Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S.

372

(Copy citation)

Supreme Court of the United States March 9, 1943, Argued ; May 24, 1943, Decided No. 553
Reporter: 319 U.S. 372 | 63 S. Ct. 1077 | 87 L. Ed. 1458 | 1943 U.S. LEXIS 1118 GALLOWAY v. UNITED STATES Prior History: CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT. CERTIORARI, 317 U.S. 622, to review the affirmance of a judgment upon a verdict directed for the Government in a suit to recover benefits under a contract of war risk insurance. Disposition: 130 F.2d 467, affirmed.

Core Terms

insanity, jury trial, army, directed verdict, permanent disability, common law, disability, new trial, deprive, soldier, demurrer to evidence, five year, depression, disease, symptom, weigh, enlistment, permanent, speculate, peculiar, directed verdict motion, insufficient evidence, reasonable inference, deposition, breakdown, vagueness, demurrer, guaranty, military, withhold

Case Summary

Procedural Posture Seeking benefits for total and permanent disability under a contract of war risk insurance, petitioner appealed a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the trial court's decision to grant a directed verdict in favor of respondent United States.

Overview Petitioner sued respondent to recover benefits for total and permanent disability by reason of insanity. Specifically, he claimed that the strain of active military service abroad brought on an immediate change, which was the beginning of a mental breakdown that eventually became a total and permanent disability. The trial court held that petitioner's evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a verdict in his favor; it therefore granted respondent's motion for a directed verdict. The lower court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and concluded that petitioner had not met his burden of showing continuous disability. In particular, it pointed to the fact that he had not submitted evidence relating to a five-year period. Concluding that the evidence of insanity was merely speculative, the Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

Outcome

The Court affirmed, holding that the trial court was entitled to grant respondent's motion for a directed verdict in light of petitioner's failure to show his whereabouts, activities, or condition for five years of the time period that he claimed to have suffered continuing and total disability.

Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 63 S. Ct. 1077, 87 L. Ed. 1458, 1943 U.S. LEXIS 1118 (U.S. 1943)

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Trial by Jury in Civil Actions

HN1

U.S. Const. amend. VII preserves the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the great

mass of procedural forms and details. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Trial by Jury in Civil Actions

HN2

U.S. Const. amend. VII requires that the jury be allowed to make reasonable inferences from facts proven in evidence

having a reasonable tendency to sustain them. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Trial by Jury in Civil Actions Evidence > ... > Testimony > Expert Witnesses > General Overview

HN3

U.S. Const. amend. VII permits expert opinion to have the force of fact when based on facts which sustain it. Shepardize -

Narrow by this Headnote

Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Trial by Jury in Civil Actions

HN4

U.S. Const. amend. VII does not require that experts or the jury be permitted to make inferences from the withholding of

crucial facts, favorable in their effects to the party who has the evidence of them in his peculiar knowledge and possession, but elects to keep it so. Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Lawyers' Edition Display

Hide

Headnotes
jury question -- total and permanent disability -- war risk insurance -- insanity -- commencement before lapse. --

The evidence, in an action commenced on June 15, 1938 for benefits for total and permanent disability under a policy of war risk insurance which had lapsed on May 31, 1919, on the theory that the insured's mental condition resulting from his military service had become such prior to the latter date that he could then be said to have been totally and permanently disabled, finally resulting in his complete insanity, is insufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury, therefore justifying the direction of a verdict for the government, where the evidence for the plaintiff consists merely of testimony of fellow soldiers as to two "crazy" acts by him

while on active duty in France, the testimony of an old friend that he was a "wreck" and "evidently unbalanced" when he came back from France, the testimony of a chaplain tending to show that a soldier having the same name as the plaintiff, whom he saw in 1920, was insane, the testimony of naval officers as to the irregular conduct of the plaintiff while in the Navy in 1920 and 1921, and expert testimony, given by a physician not a specialist but who gave "special attention" to mental diseases, and who first examined the plaintiff in 1938, that the plaintiff's insanity was the result of his military service and that he had been insane since 1918; there being nothing whatever in the plaintiff's evidence covering the period from 1925 to 1930, and practically nothing for the period from 1922 to 1925, a total of eight years apparently uneventful except for the marriage of the plaintiff; and no reason being adduced, either by the plaintiff's counsel or by his wife, acting as his guardian, why such a long gap is left wholly unexplained.

EVIDENCE, 905 > sufficiency -- continued insanity. --

The drawing of an inference of continued insanity during an unexplained period of 8 years will not be permitted, especially where evidence is available covering such period but the parties elect not to produce it.

EVIDENCE, 874 > weight and sufficiency -- expert testimony -- inference -- continued insanity. --

Expert opinion as to continued insanity will not be allowed the inference that the insanity continued during a period of 8 years which are wholly unexplained in the evidence, especially where evidence is available covering such period but the parties elect not to produce it.

JURY, 6 > trial by jury -- Seventh Amendment -- claims against United States. --

A jury trial "in suits at common law," given by the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution, is inapplicable in suits to enforce claims against the United States, except as it has been adopted by Congress in legislation governing such claims.

JURY, 22 > trial by jury -- Seventh Amendment -- direction of verdict. --

The guaranty of a jury trial in suits at common law, given by the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution, does not deprive the Federal courts of the power in a jury case to direct a verdict upon the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence.

JURY, 6 > trial by jury -- Seventh Amendment -- necessity of following old procedure. --

The guaranty of a jury trial in suits at common law, given by the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and the provision of that Amendment that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court than according to the "rules of the common law," does not bind the Federal courts to the exact procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the common law in 1791, nor confine them, in their regulation of the jury's role on questions of fact, to the two methods then generally used, i. e., the demurrer to the evidence and the motion for a new trial.

JURY, 6 > trial by jury -- Seventh Amendment -- purpose. --

The Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution, under which a jury trial is preserved in suits at common law, was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trials in only its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and details, which, even in 1791, varied widely among common-law jurisdictions.

JURY, 22 > trial by jury -- Seventh Amendment -- taking case from jury -- different standards of proof. --

The difference in the standards of proof required for submission of a case to the jury, being sometimes "substantial evidence," in other cases "some evidence" or "any evidence," does not amount to a departure from the rules of the common law, required to be followed on a demurrer to the evidence or on a motion for a directed verdict, under the provision of theSeventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court than according to the "rules of the common law."

TRIAL, 41 > sufficiency of evidence to go to jury -- standard of proof. --

LEdHN[9]

[9]

The standard of proof required for the submission of evidence to a jury is essentially one to be worked out in particular situations and for particular types of cases, the essential requirement being that mere speculation be not allowed to do duty for probative facts, after making due allowance for all reasonably possible inferences favoring the party whose case is attacked.

JURY, 6 > TRIAL, 48 > trial by jury -- Seventh Amendment -- drawing inferences. --

LEdHN[10]

[10]

The guaranty of a jury trial, given by the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution, requires that the jury be allowed to make reasonable inferences from facts proven in evidence having a reasonable tendency to sustain them, although it does not require the jury to be permitted to make inferences from the withholding of crucial facts, favorable in their effects to the party who has the evidence of them in his peculiar knowledge and possession, but who elects to keep it so.

EVIDENCE, 640 > JURY, 6 > trial by jury -- Seventh Amendment -- expert opinion -- inferences. --

LEdHN[11]

[11]

The guaranty of a jury trial, given by the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution, permits expert opinion to have the force of fact when based on facts which sustain it, but it does not require that experts be permitted to make inferences from the withholding of crucial facts, favorable in their effect to the party who has the evidence of them in his peculiar knowledge and possession but who elects to keep it so.

WAR RISK INSURANCE, 6 > total and permanent disability. --

LEdHN[12]

[12]

The words "total and permanent," in the provisions of the War Risk Insurance Act (40 Stat at L 398, 409) relating to total and permanent disability, mean something more than incipient or occasional disability.