Arrows Impossibility Theorem

Adam Englebright November 2013

What is Arrows Impossibility Theorem?

Arrows Impossiblilty Theorem (named for its devisor, Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow) states that theres no way of aggregating individual ranked preferences such that the results are fair (where fairness is outlined by criteria specied below). It should also be noted that the theorem only applies to voting systems in which all candidates are ranked it doesnt have anything to say, for instance, about rst-past-the-post, the system in place for general elections here in the UK (though FPTP has plenty of its own problems).

What does a fair voting system look like?

According to Arrow, there are four properties a voting system should have if it is to be considered fair, which all go by rather intimidating titles, but are all actually quite simple.

Unrestricted domain
Each voter can chose whichever candidates they want in whatever order they want. No, I dont know why he chose to call it that rather than free choice or something more straightforward, but Im not a Nobel Prizewinning economist, so what do I know?

Unanimity
Say there are three candidates: Ed, Dave and Nick. If every individual prefers Ed to Dave, then the group as a whole can be said to prefer Ed to Dave.

Independence of irrelevant alternatives

Returning to our friends Ed, Dave and Nick: if most voters rank Ed higher than Dave, wherever they place Nick shouldnt aect the relative positions of Ed and Dave.

Non-dictatorship
No one person gets to decide the outcome specically, the outcome shouldnt always match the opinion of one person.

Whats the problem, then?

Unfortunately, its impossible to satisfy all these conditions at once. Lets return once more to Ed, Dave and Nick. If theres an election, and everyone puts Nick dead last (poor Nick), then the group as a whole can be said to prefer both Dave and Ed to Nick. On the other hand, if theres an election and everyone puts Nick rst, then they can be said to prefer Nick to both Dave and Ed. In practice, its unlikely to be either of these, but somewhere in between. If we take the voting preferences from the rst scenario (no-one likes Nick) and start changing ballots one-by-one to prefer Nick above Ed or Dave (and wed better hope we dont get caught, because thats electoral fraud and we could be jailed for it) then theres going to be a point at which one vote is changed and the group as a whole prefers Nick to, say, Dave. The voter whose preference we change there is called the pivotal voter for Nick over Dave. Now, lets say everyone whose ballots we changed up to (but not including) the pivotal voter are called group one, and everyone else (also not including the pivotal voter) are group two. For the sake of simplicity, well say everyone in group one likes Nick best, then Dave, then Ed. Group two (and the pivotal voter, for the moment) like Ed best, then Nick, then Dave. Now, that means that the group as a whole currently prefers Ed to Nick and Nick to Dave. However, if the pivotal voter changes his mind, and prefers Nick to Ed (but leaves Dave in last), the whole groups preference shifts to preferring Nick, then Ed, then Dave. Now, lets say everyone (in both groups) except the pivotal voter decides that they prefer Dave to Nick, regardless of where they placed Ed. Even though the pivotal voter is the only one who prefers Nick to Dave overall, the group as a whole still prefers Nick to Dave. The pivotal 2

voter is therefore a dictator over the whole group (it is not necessarily true that the pivotal voters in both scenarios are the same, but it can be proven by saying the dictator for Nick over Dave must be outside group two, and for Dave over Nick musit be outside group one therefore, must be outside both, and the only person tting those criteria is the pivotal voter). This means there is a dictator, and the system is, by Arrows denition, unfair.

Bibliography
Arrow, K.J. (1950). A Diculty in the Concept of Social Welfare. The Journal of Political Economy. 58, pp.328-346. Collins, N. (2003). Arrows Theorem Proves No Voting System is Perfect. Available from: http://tech.mit.edu/V123/N8/8voting.8n.html. Accessed 27th Nov 2013. Geanakoplos, J. (1996, April (Revised 2001, July)). Three Brief Proofs of ARROWS IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM. Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. Available from: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d11a/d1123r3.pdf. Accessed: 27th Nov 2013. Yu, N.N. (2012, January). A One-shot Proof of Arrows Impossibility Theorem. Stanford University, Stanford. Available from: http://bit.ly/Ih5Dp9. Accessed: 27th Nov 2013. Implications of Arrows Impossibility Theorem for Voting Methods [online]. (2001). Available from: http://alumnus.caltech.edu/ seppley/Arrows Impossibility Theorem for Social Choice Methods.htm. [Accessed 27th Nov. 2013].