Powei anu Politics

0iganization Theoiy
ur Alf Crossman
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Key Aieas of Focus
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uemocracy and Lhe lron Law of Cllgarchy
8oberL Mlchels
ower ln organlzauons
!ohn lrench and 8erLram 8aven
!ames March
8osabeLh Moss kanLer
Penry MlnLzberg
uon Pellrlegel and !ohn Slocum
ower as properLy
!erey feer
ower and personallLy
nlccolo Machlavell
uavld Maclelland
!ullan 8ouer
Session 0bjectives
1o undersLand Lhe concepL of power
1o dlsungulsh beLween power and auLhorlLy
1o undersLand Lhe bases of soclal power
1o recognlze Lhe properLy concepL of power
1o undersLand Lhe nexus beLween power and personallLy
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Evolution of
0iganization Theoiy
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Source: uoherLy, !. ., Surles, 8. C. and uonovan, C. M. (2001) 'Crganlzauon 1heory', ln 1albou, !.
A. and Pales, 8. L. (Lds) ! #$%&'(() (* !+,-.-/&0123$ 4/567-1&05, WashlngLon, uC, Amerlcan
sychlaLrlc ubllshlng lnc, 40














"#$%&'""


"()*+&(#"(,



$+&-./,
nLCCLASSlCAL
CLASSlCAL
CCn1LMC8A8?
The Iion Law of
0ligaichy
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8oberL
Mlchels
Accordlng Lo Mlchels' Lhesls:
8ureaucracy happens. lf bureaucracy happens,
power rlses. ower corrupLs [1].
An organlzauon has Lo creaLe a bureaucracy ln
order Lo malnLaln lLs emclency as lL becomes
larger.
Many declslons have Lo be made dally LhaL cannoL
be made by large numbers of dlsorganlzed people.
lor Lhe organlzauon Lo funcuon eecuvely,
cenLrallzauon has Lo occur and power wlll end up ln
Lhe hands of a few.
1hose few-Lhe ollgarchy-wlll use all means
necessary Lo preserve and furLher lncrease Lhelr
power.
Who says
organlzauon,
says ollgarchy."
[1] Source: Leach, u.k. (2003) 1he lron Law of WhaL Agaln? ConcepLuallzlng
Cllgarchy Across Crganlzauonal lorms, 8(6-(9(:-619 #7$(05, 23 (3), pp. 312-337.
The Iion Law of
0ligaichy
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8oberL
Mlchels
uemocracy wlll fall for four reasons
ConcenLrauon of power aL Lhe Lop
lncompeLence of Lhe masses
ulvergence of lnLeresLs
Soclallsm an admlnlsLrauve 'problem
Powei veisus Authoiity
Source: 8uckley, W. (1967) 8(6-(9(:5 1.+ ;(+$0. 85/&$,/ #7$(05, Lnglewood
Clls, n!, renuce-Pall.
AuLhorlLy SysLem
Group
Consensus
Authority
Structure
Group
Compliance
Power
Structure
Differential
Goal Pursuit
Group
Goal Pursuit
ower SysLem
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Theoiies of Authoiity
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<(0,19 #7$(05 of AuLhorlLy !66$=&1.6$ #7$(05 of AuLhorlLy
rlnclples











Powei, Authoiity anu
0iganizational Politics
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ower
Amblguous and ublqulLous, relauve, noL absoluLe.
A person ls only powerful ln relauon Lo oLhers.
AuLhorlLy
When Lhe dlsLrlbuuon of power ln a soclal semng
ls accepLed or 'leglumlsed' by Lhe oLher acLors.
ollucs
Acuon Laken Lo overcome reslsLance Lo one's
preferred ouLcomes. A consclous eorL Lo musLer
and use force Lo overcome opposluon".







!erey feer
Source: feer, !. (1981) 4(>$0 -. ?0:1.-@12(./A Marsheld, MA, lLman.
ueclslon Maklng Models











Powei anu Becision
Naking
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8auonal Cholce Model
Coals/ob[ecuves, rauonal cholce, assessmenL of ouLcomes, declslon.
8ureaucrauc Model
8ules-based, followlng prevlously adapLed and eecuve processes.
ueclslon rocess Model
Slmllar Lo bureaucrauc model, presumpuon LhaL pollcy ls an ouLcome of
cholce. rocesses precede cholce. 4(>$0 noL slgnlcanL ln cholces.
Source: feer, !. (1981) 4(>$0 -. ?0:1.-@12(./A Marsheld, MA, lLman.
ollucal Model
lurallsuc and democrauc. 8argalnlng/compromlse Lo overcome lnLer-group
conlcL. More =(>$0*B9 groups geL Lhe beuer deal.
The Powei of Powei
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!ames March
Models of Soclal Cholce and Lhe ConcepL of ower












2. 8aslc force models: cholce belng a dlrecL resulL of
=(>$0 $%$0&$+ ln Lhe sysLem
1. Chance models: cholce ls a chance evenL an
-.+$=$.+$.& (* =(>$0
3. lorce acuvauon models: .(& 199 =(>$0 of every
componenL ln Lhe sysLem ls exerLed aL all umes
4. lorce-condluonlng models: =(>$0 of Lhe componenLs
ls ,(+-C$+ as a resulL of =0$3-(B/ (B&6(,$/D67(-6$/
3. lorce depleuon models: =(>$0 of componenLs ls
,(+-C$+ as a resulL of $%$02(. (* =(>$0 ln pasL cholces
6. rocess models: cholce ls subsLanually -.+$=$.+$.&
(* =(>$0 buL noL a chance evenL
Source: March, !. C. (1966) '1he power of power,' ln LasLon, u. (ed) E10-$2$/ (* 4(9-2619
#7$(05, Lnglewood Clls, n!, renuce-Pall.
The Thiee Temptations
of Powei
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01 ,23 &456789:399 7; $7<3=>
1he Lendency Lo relfy power, Lo granL lL
reallLy sLaLus on Lhe basls of our own
soclal condluonlng Lo accepL LhaL power
exlsLs.
?1 ,23 *@A7=BC:D3 7; #3C98=3@3:B>
1he rsL corollary of Lhe obvlousness of
power ls Lhe Lendency Lo look aL '7(>' we
measure power, raLher Lhan '>75' should
power be measured aL all.
E1 ,23 +396F8CG )C=6C:D3>
1he second corollary ls Lhe Lendency Lo
glve any unexplalned varlance ln
behavlour a name - Cod's wlll, power,
personallLy, exLrasensory percepuon.
Source: March, !. C. (1966) '1he power of power,' ln LasLon, u. (ed) E10-$2$/ (* 4(9-2619
#7$(05, Lnglewood Clls, n!, renuce-Pall.
1he exLenL Lo whlch we have used
Lhe concepL of power frulLlessly ls
sympLomauc of Lhree unforLunaLe
LempLauons."
Powei Lines
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%6:39 7; H8AAGI
CuLward lnuence over envlronmenLal lssues
AblllLy Lo obLaln resources
%6:39 7; *:;7=@CJ7:
1o be 'ln Lhe know', formally and lnformally
%6:39 7; H8AA7=B
lormal: freedom Lo acL wlLhouL mulu-layered
approval
lnformal: LaclL supporL of oLher gures ln Lhe
organlzauon
1hree llnes of power







8osabeLh
Moss kanLer
Source: kanLer, 8. M. (1979) 'ower fallure ln managemenL clrculLs', F10310+
'B/-.$// G$3-$>, !ul-Aug).
Powei Failuie
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Source: kanLer, 8. M. (1979) 'ower fallure ln managemenL clrculLs', F10310+ 'B/-.$//
G$3-$>, !ul-Aug).
$796J7: HI@AB7@9 H78=D39
llrsL-llne
supervlsors
Close supervlslon.
uo lL oneself, blocklng
subordlnaLes' developmenL and
lnformauon.
8eslsLanL subordlnaLes.
8ouune, rules-mlnded.
LlmlLed llnes of lnformauon.

LlmlLed advancemenL prospecLs.
SLa
professlonals
1urf proLecuon, lnformauon
conLrol
Conservausm, reslsLance Lo
change.
8ouune Lask seen as perlpheral
Lo 'real' Lasks
8eLreaL lnLo professlonallsm.
Lasy replacemenL by exLernal
experLs.
1op
execuuves
ShorL-Lerm focus.
1op-down communlcauons.

nepousm, reLreaL Lo Lhe
comforL of llke-mlnded
colleagues/lleuLenanLs.
unconLrollable llnes of supply.
LlmlLed/blocked llnes of
communlcauon.
ulmlnlshed llnes of supporL

The uame of Powei
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LxlL, volce and LoyalLy
H.+-3-+B19 67(-6$
"K6B
Clve up and leave Lhe organlzauon
lck up by ball and go

)76D3
SLay and Lry Lo change Lhe sysLem
8aLher ghL Lhan swlLch

%7ICGBI
SLay and conLrlbuLe Lo Lhe sysLem
uon'L rock Lhe boaL
Source: MlnLzberg, P. (1983) 4(>$0 -. 1.+ !0(B.+ ?0:1.-@12(./, Lnglewood Clls,
n!, renuce-Pall.







AlberL
Plrschmann
Ceneral bases of power




rerequlslLes






rlme bases of power






The uame of Powei
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Source: MlnLzberg, P. (1983) 4(>$0 -. 1.+ !0(B.+ ?0:1.-@12(./, Lnglewood Clls,
n!, renuce-Pall.
1. 8esource
2. 1echnlcal sklll
3. 8ody of knowledge
MusL be essenual
MusL be concenLraLed
MusL be non-
subsuLuLable
4. lormal power
3. 8eclproclLy
Crganlzauon power
comprlses reclprocal and
dependency relauons
The uame of Powei anu
Politics: Coalitions
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LxLernal Coalluons

1. Cwners

2. AssoclaLes

3. Lmployee assoclauons

4. ubllc

lnLernal Coalluons

6. 1op/Ceneral managemenL

7. CperaLors

8. Llne managers

9. 1echnosLrucLure analysLs

10. SupporL sLa

11. Crganlzauon ldeology
3.
ulrecLors
Source: MlnLzberg, P. (1983) 4(>$0 -. 1.+ !0(B.+ ?0:1.-@12(./, Lnglewood Clls,
n!, renuce-Pall.
Bases of Social Powei
lrench, !. 8. . and 8aven, 8. P. (1939) '1he bases of soclal power', ln CarLwrlghL,
u. (ed) 8&B+-$/ -. 8(6-19 4(>$0, Ann Arbor, Mlchlgan: lnsuLuLe for Soclal
8esearch, unlverslLy of Mlchlgan ress, 130-167.
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1?L/8?IGJK 8ASlS/KL!;4MK
8eward power - ercepuon
!'-9-&5 &( 0$>10+ 4-$6$N>(0) 01&$
Coerclve power - ercepuon
!'-9-&5 &( =B.-/7 O-/,-//19
LeglumaLe power - ercepuon
JB9&B019 319B$/ ;-9-&105
8eferenL power - ldenucauon
<$$9-.:/ (* (.$.$// F-==-$/D:1.:/
LxperL power - ercepuon
K%=$02/$D).(>9$+:$ M1>5$0/
Typology of Powei anu
Influence
Normative
Influence
Informational
Influence
Legitimate Power
Reward Power
Coercive Power
Informational
Power
Referent Power
Expert Power
Source: ueZoorL, l. 1. and Lord, A. 1. (1994) 'An lnvesugauon of pressure eecLs on
audlLors' [udgemenLs', P$713-(B019 G$/$1067 -. !66(B.2.: (6) SupplemenL, 1-30.
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lrancls 8acon
Knowleuge is Powei
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nam eL lpsa
sclenua poLesLas
esL
Powei as oiganisational
'piopeity'
Dependency Creation

Financial Resources

Centrality of Activities

Non-substitutability

Uncertainty reduction
Organisational Power
Source: Buchanan, D. A. and Huczynski, A. J. (2010) Organizational Behaviour,
Harlow, Pearson Education, p.699.
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Powei Enhancement
anu Challenge
&=LC:69CJ7: A7<3=

SLrucLure
ollcles and rules
8ecrulLmenL and Lralnlng
8ewards and punlshmenLs
8udgeLs
Machlnery and Lechnology
/2CGG3:L3 B7 A7<3=
lndlvldual
LxlL
SaboLage
Mallclous compllance
Collecuve
volce
Collecuve bargalnlng
lndusLrlal acuon
Source: Pellrlegel, u. and Slocum, !. W.
(1978 ;1.1:$,$.&Q J(.2.:$.65
!==0(167$/, 8eadlng, MA, Addlson-
Wesley.
Powei anu Peisonality
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$37AG3 D8GB8=CGGI CDM86=3 B2=33
BIA39 7; :33F






ln any lndlvldual Lhe sLrengLh of
Lhese needs vary.
need for power .4(>
need for amllauon .!R
need for achlevemenL .!67
Source: McClelland, u. (1961) #7$ !67-$3-.:
8(6-$&5, rlnceLon, n!, van nosLrand 8helngold.
%7D89 7; D7:B=7G








lnLernals: conLrolled by
self, pollucal ln naLure,
less lnuenced by
oLhers.
LxLernals: belleve Lhelr
llves and faLe ls
conLrolled by oLhers,
less pollucal
Source: 8ouer, !. (1966)
'Cenerallzed expecLauons for
lnLernal versus exLernal conLrol of
relnforcemenL', 4/567(9(:-619
;(.(:01=7/A 80 (609), 1-28.
Powei anu Peisonality
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1he rlnce ls a lesson ln sLaLecra, lL oers
advlce on how a ruler should besL preserve
hls power, conducL warfare and malnLaln
hls repuLauon.







Machlavelllan characLerlsucs
referred Lo be feared raLher Lhan llked
Manlpulauon of oLhers
use of decelL ln relauonshlps
Lngage ln uneLhlcal behavlour
8elleve LhaL any end [usues Lhe means







nlccolo
Machlavelll
Source: Machlavelll, n. (2004) #7$ 40-.6$, London, CollecLor's Llbrary.
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