33. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ADELINO BARDAJE G.R. No.

L-29271 August 29, 1980 FACTS On December 20, 1965, Marcelina Cuizon lodged a complaint with the CFI of Samar against Bardaje and five others namely, Lucio Malate, Pedro Odal, Adriano Odal, Silvino Odal and Fidel Ansuas. Bardaje was arrested on December 17th and signed a confession admitting the kidnap and molestation of Marcelina on December 20th. The fiscal charged Bardaje and the 5 others with "Rape with illegal detention." Only Bardaje stood trial while the other 5 were never arrested. Marcelina alleged that at 7pm December 14, 1965, Bardaje, accompanied by the five others, entered the house and began drinking "sho hoc tong." Thereafter, Silvino Odal broke the kerosene lamp causing complete darkness. She ran to the room where her mother was while Bardaje, Pedro Odal, Fidel Ansuas, and Adriano Odal were on trail. The said men extricated her from her mother's embrace and dragged the two of them to the sala. Pedro Odal choked her mother's neck to loosen her hold Marcelina and the four men, two of whom were armed with bolos, forced her downstairs. She was brought to a mountain about two kilometers from Barrio Crossing at aroung 12 midnight. On the way, Bardaje slapped her rendering her unconscious. When regained consciousness in a hut, Bardaje was holding her hands, and removing her panty. She struggled but Bardaje succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her while his other companions stayed outside on guard. The hut was just a one-room affair where a woman and two small children lived. Marcelina further testified that at about 8am of the following day, she was brought to another mountain, arriving at the house of one called Ceferino at past noon. Ceferino lived there with his family. She was kept in a room whre Bardaje had another sexual intercourse with her in the evening. This happened despite her struggle and shouts for help. Marcelina further alleged that she curled the hair of Narita (Ceferino's daughter) the next day because Bardaje threatened to kill her if she did not. Her curling paraphernalia was taken by Adriano Odal, upon Bardaje's instructions, from Norma Fernandez (her cousin) who gave the equipment as she was also threatened. Marcelina and her "captors" stayed in Ceferino's house for two days until December 17 when Marcelina's father arrived with two soldiers. During cross-examination, Marcelina admitted that Ceferino, his wife. and seven children were living in the same hut where she was taken the second time, which hut was about waist high from the ground, consisted of one room, 3 x 2 meters, a sala, 6 x 3 meters, and a kitchen. Between the room and the sala was a wall of split bamboos so that noise inside the room could be heard clearly from the other side. Upon medical examination, Dr. Vitus Hobayan, Jr., Resident Physician at the Samar Provincial Hospital, found that there was no evidence of external injuries around the vulva or any part of the body, that there is a presence of old healed laceration at 4, 7, 12 o'clock in the hymen, that the vagina easily admits two fingers and that the vaginal smear was negative for spermatozoa. Explaining the "old healed laceration", the doctor stated that laceration may have been caused by possible sexual intercourse or other factors, and if it were intercourse, he estimated that it could have occured " say, two weeks or one month" or possibly more. For his part, Bardaje admitted having had carnal knowledge of Marcleina but denied having raped her. He claimed that they eloped on December 14 to 17, 1965 as planned, they having been sweethearts since November 12, 1964. As such, they used to date in Tacloban and "anything goes". That he was only boxed and kicked and was forced to sign a statement implicating the 5 others as his companions even if untrue during the investigation. The statement of Bardaje regarding their elopement was corroborated by Ceferino Armada. He also stated that Marcelina offered to curl his daughter's hair (Narita's and Concepcion's). The trial court found Bardaje guilty of Forcible Abduction with Rape with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and aid of armed men, and sentenced him to death. ISSUE Whether or not the accused can be found guilty beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of testimonial and documentary evidence. RULING The guilt of Bardaje has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. In crimes against chastity, the conviction or acquittal of an accused depends almost entirely on the credibility of a complainant's testimony since by the intrinsic nature of those crimes they usually involve only two persons- the complainant and the accused. The offended party's testimony, therefore, must be subjected to thorough scrutiny for a determination of its veracity beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, Marcelina's charge that she was forcibly abducted and afterwards raped by Bardaje in conspiracy with 5 others highly dubious and inherently improbable. According to the medical findings, "no evidence of external injuries was found around the vulva or any part of the body" of Marcelina, a fact which is strange, indeed, considering that Marcelina was allegedly "dragged" slapped" into unconsciousness, "wrestled" with, and criminally abused. Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than an witnesses put together. We are also faced with the medical finding of "old healed lacerations" in the hymen which, according to the testimony of the examining physician would have occurred two weeks or even one month before if said lacerations had been caused by sexual intercourse. This expert opinion bolsters the defense that Marcelina and Bardaje had previous amorous relations at the same time that it casts serious doubts on the charge of intercourse by

force and intimidation. Furthermore, the first hut where Marcelina was taken to was a small one-room affair occupied by a woman and two small children. Her charge, therefore, that she was ravished in that same room is highly improbable and contrary to human experience. Also, the second hut where she was taken, that of Ceferino Armada, consisted of a small room separated from the sala by a wall of split bamboos where Ceferino together with his wife and seven children lived. It challenges human credulity that she could have been sexually abused with so many within hearing and distance. Moreover, if rape were, indeed, the malevolent intent of Bardaje and the 5 others, they would, in all probability, have taken turns in abusing her. That they did not, indicates that there was, indeed, some special relationship between Marcelina and Bardaje. Furthermore, with people around, and the hut constructed as it was, it would have been an easy matter for Marcelina to have shouted and cried for help. Surely, Ceferino, his wife and/or his children could not have been insensible to her outcries notwithstanding their relationship to the accused. The aphorism still rings true that evidence to be believed must not only come from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself. Additionally, the curling of the hair of Narita, one of Ceferino's daughters, is inconsistent with her allegation of "captivity". In respect of the alleged confession of Bardaje, it is to be remebered that "an extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is proved when the evidence on record shows that the crime prosecuted had been committed. That proof has not been met in the case at bar, the evidence establishing more of an elopement rather than kidnapping or illegal detention or forcible abduction, and much less rape. Moreover, Bardaje made the confession without benefit of counsel nor of anyone to advise him of his rights aside from his declaration that said confession was obtained through maltreatment and violence. The judgment appealed from imposing the death penalty, is reversed and the appellant, Adelino Bardaje, acquitted of the crime with which he is charged.

34. ROMEO SISON et al. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CA G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995. FACTS From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against 11 persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. The prosecution presented 12 witnesses, including 2 eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling. On July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities. Despite this setback, 3000 of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta at 2:30pm of the scheduled day. Led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the IBP, the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. Col. Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked the leaders for their permit. As none could be produced, they were given 10 min. to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for 30 minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators." Atty. Nuega added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo !" At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang gumanti, tayo ngayon !" A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan !" The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already fallen. Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear. Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!" Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did. Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers. He sat on some cement steps and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?"The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until

Salcedo collapsed and lost consciousness. Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various contusions, abrasions, lacerated wounds and skull fractures. The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and foreign. The press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the following day, capturing national and international attention. This prompted Pres. Aquino to order the Capital Regional Command and the Western Police District to investigate the incident. A reward of P10,000.00 was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for persons who could give information leading to the arrest of the killers. Several persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the basis of their identification, several persons, including the accused, were apprehended and investigated. For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and offered their respective alibis. Accused Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented by the prosecution because he was in his house in Q.C. at that time. Neri claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of the incident. Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at that time. He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility and that he cannot run normally nor do things forcefully. Delos Santos admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. He said that he merely watched the mauling which explains why his face appeared in some of the photographs. Pacadar admits having attended the rally on that fateful day but he merely viewed the incident. His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting Salcedo. Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The trial court found Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery. Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however, acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. The CA modified the decision by acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the information against him did not allege the said qualifying circumstance. ISSUE Whether or not the testimonies of the two in prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, are worthy of credence. Whether or not the photographs presented in the instant case are admissible as evidence. RULING 1. According to the accused, the testimonies of the two witnesses are suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced by General Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted three sworn statements to the police geared at providing a new or improved version of the incident. On the witness stand, he mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another case as accused Rolando Fernandez. Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and unresponsive prompting the trial court to reprimand him several times. There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward announced by General Lim, much less that both or either of them ever received such reward from the government. On the contrary, the evidence shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted his sworn statement immediately two hours after the mauling, even before announcement of any reward. He informed the police that he would cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants if he saw them again. The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them and his testimony incredible. The sworn statements were made to identify more suspects who were apprehended during the investigation of Salcedo's death. The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on the witness stand for being argumentative and evasive. This is not reason to reject Sumilang's testimony for he did not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely untrustworthy witness. It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts but disbelieved with respect to the others. 2. The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. When the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through counsel, objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. However, when the accused presented their evidence, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used the photographs presented as exhibits" to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. The photographs were adopted by Tamayo and Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused

per understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility. The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person who took the same was not presented to identify them. However, the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. The decision is affirmed with modification that Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and Richard de los Santos are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a consequence, he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

35. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO ADOVISO G.R. No. 116196-97 June 23, 1999 FACTS Adoviso was charged with the murder of Rufino Agunos and Emetrio Vasquez. The spouses Emeterio and Anastacia Vasquez had two adjacent houses in the place where the killing took place. One of the houses was a camalig the living area of which had walls of bamboo. This area was elevated from the ground. Three steps led down to an awning walled with bamboo slats. These slats were placed horizontally approximately four to six inches apart. A portion of the awning was used as a kitchen but another portion had a papag where Rufino Agunos (Vasquez's grandson) slept. The spouses son Bonifacio occupied the other house eight (8) meters from the camalig with his own son Elmer. At around 8pm of February 18, 1990, Emeterio Vazquez, while preparing coffee, was shot inside the camalig. The edge of gun used in the killing, as witnessed by Anastacia (Emetrio's wife), was protruding on the wall near the stairs where Emeterio went down. A lamp near the stairs where Emeterio drank coffee illuminated the camalig but Anastacia failed to recognize the persons who fired their guns at her husband. Upon hearing the gunshots, Bonifacio and his son elmer. Who were at the adjacent house, immediately went down the front yard to investigate. From a distance of 8 meters, Bonifacio saw Rufino being shot by several persons from the outside. Looking through the bamboo slats of the camalig wall, Bonifacio recognized one of the assailants, with a large built and long hair, as Pablo Adoviso because of the gas lamp that was lighted inside the camalig. Of Rufino's assailants, only Adoviso was not wearing a mask. Adoviso was holding a long firearm wrapped inside a sack with its muzzle protruding and directed where Rufino was sleeping. Adoviso then fired hitting Rufino. At that moment, Bonifacio heard Emeterio shout "Pino" and saw him go down the stairs carrying a gas lamp. Adoviso fired again, hitting Emeterio at the stomach. Elmer also testified that he saw 5 persons aiming their firearms at the camalig. Only Adoviso had not covered his face. 3 of the assailants were positioned in a ditch near the camalig while 2 were near its door. Elmer saw these 5 persons shoot Rufino. Although hit, Rufino was able to crawl under the papag. Emetrio was also hit on the stomach but he managed to up the camalig. Adoviso and his companion by the camalig door fired at Elmer upon seeing him while the 3 others at the ditch escaped. Elmer fled towards the coconut plantation. After the incident, while Elmer attended to the wounded Rufino and Emetrio, Bonifacio went to the municipal building of Bula to fetch the police. Both Emeterio and Rufino died early the next morning. Adoviso interposed alibi and denial as his defense. He claimed that in the evening of the incident from 7pm to 11pm, he was in Sitio Durabod, Palsong, about a kilometer away from the CAFGU headquarters. He, together with others, had some drinks in the store of Honoria Tragante. Honoria Tragante and Francisco Bislombre corroborated appellant's alibi. Antero Esteron likewise testified that from 7:00 until past 11:00 of the said night, he and Adoviso had a drinking spree at the Tragante store. Adoviso, in support of his denial, presented Lt. Antonio Lopez who identified a police certification prepared by Pfc. Ramon N. Canabe to the effect that the shooting incident was perpetrated "by unidentified armed men." Lopez was one of those who brought the victims to the hospital who were then still conscious. The victims told him that they did not know who shot them or why they were shot. SPO2 Claro Ballebar, however testified that several days after the incident, Bonifacio Vasquez told him him during the follow-up investigation that he "vividly saw the incident and recognized" Adoviso as one of the perpetrators of the crime. The defense offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph Examiner II of the NBI in Manila, who conducted a polygraph test on Adoviso. Lucena opined that Adoviso's ''polygrams revealed that there were no specific reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevant" to the investigation of the crimes.

Bonifacio Vasquez further revealed that he did not identify appellant as one of the culprits when he reported the incident to the police because he was afraid of Adovsio who was a member of the CAFGU. Nevertheless, Bonifacio mentioned to the police that he recognized Adoviso as one of the perpetrators of the crime although he told them that he did not recognize the other four. He did not mention to Lopez and Canabe Adovioso's identity because he was "confused" about what had happened in their house. The trial court found Adoviso guilty of 2 counts of murder. ISSUE Whether or not the accused was properly identified in the light of the circumstances of the case. Whether or not the result of the polygraph test can be used to absolve Adoviso from liability. RULING 1. Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious. In this case, not one but two gas lamps illuminated the place (the one placed inside the camalig and that held by Emeterio as he descended from the stairs after the first volley of gunfire). Moreover, the bamboo slats of the camalig could not have effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of Adovsio considering that the slats were built four meters apart. Furthermore, Bonifacio had known Adoviso for ten years while Elmer had been acquainted with him for four years. Familiarity with his face and appearance minimized if not erased the possibility that they could have been mistaken as to his identity. Adoviso's alibi thus crumbles in the face of his positive identification as one of the perpetrators of the crimes. For an alibi to prosper, there must be proof that the defendant was not only somewhere else when the crime was committed but that he could not be physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. This fact was not proved by Adoviso. 2. A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinee's conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person who lie deliberately will have rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which will be recorded on the graph. However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraphs tests when offered in evidence for the purposes of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and ascertaining truth or deception. Same rule applies in the Philippines. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.

36. EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING vs. CA and ANGELITA DIAMANTE G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001 FACTS This case involves a petition for habeas corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr. Edgardo Tijing, Jr. was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila to petitioners. Bienvenida Tijing served as the laundrywoman of Angelita Diamante. Sometime in August of 1989, Angelita went to Bienvenida's house for an urgent laundry job. As the latter was on her way to do some marketing, Angelita was asked to wait for her return and was left the care Edgardo, Jr. (then 4 month old). Upon Bienvenida's return, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were nowhere to be found. She later discovered that Angelita moved to another house. Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of Angelita, whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida went to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she saw Edgardo, Jr. The boy who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite demand. Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court to recover their son. They presented two witnesses, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical records.Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He also declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children. On the other hand, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserted that at age 42, she gave birth

to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She said that the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989. The trial court ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have children and that there exists a strong facial similarity between the child and Bienvenida. The CA reversed the decision. ISSUE Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of petitioners. RULING The following evidence presented by Bienvenida proved that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.: 1.Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted. 2. Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of an accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring. 3. The trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. The trial court's conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner concerned. 4. Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book discharge.

37. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002 FACTS This case involves the rape&slaying of a 9-year old girl. The victim's mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1pm of July 10, 1999, she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbor's house so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of the accused, could help Daisy with her lessons. An hour later, Daisy came back with the accused to look for a book which the accused could copy to make a drawing that Daisy would submit to her teacher. Daisy and accused then went back to the latter's house. At about 5:30pm, Daisy was still not home so Ma. Nilda looked for her and proceeded to the house of Aimee. Aimee's mother told her that Daisy was not there. Ma. Nida continued to look for Daisy but to no avail. At about 7pm., Ma. Nida went back to her neighbor's house, and there saw the accused, who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmate's house to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she was told that Daisy had not been there. Jessiemin Mataverde told Ma. Nida that Daisy was playing in front of her house that afternoon and even watched television in her house, but that Daisy later left with the accused. The search for Daisy continued but remained fruitless. At about 10am of July 11, 1999, the dead body of Daisy was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the "compuerta." Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. The accused was invited by the policemen for questioning as he was the suspect for the perpetration of the crime. Jessiemin testified that at around 5pm of July 10, 1999, while she and her daughter were in front of a store across the street from her house, accused arrived to buy a stick of Marlboro cigarette. Accused had only his basketball shorts on and was just holding his shirt. Both his shorts and his shirt were wet. Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified that at about 4:30pm of the same day, July 10, 1999, while she and her husband and children were walking towards the "compuerta" they met the accused near the seashore and noticed that he was uneasy and looked troubled. She also testified that accused's shorts and shirt were wet, but his face and hair were not. The police recovered the white basketball shirt and the violet basketball shorts worn by the accused the day before. The shirt and shorts, which were bloodstained, were turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination. Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite, testified that the accused told him that he killed the victim by strangling her. He claimed that he was under the influence of drugs. Atty. Lupo Leyva corroborated Mayor Abutan's testimony. Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999, he took blood samples from accused-

appellant in his office for laboratory examination to determine his blood type. Likewise, the basketball shorts and shirt worn by the accused and the victim's clothing were turned over to the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI by PO1 Amoranto of the Rosario, Cavite police for the purpose of determining the presence of human blood and its groups. The results of the examinations conducted showed the accused to belong to Group "O". The clothings presented were all positive for the presence of human blood showing the reactions of Group "A". NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from the accused as well as buccal swabs and hair samples from the parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. The samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for examination. Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests on the specimens collected by Dr. Vertido. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of the accused and the victim. The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of rape with homicide. ISSUE Whether or not accused can be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Whether or the results of the DNA analysis proves the guilt of the accused. RULING 1. An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. In rape with homicide, the evidence against an accused is more often than not circumstantial. This is because the nature of the crime, where only the victim and the rapist would have been present at the time of its commission, makes the prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator. Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand direct evidence proving the modality of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is unreasonable. 2. DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim's body for the suspect's DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim. The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample.The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results: a) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion; b) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or c) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the similarity. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of the accused, the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of human DNA due to the inadequacy of the specimens presented for examination and not due to contamination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of the accused. The totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that the accused is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court. This is how it is in this case. The decision finding the accused guilty of the crime rape with homicide is affirmed.

38. Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso, Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-21438. September 28, 1966. FACTS Carrascoso traveled through the agent of Air France, PAL from Manila to Rome. PAL issued a first class ticket to Carrascoso, it having marked "ok". From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso was seated in the first class accommodation but

he was forced to vacate his first class seat upon arriving at Bangkok as there was a white man who had the better right to such seat. A commotion ensued yet the captain refused to intervene. Carrascoso was transferred to the tourist accommodation against his will. Hence, an action for damages was instituted against Air France. Air France contended that Carrascoso was aware of the that he had no confirmed reservations in the first class accommodation. One of the pieces of evidence was the log book of the purser who entered the incident in his log book, stating 'First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will and that the captain refused to intervene'. Air France objected to its admissibility. The trial court ruled in favor of Carrascoso and awarded the latter among others, moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. ISSUE 1. Whether or not Carrascoso had the right to the first class accommodation. 2. Whether or not the record on the log book is admissible. RULING 1. It has been established that the tickets paid for by Carrascoso were all first class accommodations and are confirmed ok. In its counter argument, Air France wanted to prove that a confirmation was necessary in Hongkong for the said first class tickets, but the Court disbelieved such statements. It has noted that oral evidence to that effect cannot prevail over written evidence as the tickets has been clearly marked ok and the same were exhibited and admitted in court. 2. The record in the log book is admissible, the rule on the best evidence does not apply in the instant case. The subject of the inquiry is not the entry in the log book but the incident itself. Also, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.

39. People of the Philippines vs Hon. Bienvenido Tan, Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales, Anglelita Centeno, Julia Carpio, Calixto Hermosa and Crispula Pagaran G.R. No. L-14257. July 31, 1959. FACTS Pacita Gonzales, Centeno, Hermosa and Pagaran were charged of falsification of public document in their capacity as public officials and employees that by having made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or merchandise were purchased by Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents or sufferers, in such quantities and at such prices and from such business establishments or persons as are made to appear in the said public documents, when in fact and in truth, no such distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and supposedly purchased by said Pacita Gonzales. The evidence presented consisted of booklets of receipts issued by Metro Drug Corporation marked as Exhibit D. While the witness was presented, Judge Tan interrupted the proceedings and held that the booklet of receipts are inadmissible as the same are merely triplicate copies, the same in violation of the best evidence rule. Hence, this petition. ISSUE Whether or not the triplicate copies of the receipts are admissible in evidence in the context of the "best evidence rule". RULING Yes. The admissibly of duplicates or triplicates has long been a settled question. "When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces 2 facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others." A carbon copy of the original is admissible in evidence and possess all the probative value of the original, and the same does not require an accounting for the non-production of the original. Triplicates are admissible without accounting for the originals.

40. People of the Philippines vs Mario Tandoy G. R. No. 80505.December 04, 1990. FACTS Tandoy was charged of a violation of RA 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In a buy-bust operation conducted, Tandoy was caught in possession of 8 pieces of marijuana flowering tops, 2 pieces dried marijuana flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops, which are all prohibited. Among the pieces of evidence

presented were the photocopies of the marked money marked as ANU meaning Anti-narcotics Unit consisting of one 10peso bill and two 5-peso bills. The admission of these photocopies was objected to by Tandoy being merely a photocopy and therefore a violation of the best evidence rule. ISSUE Whether or not the photocopy of the 10-peso bill is admissible in evidence. RULING The photocopy of the 10-peso bill is admissible in evidence. The Best Evidence Rule does not apply in the instant case. The Revised Rules on Evidence provides that the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the contents of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply. In the instant case, since what is in issue is the existence of the marked money, not its contents, substitutionary evidence, like a Xerox copy is admissible without the need of accounting for the original.

41. The United States vs Bernardo Gregorio and Eustaquio Balistoy G.R. No. L-5791. December 17, 1910. FACTS Salazar is a creditor of Balistoy. He obtained a money judgment against Balistoy. Balistoy failed to pay the same. Salazar then moved for the attachment of Balistoys property which include 2 rural properties . Gregorio however moved to intervene in the auction sale of these properties contending that he owned one of the said properties. As evidence, he presented a memorandum of a private sale showing that such claimed property is owned by him. In response, Salazar filed an action for falsification of private document against Gregorio and Balistoy contending that the memorandum was shown to have been executed in 1905 when in truth and in fact it was executed in 1908. As proof, a photocopy of the alleged memorandum was presented, and a further testimony of the sheriff that he saw once the original of the alleged memorandum. The lower court convicted both Gregorio and Balistoy. ISSUE Whether or not the photocopy of the alleged memorandum of a private sale is admissible in evidence in charging the crime of falsification. RULING tTe photocopy of the alleged memorandum of a private sale is inadmissible in evidence in charging the crime of falsification In the prosecution of falsification cases, it is important to note that judges and courts should have before them the original document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited or falsified, in order to find, pursuant to the evidence produces in the cause, whether or not the crime of falsification was committed and also, to enable them to determine the degree of each defendants liability in the crime of falsification. In the instant case, the original copy of the alleged memorandum had not been presented. Hence, there could be no basis by which the crime of falsification can be prosecuted. Accused Gregorio and Balistoy are acquitted.

42. The Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga vs. Hon. Hermogenes Reyes Andres Guevarra G.R. No. 35366. August 05, 1931. FACTS The Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed two Informations for libel against Guevarra for having maliciously published a malicious statement against Clemente Dayrit and Mario Nepomuceno. The fiscal seked to present as evidence for the prosecution copies of the Ing Magumasid containing the liberous article with the innuendo, an article in the vernacular published in the same weekly, and its translation into Spanish. Counsel for the Guevarra objected to this evidence, which objection was sustained by the court. Guevarra filed a petition for mandamus praying for the admission of such evidences. ISSUE Whether or not the newspaper article exhibited in evidence for the crime of libel in admissible. RULING The newspaper article exhibited in evidence for the crime of libel in admissible. The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel or slander. The evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay. This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production of the best evidence, is applicable to the present case. And certainly the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of an article published in it.

43. Compana Maritima vs. Free Allied Workers Union et al. G.R. No. L-23893.May 24, 1977. FACTS On August 11, 1952 the Compana Maritima and the Allied Free Workers Union entered into a written contract whereby the union agreed to perform arrastre and stevedoring work for the consignees. The contract was to be effective for one month counted from August 12, 1952. It was stipulated that the company could revoke the contract before the expiration of the term if the union failed to render proper service. It was also stipulated that the company would not be liable for the payment of the services of the union "for the loading, unloading and deliveries of cargoes" and that the compensation for such services would be paid "by the owners and consigness of the cargoes". The shippers and consignees paid the union for the arrastre work. They refused to pay for the stevedoring service. They claimed that the shipowner was the one obligated to pay for the stevedoring service because the bill of lading provided that the unloading of the cargo was at the shipowner's expense. On the other hand, the company refused to pay for the stevedoring service because the contract provided that the compensation for both arrastre and stevedoring work should be paid by the shippers and consignees. The company entered into a new stevedoring and arrastre contract with the Iligan Stevedoring Association alleging that the Union is inefficient in the performance of the service. The union members then picketed the wharf which lasted for nine days and prevented the Iligan Stevedoring Association from performing arrastre and stevedoring work. The company sued the union and its officers for the rescission of the aforementioned 1952 contract, to enjoin the union from interfering with the loading and unloading of the cargo, and for the recovery of damages. Claiming for damages, the company alleged that by reason of the acts of harassment and obstruction perpetrated by the union in the loading and unloading of cargo and of the inefficiency of the Union, the company lost P450K. The cliam for demages was supported by an auditor's report which was made by the accountants hired by Compana. The court awarded Compana 450K by way of damages based on the auditor's report. ISSUE Whether or not the auditor's report is admissible. RULING The accountants' reports/auditor's reports are inadmissible in evidence. The rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss-of time and the fact sought to be established from them is the general result of the whole, the original writings need not be produced" does not apply. The rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the records, on which the accountants' reports were based, was not duly established. It is a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the company, of the summary may be tested on cross-examination. Such was not the case in the instant case. What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like" That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending the production of the records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court.

44. Villa Rey Transit, Inc vs. Eusebio Ferrer, Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc., and Public Service Commission October 29 1968. GR L-23893 FACTS Villarama was an operator of a bus transportaion under the business name of Villa Rey Transit pursuant to certificates of public convenience granted by the Public Service Commission (PSC). He subsequently sold the two certificates of public convenience in favor of Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc (PANTRANCO) with an agreement that he shall not for a period of 10 years from the date of this sale, apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the buyer. Only three months after the sale, a corporation called Villa Rey Transit, Inc was organized with the wife of Villarama as the treasurer and having the least subscription of its stocks. Villa Rey purchased from Fernando five certificates of public convenience to be fully paid upon the approval of the sale by the PSC. On the day of the execution of the sale, Villa Rey applied with the PSC to provisionally operate the service involved. Subsequently, two of the five certificates of public convenience were levied by the Sheriff, sold at a public auction and eventually sold to Ferrer who also sold to PANTRANCO. The latter applied with the PSC for an authorization to provisionally operate the servicsye involved therein. The PSC granted the authority to PANTRANCO. Villa Rey brought the matter to the Supreme Court which ordered to give the authority to Villa Rey while the issue on ownership has not yet been determined.

10

Pantranco filed a third-party complaint against Jose M. Villarama, alleging that Villarama and the Corporation, are one and the same; that Villarama and/or the Corporation was disqualified from operating the two certificates in question by virtue of the aforementioned agreement between said Villarama and Pantranco, which stipulated that Villarama "shall not for a period of 10 years from the date of this sale, apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the buyer." PANTRANCO presented as evidence Celso Rivera, accountant of the Corporation, who testified that while in the books of the corporation there appears an entry that the treasurer received P95,000.00 as second installment of the paid-in subscriptions, and, subsequently, also P100,000.00 as the first installment of the offer for second subscriptions worth P200,000.00 from the original subscribers, yet Villarama directed him to make vouchers liquidating the sums. Thus, it was made to appear that the P95,000.00 was delivered to Villarama in payment for equipment purchased from him, and the P100,000.00 was loaned as advances to the stockholders. Villarama was accordingly given notice to produce the ledgers and the vouchers. As none of the originals was produced by Villarama, photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers showing that Villarama had co-mingled his personal funds and transactions with those made in the name of the Corporation were introduced. Villarama has assailed the admissibility of these evidences contending that no evidentiary value whatsoever should be given to them since "they were merely photostatic copies of the originals, the best evidence being the originals themselves." According to him, at the time Pantranco offered the said exhibits, it was the most likely possessor of the originals thereof because they were stolen from the files of the Corporation and only Pantranco was able to produce the alleged photostat copies thereof. ISSUE Whether or not the photostatic copies of the ledgers and vouchers are admissible. RULING The photostatic copies of the ledgers and vouchers are admissible. Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the adverse party, thus: (1) opponent's possession of the original; (2) reasonable notice to opponent to produce the original; (3) satisfactory proof of its existence; and (4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in court. Villarama has practically admitted the second and fourth requisites. As to the third, he admitted their previous existence in the files of the Corporation and also that he had seen some of them. Regarding the first element, Villarama's theory is that since even at the time of the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum, the originals were already missing, therefore, the Corporation was no longer in possession of the same. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence to show that the original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that the writing is in his possession or under his control. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument should, on being notified to produce it, admit having it in his possession. Hence, secondary evidence is admissible where he denies having it in his possession. The party calling for such evidence may introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is "when the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court." The originals of the vouchers in question must be deemed to have been lost, as even the Corporation admits such loss.

45. E. Michael & Co., Inc vs. Adriano Enriquez G.R. No. L-10824. December 24, 1915. FACTS The action sprang from a sale with a right of repurchase made by Enriquez in favor of E. Michael and E. Michael & Co., sociedad en comandita, the latter claming to be the successor, by virtue of an instrument duly executed and delivered transferring property, business and assets, including the land in question. It was alleged that the period to repurchase the property had expired. Thus, the title had been consolidated in favor of E. Michael & Co. To prove its claim, E. Michael & Co. Souhgt to prove the due execution of the instrument of sale with a right of repurchase and that such instrument was lost. This act of petitioner was objected to. The court sustained the objections. ISSUE Whether or not the lower court erred in refusing E. Michael & Co. to prove the due execution and delivery of the instrument of sale with a right of repurchase and that the same is lost. RULING The lower court committed an error when it refused to admit proof of due execution and delivery of the instrument and its subsequent lost. Lower courts are correct in refusing admission pieces of evidence which are incompetent. For evidence on the contents of written instruments to be admissible, the original writing must be produced and proved. This accepts certain exceptions. It is has been lost, there must be proof of its lost and only until such time that loss is proven can proof of its contents can be duly proved. Thus, it is necessary for secondary evidence to be admissible, the following must be proved: 1. that the document was duly executed and delivered, where delivery is necessary; 2. that it has been lost or destroyed. The execution and delivery of the document may be established by the following: 1. persons who executed it; 2. persons before whom its execution was acknowledged;

11

3. any person who was present and saw it executed and delivered; 4.any person who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the signatures; 5. any person to whom the parties to the instruments has previously confessed the execution thereof. On the other hand, the destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by the following persons: 1. any person who know the fact of its loss; 2. any person who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; 3. any person who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost. Once proof of the due execution and delivery of the instrument and its subsequent loss, proof of its contents may be proved by the following: 1. any person who signed the document, or who read it, or who heard it read knowing, or it being proved from other sources, that the document so read was the one in question; 2. any person who was present when the contents of the document was talked over between the parties thereto to such an extent as to give him reasonably full information as to its contents; 4. any person to who the parties to the instrument have confessed or stated the contents thereof; 5. by a copy thereof; 6. a recital of its contents in some authentic document. Objections in the lower court were sustained primarily on the ground that counsel for E. Michael & Co characterized the instrument as an instrument of transfer or cession. On this basis alone, although erroneous, the lower court has erred in cutting off the counsel all together instead of allowing him to prove the due execution, delivery and the loss of the instrument. A new trial is in order.

46. Basilio De Vera et al. vs. Spouses Mariano and Leona Aguilar G.R. No. 83377. February 09, 1993. FACTS Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria and respondent Leona are all children of Marcosa Bernabe. During her lifetime, Marcosa owned the land in dispute. She mortgaged it to one Atty. Leonardo Bordador and was redeemed by Spouses Aguilar. Subsequently, Marcosa sold the same property to the Spouses Aguilar evidence by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Mariano Aguilar obtained a free patent to the land and was issued an Original Certificate of Title. Subsequently, petitioners wrote a letter to Spouses Aguilar asking for the partition of the subject property as co-owners with a threat that refusal to do so would result to a falsification case. The Spouses refused. So a falsification of public document case was filed against them but the same was dismissed by the court. Petitioners filed an action for reconveyance of the property contending that the Spouses sold back the property to Marcosa. The lower court ruled in their favor. Sps. Aguilar appelaed alleging that petitioners failed to present the original of the alleged Deed of Sale executed by the Spouses in favor of Marcosa as only a photocopy of the Deed was presented. Petitioners averred that the due execution of the Deed has been duly proved by the testimony of the Notary Public before whom the document was acknowledged and by Luis De Vera who was present during its execution and that the loss was duly proved by the testimony of the representatives of the offices of the National Archives and the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court. ISSUE Whether or not the photocopy of the alleged Deed of Sale is admissible in evidence. RULING The photocopy of the alleged Deed of Sale is not admissible in evidence. The Rules of Court provide in Section 4 (now Section 5, Rule 130) that: Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses. Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. Before the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must first establish the existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The petitioners has established in the lower court the due execution of the Deed by the testimony of the Notary Public. After having established the execution, it must likewise be established that the instrument is lost. In the case, the Notary Public testified that the Deed comes in four or five copies. In this regard, all the original copies must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be offered. However, only 3 copies has been accounted for. Luis

12

De Vera claimed that one copy is with the Register of Deeds but no proof of loss was presented. The absence of knowledge of loss of the National Archives Division of the instrument is not sufficient basis for its loss.

47. Marina Llemos et al. vs. Romeo Llemos et al G.R. No. 150162.. January 26, 2007. FACTS Petitioners and respondents are all heirs of Saturnina Salvatin. Saturnina had 4 children, Adriano, Santiago, Domingo and Felipe. Petitioners are the heirs of Felipe while respondents are the heirs of the other three children. Saturnina owned a parcel of land. On a certain date, the Register of Deeds cancelled the Certificate of Title in the name of Saturnina and a new one issued in the name of Felipe by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale thumbmarked by Saturnina in 1964. In 1991, Jovita, one of the respondents borrowed the title of the property and discovered that the same is already in the name of Felipe. So respondents filed an action for annulment of the Transfer Certificate of Title on the ground that Saturnina could not have executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, thumbmarked by her in 1964 because she died in 1938. To prove her death in 1938, respondents presented a Certificate of Death issued by Rev. Fr. Camilo Natividad on January 29, 1991, attesting that Saturnina died on March 12, 1938 and was buried in the Roman Catholic Cemetery. The Certificate attests that it is a true copy of the original records as it appears in the Register of Dead of the Parish. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision. ISSUE Whether or not the Certificate of Death is admissible in evidence. RULING The Certificate of Death is not admissible. After the enactment of General Orders No. 68 and Act No. 190, Church registries of births, marriages, and deaths are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence. As provided by Sec. 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: a. by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or b. by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. In the instant case, respondents failed to prove the authenticity and due execution of the Certificate of Death for having failed to present a witness to that effect. The CA also committed an error in admitting as evidence the entry in the Registry Book of St. John Metropolitan Cathedral as to the date of death on the ground that it is an entry in the course of official business which is an exception to the hearsay rule. Respondents failed to submit as evidence the Register of Dead. There was also no compliance with the rule provided in Sec. 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of court to the effect that the original document must be produced and no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the certain cases such as: 1. when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offerror; 2. when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; 3. when the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; 4. when the original is public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. The respondents failed to show that their failure to present the Register of Dead falls under any of the exceptions. The respondents likewise failed to prove that Salvatin Salvatin mentioned in the Certificate of Death is the same Saturnina Salvatin referred to by them as their predecessor -in-interest; and that Fr. Natividad has personal knowledge of the date of death of Salvatin Salvatin. Thus, contentions of respondents must fail as opposed to the Notarized Deed of Sale which establishes prima facie the authenticity and due execution of the document.

48. National Power Corporation vs. Hon. Ramon Codilla, Bangpai Shipping Company and Wallem Shipping, Inc. G.R. No. 170491. April 04, 2007. FACTS M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned by Bangpai Shipping Company bumped a power barged owned by NPC. Thus, NPC filed an action for damages against Bangpai. Among the pieces of evidence exhibited by NPC are photocopies of certain documents proving its claim for damages manually signed by its officers. Bangpai posed an objection on the admissibility of these documents for violating the Best Evidence Rule of the Rules of Court. NPC countered that these photocopies are admissible as they consist of Electronic Evidence sanctioned by the Rule on Electronic Evidence. The RTC ruled in favor of the Bangpai. The CA sustained the RTC. ISSUE Whether or not the photocopies of the documents manually signed by the officers of NPC are admissible.

13

RULING The documents which are manually signed are inadmissible under the purview of the Rule on Electronic Evidence. Section 1, Rule 2, Rules on Electronic Evidence defines Electronic Document as follows: (h) Electronic document refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. F or the purpose of these Rules, the term electronic document may be used interchangeably with electronic data message. The Rules use the word information to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This suggests that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. What differentiates an electronic document however with respect to a paper-based document is the manner the information contained therein is processed. In the instant case, what are offered in evidence are photocopies manually signed. NPC contended that the photocopies are considered as electronic evidence under the catch-all proviso of Par. H, Sec. 1, Rule 2, Rules on Electronic Evidence: x x x any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. The contention is untenable. It should be remembered that the signatures affixed in the document were manually done. Therefore, not all the information contained therein are processed electronically, thus, not falling within the definition of Electronic Document. The Best Evidence Rule requires the presentation of the original document when the contents of an instrument or document is in issue. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by: (1)a copy; (2) a recital of its contents in some authentic document; (3) testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offerror of secondary evidence must prove the following: 1.the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; 2. the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; 3. it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places. NPC failed to show that it has complied for the foregoing rules in its attempt to offer the photocopies of the document. Therefore, its claim is denied.

49. People of the Philippines vs. Gorgonio Villarama G.R. No. 139211. February 12, 2003. FACTS Villarama was charged and convicted for the crime of Rape committed against the Elizabeth Tumulak, the youngest daughter of her sister, Merlita. Elizabeth, four years old, together with her other two elder sisters, were left in their house on the day of the incident. When Villarama arrived, the other two elder sisters were asked by Villarama to pasture the goats leaving Elizabeth with her uncle. Villarama then took the opportunity to pursue his evil desires, undressed her, and made her lie down while he pulled down his pants and briefs to his knees, and then mounted his niece. On that scenario, Ricardo Tumulak, the brother of Elizabeths father came to the house and saw the accused Villarama. When the latter noticed Ricardo, he hurriedly went out of the house through the backdoor. Elizabeth told her parents what happened when they arrived. The RTC found Villarama guilty and sentenced him to death. Villarama questioned his conviction since of the non-presentation of the victim Elizabeth on the witness stand and invokes the doctrine of willful suppression of evidence which raises the presumption that such evidence was adverse to the prosecution. Accused likewise asserted that the testimonies of the victim's parents were hearsay since they did not witness the actual rape and were only relating the rape as allegedly told to them by Elizabeth. ISSUE

14

1. Whether or not there was suppression of evidence. 2. Whether or not the testimonies of the victim's parents are hearsay. RULING 1. The contention of the accused is without merit. Unlike countless other rape cases perpetrated in relative isolation and secrecy, where only the victim can testify on the forced coitus, the offense here was providentially witnessed by another person, an adult, who was definitely more articulate in describing the sensitive details of the crime. While the victim's testimony of the assault would have added support to accused's conviction, the same was not indispensable. The intent of the prosecution was to spare the victim from further trauma which could have resulted from being placed on the witness stand. Moreoever, the prosecution did not suppress any evidence. The victim was present in the court room a few times during the trial. The defense could have called Elizabeth to the stand as a hostile witness but it did not. 2. The testimonies are not hearsay. There are several well-entrenched exceptions to the hearsay rule under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Pertinent to the case at bar is Section 42 which provides: SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. To be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement must be spontaneous, made during a startling occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, and must relate to the circumstance of such occurrence. In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the victim was subjected to a startling occurrence when she pointed to accused as her assailant. It is evident from the records that the statement was spontaneous because the time gap from the sexual assault to the time the victim recounted her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant was very short. Obviously, there was neither capability nor opportunity for the 4-year-old victim to fabricate her statement.

50. Nicasio Borje vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines November 25, 1983. G. R. No. L-55436. FACTS An action for falsification of public document was filed against Borje, then, Provincial Plant Industry Officer for having allegedly falsified the payroll covering January to March, 1977 and the Daily Time Record (DTR) of one Ducusin. Ducusin was a Plant Officer, and in 1976, he became the Production Technician and was receiving NFAC incentive pay. In 1977, he claimed to have been transferred to the Surveillance Team by verbal order, hence is no longer entitled to the NFAC incentive pay. He found out however that despite his claim that he is no longer entitled to the NFAC incentive pay, it was made to appear that he is still covered by the same, that he signed the DTR and the payroll and that his name appeared in Special Order 172. The SB convicted Borje. ISSUE Whether or not the SB erred in convicting Borje in believing that Ducusin was transferred to the Surveillance team and thus no longer entitled to the NFAC incentive pay. RULING The SB has committed an error in believing that indeed Ducusin was transferred to the Surveillance team on the basis only of the claimed verbal order. According to the Supreme Court, the alleged verbal order is doubtful for under normal and usual official procedure, q written special order issued by a government office is cancelled, amended or modified only by another written special order, not only for purposes of record on file but also to prevent conflict and confusion in government operations. Moreover, under the best evidence rule, Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the supposed verbal order cannot prevail over the written Special Order 172. Decision is reversed.

51. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA, deceased, MARCELA RODELAS vs. AMPARO ARANZA, et al. December 07, 1982. G.R. No. L-58509. FACTS Rodelas filed a petition for the probate of the will of Bonilla and applied for the issuance of letters testamentary. The evidence presented consists of a photostatic copy of the holographic will executed by Bonilla. However, the petition for probate and the application for letters testamentary were opposed by Aranza on the ground that the alleged holographic will and not merely the photostatic copy thereof must be produced and that a lost holographic will cannot be proved by a photostatic copy thereof.

15

The lower court initially granted the petition but on motion for reconsideration, reveresed its decision. ISSUE Whether or not a lost or destroyed holographic will can be proved by a photostatic copy. RULING The lost or destroyed holographic will can be proved by a photostatic copy. If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or Xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity. But, it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court.

52. RODRIGO ENRIQUEZ, et al. vs. SOCORRO A. RAMOS G.R. No. L-18077 September 29, 1962 FACTS This case involves a foreclosure proceedings. Sometime in 1966, plaintiffs entered into a contract of conditional sale with Pedro del Rosario covering a parcel of land in Q.C. with a total area of 77,772 square meters for P10 per sq.m. A performance bond in the amount of P100K was executed by Pedro del Rosario to guarantee the performance of the conditions. Del Rosario was given possession of the land for development as a subdivision at his expense. He undertook to pay for the subdivision survey, the construction of roads, the installation of light and water, and the income tax plaintiffs may be required to pay arising from the transaction, in consideration of which Del Rosario was allowed to buy the property for P600K within two years with the condition that, upon failure to pay the price when due, all the improvements introduced by him would automatically become part of the property without any right on his part to reimbursement and the conditional sale would be rescinded. Unable to pay the consideration of P600K, plaintiffs and Del Rosario, together with defendant Ramos, who was a partner of the latter, entered into a contract of rescission on Nov. 24, 1958. To release the performance bond and to enable Ramos to pay some of the lots for her own purposes, plaintiffs allowed Ramos to buy 20 of the lots herein involved at the rate of P16.00 per sq.m. on condition that she will assume the payment of P50K as her share in the construction of roads and other improvements required in the subdivision. This situation led to the execution of the contract of sale subject of the present foreclosure proceedings. Ramos purchased the said 20 parcels of land for P235,056.00 of which only P35,056.00 was paid on the date of sale, the balance being payable within two years from the date of sale, with 6% interest p.a. during the 1st year, and the remainder to draw 12% interest p.a. if paid thereafter, provided that at least P100,000.00 should be paid during the 1st year, otherwise the whole unpaid balance would become immediately demandable. To secure the payment of the balance, Ramos executed a mortgage in favor of plaintiffs upon the 20 parcels of land sold and on a half interest over a parcel of land in Bulacan which was embodied in the same deed of sale. The deed of sale with mortgage was registered in the Offices of the Registers of Deeds of Q.C. and Pampanga. Ramos broke certain stipulations contained in the deed of sale with mortgage. Hence, plaintiffs instituted foreclosure proceedings. As Ramos defense,it was claimed that the contract does not express the true agreement of the parties because certain important conditions agreed upon were not included therein by the counsel who prepared the contract such that the stipulation with regards to the promise assumed by plaintiffs that they would construct roads in the lands which were to be subdivided for sale on or before January, 1959 was ommitted. The condition was not placed because it was only a superfluity as claimed by plaintiffs counsel inasmuch as there is an ordinance in Q.C. that requires the construction of roads in a subdivision before lots therein could be sold. Hence, the ordinace was deemed part of the contract. Ramos also claimed that the true purchase price was only P185,000.00, the difference of P50,000.00 being the voluntary contribution of defendant to the cost of the construction of the roads. The trial court dismissed the complaint for being on premature. It found that plaintiffs assumed the construction of the roads as a condition precedent to the fulfillment of the obligation stipulated in the contract on the part of Ramos. Since the same has not been undertaken, plaintiffs have no cause of action. ISSUE Whether or not the true purchase price is P185K or P235K Whether or not an oral agreement to the effect that plaintiffs would undertake the construction of the roads on the lots sold before defendant could be required to comply with her financial obligation is valid and binding on the parties notwithstanding the exixtence of a deed of conditional sale RULING Decision is affirmed. There is no error in the conclusion reached by the court a quo. In a subdivision, the main improvement to be undertaken before it could be sold to the public is feeder roads. Otherwise, it would be inaccessible, valueless and would offer no attraction to the buying public. Hence, it is correct to presume that when the sale in question was being negotiated, the construction of roads in the prospective subdivision must have been

16

uppermost in the mind of defendant for her purpose in purchasing the property was to develop it into a subdivision. This was exemplified by the stipulation that the sum of P50,000.00 was advanced by defendant as her contribution to the construction of the roads which plaintiffs assumed to undertake "in accordance with the provisions of the City Ordinance of Q.C." It is to be noted that said document specifically states that the amount of P50,000.00 should be deducted from the purchase price of P235,056.00 appearing in the deed of sale, and this is a clear indication that the real purchase price is only P185,000.00 as claimed by defendant, which would approximately be the price of the entire area of the land at the rate of P16.00 per square meter. It is argued that the presentation of parole evidence to prove that a contemporaneous oral agreement was also reached between parties relative to the construction of the roads should not have been allowed for same is in violation of the rule which provides that when the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing it is to be considered as containing all that has been agreed upon and that no evidence other than the terms there can be admitted between the parties. However, the rule only holds true if there is no allegation that the agreement does not express the intent of the parties. If there is such an allegation and this claim is in issue in the pleadings, the same may be the subject of parole evidence In this case, defendant has specifically pleaded that the contract of sale in question does not express the true intent of the parties with regard to the construction of the roads. 53. ESPIRIDIONA CANUTO vs. JUAN MARIANO G.R. No. L-11346 March 21, 1918 FACTS On December 4, 1913, Canuto executed a deed of sale with right of repurchase for the same amount within one year from the date of the deed of sale of the parcel of land described in the complaint to Mariano for the sum of P360. For failue of Canuto to exercise her right to repurchase within the perioed agreed upon, Mariano set up a claim of absolute ownership to the land, notwithstanding the insistent demand of Canuto that she be permitted to exercise her right of repurchase in accordance with an alleged oral agreement for the extension of the redemption period upto the end of the month of December, 1914. She claimed that on the 2nd day of December, 1914, two days before the expiration of the original redemption period, Mariano agreed to extend the redemption set out in the written contract upto the end of the month upon her request. Canuto fruther calimed that she thought to make the repurchase within the extended time but Mariano did not appear at the time and place agreed upon for the payment of the purchase price and has refused to execute a deed of resale or to reserve the purchase price agreed upon despite Canutos repeated demands and tender of the purchase price. This claim of Canuto was corroborated by one Severino Pascual who was present when the extension was granted by Mariano. ISSUE Whether or not the plaintiff should not be permitted to alter, vary, or contradict the terms of the written instrument by the introduction of oral evidence in the instant case RULING YES. The defendant having extended the time within which the plaintiff could repurchase the land on condition that she would find the money and make repurchase within the extended period, it is clear that he cannot be permitted to repudiate his promise, it appearing that the plaintiff stood ready to make the payment within the extended period, and was only prevented from doing so by the conduct of the defendant himself. The rule that the plaintiff should not be permitted to alter, vary, or contradict the terms of the written instrument by the introduction of oral evidence does not apply in the instant case. The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to prohibit the establishment by parol of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the written instrument was executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing; for the parol evidence does not in any way deny that the original agreement of the parties was that which the writing purports to express, but merely goes to show that the parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent contract. It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written contract the parol one was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is otherwise unobjectionable it may be proved and enforced. The contention that the plaintiff lost her right to redeem because she failed to make judicial deposit of the purchase price when the defendant declined to receive it is not entitled to serious consideration. A bona fide offer or tender of the price agreed upon for the repurchase is sufficient to preserve the rights of the party making it, without the necessity of making judicial deposit, if the offer or tender is refused.

54. YU TEK and CO. vs. BASILIO GONZALES G.R. No. L-9935 February 1, 1915 FACTS Plaintiff and Basilio Gonzales executed a written contract whereby Gonzales acknowledged receipt of P3K from plaintiff. In consideration of said sum, Gonzales undertook to deliver to plaintiff 600 piculs of sugar of the 1st and 2nd grade

17

beginning on the 1st day of January, 1912 and ending on the 31st day of March of the same year at any place within the municipality of Santa Rosa which plaintiff or its representative designate. It was provided in the contract that in case of failure to deliver the 600 piculs of sugar within three months, the contract will be rescinded and Gonzales will be obliged to return to plaintiff the P3,000 and to pay the sum of P1,200 by way of indemnity for loss and damages. No sugar had been delivered to plaintiff. The P3,000 was also not returned. Hence, plaintiff filed an action for the recovery of P3,000 and of the P1,200. Judgment was rendered for P3,000 only. Thus, both parties appealed. Gonzales contended that the trial court erred in not permitting parol evidence showing that the parties intended that the sugar was to be secured from the crop which he raised on his plantation, and that he was unable to fulfill the contract by reason of the almost total failure of his crop. Gonzales also contended that the contract represented a perfected sale. Hence, by failure of his crop, he was relieved from complying with his undertaking by loss of the thing due. ISSUE 1.Whether or not parol evidence should be allowed 2. Whether or not the contract represented a perfected sale RULING 1. There is not the slightest intimation in the contract that the sugar was to be raised by the defendant. The defendant undertook to deliver a specified quantity of sugar within a specified time. The contract placed no restriction upon the defendant in the matter of obtaining the sugar. He was equally at liberty to purchase it on the market or raise it himself. It may be true that defendant owned a plantation and expected to raise the sugar himself, but he did not limit his obligation to his own crop of sugar. The condition which the defendant seeks to add to the contract by parol evidence cannot be considered. The rights of the parties must be determined by the writing itself. Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the essential conditions of their contract. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. 2. There is a perfected sale with regard to the "thing" whenever the article of sale has been physically segregated from all other articles. In the case at bar, the undertaking of the defendant was to sell to the plaintiff 600 piculs of sugar of the first and second classes. For the purpose of sale of sugar, its bulk is weighed, the customary unit of weight being denominated a "picul." There was no delivery under the contract. There was no clear designation of the article sold. There was no "appropriation" of any particular lot of sugar. Neither party could point to any specific quantity of sugar. The contract in the case at bar was merely an executory agreement; a promise of sale and not a sale. Plaintiff is entitled to recover the P3,000 which it advanced to the defendant for the default of the latter. As liquidated damages are clearly provided for in the contract, the same should be awareded to plaintiff in the amount of P1200. 55. LAND SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. GARCIA PLANTATION CO., INC., and/or SALUD GARCIA and VICENTE B. GARCIA G.R. No. L-17820 April 24, 1963 FACTS Plaintiff filed an action for specific performance against the defendants for the recovery of the sum of P5,955.30, representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of two tractors, bought by Garcia Plantation Co., Inc. from plaintiff. Salud C. de Garcia was made alternative co-defendant for personally assuming the account of the company with the plaintiff as evidenced by her execution of two promissory notes. Vicente B. Garcia was included being the Salud C. de Garcia. Defendants admitted the execution of the two promissory notes in their answer but claimed that the same had been novated by a subsequent agreement contained sent by Filomeno C. Kintanar, Manager, Board of Liquidators of the LASEDECO, giving Salud C. de Garcia an extension up to May 31, 1957, within which to pay the account. Since the complaint was filed on February 20, 1957, Salud de Garcia claimed that the action was premature and hence, should be dismissed. The plaintiff admitted the due execution and genuineness of the said subsequent agreement in the reply but contended that the same did not express the true intent of the agreement. Upon presentation of Atty. Lucido A. Guinto, Legal Officer of the Board of Liquidators, to testify on the true agreement and the intention of the parties at the time the letter embodying the subsequent agreement was drafted and prepared, the lower court ruled out said testimony and prevented the introduction of evidence under the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence sought to be introduced consisted of the testimony of Attys. Guinto and Kintanar, to the effect that in view of the plea of defendant Vicente B. Garcia to give the defendants an extension of time to pay their accounts, Atty. Kintanar gave the defendants up to May 31, 1957, to coincide with their ramie harvest "provided that they will make a substantial down payment immediately, with the understanding that upon non-payment of the substantial amount, the extension shall be deemed as not granted and the LASEDECO shall feel free to seek redress in court." The lower court dismissed the case for being premature. ISSUE Whether or not parol evidence should be allowed to prove the true intention and agreement of the parties and the existence of a condition precedent RULING

18

The lower court should have admitted the parol evidence sought to be introduced to prove the failure of the document in question to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. It should not have improvidently and hastily excluded said parol evidence, knowing that the subject-matter treated therein, was one of the exceptions to the parol evidence rule. When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence. This is not varying the terms of the written contract by extrinsic agreement, for the simple reason that there is no contract in existence; there is nothing to which to apply the excluding rule. The rule does not prevent the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show that a supposed contract never became effective by reason of the failure of some collateral condition or stipulation, pre-requisite to liability. The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing, does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence, to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains reference to such collateral agreement. In the case at bar, reference is made of a previous agreement, and although a document is usually to be interpreted in the precise terms in which it is couched, Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may admit evidence of surrounding circumstances, in order to arrive at the true intention of the parties.

56. FERNANDO MAULINI, et al. vs. ANTONIO G. SERRANO G.R. No. L-8844 December 16, 1914 FACTS The action was brought by the plaintiff upon the contract of indorsement made in his favor by the defendant upon the following promissory note: 3,000. Due 5th of September, 1912. We jointly and severally agree to pay to the order of Don Antonio G. Serrano on or before the 5th day of September, 1912, the sum of three thousand pesos (P3,000) for value received for commercial operations. Notice and protest renounced. If the sum herein mentioned is not completely paid on the 5th day of September, 1912, this instrument will draw interest at the rate of 1 per cent per month from the date when due until the date of its complete payment. The makers hereof agree to pay the additional sum of P500 as attorney's fees in case of failure to pay the note. Manila, June 5, 1912. (Sgd.) For Padern, Moreno & Co., by F. Moreno, member of the firm. For Jose Padern, by F. Moreno. Angel Gimenez. The note was indorsed on the back as follows: Pay note to the order of Don Fernando Maulini, value received. Manila, June 5, 1912. (Sgd.) A.G. Serrano. The trial court provisionally admitted parol evidence to show that part of defendants business as a broker consisted in looking up and ascertaining persons who had money to loan as well as those who desired to borrow money and, acting as a mediary, negotiate a loan between the two. He in fact had done much business with the plaintiff and the borrower, as well as with many other people prior to the matter which is the basis of this action, and was well known to the parties interested. According to the method usually followed in these transactions, the broker delivered the money personally to the borrower, took note in his own name and immediately transferred it by indorsement to the lender. In the case at bar this was done at the special request of the indorsee as he did not want his name to appear on the books of the borrowing company as a lender of money. Serrano claimed that as a broker, he acted solely as an agent, a vehicle by which the naked title to the note passed fro the borrower to the lender. The only payment that the broker received was for his services in negotiating the loan. He was paid absolutely nothing for becoming responsible as an indorser on the paper, nor did the indorsee lose, pay or forego anything, or alter his position thereby. ISSUE Whether or not, under the Negotiable Instruments Law, an indorser of a negotiable promissory note may, in an action brought by his indorsee, show, by parol evidence, that the indorsement was wholly without consideration and that, in making it, the indorser acted as agent for the indorsee, as a mere vehicle of transfer of the naked title from the maker to the indorsee, for which he received no consideration whatever RULING The case at bar is not one where the evidence offered varies, alters, modifies or contradicts the terms of the contract of indorsement admittedly existing. The evidence was not offered for that purpose. The purpose was to show that no contract of indorsement ever existed; that the minds of the parties never met on the terms of such contract; that they never mutually agreed to enter into such a contract; and that there never existed a consideration upon which such an agreement could be founded. The evidence was not offered to vary, alter, modify, or contradict the terms of an agreement which it is admitted existed between the parties, but to deny that there ever existed any agreement whatever; to wipe out all apparent relations between the parties, and not to vary, alter or contradict the terms of a relation admittedly existing; in other words, the purpose of the parol evidence was to demonstrate, not that the indorser did not intend to make the particular indorsement which he did make; not that he did not intend to make the indorsement in the terms made; but, rather, to deny the reality of any indorsement; that a relation of any kind whatever was created or existed between him and the indorsee by reason of the writing on the back of the instrument; that no consideration ever passed to sustain an indorsement of any kind whatsoever. Parol evidence was admissible for the purpose named.

19

57. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs.BENITO SEETO G.R. No. L-4388 August 13, 1952 FACTS On March 13, 1948, Benito Seeto presented at the Surigao branch of PNB a check in the amount of P5,000 which was payable to cash or bearer and drawn by one Gan Yek Kiao against the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank of Communications. After consultation with the employees of the branch, Seeto made a general and unqualified indorsement of the check which was accepted and paid for. The check was mailed to the Cebu branch of PNB on March 20, 1948, and was presented to the drawee bank for payment on April 9, 1948. The check was dishonored for "insufficient funds." Thus, the check was returned to Surigao branch and upon receipt thereof on April 14, 1948, said branch sent a letter to SEETO demanding immediate refund of the value of the check. A second communication of the same tenor was sent on April 26, 1948. SEETO refused to refund the vaule of the check claiming that at the time of the negotiation of the check, the drawer had sufficient funds in the drawee bank, and had the petitioner's Surigao agency not delayed the forwarding of the check, the same would have been paid. Hence, PNB filed a complaint against SEETO alleging that the latter gave assurance to petitioner's agency in Surigao that the drawer of the check had sufficient funds with the drawee bank, and that upon these assurances petitioner's agency delivered the P5,000 to SEETO after the latter had made a general and unqualified indorsement thereon. PNB presented two witnesses who testified that it was not the practice of petitioner's agency to cash out of town checks, and that the check was cashed because of the assurances given by SEETO that the drawer had sufficient funds, and that he would refund the amount paid by petitioner's agency in case the check is dishonored. SEETO denied having made the alleged assurances. The trial court ruled in favor of PNB. On appeal, the CA discharged SEETO from liability for the inexcusable delay in the presentation of the check by PNB to the drawee bank. It also held that parol evidence is incompetent to show that one signing of a check as indorser is merely a surety or guarantor, rejecting the evidence adduced at the trial court about the respondent's assurance and promise to refund. Hence the instant petition. ISSUE Whether or not parol evidence should be allowed to show that respondent made oral assurances to refund the value of the check in case of dishonor RULING The verbal assurances given by the respondent to the employees of the bank that he was ready to refund the amount if the check should be dishonored by the drawee bank is a collateral agreement, separate and distinct from the indorsement, by virtue of which petitioner herein was induced to cash the check, and, therefore, admissible as an exception that the parol evidence rule. In another case, it was held that parol evidence is admissible to show that parties signing as principals merely did so as sureties. Any prior or contemporaneous conversation in connection with a note or its indorsement, may be proved by parol evidence. As Wigmore states, "an extrinsic agreement between indorser and indorsee which cannot be embodied in the instrument without impairing its credit is provable by parol." Thus, if the supposed assurances that the drawer had funds and that the respondent herein would refund the amount of the check if the drawer had no funds, were the considerations or reasons that induced the branch agency of the petitioners to go out of its ordinary practice of not cashing out of town checks and accept the check and to pay its face value, the same would be provable by parol, provided, of course, that the assurances or inducements offered would not vary, alter, or destroy the obligations attached by law to the indorsement. However, the supposed assurances of refund in case of dishonor of the check are precisely the ordinary obligations of an indorser, and these obligations are, under the law, considered discharged by an unreasonable delay in the presentation of the check for payment. There was no express obligation assumed by the respondent herein that the drawer would always have funds, or that he (the indorser) would refund the amount of the check even if there was delay in its presentation.

58. CHARLES F. WOODHOUSE vs. FORTUNATO F. HALILI G.R. No. L-4811 July 31, 1953 FACTS On November 29, 1947, the plaintiff entered on a written agreement with the defendant. Among the most important provisions in said agreementt were (1) that they shall organize a partnership for the bottling and distribution of Mision soft drinks, plaintiff to act as industrial partner or manager, and the defendant as a capitalist, furnishing the capital necessary therefor; (2) that the defendant was to decide matters of general policy regarding the business, while the plaintiff was to attend to the operation and development of the bottling plant; (3) that the plaintiff was to secure the Mission Soft Drinks franchise for and in behalf of the proposed partnership; and (4) that the plaintiff was to receive 30 per cent of the net profits of the business. Prior to entering into this agreement, plaintiff had informed the Mission Dry Corporation of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., manufacturers of the bases and ingredients of the beverages bearing its name, that he had interested a prominent financier (defendant herein) in the business, who was willing to invest half a million dollars in the bottling and distribution of the said beverages, and requested, in order that he may close the deal with him, that the right to bottle and distribute be granted him for a limited time under the condition that it will finally be transferred to the corporation. Pursuant for this request, plaintiff was given "a 30-days" option on exclusive bottling and distribution rights for the Philippines." Formal negotiations between plaintiff and defendant began at a meeting on November 27, 1947 with their lawyers attending. Before this meeting, plaintiff's lawyer had prepared the draft of the agreement but this was not satisfactory because a

20

partnership, instead of a corporation, was desired. Defendant's lawyer prepared after the meeting his own draft. This last draft is the main basis of the agreement. The contract was finally signed by plaintiff on December 3, 1947. On December 10, 1947, a franchise agreement was entered into in the U.S. by the Mission Dry Corporation and Fortunato F. Halili and/or Charles F. Woodhouse, granted defendant Halili the exclusive right, license, and authority to produce, bottle, distribute, and sell Mision beverages in the Philippines. Upon learning that plaintiff did not have the exclusive franchise, defendant reduced plaintiff's participation in the net profits to one half of that agreed upon which the plaintiff readily assented to. When the bottling plant was already on operation, plaintiff demanded of defendant that the partnership papers be executed. Such papers were not executed and there was failure to arrive at an amicable settlement. Hence, an action for the execution of the contract of partnership, accounting and damages was filed against the defendant. In his answer, among the defendants allegations was that the agreement to constitute partnership was secured by plaintiffs representation that he was the owner, or was about to become owner of an exclusive b ottling franchise, which representation was false, and plaintiff did not secure the franchise, but was given to defendant himself. The trial court ordered the defendant to render an accounting of the profits of the bottling and distribution business and to pay plaintiff 15% thereof. It held that the execution of the contract of partnership could not be enforced upon the parties, but it also held that the defense of fraud was not proved. ISSUE Whether or not Woodhouse had falsely represented that he had an exclusive franchise to bottle Mission beverages and whether this false representation or fraud, if it existed, annuls the agreement to form the partnership Whether or not the principle of integration of jural acts apply and hence, the first draft of the agreement is inadmissible as evidence RULING Plaintiff Woodhouse represented that he had an exclusive franchise to bottle Mission beverages per testimony of plaintiffs attorney, Mr. Laurea. The attorney testified that Woodhouse presented himself as being the exclusive grantee of a franchise in the first draft of the agreement between the parties. This fact is further established by the acts and testimonies of the plaintiff himself. The trial court did not consider abovementioned draft on the principle of integration of jural acts. Said principle is inapplicable since the purpose of considering the prior draft is not to vary, alter, or modify the agreement, but to discover the intent of the parties thereto and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract. The issue of fact is: Did plaintiff represent to defendant that he had an exclusive franchise? Certainly, his acts or statements prior to the agreement are essential and relevant to the determination of said issue. The act or statement of the plaintiff was not sought to be introduced to change or alter the terms of the agreement, but to prove how he induced the defendant to enter into it and to prove the representations or inducements, or fraud, with which or by which he secured the other party's consent thereto. These are expressly excluded from the parol evidence rule. Fraud and false representation are an incident to the creation of a jural act, not to its integration, and are not governed by the rules on integration. Were parties prohibited from proving said representations or inducements, on the ground that the agreement had already been entered into, it would be impossible to prove misrepresentation or fraud. Furthermore, the parol evidence rule expressly allows the evidence to be introduced when the validity of an instrument is put in issue by the pleadings,as in this case. Does false representation amount to a fraud that would vitiate the contract? The law distinguishes two kinds of (civil) fraud, the causal fraud, which may be a ground for the annulment of a contract, and the incidental deceit, which only renders the party who employs it liable for damages. In order that fraud may vitiate consent, it must be the causal ( dolo causante), not merely the incidental (dolo causante), inducement to the making of the contract. The record abounds with circumstances indicative that the fact that the principal consideration, the main cause that induced defendant to enter into the partnership agreement with plaintiff, was the ability of plaintiff to get the exclusive franchise to bottle and distribute for the defendant or for the partnership. The original draft prepared by defendant's counsel was to the effect that plaintiff obligated himself to secure a franchise for the defendant. Correction appears in this same original draft, but the change is made not as to the said obligation but as to the grantee. In the corrected draft the word "capitalist"(grantee) is changed to "partnership." The contract in its final form retains the substituted term "partnership." The defendant was, therefore, led to the belief that plaintiff had the exclusive franchise, but that the same was to be secured for or transferred to the partnership. The plaintiff no longer had the exclusive franchise, or the option thereto, at the time the contract was perfected. But while he had already lost his option thereto (when the contract was entered into), the principal obligation that he assumed or undertook was to secure said franchise for the partnership, as the bottler and distributor for the Mission Dry Corporation. Therefore, if plaintiff was guilty of a false representation, this was not the causal consideration, or the principal inducement, that led defendant to enter into the partnership agreement. But, on the other hand, this supposed ownership of an exclusive franchise was actually the consideration or price plaintiff gave in exchange for the share of 30 percent granted him in the net profits of the partnership business. Defendant agreed to give plaintiff 30 per cent share in the net profits because he was transferring his exclusive franchise to the partnership. Hence, while the representation that plaintiff had the exclusive franchise did not vitiate defendant's consent to the contract, it was used by plaintiff to get from defendant a share of 30 per cent of the net profits; in other words, by pretending that he had the exclusive franchise and promising to transfer it to defendant, he obtained the consent of the latter to give him (plaintiff) a big slice in the net profits. This is the dolo incidente because it was used to get the other party's consent to a big share in the profits, an incidental matter in the agreement.

59. ZACARIAS ROBLES vs. LIZARRAGA HERMANOS

21

G.R. No. L-26173 July 13, 1927 FACTS Spouses Zacarias Robles and Anastacia de la Rama, parents of plaintiff, Zacarias Robles owned hacienda Nahalinan. Upon the death of Zacarias Robles, Sr., his widow was appointed administratrix of his estate. On May 20, 1913, Anastacia leased the hacienda to Zacarias Robles for 6 years beginning at the end of the milling season in May, 1915 upto the end of the milling season in May, 1920. It was stipulated that any permanent improvements necessary to the cultivation and exploitation of the hacienda should be made at the expense of the lessee without right to indemnity at the end of the term. As the place was in a run-down state, and it was foreseen that the lessee would be put to much expense in bringing the property to its productive capacity, the annual rent was fixed at P2,000 per annum. Zacarias Robles introduced various improvements at his expense with the exception that his mother and coheirs contributed P1,500 towards the expense of the reconstruction of the dwelling house, which was one-half the outlay for that item. The firm of Lizarraga Hermanos was well aware of the nature and extent of the improvements introduced by Zacarias as he was a customer of the firm and had purchased from it many of the things that went into the improvements. In 1916, Anastacia de la Rama died, leaving as heirs Zacarias Robles together with Jose Robles, Evarista Robles, Magdalena Robles, Felix Robles and Jose Robles. Evarista Robles purchased the shares of their coheirs in the entire inheritance. At this juncture, Lizarraga Hermanos proposed to buy all of the properties belonging to the Robles estate which included other properties in addition to the hacienda "Nahalinan." As a consequence, it was proposed that Zacarias should surrender the last 2 years of his lease and permit Lizarraga Hermanos to take possession as purchaser in June, 1918. As the surrender would be disadvantageous to Zacarias as he had already made most of the expenditures in outfitting the farm which would be necessary for farming operations during the entire period of the lease, Lizarraga Hermanos agreed to pay Zacarias the value of all betterments that he had made on the hacienda and furthermore to purchase from him all that belonged to him personally on the hacienda, including the crop of 1917-18, the cattle, farming implements and equipment, according to a valuation to be made after the harvest. The latter agreed to this and the instrument of conveyance by which the three owners, Zacarias, Jose and Evarista Robles, conveyed the property to Lizarraga Hermanos was accordingly executed on November 16, 1917. However, the instrument of conveyance only covers those that Zacarias posesses as an heir and not those which he possessed in his own rights. No reference was made in the conveyance to the surrender of the plaintiff's rights as lessee, except in fixing the date when the lease should end; nor is anything said concerning the improvements or the property of a personal nature which the plaintiff had placed on the hacienda. Believing that the agreement with respect to compensation would be carried out in good faith as there was an existing confidence between Zacarias and Lizarraga Hermanos, the former did not further insist upon the incorporation of said agreement into this document. Nor was the supposed agreement otherwise reduced to writing. Defendant claimed that the agreement with respect to compensating the plaintiff for improvements and other things was never made. As against the denials of the defendant, direct testimonies of the plaintiff and his brother Jose were intoduced to the effect that the agreement was as claimed by the plaintiff; and this is supported by the natural probabilities of the case in connection with a subsequent appraisal of the property, which was rendered futile by the course pursued by the defendants. ISSUE Whether or not oral evidence of a contract is admissible in the instant case. RULING Yes. The execution of a contract in writing is deemed to supersede all oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its terms and the subject-matter which preceded the execution of the instrument, in the absence of accident, fraud or mistake of fact. But it is recognized that this rule is to be taken with proper qualifications; and all the authorities are agreed that proof is admissible of any collateral, parol agreement that is not inconsistent with the terms of the written contract, though it may relate to the same subject-matter. The doctrine here referred to is as follows: "The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity." In the case before us, the deed of conveyance purports to transfer to the defendant only such interests in certain properties as had come to the conveyors by inheritance. Nothing is said concerning the rights in the hacienda which the plaintiff had acquired by lease or concerning the things that he had placed thereon by way of improvement or had acquired by purchase. The verbal contract which the plaintiff has established in this case is therefore clearly independent of the main contract of conveyance, and evidence of such verbal contract is admissible under the doctrine above stated. The rule that a preliminary or contemporaneous oral agreement is not admissible to vary a written contract appears to have more particular reference to the obligation expressed in the written agreement, and the rule had never been interpreted as being applicable to matters of consideration or inducement. In the case before us the written contract is complete in itself; the oral agreement is also complete in itself, and it is a collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related matters. 60. LUCIO R. CRUZ vs. CA and CONRADO Q. SALONGA G.R. No. 79962 1990 December 10 FACTS

22

The following facts were taken from the parties' stipulation of facts. 1. In May, 1982, Salonga entered into a contract of what is commonly called as 'pakyawan' with Cruz on the fishes contained in a fishpond which Cruz leased from Mr. Nemesio Yabut with a verbal contract for the sum of P28,000.00. 2. Salonga advanced not only P28,000.00 but P35,000.00 to Cruz as requested by the latter so that Cruz could meet his obligation with the owner of the fishpond. 3. Pursuant to the "pakyaw" contract, Salonga was able to harvest the fishes contained in the fishpond administered by Cruz in August 1982. 4. Subsequently, the parties entered on a verbal agreement that Cruz will sublease and had in fact subleased the fishpond to Salonga for the amount of P28,000.00 for a period of one year beginning August 15, 1982. In compliance with their verbal sublease agreement, Cruz had received from Salonga P8,000.00, P500.00, P3,000.00 and P3,750.00 on various dates 5. Sometime on June 15, 1983, Mayor Nemesio Yabut, the owner of the fishpond, took back the leased fishpond. Cruz contended that Salonga owed him an additional P4,000.00 arising from another purchase of fish from other areas of his leased fishpond and for unpaid rentals. At the trial, Salonga claimed that aside from the amounts of P35,000.00 , P8,000.00 , P500.00, P3,000.00 and P3,750.00 mentioned in the partial stipulation of facts, he also delivered to Cruz P28,000.00, which constituted the consideration for their "pakyaw" agreement. This was evidenced by a receipt dated May 14, 1982. Salonga also claimed that he had paid Cruz P4,000 but the receipt of which had been lost and denied being indebted to the petitioner for P4,000 for the lease of other portions of the fishpond. Cruz claimed that he entered into a "pakyaw" and sublease agreement with Salonga for a consideration of P28,000 for each transaction. Out of the P35,000 he received from the private respondent on May 4, 1982, P28,000 covered full payment of their "pakyaw" agreement while the remaining P7,000 constituted the advance payment for their sublease agreement. The petitioner denied having received another amount of P28,000 from Salonga on May 14, 1982. He contended that the instrument dated May 14, 1982 was executed to evidence their "pakyaw" agreement and to fix its duration. He was corroborated by Sonny Viray, who testified that it was he who prepared the May 4, 1982, receipt of P35,000.00, P28,000 of which was payment for the "pakyaw" and the excess of P7,000.00 as advance for the sublease. ISSUE 1. Whether or not the parol evidence rule found in Sec. 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies. 2. Whether or not the Stipulation of Facts entered into by the parties relative to their executed transactions are binding upon them and as well as, upon the public respondent. 3. Whether or not a document should be disregarded for not having been pleaded as a cause of action. RULING 1. The rule found in Sec. 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in the intstant case. Said rule is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement. In the instant case, the instrument presented does not contain such an agreement. It is only a receipt attesting to the fact that on May 4, 1982, Cruz received from Salonga the amount of P35,000. It is not and could not have been intended by the parties to be the sole memorial of their agreement. Said receipt does not even mention the transaction that gave rise to its issuance. At most, the receipt can only be considered a casual memorandum of a transaction between the parties and an acknowledgment of the receipt of money executed by Cruz for Salonga's satisfaction. A writing of this nature is not covered by the parol evidence rule. The "pakyaw" was mentioned in the receipt dated May 14, 1982, which also declared the petitioner's receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 as consideration for the agreement. Cruz and his witnesses testified to show when and under what circumstances the amount of P28,000.00 was received. A distinction exists between a a statement of fact expressed in the instrument and the terms of the contractual act. The former may be varied by parol evidence but not the latter. Section 7 of Rule 130 clearly refers to the terms of an agreement and provides that "there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing." The statement in the receipt dated May 14, 1982 of Cruz's receipt of the P28,000.00 is just a statement of fact. It is a mere acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment made by Salonga. Its reference to the amount of P28,000.00 as consideration of the "pakyaw" contract does not make it part of the terms of their agreement. Parol evidence may therefore be introduced to explain said receipt, particularly with respect to the Cruz's receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 and of the date when the said amount was received. Even if the receipts subject of the controversy are covered by the parol evidence rule, its application will still be improper. No objection was made by Salonga when the evidence to explain the circumstances behind the execution and issuance of

23

the said instruments were produced. The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such answer. For failure to object to the evidence introduced, the benefit of the parol evidence rule is deemed to be waived. It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto. 2. Admissions in the stipulation of facts bind not only the parties but also the court, unless modified upon request before the trial to prevent manifest injustice. 3. The receipt dated May 14, 1982 can be properly appreciated despite the fact that it was not pleaded as a cause of action and was objected to by the petitioner. According to Rule 10 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. When evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse party, when the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and the court may grant him continuance to enable him to meet the situation created by the evidence .While it is true that the private respondent did not even file a motion to amend his complaint in order that it could conform to the evidence presented, this did not prevent the court from rendering a valid judgment on the issues proved. Where the failure to order an amendment does not appear to have caused a surprise or prejudice to the objecting party, it may be allowed as a harmless error. Well-known is the rule that departures from procedure may be forgiven when they do not appear to have impaired the substantial rights of the parties.

61. VICTORIA LECHUGAS vs. CA, MARINA LOZA, SALVADOR LOZA, ISIDRO LOZA, CARMELITA LOZA, DAVID LOZA, AMPARO LOZA, ERLINDA LOZA and ALEJANDRA LOZA G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300 August 6, 1986 FACTS Petitioner Lechugas filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against the respondents, alleging that the latter by means of force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered lots A and B owned by her. Petitioner also instituted another action before the CFI for recovery and possession of the same property against respondents. Lechugas testified that she bought the land subject of this litigation from Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by a public "Deed of Absolute Sale" which she had caused to be registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds. Preparatory to the execution of the deed, Lechugas had the land segregated from the bigger portion of 12 hectares owned by Leoncia Lasangue by contracting a private land surveyor to survey the land and establish its boundaries, shape, form and area in accordance with the said plan. She took possession of the land through her tenants Jesus Leoncio, Roberta Losarita and Simeon Guinta, who shared one-half of the produce of the riceland with her, while she shouldered some of the expenses in cultivation and seeds, and one-third share in other crops, like coffee beans, bamboos, coconuts, corn and the like. Lechugas' declaration was corroborated by her tenant Simeon Guinta who testified that the land subject of the complaint was worked on by him in 1954 when its former tenant left the land. That he planted rice, corn peanuts, coffee, and other minor products, sharing the same with the owner, Lechugas. That on June 14, 1958, while plowing Lot A preparatory to rice planting, defendants entered the land and forced him to stop his work. Salvador Anona and Carmelita Losa, particularly, told him that if he would sign an affidavit recognizing them as his landlords, they would allow him to continue plowing the land. On that occasion, Salvador Anona, David Loza and Jose Loza were carrying unsheathed bolos, which scared him such that he left the land and reported the matter to Victoria Lechugas. Guinta further declared that on June 24, 1958, defendants entered Lot B and cut the bamboo poles growing thereof. To top it all, in June of 1959, defendants, grabbed the whole parcel containing six hectares to the damage and prejudice of Lechugas. Defendants, on the other hand, contended that the land which Lechugas bought from Leoncia Lasangue is different from the land now subject of this action. Defendant's evidence in chief, as testified to by Carmelita Lozada shows that on April 6, 1931, Hugo Loza father of Carmelita Loza and predecessor-in-interest of the rest of the heirs of herein defendants, purchased a parcel of land from one Victorina Limor as evidenced by the deed "Venta Definitiva" . This land, containing 53,327 square meters is bounded on the north by Ramon Lasangue, on the south by Emeterio Lasangue. That immediately after the sale, Hugo Loza took possession of the said parcel of land and declared the same in his name. On March 17, 1941, Hugo Loza bought from Emeterio Lasangue a parcel of land with an area of four hectares more or less, adjoining the land hehad earlier bought from Victoria Limor, and which sale was duly evidenced by a public instrument. These two parcels of land were consolidated and designated, during the cadastral survey of Lambunao, Iloilo in 1959 as Lot No. 5456; while the remaining portion of the lot bought from Victorina Limor, adjoining Lot 5456 on the east, was designated as Lot No. 5515 in the name of the Heirs of Hugo Loza. Defendants claim that the lot bought by Lechugas from Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced is situated south of the land now subject of this action and designated during cadastral survey of Lambunao as Lot No. 5522, in the name of Victoria Lechugas. Leoncia Lasangue, plaintiff's vendor

24

testified for the defendants refuting Lechuga's contention that the land sold to her is the very land under question. ISSUE Whether or not parol evidence which is the testimony of Lechuga's vendor is admissible. RULING Yes. Leoncia Lasangue's testimony is admissible. The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby. Parol evidence rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and the private respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended to sell was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead.

62. BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR. vs. CA and PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS G.R. No. 96405 June 26, 1996 FACTS Petitioner executed a promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00 which he signed with Rene C. Naybe and Gregorio D. Pantanosas holding themselves solidarily liable in favor of Philippine Bank of Communications (PBC), Cagayan de Oro City branch. The promissory note was due on May 5, 1983. The promisors failed to pay after expiration of the due date despite demands. Hence, PBC filed a complaint for collection of the sum of P50,000.00 against the three obligors. The lower court dismissed the case against defendant Pantanosas as prayed for by PBC Meanwhile, only the summons addressed to petitioner was served as defendant Naybe had gone to Saudi Arabia. Petitioner alleged that sometime in January 1983, he was approached by Rudy Campos, who was allegedly a partner of Pio Tio, the branch manager of PBC, Cagayan de Oro City, in the falcata logs operation business. Campos intimated to him that Rene C. Naybe was interested in the business and would contribute a chainsaw to the venture. He added that, although Naybe had no money to buy the equipment, Pio Tio had assured Naybe of the approval of a loan he would make with PBC. Campos then persuaded petitioner to act as a "co-maker" in the said loan. Petitioner allegedly acceded but with the understanding that he would only be a co-maker for the loan of P5,000.00. Petitioner alleged that five (5) copies of a blank promissory note were brought to him by Campos at his office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy, he indicated that he bound himself only for the amount of P5,000.00. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud and misrepresentation that he was made liable for the amount of P50,000.00. ISSUE Whether or not parol evidence may overcome the contents of a promissory note which is merely a commercial paper and not a public document. RULING The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule states: When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document. What is required is that the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them." Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence. By alleging fraud in his answer, petitioner was actually in the right direction towards proving that he and his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only considering that, where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the inducing and moving cause of the written contract, it may be shown by parol evidence. However, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence, not even being adequate. Petitioner's attempt to prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was evidenced only by his own uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving testimony. Petitioner is liable to pay P50,000 with corresponding interest.

63. RAFAEL S. ORTANES vs. CA, OSCAR INOCENTES AND ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES

25

G.R. No. 107372 January 23, 1997 FACTS Respondents sold to Ortanes 2 parcels of registered land in Q.C. for P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. Respondents received the payments for the lots but failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. Respondents failed to deliver the titles despite demands on the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, and Ortanes' acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions. Hence, Ortanes filed an action for specific performance against the respondents. In their answer with counterclaim, respondents alleged the existence of oral conditions which were not reflected in the deeds of sale. Such conditions provide that title to the other property remains with the respondents until Ortanes shows proofall that all of the requirements have been met which include the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398 sq. m., submission of approved plan for the segregation to respondents, putting up of a strong wall between his property and that of respondents' and payment of the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be incurred by reason of sale. Respondent Oscar Inocentes orally testified during trial that the sale was subject to the above conditions although such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. The introduction of said oral conditions was admiited by the lower court despite timely objections by Ortanes based the parol evidence rule. The lower court dismissed the complaint which decision was affirmed by tthe CA. ISSUE Whether or not the introduction of oral conditions or parol evidence is admissible. RULING The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. 1. Respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties. 2. The parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule that: The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to . . . the terms of a written instrument by testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties. Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." No such fraud or mistake exists in this case. 64. AURORA FE B. CAMACHO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANGELINO BANZON G.R. No. 127520 February 9, 2007 FACTS Camacho was the owner of a 7.5-hectare parcel of land situated in Balanga, Bataan. Camacho and respondent Atty. Angelino Banzon entered into a contract for legal services denominated as a "Contract of Attorney's Fee" where the legal services of Atty. Banzon was hired for the purposes of negotiating with the Municipal Government of Balanga that the above-mentioned lot shall be the site of the proposed Balanga Public Market, to sell 1200 sq. m. for P24,000.00 right at the Market Site and to perform that which is incidental. As consideration for Banzon's services, Camacho undertook to pay 5000 square meters of the mentioned lot. Pursuant to the agreement, Banzon sent a letter-proposal to the municipal council offering 3 sites for the proposed public market. On the same date, Camacho executed a SPA giving Banzon the authority to execute and sign for her behalf a Deed of Donation transferring a 17,000 sq.m. portion of the above-mentioned lot to the municipal government of Balanga. The Deed of Donation was executed, which was later accepted by the local government unit in a Municipal Resolution. Tuazon had been an agricultural tenant since World War II of the mentioned lot. Tuazon and Camacho entered into an "Agreement with Voluntary Surrender" where Tuazon voluntarily surrendered his right as a tenant of the landholding. Despite the agreement, however, Tuazon plowed a portion of the lot and planted palay without Camacho's consent. Since Tuazon refused to vacate the premises, Camacho and the Municipality of Balanga filed a complaint for forcible entry against him. The MTC decided in favor of Camacho. On appeal, a trial de novo ensued in the RTC. Subsequently, Camacho and Tuazon entered into an "Agreement to Stay Court Order" where Tuazon was allowed to cultivate specific portions of the property as indicated in a sketch plan which the parties prepared, and to use the market's water supply to irrigate his plants within the lot subject to the market's preferential rights. The parties also contracted that no part shall be construed as impliedly creating new tenancy relationship. Later on, Camacho filed a Manifestation declaring that she had terminated the services of Atty. Banzon and had retained the services of another counsel. Atty. Banzon filed a Complaint-in-Intervention contending that pursuant to the Contract of Attorney's fee, Camacho would compensate him with a 5,000-sq-m portion of the mentioned lot in case he succeeds in negotiating with the Municipality of

26

Balanga in transferring the projected new public market which had been set for construction at the Dona Francisca Subdivision. Atty. Banzon further claimed that as a consequence of the 7 cases filed by/against Camacho, she further bound herself orally to give him a 1,000-sq-m portion of the same lot as attorney's fee. He had also acquired from Camacho by purchase an 80-sq-m portion of the subject lot as evidenced by a Provisional Deed of Sale and from third parties an 800-sq-m portion. He further declared that his requests for Camacho to deliver the portions of the subject lot remained unheeded, and that of the seven cases he had handled for Camacho, four had been decided in her favor while three are pending. Hence, Atty. Banzon prayed that: Silvestre Tuazon be ejected in so far as 6880 square meters is concerned; that Camacho deliver the 5000 sq.m., 80 sq.m. and the 800 sq.m. mentioned earlier; that Camacho pay P8,820.00, corresponding to the lease rental of 5880 sq.m. a month; that Camacho deliver 1000 sq.m. as attorney's fee in handling 7 cases. The RTC granted the motion and subsequently admitted the complaint-in-intervention. Susequently, Tuazon and Banzon entered into an amicable settlement wherein it was provided that in consideration of P2,000.00 which Tuazon received from Banzon, the former waives his defenses against the claim of Banzon to the extent of 6880 sq.m. and surrenders the actual possession to Banzon of the said portion. On the other hand, Camacho denied in her answer to the complaint-in-intervention that she solicited the services of Atty. Banzon and that it was in fact Banzon who approached and convinced her to donate a portion of the lot to the municipality of Balanga. He assured her that the municipality of Balanga planned to relocate the public market and was scouting for a new location. He also told her that her lot appeared to be the most ideal location, and that he would take care of all the legal problems. Camacho however admitted that she signed the Contract of Attorney's Fee but only upon the request of Banzon as the document would be shown to the municipal councilors "for formality's sake" to prove his authority to act for and in behalf of Camacho. It was never intended to bind her to pay attorney's fees. She denied that she agreed to give 1,000 sq m to Banzon for handling the 7 cases. Camacho also denied that Banzon made demands to deliver the mentioned portions of the property. Subsequently, Camacho and Tuazon entered into a Compromise Agreement where Camacho agreed to transfer a 1,000sq-m to Tuazon. Tuazon then moved to dismiss the civil case (ejectment case) and to remove all the improvements outside the portion of the property which Camacho had agreed to convey to him. The RTC approved said compromise agreement. Camacho then moved for the dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention filed by Banzon on the ground that the jurisdiction of the court to try the case ceased to exist because the principal action had been terminated. The motion was denied. The RTC decided the complaint-in-intervention in favor of Banzon. Applying the provisions of Section 7 (now section 9), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, it concluded that the terms of the contract were embodied in the document itself. Moreover, Camacho did not bother to pay for all the other cases being handled by Banzon because she knew that she had agreed already to pay attorney's fees. The CA affirmed the decision with modification. ISSUE Whether or not consent to the Contract of Attorney's Fee was given by Camacho. RULING Camacho claimed that she signed only upon the request of Atty. Banzon, who told her that the document would only be shown to the municipal councilors ("for formality's sake") to prove his authority in her behalf. It was never intended to bind her to pay him attorney's fees. We, however, do not agree. The contract between Camacho and Banzon is evidenced by a written document signed by both parties denominated as Contract of Attorney's Fee. It is an established rule that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only; that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger, and to show that the parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them. Moreover, the moment a party affixes her signature thereon, he or she is bound by all the terms stipulated therein and is open to all the legal obligations that may arise from their breach. Even assuming that the contract did not reflect the true intention of the parties as to their respective obligations, it is nevertheless binding. The existence of the written contract, coupled with Camacho's admission that the signature appearing thereon was hers, constitute ineluctable evidence of her consent to the agreement. It cannot be overcome by mere denial and allegations that they did not intend to be bound thereby. We also note that Camacho did not avail of the remedy of reformation of the instrument in order to reflect what, according to her, was the true agreement. The appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of a 1,000-sq.m. portion to Atty. Angelito Banzon as attorney's fees is DELETED as there were proofs presented that the cases allegedly covered by the 1000 sq.m. portion were separately subjected to attorney's fees. 65. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION vs. CA and CMS CONSTRUCTION and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 159417 January 25, 2007 FACTS On 26 July 1996, PNCC entered into a MOA with the Toll Regulatory Board, Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation and MWSS involving the task of relocating MWSS utilities along the South Superhighway affected by the construction of the Manila South Skyway Project. In undertaking said task, PNCC subcontracted the relocation of the 450 mm diameter steel pipes to CMS as the winning bidder. On 13 October 1997, even before the signing of a contract, CMS proceeded to carry out the project upon request of PNCC. A Subcontract Agreement was executed between PNCC and CMS on 21 October 1997. It was stated therein that the

27

estimated contract price was P7,990,172.61, inclusive of taxes, and that the project was to be completed within 75 calendar days from the signing of the contract. It was further stipulated that the contract price was merely an estimate and that the final price shall be computed based on the actual accomplishment of the subcontractor as approved and accepted by PNCC, the Toll Regulatory Board, and the MWSS. On 5 December 1997, PNCC informed CMS that it would provide the necessary equipment, manpower, and materials to assure the completion of the project and that all costs pertaining thereto would be charged to the latter's account. In another letter dated 19 December 1997, PNCC reiterated that it would provide manpower and equipment to CMS in order that the stated schedule for the completion of the project shall be met. On 7 January 1998, petitioner informed CMS that the 75 days period for the relocation of the steel pipes had already elapsed but the said project was far from completion. It was only sometime in April 1999 that the project was finally completed. In conformity to the letters sent by PNCC to CMS regarding the manpower and equipment supplied by the former to ensure the completion of the project, certain amounts were deducted by petitioner from CMS's billings as "accommodations." PNCC and CMS amended the Subcontract Agreement on 23 November 1999, such that the final contract price is P8,872,593.74, inclusive of taxes. It was also agreed upon by the parties under the Contract Amendment that Appendix "A" thereof constituted the final Bill of Quantities for scope of works undertaken by the subcontractor (CMS) and superseded Annex "C" of the 21 October 1997 Agreement and any bill of quantities earlier agreed upon by the parties in connection with the project. Furthermore, it was expressed therein that the said amendment superseded the price stipulated in the original Subcontract Agreement dated 21 October 1997 and any other commitment or agreement on price pertaining to works covered therein. Later on, CMS submitted for arbitration before Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a complaint for sum of money with damages against PNCC in connection with the relocation of the 450 mm diameter steel pipes along the East Service Road of the South Luzon Tollway. CMS claimed that the amended contract price has not been fully paid by PNCC since Billing Nos. 3, 4, and 5 were only partially paid because of the deductions made by the latter in the form of "accommodations," which CMS insists must be disallowed. After the proceedings, Sole Arbitrator Lazatin issued an Award in favor of CMS and disallowed the deductions as they alredy formed part of the compromise agreement which what the amended subcontract agreement was actually was. The decision was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE Whether or not the deductions for accommodations made by PNCC in billing nos. 3 to 5 were part of the compromise settlement/Amended Subcontract Agreement. RULING The deductions for accommodations were part of the compromise settlement/Amended Subcontract Agreement. Article VI, Paragraph 6.2.1 of the Subcontract Agreement states: 6.2.1 In the event SUBCONTRACTOR fails to comply with the above requirement stated therein within seven (7) days from notice/demand to comply, PNCC shall have the authority to secure the necessary manpower, equipment from other sources, to assure completion of the works. All costs and expenses, including handling of charges, transportation rentals for machineries/equipment and other expenses incidental thereto, shall be for the account of SUBCONTRACTOR and may be deducted from whatever amount that may be due or become due to SUBCONTRACTOR under this or in any agreement between the parties. In such case, however, PNCC shall exert its best efforts to minimize the costs. There is no dispute that under the aforecited provision, deductions or "accommodations" may be made against the account of the subcontractor. However, it is important at this point to underscore a provision in the Contract Amendment signed by the parties on 23 November 1999. According to said amendment to the Subcontract Agreement, Appendix "A" thereof constitutes the final Bill of Quantities for scope of works undertaken by the subcontractor (CMS) and supersedes Annex "C" of the 21 October 1997 Agreement and any bill of quantities earlier agreed upon by the parties in connection with the project. It is clear from said provision of the Contract Amendment executed after the completion of said project and after PNCC had determined the alleged deductions it was to charge against CMS' account that Annex "A" thereof reflects the scope of work undertaken by CMS. Said Bill of Quantities therefore enumerates the costs borne by CMS as subcontractor in the accomplishment of the project. A careful perusal of Annex "A" of the Contract Amendment will show that the final Bill of Quantities for the scope of works undertaken by CMS for the project amounts to P8,872,593.74. There is no mention, either in the body of said Contract Amendment nor in the annex attached thereto, regarding the alleged "accommodations" which PNCC shall deduct from the amount payable to CMS. It would only be logical, therefore, to conclude that the Contract Amendment and Annex "A" attached thereto already reflect the actual amount to be paid to CMS for the scope of work it rendered regarding the relocation of the 450 mm pipe along the East Service Road of the South Luzon Tollway, said amendment having been executed after PNCC had already determined the necessary deductions to be made against the account of CMS. The agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties' rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties. Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. Furthermore, it is a cardinal rule that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall control. 66. LEON J. LAMBERT vs. T. J. FOX

28

G.R. No. L-7991 January 29, 1914 FACTS John R. Edgar & Co., engaged in the retail book and stationery business, was taken over by its creditors among which are the plaintiff and the defendant due to its financial condition. Said creditors agreed to incorporate it and accept stock therein in payment of their respective credits. As a consequence, the plaintiff and the defendant became the two largest stockholders in the new corporation called John R. Edgar & Co., Incorporated. A few days after the incorporation was completed, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement wherein it was stipulated that they will not sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any part of their present holdings of stock in said John R. Edgar & Co. Inc., until after one year from date. That either party violating said agreement shall pay to the other P1,000 as liquidated damages, unless previous consent in writing to such sale, transfer, or other disposition be obtained. Defendant Fox on October 19, 1911, sold his stock in the said corporation to E. C. McCullough of the firm of E. C. McCullough & Co. of Manila, a strong competitor of the said John R. Edgar & Co., Inc. against the protest of the plaintiff and with the warning that he would be held liable under the contract mentioned above. In fact, the defendant Fox offered to sell his shares of stock to the plaintiff for the same sum that McCullough was paying them less P1,000, the penalty specified in the contract. Defendant argued that plaintiff cannot recover for failure to prove damages as liquidated damages are granted in excess of actual damages. Defendant also urged that the stipulation in the contract suspending the power to sell the stock referred to therein is an illegal stipulation, is in restraint of trade and, therefore, offends public policy. The trial court ruled that defendant was freed from his obligation not to sell as the agreement was for the purpose of obtaining commercial stability. As the corporation has already attained this, the defendant is free to dispose of his shares. ISSUE Whether or not defendant is liable for liquidated damages. Whether or not the stipulation in the contract suspending the power to sell the stock is an illegal stipulation, is in restraint of trade and, therefore, offends public policy. Whether or not defendant is freed from the obligation not to sell even prior to the expiration of the one-year period. RULING Yes. The party to whom payment is to be made is entitled to recover the sum stipulated without the necessity of proving damages. Indeed one of the primary purposes in fixing a penalty or in liquidating damages, is to avoid such necessity. In the instant case, the suspension of the power to sell has a beneficial purpose which is the protection of the corporation as well as of the individual parties to the contract. The length of time of the suspension is also reasonble. The suspension in this particular case is legal and valid. The intention of parties to a contract must be determined, in the first instance, from the words of the contract itself. It is to be presumed that persons mean what they say when they speak plain English. Interpretation and construction should by the instruments last resorted to by a court in determining what the parties agreed to. Where the language used by the parties is plain, then construction and interpretation are unnecessary and, if used, result in making a contract for the parties. In the case at bar the parties expressly stipulated that the contract should last one year. No reason is shown for saying that it shall last only nine months. Whatever the object was in specifying the year, it was their agreement that the contract should last a year and it was their judgment and conviction that their purposes would not be subversed in any less time. 67. THE CAPITAL INSURANCE and SURETY CO., INC. vs. ESTEBAN M. SADANG and MARIA LACHICA G.R. No. L-18857 December 11, 1967 FACTS Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. (plaintiff), subscribed to a bond in the amount of P42,000.00 in behalf of Mateo Pinto and in favor of the Macondray Farms, Inc., to guarantee the payment of rentals of the fishpond and other obligations of Mateo Pinto in the lease agreement with Macondray Farms. Inc. To protect plaintiff from any liability that may arise from the bond, Mateo Pinto and defendants, Esteban M. Sadang and Maria Lachica, executed an idemnity agreement and a deed of real of real estate mortage on the property of the defendants located in the Nueva Vizcaya. Mateo Pinto failed to pay the rentals of the leased fishpond to Macondray Farms, Inc., in the total amount of P24,668.83. Hence, plaintiff paid said amount to Macondray Farms, Inc. as surety. Mateo Pinto and his indemnitors (defendants herein) defendants failed to reimburse the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. despite repeated demands. Hence, plaintiff filed a collection suit against Mateo Pinto and defendants. The case was dismissed without prejudice but the parties had agreed in the said case that plaintiff may file as separate civil action against the defendants-spouses if the judgement debt shall not be fully satisfied after the sale of all the mortgaged properties. After the sale, a deficiency in the amount of P14,456.44 subsisted which defendants failed to pay despite demands. Hence, the present controversy. Defendants contend that their liability under the mortgage contract is limited to the first P20,000.00 that might be incurred under the bond pursuant to the provision in the mortgage contract which states that " xxx that liability secured by the above properties is limited to the first P20,000.00 that might be incurred under the bond issued in favor of the Macondray Farms, Inc." Since Mateo Pinto paid Macondray Farms, Inc., the amount of P19,700.00, they are liable to pay only amount of P300.00 which remain after deducting what was paid by Mateo Pinto to Macondray Farms, Inc. from the first liability of

29

P20,000.00.On the other hand, plaintiff argued that defendants are liable for the deficiency of P14,456.44, plus interest, attorney's feest and costs of the suit because of the indemnity agreement and the estate mortgage. He relied on the general statement of defendant's liability as it appears in the contract, to wit; "to indemnify the mortgagee for any damage, cost, expenses and charges of whatever kind and nature that it may incur or sustain as a consequence of having acted as surety or the bond. . . ." Similar stress is laid on the fact that because the principal debtor, Mateo Pinto, paid to Macondray Farms, Inc., the sum of P19,700.00 before he became in default, no liability ever attached to appellant under its bond for that amount, and hence it should not be considered as part of, or applied to, "the first P20,000.00 that might be incurred under the bond . . .," which defined the limit of appellees' obligation. ISSUE Whether or not defendants are liable for the entire value of the deficiency. RULING No. The defendants are liable only for the sum of P300.00 with interest 12% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint. During trial, it was found from the uncontradicted testimony of Esteban Sadang that there were two drafts made for the mortgage contract. The second draft was made because the first draft did not contain the provision that liability secured by the mortgaged properties is limited only to the first P20,000.00 that might be incurred under the bond issued in favor of the Macondray Farms, Inc. From the circumstances, it is clear that Esteban Sadang agreed to be an indemnitor only on condition that he would answer for the "first P20,000.00 of the total P42,000.00 bond," and that "the moment the first P20,000.00 is paid the bonding company automatically releases his responsibility to them."

30