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Theft detection and smart metering practices and expectations in the Netherlands
P. Kadurek, Student member, IEEE, J. Blom, J. F. G. Cobben, W. L. Kling, Member, IEEE1
The problem of illegal electricity abstraction is of interest to the DNOs. The users often violate the law by electricity tampering attempts. In some countries only part of the electricity generated is billed, inter alia in India 55% of generated electricity is billed (and only part of the payment reaches the supplier). However, the illegal use of electricity takes place also in European countries. One of the drives for the roll-out of automated meter reading (AMR) infrastructure for the Italian electricity utility (ENEL) was the very endeavor to minimize the non-technical losses (electricity tampering) in their distribution network. The reduction of electricity tampering has helped to justify large investments in AMR and currently Italy is a leading country with high penetration of AMR [1], [2]. The tampering attempts have a variety of forms; they usually take place on meter alone, at a cutout, at meter terminals or on meters cables. The illegal use is also a serious problem in the Netherlands. The estimated losses due to illegal use represents about 1200 GWh/year and DNOs predict average one electricity tampering attempt at half of the medium to low voltage (MV/LV) substations. Theoretically, the detection of illegal use of electricity should be easily feasible. However, due to the heavy workload on the human resources and large amount of branches in the distribution network, the current methodologies generally focus more on indirect theft detection. Moreover, some of these methodologies are not easy applicable for all customers [3], [4], [5], [6]. The automated detection of the electricity tampering should be an important factor in deployment of the future distribution networks and in the standardization of SM infrastructure. Therefore, a novel technique is proposed and its experimental results are discussed in the paper. The structure of the paper is as follows: the issue of electricity tampering as an economical problem is addresses in section II. The current practices and experiences with theft detection are presented in section III and the proposed methodology using SM is described in section IV. The requirements on SM and the future distribution stations are highlighted in section V. II. ELECTRICITY TAMPERING IN THE NETHERLANDS The illegal abstraction or use of electricity is a serious problem in several countries. The DNOs in the Netherlands are aware of the losses caused by illegal abstraction of electricity and carry out techniques for suppressing and

AbstractThis paper provides insight into the illegal use or abstraction of electricity in the Netherlands. The importance and the economic aspects of theft detection are presented and the current practices and experiences are discussed. The paper also proposes a novel methodology for automated detection of illegal utilization of electricity in the future distribution networks equipped with smart metering infrastructure. The necessary data requirements for smart meters and distribution substations are defined, in order to unlock this feature in distribution network. The paper also proposes the measures, which should be undertaken by the smart metering standards. Index TermsSmart electricity theft detection. metering, distribution networks,

I. INTRODUCTION

ELECTRICITY is vital for our everyday life and a backbone for the industry. Therefore, the concept of the future networks (smart grids) aims to increase the reliability, quality and security of supply for the future. In order to do so, this will also require more information about the operation and the state of the distribution networks. One of the key challenges in the future distribution networks will be the increasing penetration of distributed generation (DG) connected at customers premises and the shift from the traditional electricity generation concept with dominating large central power plants and unidirectional power flows to more complex power delivery. The operational information will be crucial for the functionality of the future distribution networks and for the distribution network operators (DNO). One of the information sources is going to be the smart metering (SM) infrastructure. Among others, the smart meters should enhance the customers awareness about electricity. The concept is also going to bring more information to the DNOs. This enables the possibility for the grid operator to analyze the power flows and to detect possible theft of electricity.

Petr Kadurek is a PhD candidate in the Electrical Energy Systems (EES) group of the Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, (corresponding author, phone: 0031 40 247 37 12; e-mail: p.kadurek@tue.nl). J. Blom is currently working at Alliander, one of the Dutch distribution network operators (e-mail:jos.blom@alliander.com). J. F. G. Cobben is currently working at Alliander, one of the Dutch distribution network operators and as a part-time assistant professor at the EES group of the Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, (e-mail: j.f.g.cobben@tue.nl). W. L. Kling is currently a full time professor and the chairman of the EES group of the Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands, (e-mail: w.l.kling@tue.nl).

Fig. 1. Estimated sources of grid loss in the Netherlands as a percentage of total loss (source: Alliander).

detecting the tampering attempts. The electricity theft in the Netherlands is commonly subject to an organized crime activity, mostly connected with cultivation of illegal drugs. The perpetrators are more sophisticated, organized and better skilled in the deployment of different camouflaging techniques which make the detection more complicated. The illegally cultivated plants are sometimes placed in portable containers to enable rapid change of location when required and the location is changed at least ones per year on average. In addition the amount of electricity drawn from the main is significantly higher in comparison to other tampering attempts. Therefore, the electricity tampering should be considered as a general challenge not only for the network operators [7]. Electricity theft creates an additional burden for the DNO which is directly related to the costs. After the ownership unbundling of distribution, transmission and production companies in the Dutch electricity sector, the distribution companies were legally separated. The DNO cannot be a part of the holding or own a share of production or supply company. Therefore, the network losses have to be estimated as a fraction of distributed energy and the DNO purchase the energy for a market price from independent production companies [8]. The network losses are estimated in the settlement process between the electricity traders and DNO. There are three components of the total grid losses in the Netherlands, as depicted in Fig.1. A. Technical loss The technical losses are presented by the design of the distribution network, the length of the distribution cables, the transformers and by loading. The whole distribution network is designed to minimize the technical losses, but achieve high reliability, safety operation, quality of supply and economical assessment are also taken into account. The technical losses (around 63% of the total losses) represent the most significant part of the total losses, see Fig.1. B. Administration losses Administration losses are given by unknown connections (but not due to the illegal use of electricity) or missing meters

Fig. 2. The monetary value of electricity theft in the Netherlands, the cost related to the DNOs (grid loss and sales) and government are represented separately, source Alliander.

in the network. The administration errors represent about 14% of total losses, see Fig.1. C. Illegal use of electricity The unmetered electricity usage on purpose or violation of metered data represents about 23% of total losses for the DNOs, see Fig.1. The illegal use phenomena in the Netherlands represents the additional losses of about 1 200 GWh/year. D. The value of electricity tampering The value of illegal use of electricity is not only in the terms of used energy but also in the increase of grid losses for the DNOs. In accordance with the Dutch law, the DNOs are allowed to produce only the energy to cover the losses in their networks. However, none of the DNOs participate in energy production. Therefore, DNOs purchase the energy on the electricity market, which represent direct monetary losses. The illegally abstracted electricity plays a monetary role for the DNOs in terms of sales reduction and reduced retail margin. The illegally abstracted electricity also represents monetary losses for the government in terms of uncollected tax. The loss for the DNOs in the Netherlands is estimated to be about M114/year. In addition, the loss for the government in the tax collection represents about M120/year, see Fig.2. The estimated total cost of illegal use of electricity in the Netherlands is about M255/year. This cost is in the end recovered from all customers in terms of the distribution tariffs for electricity. In 95% of detected cases involve the illegally abstracted electricity used for illegal marihuana production. The sales from this activity in the Netherlands are estimated to be about M3000/year [7]. III. CURRENT PRACTICES OF THEFT DETECTION The DNOs have made attempts to achieve the most economical operation of distribution network and distribution of energy. Therefore, electricity tampering represents additional losses and a burden for them. Nevertheless, the monetary value of tampering creates a stimulus for detection

3 of illegal use in the distribution network. In order to decrease the amount of tampering, the DNO investigates the possibilities of active search and detection of tampering attempts. However, the current practices are usually based on measurements taken in suspected locations, subsequent analysis and evaluation of the data measured. So far, there is no automated detection system for electricity tampering in the Netherlands. A. The current detection methodology Firstly, the suspected area is initially investigated (inter alia based on notice of suspected activities). Afterwards, the power quality measurements take place in order to detect the location of illegal abstraction. One of the typical phenomena observed in the distribution networks with occurring theft is the switching of large loads in periodic intervals. This pattern is typical for consumption profiles of the growing farms. The example of periodical switching of a growing farm, measured on one of the feeders on the LV side of the MV/LV substation is depicted in Fig.3. B. Limitations The detection of illegal use of electricity alone is technically easily feasible, but requires dispatch of workers (at least twice per detection period) to the selected location, for the collection of measured data. Afterwards, the data have to be evaluated and the suspected point of connection (POC) has to be localized. These operations require DNOs human resources. Moreover, the DNOs are have some difficulties in precising the locations of illegally abstraction, especially in highly populated areas, with a high aggregation of customers. Due to the large amount of branches in the distribution network, the current practices can focus only on small share of the whole network and the theft detection take place only in limited numbers of locations. Currently, one of the Dutch DNOs is investigating and deploying more sophisticated methods for electricity tampering detection and localization, but unfortunately not much information is available. IV. SMART METERS FOR TAMPERING DETECTION Many European countries are moving through the transition from traditional electricity metering infrastructure towards the SM infrastructure. In the Netherlands, the standard (NTA 8130) for SM defines the basic functionality and the responsible parties for SM infrastructure. However, proper standardization of SM or definition on functionality level is still not fully developed [9]. In order to manage and efficiently integrate new services in the future grid, suitable communication should be established. The SM should be placed in each household, directly establishing the communication channel between the customer and the other party, inter alia DNO. Therefore, the SM infrastructure should be of common interest for DNOs, suppliers, distribution system operator and designers of customers appliances. There should be common endeavor in finding the suitable SM metering platform, to unlock all possible potentials offered by SM and thus increase the social benefits from the investment into the SM infrastructure (inert alia demand response facilitated via SM) [10], [11]. The proposed method for advanced detection of illegal use of electricity will be only one of the feasible features which should be not omitted during planning and standardization of future SM infrastructure. A. Investigated network configuration In order to simulate the real conditions in the future grid, the typical LV grid configuration in the Netherlands has been taken as a base for the model simulation (cable networks with MV/LV transformer and 240 customers connected). Moreover, in regard to the expected developments in the future grid, the significant amount of DG dispatched to the LV grid (inter alia photovoltaic generators, simulating highly varying power generation in the future grid) have been included. Another aspect of the future grid may be the implementation of so called intelligent substations, which should enhance the flexibility of the MV and LV network. In comparison to traditional substations, the intelligent substation will aggregate controllable energy storage, load management system and will be equipped with MV/LV transformer with automatic tap changer, the so called Smart transformer. Thus, the voltage profile in the LV grid will be not directly linked to the loading and voltage profile in the MV grid. Moreover, the intelligent MV/LV substation will be enhanced with a monitoring system, enabling easy detection of theft in the network [12]. The SM infrastructure will take place in the future distribution network. The proposed methodology for electricity tampering detection uses the information obtained from the SM, in order to automate the detection and localization process. The smart metering infrastructure and intelligent substation are considered in the topology and are essential for the proposed electricity theft detection. Simplified topology of data acquisition and handling in the future distribution grid (LV), with the focus on electricity theft detection and localization is depicted in Fig. 4.

Fig. 3. Currents on the one feeder at the LV side of a MV/LV substation, where the illegal abstraction of electricity takes place (typical pattern is the large load switching in periodic intervals), source: Alliander.

Fig. 4. Possible data flows in future distribution network (LV part) with regard to the theft detection. The topology includes: smart meters (SM), distributed generation (DG) and intelligent substation equipped with smart transformer.

B. Detection of illegal use of electricity The proposed detection method of electricity tampering attempts consists of two phases; the first phase focuses on the occurrence criteria of illegal use within the LV network and the second phase on localization of the POC where the illegal use is expected. In the first phase, the evaluation of illegal use of electricity should be based on estimated and measured energy balance at the MV/LV substation. If the local energy balance does not match with the measured one (also including estimated losses), the localization sequence should be initiated, to verify the illegal use occurrence within the investigated network (see upper part of Fig. 5). The measuring points and the data processing in the first phase will be located in the substation alone, therefore the occurrence criteria should run in every time frame, without increasing data or computing requirements on the communication infrastructure. The energy consumption and production data should be already available via SM. However, the localization sequence alone applied for the defined time frame should also reconsider the occurrence of illegal detection one more time. Thus, if the accuracy level of the detection is not met (inter alia due to an error in some measurements), the localization should be extended to focus on another time frame [13]. C. Tampering localisation procedure If the power balances at the substation level results positive to the occurrence of electricity theft, the consequent sequence with localization of the illegal use will be automatically launched. The illegal abstraction of electricity usually takes place only near the meter or within the property. Frequently, the illegal abstraction is well camouflaged and controlled by relays, in order to make it complicated to detect the fraud. The violation attempts are mostly focused on the cables before the meter, or on the meters terminals [5]. The localization of the tampering attempt is based on presumptions, that the measured currents through SMs are not burdened by the tampering attempts (estimating the energy

Fig. 5. The program flow diagram of theft detection technique shows the occurrence criteria and subsequent localization principle.

measured and billed). However, voltages at each POC have to be considered as local values reflecting also the power drawn from the branch near the POC. The power drawn from the branches near the meter (illegal use) will influence the voltage at the meter. Therefore, the voltages are burdened by the illegal use of electricity and power flows next to the SMs contribution to the resulting voltage on the meter alone. Moreover, each tampering attempt will be reflected on the whole voltage profile for all POCs connected. Therefore, in the final procedure, the so called Theft localization, see Fig. 5, the measured and estimated voltages used for localization are compared. D. The influence of measurement errors With respect to the accuracy of the measurements, the data from SMs are expected to be affected by the measurement errors. The measured values should have standard distribution of measured errors and therefore, the time frame extension will attenuate these errors. Nevertheless, during the simulations, the method has shown its robustness even for randomly generated errors, resulting in the fact, that the exact position (or positions) of tampering attempts will be found successfully. The accuracy of the localization depends mainly on the measurement accuracy of SMs and on the amount of

5 data requirements from intelligent substation and information from SM). The second phase already focuses on localization of the illegal use (defines additional information requirements from SM). A. Data requirements from intelligent substation The data acquisition in the intelligent substation should focus on the data necessary for the first phase of detection (power/energy balance). In this phase, the key measurements and data handling will be located in the substation alone, diminishing the requirements on data transmission and infrastructure. Only the power/energy consumption and generation will be gathered from SM (inter alia the currently available information from SM will be used, the Dutch NTA 8130 already requires the measurements of electricity supplied to and from the customer to be communicated to the central access server). Therefore, the measurements in smart substation should include the following: voltages, currents, power factors and powers measurements, which should be measured on the LV side of the substation separately for each feeder and phase [13]. B. Data requirements from SM In the future network, the SM infrastructure will be roll-out and SMs will take place at each POC. Therefore, the SMs will be of use for the cost-effective localization of illegal abstraction of electricity. The standard functionality should include the measurements of voltages, currents, active power and reactive power for each phase. The whole localization procedure will be significantly speeded up, if the measurements from SMs are available on request within a shorter time frame. A very important issue for effective theft detection is the time delay between the measurements taken at different locations. All measurements in the LV grid should be synchronous (inter alia measured immediately after the request). Another important issue will be the best possible management (automatically) of data from the SM. The SM in the whole LV network should be automatically enlisted, localized and synchronized to the respective MV/LV substation, the LV-feeder and the correct phase. The correct order of measured phase values should be easily guaranteed by sending phase information from the data aggregator (located in the MV/LV substation) to all meters via power line carrier (PLC). This might be done automatically and in a simplified form during the implementation procedure to diminish the installation errors. The automated system for the theft detection will also automatically detect the administration errors in the electricity reading and will further contribute to the reduction of nontechnical losses for the network operator, see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. VI. CONCLUSIONS V. DATA REQUIREMENTS The data acquisition for effective theft detection is divided in two phases; the first phase will consider the estimation of energy balance within the grid as a main issue (defines the The transition toward future smart networks should enhance the insight into the distribution networks, increase their reliability, flexibility and reduce the transmission and distribution losses. Smart metering can also support the

Fig. 6. Theft localization: an example with two tampering attempts (red bars represent the thieves localized on one feeder).

time frames used for localization. If the difference does not clearly provide an accurate location, the estimation will be extended for another time frame or the time frames will be aggregated until the localization sequence gives a satisfying confidence level. E. Localization results The experimental localization of illegal use of electricity was tested on a model of typical LV grid in the Netherlands, considering 4 outgoing feeders with totally 240 customers (POCs) connected. The customers are connected with one or three phase connection. In order to take into account all possible variations (inter alia the illegal use may be as one, two or three phase connection), the basic consideration focuses already on one phase thefts detection. The method has shown its robustness in the environment of the future network (inter alia with a high penetration of DG) and substation equipped with smart transformer continuously adjusting the bus bar voltage. Also, a more complicated situation will be the presence of more locations with theft on one feeder. In the model, the illegal use of electricity takes place on the same feeder and same phase. Moreover, it has been simulated that one of the tampering attempts takes place only for the half of the time frames. The experimental results are shown in Fig. 6, where the two tampering attempts on one feeder have been detected (red columns at 8th and 17th POC). Both of tampering attempts have exiguous illegal use of 1kW (one phase). Even though, the first tampering attempt (see Fig. 6. Theft Location 1) takes place only for the half of the time frame therefore increasing the difficulties in estimation. The results show, that the successfully detection of illegal use of electricity is feasible and the robustness of the method in tampering localization is satisfying even for tampering attempts occurring in shorter intervals than the whole selected period.

6 customers involvement and increase their awareness about electricity and is going to be one of the key factors of the future networks. The main contribution of the article is the novel methodology proposal for automated detection of illegal use of electricity in the low voltage distribution networks. Smart meters are essential for this method. In addition, the method could be enhanced with advanced signal processing which can improve the electricity theft detection process in networks without fully deployed smart meters. The illegal abstraction of electric energy is a wide-spread practice among European countries. This problem becomes even more serious as larger numbers of dishonest customers are tempted to illegally reduce their electricity bill. The privacy issues could be also one of the reasons for adverse positions for smart metering implementation from the customers. The illegal use or abstraction of electric energy creates a measurable and significant economical loss. The victims are not only the network operators, but also the retailers and governments which suffer from significantly reduced tax collection for unbilled electricity. The theft detection should be considered as one of the important aspects of future distribution networks, as well. In order to unlock this feature, the required measurements among the distribution network and proposed distributed data processing is presented in the article. This important feature should not be omitted in the concept of smart grid and in the standardization process for smart metering ACKNOWLEDGMENT This research has been performed within the framework of the IOP-EMVT research program Intelligent Power Systems that is supported financially by SenterNovem. SenterNovem is an agency of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs. REFERENCES
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