Chapter 77: REASONING

FOR PLOTINUS ANY FORM of thinking-not

merely reasoning-signifies a deficiencyor weak-
ness. In the scale of intellectual beings man oc-
cupies the lowest rank because he reasons. But
even the pure intelligences, which know intui-
tively, rank below the One, because even the
simplest act of thought involves some duality of
subj ect and obj ect. The One, according to Plo-
tinus, transcends thought even as it transcends
being. "The super-essential," he says, "is the
supra-cogitative." The One "has no need for in-
tellection, being always self..sufficing."
Other writers do not go as far as this. Chris-
tian theologians do, however, contrast the hu-
man mind with the angelic intellect and the
mind of God by saying that the latter
pra-rational, i.e., above the need to reason. They
do not, likePlotinus, hold that the transcendent
being transcends thought itself-certainly not
insofar as they discuss the divine ideas. But the
kind of thinking which is not an instantaneous
act of vision or an imnlediate intuition involves
one denies that reasoning is thinking,nor.does
anyone deny that there are forms of thinking
which are not reasoning, since conceiving and
judging are generally regarded as kinds of think-
ing ormodes of thought. Reasoning is mel."ely
that mode of thought which is a process--the
going step by step from one statement to an-
other.
The problem which arises from thecompari-
son of reasoning with other modes of thought
turns on the question whether the mind cart
learn anything without having to think ration"
ally. Can certain things be known by insight or
instinct, by induction or intuition, rather than
by reasoning ?Arethere truths which cannot be
known by reasoning at all, but only by some
other mode of thought? These questions inturn
raise the problem of the priority or superiority
of such modes of thought as do not consist in
reasoning. The theory discussed in the chapter
on INDUCTIoN-that induction is prior to rea-
soning because intuitive generalization from ex-
perience must provide the starting-points for
demonstration-indicates one solution of the
problem. Our present concern, however, goes
beyond the issue concerning induction and de-
duction to the most general contrast between
the intuitive and the rational.
CHAPTER. 77: iREASONING
CHAPTER ON IDEA (and perhaps also the
tero
n
DEFINITION) deals with that content
of the mind--whether a percept or a con-
an image or an abstraction-which is ver"
in words or phrases and ofwhich
mis the logical representative. The chap-
JUDGMENT (and perhaps also the chapter
INCIPLE) deals with the mentalattorcon-
hat requires a sentence for its expression
logically represented by the proposition.
we are concerned with mental activity
involves not only two or more ideas, but
o or more judgments so connected that
ind passes from one to another.
ether the logical structure that Aristotle
"syllogism" represents all forms of the
1activity called reasoning, is one of the
'traditional issues. Hume suggests, for ex"
,that animals reason without making use
ogisms; and Descartes and Locke seem to
hat the highest forms of thinking, such as
in mathen1.atics or philosophy, cannot be
ed to syllogisms, except perhaps by a tour
ceo
face a different sort of problem when we
re reasoning with other acts of the mind
conception (or the having of ideas) and
l.1.dgment (or the connecting of ideas with
nather in the manner which mediaeval
scall "composition and division"). No
then Socrates is mortal,"even thoughit
a statement that may be necessary to the
ty of the reasoning, namely, "All men are
1."
s, the familiar grammatical distinctions
d {or phrase), sentence, and paragraph
seem to provide a perfect parallel for the
tions which the logicians make between
propositions, and syllogisms. But this
is clear. Just as a single word or phrase,
an" or "rational animal," can never ex"
proposition, but only a term, so a sim"
tence expresses only a proposition, and
a syllogism; and a compound sentence,
ade up of a number of sentences, expresses
gismonly if its verbal construction some'"
indicates. that they form a sequence in
one follows from the others, or if they
lated in such a way that the truth oEone is
by the truth of the others.
sometimes in terms of antecedent
quent, as by Hobbes. The premises
statements which precede the
cause the conclusion, it is said. We
Socrates is mortal because we kn
" ow
rates IS a man and that all men .. ro- ..
premises are the cause in the sense
why the conclusion may
The conclusion is also said
p:emises, or the premises are said to
yzeld the conclusion. If the
then the truth of the conclusion can
?r proved. The relationship between
Ises and the conclusion seems to be
whether the act of reasol1ing is
or "inference." The distinction
tween these two words seems to
rection. We speak of "proving" a
when we look toward the premises
dation for its truth; we speak of
conclusion when we look toward
thing which can be drawn from the
The words "if" and "then"
soning is a motion of the mind
ment to another. Sometimes the
immediate, as when we argue that
mortal, then some mortals are
two propositions are involved
simply the converse of the
deny that inlmediate inference is
ence (because a proposition and its
merely two ways of stating the same
implicitly or explicitly, re2LSOJrUDl2"
Involves at least three statements. In
single statement like "Socrates is a
even a pair of statements connected
rather than "if-then"-e"g., "Socrates
and Socrates is mortal"-does not
is commonly recognized as realSOl11ng-.
of reasoning does, however,
thIs sequence of statements, "If
546
INTRODUCTION
IN the tradition of western thought, certain
verbal expressions have become shorthand
for the fundamental ideas l"n the cll". .. ".. f " . . SCUSSlon 0
they happen to be so often repeated.
ThIs may due to the influence of the text-
books used In the schools, which copy one from
another and down an easily recited jargon
from generatIon to generation. In most cases
peat books themselves are
onglnal t?oug? they have usuallysuf-
or distortion when
theIr InsIghts are thus transmitted
"Featherless biped" and animal"
for example, stock phrases to illustrate the
Idea a definition consists of genus and dif-
ferentla---'the class teo which man l"n th " , IS In-
stance, belongs and the attribute which d'.cL -
" h" . . Iller
entlates 1m from other members of this class.
Statements such as "the whole is greater than
th ". "1 e part or twop us two equals four" simi-
larly serve to represent axioms or at least state-
ments which, whether or not they can be
proved, are usually accepted as true without
proof. In the field of reasoning, the familiar ver-
ballandmark is "All men ar.e mo.rtal S . t " , acra e$lS
a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal." Even
those who have heard of syllogisms, or
who throughly Innocent of the age-old con-
about the theory of the syllogism and
the dIfference between deduction and "d -
. . In liC
Hon, might offer this sequence of staternents if
pressed to what reasoning is, they tried
answer by giving an example.
The e.xample, shopworn though it is and far
from beIng the perfect paradig-nl d . ... . , oes convey
certain InSights lnto the nature f " " ... . 0 reasoning
whIch are generally undisputed.
!he word "therefore," which connects the
thIrd statement with the first tWA . "fi
. . ,. v, slgnl es a
relationshIp which IS sometl'mes d 'b d " , escn e III
terms of cause and effect, as by Aristotle, and
549
THE FOREGOING considerations indicate how di...
verse theories of the role of reasoning arise from
diverse theories of the nature and kinds of
knowledge in animals, men, angels, and God.
According as various distinctions are made be'"
tween human knowledge and opinion, or be-
tween the way in which different objects can be
known, or between speculative and practical
interests, so, too, different formulations are
given of the nature of reasoning.
Aristotle's distinction, for example, between
scientific and dialectical or rhetorical reasoning
turns upon his understanding of the difference
between the objects of certain knowledge and
the objects of probable opinion. This difference,
he says, makes it "equally foolish to accept prob...
able reasoning from a mathematician and to
demand from a rhetorician scientifie proofs."
" causes.
Not only men, but also animals reason in this
way. But Hume thinks "it is impossible that
this inference of the animal can be founded on
any process of argulnent or reasoning by which
he concludes that like events must follow like
objects.... The experimental reasoning itself,
which we possess in common with beasts, and
on which the whole conduct of life depends, is
nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical
po"ver, that acts in us unknown to ourselves;
and in its chief operations is not directed by
any such relations or comparisons of ideas, as
are the proper objects of our intellectual facul..
ties."
that reasoning extends kno\vledge, even though
it may not be the method of initial discovery.
A somewhat contrary view seems to be taken
by Hume. If the objects under consideration
are matters of fact rather than the relations be'"
t,veen our o\vn ideas, the kind of reasoning
which goes from premises to conclusion avails
not at all. The beliefs ,ve hold about such mat...
ters, according to Hume, result from mental
operations which are "a species of natural in-
stinct ... which no reasoning or process of
thought is able either to produce or to prevent. "
What he calls "experilnental reasoning" or "rea-
soning concerning matters of fact" is founded,
he says, "on a species of Analogy, which leads
us to expect from any cause the same events
which we have observed to result from similar
CHAPTER 77: REASONING
this view of reasoning, nothing can be
l1.demonstratively or by proof unless some
sican be known intuitively, i.e., without
nee or proof. Locke and Descartes seem
ee with Aquinas and Aristotle that dem'"
tion depends upon indemonstrable truths,
er these are called axioms, immediate
sitions, first principles, or self-evident max-
oeke and Descartes, on the one hand,
the point that in reasoning the logical
etion between premises and conclusion is
delnonstrable and must be intuitively
ed. Aquinas and Aristotle, on the other,
observe that the truth of the con'"
implicitly contained in the truth of
so that the advance which reason'"
to make from the known to the un'"
in coming to know actually
potentially known. Neverthe-
unlike Descartes and Locke, maintain
any other: and this," says Locke, "we
intuitive knowledge.... When the
cannot so bring its ideas together, as by
immediate comparison ... to perceive
agreement or disagreement, it is fain by
tervention of other ideas .. to discover
reement or disagreement \vhich it search...
d this is that \vhich we call reasoning."
in like Descartes, Locke asks,. '.'What need
re of reason?" It is necessary, he thinks,
for the enlargement of our knowledge
egulating our assent ... Sense andintui...
teach but very little of the way. l'he great-
rt of our knowledge depends upon deduc'"
and intermediate ideas; and in those cases
we are fain to substitute assent instead of
ledge, and take propositions for true with...
eing certain they are so, we have need to
tit, examine, and compare the grounds of
probability." But though reasoning en-
our knowledge beyond what can be
n intuitively, reasoning produces certain
ledge, according to Locke, only if "every
in reasoning ... has intuitive certainty.
o make anything a demonstration, it is
ary to perceive the immediate agreement
eintervening ideas, whereby the agree-
or disagreement of the two ideas under
ination (whereof the one is always the
and the other the last, in the account) is
DESCARTES USES THE yvord
the way in which \ve knt,v certain
diately and with certitude. I-Ie
"intuition from deduction by the
the conception of the latter ther
Q
tain movement or succession, in;o
former there does not... The
are given by intuition alone, \vhile,
trary, the remote conclusions
only by deduction.
Descartes says he understands to be
sa:y inference from other facts that
wah certainty, " supplements
never at any stage of the re(JlSOJrllniO"
dependent of intuition.
Not only does intuition, ac(:orIQlnIO'
supply the first principles
premIses of reasoning, but it also
step in the process. He asks us to
consequence: 2 and 2 amount to
and I. Now we need to see '1",."".11-.9._1--
that 2 and 2 make 4, and that
make 4, but further that the third
statements is a necessary conclusion
two."
in addi tion to knowing the ......... .- _.
tUItion, the drawing of a COJrlCJ.USJlOn
is, as Descartes says, itself
tion"-if the act of inference rests
tion that the conclusion follows
the premises-in what way does
reasoning supplement intui tion ?
tion, Descartes replies that
a clear vision of each step in
It cannot comprehend in one 1nt"l1,t-,nn
involved in a long
lng. Only by taking the steps one
can \ve "kno\v that the last link in a
is connected "vith the first, even
not take in by means of one and the
vision all the intermediate links on
connection depends, but only rernernbc
we have taken them successively
Like Descartes, Locke
and reasoning, or intuitive and
knowledge. "Sometimes the mind
agreement or disagreement of two
diately by themselves, without
548 THE GREAT IDEA.S
the Inind in a process of thought, somehow akl'rl ffi harmor deny a single rlrr.... f""'\r..".4-_-
to c ange or motion; and this, the theologians '
h ld
ment IS to rest, or acquisition to
. 0 ,cannot take place in any immutable be-
Ing-the angels or God.
The human intellect, according to Aquinas
gradually comes to kno\v the truth "by a kind
o! movement intellectual opera-
tion ... by advanCIng from one thing known to
But if from the knowledge of a kno\vn
pnnclple [:nen] were straight\vay to perceive as
known all ItS consequent conclusions, then there
be no place for discursiveness in the hu-
man 111tellect. Such is the condition of the an-
gels, because in the truths which they kno\v
naturally, they at once behold all things what...
soever that can be known in them."
That,' says Aquinas, is why the angels "are
called Intellectual beings" and men "are called
rational. " to reasoning on the part of
men betrays the feebleness of their intellectual
light. For if they possessed the fullness of in...
tellectual light, like the angels, then in the
first grasping of principles they would at once
all that they implied, by perceiv...
Ing at once whatever could be reasoned out of
them."
The type of intuitive apprehension which
th.e angels enjoy is even more perfectly exem-
plIfied in God's knowledge. "In the divine
kno,:ledge," according to Aquinas, "there is
no d,iscursiveness" -no succession, neither the
turning from one thought to another, nor the
from to the unknown by
from pnnciples to conclusion. The di-
Vine kn?wledge, Aquinas explains, is a single all...
act of vision, in which "God sees all
things In one thing alone, which is Himself,"
and "sees all things together and not
Apart from participation in the
VISIon of God through supernatural light all
thinking on the natural plane is
Slve. conception and the judgment
are dIscurSIve In the sense that the one involves
?n act of abstraction or definition and the other
Involves a or division of concepts.
it IS always discursive, human
,is not, to Aquinas, always
In the motton of reasoning, that is, the
tranSItion from one thought to another"R -
sonin "h '" . ea
. "g, , e says, IS compared to understand-
ing -t.e., the act of judgment by \vhieh we
THE GREAT IDEAS
551
THE DISCUSSION OF reasoning in relation. to
knowledge, opinion, and action, or in relation
to different disciplines and sciences, usually
supposes a theory of the form which reasonIng
takes regardless of its subject matter or use.
This fact is most explicitly attested by the or"
der of three great books concerned with
ing. Aristotle's Posterior Analytics th.e
theory of demonstration' in the SC1ences. H1s
Topics deals with the theory of probable
ment or reasoning in the sphere of optnlon.
CHAPTER 77: REASONING
h
tical reasoning of the sort which ends in a
throug
h an enumeration of all t e k h f
decision that leads to action, ta es t e armoa
syllogism which has one one par-
ticular premise. The maJor IS a
rule of conduct, the minor premise a
perception of fact. In the Ansto.tle
gives of the practical syllogism, the maJor
premise is the rule that .sweet ought to
be tasted, and the minor prem1se is the percep-
tion that this particular thing is sweet. two
premises lead to the practical concluslon that
this particular thing ought to be tasted. .
Not all practical reasoning, ho\vever, IS c?n-
cerned .with reaching decisions or promptlng
action in particular cases... The rules of conduct
which decisions .and actions apply may
selves be. the products of practical
The process by which genera.! are derived
from even more general pr1nclples-the p.re-
cepts .of law or
to Aquinas, a form of thinking dIffer-
ent froill the theoretic or speculat1ve sort. He
paints out in his Treatise on La"v that we are
able to formulate certain practical rules o?ly by
making particular determinations.
principles, not by drawing de?uctlons from
thenl. "Something may be denved fronl the
natural law in two ways," he writes: "first, as a
conclusion from premises; secondly, by way of
determination of certain generalities.
way is like that by \vhich, in the speculatlve
sciences, demonstrated conclusions are
from the principles; while the second mode 1S
likened to that whereby, in the arts, general
forms are particularized as to details."Of
two ways of thinking in the field of law, It
would appear that it is only. the second type
which is peculiar to thepractlcal as opposed to
the speculative order.
THEORIES of definition also affect
which is assigned to def1nition .. in
. IJobbes for example, regards reason-
lng. , h' h
kind of calculation with names, W lC...
adepends upon the of thetr
S
The operationsof addlt10n and sub-
ng . . h
n when done with words rather
ers are, he thinks, equivalent to conce1V-
the consequence of the names of all the
to the nanle of the. whole; or from ,the
of the whole and one part, to the
other part."It is "nothingbutreckonzng
is, adding and subtracting) of
es of general names agreed upon. . ns-
with the theory that definitions state the
I natures of things, not just the mean"
m . b
f words, holds that a definitlon. n:
ay
e
conclusion of a demonstration g1ving es;"
1nature," as well as' "an indemonstrable
ent of essential nature." In
the definition functions as a pnnciple In
nstration. ... .
ording to William James, reaSOI1.1ng,.
ion, is "a selective activity of the m1nd
serves an individual's interest or purpose.
hinking," he says, "is first, last,
r the sake of my doing.... Reason1ng is
sEor a subjective interest, to attain
ular conclusion, or to gratify some spec1al
sity." I t makes no whether .the
st is practical or the cunos1ty speculauve.
process of reasoning will .be the
h the element which prov1des a solutlon
problem in any emergency will
ason' if the emergency be theoretical, a
s' if it be practical." .
se writers who, like Aristotle and AqUl-
egard the speculative and the practical as
t though related orders of and
seem to think that practical reason-
o\vn syllogistic form. Practical
them are different from theoretic
The conclusion of theoretic
is an assertion that something is either
whereas the conclusion of prac-
tenbCl:atl.on is a judgment that something
or evil, and therefore should either. be
avoided. According to .l\ristotle, prac"
sis, in natural science as well as mathe
consists in going from effects to causes
the method of synthesis goes from caci
effects. the
analysis and synthesis to the difference be
inductive and deductive reasoning. ThiS'
of distinguishing between inductive a
ductive reasoning, in terms of going
effects to causes or from causes to effects
also seem to be related to the dis;i
Aquinas makes between demonstratid
(i.e., reasoning vvhich proves only that
thing exists) and demonstration propt
(i.e., reasoning which proves what S0m
is-its nature or properties). The pro
God exists is, according to Aquinas, ad.
stration quia; it is also a posteriori reaso
reasoning from effect to cause. But he
not call it "inductive." In one. passage a.
he seems to regard induction as thein].
whereby we can come to some knowle
what God is. ' 'From natural things," he
"one does not come by a demonstrati'
reason to know non-natural things, but
induction of reason one may know so
above nature, since the natural bears<a,
resemblance to the supernatura1."
This sense of the word "induction/
ever, is like that in which Aristotle opPJ.
duction to reasoning, not like thatinw
distinguishes between inductive and ded
reasoning according to the order of terflls
inductive and deductive syllogism. I.n!yfi
dinary deductive syllogism, the middl
establishes the connection betweenth
extreme terms (for example, 'being a.
establishes the connection between. 'So
and 'being morta!'). But "the syllogism.
springs out of induction," according't
tode, establishes "a relation between>(!)
treme and the middle by means of the
extreme, e.g., if B is the middle termb
A and C, it consists in proving through
A belongs to B." Starting from C (pa.
cases of long-lived animals, such asmahi
mule), we can argue inductively fr011lxt
that these long-lived animals are bileless,
general connection between B .(being,l;)
and A (being long-lived). Such reaso
valid, Aristode adds, only if we can rrea.
made up of all the particulars; for ind
550
Hume's distinction between a priori and aposte-
riori reasoning-i.e., between reasoning from
principIes and reasoning from experience-de-
pends upon his understanding of what matters
must be submitted to experience and of the
manner in which experience generates belief.
The distinction which Aquinas makes between
demonstrations propter quidand demonstrations
quia-i.e., between proving tvhat something is
from its causes and proving that it is from its
effects-depends upon his understanding of the
difference between essence and existence as ob-
j ects of rational kno\vledge.
To take an example in the opposite vein,
Locke's theory that the same type of demon-
stration is possible in both mathematics and the
moral sciences, seems to rest upon his view that
all knowledge consists in the comparison of
ideas. In contrast to this, other theories, which
hold that the mode of reasoning differs in dif-
ferent disciplines (especially in mathematics and
morals, or in metaphysics and the natural sci-
ences), seem to arise from the contrary view
that, in these different fields ofinquiry, the
jects and conditions of knowledge are different.
Sometimes a distinction in the modes of rea-
soning is based upon the same considerations,
but the distinction itself is expressed by differ-
ent writers in different terms. The role of causes
in reasoning appears to underlie Aquinas' dis-
tinction between a priori and a posteriori reason-
ing, or reasoning from cause to effect as opposed
to reasoning from effect to cause. "Demonstra-
tion can be made in two ways," he writes; "one
is through the cause and is called a priori, and
this is to argue from what is prior absolutely.
The other is through the effect, and is called a
demonstration a posteriori; this is to argue
from what is prior relatively only to us." Des-
cartes appears to make a parallel distinction,
though he makes it in different terms. "The
method of proof is twofold," he says, "one
being analytic, the other synthetic. Analysis
shows the true way by which a thing was
nlethodically discovered, as it were effect from
cause... Synthesis employs an opposite pro-
cedure, one in which the search goes as it were
from effect to cause." For both mathematical
and metaphysical reasoning, Descartes prefers
the analytic to the synthetic method.
According to Newton, the method of analy-
JAMES' ATTEMPT TO state a law of thought or
principle of reasoning which relegates all the
rules of the syllogism to the status of a special
case represents one type of attack on the syllo-
gism. \Vhether, for instance, the sample of rea-
soning ,vhich Descartes asks us to consider-
that if 2 and 2 make 4, and 3 and I 1l1ake 4, then
2 and 2 amount to the san1e as 3 and I --can be
reduced to the syllogistic fonn of subj ect and
predicate, or must be formulated under a more
general principle of "transferred relations," il-
lustrates the basic issue here between subject-
predicate logic and relational or n1athetnatical
logic. Other aspects of that issue are discussed
in the chapters on LOGIC, JUDGMENT, and RE-
LATION.
A.nother type of criticism of the traditional
theory of the syllogislll accepts the syllogism as
the form of all reasoning, but objects, as Kant
does, to what he calls "the mistaken subtilty"
of the classification of syllogisms according to
figures and moods. But Kant does not deny all
distinctions among syllogisms. On the contrary,
he says that syllogisms are "threefold, like all
judgements, differing from each other in the
Iuanner in yvhich they express the relation of
kno\vlcdge in the understanding, nalnely, cate-
552 THE GREAT
Both are preceded by his Prior Analvtics which in the first figure, or as predicate
treats of the syllogism in tern1S of"' its purely subject in both in the second and
formal structure and its various forms. In the respectively. Then according to
later tradition, the distinction between the premises are universal
problems of the Prior and the Posterior Analytics ('All M is P' or 'Some S is M'),
comes to be represented by the separation be- ther affirmative or negative ('All
tween what are called "formal" and "material" 'Some S is not M'), he further
logic. within each figure a number of
The fonnal analysis of reasoning centers on formally correct patterns of I i1IFrf."nr'.o.
the problem of its cogency. Quite apart from For example, in no figure can a
any consideration of the truth of its premises or constructed with two particular or
conclusions, reasoning is true or false according premises. No conclusion can be
as it is valid or invalid on purely logical grounds. t"vo particular statements that
From premises which are in fact false, a conelu- liquids and that some liquids are
sion, which may be either true or false, can.be to life; nor can any conclusion be
truly inferred if the structure of the reasoning the two negative statements that
is formally valid-that is, if the form of the are parallelograms and no rnC)ffiIJ01(js
premises stands ina certain logically prescribed lelograms. In the first figure, the
relation to the form of the conclusion. The logi- can be particular and must be affirma
cal problem, then, is to prescribe the formal re- major can be negative and must
lationships among propositions which permit In this figure the following CUIUOlnat:l
valid inference from certain propositions tooth- premises-"some are not
ers, without regard to the content of the propo'" with
sitions or their truth in fact. or "all prime numbers are
Defining a syllogism as "discourse in which, numbers are squares"-yield no rAr\,.' . " ........
certain things being stated, something other the second figure, one premise
than what is stated follows of necessity from tive. Here it is impossible to draw a
their being so," Aristotle says, "I call that a per- elusion from two affirn1ative pre:m1ses.
fect syllogism which needs nothing other than follows from the two affirmative
what has been stated to make plain what neces- that all fish swim and all whales
sarily follows; a syllogism is imperfect, ifit needs third figure, only a particular COJ1CIUS10n
either one or more propositions which are in- drawn from a pair ofpremises
deed the necessary consequences of the terms universal. From the proposition
set down, but have not been expressly stated as are wise and the proposition that
premises." Using the letters Sand P to symbol- mortal, we can conclude only
ize the subject and predicate of the conclusion, tals are not wise.
and the letter M to symbolize the middle term, From these examples it will be
the term which appears in the premises but not totle's rules of the syllogism are
in the conclusion, Aristotle states the form of a ing the quantity and quality of the
perfect syllogism in the following manner: "All quired in each figure to permit
M is P, all S is M; therefore all S is P." ence; and as in the third figure
The first of these propositions, the one which mit only a particular conclusion
contains the predicate of the conclusion, is so for all figures they determine
called the major premise; the second, the one of the conclusion which can be
which contains the subject of the conclusion, premises of a certain quantity
the minor premise; the subject of the conclu- one premise is negative,
sion is called the minor term, the predicate the negative. If one premise is t"'\'l1r-t"1r'11"lr
major term. Aristotle classifies syllogisms into elusion must be particular.
three figures, or formal types, according to the There seenlS to be one lln1'UI"'r<;:':l'
position of the middle term, either as subject of the syllogism which underlies all
the major premise and predicate of the tninor rules for the valid moods in .--.I ..' ....... r
CHAPTER 77: REASONING 553
hen one thing is predicated of another," the syllogism is merely a special case of transi-
stotIe says, "all that which is predicable of tivity as it appears in the relation of in1plica-
predicate "vill be predicable tion; for if P in1plies Q, and Qimplies R, then
to" The negative aspect of th1s pr1nclple 1S P implies R.
ediately obvious. What cannot he predi- Jalnes recognizes this "vhen he \vrites that
dof a predicate, cannot be predicated of its "the principle oflnediate predication or substunp-
ect. In the tradition of formal logic, this tion is only the axiom of skipped intermediaries
ciple is sometimes stated in terms of the re- applied to a series of successive predications. It
n of classes rather than in terms of subjects expresses the fact that any earlier tern1 in the
predicates: if one class in a series stands to any later term, in the same rela-
and that second class is Included In a th1rd, tion in \vhich it stands to any intermediate
, . I d d . h h d d f I terln, ln other "vords, that whatever has an attri- first is Inc u e 1n t e t 1r ; an lone c ass
ludes another, the classes vvhich it includes bute has all the attributes ofthat attribute; or more
also excluded from that other. briefly still, that whatever is of a kind is ofthat
he principle of the syllogism is traditionally kind's kind." ..J\long vvith "the axiom of1nediate
dthe dictum de omni et nullo. The dictum de equality, 'equals of equals are equal,' " the rule
i, which Kant in his Introduction to Logic of mediate predication or subsumption is, ac-
"the supreme principle of affirmative syl- cording to James, a special case of the la\v that
ms," is thus expressed by him: "Whatever "skipping intermediary terms leaves relations
, ....... affirmed of a concept is also af- the same. This AXIOM OF SKIPPED INTERMEDI-
of everything contained under it." The ARIES or of TRANSFERRED RELATIONS ... seems
de nullo, according to Kant, states that to be on the whole the broadest and deepest
is universally denied of a concept is la"v of man's thought."
of everything that is contained un-
" Kant appears to think that both these
from even more general principles:
attribute of an attribute is an attri-
thing itself" and that "whatever is
with the attribute of a thing is in-
with the thing itself."
also attempts to make a more general
of the dictum de 01nni et nullo. This
thought, he says, is "only the result ofthe
of comparison in the mind which has
SOlne lucky variation to apprehend a
more than two terms at once." As
states what he calls the "principle of me-
comparison," it appears to be broader
principle of the syllogism. It applies to
of related terms-to the relation of
and unequal quantities in mathematics,
as to the relation of subjects and predi-
the logic of predication or classes.
principle of mediate comparison itself
on what in mathematical logic and the
relations is called the "transitivity" of
The relation of larger than, for exam-
t'r", nC1 ,t-f .. r,c. for if one thing is larger than a
and the second is larger than a third, it
that the first is larger than the third. As
in rnathelnatical logic, the principle of
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
1. Definitions or descriptions of reasoning: the process of thought
la. Human reasoning compared vvith the reasoning of animals
lb. Discursive reasoning contrasted with immediate intuition
IC. 'The role of sense, memory, and imagination in reasoning:
rational reminiscence, the collation of images
5
66
5
60
559
55
8
PAGE
CHAPTER 77: REASONING
sciences
. ....... .r'T' and demonstration in the moral sciences
truth and cogency of reasoning h
1 d
truth: logical validity distinguished from factual trut
Forma an lnal 0
o o. 0 lid syllogisms; formal fallaCies
Lack of cogency In reasoning. lnva,. Of 11 0
l' . 1 oOonts rnatenal -allaCleS
Lack of truth in reasoning: sop 1Isuca argum\.- , . 0 . 0 d b-
0 d 0 cy in reasoning: logical neceSSIty; certainty an pro
NeceSSlty an canungen
ability
t of reasoning, inference, or argument .
te inference: its relation to mediated inference or reason
mg
f
d infer-
1. 0 . 0 d uses of reasoning: the distinction betvveen proo an
The Qirectl
d
n
b
an
etwee
t
l demonstration and discovery
ence, an .
doddeductive reasoning
In uctlve an 0 of bv reductio ad absurdum; argunlent
D
o t and indirect argumentatlon. pro .
tree 0 d I
from the imPOSSlble or 1 ea case
Refutation: disproof 0
o b analogy' arguments from siml1anty
Reasoning Y .
in reiation to knowledge, opinion, and action .
h d fact. mere belief distingUished from belief on
The fact and t e reasone .
rational grounds
. o. the theory of demonstration
Scienufic reasonlng. 0
d
bi a basis for demonstration
(I) The in emonstra e as. o. d finitions as the ends of reasoning
(
2) Definitio.. ns used as means m reasOnfl
ng
. eJ. from effects. from princk
. 0 0 ing' rom causes 0 .,
( ) A priori and a posterzo
rz
reason . L' 0 d h 0
3 pIes or from experience; analYSIS an s:nt. e
S1s
. 0
o demonstration and sClentlfic reasonlng
(4) The roleaf causes In .. .. d existence. demonstrations propter
(5) Demonstration relation to essence an .
quid and quza
Dialectical reasoning: the opposition of rational
..-",r1IrrJI reasoning: the rational grounds of persuaslon
Practical reasoning
The form of the practical syllogism
2 Deduction and determination in legal thought ..
Deliberation: the choice of alternative means; deClslOn
character of reasoning in the various disciplines
Proof in tuetaphysics and theology .
h
'. nalysis and synthesls
DelTIOnstration in mat ematlcs. a f d the natural
and deductive inference in the philosophy 0 nature an
show the connexion
reasoning discovers no new
of marshalling and ranging the
already. The forty-seventh ,....f"n......
first book of Euclicl, i; very
covery of it, I think, not o\ving
common logic. A man knows first,
is able to prove syllogistically;
comes after knowledge, and then
or no need of it.... Syllogism,
the art of fencing with the little
have, without making any ,..,r1.r1.t-.,.,. ....
I t maybe that the critics of
tribute to its exponents claims
inake. Aristotle, for example,
the syllogism as a method of eX1POllhCllJ
ments rather than of discovering
testing the validity of reasoning
learning the truth about
tioH given or received by way
writes, "proceeds from ... ri,,.....,
This becomes evident upon a
species of instruction. The
ences, and all other C' ..... /C'j"'lll,..,1-.... TL:>.
acquired in this way, and so are
of dialectical reasoning, C'''t:TIIr.n'fC'f-,.r'''
tive; for each of these latter
knowledge to impart ne\v, the c"r1lncr1<ttnV
ing an audience that accepts
tion exhibiting the universal as
clear!y kno\vn particular."
THE GREAT IDEAS 554
2. The rules of reasoning: the theory of the syllogism
2a. The structure of a syllogism: its figures and moods
(I) The of premises and the number of tern1S: the middle term in
soning
(2) Affirmation, negation, and the distribution of the middle term:
tityand the quality of the prelnises
2b. The kinds of syllogism: categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive, modal
2C. The connection of syllogisms: sorites, pro-syllogisms and epi-syllogisms
gorical, hypothetical,anddisjunctive."Whether
the hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms are
distinct types of reasoning, or only special cases
which it \vould be a mistaken subtlety to treat
as having principles of their o\vn, is a problem
considered in the chapter on HYPOTHESIS.
Ofall criticisms, the most severe is that which
either rejects the syllogism entirely as of no use
in reasoning, or regards the deductive syllogism
as useful only in argumentation or debate, not
in the process of inquiry or discovery, where in-
ductive reasoning alone is fruitful or instructive.
From the conclusion of a syllogism, according
to Mill, one learns nothing more than one al-
ready knew in the premises; whereas in induc-
tive reasoning, Mill, like Bacon, thinks that
the mind goes beyond anything contained in
the premises and genuinely discovers ane\v
truth.
It seems to be Descartes' opinion that "the
syllogistic forms are of no aid in perceiving the
truth about objects." Locke makes the same
point more extensively. Admitting that "all
right reasoning may be reduced to [Aristotle's]
forms of syllogism," he denies that they are
"the best way of reasoning for the leading of
those into truth who are willing to find it and
desire to make the best use of their reason for
the attainment of kno\vledge.... The rules of
syllogism," he writes, "serve not to furnish the
mind vvith those intermediate ideas that may
TI--IE GREAT IDEi\S
REFERENCES
1. Definitions or descriptions of reasoning:
the process of thought
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 244c-245c / Republic, BK VI-
VII, 383d-398c / Theaetetus, /
Sophist, 570a-577b / Statesman, 594d595d
/ Set,1fflth Letter, 809c-810d
8 l-lruSTOTLE: P!'ior Analytics, BK I, CH I[ 24bI8-
22] 39c / TopICS, BK I, CH I 143a-d / Sophistical
Refutations, CH I [16saI-3] 227b; CH 2 227d-
228a
12 Discourses, BK I, CH 7 112b-113d
17 PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR IV, CH 12, l64b
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 31
651d-652b
19 l\'QUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14,
A 7 81d-82b; Q 58, A 3 301d-302d; A 4, ANS
302d-303c; Q 79, AA 8-9 421e-423d; A 10,
REP 2---3 Q 84, A 3, REP 3 443d-
444d; Q 85, A 5, ANS
20 AQUINAS: SUlnma Theologica, PART II--n, Q 2,
A I 391a-392a; Q 8, A I, REP 2 417a-d; PART
III, Q lIt A 3
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56d-57a; 58a-e;
60a
28 HARVEY: On Ani111al Generation, 332a-335c
31 DESCARTES: Rules la-40a,c passiln, esp v-
VII 7d-12a, X-XII XIV, 28b-29a, 32d
I Objections and Replies, 137a
68a.:e; BK XII, par 16 l02d-l03a / City ofGod,
BK IX, CH 22 296d-297a; BK XI, CH 2 323a-e;
CH 7 326a-c; CH 21 333a-d; CH 29 339a-b;
BK XVI, CH 6 426e-427a; BK XXII, CH 29,
614b-d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 14,
A 7 81d-82b; Q34, A I, REP 2185b-187b; Q 4
6
,
A 2, REP 3 253a-255a; Q 58, A 3 301d-302d;
A 4, ANS 302d-303e; Q 79, A 8, ANS and REP 3
421e-422b; Q 85, A 5, ANS 457d-458d; .PART
I-II, Q 14, A I, REP 2 677b-678a; Q IS, A 4,
REP 1
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PARADISE, II [43-45]
l08a
30 BACON: Advance1nenl of Learning, .17b-e /
Novum Organum, BK II, APH 15 149a
31 DESCARTES: Rules, III, 4a-d; XI 17b-18b; XII,
23b-e / Objections and Replies, 123a-b
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2
388a-b; PART V, PROP 28 459b
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK v [469-55] 185b-
186a
33 PASCAL: Pensees, 1-5 171a-173a; 277-
288
222b-224b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I, CH III,
SECT 23 119b-120a; BK IV, CH I, SECT 9,
309b; CH IX, SECT 2-3 349a-e; eH XVII, SECT
14-1 7 378e-37ge
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 318b-319a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 33a-d / Practical Reason,
320c-321b; 337a-,e; 350c-351b / ]udgc1nent,
572d-574b; 579a
lc. The role of sense, memory, and imagina-
tion in reasoning: perceptual inference,
rational reminiscence, the collation of
images
7 PLATO: Aleno, 179d-183a; l88d-189a / Phaedo,
224a-225e; 228a-230a / Republic, BK III,
333b-d; BK VI-VII, 383d-398c / Seventh Letter,
80ge-810d
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK II, eH 19
136a-137a,e / Soul, BK I, Cll I L403a2-16]
632a-b; BK III, CH 7 143IaI4-bI9] 663d-664b
/ Sense and the Sensible, CH I [436bI7-437aI7]
673d-674a / Memory and Reminiscence, CH 2
[453a5-15] 69Sb
12 LUCRETIUS: Nature of Things, BK IV [353-5
21
]
48d-51a esp [469-521] 50b-51a
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK x, par 10 73d-
74a; par 16-19 75b-76b; par 26-38 78a-81a /
City of God, BK VIII, CH 6, 269b-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 7
8
,
A 4, ANS and REP 4-5 411d-413d; Q 81, A 3,
ANS and REP 2 430e-431d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 52b-54e; 60a-b;
PART IV, 267b
28 HARVEY: On Ani1nal Generation, 332a-335e
esp 334e-d
31 DESCARTES: Rules, XII, 18b-e; 20b-d; XIV
28a-33b / Discourse, PART I, 41d / Objections
and Replies, 229d-,230c
CHAPTER 77: REASONING
Discursive reasoning contrasted with im-
mediate intuition
PLATO: Republic, BK VI, / Seventh
Letter, 80ge-810d
ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK IX, CH 6 [
10
4
8b
18-34] 574a-e; CH 9 [Io5Ia22-34] 577b-e;
BK XII, CH 7 [1072bI4-29] 602d-603a; CH 9
605a-d
PLOTINUS: Fourth Ennead, TR III, CH 18
151b-e; TR IV, CH I 159a-d; CH 12, 164b /
Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 3 216c-217b; TR V,
CH 1-2 228b-229d passim; CH 7 231d-232b;
'fR VI 235b-237d
AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK IX, par 23-
2
5
390a-b; BK CH .3 [I I 47b2-5] 397d /
BK VII, CH 13 [I3.32a39-b8] 537a-b
Natural Faculties, BK I, CH. 12,
173a-e
AURELIUS: Aleditations, BK V, SECT 16 271e-d;
VI, SECT 23 276b; BK IX, SECT 9 292b.. d
AQUINAS: SU11'lma Theologica, PART I, Q 7
6
,
A 5, REP 4 394c-396a; Q 78, A 4, ANS and REP
5 411d-413d; Q 81, A 3, ANS and REP 2 430c-
431d; Q 86, A 4, REP 3 463d-464d; Q 96, A I,
REP 4 510b-51Ib; PART I-If, Q 13, A 2, REP 3
673e-674e
oAQUINAS: SU1n1na Theologica, PART I-II, Q 5,
A 3, REP 2 8b-9a
3 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 52b; 53a-b; 53d-
54a; 57d; 59b-e; 63a; 64a-e; 79b-c; PART II,
100a-e; PART IV, 267b
MONTAIGNE: Essays, 215a-223b passim, esp

BACON: Novum Organum, BK II, APH 35,
163d
1 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART V, 59a-60c /
Objections and Replies, 156c-d
MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VII [449-549] 227a-
229a; BK VIII [369-451] 240a-242a; BK IX [549-
566] 259b
3>PASCAL: Pensees, 339-344 233a-b
SiLoCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI,
SECT II 145d-146a; CH XXVII, SECT 8
222a; BK IV, CH XVII, SECT I 371e-d
BERKELEY: l-Iuman Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
II 407b-408a
HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IX 487b-
488e
SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, l51b-152a; l59b-
160a
ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-338a; 341d-342a
/ Social Contract, BK I, 393b-e
KANT: Pure Reason, 19ge-200e / Pref. Meta-
physical Elements ofEthics, 372a-b / Judgement,
602b,d [fn I]
DARWIN: Descent of Man, 292b-297e esp
292b-294e; 400a-e
liToLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II,
690a
JAMES: Psychology, 665a-666b; 676b-677a esp
677a; 679a-686b esp 679a-683a, 686a-b; 873a
35 LOCKE: HU1nan Understanding,
SECT 2-13 309d-312b; CH xv,
ClI XVII 371e-380d passim, esp
372b
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 337d-342e
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15d-16c;
I08a-209d esp I09d-l12d,
119a-b, 12ge-130e, 158a-159d,
l85b-e, 187a-c, 193d-194b, 199a-e;
/ Judge1nent, 570b-572e
45 LAVOISIER: Elelnents
49 DARWIN: Descent
300a
53 JAMES: Psychology,
179b-184a, 186a; 360a-362b;
664a-693b eso 666b-668a
54 PREun: Interpretation of Drc>a111s,
364b esp 364a-b; 367b-e;
379a-c; 384c-385e / Unconscious,
/ .Ego and Id, 700a-701d esp
la. Human reasoning compared
soning of animals
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I,
27] 499b / Soul, BK II, CH 3
[LpSa7-I2] 645b / MemolY
CH 2 [453
a
S-'14] 695b
9 ARISTOTLE: History of Anilnals,
[488b20--27] 9d / Ethics, BK VI, CH
To find the passages cited, use the in type, \vhich are and
nUlnbers the passages referred to. I"'or In 4 HOi\JER: Iliad, BK II [265-2831
4 1S t.he number of the volulne In the set; the number 12d indicates that th
sage IS 111 sectIon d of page 12. e
PAGE vVhen the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to
upper a.nd lower halves of the page. For exalnple, in 53 JAMES: Psychology,
the.upper half of page 116 and ends in the lo\ver half of page 119. lhen the
1n two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the
l1anasldeof the page, th.e letters e and d to the upper and lo\ver halves of the right-hand
the page. For exaJ?ple, In 7 PLATO: Symposiunt, 163b-164e, the passage begins in the
of the left-hand SIde of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side
AUTHOR'S One 0: more of. the Inain divisions of a work (such as PART
SE.CT) are Included In the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are give'n in
tain cases; e.g., Ihad, BK n [265-283] 12d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book chapter and verse When the K'
d D . d.cJ: . ." lUg
a,n oua? IHer In tItle of books or l.n numbering of chapters or verses, the
Janles vel SIan IS Cl ted first and the Douay IndIcated by a (D) follows e 0' 0
7'.T 1 l ( , " "6' LD
MENT: l.venenuan, 7:45- D) II Esdras, 7:46.
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more eSl=>eClallv
relevant parts a who.le 1 "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed
tently rather tr1an contInuously In tne work or passage cited. ...L... L .....
For additional information concerning the style of the references see the
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great
556
THE GREAT
CHAPTER'77: REASONING
559
4a. Immediate inference: its relation to medi-
ated inference or reasoning
7 PLATO: Euthyphro, 196d
8 ARISTOTLE: Interpretation, CH 7 [I7
b2
3-37]
27b-e; CH 10 [20
a
I6-37] 30d-31b I Prior
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 36d-37d; 109b-e; 120e-
121e; 133d
3d. Necessity and contingency in reasoning:
logical necessity; certainty and prob-
ability
8 ARISTOTLE : Prior Analytics, HK I, eH I [24
bI8
-
26] 3ge; CH 8-22 45b-57b; cH 30 [4
6a
3-
IO
]
63d; BK II, CH 2S 91a-b I Posterior Analytics,
BK I, CH 2 [72a2s-b4] 98d-99a;CH 6[75&12-28]
l03a-b I Topics, BKI, CHI IIod
a
2s-
b
23]
143a-b; BK II, CH S [II2
a
16-2 3] 157b-e; BK
VIII, CH 12 [I62a3S_b2] 220e I Physics, BK II,
CH 9 [200aIS-29] 277e-d I Metaphysics, BK v,
CH S [IOIS
b
6-B] 535d-536a; BK VII, cIt IS
[1039b3I-I040a8] 563d-564a; BK XII, CH 8
604c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH3 [r094bI2-27]
339d-340a; CH 7 BK
VI, CH 3 388b-e I Rhetoric, BK I, CH I [I3SS
a
3-
18] 594b;cH 2 [I3S7aI4-30] 596d-597a; BK II,
CH 25 [I402bI3-I403aI7] 652b-653a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 7, 112d-113d;
CH 26,131b
16 COPERNICUS : Revolutions of the Heavenly
Spheres, 505a-506a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 12,
A 7, ANS and REP 2 56a-57b; Q 19, A 8, REP 3
116a-d; Q 44, A I, REP 2 238b-239a; Q 47, A I,
REP 3 256a-257b; Q 82,A2, ANS 432d-433e;
PART I-II, Q 13, A S' ANS 675e-676b; A 6,
REP 1-2 676e-677b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94,
A 4, ANS 223d-224d; PART II-II, Q 4, A 8
409a'7d; PART III, Q 9,A 3, REP 2 765b-766b
23 HOBBES : Leviathan, PART I, 65e-d; 71e
31 DESCARTES: Rules, II 2a-3b; XII, 23b I
Discourse, PART II, 46e-48b / Meditations, I,
76e
33 PASCAL: Vacuuln, 368b-369a
34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XV,
SECT 1-'3 365a-d esp SECT I 365a-c; CH XVI
366d-371e passim; CH XVII, SECT 2 371d-
372b; SECT IS-I7 378d-37ge
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV
20-21 458a-e; SECT VI 469d-470d esp 469d
[fn I]; SECT X, DIV 87-88 489b-490b
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 348a,c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14d; 17d-18a; 194b-d /
Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 387a-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 878a-884b
4. The types of reasoning, inference, or argu-
ment
Lack of truth in reasoning: sophistical argu-
ments; material. fallacies
PLATO: Euthydemus 65a-84a,e I Phaedo, 237b-
238a
ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, HK I, CH 34-35
66b-d; BK, II, CH 18 87a-b I Posterior Analytics,
BK I, CH 16-17 109b-111b I Topics, BK I, CH 1
[roob23-IOIaI8] 143b-d;BK VIII, CH 10 [I60
b
23-39] 218b-e; CHI2'-I3 220e-221d / Sophisti-
cal Refutations 227a-253d I Physics, BK I, CH 2
[I8SaS-
I2
] 259d; CH 3 [I86a4-9] 260d-261a
ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 24 649d-651d
EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 7 112b-
ll3d
AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 3
1
651d-652b
HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-d; 58d-60e
BACON: Advancement of Learning, 60a-61d I
Novum Organum, BK I, APH 38-69 lOge-116b
DESCARTES: Rules, x, 16d-17a I Objections
and Replies, 126b-127e
PASCAL: Vacuum, 367a-368b
LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK II, CH I,
S.ECT 10, 123e; CH XI, SECT I3146b-e; BK IV,
CH XVII, SECT 19-21 379d-380a
HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VIII, DIV
15, 484e; SECT XII, DIV 132 509a-d
BACON: Advancement of Learning, 57d-58a;
5ge-60c I Novum Organunz, BK I, APR 14
107d-l08a
DESCARTES: Rules, x, 16d-17a I Objections
and Replies, 126b-127e
LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK II, CH XI,
SECT I3146b-e
KANT:. Pure Reason, 36a-37d esp 36b-37b;
180e-182b; 193a-b
BOSWELL: Johnson, 134e-d
TOLSTOY: War and Peace, .EPILOGUE II,683d-
684a
JAMES: Psychology, 872b; 879b-885a esp
880b-882a
Lack of cogency in reasoning: invalid syl-
logisms; formal fallacies
ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK II, CH 16-21
85e-8gb I Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 12
106d-l07a I Physics, BK I, CH 2
[I85aS-I2] 259d; CH 3 [r86a4-9] 260d-261a
ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK II, CH 24649d-651d
EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 7 112b-
l13d
AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II,CR
34 651d-653b
RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I,
23b-e
DESCARTES: Objections and Replies,.126b-127e
PASCAL: Vacuum, 368b-369a
K.ANT: Pure Reason, l09b-e; 133d
JAMES: Psychology, 108a-b; 227b-228a;236b
[En I]; 526b [fn I]
2
35 LOCKE: H.uman Understanding, BI( I
XVII, SECT 4, 373e-375a; SECT 8 3770'-
42 K.ANT: Pure Reason, 110d-112d . d ,
l18a-c esp 110tl-ll
2a( I) The number of I'remises and th
of terms: the middle term.in e nUtlt
reaso
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics BK'
]
, I, eR
32-3.9 . 40d; CH 2S 58d-59d' CR
1
M h' '32
etap ySICS, BK v, CH 3 [IOI4
a
3S-
b
]
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning,
35 LOCKE: Hunlan Understanding BK
, IV, eli
SECT 4, SECT 8, 377e-d
36 STERNE: Trzstram Shandy, 318b-319a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 110d-112d esp 110'd
112a; 118a-e
53 JAMES: Psychology, 667b-668a; 672b
2a(2) Affirmation, negation and the d'
. f h ,. 1st
tton 0 t e tuiddle term: the U
and the quality of the premises q
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics BK I C .
45b; Cll 24 58b-d; CH 26
65d-66a I Posterior Analytics BK ' R
I08d-10ga ' I, CR
19 AQUINAS: SU1nma Theologica, PART I
A I, REP 2 461c-462a '
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I
XVII, SECT 8, 377b-e
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 3ge-41e esp 39d-40
2b. The of syllogism: categorical
theucal, disjunctive, modal '
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 2
58b; CH 27-2 9 60b-63d; CH 44 68d-69
42 KANT: Pure Reason, l10d-I11
175e-d eesp 1
2c. The of sy!logisms: sorites,1
syllogtsms and ept-syllogisms
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior AnabJtics Bk
[
b J. ' .1, C
42 1-26] 5ge-d I Postenor Analytics
CH 2S [86a33-b29] 118a-c '
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I
XVII, SECT 4 373a-374d; SECT IS, 379a-
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 11ld-112d; 115d-119
53 JAMES: Psychology, 872b-873a
3. The truth and cogency of reasoning
3a. material truth: logical.va
d1sttngulshed from factual truth
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Ana/ytics, BK II, C
/ Pos:erior BK I, C
[77 16-34] l06a-107a I PhYSiCS BK I
[I8S
a
S-I2] 259d; CH 3 [I86a4-9] '260d-26
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties BK I
178c-d "
12 EPICTETUS: Disc?u:ses, BK I, CH 7 112b
18 AUGUSTINE: Chnsttan Doctrine, BK II C
34 651d-653b '
SS8
(1. Definitions or descriptions of reasoning: the
process of thought. Ic. The role of sense
1nemo1l"'\l and' . .. J
JJ tmagtnatlon tn reasoning:
perceptualtnference, rational reminiscence
the collation. of images.) J
35 LOCKE: Human Understandt'n'u, b BK II, CH XI,
SECT 13 146b-c
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 234b-236b
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 341d-342a
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 23a-24a; 34a-e; 54b-64a'
I11d-ll2a I Practical Reason, 352e-353a '
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 292d-293d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 38lb-385b; 525a-526b'
664a-666b esp 664b-665b; 667b-674a;
686b esp 677a-678b
2. The rules of reasoning: the theory of the
syllogism
7 PLATO: Phaedo, 244c-245e
8 .Categories, CH 3 [I
b
IO-I6] .. 5e-d I
Pnor Analyttcs 39a-93a,e I Posterior Analytics
BK I, CH 14 l08d-109a '
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK 1 CH 2 [13S6b - ]
596a ,1317
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses BK I CH 7 112b
113d " -
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II CH 31-
34 651d-653b '
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I . 56b-58a' S8d
60b " -
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning,
esp 57b-S8b; 5ge-60a; 96d-97a I Novum Orga-
num, BK I, APH 14 l07d-108a; APH 14-106
128a-c; BK II, APH 27-32 157b-161b esp APH
3216la-b
31 DESCARTES: Rules 1a-40a,e passim, esp V-VII
X-XII 15d-25a, XIV, 28b-29a, 32d I
Dtscourse 41a-67a,e esp PART I, 41d-42b
PART II, 45b-c, 46e-48b, PART III, 50b-5la'
PART IV, 52a '
33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration, 430b-
434a; 442a-443b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH
XVII, SECT 4-'-8 372e-377d
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 318b-319a
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 299b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 5ge-108a,e; l10d-112d es
11Od:ll1c; 115d-119a I Fund. Prin. Met!
phySIC of Morals, 253a-b I Judgement 600d-
603d esp 601d-602b '
53 JAMES: Psychology, 667b-668a; 868b-873a esp
869b-870a, 871a, 872b-873a; 878b-879a
2a. The structure of a syllogisnl: its figures and
moods
8 .ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics BK 1 CH - 6
39a-60b "I2
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel BK
22b-e ' I,
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 5ge-60a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethlcs, BK VI, CH 3 388b-c; ell 6
389d
23 HOBBES: Let/iathan, PART I, 58a-c; 60a-b;
60d; 65c-d; PART IV, 267a-e
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generati.of1, 332a-
337a,c
30 BACON: Advancenlent of Learning, 42a-c;
56c-59c; 6ld I NOVU1n Organum, PREF 105a-
l06d; BK I 107a-136a,c esp APlI 11'-26 l07d-
l08d, APH 69 l16a-b, APlI 10J-l06 127d-
128c
31 DESCARTES: Rule:;, I-XIII la-27d / Discourse,
PART VI 60d-67a,c
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 365b-366a; 368b-369a /
Geometrical Den10nstration, 430b-434a; 442a-
443b
34 N E\VTON: Principles, BK III, RULES 270a-27l b
/ Optics, BK III, 543a-b
35 LOCKE: Human []nderstanding, BK III, CH XI,
SECT 16 303c-d; BK IV, ClI I, SECT 9, 308d-
309b; ClI II, SECT 2-13 309d-312b; CH IV,
SECT 7 325b; CH VII, SECT II, 340c-341a;
CH XII, SECT 6-13 360a-362d; CH XV, SECT 1
365a-c; CH XVII 371c-380d passim, esp SECT
2-4 371d-376c, SECT IS 378d-379b
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 20
458a-b; DIV 30, 462a; SECT XII, DIV 131-132
50Bd-509d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-13d; 190c-191a;
194b-c; 211c-2l8d esp 217c-d / Fund. Prine
!vIetaphysic of Morals, 264d / Pref. Metaphysi-
cal Elements of Ethics, 365a-366a / Judgement,
463a-467a; 542c-543a; 603b-c
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445b-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 674a-675b; 617b; 862a-
865a
5b(1) The indemonstrable as a basis for dem-
onstration
7 PLATO: eratylus, l12a
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, ClI I [24a21-
bI6] 39a-c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 3
99b-lOOa; CH 7 [75
a
38-
b
7] 103c; ClI II 10Sd-
l06b; CH 19-23 111c-116a; BK II, CH 19 136a-
137a,c I Physics, BK II, CH I [I93aI'---<)1 26gb I
Heavens, BK I, CH 5 [27IbI-I3] 362c-d / Meta-
physics, BK I, CH 9 [992b24-993ar] 511a- b; BK III,
ClI 2 [996b26-997aI4J 51Sb-d; BK IV, CH 4
[Io06a4--12] 52Sa-b; CH 6 [IOIIa3-14] 530d;
BK XI, CH 6 [1063b7-12] 591d;BK XIII, ClI 4
[I078b28-3I] 610b-c I Soul, BK I, CH 3 [407a
22-3] 636d-637a
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Anin'lalJ, BK II, CH
6 [742bI7-3S] 283d-284a / Ethics, BK VI, CH 3
388b-c; CH 6 389d; CH II 392c-393b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 17,
A 3, REP 1-2 102d-103c; Q 36, A 3, REP 4
194c-195d; PART I-II, Q I, A 4, REP 2 612a-
613a
20 AQUINAS: SUl1una Theologica, PART I-II, Q 94,
A 2, ANS 221d-223a; Q 112, A 5, ANS 359c-
360c
INTRO,
CHAPTER 77:REASONING
fact and the reasoned fact: mere belief
distinguished from belief on rational
grounds
PLATO: Meno, 188b-189a I Republic, BK V,
370d-373c
ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH 6
[75aI2-37] 103a-c; CH 13 l07c-l08c; BK II, CH
1-2 l22b,d-123c / Soul, BK II, CH 2 [4I3aII-
19] 643a-b
ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 4 [I09Sa3o_bI3]
340c-d; CH 7 [I098a35-b4] 343d; BK VI, CH 3
388b-c; CH II 392e-393b
ARCHIMEDES: Method, 569b-570a; PROP I,
PLATO: Aleno 174a-190a,c / Republic, BK VI,
I Parmenides 486a-5l1d esp 491a-c
610d-613a
- Ju ..... Prior Analytics, BK I,' CH 30
Posterior Analytics 97a-137a,c I iV/eta-
BK VI, CHI [I025bI-I31 547b; BK VII,
15 [I0.39b20-I04oa8] 563c-564a
AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 9,
REP 2 765b-766b
.r. .... ' An.,...v .... Rules, XVI, 35a-b
LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXIII,
SECT 25 210c-d
Human Understanding, SECT IV 458a-
463d passim, esp DIV 28-33 460d-463d; SECT
463d-469c passim, esp DIV 38 466b-c, DIV
469c
Gullit'er, PART IV, 165R.. b
Pure Reason, 228c-d; 240b-243c /
JUtlze111e1l1t, 601d-607c
283c-288c passim I
reasoning: the theory of demon-
4 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL,
370b-371a
LOCKE: Hurnan Understanding, BK II, CH XI,
SECT 2 144a-c; BK IV, CH XVI, SECT 12 370b-
371a
BERKELEY: Iiuman Knotvledge,sEcT 15-106
433b-d
HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IX, DIV
82 487b-c; SECT XI, DIV 113 502a-d; DIV 115
503b-c
KANT: Judgement, 547b-548c; 600d-603d esp
60ld-602a, 602b [fn r]
.l.-/n..I...... Origin of Species, 26a; 241b
JAMES: Psychology, 295a-b; 677a-678a; 686b-
690a esp 688a-689a
FREUD: Civilization and Its Discontents,
80lb-c / New Introductory Lectures, 8l9a
ReaS()nlng in relation to knowledge, opin-
action
PART VI, 61d-62c / Objections
167c-d
34 NE"YTON: Principles, BK III, RULE
OptICS, BK III, 543a-b
35 LOCKE: Hun:an Understanding, BR:
SECT 6-13 360a-362<f'
35 HUME: Human Understanding,
454c-455a; SECT III, DIV 19,
DIV 26 460b-c; SECT VIII, DIV
SECT IX, DIV 82 487b-c; SECT XII,
508d-509d passim
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 45b-46a' .4..;7 ../LI-IU"'"
43 MILL: Utilitarianism ..,..... ...
475b,d [fn I] passim '
45 FARADAY: ReJearches in
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace
53 JAMES: Psychology, '
4d. Direct and indirect
by reductio
the impossible or ideal case
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I,
58b; CH 29 62d-63d; BK II, CH
84b; CH 17 86b-87a / Posterior
CH 26 118d-119b /
[I57b34-I58a2] 214b-c
CH 4 [Io06aI2-29] 525b-c; BK
34-I062aI2] 590a-b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VII CH 2
396b '
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 368b
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy,
4e. Refutation: disproof
7 PLATO: 558b-d
8 ARISTOTLE:
CH 26 91b-d / J:(erUJtatllons.
228b-237c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VII CH I
395b / Rhetoric, BK II CH;2
[I4
0
3
R
34] 644d-653a,c'esp CH 25
26 [I4
0
3
a
341 651d-653a c
10 GALEN: iVatural Facult;es BK I
179d ' ,
31 DESCARTES: Objections and
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 368b
4/. by analogy:
slmtlartty
7 PLATO: Republic, BK II, 3l6a-b; BK
BK VI-VII, 383d-391b
8 AR1STOTLE: Prior Analytics BK
91a / Topics, BK I CH 18
153a '
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I,
135
8a2
] 597c-d; BK II, CH 20
640d-641d
20 AQUINAS: SUmlna Theologica, PART
Q 7S, A3, REP 2 938a-939d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I,
30 BACON: Novum Organum, BK I,
BK II, APH 27, 158a-b
560
THE GREAT IDEi\S
(4. 0pes of iriference, or argument.
tZ. Immedzate tn"erence. 1"/.'11:' ""'0 1 t."
d:d " r;/4 .., 'ton to
me tate Inference or reasoning.)
Analytics, BK I CH 2-3 39d 40
8 ' . - e; BK II, CH
42 -10 79b-81b; CH 22 [67b26-68a24] 89b-d
KANT: Pure Reason, 17d-18a " 109d-lll
l09d-IIOa" lIOd-lIle ' c esp
4h. The. and uses of reasoning: the
distInctIon between proof and I" ,'
d be nJ.erence,
an tween demonstration and dis-
covery
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VI, 383d-388a
8 ARISTOTL.E: Posterior AnabJtics BK I
[72b25 ] 99 / 7" J' ,CH 3
c .1 OplCS, BK I, CH 2 I43d-I44a
/ SophIstIcal Refutations, CH 2 227d-228a'
10-II 234d-237c ' CH
9 :4:_r;TLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 4 [I09Sa3o_bI3]
11 ARCHIMEDES:. Alethod; 569b-570a
LeVIathan, PART IV, 267a-b
ACON: Advancement of Learning, 56c-58b'
59c-d; 96d-97a / Novum 0 . ,
IOSa rganum, PREF
10 -I06d; BK I 107a-136a,c esp APH 11-26
7d-108d, APH 29-30 109a, APH 69 116 -b
APH 103-106 127d-128c a ,
31 DESCARTES: R.ules, II, 2c-3a; x, 16d-17a;
XIV, 28b-c I Dlscourse,PART II 46c-48b
33 PASCAL' R ' ,
178a . ensees, I 171a-172a; 40 177b-
35 LOCKE: ifuman Understanding BK IV CH VII
SECT II, 340c-34la; CH XVII,
372b; SECT 6-7 376c-377b
42 KANT:. Pure Reason, 15d-16c;110d-Illc;
193a-200c e.. sp 193d-194b 199 _ /
PractIcal R '. . . ' a c
eason, 294l:t-b / Judgement, 570b-
572b; 572d-574b; 600d-603d esp 603b-c
53 JAMES: Psychology, 381b-385b esp 382a 384
385b; 672b-673b ' a-
4c. Inductive and deductive reasoning
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Anal\Jtics BK II
90 / R' .T' , CH 23
a-c osterror Analytics BK I CH I [7 a 1
97 . b " I I-II
a, Cll 3 [7
2
25-33] 99c; ClI 18 I11b- .
CH 7 [ a b ] . C, BK II,
9
2
34- I 126b / TOptcs, BK I CH 12
148d; CH 18 [I08b7-12] 152d' BK V '
[I 64aI I--16J 222d ,III, CH 14
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics BK I CH' [ a
b8] "41095 30-
340c; CH 7 [I098a3S_b3] 343d'
a388b-c / BK I, CH 2
35J 596a-598b, BK II, CH 20-22 640d-
28
2
GALILEO: Two New Sciences, FOURTH DAY
52a-b '
;g Motion ofthe Ileart, 280c
ACON. Advancement ofLearning, 42a-c; 57b-
58b; 61d; 96d-97a / Novum Organum
107a-136a,c esp APH 11-26 l07d-108d I
116a-b, APH 103-106 127d-128c ' 9
31 DESCARTES: Rules II 2d-3 .
lOb" "a, III, 4c-d' VII
'12a; XI 17b-18b' XII 23b 24 / D' '
, ., - c Iscourse,
562
563
5b(5) Demonstration in relation,to essence
and ,existence: demonstrations propter
quid and quia
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK III, CH2 [996bI2-
21] 515a-b; BK VI, CH I [I02s
b
r-I8] 547b,d
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I.,Q 2, A2
I1d-12c; Q 3, A4, REP 2 16d-17c; A 5, ANS 17c-
18b; Q46, A 2, ANS 253a-25Sa
21 DANTE: Divine Comedy, PURGATORY,III [34-
45] 56b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 78d-79a; 79d-
80b
31 DESCARTES: Meditations, I, 76c; III' 81d-89a;
VI 96b-103d /Objectiotls and Replies, 110h-c;
216d-2l8b; 261a
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK II, CH
XVII, SECT 20, 173a; CH XXXI, SECT 6 240d-
24ld esp 241a-b; SECT II 242d-243a; BK III,
CH XI, SECT 15-17 303b..304a esp SECT 16
303c-d;BK IV, CH IV, SECT8 325b-c; CHXII,
SECT 6-9 360a-361b esp SECT 9 360d..,361b
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV 458a-
463d passim, esp DIV 20-21 458a-c, DIV 30
46ld-462b; SECT XII, DIV 131-132 508d-509d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 85d-88a; 95a-:d; 179c-
182b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 667b
5c. Dialectical reasoning: the opposition of
rational arguments
7 PLATO: Euthydemus 65a-84a,c I Phaedrus,
134b-c / Phaedo, 242b-243c I Republic, BK
VI-VII, 383d-398c" / Parmenides, 491a-511d /
Theaetetus, 525d-526b / Sophist, 558b-d /
Statesman, 594d-59Sd
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, HK I, CH I [24a2I-
bI 6] 39a-c; CH 30 [46a3-IO]63d / Posterior
Analytics, BK 1, CH 6 [75a2I-28] 103h; CH II
[77
a2
5-35] l06b I Topics l43a-223a,c /
Sophistical Refutations, CH 2 227d-228a; CH 9
234b-d; CH II 236a-237c / Heavens, BK I, CH
10 [279b4-I2] 370d / Generation and Con'up-
tion, BK I, CH2 [3I6a5-14] 4l1c-d/ Metaphysics,
BK IV, CH 2 [I004bI8-27] 523d; BKXI; CH 3
[I06I
b
8-I2] 589d; BK XIII, ClI 4 [I078bIR--28]
610b
9 ARISTOTLE: Rhetoric, BK I, CH I [I355a28-39]
594c-d
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 8 ll3d-114c;
BK II, CH 12, 151d-152a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 83, A
I, ANS 436d-438a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART III, Q 9,
A 3, REP 2 76Sb-766b
24 RABELAIS: Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK II,
lOlb-l06a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 47d-48d
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART 1, 43d
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BKIV, CH XVI,
SECT 9 369b-c
(4) to 5c CHAPTER 77: REASONING
13] 547b; BK VII, CH 17 [I04IaIO_bII] 565b-d;
BK VIII, CH 4 [I044a33-b20] 569a-b
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts of Animals, BK I, CH I
[639b7-642b5] 161d-165d esp [639b34..:.640a9]
162b, [640b5-I2] 163a, [642aI4-2I]. 165b /
Ethics, BK I, CH '7 [I098a25]-CH 8 [I098b35]
343d-344b
16 COPERNICUS : Ret/olutions ' oj ,the Heavenly
Spheres, S05a-506a-
9 AQUINAS: SU1nma Theologica, PART I, Q 2, A2,
ANS and REP 2-3 11d-12c; Q 14, A 781d-82b;
A II, ANS 84c-85c; Q 19, A 5, ANS and REP 2
1l2d-ll3c; Q 44, A I, REP I 238b-239a; Q 57,
A 2, ANS 295d-297a; PART I-II, Q 14, A 5
680a-c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II" Q 55,
A 4 28c-29d; PART HI, Q 9, A 3, REP 2 765b-
766b
3 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 60a-b; PART IV,
267a-b
8 GALILEO:Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY,
202d-203a; FOURTH DAY, 252a-b
8 HARVEY: Circulation of the Blood, 3l9c / On
Animal Generation, 335c-336c;393b-c; 42Sa
oBACON: Advancement afLearning, 45a.-46a;
46c-47c / Novum Organum, BK I, APH 48
ll0d-l11a; APH 99 127b-c
1 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART IV, '52a-d;
PART VI, 61d-62c; 66a-b / 'Meditations, III
81d-89a esp 84b-85a, 87c-88c; IV, 90a-b /
Objections and Replies, l08b-112a; 120c-122c;
AXIOM V 13ld-132a; 212c; 2l5a-b
1 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART 1, AXIOM 2,4 355d;
PROP 8, SCHOL 2 356d-357d esp 357b-d;
APPENDIX. 369b-372d; PART III,' 395a-d;
PART IV, PREF, 422b,d-423c; APPENDIX, I
447a
4 NEWTON: Principles,BKIII, RULE I-II 270a;
GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a / Optics, BK III,
541b-542a; 543a-b
5 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK IV, CH XII,
SECT 9 360d-36lb; CH XVII, SECT 2 371d-
372b
5 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT VII, DIV
60, 477a; SECT IX, DIV 82 487b-c; SECT XII,
DIV 132, S09b-c
8 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 348a,c
2 KANT: Pure Reason, 46d-47c; 164a-171a;183b
[En I] / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic ofMorals, 285c-
286a / Practical Reason, 310d-311d;339a /
Judgement, 574a-b; 578a-d
5 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry, PART I, 9b-
lOb
5 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 169a; 183a-184a
9 DARWIN: Origin of Species, 217d-218a; 239b-
240d
oMARX: Capital, lOb-lIb esp lIb
3 JAMES: Psychology, 8gb-gOa; 668a-671a esp
670a-h; 745b; 824b-82Sa; 884b-886a
4 FREUD: General Introduction, 454b-c; 483d-
484a
THE, GREAT IDEf\S
(5b. 1
4
easoning: the theory of delnonstra_' _ .5b(2) taJ5
;ton. 5b(1) Tke indelnonstrableasa basis 5h(3) A prior; and a posteriori reasonin ,..
Jor demonstratton.) causes or from effects' from
or f .', 'PrIne
28 HARVEY: On Animal Generation 333d-334d experIence; analysis d
esp 334a ' thesIS aOs!'n..
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 59c-d. 97a 7 PLATO: Phaedo, 242l;l-243c
31 DESCARTES: Rules II 2a-3b / D " 8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics 13
II, 46c-4?a / Meditations, I, 99c / Physics, BK I, : 2
1
; cit
and Repltes, l23a- b; 224b,d J Ge]neratton and Corruption, BK I, Cli
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding BK IV 14 411c-d I Metaphysics, BK vn f3
SECT I, 309d; SECT 7-
8
310d-31Ia. II, 33-bI2] 552a ' CII 3 f
SECT +313b-c; CH XV, SECT 1 9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, Cll 3
365d; CH XVII, SECT IS 378d-379b' 3 I2J 340a-b; CH, 4 [I095a30-,bI31 340'
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 217c-d I Practical Reason III,CH 3 [III2
b
20-24] 358d; BK
307d-310c esp 309b I Judgement, 542d-543a ' 391b I Politics, BK I, CH 1
43 NUMBER 31, l03c-l04a
43 MILL: Uttlztarianism, 446d-447a. 461 -462 . 10 GALEN: Natural Faculties BK I
475b,d [fn 1J ' C a, 178d esp 177c, 178c-d; BK'III,
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 82b 19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica PA '
46 H A 5 680a-c . , RT I-II,
EGEL: Philosophy of Riaht
116a :> , ADDITIONS, 3 23 HOBBES: Leviathan PART I 60a-b.
267a-b '" PART
28 HARVEY: On Ani,nal Generation, 332a-33
30 BACON: Novum Organum BK I
128a-c " 'APR 10
31 DESCARTES: Rules II 2d-3. .
Ob' . "a, IV-V
?lecttons and Replies, 129a
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 368b-369a
34 NEWTON: Optics, BK III, 543a-b
34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551 b-552a
35 LOCKE: Human Understandina BK
SE 123 0' 'II, elf
10, c; 13K IV, CH XII, SECT 36
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, SECT21 4
35 I-IUME: Ht:',nan Understanding, SECT IV 4
463d passIm, esp DIV 20-21 458a-c D
462.- S ' IV
a., ECT V, 34-38, 464a-466c; SE
497b-503c passIm, esp DIV 105 498d-
SECT XII, DIV 131-132 50Bd-509d passim
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 14a-20c; 34a-36a.
l11c; 115d-I20c; 129a; 135a-173a esp
l60b, 172c-I73a; 174a; 190c-
192a-b; 193d-200c; 211c-2I8d I Funa
Metaphysic of Morals, 253a-254d esp2
254a;. 262a-287d esp 263a-264d, 268b-
Practzcal Reason., 294a-b; 307d-308b;30
329d-330c I SCIence of Right, 405b-d If
1nent, 600d-603d esp 603a- b
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445c-446b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History INTRa
183c ' ,
53 JAMES: Psyctltology , 91a-94b
674b; 872a-873a
54 FREUD: Narcissism, 400d
5b(4) of causes in demonstration
sCIentIfic reasoning
7 PLATO: Timaeus, 455a-b; 465d-466a
8 ARISTOTLE: Posterior Analytics 97a-1.3
esp BK II, CH 11-18 128d-136a I Physics, B
CH 7 275b-d / Metaphysics BK C
f9968I8-b26] 514d-SI5b; BK CH I
50(2) Definitions used as means in re ..
d fi. . .' aSOnlng.
e as the end of reasoning
7 PLATO: Sophist, 551a-552c I Seventh Letter
S09c-8l0d '
8 Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 43 68d
I Postenor AnabJtics BK I CH [, a
.J" , 2 72 19-2 4]
9Bd; CH 8 [75b2I-32] 104a; CH 10 [76b35-77a41
CH 22 [82b36-83aI] 113b; CH 33 [89a
7 5]. 121d-122a,c; BK II, CH 3-
1
0 l23c-128d
II BK VII, CH 5 [154823-bI3J 209d-210a;
11) 210d;BK VIII, CH 3 214d-215d I
etaphyslcs, BK I, CH 9f992b30-993aI] 5llb.
13K III, CH 2 515b. '
[roo b b ' BK IV, CH 4
S 35-
1
7 20] 525a-527a; CH 7 [1012ar8_
24] 532a-b; CII 8 [IOI2bS-8] 532c BK x
590 d ' I, CH 5
a- ; BK XIII, eH 4 [Io78b23-3oJ 610b-c I
Soul, I, CH I [402br6-403l't2] 631d-632a; CH
3 [47 22-301 636d-637a; CH 5 f409a31-bI8j
639b-c; BK II, CH 2 [4I3aII-19] 643a-b
9 ARISTOTLE: Parts ofAninlals, BK I, CH I [6 b
7-
6
4
2b
S] 161d-165d 39
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica PART I Q2
RE lOd " , A I,
P 2 -lId; A 2, REP 2 11d-12c Q 3 A S
ANS 17c-18b; Q 17, A 3, REP 1-2 i02ci-l03 :
Q 85, A 6458d-459c c,
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 56b-60c 65d
31 .r;ESCARTES: Objections and Replies, 1'28c-129a
33 n
I
ASCAL: I 171a-172a I Geo1netrical
emonstratton, 430h.. 434b
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK III CH XI
SECT IS-17 303b-304a esp SECT 16 303c-d:
BK IV, CH III, SECT 20, 319b '
35 I-IuME: Human Understandng, SECT VII, DIV
4
8
470d-471c; SECT VIII, DIV 74 484a-c; SECT
XII, DIV 131 508d-509a
42 KAN::: Pure Reason, 179d-182b; 21lc-218d I
Practlcal Reason, 293c-294b
51 TOLSTOY: and Peace, EPILOGUE II 690b
54 FREUD: Instincts, 412a-b '
565
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART II-II, Q 2
A 10 399b-400b; PART III SUPPL, Q 7S, A 3
REp2 938a-939d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 78d-79a; 79d-80a;
PART II, 163a-b; PART III, 165b
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART I, 122b-c
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 95d-101c
31 DESCARTES :'Aleditations, 69a-71a,c / Objec-
tions and Replies, 119d; 128a-129a
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART I, PROP II, SCHOL 358d-
359b
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 35Sb-356b
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT I, DIV 2
451b-c; DIV 4 451d-452c
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 308c-d
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 15c-16c; 85d-88a; 179c
182b; 211c-218d esp 21Sd-216d /
Fund. Prine Metaphysic of Morals, 264d /
Practical Reason, 293c-294b; 351b-352c I
Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, 365a-
366a / judgement, 600d-p03d
6b. Demonstration in tnathematics: analysis
and synthesis
7 PLATO: Meno, 180b-183c / Republic, BK VI,
386d-388a; BK VII, 392a-395c; 397c-d
8 ARISTOTLE: Prior Analytics, BK I, CH 4
1
[49
b
3
2
-37] 68c / Posterior Analytics, BK I, CH I
[7Iall-16] 97a-b; CH 10 104d-105desp [7
6b
39-7782] 105d; CH 12106c-l07c; CH 18 111b-c;
BK II, CH 9 [93b2I-25] 128a-b / Topics, BK V,
CH 4 [132832-34] 183b; BK VI, CH 4 [14
Ib
3-
22
]
194d-195a; BK VII, CH 3 [IS3
86
--
II
] 208a-b;
BK VIII, CH I [I57RI-3] 213a / Physics,BK II,
CH 9 [200aIS-29] 277c-d / Heavens,BK III, CH
4 [302b27-3I] 394a / Metaphysics, BK III, CR 2
[996a21-36] 514d-515a; [996bI8-2I] 515b; BK
VII, CH 10 [103682-8] 559b-c; BK IX, CH 9
[105Ia22-34] S77b-c; BK XI, 'CH 3 [I06I
8
2g-
b
3]
589c; CH 4 589d-590a; CH 7 [1063b36-1064a9]
592b; BK XIII, CH 2 [1077bI-IO] 608d-609a;
CH 3 609a-610a
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation of Anitnals, BK II, CH
6 [742b2J-35] 283d-284a / Ethics, BK I, CH 3
[I094bI9--27] 339d-340a; BK III, CH 3 [III2
b
20-
2
4] 358d; BK VII, CH 8 [II5
IaI
S-
1
9]
402a
11 A.RCHIMEDES: Method, 569b-570a; PROP I,
572b
11 ApOLLONfUS: Conics, BK II, PROP 44-47 710b-
713a; PROP 49-SI 714b-726a
23 IIoBBEs: Leviathan, PART I, 56b; 58a-c;
59c
28 GILBERT: Loadstone, PREF, Ib-c
31 DESCARTES: Rules 1a-40a,c passim, esp II, 3a,
IV, 7c, VI Sa-lOa, XIV, 30d-33b, XVI-XXI
33d-40a,c / Discourse, PART I, 43b-c; PART II,
46c-47c; PART IV, 52d-53a / Meditations, 73a;
I, 76c; V, 93a-d / Objections and Replies, 128a-
129a / Geometry 295a-353b esp BK I, 295a-
298b, BK II, 304a-b, BK III, 353a
CHAPTER 77: REASONING
. Proof in metaphysics and theology
7 PLATO: Parmenides 486a-511d esp 491a-c t
Sophist, 570a-d / Seventh Letter, 809c-810d
8 ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 2 [
100
4
B
25-3
1
] 523b-c; BK VI, CH I [I025bl-18] 547b,d;
BK IX, CH 6 [1048R25-b9] 573c-574a; BK XI,
eH 3 [106I
a
IO-I8] 589b; CH 7 [I064
RI
-9]
592b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q I 3a-
10c; Q 2, A 2 Ild-12c; Q 32, A I, REP 2 175d-
178a; Q 46, A 2 253a-255a
The character of reasoning in the various
disciplines
e(3) Deliberation: the choice of alternative
means; decision
5 EURIPIDES: Phoenician Maidens [S28-593]
382c-383a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK III, CH I [IIIO
R
28-35]
356a; CH 2-3 357b-359a; BK VI, CH 1-2 387a-
388b; CH 5 389a-c passim; CH 7 [II4Ib8-21]
390c-d; CH 8-9 390d-392b; CH 12 [1144
R6
-37]
393d-394a
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK IV, SECT 12 264c
19 AQUINAS: Sumlna Theologica, PART I, Q
1
9,
AS, ANS 112d-113c; A7, ANS 114d-115d; Q82,
A 2, REP 3 432d-433c; Q 83, A I, ANS 436d-
438a; PART I-II, QQ 13-IS 672d-684a; Q44, A2
808b-d
22 CHAUCER: Tale of Melibeus 401a-432a esp
par 9-36 403a-417b
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53a; 64a-65c;
77d
26 SHAKESPEARE: Merchant of Venice, ACT II, SC
VII [1-7S] 416a-417a; sc IX [19-72] 417d-418b;
ACT III, SC II [73-139] 420d-421b
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 81d-95b
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART III, 48b-50b
35 LOCKE : Human Understanding, BK II, CH XXI,
SECT 4
8
190c-d; SECT S3191d-192b; SECT 57
193b-c; SECT 60-73 194a-199c passim
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 60a-c; 169c-170a / Fund.
Prine Metaphysic of Morals, 260d-261b;
267d; 268b / Practical Reason, 327d-329a /
Science ofRight, 398a-399c / judgement, 586a-
b; 588b [fn 2]; 595a-d
43 MILL: Liberty, 276b-277a; 294d-295b /
Utilitarianism, 456a-457b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART II, par 122
44a
53 JAMES: Psychology, 794a-798b esp 794a,
796a-b
(3) to 6b
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 149d-150a
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445c-446b; 456a-457b;
475b,d [fn I]
46 HEGEL: Philosophy olRight, PART III, par
21
4
71a-c; par 216 71d.. 72a; par 222 73b-c; par
22S-229 73d-75b esp par 227 74b-d; ADDI-
TIONS, 134 138b-c; 140 139b-c
5e. Practical reasoning
8 ARISTOTLE: Topics, BK III, CH 1-4 162
/ Metaphysics, BK VII, CH 7
555b-d / Soul, BK I, CH 3 [407a22-2 ] 22]
BK III, CH 9 665c 3 36dj
9 ARISTOTLE: Motzon oj Anirllals CH 7. [
39] 236b-d I Ethics, BK I, CH [I094b70IaS-
339d-340a; CH 4 [I095a30_bI3] 340c_d
12
-
27
]
[I098a20_b8] 343c-344a 0 BK II CH 7 [ ,elf i
_ ,, 117
8
2
32] 352d-353a; x, CH I [I I72a34-b7] 4260
7
-
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK III CH -0,
178d ' 2 1770,-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 53a-54a; 60b-
66c-68a; 78a-d 6la;
30 BACON: Advancentent of Learning 57d 5
81d-82a ' - 80;
31 DESCARTES: PART III, 48b-50b
33 PASCAL: Provznczal Letters 27a-80b' 90
42
TT " a-127a
Pure Reason, 60a-c; 149d-150a
o
190
191a / Fund. Prine Metaphysic ofMoral; 2530,-
255d; 260d-261b; 264b-265b; 266b-d0' 27 a-
c; 27?d-279dj 283d-287d esp 283d-284i
a
-
Practtcal Reason, 291a-297c; 298a-300a
o

[fn I]; 306d-307a; 307d-321b esp
309d-310b; 329a-337a,c. esp 329b-d;
343d; / Pref. Metaphysical Ele-
ments of Ethtcs, 372b-d / [ntro. Metaphysic oj
383a-?; 388d; 390b,d-391a; 393a t
Sctence of Rzght, 398c-399c; 416b-417a t
judgement, 461a-467a esp 463a-467a' 596
'
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445c-d; 456a-457b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 186a; 381b-385b esp 38
5e(1) The form of the practical syllogism
8 ARISTOTLE: Soul, BK III, CH II [434816- 22
667a
9 ARISTOTLE: Motion of Animals CH 7 [701115
39] 236b-d / Ethics, BK VI, CH 9391c-392b
[I I 42b20--26] 392a; BK VII, CH 3 [1146b
1I47b19] 396d-398a passim '
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q
A 3, ANS and REP 2 430c-431d; Q 86 A I
2 461c-462a ' ,
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q
A I, ANS 141a-c; Q 77, A 2, REP 4 145d-147
5e(2) Deduction and determination in leg
thought
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, .B.K V, CH 7 c
10 385c-386b / Po!ttzcs, BK III, Cli II [1282
b
I
6] 480b-c; CH 15 [1286
8
10-37] 484b-d
o
CH I
[1287823-28] 485d; [1287bIS-25] 486a-b
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q
A 2 227c-228c; A 4 229b-230c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 86c-87b; 9
96b esp 95c-96b; PART II, 130c-136b esp 13
164a,c; PART III, 165a
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 94d-95
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK I, 3a; 3
BK XXVI, 214b,d
THE IDEAS
(5. Reasoning relation to know/edge, opinion,
and 5c. Dialectical reasoning: the
OPPOSItIon of rational arguments.)
35 I--IuME: HU1nan Understanding, SECT x, DIV
86--91 488d-491c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, la-b; 36d-37d; 108a-d'
120c-173a esp 129c-130b, 133c; 174b-177b;
187a-192d; 219a-220b' 22gb-c'
231c-232a! Fund. Prine Metaphysic lvforaIs:
260d-261b; 283d-284d / Practical Reason
291a-292a; 302a-d; 331c-337a,c; 340a-342d;
348d-349a / Science of Right, 407a-408b ;
Judgement, 540a-546d; 562a-578a esp 562d-
564c, 575b-578a; 584c-d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right PART II par 135
47b-d "
54 FREUD: General Introduction, 545d
5d. R.hetorical reasoning: the rational grounds
of persuasion
7 PLATO: Protagoras, 50d-52d; 57a-c / Phaedrus
115a-141a,c / lv/eno, 176d-
177a! Gorgtas 252a-294d / Timaeus, 457c /
Sophut, 558a-561a
8 ARISTOTLE: P:ior Analytics, BK II, CH 27 92a-
93a,c / Postertor Analytics, BK I, CH I [7181-10]
97a / Metaphysics, BK IV, CH 5 [19816-22]
528c
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094b23-27]
/ Rhetoric, BKI 593a-622d esp CH I
[1355
8
4- 22] 594b-595a; BK II, CH 18-26 639a-
653a,c; BK III, CH 15 669d-670c; CH 17-19
672a-675a,c '
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK I CH 16 180c-
181a ' ,
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 5 110b-c'
CH 8 113d-114c '
18 AUGUSTINE: Christian Doctrine, BK II, CH 36-
37 653d-654b; BK IV, CH 4 676d-677a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 83,
A I, ANS 436d-438a; PART I-II, Q 7, A I, REP I
651d-652c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 67c' PART II
127d; 128d "
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 446d-450a; 453c-454d
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 58c-59a;
66c-67c
31 DESCARTES: Rules, x, 16d-17a
33 PASCAL: Geometrical Demonstration
442a '
35 LOCKE: lfuman Understanding, BK III, CH X
SECT 34 299d-300a '
36 STERNE: Tristrant Shandy, 227a-228a
37 FIELDING: Tom jones, 261c-d; 320c-321b
42 KANT: Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics
376c-d '
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 14, 62a-d
43 MILL: Liberty, 284b-c
44 BOSWELL: johnson, 209a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK VI,243b; EPI-
LOGUE I, 672a-b
564
THE" GR.EAT IDEf\S
567
71a-c; par 222 73b-c; par 225-
22
9 73d-75b
esp par 227 74b-d; ADDITIONS, 134 138b-c;
140 139b-c
50 MARX: Capital, 6a-c
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, EPILOGUE II, 683d-
684a; 690b
53 JAMES: Psychology, 886b-888a esp 887a-888a,
888b (En I]
CHAPTER ,77: REASONING
ADDITIONAL READlr'fGS
1.
Listed below are works not included in Great Books ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:
1. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
HOBBES. Six Lessons to the Savilian Professors of
Mathematics, II-V
--. The Art of Sophistry
LOCKE. Conduct o.l the Understanding
KANT. Introduction to Logic, XI
UlNAS. De Fallaciis
OlA. Ofthe Improvement ofthe Understanding
BES. Concerning Body, PART I, CH 4
: Other comparisons of human and animal intelligence, see ANIMAL IC(2); LANGUAGE I;
MAN Ia-Ic; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6b; MIND 3
a
-3
b
.
Another discussion of the distinction between the intuitive and the discursive or rational,
see KNOWLEDGE 6c( I); and for the consideration of supra-rational knowledge, see Ex-
PERIENCE 7; GOD 6c(3)-6c(4); HAPPINESS 7
C
(I).
The distinction and relation between reasoning and other acts of the mind, See DEFINITION S;
IDEA sa-sb, se; INDUCTION Ia; JUDGMENT I, 7c ; KNOWLEDGE 6C(2); MEMORY AND
IMAGINATION 6c; SENSE IC-Id.
Other discussions bearing on the theory of the syllogism, see HYPOTHESISS; IDEA sa-sb;
JUDGMENT 7
c
; LOGIC Ia; OPPOSITION Id(I); UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR Sd.
The problems of truth and falsity, necessity and contingency, and certainty and probability
in reasoning, see NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 4e(z); OPPOSITION Id(2); SIGN AND SYM-
BOL 4e; TRUTH 3
b
(3)
An examination of immediate inference, see JUDGMENT 7
b
; and for the distinction between
inductive and deductive reasoning, and a priori and a posteriori reasoning, see EXPERIENCE
2d; INDUCTION I h; SCIENCE Sd.
The elements of scientific reasoning, see BEING 8d, 8f; CAUSE Sb; DEFINITION S; INFINITY2C;
PHILOSOPH:Y 3
C
; PRINCIPLE 3a(2)-3a(3); SCIENCE sd-se.
The analysis of dialectical and rhetorical reasoning, see DIALECTIC 2b, 2C(Z), 3b-3
C
; OPINION
2C; OPPOSITION Ie; RHETORIC 4
C
, 4
C
(2).
Other discussions relevant to the study of practical reasoning, see GOOD AND EVIL sc; JUDG-
MENT 2; KNOWLEDGE 6e(I)-6e(2); LAW Sg; LOGIC 4
e
; OPINION 6b; PRUDENCE sa, 6b.
The character of reasoning in the various disciplines, see BEING 8f; GOD2b-2C; IMMORTALITY
2; LOGIC 4
a
, 4
C
, 4
e
; MATHEMATICS 3a, 3c; MECHANICS 2; MEDICINE 3
c
; METAPHYSICS 2C;
PHILOSOPHY 3C; THEOLOGY 4
C
; WILL sc.
The general problem of the rationality of the universe, see MIND lOa; NATURE 3
a
; WORLD 6c.
OSS-REFERENCES
Intro. Metaphysic of Morals, 390b; 393a /
Science of Right, 397a-b; 398c-399c; 413d-
414a; / ]udgen1-ent, 593a-d
FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-l04a; NUMBER
85, 257d-258d
3. Utilitarianism, 445a-447b passin1; 461c-
463d passim; 475b,d (fn I]
6 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par
21
4
6c
31 DESCARTES: Discourse, PART VI 60d-67
61d-62c / Objections and Replies,
33 PASCAL: Vacuum, 365b-371a
34 NEWTON: Principles, BK III, RULES 270
GENERAL SCHOL, 371p-372a / Optics a-
541b-542a; 543a-b ' IH(
34 HUYGENS: Light, PREF, 551b-552a
35 LOCKE:. Human Understanding, BK II C
SECT 10 123b-d; BK IV CH III S .' .
321 3 . ' , . ECT 2
a- 23a paSSIm; CH VI, SECT 13 335 _ .
XII, SECT 9-13 360d-362d C d,
35 BERKELEY: Hunzan KnowledfYe
434a SECT 10
35 HUME: Human Understanding SEC
454 455
' T I, DIV
c- a; SECT. III DIV 19 458 '.
6
"a,SECT
DIV 2 460b-c;SECT VII, DIV 48 470d-4
DIV 60, 477a.; SECT IX, DIV 82
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV, 165a-b
42 KANT: Intro. Metaphysic of Morals 387
Judgement, 578d-582c esp 579b-c' a-'D t
45 FARADAY: Researches in Electricity
774d-775a . '
49 DARWIN: Origin of Species 42a239
50 MARX: Capital, 6a-c ' , C
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XI, 469a-d
53 JAMES: Psychology, 91a-94b esp 94b
127a passim; 295a-b; 324b; 385a-b'
esp 675b; 677b; 862a865a 882 .-
paSSIm ' a
54 FREUD: Narcissism, 400d-401b / Inst
412a-b / General Introduction, 483d-485a
484c-485a; 502d-503d; 545c / B . JI
P
l
7 p.. eyonu
teasure .' rtnctple, 661c-662a I New' 11
ductory Lectures, 879c
6d. Induction and demonstration in th
. em
sCIences
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK I, CH 3 [1094bI2
339d-340a; CH 4 [I095a30_bI3] 340c-d
[1098a25-b7] 343d-344a; BK VII, CH 1'[1
BK X, CH I [1172a34-b7] 426
PO!ttiCS, BK I, I [1252aI7-24] 445b
23 HOBBES: Levtathan, PART I, 58a.. b
II, 130c-136b; 153c-154a 164a C
165a " ,
35 LOCKE: Human Understanding, BK I,
SECT 1 103d-104a; SECT 4 104d-lOSa; B
CH XI, SECT 15-17 303b-304a espsEc
303c-d; BK IV, CH III, SECT 18-20 317d-
CH IV, SECT 7 325b; CH XII, SECT 8 360c
35 HUME: Human. Understanding, SECT I,DIV
451a-453b paSSIm; DIV 9, 454d-455a;
DIV 36, 465a-d [fn I]; SECT VII, DIV 48 47
471c; SECT XII, DIV 131-132 508d-509d P
esp DIV 132, S09c-d
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, xxib-c
42 KANT: Pure Reason, 169b [fn I] / Fund.
Metaphysic of Morals, 253d-254b 265c-
/ Practical Reason, 293c-294b; '304d-
306d-307a; 307d-309b; 309d-310b;
318b.; 320c-321b; 330d-331a / Pre!
phYSical Elements of Ethics, 372b-d; 376c
(6. The .ch,!racter of reasoningin the various dis-
ciplz'!es. 6b. Dell10nstration in mathe-
matzcs: analysis and synthesis.)
33 PAscAL:Pensees, 171a-173a / Vacuum,
365b-366a / Geometrzcal Demonstration 430a-
434a; 442a-443b '
34 NEWTON: Principles, la-b / Optics .BK III
543a-b ' ,
35 LOCKE:. Human Understanding, BK II, CH XVI,
SECT 4 166a-b; BK IV, CH I, SECT 0, 308d-
309b; CH II, SECT 9-10 311b-c;cH {II, SECT
18-20 317d-319c passim; Cll XII, SECT 1-8
358c-360c passim, esp SECT 7 360b-c; SECT
14-15 362d-363b; CHXVII, SECT II 378b
35 BERKELEY: Human Knowledge, INTRO, SECT
12 408a-b; SECT 15-16 409a-d
35 HUME: Human Understanding, SECT IV, DIV 20
458a-b; SECT VII, DIV 48 470d-471c; SECT XII
DIV 131 508d.:.509a . ,
42 KANT: Pure Reason, lSc-16c; 17d-18d; 46a-b
68a-69c; 211c-218d esp 215d-217a / Practical
Reas?n, . 29Sb-d; 330d-331a I.Pref. Meta-
Elements of Ethics, 376c-d / Science
of Rzght, 399a-b / Judgement, 551a-553c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 31, 103c-l04a
43 MILL: Utilitarianism, 445a-d
45 LAVOISIER: Elements of Chemistry PREF 2b
45 FOURIER: Theory of Heat, 173a-b ' ,
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK XI, 469a-d
EPILOGUE II,695b-c '
53 JAMES: Psychology, 874a-878a passim
6c. Induc:ive and deductive inference in the
of nature and the natural
sCiences
8 ARISTOTLE: Physics, BK II, CH 7-9 275b-278a,c
/ BK. II,CH 5 III, CH 7
[306 I-18] 397b-c / Generatzon and Corruption
BK I, CH 2 [316a5-14] 411c-d I Metaphysics:
BK II, CH 3 [995aI5-17] 513d
9 ARISTOTLE: Generation ofAnimals,BK III CH
10 [760b29-32] 301d-302a ' '
10 HIPPOCRATES: Ancient Medicine, par 1-8 la-
3b
10 GALEN: Natural Faculties, BK III, CH 1-2
199a-200a esp 199c-d
16 COPERNICUS: Revolutions of the Heavenl
Spheres, S05a-506a y
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica PART I Q I
. b " ,A I,
REP 2 3 -4a; Q 32, A I, REP 2 175d-178a
28 GALILEO: Two New Sciences, THIRD DAY,
207d-208c; FOURTH DAY, 252a-b
28 HARVEY: Motion of the Heart,267b,d-268a;
285c-d; 295d-296a / On Animal Gen-
eratton, 332a-335c; 336b-d; 383d
30 BACON: Advancelnent of Learning, 16a; 34b;
42a-c; S6c-59c; 96d-97a / Novum Organum
105a-195d esp PREF 105a-l06d, BK I, APH 11-
26 107d-l08d, APH 69 116a-b, APH 13-106
127d-128c, BK II, APH 1-9 137a-140c APH 36
164a-168d, APH 52 194c-195d '
566
HEGEL. Science oifLoaic VOL II S
J
S Jv1 Co', ECT I, CH 3
., ILL. ,.d s..vstenl ofLogic, BK II, v
FARADAY. Obsert/ations on the Education f tl.-
Judgment C!.t Ie
\v. JAMES. "T'he Sentiment f R' I'
The lVill to Believe 0 atlona Ity," in
terms it relates exist. The ancients, do
not appear to regard the relation as something
having a reality distinguishable from the reality
of the correlative terms. It seems to be signifi-
cant that both Plato and Aristotle discuss
relative terms, rather than relations as such.
For the most part, they signify relations by us-
ing a pair of "vords ,vhich name things standing
in a certain relation to one another.
Thus in the Categories, Aristotle refers to
'double' and 'half,' 'master' and 'slave,'
'greater' and 'less,' or 'kno,vledge' and 'object
known' as exanlples of correlative terms. "All
relatives," he says, "have a correlative."
tinles it is necessary to find the precise word, or
even to invent the right word, for in order to
indicate that a given term is relative, its cor-
relative must be appropriately named. "Con-
cubine," says I.Jocke, "is, no doubt, a rela tive
nanle, as well as wife; but in languages where
this, and like ,vords, have not a correlative
term, there people are not so apt to take them
to be so, as wanting that evident mark of
tioDS which is between correlatives, which seem
to explain one another, and not to be able to
exist but together."
When "reciprocity of correlation does not
appear to exist," Aristotle suggests that it Inay
be the result of our failure to use words care-
fully. If we wish to use the term 'rudder' as
relative, we cannot call its correlative a 'boat,'
for "there are boats \vhich have no rudders."
Since there is no existing word, it \vould be
"more accurate," i\ristotle thinks, "ifwe coined
some \vord like 'ruddered' to name the correla-
tive of 'rudder.'" Similarly, in the case of
'slave' as a relative term, its correlative is not
'man' understood in any sense, but only man
understood as 'master.'
The things \vhich are designated by a pair of
reciprocally relative- term<s must, according to
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 78: RELATION
569
IKE quantity and quality, relation is gen-
erally recognized as a basic term or cate-
Dry. But its meaning, like theirs, cannot be
dined. Relation is, perhaps, the prototype of
indefinable notion. As Bertrand Russell
ints out, it seems to be impossible to make
y statement of what relation is without using
e notion of relation in doing so.
Any term \vhich is essentially relative seems
so to be incapable of definition. Its meaning
nnot be stated without referring to its cor-
lative; and since the meaning of the latter
ciprocally involves the former as its correla-
e, each member of a pair of correlative tenns
aws upon the other for its meaning. A part is
part of a \vhole; a ,vhole, a whole of parts.
tmilarly, the meaning of parent involves the
otion of child and the llleaning of child the
notion of parent.
Plato applies this maddening fact about cor-
lative terms to all comparatives which pre-
ppose the correlation of more and less. "Com-
ratives such as the hotter and the colder," he
rites, "are to be ranked in the class of the in-
ite." They cannot' be measured or defined.
like 'much' and 'little,' 'great' and
mall' look like quantities, but, according to
1\.ristotle, they are "not quantities, but rela-
tives, for things are not great or small absolute-
ly; they are so called rather as the resul t of an
act of comparison."
Concerning quantities and qualities, the an-
cients ask how they exist. The alternatives seem
to be either that they exist in and of them--
selves, or that they exist as the attributes of
SUbstances such as stones and trees. But with
regard to relations, the question seems to be
Whether they exist rather than how they exist.
The supposi tion that a relation cannot exist
apart from the terms it relates may be thought
to imply that the relation does exist when the
MANSEL. Prolego111ena Loaica An 1 ,.
Psychological Character I into
G. C. LE\VIS. A Treatise on the:' ;a
tl
drocesses
, " lV1 e flO s oifOh
lIon and Reasoning in Politics Sfff'tJa
BOOLE. An Investigation ofthe Latus of Th
DE MORGAN. Formal Logic, Cli 5-6 ought
--. A Budget of Paradoxes
TAINE. On Intelligence
SIG\VART. Logic, PART I, CH 3' PART III
JEVONS. The Substitution of S/mil ' cr-r 3-4-
BK II, -- The P:' 'l if ars
. nnctp,es 0 Science, CH 4, 6-
CLIFFORD. Seeing and Thinking 7, I r
LOTZE. Logic, BK I CH 3' BK II
. ' , , CH 4-7
--. Outltnes of Logic, DIV I, CH 3
VENN. Symbolic Logic
C. S. PEIRCE. Collected Papers VOL II
VOL IV, par 21-79 VOl V , ' par 435-618
A. SIDGWICK. , ar 15
1
-212 '
--. The Use of Words in Reasoning
J. c. WILSON. Statement and Inference
DE\VEY et al. Studies in LOP'icai Th ,..' PART I, IU
WHITl:< d <:> eOI), I-IV
,,-,HEAD an RUSSELL. Principia MatA .
PART 1, SECT A leJnatta
The Principles of Logic
mlna1 Essays, 1 ' BK n-'III; 'Fe
--. and Reality, BK II, CH 1
--. Collected Essays, VOLI(I2) 5
-,-. Essays on Truth and Reality CH 12
DEWEY. How. We Think '
P
- Essays tn!Fxperimental Logic, II-VI
ARETO. TheA12nd and Society VOL I
BOSANQUET. Logic, VOL II CH 6_:
II
1 l' ' " , I
--. mp tcatton and Linear Inference
'\\1. E. JOHNSON. Logic, PART I CH 14'. ,
CH 1-6 " PARr 1
J. M. KEYNES. A Treatise on Probabilit1!
CH 12-1 4 .n PART
SANTAYANA. Sceptcism and Animal Faiti
MEYERSON. Du chemine1nent de la pense;' Cli 13
B. RUSSELL. Introduction to Mathematical Ph'Z
ophy, en 14 t ()
---. Inquily into Meaning and Truth, CH24
'fHE GREAT IDEA.S
II.
568
Institutio Oratoria (Institutes of
tor)), BK v, CH 10-14; BK VII, CH 8
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS Against the L "
CH 3-6 . 0gICtans,
--. Outlines of Pyrrh0nism, BK I-II
PETRUS. HISPANICUS. Summulae Logicales (L ' I
Treattses) ogtca
SUAREZ. Disputationes Metaphysicae XIX (-6)
XXIX, XXX (2, 8) '5 ,
J SAINT Cursus Philosophicus
1,USUCUs, Ars Logzca, PART I, QQ 6 8.
QQ 24-
2
5 ' ,PART II,
ARNAULD. Logic the Art of Thinking, PART III-IV
New Essays Concerning liuman Under-
standtng, BK II, CH I9
EULER. Letters to a German Princess
T. REID. Essays on the Intellectual Powers oifM
VII an,
MAINE DE BIR';N.. The Irifluence of Habit on the
Faculty of Thznkzng
SCHOPENHAUER. The World as Will and Idea
SUP, CH 10 ' VOL II,
Lectures on the Philosophy of the HUlnan
MInd, VOL PP 497-52 5
BENTHAM. RatIonale ofJudicial Evidence
--. The Book ofFallacies
WHATELY. Elements ofLogic, BK I, eH 3; BK IV
vV. HAMILTON. Lectures 011 Metaphysics and L .
VOL II (15-2 3) ogle,
\VI-IEWELL. The Pllilosophy ofthe Inductive Sciences
VOL I, BK I; VOL II, BK XI, XIII '
COURNOT. Essai sur lesfionderllents J
e
n '
, UI os connats-
et sur les characteres de la critique phi'
phtque /.oso