy, The Atlantic Monthly, February 1993, pp.89-98. Welli Clares, NATO Secretary General, TV interview by Inter Press Service, 18 February 1995. Augustin Richard Norton, ed. Civil Society in the Middle East, London, Brill, 1995, Chapter threee Modern Fundamentalist Discourse on Civil Society, Pluralism and Democracy. Edward Saeed, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How we see the Rest of the World, New York, Pantheon Books, 1981, p.51. Michael Suleiman, The Arabs in the Mind of America, Brattleboro,Vt., Amana Books, 1988, p.2 Steve Emerson, Political Islam promotes Terrorism, in Paul A. Winters, ed. Islam: opposing viewpoints, San Diego, Greenhaven Press, 1995, p. 161. Richard Nixon, Beyond Peace, Random House, New York, 1994, p.154. Proceedings of the 28th Session of the UN General Assembly U.N.A./9028/1973. UN report A/42/832, resolution of the Sixth Committee of the 94th meeting of the General Assembly, 7 December 1987.

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OIC RETROSPECT AND PROSPECTS (Tayyab Siddiqui)*

Abstract (It is frustrating that 57 Muslim countries, in possession of 70 percent of the world energy resources and 40 percent of the available raw material, should record only ve per cent of the world GDP. The failure of the Muslim world to embrace modern technology and spread education is obvious with only 500 PhDs being produced annually as compared to 3,000 in India and 5,000 in the UK. Although most Muslim countries gained independence from their colonial masters only after World War II, an organization like Organization of Islamic Countries, created in 1969, has the potential of providing them the right leadership in their collective perception, only if it is restructured in accordance with the present challenges.Editor) Introduction The decline of Muslim power and prestige after World War II accompanied by the agony caused by the creation of the state of Israel on Palestinian lands inspired Muslim intellectuals and scholars to appeal for the creation of an institution to identify the malaise aficting the Islamic world and to seek strength through unity and solidarity among Muslim ranks. Earlier, visionaries like Iqbal, Jamaludin Afghani and religious scholars such as Syed Qutub and Hasan Al-Banna had red the Muslim imagination with precepts and schemes supported by Quranic injunctions as a panacea to the problems besetting the ummah (Muslim community). However, ethnic differences, varied historical experiences, political polarization and, above all, differing idealistic impulses rendered them mere pious dreams. Historically, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) symbolizes the rst tangible evidence of the yearning for Islamic unity. It came into existence in response to the arson by Zionists in August 1969 of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem - the rst qibla (direction of prayer) of the Muslims and their third holiest shrine. Twenty-ve Muslim states participated in a summit convened by King Hasan of Morocco in 1969. The outcome of the Rabat Summit was the establishment of the OIC. Today, the organization has 57 members. The initial mandate of the OIC was to liberate Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa from
* Tayyab Siddiqui is a former ambassador of Pakistan.

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Zionist occupation. Its Charter, adopted on 27 February 1970 stressed Islamic solidarity, strengthening of cooperation in the political, economic, social, cultural and scientic elds and support for all Muslim peoples to safeguard their dignity, independence and national rights. To achieve these objectives and coordinate its actions, a secretariat was set up in Jeddah and a number of committees were established to promote and accelerate cooperation in diverse elds - political, economic, social and scientic. It was further decided that OIC heads of states/governments would meet every three years to consider plans and proposals for strengthening ties among member states and to coordinate their response to contemporary developments, while preserving their individual political and cultural identities. The OIC Charter The OIC Charter, approved in March 1972, included a commitment to act through all means, both political and military, for the liberation of the Holy City of Al-Quds from Zionist occupation. It also reiterated the Islamic states resolve to act in unison for the establishment of world peace, and reafrmed their commitment to the United Nations Charter and to fundamental human rights. The OIC Charter was registered at the United Nations on 1 February 1974. The main objectives of the Charter were to:1 1. Strengthen : a. Islamic solidarity among Member States. b. Cooperation in the political, economic, social, cultural and scientic elds. c. The struggle of all Muslim people to safeguard their dignity, independence and national rights. 2. Coordinate action to: a. Safeguard Islamic Holy Places. b. Support the struggle of the Palestinian people and assist them in recovering their rights and liberating their occupied territory. 3. Work to: a. Eliminate racial discrimination and all forms of colonialism. b. Create a favourable atmosphere for the promotion of cooperation and understanding between Member States and other countries. The Charter also enumerates the principles governing OIC activities, namely: Full equality among Member States. Support for the right to self-determination and non-interference in the internal affairs of Member States. Support for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of each

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State. The settlement of any dispute that might arise among Member States by peaceful means such as negotiations, mediation, conciliation and arbitration. A pledge to refrain, in relations among Member States, from resorting to force or threatening to resort to the use of force against the unity and territorial integrity or the political independence of any one of them.2

Main Bodies and Committees The OIC is composed of two main bodies: The Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government, which is the supreme authority of the Organization which meets once every three years to lay down the Organizations policy; and The Conference of Foreign Ministers, which meets once a year to examine progress on the implementation of its decisions taken within the framework of the policy dened by the Islamic Summit. The OIC set up a number of committees to ensure the coordination of its activities and the attainment of optimal results in all elds of political, economic, social, scientic and intellectual cooperation. The main committees include the Al Quds, the Standing Committee for Information and Cultural Affairs, Committee for Economic and Trade Cooperation and Scientic and Technological Cooperation.3 Fifteen of the committees are concerned with various political issues, such as Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc. The others relate to cultural, scientic, economic, legal, nancial, technical, educational, informational, social and human affairs institutions. Their headquarters have been distributed among various Islamic capitals.4 Evaluation It has been stated above that the creation of the OIC at the Rabat Summit was primarily in response to the situation created by the sacrilege of Al Quds. Hence, the resolution adopted on 25 September 1969 while reafrming the fraternal and spiritual bonds existing between their peoples, declared full support to the Palestinian people for the restitution of their rights and in their struggle for national liberation. It asked the international community to secure the speedy withdrawal of Israeli military forces from all the territories occupied as a result of the war of June 1967. Organizational issues occupied the next few years. The OICs Secretariat was set up in March 1970 and two years later, its Charter was approved (in March 1972). Subsequent developments in the Middle East, particularly the Ramadan

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War of October 1973, forced the OIC to embrace all issues relating to the ummah and to broaden its canvas of activities. The October 1973 war had not only restored the pride of Arabs but oil diplomacy had forced the European nations to take a second look at their pro-Israel policies. It was against this background that the second summit was held in Lahore in February 1974. The Lahore Summit was a landmark in the political struggle of Muslims to secure an inuential role in international affairs. The leadership provided by Zulkar Ali Bhutto and the presence of Arab leaders like King Faisal, Sadat, Qadda, Boumedienne, and Arafat, among 37 heads of states/governments participating in the Summit, conferred on it a unique importance. The Summit decided to address the following issues: i. eradication of poverty, disease and ignorance from Islamic countries; ii. regulation of the terms of trade between developed countries and developing Muslim countries especially the supply of raw materials and import of manufactured goods and know-how; iii. ensuring the sovereignty and full control of developing countries over their natural resources; and iv. mutual economic cooperation and solidarity among Muslim countries. It was also decided to establish a committee of eight countries, including Pakistan, to devise ways and means for attainment of these objectives. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was recognized as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinians and it was declared that the Arab cause is the cause of all countries which oppose aggression and will not tolerate that the use of force be rewarded by territory or by other gains. The OIC has, till now, held 10 summits interspersed at regular three-year intervals and numerous meetings at the ministerial and expert levels to oversee summit decisions. Unfortunately, these summits have been characterized more by empty rhetoric than concrete action. Through the years, the conguration of political and economic forces in international affairs has rendered the Muslim states more vulnerable and their leaders increasingly dependent on the U.S. for their survival. This has emasculated the OIC and weighed heavily on its decisions. Its leaders nd themselves in a quandary. They are unable or unwilling to exert any meaningful pressure on the US-led west, regarded as allies of Israel, to mitigate the hardships of the Muslim people living in the occupied territories. The mid-70s were the unprecedented but short-lived years of Arab ascendancy and prestige. The diplomatic inuence and political clout of the Arab countries was in evidence with dramatic triumphs in the U.N. Arabic was accepted as one of the ofcial UN languages. The General Assembly recognized the Palestinian people as the principal party to the question of Palestine. Arafat was invited to address the

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General Assembly on 13 November 1974 and the PLO was given observer status at the U.N. In the same year, the UNGA established a Committee on the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people. Thus, the Palestinian issue was placed in focus, drawing increasing international attention and support. The Arab achievements in the U.N. were crowned with the adoption of UNGA Resolution 3379 of 10 November 1975 by which the General Assembly determined that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination. The Resolution was adopted with 72 in favour, 35 against and 32 abstentions. With Zionism as its ideology, the reaction in Israel was severe and it campaigned hard to have the resolution annulled. The opportunity came in 1991. Israel, with the encouragement of the U.S. and European states, declared its intention to get 3379 revoked. The OIC Summit held in Senegal in August 1991 took note of these efforts and passed a unanimous resolution to defeat Israeli efforts in the U.N. by voting for the continuation of 3379. The Israeli resolution, when moved in the UNGA after a couple of weeks, was carried and the majority of OIC member states either abstained or voted for the resolution. This was illustrative of the hypocrisy of Muslim potentates of playing to the domestic gallery while keeping the U.S. in good humour. Since the establishment of the OIC, the Islamic world has suffered ve major catastrophes, which have reduced it to almost a non-factor in international politics. The break up of Pakistan through armed intervention by India in 1971, the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982 that led to yet another Palestinian diaspora, the IranIraq war, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the US occupation of Iraq have dealt a crippling blow to the unity, dignity and image of the Muslim world. The OIC failed to respond meaningfully to any of these crises or demonstrate unity other than issuing high-sounding declarations at the end of each summit. In some cases, the OIC even remained a silent spectator. This attitude not only disappointed Muslims around the world, but also encouraged the Organizations adversaries to pursue their designs against Muslim countries with impunity. The history of the Palestine problem, ostensibly the raison dtre of the OIC, is a living testimony to the impotence and paralysis of the Organisation. The Palestine issue is now no longer seen as the vacation of the occupied territories by Israel and restoration of the inalienable rights of the Palestinians, but has been re-designated as a struggle between terrorists (Palestinians) and civilians (Israelis). The creeping annexation has eroded all possibilities of any settlement as Israeli policies have completely marginalised the Palestinians. The OIC also espoused the Kashmir and Afghanistan issues, but failed to play any important or signicant role in their resolution. The gathering of potentates at

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OIC summits and their empty calls for unity of action initially stirred Muslim hearts, but soon it became obvious that these speeches, laced with rhetoric and insincere sentiments, were meaningless and of no use for confronting the challenges faced by the Islamic ummah. On the Kashmir issue, the OIC has failed to muster the courage to challenge New Delhis policies of repression and widespread violation of human rights in Indian-held Kashmir. The inaction and indifference on Israeli massacres in Sabra and Shattila (Beirut 1982), in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992) and the recent US military intervention and brutalities in Iraq and Afghanistan have, many believe, rendered the OIC totally irrelevant to the needs and requirements of ummah. The resolutions adopted by the OIC thus betray a lack of seriousness and sincerity and hence carry no meaning or signicance, thereby accentuating the frustration of the ummah. The underlying causes of the inability of the OIC to be reckoned with as an institution of political signicance in global affairs, besides the lack of political will of Muslim leaders, have originated from a lack of democratic set-up in those states, in addition to structural weaknesses, such as an absence of an institutional framework, poverty and illiteracy, and failure to recognize the absolute importance of science and technology for social emancipation and economic development. 10th Summit Kuala Lampur The OIC summit held in Putrajaya, Malaysia in 2003 was a milestone in the history of the OIC. Under the leadership of then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad, the leaders decided to make a realistic appraisal of the international situation and the role that the OIC could play to preserve and protect the interests of member-states against a sustained negative media campaign and political pressures circumscribing their economic and political rights. It was decided to dispassionately analyse the causes of decline and decay of Muslim societies and the political marginalization of the member-states, and evolve a comprehensive strategy to pull them out of this morass. President Musharraf, who led the Pakistan delegation to the summit in Malaysia, urged all Muslims in support of Mahathirs appeal. In a stirring message, President Musharraf outlined the existing realities. He referred to turbulent and troubled international developments. The world is in turmoil. Reliance on military action and force dene solutions to world disputes. Foreign occupation persists. Suppression of peoples has intensied. Power asymmetries are widening. Terrorism is taking its toll. Economic recession threatens the world fabric. Poverty is growing. Inequality is increasing. In the context of this world view, President Musharraf warned that the Muslim

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world was in the vortex of this emerging global crisis. Most of those under foreign occupation were Muslim peoples. He cited the tragedies of Palestine and Kashmir. Islamic nations are perceived as the sponsors of terrorism and proliferators of WMDs. Muslims are subjected to discrimination and exclusion. The insidious thesis of an inevitable clash of civilizations between Islam and the West is being openly propounded.5 Making this bold and frank analysis of ground realities and the political climate, he exorted some soul-searching and stock-taking by the Muslim countries since he believed that the crisis confronting the Islamic world was both external and internal. It is rooted in our own weaknesses and vulnerabilities. It ows from our economic, social and human underdevelopment, from dependencies and vulnerabilities, from the divisions and differences within, and amongst our societies and nests. Musharrafs diagnosis of Islamic inertia and weaknesses touched the hearts of all participants. His message, that we are at a dening moment in history. We can either seize the moment and dene history, or we can let the moment dene our destiny. We must turn challenge into opportunity, resonated in Muslim capitals. The 10th Summit accordingly asked the Chairman to constitute an OIC Commission of Eminent Persons (CEP) in order to nalize recommendations on the following three areas: i) to prepare a strategy and plan of action enabling the Islamic Umma to meet the challenges of the 21st century; (ii) to prepare a comprehensive plan for promotion universally and in particular, within Islamic societies, policies and programmes for instilling enlightened moderation; (iii) to prepare recommendations for reform and restructuring of the OIC system. The CEP held three sessions and prepared detailed recommendations which were approved by the ICFM meeting in Sana (Yemen) in May 2005, and submitted to the Makkah Summit. The recommendations consisted of three parts: (i) challenges of the 21st century (ii) policies and programmes for promoting enlightened moderation, and (iii) OIC reform and restructuring. The recommendations to meet the political challenge of the 21st century relate to good governance, transparency and accountability, strengthening democracy, civil society, political participation and respect for human rights.6 Challenges of the 21st Century Political Recommendations of the CEP Challenges 1. Continued marginalization of the Ummah in inuencing and setting the

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international agenda; 2. Widening gap between the ruler and the ruled in Muslim societies that have ramications on politics, economy and culture of the Ummah; 3. Inability of the Muslim countries to practice good governance and transparency. Recommendations 1. Emulate and implement universal good practices including combating corruption, and promoting accountability and transparency in the public and private sector; 2. Study good practices among OIC members on governance including ways of promoting capacity building among less developed OIC countries; 3. Strengthen democracy, civil society, political participation and respect for human rights; 4. Increase activity of member states in the UN and other organizations; 5. Support candidates of member countries to positions in international organizations; 6. Increase activity in the UN reform process including endeavors to seek adequate representation in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC); 7. More proactive coordination to promote the just causes of the occupied Muslim peoples; 8. Improve the situation of Muslim communities/minorities outside OIC membership; 9. Draw up a plan for OIC unity to gradually integrate in the future like other regional entities which could enable the Ummah to meet the challenges and demands of globalization in the 21st century. SECURITY Challenges 1. 2. 3. 4. Conict within and among Muslim nations. Foreign occupation of Muslim lands. Tensions arising from Muslim minority status in a number of countries. Extremist tendencies due to feelings of injustice, hopelessness and desperation.

Recommendations 1. Promote Condence Building Measures (CBMs) and develop a system of collective security that all Muslim countries could bind themselves together internationally to avoid border disputes and conict;

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2. Reactivate the decision to establish an Islamic Court of Justice. 3. Check the tendency of a fringe within the Ummah to resort to terrorism and violence through various means, including: a. Persuading the big powers to address the root causes of terrorism and intensifying coordination within OIC for combating terrorism; and b. Encouraging interpretations of Islam which emphasize peace and non violence and popularizing principles or programmes which promote a balanced, contemporary comprehensive and inclusive Islamic civilization. ECONOMIC Challenges 1. Failure to promote and implement sustainable development policies in the OIC world; 2. Failure to eradicate poverty, corruption, disease, and the lack of basic rights and the provision of basic needs; 3. Failure to develop strong economic cooperation despite vast natural and human resources; 4. Globalization and the need to deal with its negative effects. Recommendations 1. Address poverty eradication through measures such as capacity building, micro credit schemes, small and medium enterprises and land reform among other programmes; 2. Promote economic cooperation and coordination among member countries to enable them to plan and sustainably manage their environment and natural resources efciently, leading eventually to greater economic integration; 3. Sign and ratify all existing intra-OIC trade and economic agreements; 4. Encourage economic regional integration and development through free trade agreements, customs unions, common markets and other activities aimed at enhancing intra OIC trade and development; 5. Promote endeavors for institutionalized cooperation between OIC and UN Islamic Development Bank, World Bank, World Trade Organization, G-8; 6. Secretary General should be a member of the board of governors of the lDB.

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EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Challenges 1. Low level of contribution towards science and technology, especially in the area of research and development; 2. Lack of quality education and other aws in the educational system; 3. Failure to generate creative and innovative ideas. Recommendations 1. Increase budgetary allocation substantially, to provide quality education and enhance research and development; 2. Encourage the private sector to contribute to research and development; 3. Establish a consortium for higher education to promote scientic research and provide academic opportunities, inter alia, for those Muslim students who cannot pursue higher education in western institutions due to difculties arising after the events of 9/11; 4. Enhance exchanges of technologies among OIC countries; 5. Strengthen COMSTECH institutionally and nancially; 6. Encourage creative, innovative and critical thinking within the education system; 7. OIC to develop high standard school curriculum in order to remove all prejudices about each other and the Secretary General to approach western countries to remove the bias against Islam and Muslims from their curricula; 8. Special initiatives for women education and female literacy; 9. Modernization of curricula of religious schools. MEDIA Challenges Misrepresentation and negative stereotyping of Islam and the Muslim Ummah. Recommendations 1. Strengthen understanding and interpretation of the Muslim faith and religion to improve its image and understanding by others; 2. Consider an appropriate media strategy including the engagement of professional entities to improve the image of Islam and Muslims in the west and other parts of non-Muslim world; 3. Establish a working relationship and better coordination between the

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Information Department of the OIC and national media of Member States. OIC REFORM AND RESTRUCTURE Challenges 1. Structural aws and lack of political will within the OIC 2. Inability of the OIC as an organization to prove its relevance in todays world and the need to rejuvenate it; 3. Inability of the OIC to implement the resolutions agreed upon; 4. Inability to implement agreed programmes due to lack of funding. Recommendations OIC Charter 1. OIC must be restructured, reformed and revitalized including necessary changes in OIC charter and its name; 2. Maintenance of criteria for membership to preserve and promote its Islamic character. Ofce of the Secretary General 1. OIC Secretary Generals role should both be strengthened and fully supported. He should be given the full authority both to employ and terminate the services of OIG personnel including restructuring existing departments. 2. OIC General Secretariat should recruit ofcials on merit, nominated by those Member States, which make regular contributions and should be offered attractive nancial incentives; 3. The Secretary General could consider appointing his Special Representatives both for fact nding as well as resolution of conicts/disputes; 4. OICs relations with important international / regional organizations should be strengthened and fully utilized to actively voice all Muslim causes New Departments 1. The OIC should renew its emphasis on issues such as conict resolution; inter-faith dialogue; human rights; democracy; good governance and combating Islamophobia, etc. 2. The OIC General Secretariat should enhance the capacity of the General Secretariat through restructuring to deal effectively with subjects such as, Islamic thought; enlightened moderation, higher education with a focus on science and technology, health care and womens development;

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3. Therefore, the OIC General Secretariat would establish departments of Conict Resolution, Enlightened Moderation, Women Development, NGOs and Muslim Minorities and a Strategic Planning Unit, and Consortium of Higher Education; 4. An OIC think tank to promote Islamic thought to respond effectively to ideological and intellectual challenges of the 21st Century and to interact more proactively with universities and intellectuals in the West. Members of the think tank should also include personalities who have expert knowledge of the problems of Muslim communities in their particular regions and countries. Restructuring of Existing Departments 1. Restructuring of Dawa department and establish Dawa and Islamophobia department; 2. IINA should be activated for projection of OIC position; 3. A strong Information Department at the OIC Secretariat should be established to assist the Secretary General for projection of OIC and updating of the OIC website; 4. Strengthening the Department of Palestine and Jerusalem in the light of new OIC vision. Implementation of Resolutions 1. Member States must demonstrate strong political commitment and provide the requisite nancial backing to implement Summit and Ministerial resolutions, within specied time frame. 2. An executive body, comprising Summit and Ministerial Troikas, the OIC host country and the Secretary General, should be expeditiously established to implement Summit and Ministerial resolutions. The concerned Member States should be invited to participate in the deliberations of these meetings. 3. A Council of Permanent Representatives of OIC member states in Jeddah should be established for effective coordination, implementation and follow up. On security issues, the commission has recommended the establishment of an Islamic court of justice, a system of collective security and intensifying coordination among OIC states for combating terrorism. On the economic front, the recommendations focus on addressing poverty alleviation, promoting economic cooperation, encouraging economic regional integration and development through free trade agreements, customs unions, common

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markets and institutionalized cooperation between the OIC and the UN, the Islamic Development Bank, the World Bank, the WTO and G-8. The challenges of science and technology are to be met by increasing budgetary allocation for education, the establishment of a consortium for higher education to promote scientic research and exchanges of technologies among OIC members. The recommendations in respect of policies and programmes constitute a roadmap for the revitalization of the OIC, and cover a very wide range of human activity, but the main emphasis is on the promotion of a comprehensive, civilizational and contemporary approach in the development of Muslim societies, enabling Muslims to shape their destiny.7 The structural weakness of the OIC received a fair number of recommendations, with emphasis on reform and the empowerment of the secretariat. The need for conict-resolution, interfaith dialogue and capacity building of the secretariat through setting up a think-tank for preparing Muslims to meet ideological and intellectual changes also received priority. These recommendations became the priority agenda in the Makkah Summit, which adopted most of them in the form of a 10-year plan for the political, economic and cultural revival of Muslim societies. Makkah Summit These recommendations of the CEP were submitted to an extraordinary summit held in Makkah on 9 December, 2005. The summit was convened at the initiative of King Abdullah to address the global changes and challenges confronting Muslim countries and examine the relevance and practicality of the recommendations by the CEP.8 The summit held in Putrajaya in 2003 had deliberated on the role of the Muslim world in international affairs which all agreed was only marginal. Muslims across the world were in a state of disunity and discord, believing that their religion was the target of Western hostility and had become identied with fanaticism, even terrorism. These feelings were shared by all Muslim leaders and eloquently articulated by King Abdullah: It bleeds the heart of a believer to see how this glorious civilization has fallen from the heights of glory to the ravine of frailty, and how its targets were hijacked by devilish and criminal gangs that spread havoc on earth. The summit was seen as a turning point in the OICs history, as it also addressed the issues of restructuring, reform and redenition of the OIC mission, charter and objectives.9 The mood and expectations of Muslim leaders gathered in Makkah were best articulated by Pakistan. President Musharraf urged the summit participants to

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work out a strategy for Islamic revival and renaissance, adopt a conciliatory course in the interest of progress and prosperity of Muslims and pursue policies to face formidable challenges on all fronts, in particular share the expanding frontiers of knowledge, education, science and technology. He underscored the need for establishing a network of centres of excellence in science and technology in the Muslim world. He sounded a note of caution: The challenge is indeed enormous, but failure is not an option. In the backdrop of these assessments and expectations, the outcome of the Makkah summit failed to meet the high hopes vested in it. Indeed in many respects, it generated disappointment, owing to its failure to take a balanced view of the world situation. While too much emphasis was laid on ghting extremism and terrorism, the summit failed to comment on the presence of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nor did it express support and solidarity to Iran and Syria, both under severe pressure and threats of invasion by the US. The absence of major Muslim leaders President Bashar Asad of Syria, Abdelaziz Bouteika of Algeria and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, for instance robbed the summit of its luster. The Makkah declaration reviewed the status of the member states in the contemporary world, acknowledging the dire need of a fresh vision to turn the tide, and called for collective will and joint Islamic action. The 10-yearprogramme of action to face the challenges of the Muslim people in the 21st century proposed a wide range of reforms, initiatives and proposals to address the multifarious problems confronting the Ummah. The Summit proposed the establishment of a free trade zone for the memberstates and welcomed the formation of an Islamic international institution to nance commerce and called for increasing the capital of the Islamic Bank. The Summit urged that the member-states should allocate resources to preserve the Al Aqsa mosque, support Palestinian institutions and establish the Al Aqsa University in Al Quds. The meeting renewed its approval of the Sudanese peace agreement and the resolution issued by the 10th OIC conference to establish a fund for reconstruction activities in Sudan. It proposed establishing an independent Islamic human rights institution to monitor the rights situation in OIC member states. The summit further stressed the importance of ghting poverty, unemployment and disease by forming a specialized fund through the Islamic Bank. It decided to take steps towards developing science and technology and to narrow the gap between the Muslim nations and developed countries. The Makkah summit was heralded as a dening moment for collective efforts and resolve, but judging by its decisions, such self-congratulatory pronouncements

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are unwarranted. The basic requirements to make the Organization of Islamic Conference a living and dynamic instrument of restructuring and a new charter reecting current realities have been postponed until the next summit to be held in Senegal. Pakistans Role in the OIC Pakistan, with its legacy rooted in the Islamic faith and its consistent espousal of Muslim causes, as well as its unfettered support for the cause of liberation of Al-Quds Al-Sharif, became a founding member of the OIC in 1969. Relations with the Islamic world are of of fundamental importance of Pakistans foreign policy of Pakistan. As a founding member of the OIC, it has an abiding commitment to the purposes, principles and objectives of its Charter. Pakistan has played a pivotal role in strengthening cooperation among Muslim states by its active participation in the programmes and activities of the OIC. Its efforts have been acknowledged as exemplyed in the OIC signied by its membership of all key Standing Committees, subsidiary organs and specialized agencies of the OIC. Pakistan is also a key member of the OIC Contact Groups/Ad-hoc Committees on critical issues of the Islamic world - Palestine, Afghanistan, Jammu & Kashmir, and Somalia.10 Pakistan is the Chairman of the OIC Standing Committee on Scientic and Technological Cooperation (COMSTECH) which has its Headquarters in Islamabad. Pakistan also hosts the Secretariat of the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI), which is located in Karachi. Pakistan has been the forefront of efforts for comprehensive and drastic changes in the mandate of the OIC and has made a number of pragmatic proposals and strategies to overcome the deciencies and inherent weaknesses of the organization. Islamabad has been consulting the OIC Secretary General and other brotherly Muslim states to workout a strategy to realize the objectives of its Resolution on Enlightened Moderation. Pakistan also held a National Seminar on the OIC to solicit the opinions of Islamic scholars, prominent citizens, academicians and parliamentarians. The purpose was to discuss and create an understanding of the whole issue in order to promote a consensus on Enlightened Moderation, reforms of the OIC, and the daunting problems confronting the Islamic Ummah in the 21st Century, so as to surmount these challenges and to take advantage of the existing and potential opportunities. After the tragic events of 9/11, the world has become dangerous and volatile. The situation has been further exacerbated by the widening gulf between Islam and

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the West, giving rise to apprehensions about a clash of civilizations. There are misperceptions in the West about Islam, which is seen as a faith propagating terrorism and extremism, bent upon striking at Western values. On the other hand, many Muslims believe that the West is demonizing their religion. They distrust the West because of its policies towards Muslims smarting under foreign occupation and alien domination. Islamic states are under siege, gripped by ignorance and despondency, hopelessness and apathy, disarray and discord. The Ummah needs to focus on two areas: First, to emancipate the downtrodden people from abject poverty and social underdevelopment, and; second, to make the world a better place for future generations. The diversity amoung the member states worked both as the OICs strength and weakness in terms of realization of its objectives. No serious attempt has been made to create regional economic hubs and develop them through a viable trade growth strategy under mechanisms such as Custom Union or Trade Free Zone. Ideally, the 57 OIC countries could have been operationally divided into ve or six regional blocs, structured and designed on the basis of geography and economic considerations, eventually to be integrated into one single Islamic block. Contemporary World Scene The challenges that face the Ummah were articulated in the analysis and statements of the Pakistani leadership at the OIC forum: A far reaching transformation is currently underway in international relations. New threats including nuclear proliferation, terrorism and extremism as well as the increased use of unilateralism have compouned the earlier threats arising from poverty, underdevelopment, territorial disputes, decolonization and denial of justice. The Muslim Ummah is caught in the vortex of this upheaval. A new relationship between Muslims and the West built on mutual respect, tolerance and understanding needs to be evolved to effectively deal with these new and old threats. The virtual marginalization of Islamic countries at the global level constitutes the foremost challenge. Even those Islamic states endowed with vast natural resources have been unable to transform these assets to gain corresponding political weight and stature. On the contrary, they are under threat of economic isolation and social ferment. In todays globalized world, economic strength determines the status and clout of a bloc or a country in the international community. Without economic strength, the Ummah will remain vulnerable to external manipulation. The OICs share in global trade is barely 6-7 percent and their collective GDP amounts to a meager 5 percent of the world GDP. Similarly, the human

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development indicator of the OIC countries are among the lowest in the world. The inadequate weightage of the Muslims at the international level despite the fact that they represent 1/5th of the worlds population, possess 70 percent of the worlds energy resources, and 40 percent of the global availability of raw material, is shameful. President Musharraf made a fervent appeal to the Islamic World to seize the moment and realize the promise of a glorious destiny. The challenges facing Muslims today look formidable but can and should be dealt with collectively and comprehensively. Our perpetual dependence on other nations is the reason for our endemic under development. We should prioritize economic growth targets and pursue poverty eradication through mutual nancial and investment support. The Member States need to follow a road map that envisages benchmarks and a time-line in consonance with the MDGs. In recognition of the demands of contemporary reality a necessary shift in our focus from geo-strategic to geo-economic perspectives is required. The OIC countries must make concerted efforts to ensure poverty eradiation, human development, higher education, scientic and technological development and sustained economic growth without which the dream of peace and prosperity within our socities will remain elusive. This can be done because we have the human and material resources.11 We must realize that we have to depend on ourselves to change our destiny. We must create interdependence, learning from each others best practices and using the strength of one to overcome the weakness of the other. Pakistan also proposed a number of suggestions to revitalize the OIC both in its philosophy and at the operational level, which are summarized below: Proposals for Restructuring General:

The OIC must be enabled to respond to multifarious and multifaceted challenges, from globalization to Western power politics. Necessary institutions such as conict prevention between members should be created. The OIC must assess the security threats and developments that could have a bearing on their economic well-being. Pan Islamic cooperation must commence with low key areas, such as education, technology and defense production where member states are not required to make big sacrices. Regional economic and cultural networking could provide the foundation for intra-regional cooperation and realize the ambitious goals such as Islamic Common Market or common

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currency. Relevant models such as the EU could be studied for ne tuning OIC strategies. The failure of the key institutions such as COMSTECH (Science and Technology) and COMSEC (Commerce) and COMIAC (Information) need to be analyzed. Instead of creating new structures, the existing ones should be invigorated and made fully functional to achieve the expected objectives. There are no binding obligations on members regarding follow-up and implrementation of decisions. Therefore, the OIC must evolve mechanisms to follow-up the resolutions and decisions adopted by the Islamic Summit and Ministerial meetings. People to people contact and exchange of scholars, media persons and cultural troupes could strengthen Islamic solidarity and unity. OIC countries must establish Centers of Excellence in the elds of technology, education and economy which could be afliated with international institutions of repute for long term exchange and cooperation. Coordination among think tanks and scholars across the OIC is imperative. The Islamic world must invest in the development of frontier technologies if it is to compete in the modern era of knowledge-based economy. The OIC should nd a way to utilize the expertise and services of the Muslim expatriate community in North America and Europe.

Structural reforms:

The existing charter provides a solid foundation to address issues of interest and concerns to Muslims in areas of security, politics, economic, science and technology, commerce. There is no need to reinvent the wheel by introducing major changes in the Charter. The mechanism envisaged in the Charter simply needs to be activated through better funding, committed personnel and strong political support from the member states. In view of new challenges on account of globalization, misperception of the Islamic world, the existing OIC institutions should be strengthened and new departments with specic deliverable and time-bound action plans need to be created in areas such as international terrorism, dispute settlement, education, women empowerment, human rights. The collaboration of professionals, civil society and think tanks could prove crucial for buttressing the existing bureaucratic structure. A Crisis Management Committee which can deal with emergencies arising when the Summit Conference or ICFM is not meeting.

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Reforms in the OIC cannot be modeled on the pattern of European Economic Community (EU) because the Islamic world is not one homogenous bloc. Due attention should, therefore, be given to regional sub-blocs, working under the umbrella of the OIC. Close ties between the existing think tanks and institutions involved with security and international trade issues should be established and strengthened through bilateral and multilateral efforts.

Moderation

In dealing with the West, the OIC members must avoid confrontation as well as capitulation. Despite the inhospitable environment, the OIC should pursue a vision the central theme of which should consist of peaceful coexistence, harmonious interfaith dialogue, condemnation of terrorist acts and emphasis on settlement of disputes by peaceful means. In this respect, the existing gap between Muslim street opinions and the Governments should be abridged to avoid further polarization of Islamic societies. The Islamic world should promote signing of social contracts between governments and civil societies to reduce possible confrontation. Dialogue with the West to remove misperception of Islam as a faith seeking war against other religions and civilizations should be conducted under the OIC. Workshops, media activities and sustained advertisement highlighting Islam as a moderate and progressive religion should be launched by the OIC Secretariat for which special funds should be provided. Lack of economic justice within the Islamic societies is another obstacle in the path of moderation. The way forward is in democratization and preservation of human rights and civil liberties within Islamic countries. Internal reform in Muslim countries are essential. The US intervention in the internal affairs of Islamic countries will continue. Keeping these factors in mind, the Islamic countries should strive to benet from their cooperation with knowledge based societies and thus help avoid marginalization of the Islamic world. Creation of an effective and genuine Pan Islamic Media or news agency is needed to safeguard the image of Islam and its followers and to project Islamic perspectives in unmistakable terms.

Observer status

The inclusion of any non-Muslim state with sizeable Muslim minority should not be given an observer status within the OIC system as it will erode the Islamic character of the OIC.

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Conclusion Despite its dismal performance so far, the fact remains that the OIC is a useful medium for projecting Muslim interests in the international fora. The weakness of the OIC is due to an internal lack of cohesion and unrepresentative leadership in most member states. Its challenges primarily are of democracy, of defense of Islam and development of societies, which are responsible for marginalization of Islamic countries in world affairs. It is frustrating that despite the fact that Muslims represent one-fth of the worlds population, possess 70 percent of the world energy resources and 40 per cent of the available raw material, its total GDP is only 5 percent of the world GDP. The entire GDP of OIC member-states is a mere $1,200 billion as against Japans $5,500 billion. The failure of the Muslim world to acquire modern technology and spread education is obvious with only 500 PhDs being produced annually as compared to 3,000 in India and 5,000 in the UK. Political marginalization has thus been further compounded by economic depression. The OICs Charter and name need not be changed. An effective and powerful Secretary General of international stature could steer OICs objectives and activities. Instead of indulging in total overhaul and restructuring, which in the long run could prove impractical, a modest beginning can be made by (i) setting up an institutional mechanism for conict prevention and resolution with member states; (ii) creating a network of centers of excellence in science and technology; (iii) establishing a permanent forum of Islamic thought to provide guidance and opinion; (iv) allocating adequate nancial resources to implement these proposals; (v) allocating at least 0.5 percent of the GDP by the member states for implementing OIC objectives; and (vi) establishing a dedicated department in the OIC secretariat for promoting intra-OIC trade. The OIC is an organization of Muslim countries. Non-Islamic states like India, Russia and the Philippines who want to enter it for their own motives should not be allowed to become observers or members of the OIC. This would adversly affect Islamic solidarity. The OIC derives its legitimacy and strength not from the Charter but from the decisions of the heads of state/governments. The OIC is primarily a political organization. Specialized bodies (like COMSTECH, COMCEC, IDB, ISBO) are already there and need activation rather than creating new structures on the pattern of IMF and the World Bank. For the OIC to succeed, it should curb the tendency to set up new organizations or reach for unrealistic goals. For instance, the meeting of Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) held recently in Islamabad, inter alia, decided to set up

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a poverty alleviation fund of 10 billion dollars. Of 57 member states, how many are in a position to subscribe to this huge sum? Indeed, barring few, all member states qualify for assistance from this fund. Perhaps it would be more realistic if Pakistans proposal to set up a fund of 1 billion dollars for the promotion of science and technology is given positive consideration. The conventional wisdom is that an organization is as strong as its members wish it to be. The gathering storms over Muslim societies should alert the Muslim leadership and they must respond to the changing world with alacrity and imagination or else they will be consigned to oblivion and the OIC will remain at best, a footnote in contemporary political history.

ANNEXES
Members Full Members Afghanistan (1969) Egypt (1969) Iran (1969) Lebanon Mali Niger Yemen Sudan Turkey Qatar Sierra Leone (1972) Gambia Burkina Faso (1975) Iraq (1976) Benin (1982) Azerbaijan (1991) Tajikistan (1992) Kazakhstan (1995) Togo (1997) Observer States Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994) Central African Republic (1997) Northern Cyprus (Turkish Cypriot State) (1979) Algeria (1969) Guinea (1969) Jordan Libya Mauritania Pakistan Saudi Arabia Somalia Bahrain (1970) Syria Bangladesh (1974) Guinea Bissau Cameroon Maldives Brunei (1984) Albania (1992) Turkmenistan Uzbekistan (1995) Guyana (1998) Chad (1969) Indonesia (1969) Kuwait Malaysia Morocco Palestine Senegal Tunisia Oman (1970) United Arab Emirates Gabon Uganda Comoros (1976) Djibouti (1978) Nigeria (1986) Kyrgyzstan (1992) Mozambique (1994) Suriname (1996) Cote DIvoire (2001)

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OIC - Retrospect and Prospects

The Secretaries General of the OIC 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Tunku Abdul Rahman (Malaysia) )1971-1973) Mr. Hassan Al-Touhami (Egypt) (1974-1975) Dr. Amadou Karim Gaye (Senagal) (1975-1979) Mr. Habib Chatty (Tunisia) (1979-1984) Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada (Pakistan) (1985-1988) Dr. Hamid Algabid (Niger) (1989-1996) Dr. Azeddine Laraki (Morroco) (1997-2000) Dr. Abdelouahed Belkeziz (Morocco) (2001-2004) Prof. Dr. Ekmeleddin Ihsanogolu (Turkey) (2005 to Present)

Past Islamic Summit Conferences

Number 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 1st Extraordinary 8
th

Date 1969 September 22 25 1974 February 22 -24 1981 January 25-29 1984 January 16-19 1987 January 26-29 1991 December 9-11 1994 December 13-15 1997 March 23 1997 December 9-11 2000 November 12-13 2003 March 5 2003 October 16-17

Country Morocco Pakistan Rabat Lahore

Place

Saudi Arabia Mecca & Taif Morocco Kuwait Senagal Morocco Pakistan Iran Qatar Qatar Malaysia Casablanca Kuwait City Dakkar Casablanca Islamabad Tehran Doha Doha Putrajaya

9th 2nd Extraordinary 10th

3rd Extra Ordinary 2005 December 7-8

Saudi Arabia Makkah Al Mukaramah

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REFERENCES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 OIC Secretariat, Jeddah, Basic Facts. Ibid. Ibid. Senate of Pakistan, Foreign Relations Committee, Pakistan and the OIC, Report 6, September 2005. Documents circulated at the 10th Summit, Putrajaya, October 2003 Islamabad Meeting of the OIC Commission of Eminent Persons, May 28-29, 2005, available in Pakistan and the OIC Report of the Pakistan Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Speech of Senator Mushahid Hussain Sayed, at the Inaugural Session of the 2nd and Final Meeting of the OIC Commission of Eminent Persons, May 28, 2005. Tayyab Siddiqui, OIC at the Crossroads, DAWN Newspaper, December 22, 2005. Ibid. Tayyab Siddiqui, Restructuring OIC, DAILY POST, May 15, 2007. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Islamabad, Handbook, International Seminar on OIC Challenge and Response Enlightened Moderation, 1-2 June, 2004.

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The Shia of Iraq and the South Asian Connection

THE SHIA OF IRAQ AND THE SOUTH ASIAN CONNECTION (Khaled Ahmed)*

Abstract (The state of Iran turned Shia in the 17th century with the help of Shia scholars imported from Lebanon. The Arab population of Iraq became Shia as late as the middle of the 19th century with the help of Shia scholars of Iran and nancial assistance from the state of Awadh in India. Today a majority of the population of Iraq is Shia, engaged in a political process that it has partly borrowed from Lebanon. The custodian of the seminarian complex of Najaf and the mausoleum of Caliph Ali, is a Pakistani grand ayatollah, appointed to his top position becouse Najaf and Karbala were developed as a habitable economic zone by the Shia rulers of North India through the construction of the Hindiya Canal as a diversion from the Euphrates.-Author) Introduction Iraq did not exist till it was created as a British mandate in 1921. Before that it was a province in Syria under the Ottomans. Before that, it was simply a zone of contact between the Ottoman and Persian empires. Najaf and Karbala attracted the Shia of the region but the population of Iraq itself was not predominantly Shia. The tribes of Iraq converted to Shiism around the 18th through 19th centuries. When the Safavids ruled Iran in the 16th century they often claimed Najaf, Karbala and other cities since the Ottomans were neither reverential nor exercised much control over them. Najaf is where Caliph Ali is buried. But before he ruled from Kufa in Iraq, Umar had defeated the Persian king Yezdigerd in the battle of Qadisiya, taking prisoners, slaves and converts from Iran. When Ali ruled, his support came from this community of Persian origin. After Ali, the rule of the Umayyads from Syria was oppressive towards the Iraqis. Iraq could not win against Syria because of internal divisions typical of any melting-pot type of cultural contact zone. At Qadisiya, in 637 AD, 4,000 Sassanian troops from Daylam in Northern Iran (called the Asawira) joined the 12,000-strong Arab army in Southern Iraq and decided to ght against their own king, Yezdigerd, on condition that they be allowed to settle where they wished. In Iraq, there were a number of Iranian Muslims who joined the Muslim army under the name of Hamra, the red army. When Hazrat Ali faced the forces of Muawiyya bin Abu Suan at Sifn, his
* Khaled Ahmed is consulting editor of the Friday Times, Lahore.

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70,000 Kufan soldiers included 8,000 mawali (non-Arab Muslim converts from slaves) and abeed (slaves). Sassanian soldiers swelled the Muslim armies in later years, settling mostly in Basra from as far away as Sindh in todays Pakistan. They were better archers than the Arabs and became a useful part of the Islamic army. However, the civil war that followed the assassination of Ali in Kufa in 661 AD, and the civil war that took place between the Syrian forces of Muawiya and the Iraqis of Basra and Kufa, saw these Sassanian elements as weakening the solidarity of the Iraqis already undermined by the revolt of the Khawarij, a sect that arose at Sifn opposing both Ali and Muawiya. After the murder of Caliph Usman in 656 AD, those who were angry at the incident arose in Basra as the supporters of Hazrat Aisha, the wife of the Prophet, under the leadership of Talha and Zubair. Caliph Alis army was Kufan and was pitted against the Basrans who were routed and both Talha and Zubair killed. But this evidenced yet another split in Iraq, which made Syrian dominance of the country easy later when Imam Husain was besieged by the Syrians under Yazid. The rst Iraqi weakness appeared when the Kufans rose in revolt after the martyrdom of Imam Husain at Karbala in 683 AD at the orders of the SyrianUmayyad governor of Kufa Ubaidullah bin Ziyad. The revolt came after the death of Yazid and the ight of Ibn Ziyad back to Syria. The battle which occurred nally in North Syria was lost by the Iraqis once again because of lack of cohesion among its various communities. Many Iraqis did not join after rst promising to, while the Syrian army was united and greater in number. The Basrans and Kufans had nally to submit although they were greater in population and lived in the richest province. The Umayyads ruled their most precious territory from Syria by disarming the Iraqis, who were once the most warlike and numerically strong force, and by sending particularly tyrannical governors to keep them tamed. One such was Hajjaj bin Yusuf al-Thaqa who was extremely cruel towards the dissidents and beneted from the lack of loyalty of the Iraqi mawali. He was particular in not sending Kufan and Basran troops for conquests abroad. His nephew Muhammad bin Qasim al-Thaqa was sent for the conquest of Sindh with a Syrian army. Later, the demilitarisation and civilianisation of the Iraqi warriors actually delayed the overthrow of the Umayyads by the Abbasids. The soldiers began to be paid salaries under the Umayyads. The custom of getting Muslim convert armies from other lands was started by Ali, continued by the Umayyads, and nally adopted in real earnest by the Abbasids whose bloodline was partly from Khurasan1. The Shia of Iraq Today, Iraq has a population of 26.8 million of whom 65 percent are Shia while the Sunnis are 35 percent. The Shia of Iraq eagerly joined political movements that

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The Shia of Iraq and the South Asian Connection

take the confessional focus away from public affairs. They embraced communism and pan-Arabism in order to become integrated into a Sunni-controlled state. The Baath party with its Arab nationalist doctrine took over in 1963 and was intellectually guided, making it possible for the Shia to participate in its politics. But by 1968 the Baath was taken over by tribal Iraqis with a strong anti-intellectual bent, which included an ancient distrust of the Shia and the communists. The Shia aroused suspicion because of their closeness to their religious leaders despite the fact that these leaders remained mostly quiet so as not to attract the ire of the Sunni tribes. But there were occasions when the Baath bore down on the more outspoken of the Shia spiritual hierarchy formed around the internationally revered cities of Najaf and Karbala. The poverty of the Shia prevented them from becoming completely integrated into the secular order. Saddam Hussein perpetuated himself through organisation and unbending cruelty towards his opponents or potential opponents. Saddam banned public celebration of Shia festivals and killed the Shia leaders who showed signs of rebellion. His method of killing them was most gruesome and was meant to discourage any future disobedience. For instance in 1980 he killed the Shia cleric Baqer al-Sadr by driving nails into his head after al-Sadr had watched his sister being raped. In 1999, Saddam went on the rampage. He killed Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadeq al-Sadr along with his two sons (one son was Muqtada al-Sadrs father); he also killed ten brothers of Abdul Aziz alHakim who ed to Iran and set up his militia as Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) with Irans help and in 2006 elded the largest bloc of elected members of the Iraqi cabinet. Saddam fought his war with Iran from 1980 to 1989 with the help of the Arab states in the region and American support. Although prosperous, Iraq lost much of its economic strength because of the war, Iran was nally defeated because of its self-imposed isolation. In 1990, Saddam invaded Kuwait and began a reverse process: the world got together, isolated and attacked him. Saddam was defeated and ousted from Kuwait. This was also a window of opportunity for the Shia of Iraq. They rose in rebellion and could have won against the Saddam regime had America decided to take the invasion to its logical conclusion by removing Saddam from power. Nasr reports that Saudi Arabia prevented the Americans from removing Saddam so as not to strengthen Iran in the region. President Bush and his administration understood what they were doing when they let Saddam turn around and punish the Shias for their act of rebellion, which they had earlier instigated. The second coming of Saddam was the cruellest moment for the Shias of Iraq. Saddam crushed the religious leadership and top Shia politicians who had to ee to Iran and become dependent on Tehrans largesse. This affected the legacy

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of Grand Ayatollah Khoi who had refused to accept the concept of velayat-e-faqih of Ayatollah Khomeini and weakened the autonomous status of the Iraqi Shia. Ajami notes that President HW Bush did not go for regime-change in Iraq in 1991 because that would have Lebanonised Iraq and tilted the sects into ghting and killing each other. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell and secretary of State James Baker seemed quite sure about what they had done by not removing Saddam from power: The spectre of Lebanonisation of Iraq stayed Americas hand. The Bush administration did not trust its knowledge of Iraq and its distant ways and sects. America was haunted by the memory of Lebanon the sects warring on the deadly fault-lines and was convinced that the Shia of Iraq were destined to fall under Irans sway. The Shia were the majority of Iraqs population, the Shia faith having spread in the 19th century because the nomadic tribes of Iraq had taken to it when they settled near the shrine towns of Najaf and Karbala in search of water for agricultural. There had been no racial divide, no clear-cut distinctions between the Sunnis and Shias of Iraq. All this was unknown to those who had waged the war against Iraq. America had seen the terrible harvest of aggrieved Shiism in Tehran and Beirut. No one wanted a replay of the past. Hard as the Shia leaders of Iraq would insist that they had no sister republic of the Iranian theocracy in mind, they could get no hearing for their case2. As Ajami seemed to lay the foundation of a neo-con interpretation of what happened in 1991, plans for invading Iraq in 2003 were afoot. This time the Shia got what they wanted; but the experience of 1991 had ecked their perception of the United States with scepticism. They gravitated to religious leadership because that is what they had during long years of marginalisation and persecution. Strangely, the clergy guided them realistically albeit there were extremists like Muqtada Al Sadr who began to clamour for an end to American occupation soon after it became apparent that the Americans had little grasp of what it meant to restore the civic amenities destroyed by the war and what the US troops would be up against when the insurgency started. The Shia clergy, while representing the Shia community, got divided into three factions. The rst faction was of the quietist grand ayatollahs of Najaf Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayyad, Bashir Hussain al-Naja al-Pakistani, Said al-Hakim led by Ayatollah Sistani, that kept alive the legacy of grand ayatollah Al-Khoi and spread it through their representatives in all parts of Iraq and among the moderate exiles abroad. Khois son Majid al-Khoi returned to Najaf from London in 2003 only to be murdered by the supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr. Young Muqtada al-Sadr was the extremist who ruled the riff-raff of the Shia slum dwellers in Sadr City, Baghdad. Other slums in Kirkuk and Basra too had his

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The Shia of Iraq and the South Asian Connection

supporters and although Muqtada had failed to pass the seminary, he knew how to control his following, relying mainly on the welfare network left behind by his great father. He was violent in his actions but was weak in religion and therefore sought advice from Ayatollah Khadim Hussain al-Haeri at Qum, but he too distanced himself after seeing Muqtadas tendency towards violence. Strangely, Muqtada became more relevant to Iraq as time passed and violence became common. Insurrection played right into his hands and everyone from Ahmed Chalabi to Sistani wanted to either use him or to have him around in case the Sunnis increased their pressure. He mixed nationalism with Islam and threw his organised youths named Mahdi Army into the fray in 2004, asking the Americans to quit while confronting the Sunnis and other objectors from among the Shia, from such cities where he had established his power as Baghdad, Basra and Karbala. The lastnamed city provided big income to him from the fee collected from pilgrims. The third clerical outt is associated with Abdul Aziz Hakim and his Iranbacked SCIRI and militia Badr Brigade. He and his militia stood between the moderation of Sistani and the extremism of Muqtada. In the December 2005 elections, Muqtada joined the other two factions of the Shia clerics to sit atop the biggest bloc of members in the Iraqi government. He was readily accepted by the other two because he had re power and could return the violence of the Sunni, steadily coming from the old elements of the Baath and Saddams disbanded army. The grand ayatollahs of Najaf Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Hussaini Sistani (b.1930) emerged the highest cleric of Iraq because he inherited the mantle of the late Grand Ayatollah al-Khoi at the world centre of Shiism at Najaf. He is Iranian-born and hails from Mashhad with no connections to Qum, but has a large following in Iran because of the inuence of his moderate-quietist master, Al Khoi, also an Iranian3. Sistanis strength lay in his great learning in Shia theology and his ability to stay clear of Iranian politics, especially when taking sides had become important. He stayed clear of the quarrel which took place between the Lebanese Shia and Tehran over Musa Sadrs militia, Amal - and also remained silent over the split that occured in Iran between Grand Ayatollah Montezari and Ayatollah Khomeini over the doctrine of velayate-faqih and revolutionary violence. His status in the Shia world can be judged from his ranking among the marjas (persons worthy of following) in the world. Out of all the living ayatollahs Sistani has the largest global following, the largest in one country being in Iraq, followed by Iran. Other grand ayatollahs at Najaf are: Afghan Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayyad, Pakistani Bashir al-Naja al-Pakistani and Iraqi Said al-Hakim. In Karbala, the authority belongs to Muhammad Taqi

133

Criterion

Mudarassi; in Lebanon, to Muhammad Hussain Fadlallah; at Qum, to Mirza Javad Tabrizi, Taqi Behjat and Hussain Ali Montezari. The ideologically oriented Shia follow the Spiritual Guide Ali Khamenei in Tehran4. But in deference to the sheer power of Qum and the increasing insecurity at Najaf, Sistani chose Qum as the headquarters for his internet operations sistani.org5. So close is the Lebanese Shia thinking to the moderates of the Sistani school that Hezbollahs spiritual guide grand ayatollah Fadlallah, originally from Najaf, seriously thought of moving to Najaf but was thwarted by Iraqs insecurity. In 2003, the grand ayatollah Bashir Hussain al-Naja was targeted by Saddams fedayeen terrorists, but the grenade thrown at him only seriously wounded him. In Pakistan very few outside of the Shia clerical hierarchy know about the only grand ayatollah produced by Pakistan. There are ve grand ayatollahs living today and four of them are in Najaf, Iraq, headed by Sistani. Out of these four, only one is Iraqi-born, the others being from Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. (Grand Ayatollah Fayyad or Fayyaz is most probably a Hazara.) Ayatollah al-Uzma Sheikh Bashir Hussain Naja, as described on his personal website, was born in 1942 in Jullundhar, India, and moved with his family to Pakistan in 1947 and memorised the Quran while studying Islam in Lahore. He moved to Najaf for higher studies and in his 40-year of career in Iraq has never visited Pakistan. He registered in the hawza (complex of seminaries) of Najaf headed by Ayatollah Al-Uzma Al-Syed Mohsin Al-Hakim. He was counted among the bright students of Ayatollah AlKhoi and Ayatollah Al-Syed Mohammad Al-Rohani. After three years Naja was already teaching other students and was accepted as the rst teacher from South Asia. Under Ayatollah al-Uzma al-Khoi he started teaching the highest course of the seminary in 1974. Among his students were some Shia leaders who became famous in Pakistan: Syed Sajid Ali Naqvi, late Syed Arif Hussain Al-Hussaini, late Syed Ijaz Kazmi and Maulana Syed Nabi Hassan, etc. Among other pupils he counts the family of the famous al-Hakim clerics of Iraq, and the family of the hanging judge Ayatollah Khalkhali of Iran. The Najaf school never accepted the doctrine of velayat faqih propounded by Imam Khomeini after coming to power. Under this doctrine, about which he began thinking in 1971 during the celebration of the pre-Islamic identity of Iran by the Shah, the Shia jurist had to rule the state instead of just issuing opinion. The doctrine posited that the leading cleric could have something of the divine spark that illuminated the Imams. This controversially meant that now the chief jurist could share in the ismet (infallibility) of the Prophet and the Imams6. During Imam Khomeinis stay in Najaf, where he went in 1965, Pakistans Shia cleric from Parachinar, Ariful Hussaini, at that time a pupil of now-grand ayatollah Bashir Hussain, came under his inuence and became his companion. It is through Ariful

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The Shia of Iraq and the South Asian Connection

Hussaini that the Shia of the region of Kurram Agency, down to the settled district of Kohat in the NWFP, began going to Qum and manifesting signs of following the Khomeini doctrine. Hussaini was killed in Peshawar in 1988, followed ten days later by the death of General Zia, the ruler of Pakistan. In 1991, Shia killers ambushed and killed the governor of the NWFP under General Zia, whom they suspected of being involved in the death of their leader. It was said that after grand ayatollah Sistani, Bashir Naja would take his place at the top of the Najaf hierarchy, but as far as the administration of the seminary complex of Najaf was concerned, he was the heir to the legacy of AlKhoi who personally gave him charge of it. The seminary was shut for six months after Khois death but was revived by Naja with his personal resources. It was destroyed by Saddam in 1991 again but once again Naja was able to rebuild dozens of seminaries and hostels and resume the studies there. The average supply of electricity in 2006 was for about eight hours a day. He bought six large power generators to provide electricity to the seminaries and 2,500 houses in the neighbourhood. Some knowledgeable bloggers, one among whom is said to be a well-known British journalist writing under a pseudonym, believe that Naja is more anti-American than Sistani. His website doesnt mention Sistani, which may be signicant. If the Najaf four are killed by terrorists, the leadership of Najaf will pass to the fth grand ayatollah Kazem Haeri in exile in Qum in Iran, who has broken with the Najaf tradition of Khoi and subscribes to Khomeinis revolutionary creed. It is not known whether the three foreigner grand ayatollahs (Sistani, Naja, Fayyad) have been naturalised as Iraqis or are still aliens with passports and visas which have to be renewed. Some concern was raised about this when Sistani did not vote in the 2005 general election. One blogger reported that they had to get their visas renewed regularly through a local guarantor. He also reported that in the 1990s, it was Muqtada al-Sadr who became their guarantors and wrote the required letter of recommendation for them, and that, once, to assert his authority vis--vis the Najaf trio, he did not issue the letter and the government had to renew the visas without a guarantor. Another well known blogger says, quoting Iraqi newspaper Al Zaman: The provincial council of Najaf, now dominated by the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), requested that the rst act of the Iraqi parliament once it is seated on March 16 be to grant Iraqi citizenship to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. Sistanis family immigrated to Iraq from Iran and settled in Najaf about a century ago, the paper claims, but could never acquire citizenship. The vice- chairman of the Najaf body, Shaikh Khalid al-Numani, requested that the parliament also give citizenship to Bashir Naja (a Pakistani) and Ishaq Fayyad (an Afghan)7.

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Criterion

Najaf and the Shia of Awadh The India-born Pakistani grand ayatollah of Najaf, Bashir Hussain, belongs in the tradition linking South Asia to the Shiism of Iraq. It is quite possible that his handling of the administration of the mausoleums and the seminary complex of the city of Najaf is an extension of the past that shows India deeply involved in the consolidation of the Shia faith in Iraq. The faith itself has a pattern of transference which is quite interesting. The Safavid conversion of Iran to Shiism at the beginning of the 17th century was owed to the Shia jurists who were brought in from Lebanon, the surviving cradle of the faith. The conversion of Iraqi Arabs was owed, among other factors, to the bequests that came from Awadh8 (Oudh) in India, rst rescuing a waterless and desiccated Najaf from death, through the construction of Hindiyya Canal from the Euphrates, then through permanent stipends to the Shia jurists of the city. Najaf is where the rst Shia Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib lies buried. Karbala is where his son the third Imam Husayn fought his battle with the Umayyad caliph and achieved martyrdom. Both cities were visited by the Shia pilgrims of Iran and India. A large number of Iranians and Indians were buried in Najaf and other shrine cities. Iraq remained Arab and Sunni but there were interregnums when it was ruled by Shia rulers like the Buyids (945-1055) who defended the Shia imams and looked after the shrines of Najaf, Karbala, Kufa, Hilla, Samarra, Kazimayn, etc. After Iraq fell to the Sunni Ottomans in 1533, these shrines were simply tolerated as places visited by the Shia of Iran and India. The conversion of the Sunni Arab tribes to Shiism of Iraq is dated from the 18th century, but more signicantly from the 19th century. The dominance of the faith grew through the 20th century too till in 1932 the Shia were recorded by the census to be 56 percent of the population of Iraq9. Najaf and Karbala would have remained desert marketplaces visited by the nomadic Sunni Arab tribes during spring had it not been for the construction of the Husayniyya Canal by the Ottomans that revived Karbala. But it was the Hindiyya Canal that was to uplift the two cities and bestow on them the greatness they acquired in later times, and also led to the settlement of the Arab desert tribes and to their conversion. In the late 1780s, the chief minister of Awadh in India, Hasan Raza Khan made a contribution of Rs 500,000 towards the construction of the canal, completed in 1803, that brought water to Najaf. So big was the diversion of the water from the Euphrates that the river changed course. The canal became a virtual river and transformed the arid zone between the cities of Najaf and Karbala into fertile land that attracted the Sunni Arab tribes to settle there and take to farming.

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The Shia of Iraq and the South Asian Connection

The Shia kingdom of Awadh (1720-1856) gave more than a million rupees annually from its treasury for the upkeep of the Shia shrines in Iraq. The money went to the Iranian Shia jurists settled around these shrines. Yet the most signicant contribution emanated from the loan an Awadhi king Ghaziuddin Hayder extended to the governor-general of the East India Company during the Companys war with Burma10. The loan was never repaid but the interest on it was paid regularly according to the will of the king; and the payments continued after the British annexed Awadh in 1856. According to the will, the interest had to be paid to the four wives of the king, but after their demise it was to go in part and in some cases, full - to the Shia of Najaf and Karbala, through the Iranian jurists there, also targeting the pauper Indian Shias getting one-third of the bequest - who had made their homes in the two cities. The fund was called the Awadh Bequest amounting to nearly 200,000 rupees when ten rupees were equal to a British pound - and was handled by the British Indian consulate in Iraq, at times with an intent to extend the inuence of the Raj in Iran. Litvak reports an interesting change in the disposition of the Bequest in 1867 on the request of Nawab Iqbal al-Dawla, the grandson of Nawab Saadat Ali Khan of Awadh, who lived in Kazimayn11. He accused the Iranian jurists of not using the bequest honestly and pleaded for the pauper Indian and Kashmiri population living in Najaf. He was able to change the distribution pattern of the bequest and henceforth administered the sub-bequest whose beneciaries also included the pauperised descendants of the Awadh rulers now living in Najaf. It was only after the initiation of this bequest that more Indian paupers were attracted to the holy Shia cities like Karbala where there were no Indians to begin with12. Many factors persuaded the Arabs to embrace Shiism in the 19th century. The one big factor was the Corpse Trafc (naql al-janaez) that accounted for nearly 20,000 dead bodies of Shias from Iran and India for the purpose of burial at the shrines. The practice was old and had stemmed from the hadith of the sixth Imam Jafar Sadiq that being next to Ali a day is more favourable than seven hundred years of worship13. The coming of the corpses had its own economics that attracted a lot of commerce to the city of Najaf. The fertility of the land around Najaf and Karbala attracted the desert Arabs to agriculture, while the Ottoman bureaucracy encouraged them to own land so that tax could be collected from them. The wellendowed Iranian Shia jurists, threatened by repeated raids from the Wahhabis of Arabia against the Shrines of Najaf and Karbala, began to proselytise intensively among the Arab tribes till most of them converted. Elections under the new Constitution 2006 Sistani convinced the Iraqi Shias into agreeing that Iraq should not become

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a theocracy like Iran. He joined the various Shia formations together and got them to vote as a united front in the January 2005 elections meant to form a transitional parliament and a transitional government to oversee the framing of a constitution for Iraq. The polls anticipated a political system based on proportional representation similar to the Lebanese model and not the Iranian one. The Shia grouping won the largest number of seats in the constituent assembly but the Sunnis by and large boycotted the election. Then in January 2006 elections were held under the new constitution. A month after Iraqis voted to elect their rst permanent parliament since Saddam Husseins capture nearly three years earlier, the countrys independent electoral commission nally announced the results. As expected, the Shia-led United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which dominated the previous year-long transitional government, easily won, taking 128 out of 275 seats, with 41 percent of the votes cast, down only slightly from its near-majority in January 2005. A Kurdish alliance of two main parties took 53 seats and 22 percent of the vote, also down a bit from last Januarys total. Finally, the two main Sunni-led coalitions took 55 seats and 19 percent of the vote between them, a big gain on the 17 seats the countrys former ruling minority won a year earlier, when most Sunni Arabs had abstained14. The way the confessional communities reacted to the Constitution indicates some trends of concern. The Constitution is federal and promises enough devolution for the Shias and the Kurds to start aiming at carving out their separate states ultimately based on ethnic cleansing. The Kurds want to make an independent state out of the three northern provinces while the Shia want nine southern provinces to belong to them. Both groupings have large oil resources on the sharing of which the Constitution shows remarkable ambivalence. Both groupings are interpenetrated with other confessional and ethnic populations. The Iraq Study Group Report put it succinctly: The Iraqi Constitution, which created a largely autonomous Kurdistan region, allows other such regions to be established later, perhaps including a Shiastan comprising nine southern provinces. This highly decentralised structure is favoured by the Kurds and many Shia (particularly supporters of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim), but it is anathema to Sunnis. First, Sunni Arabs are generally Iraqi nationalists, albeit within the context of an Iraq they believe they should govern. Second, because Iraqs energy resources are in the Kurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically feasible Sunni region. Particularly contentious is a provision in the constitution that shares revenues nationally from current oil reserves, while allowing revenues from reserves discovered in the future to go to the regions. The Sunnis did not actively participate in the constitution-drafting process, and acceded to entering the government only on the condition that the constitution be amended.

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The Shia of Iraq and the South Asian Connection

In September, the parliament agreed to initiate a constitutional review commission slated to complete its work within one year; it delayed considering the question of forming a federalized region in southern Iraq for eighteen months...Iraqs leaders often claim that they do not want a division of the country, but we found that key Shia and Kurdish leaders have little commitment to national reconciliation. One prominent Shia leader told us pointedly that the current government has the support of 80 percent of the population, notably excluding Sunni Arabs. Kurds have fought for independence for decades, and when our Study Group visited Iraq, the leader of the Kurdish region ordered the lowering of Iraqi ags and the raising of Kurdish ags. One senior American general commented that the Iraqis still do not know what kind of country they want to have. Yet many of Iraqs most powerful and well-positioned leaders are not working toward a united Iraq15. If the sectarian-ethnic fallout of the American withdrawal cannot be controlled and channelled, the Shia majority may become more assertive politically, overshadowing the apolitical and mostly foreign priestly leadership of the grand ayatollahs. At the time of writing, the non-Iraqi trio is already dependent on the politicised religious leaders like Aziz al Hakim of SCIRI and Muqtada al Sadr of Mahdi Army. The eld will thus be open to Iran to benet from the decline of the anti-Khomeini foreign trio and the rise of the militias more willing to engage Iran politically. Both would require nancial and military support in the early phase, which will make them more dependent on Tehran. It is quite clear that neither Bashir al Naja nor Ishaq Fayyad is likely to succeed Sistani whose health has not been good since 2004. The fth Naja grand ayatollah is located in Qum and might be chosen on a political basis. Kazem Haeri has broken from the Khoi tradition of Najaf and embraced the Khomeinist interpretation of Shiism.

REFERENCES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Hugh Kennedy; The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in Early Islamic State, Routledge, London, 2001. Fouad Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generations Odyssey, Vintage Books 1998, p.181-182 Yitzhak Atash, Reaching for Power, Princeton 2006, says Sistani did not vote in the 2005 election probably because he was not registered as an Iraqi national (p.155). Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival, WW Norton 2006, p.71. Ibid, p.218 Daniel Brumberg, Inventing Khomeini: the Struggle for Reform in Iran, University of Chicago Press, 2001, p.82. http://www.juancole.com/ >> Juan @ 3/15/2005 06:30 (Blogger Prof Juan Cole teaches at the University of Michigan amd makes TV appearances in the US as an expert on Iraq.)

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9 10

11 12 13 14 15

Awadh is a region in the centre of the modern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, which was before Independence known as the United Provinces of Oudh and Agra. The traditional capital of Awadh has been Lucknow, still the capital of the modern State. The modern denition of Awadh geographically includes the districts of Ambedkar Nagar, Bahraich, Balrampur, Barabanki, Faizabad, Gonda, Hardoi, Lakhimpur Kheri, Lucknow, Allahabad, Kaushambi, Pratapgarh, Rai Bareilly, Shravasti, Sitapur, Sultanpur, and Unnao. The region is home to a distinct dialect, Awadhi. Literary Urdu has two competing accents, Dehlavi (represented by Ghalib) and Lakhnavi (represented by Mir). Yitzhak Nakash, The Shiis of Iraq, Princeton Paperbacks, 1995, p.13. Meir Litvak, Money, Religion, and Politics: the Oudh Bequest in Najaf and Karbala 1850-1903. International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 33, 2001, p.1-21. Litvak writes it was Nepal where the East India Company had planned its expedition. The shrines to Musa al-Kazim and Muhammad al-Jawwad, the 7th and 9th Imams, are located in Kazimayn, now a Baghdad suburb. Meir Litvak, Ibid, p.6. Yitzhak Nakash, Ibid, p.186. The Economist, 26 January 2006. The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward A New Approach, Vintage Books 2006, p.18.

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TURNING ON THE FAUCETS OF THOUGHT (Anjum Niaz)*

Abstract (The seminar on Extremism, law and order in Pakistan organized by the Criterion quarterly in May 2007 identied the fanciful doctrine of abrogation used by extremists to justify violence in the name of religion. They claim that Islams doctrinal emphasis on peace and non-aggression was abrogated by chapter 2 verse 106 of the Quran although the abrogation refers to the earlier scriptures and not to any passage of the Quran. The lack of education and the resultant intellectual decit is yet another reason for religious obscurantism. The seminar, which was televised live, was chaired by Justice Khalilur Rahman Ramday of the Supreme Court. Editor) A seminar is often an exercise in insouciance. Workshops fall in the same genre as do high-sounding conferences and esoteric roundtables. Most of these events are quickly erased from the tablet of memory. The few and far-between exceptions are those that succeed in inspiring thought and, perchance, yielding an idea that shapes destiny. Thus Victor Hugo, 1802-1885, once wrote: There is one thing stronger than all the armies of the world, and that is an idea whose time has come. The event. This was the motive behind the seminar organized by the Criterion quarterly at the Islamabad Marriott in the third week of May 2007 on the theme, Extremism, law and order in Pakistan. Extremism is not peculiar to Pakistan. It is the overarching problem of our times from which no nation, big or small, is immune. Extremist violence has been carried out in the name of religion and there could scarcely be a greater blasphemy. Most of these acts have been perpetrated by a miniscule minority that professes Islam. The organizers of the seminar had hoped that it would expound the Quranic principles of non-aggression and peaceful coexistence in order to expose the distorted interpretation of the religion that terrorists employ to justify violence. In other words, it was the message of the Quran that was the idea whose time has come and stronger than the false creed of extremism.
* Anjum Niaz is a journalist with over 20 years experience in national and international reporting.

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The project was ambitious and the pieces seemed to be in place for a memorable event. Unprecedented for a private effort, the entire three-hour seminar was televised live because the theme evoked interest and the chief guest, Justice Khalilur Rahman Ramday of the Supreme Court, is currently at centre stage in the politico-judicial drama being enacted in Pakistan. In fact there was initial scepticism among the audience that he would turn up. The panellists included the former Governor of West Pakistan, Air Marshal (retired) Nur Khan; Dr Manzoor Ahmad, Rector International Islamic University, Islamabad; Members of Parliament Ms. Fauzia Wahab of the opposition PPPP and M.P.Bhandara of the ruling PML (Q); and Tasnim Noorani, the debonair former Secretary Ministry of Interior, who Justice Ramday described as the most handsome bureaucrat he had seen. The line-up thus represented the judiciary, the legislature, the executive, the academia and the armed forces. The government was nervous on three counts. First, the subject was important; second, the on-going judicial crisis had thrust Justice Ramday into domestic and international prominence because he heads the 13-member Supreme Court Bench hearing the petition against the presidential reference against Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Choudhry, and; third, the event was being telecast live. There was no safety net and the proceedings could have had immediate and far-reaching consequences. A trend seemed to have been set because, a few days later, another seminar was organized by lawyers at the Supreme Court itself. Soon afterwards the government instructed the electronic media not to televise such events live. The fears generated by the Criterion seminar proved unfounded. Some of the speeches were undoubtedly hard-hitting, but most were anodyne and even boring. The sensation-hungry audience were disappointed and the event quickly faded from memory. However, at a deeper level, vital issues that could impact on future peace and stability were raised and, therefore, merit scrutiny. The abrogation theologians. In his welcome remarks, Criterion Editor-in-Chief, Iftikhar Murshed, told the audience that the verse from the Quran that was recited at the beginning of the seminar had been deliberately selected because it was exploited by extremists to justify violence in the name of Islam. It appears in chapter 2, verse 106 of the Quran and reads:
Any message We annul or consign to oblivion We replace with a better or similar one. Does thou not know that God has the power to will anything?

Through the centuries a number of Muslim theologians have used this passage to evolve a fanciful doctrine of abrogation under which some of the verses of the

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Quran are said to have been cancelled by subsequent ones during the twenty-three years that it took for the Quran to be revealed. Muhammad Asad (1900-1992), born Leopold Weiss, provides perhaps the most insightful comment on the above passage and I quote:
The principle laid down in this passage - relating to the suspension of the Biblical dispensation by that of the Quran has given rise to an erroneous interpretation by many Muslim theologians. The word ayah (message) occurring in this context is also used to denote a verse of the Quran (because every one of these verses contain a message). Taking this restricted meaning of the term ayah, some scholars conclude from the above passage that certain verses of the Quran had been abrogated by Gods command before the revelation of the Quran was completed. Apart from the fancifulness of this assertion which calls to mind the image of a human author correcting, on second thought, the proofs of his manuscript, deleting one passage and replacing it with another there is not a single reliable Tradition to the effect that the Prophet ever declared a verse of the Quran to have been abrogated. At the root of the so-called doctrine of abrogation may lie the inability of the early commentators to reconcile one Quranic passage with another: a difficulty which was overcome by declaring that one of the verses in question had been abrogated. This arbitrary procedure explains also why there is no unanimity whatsoever among the upholders of the doctrine of abrogation as to which, and how many, Quran-verses have been affected by it: and, furthermore, as to whether this alleged abrogation implies a total elimination of the verse in question from the context of the Quran, or only a cancellation of the specific ordinance or statement contained in it. In short, the doctrine of abrogation has no basis whatever in historical fact, and must be rejected. On the other hand, the apparent difficulty in interpreting the above Quranic passage disappears immediately if the term ayah is understood correctly as a message, and if we read this verse in conjunction with the preceding one, which states that the Jews and Christians refuse to accept any revelation which might supersede the Bible: for, if read in this way, the abrogation relates to the earlier divine message and not to any part of the Quran itself.1

In his address, Murshed explained that the doctrine of abrogation was at the heart of extremist violence that recurs in the contemporary era with alarming frequency. Aggression in any form is forbidden by the Quran. The rst revelation permitting Muslims to ght came almost immediately after Prophet Muhammad

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was forced by relentless persecution to shift from Mecca to Medina in 622. The permission to wage war was conditional and restricted to self-defence. Aggression is anathema to Quranic doctrine. Al-Baydawi (d. 1291), who scholars describe as the soundest and most authoritative commentator of the Quran,2 dened aggression as:
Initiation of fighting, fighting those with whom a treaty has been concluded, surprising the enemy without first inviting them to make peace, destroying crops or killing those who should be protected.3

The awed doctrine of abrogation also jeopardizes several Quranic injunctions on important matters that concern peace and security such as: (a) terminating hostilities should the aggressor incline towards peace;4 (b) showing compassion towards those professing other beliefs;5 (c) protecting non-believers and escorting them to safety in times of war;6 (d) restricting ghting only to combatants thereby prohibiting terrorism;7 (e) ensuring that the damage inicted on the enemy is not excessive but proportional to the damage they have caused thus ruling out the use of weapons of mass destruction;8 (f) stressing that the conditional permission to ght does not imply a clash of civilizations because war can also be waged against believers if they persist in aggression;9 (g) extending cooperation to the international community in promoting global peace and harmony; 10 and (h) honouring all treaties in letter and spirit11. The abrogation theologians have thus spawned the debate for and against extremism in Islam which is frightening in its capacity for mobilizing opinion among extremists. They have canonized a doctrine to destroy, to gain legitimacy to kill, and to provoke various sorts of murderous acts in the name of Islam. They propound the absurd theory that all the Quranic injunctions that strictly prohibit violence and aggression have been annulled. Similarly, to justify suicide bombings and other terrorist acts, these elements have employed the concept of abrogation to negate all verses pertaining to the conditional permission to ght only in selfdefence. An example in point is the following verse:
And so, when the sacred months are over, slay those who ascribe divinity to aught beside God wherever you may come upon them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every conceivable place. Yet if they repent, and take to prayer, and render the purifying dues, let them go their way: for behold, God is much forgiving, a dispenser of grace.12

According to Murshed, the 6.247 verses of the Quran13 reinforce each other and cannot be taken out of context. Thus 2:106 refers to the preceding verse which deals with the Bible in the context of abrogation. Similarly, the above verse pertains

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to a war already in progress and cannot be de-contextualized. He observes.

The killing of those who ascribe divinity to aught beside God has been taken out of context to justify violence although the verse pertains to an ongoing war and cannot imply the initiation of hostilities because aggression in any form is prohibited. This passage, which is misconstrued by extremists as authorization for indiscriminate slaughter, has been described as the sword verse although the word sword does not appear even once in the Quran.14 In fact the very next passage enjoins believers to protect polytheists who have not attacked them and conduct them to a place of safety. The second part of this so-called sword verse beginning with the words Yet if they repent is said to have abrogated several passages of the Quran such as 2: 256 which unambiguously affirm that there cannot be any compulsion in matters of faith. This has not only resulted in the mistaken belief even among Muslims that apostasy is punishable by death but has also led to the distortion of history that Islam spread through the sword though closer to the truth is that the religion established itself in spite of the sword. The requirement that those who repent should take to prayer, and render the purifying dues, etc., is only one, and by no means the exclusive, way in which the aggressors can demonstrate the termination of hostilities.15

In the context of the seminar, I had hoped that these opening remarks would be like the overture to a symphony and that the other speakers would develop the concept. However, only Dr Manzoor Ahmad and, to a lesser extent, Justice Khalilur Rehman Ramday picked up the thread of Mursheds introductory words and added to the wisdom of the Quranic verse with their robust analysis. In truth, the audience had side-stepped the fusion of Verse 2:106 with the overall discussion that Iftikhar Murshed had creatively constructed until Dr Manzoor Ahmad re-animated it by his opening lines:
God has changed His mind and God has been changing His mind and unless we accept this, we wont be able to solve the problem. This is a very crucial point because we have forgotten this and were facing these difficultiesthe Shariah needed to be changed, we needed a new prophet

The breathless urgency in his tone and recusant syntax employed by the respected academician enticed everyone to take note. The slouchers, seduced by his disputation, sat up and tried to dig out of the hole earlier dug by Mursheds epigrammatic lines. It is not what the learned Dr Ahmed said, but that his opening didnt appear a good t to the framework raised on 2:106 by Murshed. On the other hand, Dr Ahmads zinger appeared contrary to Mursheds avowal that whatever

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was in the Quran was immutable. I again borrow a passage from Mursheds article in the inaugural issue of Criterion:
Implicit also in this controversial doctrine [of Abrogation] is a presumption of Divine fallibility. The implication is that God made His commandments known but then had second thoughts and amended His earlier pronouncements. The annulment indicated in 2: 106 was necessitated because of human manipulations of the earlier scriptures. For instance, it was only at the Council of Nicaea in 325 that the concept of the divinity of Christ became the basis of Christian beliefs. This, however, generated controversy which raged till 381 when the Emperor Theodosius the Great convened the Council of Constantinople which confirmed the Nicene doctrine of Trinity. 16

Writer Max Beerhohm, famous for his witty quotes, once said But, (it seems I must begin every paragraph by questioning the sincerity of what I have just said). So must I. Let me therefore pause here. Quoting the Quran and interpreting the meaning is a matter best left to specialists and scholars of Islam. But by the same token, lay persons not well initiated in the study of the Quran, yet wanting to understand the divine message in crisp, cogent and pared-down prose can have a hard time guring out what is true and what is not. Wary about misquoting Dr Manzoor Ahmad, I emailed him some questions for this article and he replied:
When I talked about God changing His mind what I meant was that the Sharias i.e., laws governing our social structures have been changing from time to time. God Himself has said that He has sent Shariahs for every ummah (community). Since we believe in the finality of the Prophethood and since no Prophet is going to come to make amendments in the Shairah, it is the duty of the Muslim ummah to amend it if necessary. To believe that social evolution has stopped 1400 years ago would be irrational and to believe that the Shariah is fixed would thus be contradictory.

Earlier, during the seminar, Dr. Manzoor Ahmad had told the audience:
Against this background, reading the Quran carefully is de rigueur and you will see that God has given Sharias which are ways and paths to various people and they were not the same, they were different. They were suited to different times for which they were given i.e., laws governing our social structures have been changing from time to time. Since we believe in the finality of the Prophethood of Mohammad and since no prophet is going to come to make amendments in the Shairah, it is the duty of the Muslim ummah to amend it if necessary. God said that there was no need for another prophet, everybody has been endowed with one very important thing that is your head. Use it you will find the right path

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if you have the motivation.

Here, I must categorically assert that not one word, not one syllable, not one coma of the Quran can be changed. Its laws whether pertaining to the executive, legislature or any other matter are immutable. Thus while Islam believes in strong central authority, it does not countenance totalitarianism. The powers of the head of state are limited by the injunctions of the Quran and, in this sense, there can never be a Hitler or Mussolini in an Islamic society.17 Similarly, the Quran also curtails the powers of the legislature. No parliament can promulgate the profane or prohibit what is lawful. There can therefore be no question of a parliament in a Muslim society, legalizing homosexuality, altering the basic laws of the Quran or curtailing the rights that it gives to men and women. However this does not substantially restrict the competence of parliaments to legislate because only 190 of the Qurans 6,247 verses deal with personal, penal and civil laws as well as jurisprudence and testimony. Therefore, there is no impediment in the way of Islamic legislatures enabling them to enact laws in line with modern values.18 If by Sharia Dr. Manzoor Ahmad means laws in Islamic societies that are not Quranic injunctions then, perhaps, these can be amended and here a distinction has to be made between religion and ideology. Religion and Ideology. According to Dr. Manzoor Ahmad, Ideology is secular; religion is sacred. Ideologies are based on secular principles for structuring society in a particular way and have proven to be more coercive in nature than accommodative. On the other hand the word religion encompasses a whole range of attitudes starting from the Sus world view to liberalists who believe that God actually sits on a throne and intervenes in worldly affairs on a day to day basis. Religions establish a relationship between man and a higher reality whereas ideologues have been earth bound and mostly concerned with themselves in regulating the daily life of a human being. He believes that all ideologies are intolerant and zealots have made Islam into an ideology operating on a true or false logic. It was only in the 20th century, that a new and exotic meaning was afxed to Islam by intellectuals eager to prove that the religion could meet the modern challenges of the global world if dubbed an ideology. Just as the Muslims under the inuence of communism began calling Islam an ideology in the last century, the current century opened with fundamentalist forces in the forefront. Consequently most intellectuals opt out of discussing religion. They fear inviting controversy that can spiral into ugly accusations scourging them heretics by die-hard purists who shun views on Islam that dont correlate with their beliefs. This is a very dangerous development, quite

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recent, where the level of tolerance grows increasingly narrow. It shuns probes and explorations for value and benet; it marginalizes free and parallel thinking and a spirit of inquiry; it discourages honesty and confession; it abhors hunch, intuition, experience, judgment and feelings. Flick through any religious channel and you will nd turgidity not innovation; read through any religious literature and you will nd ignorance not enlightenment. Addressing the basic problem of intolerance, the root of extremism in religions, Dr Manzoor Ahmad calls it command and obedience which rules our social, moral, religious and political life. Since this paradigm is coercive in nature and tries to shut all avenues of debate and disagreement, the pent-up feelings burst through the weak spots in the command structure whenever they nd a chance. Dr. Manzoor Ahmads differentiation between ideology and religion raises fundamental issues. To many, Islam is more than a just a personal faith it is a way of life. The secular and the spiritual are not watertight compartments of human existence. They are inter-related. In this sense the kingdom of God and the kingdom of Caesar are not separate entities. They are one. If this is the case then it also must be said that religion, if wrongly interpreted, is not merely the opiate of the people as the Marxist believed - it can become the poison that destroys society.19 The correct interpretation of religion is, therefore, directly related to education and this is what both Dr. Manzoor Ahmad as well as Justice Ramday stressed during the seminar. The latter, without naming the clergy, emphasized the need to study and understand religion ourselves rather than through the eyes, ears and minds of professionals whose bread and butter depended on it. He then struck out at the mullahs saying in legal and judicial terms we discard such people as interested witnesses because theres a motive attached to their evidence. As I was coming here I thought of the Almighty ordaining knowledge for man after He created Adam. And it is no coincidence that the commencement of our religion also started with the command said Justice Ramday. He recited the relevant verses in uent Arabic underpinning the splendour of self-study and logic made easy for humans. The judge asked the audience to mull over it. Ordinarily, at the rst meeting, you make your own introduction, the way God did with Moses when he went up the mountain in search of re. I am God. But in the case of Prophet Mohammad, God asked him to read. Thats the kind of emphasis Islam puts on learning. That settled the judge moved on to the heart of Islam. It is nothing beyond a path that prescribes a man to be a good human being. There is not a single religion in the world that believes in this life being temporary and when our life ends, there has to be accountability and stocktaking with reward and punishment coming into play. As one deeply interested in other religions, Justice Ramdays

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quintessential observation was profoundly simple: What does the Old Testament, the Bible, Vedas, the Wheel of Life with 8 spokes, Jainism, Buddhism and all other scriptures speak of? They show the path for man to be a human; how to attain nirvana and salvation. The venerable judge is aware of the Day ;/of Judgment hovering over all of us. He recently rebuffed a government counsel arguing against the chief justice: Will a judge wait for the Day of Judgment to get justice? As an ardent advocate of interfaith dialogue, he said this planet would be worth a life if, a Muslim, Hindu, Jew or Christian irrespective of his faith, is above all a good human being. He took the road not taken by others. Its sheer ignorance on our part that we become exposed to exploitation by certain vested interests who pitch us against each others religions. Calling people who attack each other narcissists Justice Ramday gave a parabolic example of two people travelling to Lahore from Islamabad via two different routes the Motorway and the GT Road. Instead of slitting each others throats saying their route was better wouldnt it be civil if both the feuding parties eschewed their differences and said to each other: I wish you good luck. Follow the rules. Be careful with your speed. I have to interject at this point by respectfully adding that such logic is easier said than done. Real life tells us that when there is such a polarization of views, its well neigh impossible to reach a middle ground. Thus we have two different points of view: an academic who believes that the secular (ideology) and the spiritual (religion) are mutually exclusive and cannot be reconciled; and a judge whose vision is inspired by the belief that there is unity in diversity as the human race embarks upon a transcendental voyage towards the One reality. The former envisages conict; the later does not abandon the hope that religion-motivated violence, particularly in the name of Islam, can be defeated. The implication is that the Quran must be understood and not merely chanted. This was the essence of what emerged from the seminar. Had it been properly developed, then the event could have been both memorable and consequential because of the live telecast. The opportunity was lost and, instead, sub-themes were dwelt upon. Known facts were repeated ad nauseam and Justice Ramday referred to some of them in his summation. The sub-themes. Strong women are not tolerated, was the important line in Ms Fauzia Wahabs presentation. She gave the example of Ms Nilofur Bakhtiar, the federal minister for tourism currently standing in the line of re for hugging a paraglider in Paris! The Taliban at the Lal Masjid in Islamabad have declared her a nonMuslim and the government, despite all its talk about enlightened moderation,

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seems to have knuckled under. Ms Fauzia Wahab described extremism as a monster at the doorsteps of every home. To that extent, she is right. She is also right when she said that Muslims over the last 800 years lived a peaceful existence where women attended qawallis, mushairas, urs and visited tombs of saints. She blamed Gen. Ziaul Haqs tsunami of Islamisation that swept away moderation and all the student unions leaving behind a otsam of fundamentalism. The rabid arm of Jamaat-e-Islamis student body known as the Jamiat-e-Tulaba-e-Islam was the only union allowed by Zia. Today you see the stufng from those dark decadent days serving as professors and administrators. Having won the battle for the hearts and minds of their students, the extremists supremacy stands unchallenged in universities and colleges. Ms Wahab spoke of the wave of religiosity in the 90s when organizations like the Al-Huda seized control under state patronage: At the Presidency, the First Lady would invite women to a weekly lecture on Islam and purdah (segregation), the same being the case at the Corps Commanders House in Karachi. This inuence was devastating. It ruined the extended family because women began observing strict purdah from their close relatives, was Ms Wahabs lament. Would it not have been wonderful had she connected the dots she put out for the audience and wisely and ably steered her ship toward a dock? It is always convenient for politicians to pass the buck to their adversaries, but her own party, led by a woman, Ms Benazir Bhutto, holding the singular distinction of being the rst Muslim woman prime minister and despite serving as Pakistans prime minister twice, failed to abolish anti-women laws for fear of losing support from the clergy and conservative elements in the political sphere. Would we not have clapped had Ms Wahab vowed to ght for an end to honour killing, little girls given in marriage to older men, gang rapes and domestic violence? No man or woman head of government has had the guts to end such inhuman practices. M.P. Bhandara made at least two important points that have a bearing on religious extremism in Pakistan. The rst was the proposal to move a constitutional amendment bill calling for the inclusion of the Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnahs 11 August 1947 speech in article 2 of the Pakistan Constitution. In that speech Jinnah had said: you may belong to any religion, cast or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state.20 However, article 2 of the 1973 Constitution declares: Islam shall be the state religion of Pakistan. Bhandara elaborated that this provision does not appear either in the 1956 or the 1962 constitutions. Indeed, if one goes through the Muslim League Council records from 1906 to 1948, there is no reference to a theocratic Pakistan.21 It is signicant that Justice Ramday, a religious scholar who refuses to be intimidated by fundamentalists, declared during the seminar: Theres no theocracy in Islam.

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The second, no less relevant, element in Bhandaras address was his proposal to amend the Blasphemy Laws. Under the amendment, the punishment for deling the Holy Quran would also apply to the desecration of any other Holy Book. Similarly, the punitive measures for derogatory remarks in respect of the Holy Prophet are also sought in respect of such remarks against any other Holy Prophet. Although the proposed amendments have already been rejected by members of parliament from both sides of the political divide, Bhandara stated that he would continue with his efforts. However, as a parliamentarian from the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (Q), Bhandara glossed over the violence inicted almost every day on members of the minority community despite adequate coverage of these atrocities by the print and electronic media. For instance, only recently one of the leading English language newspapers commented editorially:
In an atmosphere of increasing religiosity, the Bishop of Rochester (UK) Michael Nazir Ali has done well to voice his concerns for Pakistans nonMuslim minorities. Unfortunately, so long as divisions between Islam and the West deepen all over the world, minorities in Muslim societies will continue to be targeted by zealots who are egged on by fire-breathing mosque imams.22

All that Bhandara could bring himself to say at the seminar was: There is a lunatic fringe here and elsewhere who burn churches and other places of worship. This is a very small fringe. All sane people must condemn it. To him such incidents were few and far between and by and large minorities have been fairly dealt with. Good governance! came the cry from Air Marshal Nur Khan, a giant of an administrator, who put the Pakistan Air Force on the victory stand during the 1965 war against India; who de-politicized the Board of Cricket Control; who professionalized the Pakistan International Airline and pinned it on the world map as one of the best air carriers. Now, in the twilight of his life watching helplessly his country slide into the throes of chaos, the air marshal hangs on the remote hope of Pakistan returning to normalcy. Law and order is worse than ever, but I am an optimistic manPakistan has a great future. Field Marshal Ayub Khan was not a political man and thats why he oundered in the end. However, it is an irony of history that all others who followed him down to the present incumbent tried aping Ayub. They followed his practice of one-man-rule and shunned dissent. Predicting that Gen. Musharraf will have a hard landing if he doesnt invite all the political parties, including the religious, to arrive at a consensus regarding holding of fair and free elections conducted by an independent election commission. He concluded: There is a revolt against the system. Muslims have been humbled by their own governments. People have been left illiterate and unlettered. Unless you

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educate your masses, the disconnected will take up guns. Tasneem Noorani, another outstanding administrator who until last year was the interior secretary, controlling the law and order machinery of the country, played out the role of a typical Monday morning media quarterback, a term given to American sports commentators who wax eloquent after the game is over. Mr Noorani with his seven-points failed to engage the audience with case studies and real life experience of ways and means to weed out terrorism. Yes, he talked of Pakistans support to the US on the war against terror; the arrests of Al-Qaeda activists here; the spread of talibanization; Shia Sunni animosity; the nurturing of Jihadi parties to liberate Indian Held Kashmir; the gap between the rich and the poor, the law and order situation prevalent in Pakistan today, but all these points didnt quite gel. Instead it was all canned stuff. My admiration for Justice Ramday, therefore, goes up a notch when as a serving judge presiding over the most sensitive issue that Pakistan could ever face, he spoke without any fear knowing full well that each word of his was being weighed by the audience and all the TV viewers including the establishment waiting for him to trip. But Tasneem Noorani, undeniably the most handsome bureaucrat in the words of Justice Ramday, took us on a jerky ride through the jungle of jargon and ofcialese. I am going to show you the other side of this handsome face which is more human and therefore more appealing by quoting you from his article in the Op-ed page of Dawn. He begins his story thus:
An outstanding functionary of the state was killed with a shot to the head in his bedroom in front of his wife during the wee hours of the morning some time ago in Pakistans so-called safest city Islamabad. The immediate reaction of the police was that it was a robbery. This instinctive reaction to point out a safe direction for the deed defies logic. Why should four men waste their time in trying to rob an officer with an honest reputation and living in Spartan conditions when they have far more lucrative alternatives? Investigations are being supervised by the apex court of the country the deceased being an officer of the Supreme Court at the time of his demise.23

Noorani then shares the contents of an email the deceased, Syed Hammad Raza, sent to his friend three days before his death. Talking about corruption wrote Mr Raza: Before putting someone else to the test, I tried it on myself with horrifying results. May I then submit my own case: 1. Not every minute of my time spent in the ofce has been in discharging ofcial duties. 2. Not every call from the ofcial telephones provided for use has been ofcial. 3. Not every litre of fuel provided to me ofcially has been used for strictly ofcial purposes. 4. There have been certain occasions during eld postings when I have not paid my utility bills.

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These are some of the charges that came up against me during the investigation of introspection. And I plead guilty on each count and await your verdict as to where I stand. Nooranis brilliant piece of writing can become a trailblazer were he to often open up his heart and spill the beans on why the government cares two gs for the life and security of its non-VIP citizens. An eye-opener is the amount of money guzzled by the exercise of protecting VIPs in Islamabad. According to an year end review of police performance by the Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives, out of Rs 290 million for capital police, the lions share went towards protecting VVIPs. What also could have been rewarding was the question answer session. But it wasnt. Justice Ramday was conducting the proceedings and was perhaps too polite to order us to be brief and ask pointed questions instead of making lengthy statements. Its worthwhile to recall an observation of Brigadier (retd) Abdul Majid Khan who gave an eye-witness account of foreigners of Uzbek and Middle Eastern origin operating in Bannu They came from abroad and we should expel them but our government is too soft on them, he said. Interesting, a few days later one read in the news of militants ring rockets on a police check-post in Bannu while in a separate incident, a bank ofcial, Mohammad Rashid of Agriculture Development Bank of Pakistan at Bannu was injured when a home made bomb exploded in his car. Meanwhile at Landikotals (Khyber Agency) Agencies Headquarter Hospital, another set of militants struck injuring clerk Khaista Mohammad. The NGO Save the Children unit was the target. The principal ofcer of the US Consulate in Peshawar had inaugurated the ofce at the hospital two months earlier. This happened on the same Friday when 130 miles away, the Imam-e-Kaaba was giving his sermon on Muslim brotherhood and harmony. A groundswell attended the Friday prayers at Faisal Mosque on 1 June to hear the sermon by Imam-i-Kaaba Al Sheikh Abdur Rehman Al Sudais. He preached to those gathered and to Pakistanis all over to shun sectarianism and extremism as they have no place in Islam. For a single Ummah that faces one Kaaba there should be no reason for differences. He said Islam protected human rights and promoted harmony and brotherhood and discouraged mischievous acts. He called for resolving conicts through dialogue and negotiations taking into consideration social and economic benets that could be achieved by resolving disputes. President Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz played host to him at their respective palaces. Better it would have been had the Imam-e-Kaaba in clear and categorical diction denounced suicide bombings, violence against women and extremism in the name of Islam. His words more than anyone elses in the whole world would have sunk in the souls of 160 million Pakistanis. But thats asking for the moon. Hes a man of the cloth and perhaps

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prefers to stay away from religious issues that are tainted with controversy. Justice Ramdays summation. As I begin to assemble a portrait of the judge - very much a product of the society in which we live today the contrarians among us may well ask why the pressing need to know Justice Ramday. Fair question. The persona of a judge his intellectual pursuits, mannerisms, attitudes, interests and life outside the purview of the court - helps us frame our personal beliefs by correlating his legal arguments with his personal characteristics rather than legal precedents that he may cite. Our opinions can be over simplistic or too nuanced, ercely dramatic or cloyingly pious, but at least we would have tried entering the judicial monastery where no ordinary mortal dare wander. Taking a chapter out of the book of Confucius Sayings is instructive. The Chinese sage preferred focusing on behaviour rather than personality that Freud later pushed on to us. Relying on the wisdom of Confucius, allow me to spotlight Justice Ramdays personality and not merely his behaviour at the seminar which he presided with professional sangfroid. Furthermore, it would be unfair to Justice Ramday were I to place him beyond the pale of human experience, etherizing him as a judge whose heart and soul cannot be touched. On the contrary, generous with his personal narrative, the judge provided us a multidimensional view of his diverse background, the telling feature being that he was comfortable sharing his life story just like any other human who himself tells about who he is, and why. On the dais, he sat not nitpicking panellists, but wanting to be enlightened. He heard with rapt attention what Air Marshal Nur Khan said about the end of Musharrafs army rule and the beginning of democracy; he introduced the former interior secretary Tasneem Noorani as the most handsome bureaucrat hed seen; he appreciated MNA Meenu Bhandaras bid to re-launch his amended bill on Blasphemy; he complimented his host Iftikhar Murshed for his excellent journal the Criterion; and he gave us a patient hearing when the audience instead of asking short questions engaged in dialectics. He joked, smiled, listened, spoke as if he was one of us and not above us. A esh and blood kind of man one can dialogue with. His moral compass pointed in the right direction; his spiritual reach was authoritative; his knowledge of Islam and other religions far-reaching. The audience, wary at rst (arent we all scared to even approach our lordships for fear of contempt of court?), drawn by his sincerity of purpose, gravitated towards Justice Ramday. Dont scare us Justice Ramday had warned Malik Qayyum, the governments counsel, after hearing how Malaysian president Mahathir Mohammad deposed judges inimical to him. The judge who today is the most crucial point person in

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the judicial crisis raging like wild re through Pakistan, left the Supreme Court to motor across to Marriott that Monday afternoon to preside over this lecture on religion, terrorism and law and order. Apart from one oblique reference about the crisis it is very embarrassing moment for me today, Justice Ramday immersed himself in his role as a moderator of the seminar. This one-liner caps a thousand word essay on the duel between chief justice and the president with Justice Ramday as the referee. The judge genuinely looked pained. From his heavenly discourse mentioned earlier, the judge descended the spiritual staircase down to the every day world inhabited by ordinary Pakistanis in quotidian life. He reminisced of his college days, some 40 years back. Earlier parliamentarian Ms Fauzia Wahab of the PPPP had mentioned her university days in Karachi and how girl students were free to roam around the campus. Justice Ramday joked about having missed all that fun for being in the wrong place at the wrong time. He told us that he went to Gordon College, Rawalpindi, and was not allowed to talk to girls: We had a notice saying, anybody talking to a girl will be ned Rs 10. The underlying humour was contagious and the audience began to chill out, no longer awestruck by the presence of a judge presiding over the destiny of the nation. And the lady I couldnt nd in the campus, pointing towards Ms Wahab, who talked longingly about life on the campus where out of 5000 girl students only one wore a burqa, Justice Ramday dispelled her fears, with terse and witty remarks that the beard is not the sole identity of Muslims. The Jews, Christians and Sikhs too sport beards. A beard is not the kind of curse we take it to be. Similarly, he said, we shouldnt look down upon women who cover their faces. He mentioned travelling the countryside in India and found Hindu women bent in veils coming down to their ankles. When he visited the Gurukul University in India, one of the elitist and oldest seats of education, he found no girl students. Dr Satwant Kumar, the vice chancellor told me when I asked him where the girls were, that the college didnt adhere to co-education and that the girls campus was a good 40 miles away! Given to epigrammatic one-liners, Justice Ramdays summation made a deeper impact than all other speakers except Dr Manzoor Ahmad. But remember, our Lordship was an ace debater in college. Conclusion. Ideally, my model for an exchange (not a seminar, please!) is the Doha Debates. Dubbed as a public forum for dialogue and freedom of speech, the Qatar-based debates are chaired by Tim Sebastian, renowned for putting his interviewees on the spot. His programme on BBC called Hard Talk is remembered by many where he would eke out the last iota of truth or falsehood from his guests, especially

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the controversial kind. The three-year-old Doha Debates, sponsored by the Qatar Foundation encourage open and frank dissection of important issues in the Arab and Islamic worlds; principles of free speech and democratic decision-making through the use of this traditional debating format. They provide a forum for serious discussion on the hottest issues for people of various backgrounds, expertise and opinions to share knowledge and exchange views. Besides, the Debates ultimate objective is sublime: to create a sense of social responsibility that will carry through to real life. In the words of Tim Sebastian The Doha Debates form part of the vital push for change and reform thats being spearheaded in Qatar. The programme is a unique venture for this region and represents, I believe, a vital exercise for a free and modern society. Iftikhar Murshed is no Tim Sebastian. Alas. Can he become one? Well, whats stopping him? He has the makings of one: He couldnt have chosen a more newsworthy topic than he did for Criterions inaugural seminar, he couldnt have bagged a newsier chief guest than he did; and he couldnt have been pushier than he was when he told the audience to ask whatever, without fear or favour, never mind if the event was being carried live on one of the television channels. However, the weakest link was the quality of intellects he managed to pull together. Most were time-worn, tired, recyclers. They had nothing new to reveal. Why invite them then? Wasnt his role that of a concept manager responsible for rousing, stimulating and shepherding his ock? Had he followed the format adopted by the Doha Debates, Iftikhar Murshed, at the most, would have erred on the right side of grandiosity. The guest speakers, instead of accid oggers of tired dogma could have transformed into ery debaters zeroing in on the logic of their argument by examining the complexity of the issue from different angles to reach a conclusion that the audience would have found inspiring and fresh. Another claim to fame of the Doha Debates is its invited speakers which according to the organizers are highly regarded academics, politicians, religious gures, government ofcials, policy experts and journalists from around the world. Keeping the Doha Debates as the model, Criterion must strive to raise the level of discussion by its speakers. The so-called intellectuals and experts must not take for granted the audiences in Pakistan. Thanks to the Internet and 24-hour news channels from around the world, an average Pakistani is extremely savvy about religion and politics. He doesnt need lectures and classroom seminars; he needs answers and solutions to problems he is perhaps better initiated than our talkingheads. What we also need is accountability, putting on the mat those responsible for misusing their power and authority. They must be singled out and pressurized

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to respond, on the lines of a truth and reconciliation commission. Criterion is an ideal forum for civil society to constitute a pressure group that makes meaningful inroads into territories till now marked restricted, no-go and out-of-bounds for the ordinary citizens. At the conclusion of the Criterion seminar, I asked Dr Manzoor Ahmad as to what his thoughts were when he stood at the lectern? To tell you the truth I went to the meeting quite unprepared and had to trust my guts to say something meaningful. I dont know whether I succeeded or not but the sort of things I had in my mind have been expressed in a slightly different way on different occasions (that he later emailed to me). I own what I have written in these pages. I then proceeded to ask him his opinion of the audience participation. The audience was perceptive and good but I am afraid I probably was not able to say certain things which were in my mind in very coherent way. I thought I would later write something about it, but have not been able to do so yet. Now here is an honest response. It only reiterates what I state in the beginning of this paper - that seminars are perhaps not the forum for a meaningful dialogue. By saying that Islam is a religion of peace is not enough. Instead build a self critique not on if and why Islam is the religion of peace but on a paradigm on which you have built your Islam for the 20th century and then try to build an alternative paradigm on the basis of which you can say Islam is a religion of peace and not an extremist religion. He thinks that Muslims as a whole suffer from an intellectual decit. We dont have a critical mass of philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, economists of world repute in the Muslim world today. Unfortunately those who are especially interested in reviving Islam have not been able to develop a new hermeneutics which can gel with modern understanding, Dr Manzoor Ahmad laments. They say journalism is the rst draft of history. What the speakers at the seminar said had little relevance to the day-to-day realities reported prominently in the national press. In this landscape of irrational fault-lines where religious extremists spread their malevolent tentacles, shutting out public discussion on religion is a sin. At the risk of repeating myself, let me state with condence that newspaper columnists are frequently given a shut-up call by their editors and proprieties of mass media under the practice self-censorship. Recently, in one of my columns, I put across a sustic view of divine intervention in the affairs of men and how God was busy balancing the books of both the rich and the poor. I gave rst-hand examples. My column angered the so-called thekadars (contractors) of Islam, a term most recently coined by President Musharraf for the mullahs. My harried editor emailed me to refrain from writing on religion in future! Newspaper editors and media barons would do well not to buckle under the pressure of a handful of illiterate obscurantist who will not allow a public debate on Islam for

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fear of the educated class taking over their turf and depriving them of a cushy lifestyle sustained by gullible followers. But the bigots in the West are no better. Their diatribe against Islam is succinctly summarized by Mustapha Marrouchi. Discussing his thesis in Countercurrents.org, the professor of English who writes with aplomb on all things Middle-Eastern says discourse on terrorism often gets streamlined. Its scholarship is yesterdays newspaper or todays CNN bulletin. Its gurusJudith Miller[since sacked from the New York Times for misreporting on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq],Tom Friedman, Charles Krauthammer, David Frum, William Sare, George Will, Norman Podhoretz, Seymour Hersh, Michael Massing, Mark Danner, A.M. Rosenthal, to name the happy few are journalists with obscure, even ambiguous, backgrounds. Most of the writing about terrorism is brief, pithy, and totally devoid of the scholarly armature of evidence, proof, or argument. Its paradigm is the television interview, the spot news announcement, the instant gratication one associates with the Bush White Houses reality time, the evening news based entirely on the sound bite, says Mr Marrouchi. The oftentimes pseudo scholarship and expert jargon by the US media has never ceased to amaze me while living in America for the past nine years. I have spoken with investigative journalist Seymour Hersh (mentioned above) famous for his revealing pieces in The New Yorker magazine that frequently ignite spirited talk shows sending seismic signals over America. Even the White House goes into twitters but pretends ignorance of Mr Hershs very existence. He has honed into a rabid confrontationist and claims inside knowledge with his war chest of intelligence briefs collected during interviews with intelligence operatives in the most sensitive parts of the world. However he is no different from the run-off-themill western writers who Marrouchis describes as self-righteous sophists who forward specious arguments and sermonize tiresomely without ever undergoing an exercise in self-criticism,

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REFERENCES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Asad, Muhammad, The Message of the Quran, The Book Foundation, Bristol, 2003, p. 31, footnote 87. Glasse, Cyril, The Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam, Stacey International (revised edition 2001) p. 83. Abdel Haleem, Muhammad, Understanding the Quran: Themes and Style, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1999, p. 64, The Quran, 2:193. Ibid., 60:8. Ibid., 9:6. Ibid., 2:190. Ibid., 2:194. Ibid., 49:9 Ibid., 5:2. Ibid., 5:1, 16:91-91, etc. Ibid., 9:5. The number becomes 6,360 if the words In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Dispenser of Grace, are counted as a verse because 113 of the 114 chapters of the Quran begin with this sentence which also nds mention within the text of one of the chapters. Abdel Haleem, Muhammad, Understanding the Quran: Themes and Style, I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd.. 1999 p.65. S. Iftikhar, Murshed, Criterion, Vol 1, No. 1, Oct Dec 2006, p.14. Ibid., p.p.13. Roy, Olivier, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan Cambridge University Press, 1986, p.5. S. Iftikhar, Murshed, Criterion, Vol. 1, No. 1, Oct Dec 2006, p. 21. Ibid., p.23. Speech delivered by the Quaid-e-Azam as President of Pakistans rst Constituent Assembly and as governor-general designate on 11 August 1947. Bhandara, M.P., Quaids Concept of Pakistan, Daen, Islamabad, 25 March 2007. Plight of Minorities, Dawn, 5 June 2007. Dawn, 24 May 2007.

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