Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin

http://psp.sagepub.com The Role of Self-Deception in Perceptions of Past, Present, and Future Happiness
Michael D. Robinson and Carol D. Ryff Pers Soc Psychol Bull 1999; 25; 596 DOI: 10.1177/0146167299025005005 The online version of this article can be found at: http://psp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/25/5/596

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PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN

Robinson, Ryff / SELF-DECEPTION AND HAPPINESS

The Role of Self-Deception in Perceptions of Past, Present, and Future Happiness

Michael D. Robinson University of Illinois at Champaign Carol D. Ryff University of Wisconsin at Madison Previous research suggests that self-deception is maximized when (a) there is a lack of concrete information, and (b) the motivation to self-deceive is high. In applying this model to past, present, and future judgments about the self, the future is unique because of its uncertainty, whereas the past is unique because of its lesser relevance to current motivations. We therefore predict that people will be the most self-deceptive when thinking about their future, a prediction supported in four studies ( Ns = 96, 125, 40, and 298) using various measures of self-deception and subjective well-being. Studies 1 and 2 provide basic evidence for future self-enhancement, whereas Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that concrete information about the future reduces this bias. More generally, the findings highlight the special status of future wellbeing judgments as well as the flexible link between self-deception and self-evaluation. attributes and abilities (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989; Dunning, Perie, & Story, 1991). One way this is accomplished is by giving more attention to positive information about the self than to negative information (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992). In perceiving the future self, most of us appear to be great optimists, overestimating the likelihood that positive events will happen to us (Irwin, 1953; Langer & Roth, 1975; Weinstein, 1980) as well as underestimating the likelihood that negative events will happen to us (Kuiper, MacDonald, & Derry, 1983; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986). Despite considerable evidence that self-deception plays a role in perceptions of past, present, and future selves, little is known about the degree to which people are self-deceptive across each of these temporal selves. That is, are people more unrealistically positive about their future self than about their past and present selves? In answering this question, it is useful to consider two factors that should influence the degree to which people engage in self-deception. First, people are more likely to engage in self-deception when there is less available evidence or when that evidence is more ambiguous (Baumeister, 1993; Brown, 1986; Paulhus, 1991). Another way of stating this informational principle is that the less selfrelevant information a person has within a specific domain, the more likely he or she is to engage in selfdeception. In the context of temporal perceptions, we know a great deal about the events and circumstances surrounding past and present selves but comparably less
Authors Note: Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Michael D. Robinson, Psychology Department, University of Illinois, 603 E. Daniel St., Champaign, IL 61820; e-mail: michaelr@ s.psych.uiuc.edu. PSPB, Vol. 25 No. 5, May 1999 596-608 1999 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Self-deception, defined as the tendency to view oneself

in an unrealistically favorable light, may be an important component of subjective well-being (Diener, Sandvik, Pavot, & Gallagher, 1991; Paulhus & Reid, 1991). Indeed, influential perspectives on optimism and selfdeception view self-deception as a primary basis of good mental and physical health (Baumeister, 1993; Scheier & Carver, 1985; Taylor & Brown, 1988).1 Separate literatures suggest that self-deception and related constructs also play a role in perceptions of past, present, and future selves. In perceiving the past self, Greenwald (1980) has likened self-evaluation to a totalitarian system in which past history is rewritten to serve current needs. Similarly, Ross (1989) has provided a good deal of evidence that past attitudes are largely reconstructed on the basis of current attitudes. In perceiving the present self, most people consider themselves to be above average on a wide range of positive 596

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Robinson, Ryff / SELF-DECEPTION AND HAPPINESS about the events and circumstances surrounding the future self. For this reason, there is more room for selfdeception in perceptions of the future self than in perceptions of past or present selves. A second principle is that motivational factors will play a role in self-deception: The greater the motivation to perceive oneself positively within a given domain, the more likely a person is to self-deceive (Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988). On the basis of this motivational principle, we contend that people have stronger motivations for selfdeception when thinking about present and future selves than when thinking about the past self. Why? First, a negative view of the past self can actually boost the perceived positivity of present and future selves (Gergen & Gergen, 1988; Ross, 1989). Second, present and future selves may be more central to ones motivational structure than is the past self (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Ruvolo, 1989), presumably because these selves are currently unfolding, or have yet to unfold. And third, we have a greater degree of perceived control over present and future events than over past events. To the extent that the motivational principle affects the use of selfdeception, people should be more self-deceptive about their present and future selves than about their past selves.
SELF-DECEPTION AND JUDGMENTS OF PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE HAPPINESS

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Self-deception is defined as an unrealistically positive view of the self. Unlike impression management, which represents an intentional self-presentation tactic, selfdeception is a nonintentional bias in perceiving the self. Consider a representative item from the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) (Paulhus, 1989): I am fully in control of my own fate. Objectively, such a statement is true of no one. Subjectively, however, it is possible for someone to endorse this statement with the earnest belief that it is true. Self-deception biases can be seen in many subjective judgments that are associated with socially desirable states or attributes (Taylor & Brown, 1988). Happiness judgments are ideally suited for studying self-deception biases, particularly because happiness is among the most valued of personal attributes (Diener, 1984). Previous research has in fact shown that trait self-deception has a positive association with ratings of present subjective well-being (Diener et al., 1991; Paulhus & Reid, 1991). We also know at least two things about past, present, and future happiness judgments. First, Ryff (1991) has shown a tendency for young and middle-aged adults to see gains in subjective well-being from the past to the present to the future. Second, at a normative level, we know that such claims of temporal gains in subjective well-being are unfounded by cross-sectional and longitu-

dinal investigations of happiness over the life span (Andrews & Withey, 1976; Myers & Diener, 1995), although there may be certain exceptions. For example, Helson and Moane (1987) found that a particular group of young women experienced increases in confidence, dominance, and coping skills as they matured from their college years to the age of 43. More recent research, however, suggests that age-related changes in well-being are more complicated, with mean gains, declines, and stability occurring on different dimensions (Ryff & Keyes, 1995). Given this differentiated pattern, we maintain that, at the normative level at least, people are deceiving themselves when they claim that they will be much happier in the future than they are in the present or were in the past. In the current studies, we sought to provide more direct evidence that perceptions of future happiness are more vulnerable to self-deception biases than are perceptions of past happiness. We examined this hypothesis in various ways. In Study 1, we predicted that trait selfdeception would make a unique contribution to future happiness judgments (with self-esteem and impression management controlled). In Study 2, we predicted that people would view the future in a less differentiated and more positive manner than they viewed the past and present. In Study 3, we predicted that perceived certainties about the future would cause people to report less exaggerated future happiness judgments. And in Study 4, we predicted that unrealistic ideas about happiness in the future would decline with age. We have been explicit about our hypotheses as they relate to perceptions of past and future happiness: On all measures, we expected participants to be more selfdeceptive about their future happiness than about their past happiness. As detailed above, past and future selves are thought to differ on both the informational and motivational factors that drive self-deception. By contrast, the present self is believed to differ from the past self in terms of the motivational factor but not in terms of the informational factor. Also, the present self is believed to differ from the future self in terms of the information factor but not in terms of the motivational factor. Thus, by examining how the present self is viewed in relation to past and future selves, we hoped to gain an understanding of whether motivational or informational factors play a larger role in perceptions of happiness across time.
STUDY 1

Method
OVERVIEW

Participants were asked to rate their happiness in the past, present, and future. Following this, they completed

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PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN are impression management scores (Hoorens, 1995; Paulhus & Reid, 1991). Results
OVERVIEW

a self-esteem scale and a scale designed to tap the two social desirability dimensions of self-deception (an unconscious tendency to perceive the self in an unrealistically positive light) and impression management (a relatively conscious tendency to present oneself favorably to others). All participants made happiness ratings in the same orderpast, present, then future.
PARTICIPANTS

Participants were 96 college undergraduates from the University of California, Davis, who chose to volunteer to earn extra credit for their psychology classes.
INSTRUCTIONS AND DEPENDENT MEASURES

We first report an analysis of happiness ratings alone. We then examine the relationship between the personality measures and self-reports of happiness in the past, present, and future.
HAPPINESS RATINGS

Participants were initially asked to rate their happiness in the past, present, and future, with the specific time frames left unspecified. Each of these ratings was made by choosing a number from a 9-point, single-item happiness scale (1 = very unhappy, 9 = extremely happy). Participants then completed the 10-item Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale, which involves agreeing or disagreeing with 10 statements characteristic of low or high selfesteem (e.g., On the whole, I am satisfied with myself). This scale has a Cronbachs of .88 and a test-retest correlation of .82 for a 1-week interval (Fleming & Courtney, 1984). The validity of the scale is also well established. Scores from Rosenbergs (1965) scale correlate positively with general self-regard (.78) and social confidence (.51) but negatively with self-reported anxiety (.64) and depression (.54) (Fleming & Courtney, 1984). To determine the role of social desirability responding in self-reports of happiness, participants completed the 40-item BIDR (Version 6) (Paulhus, 1989). The inventory consists of two separable 20-item scales, one of which measures self-deception (e.g., I am fully in control of my own fate) and the other of which measures impression management (e.g., I never take things that dont belong to me). Factor analytic results have supported the BIDR distinction between self-deception and impression management (Paulhus, 1991), with correlations between the two subscales ranging from .05 to .40. Cronbachs for the Self-Deception scale has ranged from .68 to .80, whereas Cronbachs for the Impression Management scale has ranged from .75 to .86 (Paulhus, 1991). The BIDR also displays construct validity. For example, Paulhus has shown that manipulations involving anonymity (Paulhus, 1984) and self-presentation strategies (Paulhus, Bruce, & Trapnell, 1995) influence impression management scores more than they influence selfdeception scores. The self-deception component of the BIDR has been validated in studies showing that selfdeceptive enhancement tends to be more closely related to the endorsement of positive attributes for the self than

To see whether participants happiness ratings differed according to whether they were rating the past, present, or future self, we performed a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) on happiness ratings, with time frame (3) as a within-subject repeated measure. A main effect for time frame, F(2, 190) = 29.05, p < .001, indicated that happiness ratings did indeed differ according to whether participants were rating the past (M = 6.21), present (M = 6.33), or future (M = 7.53). Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants felt they would be more happy in the future than in the present, F(1, 95) = 90.11, p < .001, or past, F(1, 95) = 37.91, p < .001, but that their happiness in the past and present did not differ, F < 1.2
PREDICTORS OF HAPPINESS IN PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

We next examined which of the personality variables (self-esteem, self-deception, or impression management) were uniquely associated with ratings of past, present, and future happiness. To address this issue, we performed three separate regressions, with happiness in a particular time frame (past, present, or future) entered as the dependent variable and self-esteem, self-deception, and impression management entered as simultaneous predictors. As indicated by the s reported in Table 1, self-deception made a unique contribution only to the prediction of future happiness. In fact, with impression management and self-esteem controlled, self-deception was the only unique predictor of future happiness. By contrast, ratings of present happiness were uniquely predicted by self-esteem but not by self-deception. Ratings of past happiness had no unique predictors. Discussion As expected, participants viewed their future happiness as higher than their past happiness. Further findings suggested that such a mean difference was partly due to self-deception. Specifically, multiple regressions indicated that self-deception made a unique contribution to the prediction of future happiness but did not predict past happiness.

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Robinson, Ryff / SELF-DECEPTION AND HAPPINESS

TABLE 1: Self-Esteem, Self-Deception, and Impression Management as Predictors of Happiness Ratings Measure Happiness Ratings Past Present Future SelfEsteem .10 .33** .02 SelfDeception .19 .08 .32* Impression Management .13 .14 .11

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NOTE: Listed in the Table are the s resulting from three multiple regressions. In each case, happiness ratings in a particular time frame (past, present, or future) were the dependent measure, and selfesteem, self-deception, and impression management scores were the predictors. *p < .05. **p < .01 (both two-tailed). STUDY 2

Study 2 introduces several new measures designed to validate our ideas about temporal self-perception. First, participants rated their past, present, and future selves on representative statements from the BIDR (Paulhus, 1989). If participants are indeed more self-deceptive about their future selves than about their past selves, means on the Self-Deception scale of the BIDR should reflect this difference. Second, participants rated their past, present, and future satisfaction with 20 different areas of life. In addition to seeing whether mean satisfaction scores were highest for the future self, we also examined the extent to which participants gave differentiated judgments for each of the time frames as well as the extent to which their happiness judgments exhibited a sensitivity to their life domain ratings. Method
OVERVIEW AND DESIGN

Dependent measures fell into three categories: (a) happiness ratings, (b) personality measuresselfesteem, self-deception, and impression management, and (c) satisfaction ratings for various areas of life. All participants rated these three categories for their past, present, and future selves. Time frame (past, present, or future), a within-subject variable, was the variable of primary interest. An order variable was also created by constructing six different questionnaires corresponding to the six different possible orders of time frame ratings (e.g., past, present, future; past, future, present, etc.). Participants were randomly assigned to order condition.
PARTICIPANTS

Participants initially rated the happiness of past, present, and future selves (1 = very unhappy and 9 = extremely happy). Questions presented at the end of the questionnaire revealed that, on average, they had been considering a past self of 4.83 years ago, a future self of 6.16 years in the future, and a present self that extended from 1.33 years in the past to 0.97 years in the future. The order of time frames for happiness ratings was identical to the order of time frames for the other dependent measures in that condition (e.g., if they rated the other dependent measures in a present/past/future order, they also made happiness ratings in that order). Whereas the other dependent measures were grouped by time frame (i.e., participants rated all of the other dependent measures in the context of one time frame before moving on to the next one), happiness ratings were made all at once. This was done to facilitate time frame comparisons of subjective happiness. Following happiness ratings, participants were asked to consider either their past, present, or future self, depending on order condition. For each time frame, they rated 10 items from the BIDR (Version 6) (Paulhus, 1989), 5 of which tap self-deception and 5 of which tap impression management.3 Following BIDR ratings, participants completed Rosenbergs (1965) Self-Esteem Scale. The wording of all self-esteem and BIDR items was identical to the original scales except that the items were modified to reflect a particular time frame. Each item was preceded by a phrase specifying the time frame, and verbs were also changed accordingly (e.g., In the past, I was fully in control of my own fate). After the Self-Esteem Scale, participants rated their satisfaction with 20 different areas of life for that same time frame. These 20 areas are listed in the results section. All satisfaction ratings were made on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all satisfied, 9 = extremely satisfied ) and were always presented in the same randomized order. Results
HAPPINESS RATINGS

Participants were 125 college undergraduates from the University of California, Davis, who volunteered to earn extra credit for their psychology classes.
INSTRUCTIONS AND DEPENDENT MEASURES

As in Study 1, an ANOVA revealed a main effect for time frame on happiness ratings, F(2, 248) = 39.04, p < .001. Also as in Study 1, future ratings of happiness (M = 7.42) were higher than both present (M = 6.32), F(1, 124) = 63.90, p < .001, and past ratings of happiness (M = 6.06), F(1, 124) = 59.14, p < .001. Finally, as in Study 1, ratings of happiness given in the present condition were statistically equal to ratings of happiness given in the past condition, F(1, 124) = 2.19, p > .10. It therefore appears that varying the order of happiness ratings did not influence means for the three time frames.
SATISFACTION RATINGS

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PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN not artifactually due to the higher mean ratings given to the future self. Specifically, neither of the significant pairwise comparisons interacted with a trichotomized measure of mean future satisfaction, both ps > .05. We next sought to examine whether a belief that the future would be better than the past and present generalized to the various life domains represented by the satisfaction scale. Rather than examining these satisfaction ratings separately, we factor analyzed them to create meaningful subscales. First, we averaged ratings for each area of life across past, present, and future time frames. Second, we performed a factor analysis on these mean ratings by using principle components extraction and varimax rotation. Four factors were extracted and all 20 items loaded onto one of the factors at .30 or higher. Factor 1 (42.6% of the variance) was termed social well-being because most of the items involved ones relationship with others: image I project to others (loading = .72), leisure activities (.71), health/physical well-being (.70), group involvement (.68), importance to others (.68), friendships (.66), appearance (.64), and romantic involvements (.36). Factor 2 (9.6% of the variance) was termed achievement well-being because all of the items refer to goals or achievements: academic standing (.86), academic goals (.84), progress toward goals (.74), professional goals (.67), and work (.52). Factor 3 (6.1% of the variance) was termed spiritual well-being because the highest loading items refer to personal values and beliefs: efforts to further causes (.74), spiritual life (.65), family relationships (.56), and control over life (.54). Factor 4 (5.7% of the variance) was termed material well-being because the items refer to finances, possessions, or ones physical environment: financial situation (.76), geographic environment (.71), and material possessions (.68). The items loading onto each of the factors were then averaged to create Social, Achievement, Spiritual, and Material Well-Being satisfaction subscales.
TIME FRAME EFFECTS ON THE SATISFACTION FACTORS AND THE OTHER DEPENDENT MEASURES

To investigate the relationship between domain satisfaction ratings and happiness ratings, we first computed correlations between each of the satisfaction items and happiness ratings in the same time frame (e.g., responses on the past satisfaction Item 1 were correlated with past happiness ratings). For each of the time frames, then, there were 20 correlations between a satisfaction item (in that time frame) and happiness ratings (in that time frame); that is, items rather than participants were the units of analysis. Following procedures used by Robinson and Johnson (1996), we then converted these correlations into z scores and analyzed the z scores in a time frame (3) ANOVA. The results of this analysis would indicate whether the relationship between satisfaction and happiness ratings varied according to whether participants were rating themselves in the past, present, or future. A main effect for time frame, F(2, 38) = 12.70, p < .001, indicated that this was indeed the case. Further pairwise comparisons revealed that the relationship between satisfaction and happiness ratings was a stronger one when participants were rating the past (mean r = .44) than when they were rating the present (mean r = .33), F(1, 19) = 24.60, p < .001, or future (mean r = .29), F(1, 19) = 16.69, p < .005. By contrast, the relationship between satisfaction and happiness ratings did not differ when participants were rating the present or future, F(1, 19) = 1.20, p > .20. It therefore appears that ratings of past happiness were more closely tied to ones satisfaction with various areas of life than were ratings of present or future happiness. We next sought to examine whether participants viewed the future in a less differentiated manner than they viewed the past or present. To examine this issue, we first computed three within-subject measures of satisfaction rating variability, one for each of the time frames. These scores represent the extent to which participants differentiated among the different life domainsthat is, the extent to which they reported high satisfaction in certain life domains but low satisfaction in others. Second, we examined these interscale variance scores as a function of the particular time frame that was being rated. A within-subject ANOVA yielded a significant main effect for time frame on these interscale variance scores, F(2, 248) = 69.83, p < .001. As expected, pairwise comparisons confirmed that satisfaction ratings were less variable when participants were rating their future self (M variance = 1.50) than when they were rating their present (M variance = 3.49), F(1, 124) = 124.56, p < .001, or past selves (M variance = 3.25), F(1, 124) = 93.42, p < .001, but that the variability of past and present satisfaction ratings did not differ, F(1, 124) = 1.48, p > .20. Further analyses indicated that these variability results were

We performed time frame (3) ANOVAs on the measures of self-esteem, self-deception, impression management, and the four satisfaction subscales. As indicated by the results reported in Table 2, time frame had a main effect on all of these measures, all ps < .001. Supporting our hypothesis, participants engaged in more selfdeception concerning their future self than concerning their past or present selves. Participants also engaged in more self-deception concerning their present self than concerning their past self, suggesting that the past self may be viewed the most objectively. Further pairwise

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Robinson, Ryff / SELF-DECEPTION AND HAPPINESS comparisons revealed that, with one exception, the future self was seen as higher on all attributes than present and past selves were. Discussion Study 2, which varied the order of happiness ratings, replicated Study 1 by showing that people believe that they will be happier in the future than in the past and present. Study 2 also added a number of findings supporting the idea that participants were more selfdeceptive when perceiving their future self than when perceiving their past self. The future was not just rated highest in happiness but was also rated highest in selfesteem, all four satisfaction subscales, and a five-item measure of self-deception. Additional findings support our hypotheses about self-perception across time. When we correlated individual satisfaction items with past and future happiness ratings, results indicated that past happiness ratings were more highly related to ones perceived satisfaction with various areas of life. This suggests that participants based ratings of past happiness more closely on an actual consideration of the available information. Further analyses conducted on the satisfaction ratings suggested that participants tended to view the future in a less differentiated manner than they viewed the past and present. That is, although one might predict that the uncertainty about the future would lead to highly variable satisfaction ratings, our findings indicated that the opposite effect occurred; that is, there was a marked reduction in the variability of future satisfaction ratings. These findings only make sense in light of peoples motivation to perceive the future in highly desirable terms. As in Study 1, the results involving the present self ratings suggested that both informational and motivational influences on the use of self-deception were occurring. Supporting the informational view, present happiness was no higher than past happiness, and similar results were obtained on the Social Well-Being subscale. Furthermore, the within-subject variance scores suggested that participants were viewing the present in a relatively differentiated manner. Supporting the motivational view, mean self-deception was higher for the present self than it was for the past self. In addition, the satisfaction/happiness correlations suggested that present happiness was less tied to an evaluation of different life circumstances than was past happiness. It is reasonable to conclude that both informational and motivational factors influence self-perception across time. The future self is always viewed more positively than the past self because both motivational and informational factors differentiate these two time frames. The present self, by contrast, is not aligned exclusively with either the past self or the future self.
TABLE 2: Time Frame Effects on Dependent Measure Means Time Frame Measure Happiness Self-deception Impression management Self-esteem Satisfaction scales Social well-being Achievement well-being Spiritual well-being Material well-being Past 6.06a 3.72a 3.72a 2.95a 5.95a 6.14a 5.84a 5.93a Present 6.32a 4.60b 4.19b 3.18b 6.11a 5.55b 6.28b 5.79a

601

Future 7.42b 4.83c 4.33b 3.38c 7.14b 7.13c 7.32c 6.97b

NOTE: Main effects for time frame (3) were found on all dependent measures, all ps < .001. Means in the same row not sharing subscripts differ at the .05 level.

Although participants may have a strong motivation to view the present self in positive terms, such a tendency must be partially restrained by the facts of ones life. The future self, less constrained by these objective facts, can be viewed in a much more positive manner.
STUDY 3

Consistent with our predictions, the young adults in Studies 1 and 2 consistently saw the future as more rosy than the past and present. One of the assumptions of our framework is that uncertainty about the future is a key reason for this unrealistically positive view of the future self. This assumption is directly examined in Studies 3 and 4. In study 3, we experimentally manipulated uncertainty about the future by randomly assigning young adults to two groups. One group was asked to think about self-generated aspects of their lives that would remain relatively the same over the next 5 years. A second group, by contrast, was asked to think about the aspects of their lives that would probably change quite a bit over this time span. We expected that the latter group, relative to the former group, would spend their time thinking about how things would change for the better (rather than for the worse) and thus give higher future happiness ratings. Method
PARTICIPANTS

Participants were 40 men and women (in approximately equal proportion) who were recruited by posters distributed throughout the Madison, Wisconsin, community. Approximately 80% were college students seeking extra spending money ($6) during the summer. The remaining 20% were young professionals (10%) and middle-aged adults (10%).
DESIGN, INSTRUCTIONS, AND DEPENDENT MEASURES

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PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN moral fiber will likely be stronger; Ill have a larger circle of friends). In a final analysis, we sought to determine if the effects of the priming manipulation were due to the positivity of described life aspects (either continuities or discontinuities). We first computed a positivity ratio, defined as the number of described positive life aspects divided by the total number of valenced aspects that were described. When this variable was used as a covariate in an ANCOVA, the effect of the priming manipulation was still significant, p < .05. This suggests that the effectiveness of the manipulation did not depend on the valence of recalled information. Instead, perceived continuities between the present and future, whether positive or negative, served to constrain the illusion that people would be much more happy in the future than in the present.
STUDY 4

After taking part in an unrelated study on text comprehension, participants were randomly assigned to certainty (n = 20) or uncertainty (n = 20) questionnaire conditions. Differences between the certainty and uncertainty conditions are noted by italics, with the uncertainty instructions placed in parentheses:
As people make transitions through life, some things change quite a bit, whereas other things tend to remain the same. We want your ideas about the aspects of your lifeeither negative or positive or boththat are likely to change very little over time (quite a bit over time). Specifically, when you think about yourself as you will be 5 years from now, what aspects of your life are likely to be relatively the same (relatively different)?

To facilitate the effectiveness of this manipulation, we asked participants to list and describe at least five things that are either unlikely to change much (certainty condition) or likely to change to a considerable extent (uncertainty condition) in the next 5 years. After writing their five statements, all participants then rated how satisfied they would be with 10 different life domains 5 years from the present. All 10 domains were rated on the same 9-point satisfaction scale (1 = not at all satisfied and 9 = extremely satisfied ).4 Results and Discussion Because the reliability of the 10-item satisfaction scale was quite high (Cronbachs = .95), we averaged over the 10 domains to get a single future satisfaction with life score. In support of our hypothesis, a one-way ANOVA indicated that participants in the uncertainty condition reported that their future would be happier (M = 7.56) than did participants in the certainty condition (M = 6.63), F(1, 38) = 4.25, p < .05. An analysis of their written responses suggests why this was the case. When asked about things that would change, participants in the uncertainty condition were more likely to write about things that would change for the better (M number of statements = 2.95) than about things that would change for the worse (M = .65), F(1, 19) = 78.42, p < .001. Although participants in the certainty condition were also more likely to write about positive things (M = 2.50) than about negative things (M = .95), F(1, 19) = 11.01, p < .005, these relative certainties apparently provided some check against future self-deception. That is, because these certainties made the future seem more predictable (e.g., I will still be married to my spouse; I will still have many of the same friends), they also constrained visions for the future self. Participants in the uncertainty condition, by contrast, were given free reign to imagine all sorts of life details changing for the better (e.g., My determination will sky-rocket; My

Study 3 revealed that those who were led to focus on predictable (vs. unpredictable) aspects of the future reported that they would be less satisfied with their future lives. In Study 4, we sought to find a natural analog for the experimental manipulation. In doing so, we reasoned that different age groups might view the future quite differently. The participants in Studies 1, 2, and 3 were young adults. In the future, these individuals are likely to move to a different location, begin their careers, get married, and start a family. In a very real sense, then, the most important details of their lives have yet to be actualized. The life status of these young adults can be contrasted with the life status of middle-aged and older adults. Middle-aged adults have already chosen their careers and have likely already started families. Nevertheless, there are certain life transitions that have yet to be experienced. People in this age group are likely to experience future changes in work and economic status, and they have yet to experience retirement and the leisure time that it brings. By contrast to these two age groups, the future would seem to be the least ambiguous for people who are older. Their work, family, economic status, and living situations are unlikely to change dramatically in their future years. And, unfortunately, they can reasonably expect an increase in health-related problems as they continue to age. These age-related expectations allow comparably less room for self-deception about the future. In Study 4, we sought to provide support for these ideas. All reported analyses are based on data collected by Ryff (1991), but all analyses are completely new. Method
PARTICIPANTS

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Robinson, Ryff / SELF-DECEPTION AND HAPPINESS Participants were 298 young (n = 121; M age = 19.3), middle-aged (n = 92; M age = 46.0), and old-aged adults (n = 85; M age = 73.4). The young participants were contacted through an educational institution. The middleand old-aged participants were contacted through community and civic organizations.5
DESIGN AND DEPENDENT MEASURES TABLE 3:

603

Future Enhancement Among Three Different Age Groups Age Group

Well-Being Dimension Autonomy Positive relations with others Personal growth Purpose in life Environmental mastery Self-acceptance

Young .78a .49a .19a .49a .75a .73a

Middle-Aged .32b .25b .07b .14b .16b .29b

Old .12c .26c .44c .35c .57c .11c

Participants completed six 20-item well-being scales created by Ryff (1989). The scales tap self-perceptions of autonomy, positive relations with others, personal growth, purpose in life, environmental mastery, and self-acceptance. Items for each of these six scales consist of statements judged to be low or high on the particular well-being dimension. All items were rated on the same 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree). Cronbachs s for the six scales range from .86 to .93, and the scales have 6-week test-retest reliabilities ranging from .81 to .88 (Ryff, 1989). Participants were instructed to complete the scales in the context of present, ideal, past, and future selves, in that order. They completed the scales in the same temporal order because previous research (Ryff & Heincke, 1983) suggested that it is difficult to evaluate past and future selves without first evaluating the present self. Because the data collection also included a life history inventory, the results of which are reported in Ryff and Heidrich (1997), it was deemed desirable to have participants rate their ideal self before their past and future selves. Instructions to think about past and future selves were more specific than those used in Studies 1 and 2. Young adults were instructed to imagine themselves as adolescents (past self) and as 40- to 50-year-olds (future self). Middle-aged adults were instructed to imagine themselves as 20- to 25-year-olds (past self) and as 65- to 70year-olds (future self). Finally, old-aged adults were instructed to imagine themselves as 40- to 50-year-olds (past self) and 10 to 15 years in the future (future self). Results
FUTURE ENHANCEMENT AMONG THREE DIFFERENT AGE GROUPS

NOTE: Future enhancement scores were created by subtracting present well-being scores from projected future well-being scores on each of the dimensions. Thus, positive numbers represent a belief that the future will be happier than the present, whereas negative numbers represent a belief that the future will be less happy than the present. On each of the well-being dimensions, scores within a row not sharing a subscript differ from each other at p < .005.

and young vs. old) on each of the well-being dimensions. Results indicated that all pairwise comparisons were significant, all ps < .005, and all conformed to predictions. Specifically, on all of the well-being dimensions, future enhancement was highest among the young age group and lowest among the old-aged group. In all analyses, furthermore, the middle-aged group fell in between the other two groups: Their future enhancement scores were higher than the old-aged group but lower than the young age group. Results, which are reported in Table 3, thus provide strong support for predictions derived from the two-factor model of self-deception.
CORRELATIONS INVOLVING IDEAL SELF RATINGS

Future enhancement scores were created by subtracting present well-being scores on a given dimension from future well-being scores. This measure thus reflects the extent to which participants of different age groups envision themselves being happier in the future than they are in the present. These future enhancement scores were examined in six ANOVAs in which age group was a three-level independent variable. As predicted, age group had an effect in all six ANOVAs, all ps < .001. Follow-up ANOVAs tested each of the pairwise comparisons (young vs. middle-aged, middle-aged vs. old,

We correlated past, present, and future self ratings with ideal self ratings (as shown in Table 4). All pairs of correlations were compared within a particular age group on a particular dimension (e.g., for young adults, the correlation of past and ideal self autonomy ratings was compared to their correlation of future and ideal self autonomy ratings). On all six dimensions, young adults future/ideal self correlations were higher than their past/ideal self correlations, again supporting the idea that young adults are quite optimistic about their future self. This optimism is not limited to young adults. On all six of the dimensions, middle-aged adults also had higher future/ideal self correlations than past/ideal self correlations. The results involving young and middle-aged adults can be contrasted quite sharply with the results involving old-aged adults. On only one of the dimensionsself-acceptancedid old-aged adults have a higher future/ ideal self than past/ideal self correlation. The general lack of this difference among old-aged adults seems to be partly due to more modest expectations for the future self.

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Correlations Between Ideal Self Ratings and Past, Present, and Future Self Ratings Correlation Coefficients GENERAL DISCUSSION

TABLE 4:

Measure and Age Group Autonomy Young Middle-aged Old-aged Positive relations with others Young Middle-aged Old-aged Personal growth Young Middle-aged Old-aged Purpose in life Young Middle-aged Old-aged Environmental mastery Young Middle-aged Old-aged Self-acceptance Young Middle-aged Old-aged

Past and Ideal

Present and Ideal

Future and Ideal

.07a .25a .46a .24a .32ac .50a .45a .20a .43ac .29ac .22a .42a .09ac .21a .36ac .11ac .12a .44a

.31b .40b .62a .45b .41ad .57a .65b .58b .69bd .41ad .44b .72b .22ad .25a .60bd .26ad .39b .66b

.47b .70c .54a .55b .57bd .43a .60b .59b .55ad .52bd .58b .48a .38bd .49b .47ad .38bd .52b .62b

Two main findings emerge from the four studies reported in this article. First, people tend to believe that they will be happier and more satisfied with various aspects of their lives in the future than in the past and present. Second, concrete information about the future, in terms of either perceived continuities with the present (Study 3) or age-related expectations (Study 4), serves to reduce this future self-enhancement bias. Results are consistent with past findings that suggest that selfdeception is greatest under conditions of information uncertainty and high motivation. Future Self-Enhancement Although previous research has shown that selfenhancement biases can influence perceptions of past (Fischhoff, 1975; Greenwald, 1980; Ross, 1989), present (Alicke, 1985; Baumeister, 1993; Brown, 1986, 1990; Dunning et al., 1989), and future selves (Alloy & Ahrens, 1987; Psyzczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987; Weinstein, 1980), no previous research has, to our knowledge, focused direct attention on comparative enhancement across the three time frames. Our findings suggest that perceptions of future well-being are particularly subject to self-enhancement biases. Why is the future rated so positively? Although the present and future are both motivationally relevant (and thus highly important to the present self), the present and future differ in their opportunities for successful self-enhancement. More specifically, because the future is marked by uncertainty, and thus presents novel possibilities for the self, the most desirable selves can be envisioned without contradicting known facts (Markus & Nurius, 1986; Weinstein, 1980). The positivity of the future self may be critical to the maintenance of a positive self-evaluation. In contrast to predictions generated from reflexive views of selfevaluation (Mead, 1934), people tend to maintain positive self-views even after receiving negative feedback (Snyder & Higgins, 1988; Tesser & Paulhus, 1983). Although various mechanisms may account for this null result (Brown, 1990; McFarlin & Blascovitch, 1981; Tesser & Paulhus, 1983), a crucial mechanism seems to be the positivity of visions for the future self (Bandura, 1989; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Scheier & Carver, 1985). Recent evidence, in fact, suggests that deficiencies in future self-enhancement can have negative consequences for mental and physical health. For example, Alloy and Ahrens (1987) found that depressed relative to nondepressed participants made more pessimistic predictions for their future performance, even when given the same task-relevant information (see also Psyzczynski et al., 1987). Indeed, hopelessness about the future may be key in the genesis of depression (Abramson, Selig-

NOTE: Correlations less than .21 in magnitude are nonsignificant (seven correlations). All other correlations are significant at p < .05. Across each of the rows, correlations not sharing any subscripts are significantly different from each other at p < .05.

Discussion Study 4 provided consistent support for our predictions. Specifically, positive expectations for the future self diminished with age. Future enhancement was highest among the young adults, intermediate among the middle-aged group, and nonexistent among the oldaged group. Consistent with Study 3 findings, it appears that ambiguity about the future, in the form of important life transitions, is a key variable that influences the positivity of expectations for the future self. Correlations involving ideal self-ratings reveal a similar pattern. Among the young and middle-aged participants, future/ideal self correlations were consistently higher than past/ideal self correlations, whereas this pattern was not apparent among old-aged participants. It is important to note, however, that the old-aged participants were not pessimists: Their future/ideal self correlations were not lower than their past/ideal self correlations. Instead, it is likely that motivational and informational factors influenced self-deception in opposite directions for old-aged participants, in effect canceling each others influence.

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Robinson, Ryff / SELF-DECEPTION AND HAPPINESS man, & Teasdale, 1978; Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974). By contrast, optimism about the future has been linked to a variety of positive outcomes, including better adjustment to the stresses of college life (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; Scheier & Carver, 1985) and resilience in the face of major health problems (Scheier et al., 1989; Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984; Timko & Janoff-Bulman, 1985). How do positive expectations about the future lead to positive outcomes? According to Bandura (1989), people who expect positive outcomes set higher goals for themselves, pursue these goals more vigorously, and are more likely to persist in the face of temporary setbacks. Similarly, Scheier and Carver (1985) have found that dispositional optimism leads to more problem-focused coping (defined by attempts to change a problematic situation) and less denial (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989). Other research indicates that merely thinking about an event makes the event seem more likely (Carroll, 1978; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) and that beliefs about the future self can create their own reality (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1962; Sherman, 1980). Taken together, this research suggests that future self-enhancement may be a normative tendency possessing more positive than negative consequences. Limitations to Future Self-Enhancement Although we assume that all people are motivated to envision a positive future self, we also assume that there are limiting conditions. Specifically, relatively concrete information about the future will serve to minimize such enhancement. Evidence for these limiting conditions was obtained in Studies 3 and 4. In Study 3, we manipulated a priming factor hypothesized to minimize future self-enhancement. Consistent with our predictions, those asked to think about continuities between the present and future reported lower satisfaction with future life domains than did those asked to think about discontinuities. Although participants in the change condition were free to think about how their lives would deteriorate, we did not expect them to do so. Instead, we expected that their motivations would channel their thoughts in a positive direction, a prediction confirmed by the life changes that they described. Participants in the stability condition also tended to describe the positive aspects of their lives, but these continuities provided some concrete expectations about the future and thus restrained future self-enhancement. These ideas were also tested in a cross-sectional investigation of people from different age groups (Study 4). Reasoning that peoples life circumstances become more stable as they age, we expected that visions for the future self, and thus future self-enhancement, would

605

also become more constrained with age. Results were supportive of this account. On all six of Ryffs (1989) well-being dimensions, future self-enhancement was most extreme among young participants, was weak to moderate among middle-aged participants, and was nonexistent among old-aged participants. Additional results demonstrated that older adults tended not to view their future selves in more idealistic terms than their past selves, whereas this was a consistent pattern among young and middle-aged adults. The results, in sum, provide clear evidence that future selfenhancement tends to diminish with age. In a recent study of high relevance, Cross and Markus (1991) asked four age groups about their hoped for and feared future selves. The youngest group (ages 18-24) reported hoped for selves that were extremely positive and unrealistic. Their hoped for selves were also the least tied to current circumstances (e.g., being famous, marrying a Playboy centerfold). By contrast, the young adults (ages 25-39) reported hoped for selves that were less extreme and more constrained, and this tendency only increased across the other two age groups (ages 40-59 and 60+). Typically married and settled in a career, for example, the middle-aged group expressed the hope that they could perform their roles well (e.g., being a good husband and father, successful at work). Finally, the hoped for selves of the oldest group were quite modest and realistic. Their hopes centered around fighting aging and maintaining active lives (e.g., being useful and able to help others, being an active old person). Despite the more modest goals of older people, research indicates that they tend to be just as happy as young people (Myers & Diener, 1995). Gerontologists seem to agree that modest visions for the future self are actually a critical determinant of adjustment to old age (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Brandstdter & Greve, 1994). Setting fewer and more modest goals allows older individuals to make meaningful subjective progress in their lives. Hence, just as future self-enhancement may be adaptive for young adults, a more modest vision for the future self may be adaptive for older adults. Age brings continuity, specifically in the form of more stable commitments and roles, and this continuity diminishes the tendency toward future self-enhancement. Although ratings of present well-being tend not to diminish with age (Andrews & Withey, 1976; Myers & Diener, 1995), judgments of future well-being do. In this regard, we contend that future well-being judgments have an intimate connection with long-term goals in a way that present well-being judgments do not. Specifically, the degree to which people engage in future selfenhancement should be related to the degree to which they expect their lives to change. A teleological goal focus, arguably a defining characteristic of young adult-

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1. There are many psychologists who share our broad view of selfdeception (e.g., Baumeister, 1993; Hoorens, 1995; Paulhus, 1984). On the other hand, there are others who conceive of self-deception in more restricted terms. According to Gur and Sackeim (1979), selfdeception occurs when an individual simultaneously holds two contradictory beliefs, is unaware of one of these beliefs, and when this unawareness is motivated. Our results are not necessarily germane to this more restricted view of self-deception. 2. In neither Study 1 nor Study 2 did we ask for the gender of the participants. Previous research indicates that gender differences in happiness tend to be weak and inconsistent (Andrews & Robinson, 1991). Both samples were drawn from a population in which there were slightly more women than men (i.e., about 60% women). 3. We included only 10 of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) items in Study 2 because of the number of other dependent measures also examined in the study. We primarily limit our Study 2 conclusions concerning these measures to the following research question: Do mean ratings of self-deception and impression management in the past, present, and future parallel mean ratings on the happiness scale? 4. The life satisfaction scale for Study 3 consisted of the following 10 items: my family relationships, my friendships, my sense of purpose, my control over life, my importance to others, my goals, my emotional well-being, my group activities, my basic life situation, and myself. 5. The gender composition of the young (58% male) and middleaged (55% male) adults was comparable, but we had less balance (29% male) in the old-aged group. One reason for the latter imbalance is that women live longer than men, and the average age of this group was relatively old (mean age = 73.4). Nevertheless, participant gender had no main effect on any of the future enhancement scores, and interactions involving participant gender did not exceed the number that would be expected on the basis of chance. REFERENCES Abramson, L. Y., Seligman, M.E.P., & Teasdale, J. D. (1978). Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 49-74. Alicke, M. D. (1985). Global self-evaluation as determined by the desirability and controllability of trait adjectives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 1621-1630. Alloy, L. B., & Ahrens, A. H. (1987). Depression and pessimism for the future: Biased use of statistically relevant information in predictions of self versus others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 366-378. Andrews, F. M., & Robinson, J. P. (1991). Measures of subjective wellbeing. In J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver, & L. S. Wrightman (Eds.), Measures of personality and social psychology (pp. 61-114). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Andrews, F. M., & Withey, S. B. (1976). Social indicators of well-being. New York: Plenum. Aronson, E., & Carlsmith, J. M. (1962). Performance expectancy as a determinant of actual performance. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 65, 178-186. Aspinwall, L. G., & Taylor, S. E. (1992). Modeling cognitive adaptation: A longitudinal investigation of the impact of individual differences and coping on college adjustment and performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 989-1003. Baltes, P. B., & Baltes, M. M. (1990). Psychological perspectives on successful aging: The model of selective optimization with compensation. In P. B. Baltes & M. M. Baltes (Eds.), Successful aging: Perspectives from the behavioral sciences (pp. 1-34). New York: Cambridge University Press. Bandura, A. (1989). Human agency in social cognitive theory. American Psychologist, 44, 1175-1184. Baumeister, R. F., & Cairns, K. J. (1992). Repression and selfpresentation: When audiences interfere with self-deceptive strategies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 851-862. Beck, A. T., Weissman, H. W., Lester, D., & Trexler, L. (1974). The assessment of pessimism: The Hopelessness scale. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 42, 861-865.

hood, leads to exaggerated visions of future well-being. By contrast, a maintenance goal focus, arguably a defining characteristic of old age, leads to relatively modest visions of future well-being. Self-Deception and Subjective Well-Being: Some Remaining Questions Relatively little is known about future well-being judgments, and many questions remain. One question is whether current life circumstances matter. On one hand, one might assume that there is a perceived continuity between present and future selves and, thus, that judgments of future well-being would vary with current happiness. On the other hand, Markus and Nurius (1986) have argued that people can tolerate negative circumstances in the present to the extent that they hold onto positive visions of the future. Under this formulation, future visions of well-being can compensate for negative circumstances in the present, and one might expect that current circumstances would have little influence on such judgments. In addition, we have made a number of assumptions about future self-enhancement that deserve further scrutiny. First, we assume that future self-enhancement represents a construct that is distinct from present selfenhancement. Second, we assume that judgments of future well-being are intimately tied to ones goal structures (i.e., teleological vs. maintenance). Third, we assume that role commitments are the critical reason why future self-enhancement diminishes with age. Fourth, we assume that future self-enhancement is functional for young adults but not functional for people who have settled into their life roles. Although all of these assumptions require scrutiny, the present studies provide basic evidence for future self-enhancement and, in doing so, help elucidate the relationship between self-deception and subjective well-being.
CONCLUSION

By considering the motivational and informational factors that influence self-evaluations, we have provided support for predictions about the circumstances under which self-deceptive enhancement is particularly likely or unlikely. Specifically, we have provided evidence that there is a close connection between self-deception and future self-enhancement. Unrealistic optimism about the future is particularly likely when people expect that the future will be different from the present. Under these circumstances, uncertainty about the future provides an ideal opportunity for envisioning the best possibilities for the self.
NOTES

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