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The Rise of Al-Qaeda And Its Ultimate Defeat

Brian Hubbs

Ten years after the events of September 11 !""1 al-Qaeda remains a formidable or#ani$ation despite a %on%erted effort by international se%urity for%es to destroy the terrorist #roup& Al-Qaeda's ability to su%%essfully adapt a%%ordin# to its threat environment is due to its understandin# of intelli#en%e #atherin# methods and its (no)led#e of strate#i% do%trine s%ien%e and en#ineerin#& *hile al-Qaeda remains a sophisti%ated or#ani$ation )ith the %apa%ity to undermine international se%urity and intelli#en%e servi%es al-Qaeda has several vulnerabilities that are open to e+ploitation leadin# to the disinte#ration of the or#ani$ation&

Al Qaeda's %urrent strate#i% do%trine and stru%tural or#ani$ation is mainly predi%ated on the tea%hin#s of Abu ,usab Al-Suri& Al-Suri a Syrian native from the %ity of Aleppo had been an a%tive member in the Syrian ,uslim Brotherhood's %ombat van#uard and a parti%ipant in the 1-.! Hama uprisin# )hi%h aimed to overthro) the Syrian re#ime&1 The subse/uent #overnment response led to the deaths of appro+imately 0. """ of Hama's inhabitants for%in# members of the ,uslim Brotherhood in%ludin# Al-Suri to flee into nei#hborin# %ountries for 1 Al-Shishani, Murad. "Abu Musab al-Suri and the Third Generation of Salafi-Jihadists." Aug 15,
2005.htt !""###.$a%esto#n.org"single"&no'(a(he)1*t+'ttne#s,5-tt'ne#s,5.)5/0 1a((essed A ril 20, 20112.

prote%tion&! In 1-.. al-Suri 1oined al-Qaeda be%omin# a %entral 1ihadi instru%tor runnin# terrorist trainin# %amps in Af#hanistan&0 2rom 1--" to !""3 al-Suri %omposed a treatise on Islamists movements entitled The Global Islamic Resistance Call )hi%h outlines the failures of previous Islamist or#ani$ations at a%hievin# their intended #oals providin# ne) solutions aimed at resolvin# past failures& 3

The Global Islamic Resistance Call e+plains that the past failures of Islamist movements resulted from an outdated or#ani$ational stru%ture of the Islamist %ells and a poorly %rafted strate#i% model& Traditionally the or#ani$ational stru%ture of the 1ihadists %ells )ere desi#ned in a hi#hly %entrali$ed pyramid-li(e fashion )ith the main po)er and leadership %onsolidated at the head of the or#ani$ation filterin# do)n the ran(s to a lar#er base of 4foot-soldiers&5 Al-Suri noted that the problem )ith or#ani$in# Islamist %ells in a hi#hly %entrali$ed manner is that ea%h %ell is easily %ompromised&6 Upon the %apture of a sin#le member the #overnment's se%urity for%es are able to e+tra%t the ne%essary information in order to undermine the entire %ell7 subse/uently the %ompromisin# of a sin#le %ell in%reased the potential of underminin# the entire or#ani$ation& 8 2urthermore the strate#i% model ! Me3ers, Ji%. "1452 S3ria Massa(re Still 6aunts Mideast." 7eb 2,
2011.htt !""###.ne#s%a+.(o%"8e#sfront"s3ria-ha%a-%assa(re-eg3 t"2011"02"02"id"95/055 1a((essed A ril 20, 20112.

0 2air%hild Brian& 9!"1":& 4An Anal3sis of :ns ire Maga;ine and the :nternational Strateg3 of the SalafiJihadi Mo<e%ent =<ideo>, htt !""###.intre idgrou tutorials.(o%", 1a((essed A ril 20, 20102.

3 Ibid& 6 Ibid& 8 Al-?aeda, "The Jihadi @+ erien(e! The A en 7ronts and the :ndi<idual :nitiati<e ." Inspire Fall 2010,
2010, 10-21.

utili$ed by previous Islamist or#ani$ations failed to provide a sin#le %oherent and universal messa#e intended to unite all ,uslims& Al-Suri stated that ,uslims not dire%tly involved in the 1ihadist or#ani$ations )ere una)are of the reasonin# behind the 1ihadists' use of terrorist ta%ti%s a#ainst #overnment tar#ets alienatin# lar#e numbers of potential ,uslim re%ruits& The poor %ommuni%ation and la%( of a unifyin# messa#e dire%ted at ,uslims emanated from the small si$e of the %ells )hi%h limited membership and the se%re%y under )hi%h the %ells operated& Additionally the leadin# members of the 1ihadist %ells did not have the appropriate amount of time ne%essary in order to edu%ate individuals )ithin their or#ani$ations on military te%hni/ues and ideolo#y due to the %onstant pressure applied to the #roups by #overnment se%urity for%es&; <astly al-Suri e+plained that previous Islamist or#ani$ations )ere too fo%used on lo%al #rievan%es )ithin their o)n %ountries )hi%h limited their ability to %ooperate )ith other Islamist #roups and to amass #reater stren#th and po)er in order to a%hieve bi##er #oals&

In order to over%ome past failures al-Suri developed several %ounter strate#ies& AlSuri transformed al-Qaeda from a hi#hly %entrali$ed or#ani$ation into a predominantly de%entrali$ed Islamist #roup& <ar#e 1ihadi trainin# %amps that e+isted prior to the )ar in Af#hanistan )ere abandoned in favor of %ondu%tin# military trainin# and Islamist edu%ation in small se%ret lo%ations and houses throu#hout the Islami% )orld&. Hidden amon#st the #eneral population and in multiple lo%ations ; Ibid& . Ibid&

the individuals )or(in# for al-Qaeda )ere no lon#er easy tar#ets for *estern military stri(es and lo%al #overnment harassment& The de%entrali$ed nature of alQaeda further provides the or#ani$ation prote%tion a#ainst the possibility of be%omin# %ompromised due to the %apture or death of a sin#le member& =aptured or (illed individuals in a de%entrali$ed al-Qaeda have not lessened the intelle%tual and strate#i% depth of the or#ani$ation or have lead to mass arrests of si#nifi%ant numbers of its members due to information obtained throu#h interro#ations& *hile the de%entrali$ation of al-Qaeda is sometimes vie)ed as a 4leaderless resistan%e 5 individuals a%tin# on behalf of al-Qaeda either in small #roups or alone rely on alQaeda's %entral leadership to provide ideolo#i%al indo%trination and operational theories in addition to re%eivin# re%ommended tar#ets of interest as )ell as #uidan%e on %hoosin# tar#ets of interest and parti%ipation in spe%ifi% areas of operation&

In addition to reformin# al-Qaeda into a de%entrali$ed or#ani$ation al-Suri's strate#i% model advo%ates a%hievin# al-Qaeda's #oals by en#a#in# its enemies )ith individual terrorist atta%(s and in 4>pen 2ront5 1ihad )hi%h is primarily %arried out )ith small unit #uerilla assaults&- The individual atta%(s are strate#i%ally desi#ned to e+haust the enemy's se%urity for%e's resour%es and e%onomi% institutions )hile the >pen 2ront 1ihad fi#htin# for %ontrol of territory is ne%essary in order to establish an Islami% state& Al-Suri defines the >pen 2ront as any pla%e )ith open porous borders7 ineffe%tive or )ea( #overnments7 easy a%%ess to )eapons and - Al-Qaeda Inspire 2all !"1"&

natural resour%es to sustain the fi#htin# for%es7 mountainous and %overed terrain for %on%ealment and areas )ith tribal so%ieties that are easy to manipulate& Al-Suri learned the importan%e of buyin# the loyalty of tribes after the start of >peration ?ndurin# 2reedom& Tribes )hose loyalty had been bou#ht by the Ameri%an military turned on the Taliban and al-Qaeda detainin# many of their members in%ludin# alSuri turnin# over their %aptures to Ameri%an and @a(istani for%es7 al-Suri mana#ed to es%ape ho)ever& Al Qaeda's %urrent >pen 2ronts in%ludeA Bemen Ira/ Somalia Af#hanistan and Corthern Afri%a&

Al-Suri further advan%ed the %on%ept of an inte#rated and unifyin# messa#e aimed at rallyin# )orld)ide ,uslim support& Al-Suri e+plains that ,uslims have been %orrupted into believin# that the borders of ,iddle ?astern states are le#al %onstru%ts that are to be re%o#ni$ed and obeyed& In order to repro#ram ,uslims into a%%eptin# the falsehood of the modern-day nation-state al-Suri advo%ated appealin# to ,uslims to parti%ipate in 1ihad as a part of the ummah or the #lobal ,uslim %ommunity )ith the intended #oal of establishin# a )orld)ide =aliphate& 1" The ummah re%o#ni$es no traditional politi%al borders repla%in# the %on%ept of international borders )ith a vie) that the )orld is sharply divided bet)een the for%es of #ood and evil or the land of )ar 9dar al-harb: and the land of Islam 9dar alIslam:& Unli(e previous Islamist movements )hi%h )ere primarily fo%used on lo%al #rievan%es and had little unifyin# effe%t bet)een other Islamist #roups al-Qaeda's appeal to all ,uslims as part of a sin#le #lobal %ommunity provides a unifyin# for%e 1" Ibid&

for li(e-minded ,uslims re#ardless of )here the individuals reside& The %on%ept of appealin# to ,uslims in terms of the ummah is strate#i%ally important for several reasons& By e+tendin# al-Qaeda's membership to all ,uslims re#ardless of their #eo#raphi% lo%ation al-Qaeda's rea%h e+tends #lobally #ivin# al-Qaeda the ability to stri(e tar#ets of opportunity any)here on ?arth& ,oreover by framin# al-Qaeda's 1ihad as a stru##le that is in%umbent upon all ,uslims as a duty to the ummah alQaeda's members be%ome more %ommitted to the or#ani$ation by feelin# a truer sense of belon#in#&

After e+plorin# the reasons asso%iated )ith the past failures of Islamist movements and developin# ne) methods of operation to over%ome their defi%ien%ies al-Qaeda %ontinues to prove its %apa%ity to adapt to %ounterterrorism ta%ti%s implemented by lo%al and international se%urity for%es& Al-Qaeda's ability to %ontinuously undermine international efforts aimed at destroyin# the or#ani$ation is due to its effe%tive use of propa#anda te%hni/ues and %omputer based te%hnolo#y7 (no)led#e of en#ineerin# and ele%troni%s7 a s%holarly understandin# of #uerilla and urban )arfare as )ell as a broad (no)led#e of *estern intelli#en%e %olle%tive methods&

In order to e+%han#e sensitive information se%urely over the Internet al-Qaeda developed its o)n en%ryption soft)are 4Asrar Dse%retE al-,u1ahideen !&"&5 Asrar !&" )hen utili$ed a%%ordin# to the #uidelines pres%ribed by al-Qaeda is %onsidered virtually infallible a%%ordin# to a respe%ted e+pert )ithin the %yber-se%urity field& 11 11 7air(hild, -rian. 120112. BAl ?aedaCs Dno#ledge of A%eri(an :n<estigati<e Era(ti(esF
=<ideo>, htt !""###.intre idgrou tutorials.(o%", 1a((essed A ril 20, 20102.

Asrar !&" and the instru%tions developed by al-Qaeda for its se%ure operation illustrate al-Qaeda's level of sophisti%ation and understandin# of U&S& and *estern intelli#en%e #atherin# te%hni/ues& ,oreover al-Qaeda's (no)led#e of intelli#en%e #atherin# methods is further demonstrated in the do%ument The Myth of Delusion: Exposing the American Intelligence, by al-Qaeda operative ,uhammad al-Ha(aymah& The ,yth of Delusion %overs a )ide ran#e of intelli#en%e #atherin# te%hni/ues to in%lude the pro%ess of trainin# =IA offi%ers7 the =IA's methods for re%ruitin# spies and testin# their loyalty7 espiona#e te%hni/ues and the %olle%tion methods for various types of si#nals intelli#en%e&1!

*hile ea%h se%tion )ithin The ,yth of Delusion %ontains detailed information that al-Qaeda is able to employ a#ainst U&S& intelli#en%e %olle%tion efforts the se%tions outlinin# the re%ruitment of spies and the U&S& methods of #atherin# si#nals intelli#en%e are the most alarmin# #iven the shield of se%re%y and the potential infiltration %apabilities that al-Qaeda is able to a%hieve by havin# a%%ess to su%h (no)led#e& 2or e+ample al-Qaeda's (no)led#e of =IA re%ruitment te%hni/ues )hi%h in%lude the understandin# that =IA a#ents see( potential spies )ho have dire%t a%%ess to (ey sour%es of information and people )ithin the tar#et #roup led to the deaths of seven =IA a#ents in Fordan )ho )ere falsely lured into trustin# alQaeda double-a#ent Humam al-Bala)i& 10 Bala)i pretended to be a 4turned5 Islamist 1! Al-6aGa3%ah, Muha%%ad Dhalil. "The M3th of .elusion." 200H.htt !""(ounterterroris%blog.org"siteresour(es"i%ages"M3th-of-.elusion. df 1a((essed A ril 20, 20112.

10 7inn, Eeter, Iarri(G, Job3 . ":n Afghanistan atta(G, J:A fell <i(ti% to series of %is(al(ulations about
infor%ant." Jan 1H, 2010.htt !""###.#ashington ost.(o%"# d3n"(ontent"arti(le"2010"01"15"AK201001150/0H5'2.ht%l 1a((essed A ril 20, 20112.

and had a%%ess to the top leadership in al-Qaeda )hi%h Bala)i %onfirmed by providin# %ertain pie%es of verifiable intelli#en%e to the =IA solidifyin# a loyalty bet)een Bala)i and the =IA a#ents& After #ainin# the trust of the =IA Bala)i entered =ombat >utpost =hapman in Ghost Af#hanistan (illin# several a#ents in a sui%ide bombin# operation&

Al-Qaeda's understandin# of U&S& si#nals intelli#en%e %olle%tive methods allo)s alQaeda to operate in relative se%re%y providin# al-Qaeda )ith the means to e+ploit su%h methods for their o)n #ain& Al-Qaeda's relian%e on the Internet for the dissemination of propa#anda information sharin# and #atherin# ma(es the #roup vulnerable to intelli#en%e a#en%ies that monitor and tra%( their online a%tivity& In addition to developin# robust en%ryption soft)are for the transmission of sensitive data over the Internet al-Qaeda members are instru%ted to stay a)ay from e+tremist )ebsites for information and en%oura#ed to visit 1ihadi monitorin# sites su%h as SIT? Intelli#en%e and ,?,RI in order to obtain the latest ne)s and information re#ardin# the mu1ahedeen&13 ,oreover al-Qaeda members are instru%ted to restri%t %onversations %on%ernin# operational matters over a mobile phone to a minimum and to use only %oded lan#ua#e durin# su%h dis%ussions& Additionally al-Qaeda is a)are that %ellphones have the potential to be remotely turned into listenin# devi%es by *estern intelli#en%e a#en%ies even if the %ellphone is turned off& 16 The battery in 13 Al-?aeda, "The Jihadi @+ erien(e! The A en 7ronts and the :ndi<idual :nitiati<e ." Inspire Fall 2010,
2010, 5H.

16 Al-6aGa3%ah, BThe M3th of .elusion.F

the %ellphone is still able to provide po)er to the mi%rophone )hi%h dete%ts and transmits the voi%es and %onversations of individuals nearby&

Al-Qaeda further understands the pro%ess of voi%e mappin# and printin# )hi%h tar#et (ey )ords and the lan#ua#e spo(en 9to in%lude %ollo/uial dialo#ues: by the individuals bein# monitored in order to #enerate a di#iti$ed map of their voi%e and #ather information re#ardin# their a%tivities&18 The voi%e re%ordin#s are a%/uired from spee%hes videos )iretaps or other audio sour%es )hi%h are fed into a %omputer that s%ans satellite transmitted %ommuni%ations 9the medium sour%e of all modern land line phones: and %ellular %ommuni%ations for a mat%h of the mapped voi%e7 (ey )ords su%h as Fihad The @rophet ,uhammad Bin <aden al-Qaeda or any )ord or phrase %ommonly asso%iated )ith Islamist verna%ular are mar(ed for analysis by intelli#en%e personnel&

The detailed (no)led#e of U&S& and *estern intelli#en%e %olle%tin# methods alQaeda has as%ertained is not only used by al-Qaeda as a means to develop ta%ti%s desi#ned to maintain operational se%re%y the information is a subse/uent sour%e for %ondu%tin# %ounter-espiona#e operations& Gno)in# that individuals are bein# tra%(ed and monitored throu#h te%hni/ues su%h as material bran%hin# 9)ire taps: and se%ret bran%hin# 9spa%e satellite si#nals: allo)s al-Qaeda members to #enerate false alarms )ith the intention of e+pendin# and e+haustin# the resour%es of the intelli#en%e a#en%ies& A member of al-Qaeda has the ability to #enerate a mobile 18 Ibid&

phone or landline phone %onversation re#ardin# a false terrorist operation in a %ertain part of the )orld )hi%h is subse/uently pi%(ed up by the international intelli#en%e %ommunity fo%usin# resour%es on )hat analysts believe to be an eminent atta%( )hi%h leads to an inability of the intelli#en%e a#en%ies to dete%t the a%tual terrorist atta%(& ,oreover the intelli#en%e a#en%ies do not o)n a monopoly on the soft)are that allo)s %ell phones to be remotely turned into listenin# devises& The soft)are is ine+pensive and readily available on the Internet& 1; Al-Qaeda members in possession of the a%tivation soft)are have the %apa%ity to listen-in on the %onversations of the intelli#en%e a#ents )ho %arry or have %ell phones in their vi%inity& The use of easily obtainable and ine+pensive soft)are to %ompromise the intelli#en%e #atherin# %apabilities of the U&S& military o%%urred in the )ars in Ira/ and Af#hanistan as insur#ents utili$ed a %omputer pro#ram S(yHrab to inter%ept live video foota#e from Unmanned Aerial Iehi%les 9UAI's: %ondu%tin# battlefield surveillan%e&1.

Airport se%urity is another dimension )ithin al-Qaeda's ta%ti%al %apa%ity )hi%h demonstrates their ability to adapt to in%reasin# %ounterterrorism measures& AlQaeda operatives Umar 2arou( the =hristmas Day 9or under)ear: Bomber and Abdul Ghayr the attempted U@S bomber had been able to smu##le e+plosive material onboard airplanes after defeatin# airport se%urity pro%edures& 1- In the 1; 7le+iS 3, "7irst S 3 Ehone Soft#are Te(hnolog3 8o# A<ailable for iEhone."
htt !""###.(ell hones 3soft#are.org"s 3- hone-i hone-(ell- hone-s 3" 1a((essed A ril 20, 20112.

1. Iall Street Journal, ":nsurgents 6a(G L.S. .rones." Se 10,


2004.htt !""online.#s$.(o%"arti(le"S-12H1022/0554045011.ht%l 1a((essed A ril 20, 20112.

1- Al-?aeda, "A eration 6e%orrhage ." Inspire November 2010, 8o<e%ber, 2010, 19-15.

terrorist in%ident involvin# Umar 2arou( Al-Qaeda rendered the airport's metal dete%tors useless by %onstru%tin# the e+plosive's detonators )ith non-metalli% parts7 the ma%hines and do#s employed to dete%t the presen%e of e+plosive materials )ere th)arted as the material had been thorou#hly sealed and the pa%(a#in# thorou#hly %leaned in order to remove dete%table tra%e amounts of the e+plosive& !" *hile Umar 2arou( smu##led the e+plosive material in his under)ear therefore bypassin# the Jray ma%hine the bomb onboard the U@S airplane had been sub1e%ted to an J-ray s%anner& The airport's J-ray ma%hines )ere %ompromised by %onstru%tin# the e+plosive devise )ithin a %omputer printer usin# sophisti%ated en#ineerin# and s%ientifi% (no)led#e in order to fool the J-ray ma%hine into believin# that the materials )ithin the printer )ere harmless&!1 Additionally the U@S bomb's level of sophisti%ation is further demonstrated by the fa%t that intelli#en%e e+perts in the UG )ere unable to dete%t the e+plosives embedded )ithin the printers despite bein# sear%hed t)i%e& Al-Qaeda spent K3 !"" on the U@S bomb operation and despite preventin# the e+plosives from detonatin# *estern #overnments have %ontemplated spendin# millions of dollars in establishin# ne) se%urity measures in order to prevent similar future atta%(s&!!

*hile al-Qaeda is an or#ani$ation %omprised of talented and intelli#ent members )ith the %apa%ity to undermine the se%urity apparatus of the U&S& and other *estern !" Ibid& !1 Ibid& !! Ibid&

states al-Qaeda is not )ithout its A%hilles heel& In order to defeat al-Qaeda international se%urity servi%es should employ a multi-pron#ed approa%h )hi%h tar#ets the #roup throu#h a disinformation and %ounter-propa#anda %ampai#n7 e+ploits their %laims to reli#ious le#itima%y and hi#hli#hts 1ihadists that have left the or#ani$ation over internal disputes&

Al-Qaeda's propensity for (illin# fello) ,uslims for the purpose of insti#atin# %onfli%t bet)een different se%ts of Islam or by en#a#in# in ta(fir the desi#nation of %ertain ,uslims as apostates )ho do not pra%ti%e Islam in the manner pres%ribed by al-Qaeda has alienated the support of a lar#e se%tion of the ,uslim population& !0 Bet)een !""3 and !"". al-Qaeda infli%ted .6 per%ent of its total %asualties a#ainst other ,uslims )ith 16 per%ent bein# *estern %asualties& !3 In the do%ument 4The @o)er of Truth5 al-Qaeda's Ayman al-La)ahiri denies that Al-Qaeda has (illed inno%ent %ivilians and deliberately tar#ets ,uslims statin# that ,uslims and %ivilians (illed durin# operations are unintentional a%%idents& !6 Ironi%ally in La)ahiri's memoirs 4Gni#hts Under the Banner of the @rophet 5 La)ahiri re%ounts the setba%( 1ihadists en%ountered follo)in# the failed assassination attempt of !0 6oro#it;, Juliana . ".e(lining Su ort for bin Maden and Sui(ide -o%bing." Se t 10,
2004.htt !"" e#resear(h.org" ubs"1995"de(lining-%usli%-su A ril 20, 20112. ort-for-bin-laden-sui(ide-bo%bing 1a((essed

!3 Iashington Ti%es, "Al ?aeda hurts Musli%s %ost." Januar3 1/,


2010.htt !""###.#ashingtonti%es.(o%"ne#s"2010"$an"1/"al-Naeda-hurts-%usli%s-%ost" 1a((essed A ril 20, 20112.

!6 Jo%bating Terroris% Jenter, "T6@ EAI@K A7 TKLT6! O ?L@ST:A8S 7AK APMA8 AMQAIA6:K:." A ril 21, 2005.htt !""###.(t(.us%a.edu"Nuestions"JTJ-Eo#er'of'Truth'/-21-2005. df 1a((essed A ril 20, 2011

?#yptian @rime ,inister Atef Sid/i )hi%h mista(enly (illed a little #irl turnin# publi% support a#ainst the 1ihadists& In a different in%ident al-Qaeda fa%ed heavy %riti%ism after the dis%overy that al-Qaeda members had for%ed mentally defi%ient )omen to en#a#e in a sui%ide operation pla%in# the bombs on their bodies )ithout their (no)led#e and detonatin# the bombs remotely& !8 The e+istin# %riti%ism levied a#ainst al-Qaeda by fello) ,uslims and the resultin# de%line in support for the or#ani$ation hi#hli#hts a %entral point of vulnerability )ithin al-Qaeda needin# to be e+ploited& *henever al-Qaeda (ills other ,uslims a %on%erted effort to hi#hli#ht the in%ident should be underta(en by the international intelli#en%e %ommunity to in%lude the )ide dissemination of the in%ident to the #lobal media and the Internet& 2urthermore plausible e+a##erations of the in%ident in spe%ifi% %ases should be underta(en in order to amplify the ne#ative rea%tions to)ard al-Qaeda7 #iven the hi#hly %onspiratorial nature of the ,iddle ?ast and its media 4lea(in#5 fa(ed do%uments or ne)s stories )ith %onspiratorial desi#ns re#ardin# ,uslims (illed by al-Qaeda provides intelli#en%e a#ents )ith a %ontrolled and sustainable method of underminin# the or#ani$ation&

In addition to a %ampai#n aimed at publi%ly shamin# al-Qaeda's ta%ti% of (illin# other ,uslims as )ell as the distribution of %onspiratorial propa#anda usin# the )ords and the reli#ious %redentials of influential ,uslim %leri%s and former 1ihadists is another useful method of attemptin# to dismantlin# the Islamist #roup& In ,ar%h !8 J88, "L.S.! C.e%oni(C %ilitants sent #o%en to bo%b %arGets in :raN." 7eb 1,
2005.htt !""arti(les.(nn.(o%"2005-02-01"#orld"iraN.%ain'1'al-gha;l- o ular- et-%arGets-iraNis& 's)EM!IAKM. 1a((essed A ril 20, 20112.

!"1" fifteen Islami% s%holars #athered in ,ardin Tur(ey to rea%h a %onsensus on the interpretation of a fat)a issued by a 10th =entury Islami% s%holar Ibn Taymiyya and used by >sama Bin <aden to 1ustify al-Qaeda's 1ihad& !; The fat)a issued by Ibn Tymiyya states that ,uslims have the ri#ht to en#a#e in 1ihad a#ainst ,uslim #overnments that are insuffi%iently Islami% and divides the )orld into the abode of Islam and the abode of )ar& The s%holars presidin# over the %onferen%e de%lared Ibn Taymiyya's fat)a to be a produ%t of its time a response to the ,on#ol invasion in the ,iddle ?ast7 affirmin# that international treaties and the emer#en%e of %ivil states are the prote%tors of individuals' ri#hts ma(in# the entire )orld a pla%e of pea%eful %oe+isten%e bet)een all reli#ions #roups and fa%tions& !. The s%holars further reaffirmed that only spe%ially edu%ated and /ualified Islami% %leri%s or muftis are %apable of issuin# fat)as and that only heads of state have the ri#ht to authori$e %ombative 1ihad )hi%h undermines al-Qaeda's reli#ious le#itima%y&

2ormer al-Qaeda member and founder Imam al Sharif %ondemned al-Qaeda's ideolo#y and ta%ti%s in%ludin# the terrorist atta%(s of September 11 th !""1 in a boo( Rationali ation of !iha", that Sharif published )hile in prison& The boo( %riti%i$es alQaeda's leadership as immoral layin# its heaviest %riti%ism upon al-La)ahiri )hi%h prompted La)ahiri to issue a !""-pa#e rebuttal& ,oreover %onfli%ts bet)een alQaeda and other Islamist #roups have the potential to )ea(en al-Qaeda further& AlQaeda and the ,uslim Brotherhood are ideolo#i%ally opposed and %ompete for !; 2air%hild Brian& 9!"1":& 4An Anal3sis of :ns ire Maga;ine and the :nternational Strateg3 of the SalafiJihadi Mo<e%ent =<ideo>, htt !""###.intre idgrou tutorials.(o%", 1a((essed A ril 20, 20102.

!. Ibid&

re%ruits and presti#e )ithin the Islamist movement& Al-La)ahiri %riti%i$es the ,uslim Brotherhood for en#a#in# in politi%s intera%tin# )ith Arab #overnments and parti%ipatin# in the demo%rati% pro%ess& In the do%ument The #o$er of Truth La)ahiri %ondemns the ,uslim Brotherhood spe%ifi%ally the ,uslim Brotherhood's leadin# ,uslim s%holar Busuf Qarada)i&!- The animosity bet)een the t)o #roups and individuals is open for e+ploitation& @ubli%i$in# %riti%al statements or )ritin#s by either of the #roups or leaders aimed at one another has the potential to lead to a violent rivalry )hi%h has the potential to e+pend the resour%es of the #roups and #enerate rifts that result in mass defe%tion of their follo)ers& The use of false fla# operations to undermine both the ,uslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda is a potentially benefi%ial ta%ti% #iven proper plannin# and e+e%ution&

Al-Qaeda is a sophisti%ated or#ani$ation that %ontinues to survive due to its %apa%ity to evolve and adapt to the ta%ti%s employed a#ainst it by international se%urity and intelli#en%e for%es& Al-Qaeda be#an as a se%retive or#ani$ation )ith sele%t members a hierar%hi%al leadership stru%ture and narro) #oals to embra%in# a #lobal ideolo#y that )a#es 1ihad on 8 of ; %ontinents en%oura#es and instru%ts its follo)ers to %ondu%t lone )olf atta%(s and publishes a /uarterly ele%troni% ma#a$ine detailin# its a%%omplishments #rievan%es and modes of indo%trination& In addition to adaptin# its or#ani$ational stru%ture to in%rease its operational se%urity al-Qaeda's (no)led#e of en#ineerin# s%ien%e and intelli#en%e %olle%tin# methods )or( in that %apa%ity as )ell& The (no)led#e al-Qaeda has as%ertained in the s%ien%es and !- Jo%bating Terroris% Jenter, "T6@ EAI@K A7 TKLT6.F

intelli#en%e allo)ed an al-Qaeda operative to infiltrate a =IA espiona#e net)or( in Af#hanistan as a double a#ent and provided the means for t)o e+plosive devi%es to end up on airplanes despite K3" billion dollars in se%urity up#rades to airports follo)in# September 11th !""10"& Despite al-Qaeda's level of sophisti%ation several means of e+ploitin# al-Qaeda's )ea(nesses e+ist& Al-Qaeda's propensity for (illin# fello) ,uslims and %ivilians has diminished support for their #roup throu#hout the ,iddle ?ast and South Asia7 furthermore al-Qaeda's reli#ious %redibility has been undermined by Islami% s%holars7 their animosity for other Islamist movements su%h as the ,uslim Brotherhood is breedin# dis%ontent and 1ihadists unhappy )ith alQaeda's ta%ti%s are openly e+pressin# their %ondemnation of the #roup& Al-Qaeda's )ea(nesses %an be e+ploited throu#h an intense disinformation and %ounterpropa#anda %ampai#n& By publi%ly hi#hli#htin# and sho)%asin# the ,uslims and %ivilians (illed by al-Qaeda invitin# former 1ihadists and Islami% s%holars opposed to al-Qaeda to spea( out publi%ly a#ainst al-Qaeda's reli#ious %redentials and by fa%ilitatin# and amplifyin# the animosity bet)een other Islamist #roups and aQaeda al-Qaeda's disinte#ration is inevitable&

0" MS8-J Mone3, "The 6igh Jost of Air ort Se(urit3." Jan 12,
2010.htt !""arti(les.%one3(entral.%sn.(o%":n<esting"@+tra"the-high-(ost-of-air ort-se(urit3.as + 1a((essed A ril 20, 20112.

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