ESTACION V.

BERNARDO Facts: Respondent Noe was going home, boarded a Ford Fiera passenger jeepney driven by respondent Geminiano Quinquillera (Quinquillera), owned by respondent Cecilia Bandoquillo (Bandoquillo) He was seated on the extension seat placed at the center of the Fiera and later on, he hung or stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle when an old woman wanted to ride. On its way, the Fiera began to slow down and then stopped by the right shoulder of the road to pick up passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck, owned by petitioner and driven by Gerosano, which was traveling in the same direction, hit the rear end portion of the Fiera where respondent Noe was standing. Due to the tremendous force, the cargo truck smashed respondent Noe against the Fiera crushing his legs and feet which made him fall to the ground. A passing vehicle brought him to the hospital where his lower left leg was amputated. Respondent Noe, through his guardian ad litem Arlie Bernardo, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a complaint 3 for damages arising from quasi delict against petitioner as the registered owner of the cargo truck and his driver Gerosano alleging that the proximate cause of his injuries and suffering was the reckless imprudence of Gerosano and petitioners negligence in the sele ction of a reckless driver and for operating a vehicle that was not roadworthy. Petitioner and his driver Gerosano filed their Answer 4 denying the material allegations in the complaint. They, in turn, filed a third party complaint5 against respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, as owner and driver respectively of the Fiera. They alleged that it was the reckless imprudence of respondent driver Quinquillera and his clear violation of the traffic rules and regulations which was the proximate cause of the accident and asked for indemnification for whatever damages they would be sentenced to pay. The RTC rendered its judgment in the civil case,7 ordering defendants Gerosano and Estacion, to pay plaintiff the damages, jointly or solidarily holding that the negligence of Gerosano, petitioners driver, is the direct a nd proximate cause of the incident and of the injuries suffered by respondent Noe. Dissatisfied, only petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the herein petition for review. Issue: Who shall be considered negligent and liable? Held: All parties were negligent, that is, the truck driver and truck owner, the jeepney driver and its owner, and the passenger-victim. Negligence of Noe Respondent Noes act of standing on the rear carrier o f the Fiera exposing himself to bodily injury is in itself negligence on his part. We find that the trial court and the CA erred when they failed to consider that respondent Noe was also guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is a conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. 23 Negligence of the jeepneys driver Respondent Quinquillera, the Ford Fiera jeepney driver, was also negligent in allowing respondent Noe to stand on the Fieras rear portion. The act of permitting respondent Noe to hang on the rear portion of the Fiera in such a dangerous position creates undue risk of harm to respondent Noe. Quinquillera failed to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand. Thus, respondent Noe suffered injury.25Since respondent Quinquillera is negligent, there arises a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer , respondent Bandoquillo, in supervising her employees properly. Such presumption was not rebutted at all by Bandoquillo. Negligence of the trucks driver/owner Petitioners contention that he was able to establish that he exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his employees as well as in the maintenance of his cargo truck in good operating condition is not meritiorious. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omiss ions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. x x x Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. x x x The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. As the employer of Gerosano, petitioner is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former. Petitioner is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law and may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of his driver, who at the time was acting within the scope of his assigned task, only if he can show that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. As to the liability: Turning now to the award of damages, since there was contributory negligence on the part of respondent Noe, petitioners liability should be mitigated in accordance with Article 2179 of the Civil Code which provides: When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot r ecover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. The underlying precept of the above article on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. 32

Petitioner and respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera are jointly and severally liable for the 80% of the damages as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses conformably with our pronouncement in Tiu v. Arriesgado3 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals was AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

OTHER DOCTRINES: 1. In Yambao v. Zuniga,27 we have clarified the meaning of the diligence of a good father of a family, thus: The "diligence of a good father" referred to in the last paragraph of the aforecited statute means diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Thus, when an employee, while performing his duties, causes damage to persons or property due to his own negligence, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, either in the selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after the selection. For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good father of a family. x x x 2. In Phoenix Construction, Inc., v. Intermediate Appellate Court ,33 where we held that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisios injuries was the wrongful and negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked but found Dionisio guilty of contributory negligence on the night of the accident, we allocated most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. In said case, we required Dionisio to bear 20% of the damages awarded by the appellate court, except as to the award of exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs. Res Ipsa Loquitor PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. and BIENVENIDO S. PASCUAL,vsSPS. GAUDENCIO SARANGAYA III a nd PRIMITIVA B. SARANGAYA, Facts:

Respondent spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva Sarangaya own a commercial building known as Super A Building, subdivided into three doors, each of which was leased out. Petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. through its branch manager Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door of the Super A Building. Perla Compania renovated its rented space providing for an office and garage for his 14-year old car, 1981 model 4-door Ford Cortina, a company-provided vehicle he used in covering the different towns within his area of supervision. Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not bring the car with him. 3 days later, he returned to Santiago and, after checking his appointments the next day, decided to warm up the car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the ignition key, the engine made an odd sound and did not start. He started the engine again when the small flame started coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage . Suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his face, legs and arms. Respondents who were living behind the commercial building heard two loud explosions. Fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings, furniture and appliances. The city fire marshall conducted an investigation and concluded that the fire was accidental. The report also disclosed that petitioner-corporation had no fire permit as required by law. Respondents later on filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages based on quasi-delict against petitioners, alleging that: Pascual - acted with gross negligence Perla Compania - lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of Pascual as its employee. RTC Pascual and Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. liable to pay jointly and solidarily. Liable under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that they employed the necessary care and diligence in the upkeep of the car and it failed to employ the diligence of a good father of a family, as required by law, in the selection and supervision of Pascual. CA - affirmed but modified the amount of damages. Hence, this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to annul the decisions of the CA.l
ISSUES: 1. 2. HELD: W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable. W/N Perla Compania lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee.

ON ISSUE #1: W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable YES Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.[10] It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiffs prima facie case.[11] The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption.[12] The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking.[13] The doctrine is based on the theory that Pascual or Perla Compania either: knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms.[14] In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence. [15] The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendants responsibility to show that there was no negligence on his part. [16] To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur: a. the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; - Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Hence, in this case, without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturcomes into play and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the evidence at hand, someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the accident. Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year-model and condition required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have known that a 14-year-old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car. b. the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and In this case, the car where the fire originated was under the control of Pascual. Being its caretaker, he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning. . No other person, not even the respondents, was charged with that obligation except him. The incident would not have happened had that person used proper care. The inference is that it occurred because of lack of such care.[23] The burden of evidence is thus shifted to defendant to establish that he observed all that was necessary to prevent the accident from happening. In this aspect, Pascual utterly failed. c. the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. [17] there is nothing in the records to show that Spouses Sarangaya contributed to the incident. They had no access to the car and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was parked in a building they owned. ON ISSUE #2: W/N Perla lacked the required diligence in the selection & supervision of its employee. - NO In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records.[25]While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his position, its lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire. The burden of proof that such diligence was observed devolves on the employer who formulated the rules and procedures for the selection and hiring of his employees. Perla did not include any rule or regulation that Pascual should have observed in performing his functions It also did not have any guidelines for the maintenance and upkeep of company property like the vehicle that caught fire. Perla Compania did not require periodic reports on or inventories of its properties either. Based on these circumstances, it clearly did not exert effort to be apprised of the condition of Pascuals car or its serviceability.

OTHER DOCTRINES: The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act, use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the same situation would have employed? [19] If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Pascual attempted to exculpate himself from liability by insisting that the incident was a caso fortuito. We disagree. The exempting circumstance of caso fortuito may be availed only when: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was independent of the human will; (b) it was impossible to foresee the event which constituted the caso fortuito or, if it could be foreseen, it was impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible to perform an obligation in a normal manner and (d) the person tasked to perform the obligation must not have participated in any course of conduct that

aggravated the accident.[20] III. E. 6. SERVANDO VS PHIL. STEAM FACTS: Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board a vessel of Philippine Steam Navigation Co. for carriage from Manila to Negros Occidental 1,528 cavans of rice and 44 cartons of colored paper, toys and general merchandise. Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, in the morning of November 18, 1963, the cargoes were discharged, complete and in good order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. At about 2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin, destroying appellees' cargoes. Before the fire, however, appellee Uy Bico was able to take delivery of 907 cavans of rice. On the bases of the foregoing facts, the lower court rendered a decision, ordering Philippine Steam to pay for damages. The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the appellant. Philippine Steam on the other hand relies on the following: Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure, dangers or accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire . ... ISSUE: WON the above stipulation validly limits the liability of the ship owner in this case. HELD: YES. The parties may stipulate anything in the contract for so long as the stipulation is not contrary to law, morals, public policy. The stipulation which merely iterates the principle of caso fortuito is for all intents and purposes valid. The agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic principle of law written in Article 1174 of the Civil Code: Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by sti pulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. III. E. 2 PNR vs Brunty FACTS: Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty, together with her Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz sedan driven by Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, 1980. By then, a PNR Train , driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila. By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they were about to collide with PNR Train. Mercelita was instantly killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two other passengers suffered serious physical injuries. Rhonda Brunty was brought to the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital in Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead after ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had suffered severe head injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital. He was transferred to the Manila Doctors Hospital, and later to the Makati Medical Center for further treatment. Ethel Brunty and Garcia, filed a complaint for damages against the PNR before the RTC of Manila. They alleged that the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the physical injuries suffered by Garcia, were the direct and proximate result of the gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the necessary equipment at the railroad crossing. They pointed out that there was no flagbar or red light signal to warn motorists who were about to cross the railroad track, and that the flagman or switchman was only equipped with a hand flashlight. Plaintiffs likewise averred that PNR failed to supervise its employees in the performance of their respective tasks and duties, more particularly the pilot and operator of the train. PNR claimed that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family not only in the selection but also in the supervision of its employees. It stressed that it had the right of way on the railroad crossing in question, and that it has no legal duty to put up a bar or red light signal in any such crossing. It insisted that there were adequate, visible, and clear warning signs strategically posted on the sides of the road before the railroad crossing. It countered that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Mercelitas negligence, and that he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. The driver disregarded the warning signs, the whistle blasts of the oncoming train and the flashlight signals to stop given by the guard. ISSUE: W/N Mercelita is guilty of contributory negligence HELD: YES, but it cannot mitigate the liability of PNR. Mercelita was driving at a speed of 70kph and had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before the track. Such acts, while not the direct and proximate cause, contributed to the collision. Contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff does not exonerate a defendant. It can only mitigate the defendants liability (Art. 2179).

However, contributory negligence cannot be appreciated in this case since the relationship between Mercelita, the driver, and Rhonda Brunty was not alleged. III. D. 2. b. Marinduque Iron vs Workmens Compensation FACTS: Pedro Mamador together with other laborers boarded a truck belonging to Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. On its way to the place of work at the mine camp at Talantunan, while trying to overtake another truck on the company road, the truck turned over and hit a coconut tree, resulting in the death of said Mamador and injury to the others. The driver of the truck, Procopio Macunat, was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased. However, nothing was paid to the heirs of Mamador. ISSUE: WON there was notorious negligence by the deceased for having violated the employers prohibition to ride haulage trucks. HELD: No. There was no notorious negligence by the deceased. There is no doubt that mere riding on haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldnt be, because transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. Although the employer prohibited its employees to ride the haulage trucks, its violation does not constitute negligence per se, but it maybe an evidence of negligence. Under the circumstance, however, it cannot be declared negligence because the prohibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders. Violation of a rule promulgated by a Commission or board is not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of negligence. An order of the employer (prohibition rather) couldnt be of a greater obligation than the rule of a Commission or board. Picart v. Smith Facts: Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on the Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union when the defendant, riding on his car, approached. Defendant blew his horn to give warning. Plaintiff moved the horse to the right instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he had no sufficient time to move to the right direction. Defendant continued to approach, and when he had gotten quite near, he quickly turned to the left. The horse was frightened that it turned his body across the bridge. His limb was broken and the rider was thrown off and got injured. The horse died. An action for damages was filed against the defendant. Issue: Whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done Held: As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. Bataclan vs Medina Proximate Cause Facts: The front tire of a bus operated by its owner Mariano (defendant) and driven by Saylon suddenly burst which caused the bus to zig zag and turn turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bust but three passengers were left inside. Villagers of a nearby town came to the scene to help. Since it was nighttime, they brought lighted torches to aid them in the rescue. Suddenly, as they scanned the area, a fierce fire started burning the bus and the trapped passengers inside. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover

from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the case to CA which endorsed the case to SC. Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or the fire that burned the bus, including the 4 passengers left inside. Held: The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus because when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected. The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. MR. & MRS. ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT PROOF of Negligence Facts: Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral expenses and attorneys fees for the death of their son, Dominador Ong, in one of the swimming pools of the latter. After trial, the CFI dismissed the complaint for it found the action of the plaintiffs-appellants untenable. Issues: (1) WON plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the defendants so as to make it liable for the damages sought; (2) WON the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bench. Ruling: Judgment affirmed. The person/s claiming damages has/have the burden of proving that the damages is caused by the fault/negligence of the person from whom the damages is claimed. Plaintiffs failed to overcome the burden. Defendant employed 6 well-trained lifeguards, male nurse, sanitary inspector and security guards to avoid danger to the lives of their patrons. The swimming pools are provided with ring buoy, tag roof and towing line. Also, conspicuously displayed in the pool area the rules and regulations for pool use. In that, it appears that defendant has taken all the necessary precautions to avoid/prevent danger/accidents which may cause injury to or even death of its patrons. The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, a person who has the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. Since minor On g has went to the big swimming pool w/o any companion in violation of the rules and regulations of the defendant as regards the use of pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it, applying all efforts into play in order to bring minor Ong back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the Doctrine to impute liability to appellee. Minor Ongs fault/negligence is the proxima te and only cause of his death. RAKES V. ATLANTIC GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY Facts: Rakes was working as a laborer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they were working in the companys yard and the y were transporting heavy rails using karitons, each car carrying the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars from behind. There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The tracks where the cars move were also weakened by a previous typhoon. It was alleged that Atlantics foreman was notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. While the cars were being mov ed and when it reached the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won. Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered their workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired; that Rakes himself was negligent for having known of the depression on the track yet he continued to work. Issue: Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable. Held: Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another employee who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can be inferred from the fact that he was on the

side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company barring workers from standing near the side of the cars. His disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of damages though; the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages. SPOUSES SANTOS V. PIZARDO Facts: Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries due to the vehicle collision between Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a Lite Van Ace. However, the municipal circuit trial court has no pronouncement of civil liability. The petitioners filed a complaint for damages to the respondents pursuant to their reservation to file a separate civil action citing Sibayans judgment conviction. And it was moved to dismiss by the Viron Transit. The petitioners opposed and contend that the motion to dismiss will be ten (10) years from the judgment of criminal action and therefore, it is within the period since it was just barely two (2) years that elapsed. The complaint was dismissed by the trial court due to the ground that the cause of action had prescribed; based on quasi-delict that it prescribes four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Again the petitioners filed a reconsideration that the complaint is not based on quasi- delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years upon the finality of the judgment. The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners was denied by the trial court based on quasi-delict in Article 1146 of the Civil Code that the complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular activities. Therefore, it prescribed already. On the petition for certiorari the petitioners filed to the Court of Appeals, it was dismissed on the same error in the choice or mode of appeal. Petitioners insist that it should be enforced in the complaint that arose in ex delicto and not based on quasi-delict. Since the action is based on the criminal liability of private respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the judgment of conviction. Private respondents insisted, pointing out the averments in the complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict in Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period of four (4) years should be reckoned from the time the accident took place. Viron transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case, in sitting Art. 103 of Revised Penal Code the civil aspect of the case were instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil case was made. Respondents likewise allege that the petitioners should have appealed the adverse order of the trial court. Issues: Whether or not the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer. Held: No. The dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the subsidiary liability of the employer. Because the Article 103 of the R.P.C. operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee. The trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits. This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil actions but this is merely an avoidance of multiple suits. The action for damages based on quasi- delict should be considered waived no occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private respondents as available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. GUILATCO V. CITY OF DAGUPAN Facts: Guilatco, a court interpreter, fell into a manhole at Perez Blvd. which is owned by the national Government. She fractured her right leg, thus was hospitalized, operated on, and confined. City Engineer testified that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered. City Charter of Dagupan also says that the city supervises and manages National roads and national sidewalks. Issue: Whether or not the City of Dagupan is liablie. Held: Yes. The liability of private corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code in Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of the city. On the other hand, article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from defective streets, public buildings and other public works. INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS V. ARGOS Facts: Argos and Pineda, general manager and commercial director respectively of the International Flavors and Fragrances Incorporated (IFFI) filed a libel case against Costa, the managing director of IFFI after being described by the latter as pesona non grata in his Personal Announcement after termination of their services. They later filed a separate civil case for damages against Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig wherein IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint. The Regional Trial Court granted IFFIs motion to dismiss for respondents failure to reserve its right to institute a separa te civil action. Upon a motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court granted Argos and Pinedas petition which was later affirmed by the appellate court. Issue:

Whether or not Argos and Pineda could sue IFFI for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Held: No. IFFI, petitioner contends that respondents did not allege that IFFI was primarily liable for damages and on the contrary, the complaint was replete with references that IFFI was being sued for its subsidiary capacity. Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary capacity. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability as such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee adjudged guilty of the wrongful act. Thus, the Supreme Court granted IFFIs petition for dismissal. Gabeto vs Araneta Facts: Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata in Ilo-ilo City in going to a cockpit. When the driver (Pagnaya) turned his horse and started in the direction indicated, Araneta stepped out in the street, stopped the horse and protested to the driver that he called it first. The driver replied that he did not see Araneta calling him and it was the two passengers who first employed him. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta, so that he can pass on. However, due to the looseness and rottenness of the bridle, the bit came out of the horses mouth. Pagnaya and Ilano got the chance to alight fro m the carromata but not Cayetano. When Pagnaya fixed the bridle, the horse being free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and move forward, the horse then struck a telephone booth which frightened him, which made him ran at full speed. As Gayetano tried to jump out of the carromata, he suffered injuries and then died. Issue: WON Araneta is the proximate cause and is liable? Held: No. The court is of the opinion that the mere fact that the defendant interfered with the carromata by stopping the horse would not make him liable for the death of Gayetano. The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the proximate cause thereof. It was the act of the driver by getting down and fixing the bridle that made him primarily responsible for the control of the horse. The defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. Mallari vs CA Facts: Mallari Jr. was driving a jeepney owned by his father, Mallari Sr. The jeep collided with a delivery van of Bulletin Publishing Corp while travelling on the National highway of Bataan. Mallari Jr. was trying to overtake a Ford Fiera which had stopped infront of him, he then negotiated the curve and moved forward to the opposite lane in order to overtake the fiera. As he was passing the Fiera, he already saw the Bulletin van approaching on the opposite side. The result of which, the wto vehicles collided. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side of the delivery van. It caused injuries to the passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who then died due to the gravity of his injuries. The widow of Reyes filed a complaint for damages from both Mallaris and the Bulletin Corp. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was th e negligence of the van driver. On appeal, the court reversed the decision and held the Mallaris negligent. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON Mallari Sr. is also Liable? Held: Yes. The SC affirmed the decision of the CA that the Mallaris are responsible for the death of Reyes. The negligence a nd recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against petitioner Mallari Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier, considering the fact that in an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment of damages sought by the passenger. Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers employees. PLDT v CA Facts: Spouses Esteban were riding their jeep when they ran over an earth mound and fell in an open trench on the road resulting to slight injuries to the husband and serious injuries to the wife. The windshield of the jeep was also shattered due to the accident. Spouses Esteban accused PLDT of negligence because of lack of warning signs placed near the manhole dug resulting on the earth mound on the road causing injuries to the wife. PLDT contends the injuries were the result of the negligence of the independent contractor the company hired (Barte) and should be the one held liable and not the company. RTC ruled in favour of the spouses while the CA under Justice Agrava as ponente reversed the decision of the RTC. Issue: W/N PLDT can be held liable for the injuries caused to spouses Esteban

Held: PLDT and Barte contends that the independent contractor placed signs on the road and that it was the fault of Mr. Esteban because he did not diligently drive the jeepney. Mr. Esteban had quickly swerved from the outer lane thereby hitting the earth mound. SC finds no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. Taylor vs Manila Electric FACTS: David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dads office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age. One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye. Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the companys negligence. ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages. HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows: (1) Damages to the plaintiff. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the companys negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries. Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous. The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences. The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he cannot demand reparation therefor from another. Urbano vs IAC FACTS: On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the

affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latters death Held: A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." Bernal vs House of Tacloban Electric DOCTRINES: The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any,does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sensecould only result in reduction of the damages.

FACTS: On the evening of April 10, 1925, the procession of HolyFriday was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso withher daughter Purificacion Bernal came from anothermunicipality to attend the religious celebration.2. After the procession was over, the woman and her daughter,passed along a public street named Gran Capitan.3. The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & IcePlant, Ltd., and automobile appeared from the oppositedirection which so frightened the child that she turned torun, with the result that she fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditchcoming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When themother and her companions reached the child, they foundher face downward in the hot water. The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. There she wasattended by the resident physician, Dr. Victoriano A. Benitez. Despite his efforts, the child died that same night at 11:40o'clock.7. Dr. Benitez certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rdDegree, whole Body", and that the contributory causes were"Congestion of the Brain and visceras of the chest &abdomen". RESPONDENT?S DEFENSE-that the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities and that the cause of death was other than the hot water; andthat in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence.LOWER COURTThe trial judge, however, after examination of the evidencepresented by the defendants failed to

sustain their theory of thecase, however, he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. ISSUE:Whether the respondent is absolved from liability because of thecontributory negligence of the plaintiffs. HELD:NO, the death of the child Purificacion Bernal was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through thepublic streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who wereunfortunately enough to fall into it. We are shown no good reason for the departing from theconclusion of the trial judge to the effect that the suddendeath of the child Purification Bernal was due principally tothe nervous shock and organic calefaction produced by theextensive burns from the hot water.On the contributory negligence. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on theprincipal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when thereligious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to runalong a few paces in advance of the mother.No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobileappearing and of a frightened child running and falling into aditch filled with hot water. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages.The death of the child Purificacion Bernal was the result of fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow throughthe public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers- bywho were unfortunately enough to fall into it. Pestano v Sumayang Facts: Sumayang, accompanied by another person, was riding a motor vehicle on a highway in Cebu. While turning left at a junction, Sumayang was violently hit by a speeding bus driven by Pestano. Sumayang and his companion died due to the accident. The heirs of Sumayang filed a civil action against Pestano and Metro Cebu Bus Company, the owner of the Bus driven by Pestano. A witness named Neis accounts that before Sumayang turned left, the former had raised his left arm as a signal but was run over by the bus and was thrown 14 meters away. Pestano alleges the victims were negligent because 15-20 meters away, he had already blown the bus horn and even blew it a second time when he got near but could only step on the brake after the bu s had hid the motor vehicle. RTC and CA held Pestano liable and also held Metro Cebu Bus liable for negligence. Issue: W/N Metro Cebu Bus may be held liable for the acts of Pestano. Held: There were factual findings that the bus had a defective speedometer and the Company was held to have shown laxity in the conduct of its operations and supervision of employees. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee. The CA said that allowing Pestao to ply his route with a defective speedometer showed laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the supervision of its employees. The negligence alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver, not in that which directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestao was able to use a bus with a faulty speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its employees and in the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the diligence required by law. Oscar del Carmen Jr. v Geronimo Bacoy Facts: Spouses Monsalud and their daughter died from being run over by a jeepney driven by a certain Allan Maglasang. The jeepney was owned by Oscar del Carmen Jr. Allan was declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case while the father of the late Mrs. Monsalud, Geronimo Bacou filed an independent civil action againt the former in behalf of the minor children left by the Monsalud spouses. Del Carmen Jr. claimed he was a victim as well as Allan stole the jeep and was not hired as a driver by the former; he was a conductor (and had been released from employment lately) and it was the brother of Allan, Rodrigo who was hired as a driver. Del Carmen Jr. filed a carnapping case against Allan but was dismissed by the court for insufficient evidence. RTC held del Carmen Jr. subsidiary liable and held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.s defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to use the subject vehicle because the brothers were assigned to said jeep. After a days work, the jeepney would be parked beside the brothers house and not returned to del Carmens residence; the jeep could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area was not fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even without the ignition key.

Issue: W/N owner of vehicle is directly and primarily liable for injuries caused by the operation of such Held: Del Carmen Jr. was held to be primarily liable and not merely subsidiary liable. Del Carmen Jr.s own evidence cast dou bt that Allan stole the jeepney. Given the dismissal of the carnapping case filed by del Carmen Jr. against Allan, the former also admitted to such dismissal in the SC. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care. All three are present in the case at bar. L.G. FOODS v. Pagapong-Agraviador FACTS Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident. An Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver; before the trial could end, he committed suicide. Subsequently, , the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. Naturally, defendants denied liability principally contending that since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss prompting the petitioners to bring the case to the CA which appellate court sustained the lower court. Essentially, the CA opined that that the complaint neither represents nor implies that the responsibility charged was the petitioners subsidiary liability under Art. 103, Revised Penal Code; further, a civil action to enforce subsidiary liability separate and distinct from the criminal action is even unnecessary. ISSUE Whether the civil action against petitioner employer on the ground of vicarious liability is proper. HOLDING YES. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couples minor son was caused by the negligent act of the petitioners driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing to exercise the necessary dili gence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said accident. The victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to the employers defense of exercise of the diligenc e of a good father of the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee It is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their answer repeatedly made mention of Article 2180 of the Civil Code and anchored their defense on their allegation that they had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of [their] employees. The Court views this defense as an admission that indeed the petitioners acknowledged the private respondents cause of action as one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Teh Le Kim vs. Phil. Aerial Taxi Facts: Plaintiff bought a plane ticket to Iloilo in one of the defendant company's hydroplanes. After an uneventful flight, the plane landed on the waters of Iloilo, and taxied toward the beach until its pontoons struck bottom, when the plane stopped. As a safety precaution however, the engines remained in operation. While the pilot was signaling to an oncoming banca outside the plane, plaintiff herein unfastened the straps around him and, not even waiting to put on his hat, climbed over the door to the lower wing, went down the ladder to the pontoon and walked along the pontoon toward the revolving propeller. The propeller first grazed his forehead and, as he threw up his arm, it was caught by the revolving blades thereof and so injured that it had be amputated. It is to be noted that the usual procedure in discharging passengers from a hydroplane is to wait until the propeller stops, then turn the plane around by hand so as to have the rear or tail and thereof towards the beach, and then take the passengers to shore in a banca. Issue: WON, respondent is liable. Ruling: No. The contract of carriage required the company to take the passengers safe and sound, on the beach of Iloilo. In order to do this, it was necessary to wait for the propeller to stop, turn the rear or tail end of the plane towards the shore, take the passengers out by the rear or tail end, place them in a banca and take them ashore. In the case at bar, the plaintiff-appellant acted with reckless negligence in approaching the propeller while it was still in motion, and when the banca was not yet in a position to take him. The plaintiff's negligence alone was the direct cause of the accident. NPC vs. CA Facts: By virtue of Memorandum Order No. 398 - "Prescribing Measures to Preserve the Lake Lanao Watershed, To Enforce the Reservation of Areas Around the Lake Below Seven Hundred And Two Meters Elevation, and for Other Purposes.", petitioner

herein built and operated the Agus Regulation Dam at the mouth of Agus River in Lanao del Sur, at a normal maximum water level of Lake Lanao at 702 meters elevation in 1978. In 1986, private respondents fishponds and other improvements were washed away when the water level of the lake escalated and the subject lakeshore area was flooded. NPC refused to compensate them so they filed an action for damages, alleging that the negligence and inexperience of NPCs employees assigned to operate the Ag us Regulation Dam were the proximate causes of the damage caused to their properties and livelihood. NPC denied the allegations and alleged that: 1) the water level of Lake Lanao never went beyond 702 meters, 2) their employees were not negligent, 3) private respondents fishponds were located below the 702-water level, which is prohibited. Issue: WON, NPC is liable for damages. Ruling: Yes. By virtue of MO 398, NPC had two duties: 1) maintain the normal maximum lake elevation at 702 meters, and 2) build benchmarks to warn the inhabitants in the area that cultivation of land below said elevation is forbidden. Now upon ocular inspection by the lower courts, it was established that in the subject areas, the benchmarks as pointed out by the NPC representative, could not be seen nor reached because they were totally covered with water. Thus, an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the thing speaks for itself, is proper. The doctrine states that: Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. In the case at bar, the fact that the benchmarks could not be seen nor reached, is by itself, constitute proof that the water level did rise above the benchmarks and inundated the properties in the area. Thus, In the absence of any clear explanation on what other factors could have explained the flooding in the neighboring properties of the dam, it is fair to reasonably infer that the incident happened because of want of care on the part of NPC to maintain the water level of the dam within the benchmarks at the maximum normal lake elevation of 702 meters. Professional Services v. Natividad (2007) Facts: Natividad Agana was operated by Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes, attending physicians of Medical City Hospital, owned and operated by PSI, to treat her cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil was the leading surgeon. In fact, Dr. Fuentes was only called for the operation by the request of Dr. Ampil who in turn examined and reviewed Dr. Fuentes' operation. After the operation, Agana experienced excruciating pain on the part of her body which undergone the said operation, prompting her to seek U.S. Doctors and other doctors in the Philippines. It was discovered that two gauzes were left inside her vagina allegedly during her first operation. Agana filed a complaint for damages against Dr. Ampil, Dr. Fuentes and PSI. Trial Court found them all negligent and liable. CA affirmed the said Decision, except the part where the trial court found Fuentes liable. Hence, these consolidated petitions in the SC. Issue: WON Dr. Ampil was negligent WON CA erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes WON PSI can be held liable for the negligence of its attending physicians Held: 1.) Dr. Ampil is guilty of medical negligence or malpractice. In pursuing medical negligence, it is only necessary for the plaintiff to prove that his health care provider did or failed to do something which a reasonably prudent healt care provider should have not have done or should have done as required by law under the circumstances. Hence, the elements are DUTY, BREACH, INJURY, and PROXIMATE CAUSATION. In the case at bar, Dr. Ampil, as the lead surgeon, failed to remove the two gauzes left inside the body of Agana, as well as in informing Agana of such failure, when in fact and in law he should have, if not removal of said gauzes is not possible, at least informed her in order for her to take the necessary steps to remove the foreign objects from her body. Moreover, such failures resulted to Agana's injury which prompted her to take further medical advice. Had Dr. Ampil exercised proper care in performing her professional duties, the injury would not have occurred. What made it even worse was the unscrupulous act of Ampil in deceiving Agana that her pains are the natural effect or course of the operation. 2.) Dr. Fuentes was not improperly absolved by the CA. The Doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is not applicable in the case of Fuentes. The elements of said doctrine are the following, to wit: (a) injury; (b) the thing which caused said injury is under the exclusive control and management of the defendant; (c) the injury is such that it would not have resulted had the defendant exercised proper care; (d) the defendant has no justifiable explanation therefor. Where the thing that caused the inury, without fault on the part of the injured party, is under the exclusive control of the defendant, and the injury is such that it would not have resulted had said defendant exercised proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation, that the injury was due to the want of care of said defendant, shifting the burden of proof to him who must establish that he observed due care and diligence. In the case at bar, Dr. Fuentes had no control. In fact, it was Dr. Ampil who had control. Under the Captain of the Ship rul e, the lead surgeon is the person in charge of the surgery room and all the personnel therein. This can be proved by the following circumstances: that he was the one who ordered the closing of

the incision; that he called the services of Dr. Fuentes; that he examined and reviewed Dr. Fuentes' operation and adjudged it to be satisfactory; and that he approved of Dr. Fuentes' leaving the surgery room. 3.) PSI is liable under the theories of respondeat superior, agency by estoppel, and corporate negligence. It has been accepted that, for purposes of apportioning the liability in case of medical negligence, there exists an employer-employee relationship between the hospital and its attending physicians. The test to determine the existence of said relationship is the control test. Although physicians are not technically employees of the hospital, they are subject to the control of said hospital, in view of the participation of the hospital in hiring, firing of, and in the conduct of the work of physicians within the walls of said hospital. As such, under the law, employers are liable for the damages caused by its employees in service of the branch in which the latter are employed, or on the occasion of their functions, as well as for the damages caused by said employees acting within their assigned tasks even though the employers are not engaged in any business or industry. Furthermore, when a hospital enlists physicians in their list of doctors, endorsed along their lobbies, they impliedly vouch for the quality of their medical skill and expertise. In effect, they hold out to the public that said physicians are their agents who act in behalf of the hosptitals. In determining such apparent authority, it is significant to determine whether or not the principal (hospital) has, by his voluntary act, placed his agent in such a situation that a man of ordinary prudence, conversant with the ordinary and natural usages and traditions of a particular business, is justified in assuming and believing that said agent is authorized in peforming the acts in question. Corporate entities, such as PSI, are capable of acting only through other individuals, such as physicians. Lastly, the courts have come to realize that medical service is not anymore the sole responsibility and prerogative of the physician. With the passage of time, hospitals have organized highly professional staffs whose competence and performance require supervision and overseeing on the part of hospitals as required by their moral and legal duty to provide adequate and quality medical and health care. PSI, therefore, has the duty to exercise reasonable care in seeing to it that its patients are protected from harm. Hence, its failure in conducting an inquiry or investigation regarding the operation of Agana is tantamount to negligence in performing its legal duty to oversee and monitor the methods of medical treatment conducted by its attending physicians, as required by its nature as a corporate entity. Courts will not allow medical institutions and professionals to callously turn their backs on and disregard the mere probability of a mistake and negligence by failing to inquire into a serious matter involving medical operations in which the lives of people are at stake. A corporation is bound by the knowledge and notice acquired by its agents within the scope of their authority and in respect of a particular matter to which said authority extend. This renders PSI not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Art. 2180, but also directly liable for its own negligence under Art. 2176. Failing to adduce evidence that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and supervision of Dr. Ampil, PSI is adjudged solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil, and also directly liable to Aganas. PSI v. Natividad (2008) Facts: PSI filed a Motion fo Reconsideration of the SC 2007 Decision finding PSI and Dr. Ampil jointly and severally liable for medical negligence in favor of the Aganas. The Motion is premised on the following allegations of PSI: that the doctrine of employer-employee relationship existing between hospitals and physicians indoctrinated in the case of Ramos has been reversed by the SC in a Resolution; that the Doctrine of Agency by Estoppel is not availing since the Aganas failed to show that Natividad Agana engaged the services of Dr. Ampil on her reliance of the representation made by the hospital; and that the doctrine of corporate negligence is misplaced because the proximate cause of Natividad's injury is the negligence of Dr. Ampil. Issue: WON the Motion has merit. Held. The Motion is devoid of merit. The doctrine espoused by the High Court in Ramos was not at all reversed by the SC. It was only ruled and clarified that in that case, no control was exercised by the De Los Santos Medical Clinic over its consultant. Hence, the doctrine of employer-employee relationship existing between hospitals and their physicians subsist. Assuming arguendo that Dr. Ampil was merely an independent contractor of PSI, PSI would still be solidarily liable under the theory of agency by estoppel. In general, hospitals are not liable for th negligence of an independent contractor-physician. The exception to this rule is when there are circumstances that lead an agency by estoppel. Two factors are considered under such doctrine. First, the Court considers the hosptital's manifestations whether or not the hospital acts in a manner which would produce in the mind of a man of ordinary prudence a presumption that the negligent person is an agent or employee of the hospital. Secondly, the Court takes into account the reliance of a person upon the representation of a hospital in engaging the services of the physician, consistent with ordinary prudence and care. With respect to this, Atty. Agana testified that he chose Dr. Ampil to be his wife's physician because he knew the latter to be a staff member in Medical City, a prominent and known hospital. Its act of displaying his name and those names of other physicians in the public directory located at its lobby is tantamount to its holding out to the public that it is offering quality medical services through its physicians. Lastly, the hospitals are under the responsibility and legal duty to examine, monitor and supervise the methods of treatment administered by physicians to patients admitted to said hospitals. This includes the taking of necessary steps to correct

the negligent acts or omissions of their medical staff. Failure to do this results not only in a vicarious liability on the part of the hospital for the negligence of its medical staffm, but also a direct liability on its part under Art. 2167. PSI v. Natividad (2010) Facts: PSI, now joined by intervenors in the form of other hospital entities, reiterated its allegations in the first Motion for Reconsideration.

Held: PSI is vicariously liable not on the ground of respondeat superior, but on the ground of agency by estoppel and corporate negligence. In order for employer-employee relationship to exist between hospital and its physicians, there must be the power of control that at least can be wielded by the hospital over the means and details of process by which a physician is to accomplish his task. In this case, there is insufficient evidence that such power is exercised by Medical City over Dr. Ampil's method of operation by which he treated Natividad. Even the trial court and the CA found no employer-employee relationship. However, there is sufficient evidence to support that Medical City, by its voluntary act in displaying the name of Dr. Ampil and other names of the physicians in the public directory at the lobby of the said hospital, placed Dr. Ampil in such a situation that Enrique Agana and Natividad, both of ordinary prudence, are justified in assuming that Dr. Ampil is Medical City's agent authorized to perform the act in question; and that on the reliance of such representation the Aganas chose Ampil as their attending physician. This is corroborated by Enrique's testimony that he chose Ampil since he assumed that the latter is a member of the medical staff of a known and prominent hospital. Hence, the Aganas saw Ampil as an integral part of Medical City, not as an independent part thereof. Finally, that there is corporate negligence on the part of PSI is obvious and admitted by PSI itself when it alleged in its first Motion for Reconsideration that had the Aganas notified PSI it could have conducted the required inquiry to remedy the negligence committed by its medical staff and tread on the 'captain of the ship' rol e assumed by Ampil in the surgery operation.... This is a judicial admission on the part of PSI that, although it had no power of control over the means and details of the process by which Ampil performed the surgery in question, it had the power to review and examine the method by which Ampil conducted the surgery for the purpose of determining the existence of negligence; that it had the duty to tread on the captain of the ship role of any doctor rendering services within its walls to ensure protection of the patients; that it had corporate duty to Natividad even after the questioned operation; and that such duty extended to determining Ampil's role in it, bringing the matter to his attention, and correcting his negligence. An admission in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and is conclusive to him, and any evidence presented contrary thereto shall be ignored, regardless of whether the party had objected or not. In the case, PSI imposed unto itself the separate and independent responsibility of initiating the inquiry into the missing gauzes. The record taken during the surgery that there were missing gauzes should have prompted PSI to conduct an inquiry. The corporate negligence of PSI is distinct and independent of the medical negligence of Dr. Ampil. Failure of PSI to fulfill its duties as a hospital corporation gave rise to direct liability to the Aganas distinct from that of the Ampil. PCI Bank v. CA Facts: The case consists of consolidated petitions. The original actions were instituted by Ford Philippines to recover from the drawee bank (Citibank) and collecting bank (PCIBank) the value of several checks payable to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, which were embezzled allegedly by an organized syndicate I.G.R. Nos. 121413 and 121479 Plaintiff Ford drew and issued a Citibank check, which was crossed check, Payee's Account only, to settle the former's percentage taxes for the 3rd quarter of 1977. The aforesaid check was deposited with PCI Bank and was subsequently cleared at the Central Bank. PCI had stamped that all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsements guaranteed. Upon presentment with the Citibank, the proceeds of the check was paid to PCI as collecting and depositary bank. Said proceeds was never paid to or received by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Thus, Ford was compelled to make a second payment. An investigation by the NBI revealed that the check was recalled by Rivera, the General Ledger Accountant of Ford to allegedly correct an error in the computation of the tax due. With his instruction, PCI replaced the check with Manager's Checks. Alleged members of the syndicate later deposited the two MCs with the Pacific Banking Corp. The case reached the CA which rendered PCI solely liable. II. G.R. No. 128604 Ford drew two Citibank checks, which were likewise crossed checks, to settle percentage taxes. They never reached the CIR. The difference in the first petition was that, in this second petition, PCI never received nor held the two Ford checks at all. It was discovered that the same syndicate group was behind the embezzlement, involving a certain Castro who was a manager of PCI, as well as employees of Ford. Both the CA and the trial court found Citibank solely liable.

Issue: Who is liable in both cases? Held: In the first petition, only PCI is liable. On record, PCIBank failed to verify the authority of Mr. Rivera to negotiate the checks. The neglect of PCIBank employees to verify whether his letter requesting for the replacement of the Citibank Check was duly authorized, showed lack of care and prudence required in the circumstances. Furthermore, it was admitted that PCIBank is authorized to collect the payment of taxpayers in behalf of the BIR. As an agent of BIR, PCIBank is duty bound to consult its principal regarding the unwarranted instructions given by the payor or its agent. It is well-settled that the relationship between the payee or holder of commercial paper and the bank to which it is sent for collection is, in the absence of an argreement to the contrary, that of principal and agent. A bank which receives such paper for collection is the agent of the payee or holder. The crossing of the check with the phrase "Payee's Account Only," is a warning that the check should be deposited only in the account of the CIR. Thus, it is the duty of the collecting bank PCIBank to ascertain that the check be deposited in payee's account only. Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which is bound to scruninize the check and to know its depositors before it could make the clearing indorsement "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed. the drawee bank has a right to believe that the cashing bank (or the collecting bank) had, by the usual proper investigation, satisfied itself of the authenticity of the negotiation of the checks. Thus, one who encashed a check which had been forged or diverted and in turn received payment thereon from the drawee, is guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the success of the fraud practiced on the drawee bank. The latter may recover from the holder the money paid on the check. The drawee bank (Citibank) has a right to believe that the collecting bank (PCI) had, by the usual proper investigation, satisfied itself of the authenticity of the negotiation of the checks. Thus, one who encashed a check which had been forged or diverted and in turn received payment thereon from the drawee, is guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the success of the fraud practiced on the drawee bank. The latter may recover from the holder the money paid on the check. Having established that the collecting bank's negligence is the proximate cause of the loss, the Court concludes that PCIBank is liable in the amount corresponding to the proceeds of Citibank Check. In the second petition, there was no evidence presented confirming the conscious particiapation of PCIBank in the embezzlement. As a general rule, however, a banking corporation is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and declarations of its officers or agents within the course and scope of their employment. It was found that the PCIBank Ptro-manager, Castro, and his co-conspirator Assistant Manager apparently performed their activities using facilities in their official capacity or authority but for their personal and private gain or benefit. A bank holding out its officers and agents as worthy of confidence will not be permitted to profit by the frauds these officers or agents were enabled to perpetrate in the apparent course of their employment; nor will t be permitted to shirk its responsibility for such frauds, even though no benefit may accrue to the bank therefrom. However, PCI is not the sole negligent party in this case. The evidence on record shows that Citibank as drawee bank was likewise negligent in the performance of its duties. Citibank failed to establish that its payment of Ford's checks were made in due course and legally in order. As ruled by the Court of Appeals, Citibank must likewise answer for the damages incurred by Ford on the Citibank Checks, because of the contractual relationship existing between the two. Citibank, as the drawee bank, breached its contractual obligation with Ford and such degree of culpability contributed to the damage caused to the latter. Citibank should have scrutinized Citibank Checks before paying the amount of the proceeds thereof to the collecting bank of the BIR. One thing is clear from the record: the clearing stamps at the back of Citibank Checks do not bear any initials. Citibank failed to notice and verify the absence of the clearing stamps. Had this been duly examined, the switching of the worthless checks to Citibank Checks would have been discovered in time. A business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. Thus, invoking the doctrine of comparative negligence, the Court is of the view that both PCIBank and Citibank failed in their respective obligations and both were negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of Citibank Checks. Thus, we are constrained to hold them equally liable for the loss of the proceeds of said checks issued by Ford in favor of the CIR. Time and again, the SC has stressed that banking business is so impressed with public interest where the trust and confidence of the public in general is of paramount umportance such that the appropriate standard of diligence must be very high, if not the highest, degree of diligence. However, Ford is not completely blameless in its failure to detect the fraud. Failure on the part of the depositor to examine its passbook, statements of account, and cancelled checks and to give notice within a reasonable time (or as required by statute) of any discrepancy which it may in the exercise of due care and diligence find therein, serves to mitigate the banks' liability by reducing the award of interest from twelve percent (12%) to six percent (6%) per annum. As provided in Article 1172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover. Kramer v. CA

Facts: F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners, Kramer spouses, collided with M/V Asia Philippines owned by private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. Marjolea sank. After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI). BMI conducted an investigation to determine the proximate cause. On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer. ON MAY 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent in the RTC. The private respondent filed a motion seeking dismissal on the ground of prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period. The Trial Court denied the motion. The CA reversed the Trial Court. Issue: WON the action prescribed.

Held: Yes. An action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. The prescriptive period must be counted from the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises. It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages. Joseph v. Bautista Facts: Perez, one of the respondents in the case, is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying cargoes and passengers. On a certain day, when said cargo truck, driven by Villa, was on its way to Bulacan, petitioner Joseph boarded the truck after paying a sum of money. While said truck was on the highway, Villa tried to overtake a tricycle. At about the same time, a pick-up truck, allegedly owned by respondents Sioson and Pagarigan, and driven by co-respondent Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck as the latter was on the process of overtaking the tricycle. This led to the injury of Joseph who instituted a complaint for damages against the owner of the truck on the ground of breach of contract of carriage, and against the owner and driver of the pick-up truck on the ground of quasi-delict. Thereafter, respondents Villanueva, Cardeno, Sioson and Pagarigan, through their insurer, paid petitioner's claim for injuries sustained. As a consequence, petitioner executed a release of claim in favor of the said paying parties. Subsequently, respondent Perez filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the premise that the release of claim executed by petitioner in favor of the other respondents inured to the benefit of Perez, considering that all the respondents are solidarily liable to petitioner. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Hence, this petition. Issue: Did the payment by the other respondents inure to the benefit of Perez, sanctioning the dismissal of the case? Held: Yes. A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. A single act or omission may simultaneously be violative of various rights, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. Notwithstand said fact, where there is only one delict or wrong, there is a but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated. If only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. In the case at bar, petitioner sustained only one injury on his person, vesting in him a single cause of action, although there are correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed. A recovery by petitioner under one remedy, as when he already recovered under the principle of quasi-delict, necessarily bars recovery under the other. This is the principle of the proscription in the law against double recovery for the same act or omission under the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment. Moreover, since the respondents are solidarily liable to petitioner, the full payment by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release from liability resulted in the extinguishment and release from liability of the other solidary debtors, including Perez. 4.A.2 Real v Belo Facts: Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the Food Center of the Philippine Women's University (PWU) along Taft Avenue, Malate, Manila. Sisenando H. Belo (respondent) owned and operated the BS Masters fastfood stall, also located at the Food Center of PWU. Around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, a fire broke out at petitioner's Wasabe Fastfood stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood stalls in the area, including respondent's stall. An investigation on the cause of the fire by Fire Investigator SFO1 Arnel C. Pinca (Pinca) revealed that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming from the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove

and tank installed at petitioner's stall. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the fire, respondent demanded compensation from petitioner. However, petitioner refused to accede to respondent's demand. Hence, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court. Respondent alleged that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the upkeep and maintenance of her cooking equipments, as well as the selection and supervision of her employees; that petitioner's negligence was the proximate cause of the fire that gutted the fastfood stalls. Petitioner denied liability and contends that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees. After trial, the MeTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondent. Upon motion to the RTC, RTC holds that it cannot disregard evidence showing that the fire originated from petitioner's fastfood stall. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the CA which denied petitioners motion on procedural defect. Hence this petition. But for purposes of discussion, we would address the issue raised in the RTC. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for the damages caused by the fire which originated from petitioner's fastfood stall. Ruling: The Civil Code provides: Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG stove and tank in her fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and periodically checked for defects but she also failed to submit proof that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employees. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her cooking equipment and in the selection and supervision of her employees, the necessary inference was that petitioner had been negligent. Thus, the petition is granted. III.E.7. Go v IAC Facts: Floverto Jazmin is an American citizen and retired employee of the United States Federal Government. He had been a visitor in the Philippines since 1972 residing at 34 Maravilla Street, Mangatarem, Pangasinan. As pensionado of the U.S. government, he received annuity checks in the amounts of $ 67.00 for disability and $ 620.00 for retirement through the Mangatarem post office. He used to encash the checks at the Prudential Bank branch at Clark Air Base, Pampanga. Agustin Go is the branch manager of the then Solidbank (which later became the Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation) in Baguio City of which the subject altered checks in this case was withdrawn by certain Floverto Jasmin with mailing address at Maranilla St., Mangatarem, Pangasinan . Consequently, Go reported the matter to the Philippine Constabulary which require Jazmin to appear for investigation regarding the complaint filed by Go for passing altered dollar checks. Hence, respondent filed with the CFI for moral damages alleging that Go allowed the deposit of the dollar checks and the withdrawal of their peso equivalent "without ascertaining the identity of the depositor considering the highly suspicious circumstances under which said deposit was made; that instead of taking steps to establish the correct identity of the depositor, Go "immediately and recklessly filed (the) complaint for estafa through alteration of dollar check" against him. He averred that his peace of mind and mental and emotional tranquility as a respected citizen of the community would not have suffered had Go exercised "a little prudence" in ascertaining the identity of the depositor and, for the "grossly negligent and reckless act" of its employee, the defendant CBTC should also be held responsible. CBTC on the other hand interposed that the bank may not be held "co-equally liable" to pay nominal damages in the absence of proof that it was negligent in the selection of and supervision over its employee. Issue: Whether or not Go and Consolidated Bank and Trust Corp. is liable for damages suffered by Jazmin. Ruling: Emphasizing that the main thrust of the complaint was "the failure of the defendants to take steps to ascertain the identity of the depositor," the court noted that the depositor was allegedly a security officer while the plaintiff was a retiree-pensioner. It considered as "reckless" the defendants' filing of the complaint with the Philippine Constabulary. The court also noted that instead of complying with the Central Bank Circular Letter requesting all banking institutions to report to the Central Bank all crimes involving their property within 48 hours from knowledge of the crime, the bank reported the matter to the Philippine Constabulary.

Finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently shown that prejudice had been caused to him in the form of mental anguish, moral shock and social humiliation on account of the defendants' gross negligence, the court, invoking Articles 2176, 2217 and 2219 (10) in conjunction with Article 21 of the Civil Code, ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Anent petitioner bank's claim that it is not "co-equally liable" with Go for damages, under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, "(E)mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees . . . acting within the scope of their assigned tasks." Pursuant to this provision, the bank is responsible for the acts of its employee unless there is proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Hence, the burden of proof lies upon the bank and it cannot now disclaim liability in view of its own failure to prove not only that it exercised due diligence to prevent damage but that it was not negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees. Ramos v. CA (G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999) FACTS: Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder (cholecystectomy). Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, agreed to perform the operation on her. He also recommended to them the services of Dr. Gutierrez, an anesthesiologist. The operation was scheduled for June 17, 1985 at 9:00 in the morning at De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Upon the request of petitioner Erlinda, her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was then Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center, was allowed to accompany her inside the operating room. Dr. Hosaka arrived at the hospital at around 12:10 in the afternoon, or more than three hours late after the scheduled operation. While she held the hand of Erlinda, Cruz saw Dr. Gutierrez trying to intubate the patient. Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez utter: " ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan ." Cruz noticed a bluish discoloration of Erlindas nailbeds on her left hand. Cruz then heard Dr. Hosaka instruct someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. When he arrived, Dr. Calderon attempted to intubate the patient. The nailbeds of the patient remained bluish, thus, she was placed in a trendelenburg position a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower than her feet. Since the ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition. Petitioner presented the testimonies of Dean Herminda Cruz and Dr. Mariano Gavino to prove that the comatose sustained by Erlinda was due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by private respondents during the anesthesia phase. On the other hand, private respondents primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Eduardo Jamora, a pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda's allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).The trial court found private respondents liable for damages arising from negligence in the performance of their professional duties. However, the Court of Appeals overturned the decision of the RTC. ISSUES: 1. Whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies in this case 2. Whether Dr. Gutierrez, the anaesthesiologist, is liable for negligence 3. Whether the faulty intubation is the proximate cause of Erlindas brain damage 4. Whether Dr. Hosaka, the surgeon, is liable for negligence 5. Whether DLSMC is liable for any act of negligence by Gutierrez and Hosaka RULING: 1. Yes. Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm. A case strikingly similar to the facts herein is Voss vs. Bridwell, where the Kansas Supreme Court applied the doctrine. Considering that a sound and unaffected member of the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the patient is unconscious and under the immediate and exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a practical administration of justice dictates the application of res ipsa loquitur. 2. Yes. Respondent Dr. Gutierrez was negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase. As borne by the records, she failed to properly intubate the patient. This fact was attested to by Cruz who was in the operating room right beside the patient when the tragic event occurred. Moreover, respondent Dr. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physician's centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to perform pre-operative evaluation of the patient is, therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence. 3. Yes. Private respondents' theory, that Thiopental Sodium may have produced Erlinda's coma by triggering an allergic mediated response, has no support in evidence. No evidence of stridor, skin reactions, or wheezing some of the more common accompanying signs of an allergic reaction appears on record. No laboratory data were ever presented to the court. In view of the evidence at hand, faulty intubation is undeniably the proximate cause which triggered the chain of events leading to Erlinda's brain damage and, ultimately, her comatosed condition. Even granting that the tube was successfully inserted during the second attempt, it was obviously too late. As aptly explained by the trial court, Erlinda already suffered brain damage as a result of the inadequate oxygenation of her brain for about four to five minutes. 4. Yes. As the so-called "captain of the ship," it is the surgeon's responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that

respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. 5. Yes. Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In the instant case, respondent hospital, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. Respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's condition. Ramos v. CA (G.R. No. 124354, April 11, 2002) FACTS: After the SC denied the motions for reconsideration of private respondents, they then filed their respective second motions for reconsideration. Respondent Dr. Gutierrez insists that, contrary to the finding of this Court, the intubation she performed on Erlinda was successful. For his part, respondent Dr. Hosaka mainly contends that the Court erred in finding him negligent as a surgeon by applying the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. Dr. Hosaka argues that the trend in United States jurisprudence has been to reject said doctrine in light of the developments in medical practice. Respondent DLSMC contends that applying the four-fold test in determining whether such a relationship exists between it and the respondent doctors, the inescapable conclusion is that DLSMC cannot be considered an employer of the respondent doctors. The Court noted these pleadings. ISSUES: 1. Whether Dr. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist, is liable for negligence 2. Whether Dr. Hosaka, the surgeon, is liable for negligence 3. Whether DLSMC is liable for any act of negligence by Gutierrez and Hosaka RULING: 1. Yes. Unfortunately, Dr. Gutierrez claim of lack of negligence on her part is belied by the records of the case. It has be en sufficiently established that she failed to exercise the standards of care in the administration of anesthesia on a patient. Had she been able to check petitioner Erlindas airway prior to the operation, Dr. Gutierrez would most probably not have experienced difficulty in intubating the former, and thus the resultant injury could have been avoided. The injury incurred by petitioner Erlinda does not normally happen absent any negligence in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of an endotracheal tube. 2. Yes. Due regard for the peculiar factual circumstances obtaining in this case justify the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. From the facts on record it can be logically inferred that Dr. Hosaka exercised a certain degree of, at the very least, supervision over the procedure then being performed on Erlinda. First, it was Dr. Hosaka who recommended to petitioners the services of Dr. Gutierrez. In effect, he represented to petitioners that Dr. Gutierrez possessed the necessary competence and skills. Second, Dr. Hosaka himself admitted that he was the attending physician of Erlinda. Thus, when Erlinda showed signs of cyanosis, it was Dr. Hosaka who gave instructions to call for another anesthesiologist and cardiologist to help resuscitate Erlinda. Third, while the professional services of Dr. Hosaka and Dr. Gutierrez were secured primarily for their performance of acts within their respective fields of expertise for the treatment of petitioner Erlinda, and that one does not exercise control over the other, they were certainly not completely independent of each other so as to absolve one from the negligent acts of the other physician. It is equally important to point out that Dr. Hosaka was remiss in his duty of attending to petitioner Erlinda promptly, for he arrived late for the scheduled operation. The long period that Dr. Hosaka made Erlinda wait for him certainly aggravated the anxiety that she must have been feeling at the time. It could be safely said that her anxiety adversely affected the administration of anesthesia on her. Dr. Hosaka's irresponsible conduct violative, not only of his duty as a physician "to serve the interest of his patients with the greatest solicitude, giving them always his best talent and skill," but also of Article 19 of the Civil Code which requires a person, in the performance of his duties, to act with justice and give everyone his due. 3. No. There is no employer-employee relationship between DLSMC and Drs. Gutierrez and Hosaka which would hold DLSMC solidarily liable for the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The contract between the consultant in respondent hospital and his patient is separate and distinct from the contract between respondent hospital and said patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the consultant to the patient, while the second concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper

treatment of the patient. No evidence was adduced to show that the injury suffered by petitioner Erlinda was due to a failure on the part of respondent DLSMC to provide for hospital facilities and staff necessary for her treatment. Bermudez, Sr. v. Herrera (G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988) FACTS: A cargo truck, driven by Domingo Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which Rogelio Bermudez, a six-year old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries which caused his death. As a result, a criminal case for homicide through reckless imprudence was filed against Domingo Pontino. Plaintiffs-appellants filed in the said criminal case "A Reservation to File Separate Civil Action. Subsequently, the plaintiffs -appellants filed a civil case for damages against Domingo Pontino and Cordova Ng Sun Kwan. The trial court dismissed the complaint against Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and suspended the hearing of the case against Domingo Pontino until after the criminal case is finally terminated. The trial court stated that if, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. ISSUE: Whether a reservation to file a separate civil action in a criminal case precludes the filing of a civil action based on quasidelict RULING: No. In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi- delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. In the case at bar, the action filed by plaintiffs-appellants was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict. In fact, even without such a reservation, the injured party in the criminal case which resulted in the acquittal of the accused is allowed to recover damages based on quasi-delict. Africa v. Caltex (G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966) FACTS: While a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the underground storage of Caltex, a fire broke out from the gasoline station, spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including those of petitioners. Allegedly, a passerby threw a cigarette while gasoline was being transferred which then caused the fire. However, no evidence was presented to prove this theory and no explanation was made by respondents as to the real reason for the fire. Petitioners sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and the alleged branch owner Mateo Boquiren for damages based on negligence. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. ISSUE: Whether respondents were negligent RULING: Yes. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "where the thing which caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose from defendant's want of care." The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of respondents. When a fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses, the persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were respondents and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. Defendants' negligence, therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the neighboring houses. Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw (G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967) FACTS: Maximo M. Kalaw, general manager and board chairman of National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO), executed contracts for the delivery of copra without prior board approval as prescribed by the by-laws. However, these contracts were only partially executed by NACOCO due to four devastating typhoons which visited the country. Subsequent meetings were then held where Kalaw made a full disclosure of the impending losses. The members of the board then unanimously approved the said contracts. The buyers of copra threatened damage suits, prompting NACOCO to make settlements totalling to P1,343,274.52. In this suit, NACOCO seeks to recover the said sum from Kalaw, and the rest of the directors. It charges Kalaw with negligence under Article 1902 of the old Civil Code and defendant board members, including Kalaw, with bad faith and/or breach of trust for having approved the contracts. The lower court dismissed the complaint and hence, this appeal was lodged directly in the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Kalaw contracts are valid 2. Whether the directors approved the contracts in bad faith 3. Whether Kalaw was negligent 4. Whether Kalaw and the directors are liable

RULING: 1. Yes. Settled jurisprudence has it that where similar acts have been approved by the directors as a matter of general practice, custom, and policy, the general manager may bind the company without formal authorization of the board of directors. In the case at bar, the practice of the corporation has been to allow its general manager to negotiate and execute contracts in its copra trading activities for and in NACOCO's behalf without prior board approval. If the by-laws were to be literally followed, the board should give its stamp of prior approval on all corporate contracts. But that board itself, by its acts and through acquiescence, practically laid aside the by-law requirement of prior approval. Thus, the Kalaw contracts are valid corporate acts. 2. No. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known duty thru some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. Applying this precept to the given facts, it was found that bad faith did not exist. Obviously, the board thought that to jettison Kalaw's contracts would contravene basic dictates of fairness. The ratification of the contracts was an act of simple justice and fairness to the general manager and the best interest of the corporation whose prestige would have been seriously impaired by a rejection by the board of those contracts which proved disadvantageous. 3. No. Kalaw could not have been an insurer of profits. He could not be expected to predict the coming of unpredictable typhoons. And even as typhoons supervened Kalaw was not remissed in his duty. He exerted efforts to stave off losses. Kalaw cannot be tagged with crassa negligentia or as much as simple negligence. This would seem to be supported by the fact that even as the contracts were being questioned in Congress and in the NACOCO board itself, President Roxas defended the actuations of Kalaw. 4. No. This is a case of damnum absque injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong is here absent. There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is wanting. JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR., vs. IGLESIA NI CRISTO, INC. Facts: The petitioner owns a gasoline station. It is bounded on the south by a chapel of the respondent.The gasoline station supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms. In view of this, the services of Dioscoro Ely Yoro (Yoro), a retired general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was procured by petitioner, as the former was allegedly a construction contractor in the locality. Petitioner and Yoro executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Diggings thereafter commenced. After some time, petitioner was informed by the members of the respondent that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent. A complaint against petitioner and a certain Teofilo Oller, petitioners engineer, was filed by the respondent before the RTC. After four years of hearing the case, the trial court promulgated its Decision holding that the diggings were not intended for the construction of sewerage and septic tanks but were made to construct tunnels to find hidden treasure. The trial court adjudged the petitioner and Yoro solidarily liable to the respondent on a 35%-65% basis (the petitioner liable for the 35%), and absolving Oller from any liability. The petitioner appealed the decision. The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision denying the appeal. It affirmed the trial court but with modifications. Undeterred, petitioner instituted the instant case before the Supreme Court. Petitioner avers that no liability should attach to him by laying the blame solely on Yoro. He argues that the MOA executed between him and Yoro is the law between them and must be given weight by the courts. Since nothing in the MOA goes against the law, morals, good customs and public policy, it must govern to absolve him from any liability.[23] Petitioner relies heavily in Paragraph 4 of the MOA, which is again reproduced hereunder: 4. Any damage within or outside the property of the FIRST PARTY incurred during the digging shall be borne by the SECOND PARTY. In answer to this, the respondent asserts that the MOA should not absolve petitioner from any liability. This written contract, according to the respondent, clearly shows that the intention of the parties therein was to search for hidden treasure. The alleged digging for a septic tank was just a cover-up of their real intention. The aim of the petitioner and Yoro to intrude and surreptitiously hunt for hidden treasure in the respondents premises should make both parties liable. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PETITIONER AND YORO HAS THE EFFECT OF MAKING THE LATTER SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENT. Held: No. Petitioner and Yoro were in quest for hidden treasure and, undoubtedly, they were partners in this endeavor. The basis of their solidarity is not the Memorandum of Agreement but the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict are the following: (a) there must be an act or omission; (b) such act or omission causes damage to another; (c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and (d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage to the respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation on respondents premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre -existing contractual relation between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other. For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. The heavy reliance of petitioner in paragraph 4 of the MOA cited earlier cannot steer him clear of any liability. As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had provisions in their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any is found within or outside petitioners property li ne. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so declared as liable. Besides, petitioner cannot claim that he did not know that the excavation traversed the respondents property. In fact, he had two (2) of his employees actually observe the diggings, his security guard and his engineer Teofilo Oller. Gula vs. Dianala, 132 SCRA 126 Facts: Esperanza Gula, wife of plaintiff-appellant, lsmael Gula, was run over and killed by a cargo truck driven by defendant-appellee, Pedro Dianala and owned by defendant, Ponciano Rejon, on the public highway inside Bago City, Negros Occidental.

The City Fiscal of Bago City filed Criminal Case No. 3092 against the driver, Pedro Dianala for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence before the Bago City Court. Plaintiffs-appellants participated in the criminal case through their private prosecutors. No reservation to file a separate civil action was made. The defense was that while the accused was driving in front of the old market of Bago City, suddenly, an old woman (the deceased), crossed the street from the right side and his truck bumped her even as he swerved to the left to avoid her. The Bago City Court acquitted the accused on reasonable doubt. Plaintiffs-appellants then sued for damages, based on quasidelict, against defendants-appellees in the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Forthrightly, the latter filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that "the damages claimed has been waived, abandoned, and extinguished; that the Court has no jurisdiction over the nature or subject of the suit; and that the present action is barred by prior judgment." Plaintiffs-appellants filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss arguing that the civil liability of defendant driver based on his tortious acts is different and distinct from his civil liability based on criminal negligence, and that his civil liability based on tort is likewise separate and distinct from the civil liability of the defendant-owner of the vehicle, as provided for in the Civil Code. On August 22, 1972, the Court dismissed the case. Plaintiffs-appellants then filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that a reservation in a criminal case for purposes of filing a civil action based on quasi-delict is not necessary; that judgment in a criminal case cannot be considered as res judicata

constituting a bar to an action based on tort; and that the acquittal of an employee in a criminal case does not preclude a civil action for damages against the employer based on culpa acquiliana. The defendants filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, and on November 14, 1972, the Court issued an Order denying reconsideration. Plaintiffs-appellants appealed to the then Court of Appeals, but the Appellate Court certified the case to this instance because it involves only a question of law Issues: Whether or not the Trial Court erred in dismissing the complaint for damages on the ground of res judicata and lack of cause of action as against the defendant-owner. Held Yes. The question has since been squarely resolved in Elcano vs. Hill, 1 which has enunciated the following doctrine: a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3, Rule 111, refer exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. ... Since the cause of action of plaintiffs-appellants is based on culpa aquiliana and not culpa criminal, thus precluding the application of the exception in Sec. 3(c) of Rule 111, 2 and the fact that it can be inferred from the criminal case that defendantaccused, Pedro Dianala was acquitted on reasonable doubt because of dearth of evidence and lack of veracity of the two principal witnesses, the doctrine in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, will not find application. In that case, the acquittal was not based on reasonable doubt and the cause of action was based on culpa criminal, for which reason we held the suit for damages barred. Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action me.' proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Neither can the principle of res judicata apply as against defendant-employer for the simple reason that he was not included as a co-accused in the criminal case. 3 The cause of action against him is based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code 4 and is predicated on his primary liability thereunder and not on his secondary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Nor was there need for plaintiffs-appellants to have filed a reservation for a separate civil action inasmuch as the civil action contemplated in the case at bar is not derived from the criminal liability but one based on culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. 5 Raynera vs. Hiceta, Gr. No. 120027, April 21, 1999 Facts : At about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. He happened upon an Isuzu truck-trailer in front of him. Respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla were the owner and driver, respectively, of such Isuzu truck-trailer. 1.) The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. 2.)The truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three (3) feet on the right. 3.) There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on both sides of the metal plates. 4.) The asphalt road was not well lighted. At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino D. Lucelo rushed him to the Paraaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, pronounced Reynaldo Raynera dead on arrival.

The trial court rendered decision in favor of petitioners. It found respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla negligent in view of these circumstances: (1) the truck trailer had no license plate and tail lights; (2) there were only two pairs of red lights, 50 watts each, on both sides of the steel plates; and (3) the truck trailer was improperly parked in a dark area. The trial court held that respondents negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of Reynaldo Rayneras death, for whic h they are jointly and severally liable to pay damages to petitioners. The trial court also held that the victim was himself negligent, although this was insufficient to overcome respondents negligence. The trial court applied the doctrine of contributory negl igence and reduced the responsibility of respondents by 20% on account of the victims own ne gligence. (Reversed by CA) Respondents Hiceta and Orpilla appealed to the Court of Appeals. After due proceedings, the Court of Appeals rendered decision setting aside the appealed decision. The appellate court held that Reynaldo Rayneras bumping into t he left rear portion of the truck was the proximate cause of his death, and consequently, absolved respondents from liability. Issue (a)Whether or not respondents were negligent, and if so, (b) whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Reynaldo Raynera. Held: No. The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something, which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produ ces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents truck was visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, because the cargo they were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136)[25] respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicles cargo load extended beyond the bed or body thereof.

We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than that in the highway. It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle. Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself since he was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident. AIR FRANCE vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO Plaintiff was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes. The defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. Carrasco refused and a commotion ensued which made many of

the Filipino interfered and pacified Mr. Carrascoso, making him gave up his seat reluctantly. When Carrascoso arrived in the Philippines, he filed an action before the CFI of Manila which rendered a judgment in favor of Carrascoso. On appeal, the CA modified the damages awarded. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether Air France is liable for damages under quasi-delict. Decision: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the first class ticket issued to respondent is evidence that he is entitled to the first class seat. The Court said that it is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not. If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hands of an airline. It will always be an easy matter for an airline employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. A written document speaks a uniform language. That spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the present case. Petitioner also assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Claiming that Carrascosos action is planted upon breach o f contract, and that to authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith, which the CA failed to mention. The SC however said that while it is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion. That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established . The defendant airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a corresponding "first class" ticket. Even though the Court of Appeals did not use the term "bad faith, it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. In addition, since damages has already been awarded under quasi-delict, Singson cannot recover other damages based on the contract, otherwise, it would be against the rule prohibiting double recovery. FAROLAN V. SOLMAC MARKETING Solmac Corporation imported OPP film/waste scrap into the Philippines, one of which is the Clojus shipment. Upon application for entry, SOLMAC presented a Board of Investment (BOI) authority for polypropylene film scrap to the BOC. However, upon examination of the shipment by the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST), it turned out that the importation were oriented in such a way that the materials were stronger than OPP film scrap. Considering that the shipment was different from what had been authorized by the BOI and by law, petitioners withheld the release of the subject importation. Petitioner Parayno wrote the BOI asking for the latter's advice on whether or not the subject importation may be released. A series of exchange of correspondence between the BOI and the Bureau of Customs, on one hand, and between the counsel for the private respondent, and the BOI and the Bureau of Customs, on the other, ensued, which said that holes must be drilled before the release. Petitioner Farolan wrote the BOI requesting for definite guidelines regarding the disposition of importations OPP. Since the goods were not released, Solmac filed the action for mandamus and injunction with the RTC praying for the unconditional release of the goods and asked for award of damages. The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of Solmac ordering the release of the goods unconditionally. Solmac appealed to the CA only insofar as to the denial of the award of damages is concerned. On the other hand, the petitioners had already released the goods without drilling holes. Also, the private respondent filed its appeal demanding that the petitioners be held, in their personal and private capacities, liable for damages despite the finding of lack of bad faith on the part of the public officers. The CA ruled in favor of respondent and awarded damages. On motion for reconsideration, the CA lessened the damages awarded. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the petitioners are liable for damages in favor of private respondent. No. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners are in good faith. Good faith refers to a state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is the opposite of fraud, and its absence should be established by convincing evidence." In the present case, the record is replete with evidence bolstering the petitioners' claim of good faith. First, there was the report of the NIST that, contrary to what the respondent claimed, the subject importation was not OPP film scraps but oriented polypropylene whose importation to the Philippines was restricted, if not prohibited. It was on the strength of this finding that the

petitioners withheld the release of the subject importation for being contrary to law. Second, on many occasions, the Bureau of Customs sought the advice of the BOI on whether the subject importation might be released and there was no clear-cut policy on the part of the BOI regarding the entry into the Philippines of oriented polypropylene. Thirdly, when a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds himself to perform the duties of his office faithfully and to use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is to use that prudence, caution, and attention which careful men use in the management of their affairs. In the case at bar, prudence dictated that petitioners first obtain from the BOI the latter's definite guidelines regarding the disposition of the subject importation then being withheld at the Bureau of Customs. These products were competing with locally manufactured polypropylene and oriented polypropylene as raw materials which were then already sufficient to meet local demands, hence, their importation was restricted, if not prohibited. the petitioners can not be said to have acted in bad faith in not immediately releasing the import goods without first obtaining the necessary clarificatory guidelines from the BOI. As public officers, the petitioners had the duty to see to it that the law they were tasked to implement was faithfully complied with. But even granting that the petitioners committed a mistake in withholding the release of the subject importation because indeed it was composed of OPP film scraps, contrary to the evidence submitted by the National Institute of Science and Technology that the same was pure oriented OPP, nonetheless, it is the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not hampered in the performance of their duties or in making decisions for fear of personal liability for damages due to honest mistake. Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such an erroneous interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. After all, "even under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith. SINGSON vs.BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case in which judgment had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein, namely, Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay a certain sum to the plaintiff. Philippine Milling Co., Singson and Lobregat had seasonably appealed from said judgment, but not Villa-Abrille & Co., as against which said judgment, accordingly, became final and executory. In due course, a writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon the Bank of the Philippine Islands in which the Singsons had a current account insofar as Villa-Abrille's credits against the Bank were concerned. Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank upon reading the name of the Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further reading the body of the said garnishment prepared a letter for the signature of the President of the Bank informing the plaintiff Julian C. Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that case. Subsequently, two checks were issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B. M. Glass Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, and drawn against the said Bank, were deposited by the said drawers. The checks were, however, dishonored by the bank on the belief that Singson has no more control over the same. The said B. M. Glass Service closed Singsons credit account with them. In view thereof, plaintiff Julian C. Singson wrote the defendant bank claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Garnishment. The President of the bank took steps to verify this information and after having confirmed the same, apologized to the plaintiff and told that the action of garnishment from his account had already been removed. Thus, the defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently committed, resulting in the temporary freezing of the account of the plaintiff with the said bank for a short time. With this, Singson commenced the present action against the Bank and its president, Santiago Freixas, for damages in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs' account. The CFI of Manila rendered judgment dismissing the complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a quasi-delict, because the relation between the parties is contractual in nature. The lower court held that plaintiffs' claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict, their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature. From this decision, the plaintiff appealed directly to the SC. Whether or not is entitled to damages. The SC held that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. However, considering the facts and circumstances in the case at bar, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, the SC only awarded nominal damages. In addition, since damages has already been awarded under quasi-delict, Singson cannot recover other damages based on the contract, otherwise, it would be against the rule prohibiting double recovery. QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT vs FULGENCIO DACARA FACTS: Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of '87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan with Plate No. 877 (sic), while driving the said vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.

Indemnification was sought from the city government, which however, yielded negative results. Consequently, Fulgencio P. Dacara (hereinafter referred to as FULGENCIO), for and in behalf of his minor son, Jr., filed a Complaint for damages against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants, before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 101, Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-233. FULGENCIO prayed that the amount of not less than P20,000.00 actual or compensatory damages, P150,000.00 moral damages,P30,000.00 exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 attorney's fees and costs of the suit be awarded to him. Defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged that the subject diggings was provided with a mound of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or after it which was visible during the incident on February 28, 1988 at 1:00 A.M. In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latter's negligence and failure to exercise due care. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision dated June 29, 1990. The evidence proffered by the complainant (herein respondent) was found to be sufficient proof of the negligence of herein petitioners. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, the latter were held liable. The CA agreed with the RTC's finding that petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent. Noting the failure of petitioners to present evidence to support their contention that precautionary measures had indeed been observed. ISSUE: WON there is negligence on the part of Quezon city in the instant case HELD: The Petition is partly meritorious. Maintaining that they were not negligent, petitioners insist that they placed all the necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of a roadside construction. They argue that the driver (Fulgencio Dacara Jr.) of respondent's car was overspeeding, and that his own negligence was therefore the sole cause of the incident. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue that this Court cannot pass upon, absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that they lacked any basis for their conclusions. The unanimity of the CA and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own. The function of this Court is limited to the review of the appellate court's alleged errors of law. It is not required to weigh all over again the factual evidence already considered in the proceedings below. Petitioners have not shown that they are entitled to an exception to this rule. They have not sufficiently demonstrated any special circumstances to justify a factual review. The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable. Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of February 28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how then could it be explained that according to the report even of the policeman which for clarity is quoted again, none was found at the scene of the accident. Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is transfixed by the attending circumstances so that the greater the danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care required to be observed.

Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. This speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on "city streets with light traffic, when not designated 'through streets,'" as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (Republic Act 4136). Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr., having violated a traffic regulation, should be presumed negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code. These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time during the trial. It is evident from the records that they brought up for the first time the matter of violation of RA 4136 in their Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision dated February 21, 2001. It is too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. It is well-settled that points of law, theories or arguments not brought out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal. To consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process. Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts' findings, which are amply substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to petitioners' negligence as the proximate cause of the damages suffered by respondent's car. No adequate reason has been given to overturn this factual conclusion.

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE vs CA FACTS: The case stemmed from a complaint filed by the private respondent Rommels Marketing Corporation (RMC for brevity), represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana, to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC for brevity), now absorbed by the Philippine Commercial International Bank, the sum of P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with said bank but which were not credited to its account, and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank. In the ordinary and usual course of banking operations, current account deposits are accepted by the bank on the basis of deposit slips prepared and signed by the depositor, or the latters agent or representative, who indicates therein the curren t account number to which the deposit is to be credited, the name of the depositor or current account holder, the date of the deposit, and the amount of the deposit either in cash or checks. The deposit slip has an upper portion or stub, which is detached and given to the depositor or his agent; the lower portion is retained by the bank. In some instances, however, the deposit slips are prepared in duplicate by the depositor. The original of the deposit slip is retained by the bank, while the, duplicate copy is returned or given to the depositor. Irene Yabut would accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBCs teller, Azuc ena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon, which is that of her husbands, and make it appear to be RMCs account number, i.e., C.A. No. 53-01980-3. With the daily remittance records also prepared by Ms. Yabut and submitted to private respondent RMC together with the validated duplicate slips with the latters n ame and account number, she made her company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when, in truth and in fact, they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. This went on in a span of more than one (1) year without private respondents kno wledge. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money, but as its demand went unheeded, it filed a collection suit before the Regional Trial Court. The Trial Court found petitioner bank negligent. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the foregoing decision with modifications. ISSUE: WON the proximate cause of the loss is the negligence of respondent Rommel Marketing Corporation and Romeo Lipana in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee or that of the petitioner banks HELD: The petition has no merit. Our law on quasi-delicts states: "Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for

the damage done. Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."cralaw virtua1aw library There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. In the case at bench, there is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the private respondent (plaintiff in the trial court) RMC in the amount of P304,979.74. It is in ascribing fault or negligence which caused the damage where the parties point to each other as the culprit. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. The seventy-eight (78)-year-old, yet still relevant, case of Picart v. Smith, 8 provides the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case which may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. Applying the above test, it appears that the banks teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself Clearly, Ms. Mabayad failed to observe this very important procedure. The fact that the duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd circumstance alone that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information that of the name of the account holder should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook, line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only for her personal record, she would simply fill up the blank space later on. 11 A "reasonable man of ordinary prudence" 12 would not have given credence to such explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a condition for validation. Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller Mabayad proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private Respondent. Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the latters act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is modified by reducing the amount of actual damages private respondent is entitled to by 40%. Petitioners may recover from Ms. Azucena Mabayad the amount they would pay the private Respondent. Private respondent shall have recourse against Ms. Irene Yabut. In all other respects, the appellate courts decision is AFFIRMED. GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs GLORIA E. CHATTO and LINA DELZA FACTS: In the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-year old daughter, plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated for one (1) day. The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. Plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto suffered injuries Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in July 1982 for further treatment. She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in

the U.S. for about three (3) months during which time she had to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6) times. The Chattos seek for award of actual or compensatory and moral damages and attorney's fees Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or construction defect. Lower court ruled in favour of the Chattos . The Defendants contended that the lower court erred in finding that the ceiling of the balcony collapsed due to some structural construction or architectural defect, and not due to an Act of God or Force Majeure. ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in finding that the ceiling of the balcony collapsed due to some structural construction or architec tural defect, and not due to an Act of God or Force Majeure. HELD: In its decision, respondent Court found the appeal to be without merit. It was the burden defendant-appellant to prove that its theater did not suffer from any structural defect when it was built a nd that it has been well maintained when the incident occurred. This is its Special and Affirmative Defense and it is incumbent on defendant-appellant to prove it. Considering the collapse of the ceiling of its theater's balcony barely four (4) years after its constr uction, it behooved defendant-appellant to conduct an exhaustive study of the reason for the tragic incident. On this score, the effo rt of defendant-appellant borders criminal nonchalance. Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure. To Our mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force majeureobtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His answers to the leading questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said. inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the instant petition with costs against petitioner.

Reynalda Gatchalian v. Arsenio Delim & Court of Appeals Facts: On 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province. On the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, La Union, for medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner was found to have sustained physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead, specifically described as follows: lacerated wound, forehead; abrasion, elbow, left; abrasion, knee, left; abrasion, lateral surface, leg, left. On 14 July 1973, while injured. passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00 with which to pay her transportation expense in going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit which stated, among other things that they are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries. Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the then Court of First Instance of La Union an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit, she relinquished any right of action (whether criminal or civil) that she may have had against respondent and the driver of the mini-bus. On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but affirmed the dismissal of the case by denying petitioner's claim for damages.

Issue: Was there a valid waiver on the part of the petitioner as evidenced by the Joint Affidavit which she had signed? Ruling: No. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.The degree of explicitness which the Court has required in purported waivers is illustrated in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit, where the Court in reading and rejecting a purported waiver said: Even a cursory examination of the document mentioned above will readily show that appellees did not actually waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the latter's failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All that said document proves is that they expressed a "desire" to make the waiver which obviously is not the same as making an actual waiver of their right. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and unequivocal which is not the case of the one relied upon in this appeal. Applying the standard enunciated in the said case, the Court concluded that the terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in "clear and unequivocal" terms. Moreover, the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent. Finally, because what is involved is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, any such purported waiver must most strictly be construed against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. Such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy. Sofia Fernando v. Court of Appeals & City of Davao, GR No. 92087 Facts: The septic tank in Agdao Public Market was due for re-emptying. Before the project could even begin, bidder Bertulano along with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The investigation of the office the City Engineer provided that the five victims entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a septic tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas which killed the laborers. They submit that the public respondents gross negligence was the proximate cause of the fatal incident. The trial court dismissed the said petition. Petitioners then appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which rendered a decision ordering the defendant to pay the petitioners compensatory and moral damages. Both parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals then granted the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant, thereby reversing its prior decision. Hence, this petition. Issues: 1) Is the City of Davao guilty of negligence in the case at bar? 2) If so, is such negligence the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of the victims hereof? Ruling: 1) No. While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in AgdaoPublic Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. The public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed. The absence of any accident was due to the public respondent's compliance with the sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing the toilet and the septic tank. Hence, the toxic gas from the waste matter could not have leaked out because the septic tank was air-tight. Thus, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers.

2) No. To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Where the resulting injury was the product of the negligence of both parties, there exists a difficulty to discern which acts shall be considered the proximate cause of the accident. InTaylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., the Court set a guideline for a judicious assessment of the situation: Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. The fatal accident in this case would not have happened but for the victims' negligence. Feliza P. De Roy v. Court of Appeals et al., GR No. 80718, January 29, 1988 Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Upon the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court. Petitioners also filed their motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Issue: 1) Are petitioners guilty of negligence as proprietor of the building which collapsed and destroyed the shop of the respondents? Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the ruling of the Court of which affirmed the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, providing that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case. Coca-cola Bottlers vs. CA FACTS: Lydia Geronimo filed for damages in RTC Dagupan. She was a proprietress in Kindergarten Wonderland Cantee. One day, parents and students complained to her that the coke and sprite softdrinks contained foriegn and fiber-like matters. She brought the bottle to Regional Health Office of the DOH. Results were that the softdrinks were adulterated. As a result of such, it caused the decrease in her sales and not long after, closed her shop. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. RTC granted the motion and denied reconsideratiin. On appeal, CA ordered the lower court to conduct furtheer proceeding. Hence this petition. ISSUE: whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages when their is existing contract between them. RATIO: Supreme court ruled in affirmative. RATIO: As ruled in CA, it should be stressed that allegations in the complaint shows that it is an action for damages arising from the respondent's acts of "recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption." What determines the action are the facts alleged in the complaint and those averred as defence in the defendant's answer. In Singson vs. CA, it has been repeatedly held that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of tort by one against the other and consequent recovery for damages thereof. The vendees remedies are not limited to breach of warranties or annulment of contract, the vendor could likewise be liable under quasi-delict. While it is true that pre-

existing contract, as a general rule, bars the recovery of the law on quasi-delict, the liabiltiy may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict. Umali vs. Hon. Bacani FACTS: A storm with strong rain hit the municipality of Alcala, Pangasinan, which started from 2pm to midnight. Banana plants were standing on elevated ground near a transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant. As a result, the plant fell on the wire and cut it. The next morning, the captain of the place noticed the cutted wire and noticed everyone. He also informed a certain Baldomero, a laborer of the Plant but claimed that he cannot fix it and promised to look for someone who can. After they left, a boy, Manuel Saynes, went to the place and played around. As a result, he was electricuted by the live wire and later, died. The parents of the boy filed for damages in CFI under quasi-delict. The petitioner alleged that it was a fortuitous event. The court ruled in favor of Saynes but mitigated such for the parent's contributory negligence, in not providing for the proper and delegated supervision of their son. Hence, this petition for certiorari from the decision of the CFI. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was liable for damages. HELD: Supreme Court ruled in affirmative. RATIO: A careful examination of facts would show that the petitioner did not exercised diligence: 1. There were banana plants beside the wire post; 2. It failed to cut it after being made aware; 3. Baldomero was negligent in failing to act on the threat. That, as the immediate and proximate cause, is liable for the injury. Under article 2179 of the civil code, if negligence of the plaintiff was contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages bu the court shall mitigate the damages awarded. The law provides only for mitigation of the liability but does not exempt such. Moreover, under article 2180 par. 4. Of the civil code provides that, the owner and manager of an establishment pr enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occassion of their function. Uneder such lawm negligence of the employee is presumed negligence of the employer who is suppose to exercise supervision. Emiliano Manuel and Superlines Transportation Co., Inc. vs. CA FACTS: One drizzling afternoon, the scout car, owned by Ramos and driven by Fernando Abcede, Sr., was zigzagging the road of Camarenes Norte when it was hit on its left side by the petitioner bus driven by Manuel. The scout csr was thrown back against the protective railing, which resulted to damages and injuries to the passengers of the scout car. Later on, Manuel was prosecuted for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence in MTC but could not be found as he did not anymore reported to work the following day. The private respondents filed for damages under quasi-delict. In the RTC, the petitioners and their insurance company were made solidarily liable for the damages. On appeal, CA affirmed the lower court's decision. Hence, this petition. Petitioner alleged that the evidence, like the skid marks, were inaccurate and that the driver of the scout car was Fernando Abcede Jr., who has no license . ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the damages and injuries. HELD: Supreme court ruled in affirmative and dismissed the petition. RATIO: Evidence with respect to the issue that it was Abcede Jr who drove the car and was driving without license could not exempt the petitioner from the liability. It was clear from the facts that it was the petitioner that encrouched the scout car; hence, hitting the latter on the left side. It was the one who violated the traffic rules by encrouching the other lane. National Development Corporation vs. CA FACTS: NDC as a preferred mortgagee of the three ocean-going vessel, one of which is the "Doa Nati." NDC and Maritime Company of the Philippines(MCP), entered a memorandum of agreement making the latter as the former's agent and operator. E. Philipps coproration loaded 1,200 bales of American raw cotton and in Japan, Kyokuto Boekui kaisa, Ltd. also loaded cargoes bound to manila. En route to Manila, Doa Nati collided with a Japanese vessel and sunk, loosing all its cargo. Development Insurance and Surety Corp, as insurer, paid a total of 364,915.86Php and instuted the present action in the CFI for reimbursment. CFI rendered a decision in favor of the insurer. On appeal, CA affirms the latter's decision. Hence, this present action. ISSUE: Whether or not NDC can be held primarily liable for the lost.

HELD: Supreme court ruled in affirmative. RATIO: As already ruled in Eastern Shipping Lines vs IAC, the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of loss, destruction or deterioration. Hence, it is the Civil Code should govern and the Carriage of Goods by Sea act as mere suppletory. Under Art. 1733 of the Civil Code, Common carriers from the reason of their business and for the reason of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods and the safety of their passengers transported by them according to the circumstances of each. Under our law, common carriers are presumed to be at fault or negligent. Furhter, under article 827 of the Code of Commerce, if collision is imputable to both vessel, each of them shall suffer its damages and shall be solidarily liable for the loss and damages suffered by its cargoes. The Code of Commerce does not exclude the liability of the shipowner due to the fault and negligence of its captain. The owner and agent are both civilly liable for the acts of the captain. Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation vs. Transport Venture, Inc. FACTS: SYTCO Pte Ltd. Singapore shipped from the port of Ilyichevsk, Russia on board M/V Alexander Saveliev (a vessel of Russian registry and owned by respondent Black Sea) 545 hot rolled steel sheets. The vessel arrived at the port of Manila and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) assigned it a place of berth at the outside breakwater at the Manila South Harbor. Petitioner Schmitz Transport, engaged to secure the requisite clearances, to receive the cargoes from the shipside, and to deliver them to Little Giant Steelpipe Corporations warehouse at Cainta, Rizal. It likewise engaged the services of respondent Transport Venture Inc. (TVI) to send a barge and tugboat at shipside. The tugboat, after positioning the barge alongside the vessel, left and returned to the port terminal. Later on, arrastre operator commenced to unload 37 of the 545 coils from the vessel unto the barge. By noon the next day, during which the weather condition had become inclement due to an approaching storm, the unloading unto the barge of the 37 coils was accomplished. However, there was no tugboat that pulled the barge back to the pier. Eventually, because of the strong waves, the crew of the barge abandoned it and transferred to the vessel. The barge capsized, washing the 37 coils into the sea. Earnest efforts on the part of both the consignee Little Giant and Industrial Insurance to recover the lost cargoes proved futile. Industrial Insurance later filed a complaint against Schmitz Transport, TVI and Black Sea through its representative Inchcape (the defendants) before the RTC of Manila, for the recovery of the amount it paid to Little Giant plus adjustment fees, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses. Industrial Insurance won and the Schmitz et al.s motion for r econsideration is denied. In effect, Schmitz now filed charges against TVI et al. It asserts that in chartering the barge and tugboat of TVI, it was acting for its principal, consignee Little Giant, hence, the transportation contract was by and between Little Giant and TVI. The Court rendered a decision holding Schmitz and TVI liable. ISSUES: 1. WON the liability for the loss may attach to Black Sea, Schmitz and TVI 2. WON the loss of cargoes was due to fortuitous event. HELD: 1. TVIs failure to promptly provide a tugboat did not only increase the risk that might have been reasonably anticipated during the shipside operation, but was the proximate cause of the loss. A man of ordinary prudence would not leave a heavily loaded barge floating for a considerable number of hours, at such a precarious time, and in the open sea, knowing that the barge does not have any power of its own and is totally defenseless from the ravages of the sea. That it was nighttime and, therefore, the members of the crew of a tugboat would be charging overtime pay did not excuse TVI from calling for one such tugboat. As for Schmitz, for it to be relieved of liability, it should, following Article 1739 of the Civil Code, prove that it exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss, before, during and after the occurrence of the storm in order that it may be exempted from liability for the loss of the goods.

While Schmitz sent checkers and a supervisor on board the vessel to counter-check the operations of TVI, it failed to take all available and reasonable precautions to avoid the loss. After noting that TVI failed to arrange for the prompt towage of the barge despite the deteriorating sea conditions, it should have summoned the same or another tugboat to extend help, but it did not. The Court holds then that Schmitz and TVI are solidarily liable for the loss of the cargoes. As for Black Sea, its duty as a common carrier extended only from the time the goods were surrendered or unconditionally placed in its possession and received for transportation until they were delivered actually or constructively to consignee Little Giant Parties to a contract of carriage may, however, agree upon a definition of delivery that extends the services rendered by the carrier. In the case at bar, Bill of Lading No. 2 covering the shipment provides that delivery be made to the port of discharge or so ne ar thereto as she may safely get, always afloat. The delivery of the goods to the consignee was not from pier to pier but from the shipside of M/V Alexander Saveliev and into barges, for which reason the consignee contracted the services of petitioner. Since Black Sea had constructively delivered the cargoes to Little Giant, through Schmitz, it had discharged its duty. In fine, no liability may thus attach to Black Sea. 2. NO. In order, to be considered a fortuitous event: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of human will; (2) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in any manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. Petitioner and respondent TVI were jointly and severally liable for the amount of paid by the consignee plus interest computed from the date of decision of the trial court. Gilchrist v. Cuddy, et al FACTS Defendant Cuddy was the owner of a film called Zigomar. On April 24, he rented it to Gilchrist for a week at Php 125.00, the same to be delivered to plaintiff on May 26. At the last minute, Cuddy sent the money back to Gilchrist, saying that he made other arrangements with the film. The other arrangements referred to were the rental of the same flick to defendants Espejo and his partner at Php 350.00 for a week . A mandatory injunction was issued directing Cuddy to send the film to Gilchrist. So, too, a preliminary injunction was issued restraining Espejo and Zaldarriaga from exhibiting in their theater Zigomar. Both Espejo and his partner filed a crosscomplaint for damages against plaintiff Gilchrist for the alleged wrongful issuance the injunction. ISSUE Whether Espejo and Zaladarriaga were liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy regardless of the fact that they did not know the identity of one of the parties. HOLDING YES. Article 1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage do done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chapter wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required in order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered. In the case at bar the only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for interfering with that contract and causing its breach. It is therefore clear that they were liable to Gilchrist for the damages caused by their acts and the fact that they did not know at the time the identity of the original lessee (Gilchrist) of the film does not relieve them of that liability. The liability of the appellants arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as they were under no such obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code. LG FOODS v. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR (September 26, 2006) Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decisioni[1] dated April 25, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA), as reiterated in its Resolution of July 10, 2003,1[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, affirming an earlier Order of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 43, which denied the petitioners motion to dismiss in Civil Case No. 99 -10845, an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident thereat instituted by the herein private respondents - the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera - against the petitioners. The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as follows: On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident. In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, entitled People of the Philippines v. Vincent Norman Yeneza. Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case. On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint2[3] for damages against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10845, the complaint was raffled to Branch 43 of the court. In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,3[4] the petitioners as defendants denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras 7-year old son, claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, including the deceased driver. They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera couple. During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that their dismissal prayer be resolved. Hence, the trial court required them to file within ten days a memorandum of authorities supportive of their position. Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, the defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is basically a claim for subsidiary liability against an employer under the provisio n of Article 1034[5] of the Revised Penal Code. Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that since the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a separate action for damages when the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal action. which was already dismissed. In an Order dated September 4, 2001,5[6] the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial. With their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its subsequent order6[7] of September 26, 2001, the petitioners then went on certiorari to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to dismiss the basic complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845. In the herein assailed

decision7[8] dated April 25, 2003, the CA denied the petition and upheld the trial court. Partly says the CA in its challenged issuance: It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor implies that the responsibility charged was the petitioners subsidiary liability under Art. 103, Revised Penal Code. As pointed out [by the trial court] in the Order of September 4, 2001, the complaint does not even allege the basic elements for such a liability, like the conviction of the accused employee and his insolvency. Truly enough, a civil action to enforce subsidiary liability separate and distinct from the criminal action is even unnecessary. Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts responsibility for fault or negligence under Art. 2176, Civil Code, which is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the liability under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate, and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee or prior showing of the latters insolvency . (Underscoring in the original.) In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in its resolution8[9] of July 10, 2003. Hence, the petitioners present recourse on their submission that the appellate court committed reversible error in upholding the trial courts denial of their motion to dismiss. We DENY. As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is whether the spouses Vallejeras cause of action in Civil Case No. 99 -10845 is founded on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as maintained by the petitioners, or derived from Article 21809[10] of the Civil Code, as ruled by the two courts below. It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845. That complaint alleged, inter alia, as follows: 3. That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the registered owner of a Ford Fiera Van with Plate No. NMS 881 and employer sometime February of 1996 of one Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer, a salesman of said corporation; 4. That sometime February 26, 1996 at around 2:00 P.M. at Rosario St., Bacolod City, the minor son of said plaintiffs [now respondents], Charles Vallejera, 7 years old, was hit and bumped by above-described vehicle then driven by said employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer; 5. That the mishap was due to the gross fault and negligence of defendants employee, who drove said vehicle, recklessly, negligently and at a high speed without regard to traffic condition and safety of other road users and likewise to the fault and negligence of the owner employer, herein defendants LG Food Corporation who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer; 6. That as a result of said incident, plaintiffs son suffered multiple body injuries which led to his untimely demise on that very day; 7. That a criminal case was filed against the defendants employee, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, (earlier filed as Crim. Case No. 96-17570 before RTC) before MTC-Branch III, entitled People v. Yeneza for Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, but the same was dismissed because pending litigation, then remorse-stricken [accused] committed suicide; xxx xxx xxx 8. That the injuries and complications as well as the resultant death suffered by the late minor Charles Vallejera were due to the negligence and imprudence of defendants employee;

9. That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of its employee since it failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence if exercised, would have prevented said incident. (Bracketed words and emphasis ours.) Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein petitioners are being made to account for their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. As correctly pointed out by the trial court in its order of September 4, 2001 denying the petitioners Motion to Dismiss, the complaint did not even aver the basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency. Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old son. Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defi nes cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may come from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts.10[11] Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto;11[12] and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law;12[13] the intentional torts;13[14] and culpa aquiliana14[15]); or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action.15[16] Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender.16[17] Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to the employers defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. On the

other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.17[18] Article 116118[19] of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision of Article 217719[20] and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his initiatory pleading or complaint,20[21] and not with the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of the plaintiffs cause of action or lack of it based on the defendants perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee.21[22] Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couples minor son was caused by the negligent act of the petitioners driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said accident. Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done by their employee (driver) based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.22[23] Since there was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based on quasi-delict. Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim,23[24] repeatedly made mention of Article 2180 of the Civil Code and anchored their defense on their allegation that they had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of [their] employees. The Court views this defense as an admission that indeed the petitioners acknowledged the private respondents cause of action as one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover damages primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in any business or industry.

Citing Maniago v. CA,24[25] petitioner would argue that Civil Case No. 99-10845 should have been dismissed for failure of the respondent spouses to make a reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages when the criminal case against the driver was filed. The argument is specious. To start with, the petitioners reliance on Maniago is obviously misplaced. There, the civil case was filed while the criminal case against the employee was still pending. Here, the criminal case against the employee driver was prematurely terminated due to his death. Precisely, Civil Case No. 99-10845 was filed by the respondent spouses because no remedy can be obtained by them against the petitioners with the dismissal of the criminal case against their driver during the pendency thereof. The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was made when the criminal case was filed is of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed without any pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for the petitioners to insist for the conviction of their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for the impossible. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Sarmiento v. Sun-Carbido FACTS Petitioner Sarmiento was requested by a certain Dr. Lao to find somebody to rest a pair of diamond rings, owned by Lao, into two (2) gold rings. Sarmiento, in turn, asked Payag to send the two (2) diamond rings to Dingdings Jewelry Shop. Payag delivered to Dingdings one of the diamond earrings. Respondent Sun dismounted the diamond from the original setting but was unsuccessful; so she asked Santos, a goldsmith with 40 years of experience, to do it. Santos attempted to accomplish the same by using a pair of pliers but he ended up breaking the gem in the process. Payag demanded Php 15,000.00 as payment for the damage from Santos but since he had no money, she turned to Sun, thinking the latter was the owner of Dingdings. Petitioner Sarmien to required respondents to replace the diamond with the same size and quality; respondents refused. The controversy found its way to the MTCC which decided for petitioner. The RTC reversed the decision, absolving the defendants from liability for breach of contract; this was upheld by the CA. ISSUE Whether Santos was negligent in the performance of his obligation as to give rise to liability. HOLDING YES. It is beyond doubt that Santos acted negligently in dismounting the diamond from its original setting. It appears to be the practice of the trade to use a miniature wire saw in dismounting precious gems, such as diamonds, from their original settings. However, Santos employed a pair of pliers in clipping the original setting, thus resulting in breakage of the diamond. The jewelry shop failed to perform its obligation with the ordinary diligence required by the circumstances. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Corollarily, those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. Daywalt v. La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos, et al FACTS In 1902, Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to plaintiff a tract of land. It was agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as the title to the land should be perfected and a Torrens certificate should be produced therefore in the name of Endencia. True enough the decree had been obtained but the Torrens certificate was not issued until later. All the same, the parties entered into another contract with a view to carrying the original agreement (i.e. 1902 contract) into effect. Still, a third agreement was entered into between the parties in 1909; this time Endencia promised that upon receiving the Torrens title, she will immediately deliver the same to Daywalt. In time, the Torrens certificate was issued. Haplessly for the plaintiff, Endencia now became reluctant to turn over the same for the reason that it was not her intention to sell so large an amount of land as what was found by the official survey. Eventually, the controversy one different from this case had reached the Supreme Court which Court found for Daywalt; the Court ordered Endencia to convey the whole tract to Daywalt.

La Corporacion de los Padres Recoletos, is a religious corporation, who owned an estate on the same island immediately adjacent to the land which Endencia had sold to Daywalt for many years the Recoletos Fathers had maintained large herds of cattle on the estate. Father Sanz, the person in charge with the farms management, had long been well acquainted with Teodor ica Endencia and exerted over her an influence and ascendency due to his religious character as well as to the personal friendship which existed between them. Teodorica appears to be a woman of little personal force, easily subject to influence, and upon all the important matters of business was accustomed to seek, and was given, the advice of father Sanz and other members of his order. He was fully aware of the existence of the contract of 1902 as well as of the later important developments connected with the history of that contract and the contract substituted successively for it. When the Torrens certificate was finally issued in 1909, Endencia delivered it for safekeeping to the defendant corporation where it remained in the custody and under the control of P. Juan Labarga. What is more, Father Sanz entered into an arrangement with Endencia whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the defendant corporation were to be pastured upon said land during a period extending from June 1, 1909, to May 1, 1914. Plaintiff Daywalt sued defendant La Corporacion, in part, for damages for wrongful interference in the performance of the contract. ISSUE Whether the act of defendant La Corporacion in advising Endencia to abstain from carrying on with the contract constituted a tort. HOLDING NO. Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person who by an act or omission, characterized by fault or negligence, causes damage to another shall be liable for the damage so done. Ignoring so much of this article as relates to liability for negligence, we take the rule to be that a person is liable for damage done to another by any culpable act; and by "culpable act" we mean any act which is blameworthy when judged by accepted legal standards. The idea thus expressed is undoubtedly broad enough to include any rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society. The fact that the officials of defendant La Corporacion may have advised Endencia not to carry the contract into effect would not constitute actionable interference with such contract. It may be added that when one considers the hardship that the ultimate performance of that contract entailed on the vendor, and the doubt in which the issue was involved to the extent that the decision of the Court of the First Instance was unfavorable to the plaintiff and the Supreme Court itself was divided the attitude of the defendant corporation, is not difficult to understand. To our mind a fair conclusion on this feature of the case is that father Juan Labarga and his associates believed in good faith that the contract could not be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was, therefore, prompted by no mean or improper motive. It is not, in our opinion, to be denied that Teodorica would have surrendered the documents of title and given possession of the land but for the influence and promptings of members of the defendants corporation. But we do not credit the idea that they were in any degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the desire to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their cattle upon the land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff. Dulay v. Court of Appeals FACTS An altercation occurred between Atty. Napoleon Dulay (deceased) and Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty, and the latter shot and killed Atty. Dulay with a .38 caliber revolver belonging to his employers, Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc. (Safeguard) and/or Superguard Security Corp. (Superguard) Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased, filed an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela, Safeguard and Superguard (as alternative defendants) The complaint alleged that the incident was due to the concurring negligence Torzuelas wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm issued to him Safeguard and/or Superguards failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the supervision and control of its employee o Maria Dulay prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. o Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action. Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Maria Dulay opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action is based upon their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code: o The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the o

scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry . xxx Meanwhile, an Information, charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide,was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. RTC Judge Rginogranted Safeguards motion to dismiss and Superguards motion for exclusion. CAAffirmed. ISSUE: WON Maria Dulay has cause of action against Safeguard and/or Superguard to hold them liable for the criminal act of Torzuela. HELD: YES. Although Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide, Maria Dulay still has the right to file in independent civil action to recover damages for the fatal shooting of Atty. Dulay. Section 1, of Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure ii that a civil action may be separately instituted when the party expressly reserves the right to do so or when it is instituted prior to the criminal action. o Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals: The filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation. This is precisely what the Maria Dulay opted to do. However, the Safeguard and/or Superguard opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. o There is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Codeiii to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Elcano v. Hill (echoed by Andamo v. Intermediate Appellate Court): "Fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character. A separate civil action lies against the offender, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores. Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the Civil Codeiv applies only to injuries intentionally committed v and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. Physical injuries is discussed in jurisprudence, to wit: It includes bodily injuries causing deathvi. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. vii o Marcia V. CA: No independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal negligence. However, since Torzuela is charged with homicide, and not with reckless imprudence, a civil action based on Article 33 lies. Safeguard and/or Superguard further contend that they are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the scope of his duties as a security guard. And their liability (if any) would only be subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code. o Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court: Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Codeviii when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee.ix Therefore, it is incumbent upon Safeguar and/or Superguard to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. [Side issue] Whether the complaint states a sufficient cause of action o General rule: allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. o Elements of a cause of action: A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. The Court finds, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and Safeguard and/or Superguard. o o

This does not operate however, to establish that the defendants below are liable. Such question would be better resolved after trial on the merits.

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
ii

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
iii

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. v Marcia v. CA vi Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines vii Madeja v. Caro viii Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
iv

xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or an industry. ix Kapalaran Bus Lines v. Coronado