In memory of Aaron Swartz.

This book is being released to fill a gap in public internet archives; three of
the other volumes: The inal !eport of the "ommittee and the appendi#es
covering $artin %uther &ing' (r.' and (ohn . &ennedy are already archived
on www.archive.org. This volume covers the first part of the hearings' the
testimony of the heads of the )I and "IA and a number of e#hibits mostly
dealing with surveillance' domestic and foreign' infiltration of civilian
political action groups' informants' and information gathering.
%ike many documents of its time' there is occasional fuzziness from the
original copy process and there are a few irregularities in the te#t. This is
present in the original document. The markings in the latter part of the book
are likewise on the originals and are not defacements.
*emocracy can only thrive in an atmosphere of free and unhindered access to
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difficult to study: locating the resource' traveling to it' copying or scanning ,
which may be regulated or charged for by the institution that holds it , all
these things can prove insurmountable challenges to an ordinary citizen with
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LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE REf'ORM
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
S O ~ D SESSIOX
DECEMBER 11, AND 12, W78
OLUME I
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LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
-
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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
NI NETY-F I FTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
DECEMBER 11, AND 12, 1978
VOLUME I

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Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
38-0280 WASHINGTON : 1979
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SELECTCOMMITTEEON ASSASSINATIONS
WUISSTOKES.Ohio, Chairman
RICHARDSONPREYER, NorthCarolina SAMUEL L.DEVINE.Ohio
WALTER E. FAUNTROY.Distri ct ofColumbi a STEWARTB.McKINNEY,Connect icut
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, California CHARLESTHONE.Nebr aska
CHRISTOPHER J . DODD. Connecticut HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan
HAROLDE.FORD,Tennessee
FWYD J.FITHIAN. Indiana
ROBERTW.EDGAR. Pennsylvania
(Ill
CONTENTS
Page
December 11. 1978:
1
Openingremarksby Hon. Louis Stokes,ChairmanofFullCommittee .
William H. Webster, Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation .
3
AFTERNOON SESSION
St ate ment of Frank C. Carlucci, Deputy Director, Cent ral Intelligence
Agency 47
December 12,1978:
StatementofH.S. Knight,Director,U.S.SecretService 91
AFTERNOON SESSION
Statement ofBenjaminR.Civiletti, DeputyAttorneyGeneral ..................... 111
Sta te ment and material supplied to the committee from The American
Civil LibertiesUnion 148
Closing remarksby ChairmanLouis Stokes 559
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LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1978
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washingt on, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant 'to notice, at 9:10 a.m., in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman
of the committee) presiding. .
Present : Representatives Stokes, Preyer, McKinney, Fauntroy,
Dodd, and Fithian.
Chair man STOKES. The committee will come to order.
The Chair would like to make some opening remarks.
OPENING REMARKS BY HON. LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN OF
FULL COMMITTEE
The t ime has come for the select committee to shift its attention
away from the deaths of President Kennedy and Dr . King and t o
turn t o the general subject of political assassination.
Up until now in these public hearings, the committee has been
looki ng back to the murders of John F. Kennedy and Martin
Luther King, Jr. , to try to work out some meaning for those awful
events.
Today and tomorrow the committee will look to the present and
the future, taking as its premise the grim reality that political
assassinat ions-t he murder of public officials or of private citizens
who have become public figures-will inevitably occur again if the
past is any guide to the future. For the future may be foretold in
the star k statistics of the past. Nine American Presidents, nearly
one in four, have been targets of assassin's bullets, and four of
them have died as a consequence.
Two U.S. Senators have been fatally assaulted, while four others
have narrowly escaped. And with the recent murder of Leo Ryan,
our colleague, four Members of the House have been assassinated,
while seven others have been targets of unsuccessful attempts.
Sadly, it is, therefore, an appropriate time for this concern. How
terribly ironic it is that over the throne of the self-appointed mes-
siah who ordered the murder of Congressman Ryan, there was a
SIgn that paraphrased the words of George Santayana, the philos-
opher : .
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat
it. " ,
Ten years ago, the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevent ion of Violence did a comparative analysis of assassination
III this country and elsewhere. It concluded that high rates of
(1)
-
2 3
assassinat ion tend to accompany rapid economic development, and
t hey exist in countries ruled by regimes that are coercive, but not
wholly t otalitarian.
This general conclusion should mean that the United States
should have a low incidence of political murder, whereactuallythe
reverse is the case. A nat ion wit h one of the highest levels of
economi c developmentand greatestdegree of political freedom, the
United Statesalso has a uniquel y high assassination rate.
President Kennedy was philosophical about the problem, and
prophetic, as well. On the trip to Texas, during which he was
killed, he said to an aide, 1/ .If anybody really wants to shoot
t he President it (is) not a very difficult job-all one
(has) to do (is) get a high building with a telescopic
rifle, and there (is)nothing anybody (can) do to defend
againstsuch anattempt."
Thequestionthis committeemustnow addressis this:
How is the Nation prepared to try to prevent and then to re-
spond to future political assassinat ions, Presidential or otherwise?
Frankly, if our record of t he past is indicative, the prospects are
not good.
Congress, for one, hastaken a piecemeal, afterthefact,approach
in enacti ng legislation, to wit :
A President was assassinated, so Public Law 89-141 was enacted
on August 28, 1965, making it a Federal crime to kill, kidnap or
assault the President, the President-elect, the Vice President or, if
t here should be no Vice President , the officer next in the order of
succession. Before t hen, assassinati ng the President was nota Fed-
I
eral offense.
I
Then, in 1968, Senator Robert F. Kennedy was assassinated, and
title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 (18 U.S.C. 351)
II
was enacted, making it a crimet o kill, kidnap or assaulta Member
of Congress or a Member-elect. Before t hen, assassinat ing a
Member ofCongress was nota Federaloffense.
Finally, following the murder of Israeli at hletes at the Olympic
Games in Munich in 1972, Public Law 92-539 extended the cover-
age of Federal law to foreign officials in the Uni ted States and to
officia lguests.
But, the committee must ask itself, is this enough? It may well
be that a forward looking comprehensive approach is required. In
this period of relat ive calm, it is time t o reflect on what has been
done andwhatneeds to be done.
Today and tomor row, t he committee will be hearing from top
officials of the major Federal law enforcement and intelligence
agencies having someresponsibilityin this area,the Direct or oft he
FBI, the Deputy Director of the CIA, and Director of the Secret
ServiceandtheDeputyAttorneyGeneral.
Questionsthecommitteewill be consi deringarethese:
How adequateareoureffortsto preventass assinat ion?
Areourcriminal lawsadequate to protect publicofficials?
Do they also give adequate protection to privatecitizens who are
public figures?
Do they protect not only against death and the threat of death,
but also againstkidnapingandotherassaults?
Assuming the worst occurs, are the laws granting authority to
our investigativeagencies adequate?
Do the Federal investigative agencies haveadequate authorityto
cont rol thecrimescene?
Have plans been made to bring the best in modern science and
technology to bearon thetruth-findingprocess?
Is oursystem of prosecution adapted to handlingsensitive assas-
sinationcases?
Do we afford to the accused of these heinous crimes those proce-
dural and other due process rights that are the hallmark of a free
society?
It is on these and other questions that the committee will focus
its thoughts in thesehearingstodayandtomorrow.
Our first witness today is Mr. William H. Webster, the Director
oft he FederalBureauofInvestigation.
Mr . Webster, welcome. It is nice to have you here with our
commit tee this morning, andyou may proceed in anymannerthat
you so desire.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, DIRECTOR OF THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. WEBSTER. Thankyou verymuch, Mr.Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the
FBI' s current and future capabilities with regard to the serious
problem ofpoliticalassassinations.
Although much hasbeen learnedfrom inquiryintoourinvestiga-
t ions of the assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and
President John F. Kennedy, I would prefernotto dealdirectlywith
t hese matterstoday.I takethisapproachfor t wo reasons:
First, the FBI has already cooperated with this committee in
making available personnel and material from our files. Since De-
cember of 1976, at a cost to date exceeding $800,000, we have
produced approximately 700,000 pages of requested documents. As
many as 75 persons have worked together searching, clearing, and
assembling this information, and I want you to know we remain
ready to provideanyfurtherassistanceyou may require.
Second, as a practical matter, there-is little I could personally
add in commenting on historical matters which preceded by 10
years or more my appoint ment as Director.
I want, therefore,to look ahead. My commentswill addressthree
issues: First, our response to any future assassinations including
Our jurisdiction to investigate political assassinations generally;
second, potential obstacles thatmight be encountered during relat-
ed investigations; and third, arrangements which have been made
to interact with other governmental agencies in conducting these
investigations.
Letme takeup jurisdictionfirst.
After President Kennedy was assassinated in November of 1963,
Direct or Hoover advised the Attorney General that there was a
lack of Federaljurisdictionoveroffenses ofthis nature.Lee Harvey
Oswald was, in fact, in the custody of a local law enforcement
agency atthetimeof his death.
Today, owing t o a number of subsequently passed statutes, we
canassertjuri sdiction overthiskindofoffense.
--
4
The Presidential assassination statute provides that the FBI
shall investigate the assassination, kidnaping, assault, attempted
killing or kidnaping, or conspiracies to kill or kidnap the President,
the President-elect, Vice President, Vice President-elect or if there
is no Vice President, the officer next in order of succession to the
Office of President of the United States-or any individual who is
act ing as President under the Constitution and laws of t he United
States.
Under this statute, where we assert jurisdiction, State and local
jurisdiction is suspended. Their role, by statute, is limited to pro-
viding assistance to the FBI.
A similar statute provides FBI investigative jurisdiction over
congressional assassinations, kidnapings, and assaults, attempted
killings or kidnapings, and conspiracies to kill or kidnap. The same
crimes committed against Members of Congress-elect are also cov-
ered.
Federal laws also prohibit the killing or kidnaping of foreign
officials, official guests, or internationally protected persons. In
addition, these laws make conspiracies to kill or kidnap unlawful.
We may assert jurisdiction under a variety of other statutes. The
basic Federal criminal civil rights laws, for example, give us juris-
diction when federally secured rights are violated or when parties
conspire to violate these rights. And we investigated the Martin
Luther King, Jr., assassination on the premise that his Federal
ri ght to travel had been denied thus, in effect, we are answering
some of the questions about private citizens who are in the public
domain.
Other kinds of violations occurring in a political assassination
cont ext would also give jurisdiction to invest igate.
For instance, we have jurisdict ion over cases in which someone
had transported interstate explosives wit h intent to injure or had
bombed U.S. property or an insti t uti on or organization receiving
Federal financial assistance. These sit uations could coincidentally
involve political assassinations.
Other pertinent statutes might involve various sections of Crime
on Government reservat ions statutes which include murder, at-
tempted murder and manslaughter , kidnaping, dest r ucti on or
injury to publ ic buil dings or property; also the racketeer influence
corrupt practices st at ute, if t he assassination were committed in
furtherance of a pattern of racketeering activity; the elect ion law
statute if the assassination, for example, injured, intimidated, or
interfered with a person campaigning as a candidate ; and the
foreign agents registration, Federal train wreck, and aircraft
piracy statutes.
Now, with respect to our response: Assuming there is an assassi-
nation over which we have jurisdiction, how would the FBI re-
spond? Let me preface my reply with two points:
First, as Director, I am responsible for all investigations conduct-
ed by the Bureau. I delegate authority for the handling of investi-
gative matters to our special agents in charge, which we call our
SAC's, through the Associate Director and appropriate Assistant
Director.
The SAC carries out his responsibilities by directing his assis-
tants and squad supervisors who, in turn, direct the efforts of the
5
invest igat ors. I might say, parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, we have
59 special agents-in-charge in our various field command offices.
It should be noted that assignment of responsibility does not
abrogate or dilute responsibility; each superior must insure that
his instructions are promptly and properly carried out.
Second, our response to any assassination would be of a magni-
tude commensurate to the impact of the specific crime on national
or international society and to the complexity of the act. Thus, the
abor ted attempt of "Squeaky" Fromme to kill President Ford, a
direct , personal attempt, which was solved immediately, would gen-
erate a different degree of response than a sophisticated, possibly
conspirat or ial, or successful crime.
Because I can't describe how we would react in every situation,
let me first consider how we would respond in the most important
and most traumatic, the assassination of the President.
If this occurs, the field commander would immediately imple-
ment our major case operations plan. The SAC, as field command-
er, would initiate a major case investigation under that plan. In
addition, I would consider sending an Assistant Director or other
ra nking official to the scene to assume overall command of the case
in t he field.
The major case operation plan invol ving a Presidential assassina-
tion would include the following arrangements:
Following confirmed reports of the assassination, two command
posts, one at headquarters and one in the field, would be estab-
lished. Supervisory personnel from all affected divisions would man
the headquarters command post. Here, all leads and investigative
res ults would be coordinated. The field command post through a
mult iple communications capability would forward information de-
veloped by its investigative task force to headquarters.
The major case operation plan can, of course, be utilized in other
serious crimes. In fact, our investigation of the assassination of
U.S. Representative Leo J . Ryan of California gives a good illustra-
tion of how the major case plan works in actual practice.
We premised this investigation on violat ion of the congressional
assassinat ion statute. A Deputy Assistant Director of the Criminal
Invest igat ive Division was designated to take charge of that investi-
gation. Under his personal direction, the FBI Headquarters Com-
mand Post was activated. Oral and written reports.were submitted
to me daily on the progress of the investigation. . j , ,:,::. '
The FBI Headquarters Command Post was staffed by supervisory
personnel who were responsible for various aspects of the investiga-
tion which were coordinated with other agencies. This is, of course,
an ongoing investigation.
The command post was further broken down in a manner that
fixed responsibility for all investigation in Guyana and for investi-
gati on in various sections of the United States.
FBI personnel were physically located at the U.S. State Depart-
ment Command Post as well as the Pentagon Command Post in
Washington, D.C. The Deputy Assistant Director immediately es-
tablished liaison with officials of the U.S. Department of Justice,
U.S. Secret Service, Mili tary Services, U.S. Marshals Service, and
U.S. Department of Heal th, Educat ion, and Welfare.
6
It was also necessary to establish three field command posts in
the United States to adequately investigate the murder.
A Deputy Assistant Director of the Identification Division was
placed in charge of the FBI's Disaster Squad at Dover Air Force
Base, Dover, Del. The FBI's Disaster Squad, along with representa-
tives of the Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of
State, had the responsibility to identify the dead which have been
returned from Jonestown, Guyana.
A command post was established at Charleston, S.C., to handle
the interviews of all survivors who were expected to return there
from Guyana. The FBI's Command Post was under the personal
command of a special agent in charge. There were also representa-
tives from local law enforcement; Health, Education, and Welfare;
Secret Service; Marshals Service; State Department; Defense De-
partment, as well as U.S. attorneys from Columbia, S.C., and San
Francisco, Calif.
A third command post was established in San Francisco under
the personal command of the special agent in charge. All three
field command posts were under the direct control and supervision
of a Deputy Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigative
Division.
Again, this is one example. Depending on the seriousness and
complexity of the case, our responses could vary. But whatever the
extent of our investigation, it will be as thorough and well ordered
as we are capable of maki ng it.
Turning now to the obstacles I mentioned earlier, we recognize
that there may be obstacles to the speedy completion of an investi-
gation. Some may be foreseen, perhaps on past experience. These
include the immediate performance of a thorough and completely
reliable autopsy; the preservation and accessibility of material
which may substantially assist in resolving doubtful aspects of
investigation, such as media or spectator photos or recordings, and
accessibility of financial, communications, or other records.
With respect to the autopsy investigation, a memorandum of
agreement between the FBI and the Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology (AFIP) requires the AFIP to provide medical investiga-
tive support to the FBI on a cost-reimbursable basis upon request
in the event of an assassination of the President, Vice President, a
Member of Congress, and certain other designated individuals de-
scribed in the Presidential and congressional assassination statutes.
The memorandum provides that AFIP will conduct a forensic
autopsy for the FBI upon the President's body; further, that AFIP
will dispatch designated personnel to the scene of death to obtain
relevant medical information and will designate a staff of board-
certified forensic pathologists and allied science personnel to fulfill
its responsibilities under the agreement. The AFIP would also pro-
vide us with a final report of the medical investigation.
It will be our responsibility to secure release of the body from
local custody. In addition, our personnel will attend the medical
investigation to receive and retain custody of physical evidence
obtained.
The Presidential assassination statute clearly indicates that the
Federal Government may assert exclusive jurisdiction over the
body of an assassinated President.
7
With respect to media and private photographic or tape-recorded
evidence, the value to an investigation of all media and private
photographic or recording results taken at the assassination scene
may be considerable.
Under current law, the materials are not voluntarily delivered;
they may be obtained by a grand jury subpena or with a search
warrant.
Wit h respect to media-held materials, the Supreme Court ruled
recentl y in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily that these may be obtained
with a warrant, even in a place owned or possessed by someone not
reasonably suspected of criminal involvement.
The Bureau places a Stanford Daily-type search in a special
category. It is not permitted except with my approval and then
only in extraordinary circumstances, as presumably would be the
case if a President were assassinated.
Wit h respect to financial! communications records, traditionally,
t he FBI has obtained financial transaction records through a judi-
cial search warrant, grand jury subpena, or by consent of the
holder.
Acquiring records today, however, is more difficult than in the
past. This is a result of legislation rather than court decisions.
Indeed, decisions have not recognized fourth and fifth amendment
rights asserted by owners of documents, that is, customers, held by
third parties, suc h as banks.
This legislation has established requirements concerning the
kinds of information which may be obtained and has set up proce-
dures to be complied with before materials can be obtained. Exam-
ples include the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Fair Credit Reporting
Act , and the very recent Right to Financial Privacy Act.
The latter will significantly regulate the FBI's ability to gain
access to records in possession of third party financial institutions
and curtail the rapid access to such records. The act effectively
ends infor mal access to financial records subject to certain excep-
t ions.
Under it, an individual has a right both to be notified when the
Government is seeking his financial records and to challenge t he
Government' s access to his records. These rights would not apply
When documents were sought with a grand jury's subpena. We will
monit or this new legislation to determine its impact upon our
Investigat ive responsibilities. .r- / .: :' __'
In effect , today, should financial, tax, or credit records be sought
after a Presidential assassination, the FBI might experience consid-
erably more difficulty acquiring them than it did in the past.
. Communicat ions records would al so be important to an investiga-
tion. Although access to these is not currently controlled by stat-
ut e, we find it increasingly difficult to obtain them informally.
The third subject which I propose to discuss is information ex-
change and assistance from other agencies.
The Presidential assassination statute specifically instructs that
the FBI shall investigate violations and that "Assistance may be
requested from any Federal, State, or local agency, including the
Army, Navy, and Air Force, any statute, rule, or regulation to the
cont rary notwithstanding. " The wording recognizes the statutory
II I
8
prohibition against the general use of the Army or Navy as a
possee comitatus.
Executive Order 12936 provides a vehicle for the FBI to request
the Attorney General to ask other intelligence gathering agencies
for specific information regarding violations of criminal law. This
authority could be used if the President or other political official
protected by statute was assassinated.
In the event of a calamitous event, such as a Presidential assassi-
nation, the FBI would relay all pertinent information to all official
U.S. Government agencies concerned with developments, including
the White House, the U.S. Department of State, the Department of
Justice, the National Military Command Center, and the U.S.
Secret Service.
We are currently conducting a periodic review of a formal agree-
ment between the FBI and Secret Service which defines areas of
activity regarding the Secret Service's protective responsibilities
and the investigative responsibilities of the FBI and establishes
mutual communication and cooperation in ordinary and extraordi-
nary situations.
Through established liaison at Headquarters, the FBI is in regu-
lar communication with many agencies of Government in Washing-
ton having normal business with us, including all of those men-
tioned above. Means are available to immediately contact any U.S.
agency which might afford assistance or information.
Our field offices maintain regular contact with criminal justice
agencies at Federal, State, and local levels within their territories
and can promptly contact any who might assist in an investigation.
Through legal attaches, FBI agents attached to the U.S. embas-
sies in several foreign countries, liaison is maintained with many
friendly foreign policy agencies to resolve mutual problems of in-
ternational criminality. The cooperative assistance of those foreign
police agencies could be solicited for specific investigation outside
the jurisdiction of the United States, subject, of course, to any State
Department concerns arising from the specific situation.
The specific situation which might arise would govern the degree
of assistance and information which might be sought. Within the
United States our jurisdiction appears ample. Within legal bounds,
the FBI will not hesitate to solicit cooperation, assistance, or infor-
mation from whatever source may be required.
Mr. Chairman, I have tried to give you an overview of our
jurisdiction to investigate political assassinations, of the way we
would respond in the most serious of these situations, of the obsta-
cles we might face in proceeding with an investigation, and of the
extent of cooperation we might expect from other agencies in con-
ducting such an investigation.
I'I
Obviously, there are many areas that I have not touched on, and
I would be happy to answer whatever questions you may have
about these or about specific issues that have come to mind con-
cerning the materials I have just presented.
Thank you very much.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much, Mr . Webster, for the
statement you have just given us.
9
I apologize for the difficulty we are having with our acoustic
system here; we have asked someone to come up and check on it,
though. lik t thi ti ith t bi hId .
I would 1 e a IS ime, WI ou 0 jection, to ave pace into
the record the FBI functional organization chart and have that
made a part of the record at this point.
[The information follows:]
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Chairman STOKES, The committee will operate under the 5-
minute rule.
I guess the first question I would have of you, Mr. Webster, is
really a quest ion as to whether or not we can really prevent
political assassinations to save a President of the United States.
In my opening statement I made the comment that President
Kennedy had made in Dallas, and I guess my first question to you
is, What role can the FBI play in preventing political assassina-
tions?
Mr . WEBSTER. The primary protective responsibility is, of course,
as I am sure the chairman is aware, with the Secret Service. We do
attempt and do in fact provide informational assistance to the
Secret Service regarding any information that properly comes into
our possession that suggests that a plan or a conspiracy is afoot to
do injury to public officials and specifically the President.
We have gui delines in place which govern our ability to develop
such informat ion. As it comes to us properly, we make a point of
getting that information immediately to the Secret Service, and
that is probably the most effective means by which we can contrib-
ute to the Secret Service's protective and hence preventive respon-
sibilities.
Chairman STOKES. Can you tell us whether the Attorney Gener-
al's guidelines on domestic security investigations have had an
adverse effect on the FBI's ability to prevent political assassina-
tions?
Mr . WEBSTER. Of course, I have to begin and answer that ques-
tion by saying any restriction to that extent impedes the free
exercise of investigative activity. But these are often choices that
are made in a free society.
I personally do not feel at the present time that the domestic
security guidelines unreasonably impede or interfere with our abil-
ity to develop legitimate information. Whenever we have informa-
tion that an organization or individual is planning an act of force
or violence against the United States or instrumentalities of the
United States or against civil rights, we have the basis for an
investigat ion. ,
We do not put in place informants ' to tell us what every first
amendment organization or other political group may be up to and
hence we cannot be assured that we will learn of a plan in time to
avert it . That is one of the choices, one of the assumed risks that
:v
e
take in a free society, and I by no means suggest alteration
ill that approach.
Chair man STOKES. I guess that sort of brings me to the next
question.
Chart er legislation is now pending, Mr. Webster, as you know, in
both Houses of Congress to authorize and prevent abuses of domes-
secur ity investigations or the use of such investigative tools as
Infor mants and wiretapping.
I would appreciate having your comment on the best approach to
fOll ow in working out these problems; that is, should the Attorney
General issue guidelines subject to congressional veto, should the
Congress work out specific legislation subject to executive depart-
ment input?
I
I
12
111;
i
Mr. WEBSTER. Mr. Chairman, it's my view that all of the sensi-
I
tive areas oughtto be addressed in the legislation. By saying this I
ill
don't endorse the concept that every fine point ought to be a
matter of stat ute. Investigative techniques vary from time to t ime,
conditions change.
I have always asked for t he degree of flexibility that guidelines
provide. My approach woul d be for the legislation to provide for
more specific guidel ines to be promulgated by the Attorney Gener-
al in specific sensitive areas with congressional oversight over
thoseguidelines.
I think we can live very comfortablywith thattype of oversight
andgovernance.
That is the approach that I have taken in submitting draft
proposals for consideration by the Department and the Congress.
Chairman STOKES. Under t he present guidelines some domestic
security surveillance will be possible. However, nothing like what
happenedto Dr.Kingis supposed to be possibleagain.
But, suppose a public figure in a group that was legit imat ely
under investigation was assassinated, do you think t he Bureau
itselfshould be disqualified from conducting an investigation over
hisdeathin order t oassure theappearanceofobjectivity, or should
justtheagentsinvolvedin theinvestigationbe disqualified?
Mr. WEBSTER. I am t r ~ n t o get a handle on how best t o ap-
proach it because I don t want t o assume the premise t hat any
agent of the FBI will be conducting an investigation contrar y to
the rules and guidelines presently in effect and the instructions
which I have given with respect to the conduct of investigations
within theruleoflaw.
I have tried to avoid historical comparisons, butwe don't have a
special organization within the Bureau engaged in internal secu-
ritymattersanymore. All of these investigationsarebeingconduct-
ed by our criminal investigative units, and atthe present time all
of the organizations subject to investigation and individuals within
thoseorganizationsareterroristrelatedandcouldjustas well have
beenconductedundera criminalstandard.
So I don't see how it would be possible or feasible to interject
another agency to protect the integrity of the investigation. It
seems to me thatcongressional oversight into our investigations is
the answer. The FBI is the premiere investigative agency in the
country. We have specific authority in this area. Any information
thatwe hadcollectedwithrespectto a terroristorganization would
logicallybe needed anduseful in tryingto solve an actof terrorism
suchas anassassinationofa President.
ChairmanSTOKES. Thankyou.
My timehasexpired.
Thegentlemanfrom NorthCarolina, Mr. Preyer.
Mr. PREYER. Thankyou, Mr. Webster.
It's good to have you here today, Judge Webster, and thank you
for yourcooperationin thisassassinationhearing.
I understand that the Secret Service and the State Department
don't presently do any domestic security investigations. Therefore,
it has to rely on you, the FBI, to furnish it with domestic security
intelligence.
Is thattheway it operates?
13
Mr. WEBSTER. That'sright,JudgePreyer.
Mr . PREYER. What is the FBI doing to insure t hat the Secret
Service or t he StateDepartmentis providedwithintelligenceinfor-
mation that relates to the safety of the President or of foreign
officials?
Mr. WEBSTER. Any information that properly comes into our
possession is immediately refer red both at the local level and at
Headquarters level t o the State Depart ment and the U.s. Secret
Service. There is probably going to be in the course of the testimo-
ny in the next few days some difference of opinion as to whether
quantitati vely they are receiving the amount of information that
theyhavebeen accustomedto receive in thepast.
No attempt has yet been made to analyze whether the smaller
amount of information that we are now furnishing under guide-
lines is as important and relevant as the other material which we
used to submit which had to be sifted out for relevance, and per-
hapsthat is a projectfor reviewdown theroad.
The infor mat ion that we are receiving has to be important and
useful to them.
But,sincewe havesignificantlyfewer informantsin thedomestic
security field and in our other areas, organized crime and general
crimes, itfollows thatthere is less information available to us and
henceless informationavailableto them.
Mr . PREYER. You mention the sifting out process to decide what
informat ion was madeavailable to them. How does thatsiftingout
process work and does the State Departmentor the Secret Service
participate in anydecision aboutsiftingout?
Mr. WEBSTER. By siftingout, I meant thatinformation thatused
t obe furnished wholesale was rawdata, characterizations, a larger
volume of information, because we had a great many more infor-
mants in place in a lot of organizations whether or not they were
planning acts of force or violence againstthe United Statesor civil
rights.
We simplyarelimited now in theamountofinformationbecause
of our criteria with respect to when we conduct such an investiga-
tion. But , as we receive it, without sifting it out, as to any perti-
nence to their areas of responsibility, we furnish it both at the
local andthenationallevelas fast as we receiveit.
The analysis is theirs, if that's your question, and we do have
liaison andcoordination to see whetherbetween.US.,we see any real
significance to theparticularinformation.
Mr. PREYER. Is there a specific person or group of persons in the
FBI thatis responsible for seeing to it thatthe SecretService and
the State Departmentgets all of the relevant information quickly?
Mr. WEBSTER. Yes, sir. The SAC is responsible atthe local level
and the Assistant Director or his designee on the criminal investi-
gative end is responsible at the national or Headquarters level.
Mr. PREYER.So thatis a formal designation ofa group? .
Mr. WEBSTER. That'sright.
Mr. PREYER. Is there a corresponding person formally designated
at theStateDepartment?
Mr. WEBSTER. Thatis my understanding.
Mr. PREYER. And in theSecretServiceto do that?
38-028 0 - 19 - 2
15
14
Mr. WEBSTER. That's right . We are in an ongoing dial og with
those agencies. So that we are in da ily telephone communication
with them. There is no delay or confusion as to whom to make the
reports.
Mr. PREYER. So that you mention that you have entered into an
agreement?
Mr. WEBSTER. Yes.
Mr. PREYER. With the State Department?
Mr. WEBSTER. Well, with the Secret Service and the Department
of Defense.
Mr. PREYER. Is this a formal agreement?
Mr. WEBSTER. Yes, it is. It's a memorandum of understanding.
Mr. PREYER. All right.
Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I think I have taken my 5 minutes at this time.
Before going on t o other subjects I will yiel d to the next questioner.
Chairman STOKES. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
t ime.
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney.
Mr . McKINNEY. Mr. Webs ter, welcome.
Mr. WEBSTER. Thank you.
Mr . McKINNEY. I want to follow through on this just a little bit
further.
One of t he problems I think t hat t he American people have had
with t he assassination of President Kennedy and one of the prob-
lems we have found and, this is going back many years, was that
Lee Harvey Oswal d passed through t he gamut of Federal agency
observances. And, we are fairly aware of the fact that the CIA and
the FBI did not look casually on the return of an American who
had gone over and then come back. And, last but not least, of
course, the Secret Service was investigating the President's poten-
tial safety in Dallas, and yet there didn't seem to be any communi-
cation. In all honesty, I have to say probably some of that was due
to personality conflicts of some of the players involved.
But that's well enough left alone. Those days are gone.
Would you suggest that we should perhaps set up or authorize
you to set up, a specific group of these four different agencies, that
meet simply for the point of discussing on a regularly scheduled
basis where there would be problem areas for the President or
someone else to go to exchange information?
It could even come down to the point, for instance, of the CIA
beir b able to turn to the State Department in Congressman Ryan's
tragic case and say, quite frankly, here is what we see and we
think you ought to stay away.
Do you think that some sort of a mutual board or agency should
be set up that is in constant communication on this?
Mr. WEBSTER. I can see considerable merit in that kind of ap-
proach. I am not sure that we don't already have the vehicle for it
in the form of the Security Coordinating Committee, which regu-
larly meets to consider matters of national intelligence and nation-
al security, including foreign counterintelligence.
I have seen that type of information effectively shared and ana-
lyzed by working groups within the Security Coordinating Commit-
tee. It may be that, and I would think that if you use as an analog
t he juri sdi ct ional assumptions in the President ial assassination
statute, that any ki nd of assassination of t he President or plan of
injury t o t he President impacts upon the United States, it is not
just a personal problem.
Certai nly that organizat ion woul d have a legit imate stake in that
type of information. There might be a need for other coordinating
efforts. We are learning, as we go along, that these types of sharing
efforts are very productive if they don't proliferate highly sensitive
informati on. So far we have been pretty successful at that, and I
think that is working well.
Certainl y it should be considered.
Mr. McKINNEY. Let me ask you some hypotheticals because I
think they need examination. Say the White House decides that
the President is going to make a trip to Miami, Fla. Is the FBI
infor med of that?
Mr . WEBSTER. As I understand it, the FBI is not regularly in-
formed of the President's movements unless the Secret Service, for
particular reasons or concerns, decides that it's advisable to seek
our assi stance in a particular area where their own staff is inad-
equate to meet a potential threat, and that is done for reasons of
security, again, to avoid proliferation of information about the
President's movements.
Mr . McKINNEY. And yet you are basically the only investigative
arm the Secret Service has except for its own record system?
Mr . WEBSTER. That's true. They might ask us about a particular
situation in Miami without telling us the President is going to be
there for 2 days.
Mr. McKINNEY. So they would not specifically turn to you and
say, is there a danger to the President?
Mr . WEBSTER. Well, I don't think they would do that. Someone
might ask the question, but the responsibility for that value judg-
ment is with the U.S. Secret Service. It's our obligation to make
sure that they have everything that we have to assist them in
making t hat val ue judgment.
Mr. McKINNEY. Wouldn't it be better, though, to have a limited
board so that you would keep your information as tightly amassed
as possible, of the .St ate Department, the CIA, the FBI and the
Secret Service and so that the Secret Service could come to the
State Depart ment and say, have we got a Cuban exile problem in
Miami that could be dangerous, or could go the C I ~ n d say, have
we got any foreign activity going on there which <iiie have heard
about , or go to you and say, do we have any known violent enemies
of the President in the Miami area? Should we do that so that all
of these fields are covered rather than left to chance?
~ r WEBSTER. If I am not mistaken, I think that that process is
beIng effectively conducted by the Secret Service itself by making
contact . I am not aware of any of the agencies sitting down togeth-
er t o.explore it. That may have some merit in given situations, but
~ believe that the Secret Service is systematically making contact
oth at the national and local levels for information that would be
Useful to them.
. Mr. McKINNEY. To your point of view, would there be any value
~ sending a specific FBI agent with the Secret Service when the
resident makes a trip or does one go now?
16
Mr. WEBSTER. No. Just my gut reaction is that I can't see any
specific advantage. I am a great believer that the people in the
field, at the scene, are normally the ones who know the territory
the best. Just sending somebody along isn't necessarily going to
helpthesituation.
We have very good communication systems, secure systems, and
I put a great deal of confidence in the special agent in charge at
the scene in knowing what his problems are. We coordinate them
at headquarters, but when we are talking about a local situation,
suchas a visit, I placetheconfidencethere.
When I travel, I rely on my local people rather than taking
peoplealongfor assistance.
Mr. McKINNEY. Thatlittle red light says I have run outof time.
ChairmanSTOKES. Thetimeofthegentlemanhasexpired.
The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, Mr.
Webster.
On pages 11 and 12 of your statement, dealing with information
exchangeandassistance from otheragencies, I notethattheCIA is
noticeablyabsentfrom thereferences there,andalso in yourdialog
with Congressman Preyer, you dealt with references to the Secret
Service and the State Department in terms of sharing of informa-
tion, the kind of information you felt that the FBI should obtain
for them.
I wonder ifyou would caret ocommenton thatabsence?
Mr. WEBSTER. I certainlywouldn'twanttheCongressman to read
anything into thatomission, because, of all of the agencies thatwe
deal with today, I think thatwe have developed and improved the
relationship with the CIA the most. We have exchanged with the
CIA our expertise on surveillance and they have given us their
expertson analysis.
We are trying to sharejointly information that would help both
of us to reach valuejudgments. Thisis particularlytruein t he case
of double agents, things of that kind. Should we receive any infor-
mation at all from the CIA that had any possible relevance to a
threat against the President, it would be our responsibility to see
that information was immediately conveyed to the Secret Service
and theStateDepartment.
Mr. FAUNTROY. You really indicate that you would relate perti-
nentinformationlikewiseto theCIA?
Mr. WEBSTER. Yes, indeed.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. McKinney began to explore in your judg-
mentwhatrecommendationsyou mighthavefor theSecretService
in handlingmore effectivelythePresident'sprotection, or theState
Department,as thecasemaybe.
Let me give you an example and have you sort of guide us
throughhow you feel now itoughtto be handled.
Let us saythePresidentis in a major cityof theUnited States. I
takeit theSecretServicewould be with him; is thatright?
Mr .WEBSTER.That'sright.
Mr. FAUNTROY. The FBI would not, as a matter of routine, have
anagentwith thePresident?
Mr. WEBSTER. Not unless requestedby theSecretService.
.............--
Mr. FAUNTROY. Would local and State authorities have police
officers assigned to thePresidentduringhis visit?
Mr . WEBSTER. It is my understanding that is all coordinated
t hrough the Secret Service, yes, sir. They have traffic control and
crowd control and other responsibilities which the Secret Service
coordinates.
Mr . FAUNTROY. Ifthe President is shot, what does the Secret
Service do?
Mr. WEBSTER. The Secret Service is on the scene, so the Secret
Service would conduct the immediate investigative activity, would
take charge of the scene, would be responsible for securing the
scene, preservingorder, preservingevidence, until anorderlytran-
sition could take place between the FBI and the-we are talking
aboutshotandkilled, I assume?
Mr .FAUNTROY.Yes.
Mr .WEBSTER. Between theFBI andtheSecretService.
Once I accepted the responsibility the statute imposes, the FBI
assumes the responsibility for the investigation, the Secret Service
would continueto offersuchsupportandcooperationandcoordina-
tionofeffortas would be necessaryatthescene.
I don't know how much detail you would like me to go into. I
think you were talking about the transition from the Secret Serv-
ice to the FBI. That is all spelled out by memorandum of agree-
ment.
Mr . FAUNTROY. I see. Are there any agency regulations prescrib-
ing whatwill be done to freeze thecrimescene andwho will do it?
Mr. WEBSTER. I'm notcertainwhattheSecretService procedures
are,butI am reasonablyconfidentthattheywould takeimmediate
stepsand by regulation, thatis, withrespectto theirregulations-I
haven' t seen theirregulations-tofreeze thescene.
We would freeze thescene with the assistance of Stateand local
lawenforcement officials as soon as we arrivedon thescene.
Mr. FAUNTROY. How then is the FBI notified, inasmuch as you
don' t have personson thescene?
Mr. WEBSTER. Well , in most situations we are there; we are in
the city. We have 59 major field offices. We have 450-some odd
resident agencies around the country, so we are minutes away.
You have tremendous communications going in any Presidential
entourage. You have radio communications, telephone, and so
forth. .--' ,,:/,'
Mr .FAUNTROY. Sothatyou wouldbe monitoringthose--
Mr .WEBSTER. Yes.
Mr. FAUNTROY [continuing].Youroffices would be?
Mr. WEBSTER. That's right, the FBI would not necessarily moni-
tor all radio traffic, butwould be in close contactwith appropriate
authorities,bothStateandlocal.
Mr. FAUNTROY. And what personnel would be sent to the scene?
.Mr. WEBSTER. Well, thespecial agent in charge would designate
hIS force on a major case situation. We have a manual-Case
Manual of Procedures for the handling of what we call our major
cases . He would send to the scene the numbers of squads that
~ m appropriate to him under the circumstances. He would
Immediately note and establish a command center. The command
17
II
18
centermightbe atthefield office or itmightbe atthecrimescene,
dependingon where itoccurred.
A similar command center would be established in Washington.
The command center is already set up to be manned and proce-
dureshavebeenestablished.
I would have to make a decision as promptly as possible as to
whether or not the particular special agent in charge, given the
particular crime scene and event, was the best person to man the
situation atthatpoint, or whetherI shouldsend a special agent in
command to actas thecommanderfor thatparticularscene.
Itmight be that I would make that decision immediately or it
might be that the situation would require it at a later date. We
like to have the flexibility to make thatjudgment. I would desig-
nateeitheranAssistantDirectoror a DeputyAssistantDirectorin
I I I
theCriminal Investigative Division to command the command post
in Washington. The associate director under my supervision would
also be involved in the chain of command in a Presidential assassi-
nation.
ChairmanSTOKES. Thetimeofthegentlemanhasexpired.
Thegentlemanfrom Indiana,Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN. Thankyou, Mr .Chairman.
Welcome, JudgeWebster.
Mr. WEBSTER. Thankyou.
Mr. FITHIAN.We're happyto haveyou herethismorning.
Let me just ask for some clarification of two points in your
written presentation:
You indicate on page 10 that acquiring records today is more
difficult than in the past and decisions have not recognized fourth
and fifth amendment rights asserted by owners of documents held
by third parties-banksand the like. I read into that some state-
mentof discomforton your part,thatyou weren't reallyable to do
t he kind ofspeedy investigation, acquisition of those recordsandso
on that the FBI could have in the past. Was I interpreting you
correctly?
Mr. WEBSTER. Well, we are at the monitoring stage right now,
and, I think, in all candor, we would have to say that we don't
know.We haven'thadanassassinationsincethoseactswere putin
I "
place. We don't know the level of cooperation thatwe could expect
from thirdparties.
We have watched that level of cooperation deteriorate as more
and more third parties become concerned about personal liability
for cooperation. That includes communicationscarriers,banks, and
otherinstitutions.
The informal approach is just about gone. We do have the re-
quest mechanism under the Financial Privacy Act which has not
yet been tested, and so that is what I mean when I say we are
monitoring, to see whether or not it is going to work successfully.
I am optimistic, frankly, thatwe will geta high level of coopera-
tionin theeventofa Presidential assassination,buttheold daysof
walking in and saying we would like to see those records, and we
would like to see them right now, are gone, for obvious reasons.
Incidentally, if I could take this opportunity to refer back to a
question that the chairman put to me earlier about restrictions,
while I was expressing the view that I didn't see any need to
19
modify the guidelines, I am concerned that we not be confronted
withhavingto seeka searchwarrant,to putan informantin place.
We have so few informants now under our guidelines that it is
very importantto me thatwe not have to go throughsomejudicial
process in order to have an informant of gathering information if
t he guideline requirements are present, that is, we have clear
evidence ofa planto engagein force or violence againsttheUnited
States or civil rights
I know that those suggestions come up from time to time and I
hope we will have a chanceto address them adequately if theyare
proposed in legislation. We have had eminent professors of crimi-
nology who have all testified before various committees that this
would be folly to do;andI hopethatthatview will prevail.
An informant is not something that you can put in place by
means of a warrant. They get information from time to time; they
don't know when they are going to get it . If we have a right to
receive that information, we ought to be able to receive itwithout
theadditionalburdenofseekinga courtorderto do so.
Mr. FITHIAN. In recent years the Congress has enacted a variety
of st at utes in this area, and the Right to Financial Privacy Act,
1978, makes anexception for certain of theSecretService's protec-
tive functions.
Do you think that similar exceptions would be helpful or neces-
sary to you andyouragency?
Mr .WEBSTER. Well, itwould be helpful, to theextentitwould be
one less thing that we would have to cope with; but I accept the
fact that some of those provisions had the endorsement of the
administ rat ion, and we don't know that they are going to be an
unr easonably burdensomehandicap, andthey probably oughtto be
tried and monitored.
Mr . FITHIAN. I am curious to know whether in the very narrow
sense of prospective assassinations we mightnot makesome excep-
tions?
Mr . WEBSTER. That is a major policy question and, I guess, the
policy question you have to decide is, is an assassination so much
different in its nature and impact upon the country that it de-
?erves special investigative techniques thataredifferent and more
Int rusive than the investigative techniques that we are permitted
touse in othertypesofcriminalinvest igat ions?
Mr . FITHIAN. I am a little troubled by what 1.understand the
?tatute to say. I would be curious to know your interpretation. But
~ t only says, as I understand it, thatthe Federal Government, that
IS, theFBI, mayassertitsexclusive jurisdiction;butit does notsay
that it must or that it shall. Does this leave us with the prospect
sItuation whereitis viewed as a homicide by a Stateauthorityand
~ h FBI special agent in charge, or whatever, mayor may not
Invoke therightof theFederalGovernmenttojurisdiction?
Mr. WEBSTER. There could be some delay and frustration ifthe
machinery were not in place to make that assertion instantly.
. It is my understanding thatthe Justice Departmentalready has
~ placetriggeringmechanismswhichautomaticallyassertjurisdic-
tion. There are very few cases that I can conceive of, ifany, that
~ would not want the Federal Government to assertjurisdiction
In thefirstinstance.
I
20
I suppose it is possi ble to conceive of one where there was an
attempt made, for instance, and the attemptfailed and the person
was promptly placed in St at e custody and tried on a State offense;
butI suspectif pasthistory is anyindicator ,thatif thethreatis on
the life of an important public official, such as the President, the
questions are going to be asked down the road about whether the
Statepeoplegoteverybodythatwas involved, or whethertherewas
a conspiracy, whether others were involved; and I don't know any
way to resolve that ot her than a prompt Federal presence and a
thorough investigationto eliminatedoubts.
II!
In the Guyana situation, for instance, one of the real services
III, that our disaster squad has rendered, with the major problems of
identification because of the delay in getting possession of the
bodies, has been the identification of all eightof those identified as
participating in the shooting on the airstrip as being among the
dead.
The very clear and positive identification of the Reverend Jones
as dead, put to rest the already emerging idea that maybe he had
placed a substitute. I doubt that those services could have been
supplied with the necessary expertise by any other agency other
thantheFBI.
ChairmanStokes.Thetimeof thegentlemanhasexpired.
Thegentlemanfrom Connecticut, Mr. McKinney.
Mr. McKINNEY. I am just going to go a little further, since we
havebeen talkingaboutGuyana.
What powers do you have and what are the restrictions on your
power, say, if the President should be assassinated overseas in
another country?
Mr. WEBSTER. I believe we now have clear opinions from the
Justice Department, with respect to congressional assassinations
and Presidential assassinations thatwe have extraterritorialjuris-
diction, thatis t osay, we canimmediatelyconductaninvestigation
of the incident, and we can apprehend, and the Government can
try, anyone thattheycangetbackintothiscount ry.
Thatdoesn't Mean thatthewhole hostis going to cooperate, and
it doesn't mean that the State Department is going to be in a
position to insistupon cooperation.
In Guyana it was very sensitive. We had one legal attache in
place who was welcomed there because he was a legal attache. He
is a special agent that I sent up from Caracas with his secretary.
He arrived unarmed. It was several days before arrangements
could be worked out to put four more technical people in to assist
the Government of Guyana, and they were sent there unarmed.
I can appreciate the sensitivities-we saw similar situations in
Italy and other places-as to whether there was or was not an
American presencewhilethese investigationsweregoingon.
So the State Department is involved; and has to take a hand in
getting the cooperation of the local governments. That has been
one of the things that we have found very useful with our Legat's,
as we call them, our legal attaches, because they have developed
with local police an extraordinaryamountof cooperation, coordina-
tion, anda willingnessto assist.
It was through our relationship with Interpol that we were able
to get photographs of fingerprints from the Guyanan Government
21
and were able to identify over 575 of the bodies through reference
to finger pr ints thatwould nototherwisehavebeenavailable.
So that is a sensitive area. We can't automatically assumejuris-
dict ion in a foreign country, but we do have the jurisdiction to
conduct t he investigation here and abroad to the extent that local
people will permitus to do it .
Mr . McKINNEY. Moving away from those people specifically cov-
ered by our assassination statutes and into the subject of political
leaders, I think that even t hough he was not running for any
office, you have t o certainly consider Dr. Martin Lut her King a
political leader . You have stated before that you are limited in
interfer ing in those cases to the civil rights statutes in effect; isn't
thatcor rect?
Mr. WEBSTER. Well, of course, we did take jurisdiction in Dr.
King's case, and we did it under civil rights statutes which pre-
cluded interference with people's civil rights, and the particular
civil right thatwas used as a predicatein thatcasewas hisri ghtto
travel.
It sounds likea thinreed, butitwas successfullyasserted.
Mr. McKINNEY. It is a thin reed to a lawyer because when you
are going after someone for murder, it sounds pretty innocuous to
goafter them for a violation of civil rights, even though thatis the
greatestviolation ofcivil rightsthatcanoccur.
When you are investigating a case such as Dr. King's case, can
you use the same availability of resources thatyou are allowed to
use under the assassination laws thatwe passed here in Congress?
Mr . WEBSTER. Once the FBI has jurisdiction to investigate a
crime, it may commit whatever resources it deems necessary to
solve the crime. I should pointout, however, thatbecauseofpolicy
considerat ions and budget constraints, the FBI has had to allocate
its res ources accordingto its priorities. In answeringyourquestion,
I believe the FBI could and would commitsubstantial resources to
a civil rights case such as it did in the Dr. King investigation. I
think the commitment of resources would be dependent upon
whether thevictim of the crime was a public official orfigure ora
private citizenactingin a publicsituation.
Let mealso makeoneothercommentwith regardto ourjurisdic-
tion t o investigative civil rights cases. In civil rights we do not
appear to have extraterritorialjurisdiction, so if Dr. King were in
quyana we would not have had the ability to open an investiga-
tIon, except for persons possibly responsible in the,,:Uhited States.
There is another restriction on that, the posse comitatus and
other typesof activity. We don'thave therightto callon theArmy
and others in this particular type of statute, as I read it, such as
~ clearly and expressly have the right to do under the Presiden-
tial assassinations.
.Mr. McKINNEY. Do you think it would be wise to give you that
tight in this kindof a severecase?
Mr. WEBSTER. Again, I'm back where I was before. That is. a
~ j o policy judgment and you just have to decide whether the
Impact of a particular political assassination is so egregious that
we arewilling to permit the extraintrusion thatis involved in the
ext ra procedures. Clearly, thatis t he casewiththePresidentbutat
Some pointyou haveto say, how muchofa political figure?
I
22
Mr. McKINNEY. Let me ask you this: IfRobert Kennedy had not
been running for the Presidency and therefore a candidate for the
Presidency, if he had simply been the Attorney General of the
United States,andhe hadstill been assassinated, whatwould have
beenyour powersin thatcase?
Mr. WEBSTER. Well, we don' t have a statute that deals with
injuryto Governmentofficials.
Mr. McKINNEY. Do you have the right to go to all these outside
III.
sourcesfor that?
Mr. WEBSTER. No, no.
Mr. McKINNEY. Don'tyou thinkthatyou should have?
i Mr. WEBSTER.Well, theassassination ofSenatorRobertKennedy
!
did not create the potential for a national crisis such as would be
thecase ofa President,so I can'tsee anyreason whywe wouldcall
on the Army for assistance, or anticipate that we would need to
call on theArmyfor anytypeofassistance.
Mr. McKINNEY. However, it has been suggested in cases, for
instance in the Reverend Jones case, that perhaps he had an idea
ofcreatingnational chaos by, in essence, going for variousdifferent
political figures, atrandom.
Mr. WEBSTER. Yes.
Mr. McKINNEY. So t hat would certainly bring about a national
emergency stat us, it would seem, ifsomeone suddenly went after
25ofour100Senators.
Mr. WEBSTER. Well, I can appreciate your concer n and I shareit,
but the only way to deal with that particular type of alleged "hit"
list would be to declare martial law; and I don't think thatwould
be acceptable.
ChairmanSTOKES.The timeofthegentlemanhasexpired.
Mr. Webster, let me ask you this: Let's assume that the Presi-
dent of the United States is in one of our cities here in the United
States and that he is shot, that the wound is fatal. Now at that
point does the Federal Government have exclusive authority to
conducta forensic autopsy?
Mr. WEBSTER. I think that is clear from the statute. That's the
way we have construed it, and we would expect to do so. That is
Ir
maybe a legal question, but that is certainly the basis for the
memorandum of understanding that we have with the Army's
InstituteofPathology.
ChairmanSTOKES. Andwho wouldconducttheautopsy?
Mr .WEBSTER. The Instituteof Pathology, Armed Forces Institute
ofPathology, AFIP.
Chairman STOKES. Let me ask you this further question then:
Would you saythatappearson theface ofthestatute, or is thatby
implication in thestatute?The reason I ask thequestion is, itdoes
not appear to the committee that that is explicit in the statute.
Mr. WEBSTER. I think thatonce we takejurisdiction, the statute
is clear that the Federal Government then has preempted the
jurisdictionin all respects. I thinkthatthatis clear. Theimpacton
the United States is such that it doesn't take much to go from
there to the fact thatthebody is physical evidence of an investiga-
tion in which we have very important concern. We would preempt
the local laws on coroners' laws and the laws of autopsy. This, as
you know, was putin there to avoid the types ofstressandtension
~
23
that devel oped atthe t ime of theassassination of President Kenne-
dy when t hey were having trouble getting the body out of Texas.
If we are reading too much into the authority, the power to
conduct an autopsy, then perhaps that ought to be corrected as a
mat ter of legislation. We certainly think it is absolutely necessary
and we would intend to do itunder the assumed incidental powers
thatgowit h thatstatute. . .
Chairman STOKES. One of the concerns of the committee IS
whether some type of recommendation ought to be made with
reference to whether there ought to be perhaps an independent
panel of pathologists rathert han a branch of the militaryconduct-
ing theautopsy on t he President.
Mr. WEBSTER. That again is a policy decision. It is my under-
standing,based on yearsof experience withmilitarycasualties and
medical research, thatyou probably have the finest pathologists in
the count ry in thisorganization. You can certainly provide for any
type of oversight or review of their findings, but right away we
want to know, justas soon as possible, what happened and how it
happened.
Ameet ing ofa board mightbe anunnecessarydelay.
Chair man STOKES. One of our concerns is the image that is
created, in the sense that here is the military conducting the
autopsy on the President, and in terms of the order of successsion
this is basically,I think,one ofourconcerns. Fromthatperspective
weought to consideranindependentpanelofcitizens.
Mr. WEBSTER.Thereagain it is a matterof policy, Mr.Chairman.
I am t hinking of it, first, from investigation, and prompt, effec-
tive investigation. I can see the other policy consideration but I
perhapsoughtnotto commenton it.
Chai rman STOKES. Let me ask you this: There have been a
number of very critical comments in the press about the handling
of the Guyana autopsies. I guess my question is: Do you really
t hink t hat Federal law is sufficientin this area, whetherwe ought
to be thinking in terms of how to comply with situations of that
sort? In fact, I can think of some very real legal problems that
would seem to me that crop up when you autopsy 7 out of 911
bodies in terms of murder prosecutions: I think you would have
some veryseriousproblemsthere.
Mr. WEBSTER. I can appreciate all of those problems, and I am
surewe canallappreciate theproblemconfrontingtheArmywhen
t ~ y wereaskedto conductautopsies, or considerconductingautop-
SIes, on 900 bodies of privatecitizenswho mettheirdeathsin other
than any military event. There was a question of trying to get
appropriate consents and find relatives, and they weren't even
aWare of who some of them were at the time. They had a monu-
tnental responsibility, and so far I am not aware of any problem
~ ~ t we have had with respect to the professionalism with which
ey undertookthespecificautopsiesthattheyagreedto do.
Most of our concerns with respect to those autopsies dealt with
What I mentioned earlier, and that is, any information bearing on
a potent ial conspiracy and trying to put to bed with the finality
~ h t comes with credibility the causes and effects of this unusual,
ragiccircumstance.
Mr. FITHIAN.Would the Chairman yield?
24 25
ChairmanSTOKES. Yes; Iyield to thegentleman.
Mr. FITHIAN. I am curious to know whether in the case of a
Presidential assassination that the statute specifically would over-
ride the requestof the family. I know it is a verydifficultarea, but
itis a veryreal one.
Mr. WEBSTER.Yes.
Mr. FITHIAN. It was, of course, apparently dominant in the Ken-
I! nedycase?
,
Mr. WEBSTER. I wish I were able to give you a good answer to
that. We assume that it would, but you may decide thatyou need
to clarifythatin legislation.
Any time you have a Presidential assassination, you have a
potential for evidence of a matteraffectingthe nationalsecurityin
a very real and unquestioned sense, and it is vitally important,
both in terms of the ongoing investigation and for historical per-
spectives, thatthe public be satisfied with the answers, so thatthe
lingering conspiratorial concepts that have a way of arising years
latercanbe metatthattime.
If we don't have the power to do it without family consent,
maybe legislation is the appropriate answer to it. We assume that
we have.
ChairmanSTOKES.Will thegentlemanyieldback?
I think that I just have one further question in that area then,
and thatwould be this-andI think the underlyingquestion posed
by Mr . Fithian is, who would legally own the physical evidence
produced by theautopsy? And we pose thatquestion because of the
Kennedy assassination and the question as to who legally owned
thephysical evidence.
Mr. WEBSTER. I never was very much of an expert on remains,
andI haveneverbeensurethatit wasa question ofownership,but
rather custody, control and usage. Who has the right t o possess at
anygiven time, and what do you have the right to do with posses-
sion? I don't know that anybody ever really owns someone else' s
remains, butcertainlyanattackon a President is anattackon the
country.
Mr. McKINNEY. Would theChairmanyield?
ChairmanSTOKES.Iyieldto thegentleman.
Mr. McKINNEY. That is one of our recommendation problems in
the Kennedy assassination. There obviously wasn't much prece-
dent. Mrs. Kennedy and the family, then the Attorney General,
took possession, in essence put the body on a plane, flew it, and
picked the pathologist who was not trained in forensic pathology,
and took possession of many of the materials that came from that
autopsy.
And it seems to me as a layman, that perhaps one of the things
thatwe oughtto decide is thatanyonewho goes into publiclife and
becomes a Congressman or a Senatoror a President forfeits perse,
himself, his family's possessive rights to thatevidence and, I guess,
to the corpse, for the time being. It is not a very attractive way t o
putit, butI don'tknowofanyotherway to putit.
Mr. WEBSTER. I don'tsee any majorconstitutional problems with
that. State laws for years have provided if someone dies under
unusual circumstance not under the care of a physician there has
to be an autopsy. None of the privacy interests of the surviving
families can be allowed to interfere with that. It is justa question
of whet her you think maybe it ought to be spelled out that there
will be an autopsy in any such case and it will be conducted by
Federalauthoritiesifjurisdictionhasbeen asserted.
Chairman STOKES.I thinkthereis oneadditional aspecthereand
that is t he question in the Kennedy assassination, of whether the
photographs , the X-rays and the clothing belonged to the Govern-
ment or belonged to thefamily.
Mr.WEBSTER. And I suppose whethertheycan be made publicor
whet her theymaybe sealed.
Chair man Stokes. Right.
Mr. WEBSTER. Our immediate stat ut ory responsibility is to see
that t he evidence is preserved and accumulated and used for the
effect ive identification of those responsible, and there is an effec-
tive prosecuti on.
Our onl y interestin what happens to itafterward would be that
we have tried to avoid the kind of second guessing thatgoes on so
often, par t icularl y when an investigation may not have been as
complete as it could havebeen.
Chai rman Stokes. My timehasexpired.
Thegentlemanfrom Connecticut, Mr.Dodd.
Mr.DODD. Thankyou, Mr. Chairman.
Mr .Webster,I listened to yourresponsesto Mr. Stokes'question,
and it is still a little vague in my own mind as to the actual
jurisdict ion of the Federal Government in light of the statutes, 18
U.S.C. 1751and 351.It seemsto raise in my mindsome question as
to when it triggers the jurisdiction of the Federal Government.
These statutes don't make it clear that the Federal jursidiction is
automatic?
Mr.WEBSTER.That'sright.
Mr. DODD. Rather it has to be a decision on the partof someone.
My quest ions pertain to that particular point: Should it be auto-
mat ic,and who shouldbe makingthatdecision?
Mr . WEBSTER. I believe that the proper construction that has
been placed on it is that the Attorney General, as the chief law
of the country, makes thatdecision and asserts it on behalf
of the Government, thatthe Departmentof Justice has already-I
am sure you cangetthatin more detail from the Deputy Attorney
tomorrow-thereis alreadya step-by-step-procedure under
whlCh theDepartmentwould planto triggerthatassertion.
.As I said earlier, I searched my mind; I can't think of any
in which the Government would not assert it, and there-
ore perhaps it oughtto be anautomaticpreemption.
DODD.The reason I raise the pointis-Godforbid a situation
a:lses again where this occurs-that the statute talks about a
fldn.aping, a killing, an assault, assassination. If a President were
th die of natural causes, having gone through this experience for
c e past 2 years, I would not at all be surprised at there being
ertam people who would want to know whom he had lunch with
and Where he had been theday before, andso forth andso on' and
:e would have books written and Lord knows what else. 'This
tatutedoesn'tseem to covera death by natural causes.
26
It has occurred to me that there should be a mechanism for
taking some action even with the death of a President or Vice
Presidentby naturalcauses.
Obviously, if it occurredattheWhiteHousetherewouldbe little
question there; butif itoccurred in some otherjurisdiction, do you
think the Federal Government ought to have automatic jurisdic-
tionwhereit did notseemattheoutsetto involvea crime?
Mr . WEBSTER. I suppose I need to know, jurisdiction to do what?
Ifyou are talking aboutjurisdiction to conduct a criminal investi-
gation--
Mr. DODD. In thatcase, yes.
Mr. WEBSTER. It's a little unusual, in thatif the FBI would have
that responsibility, you would be sending us to see if something
were rotten in the State of Denmark, and while it would present
some problemsto us, theyaren'tinsurmountableproblems.
Having seen the ability of individuals who have access to the
media and the press to conjure up theories and undermine public
confidence, theremightwell be a basisfor anorderlyanddignified
procedure for making a positive determination such as in the form
of a quasi-judicial inquest of some kind, with the FBI assisting as
required; but I don't know whether we would want to be in the
position of moving in on a deathbed situation in the White House,
as if itwere-itisa verysensitivesortofthing.
Mr. DODD.Thatis why I asked thequestion; it is a verydifficult
question. I am not suggestingitlends itselfto an easy response. It
would be in a sensetakingjurisdictionoverthebody ofa person on
thegrounds thatthe person held a certain office, rather than that
he or she died undera particularsetof circumstances. Itwould be
a diversion from normal practice.
There are in both of these statutes that I have cited to you
clauses t hat say that the FBI shall be the agency which investi-
gates the crime, and they further state-and I am quoting here-
"assistance may be requested from any Federal, State, or local
agency, including the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, any
statute,rule,or regulation to thecontrarynotwithstanding."
Thatraises some questions in my mind. Firstof all, whatis your
understandingof who may request thatassistance? Is it a group of
peopleor is itjusttheAttorneyGeneralor thePresident?
Mr. WEBSTER. I would assume that the FBI could request it
through the Attorney General and that that would be a sufficient
compliance with the statute. I might read that a little more care-
fully, butI reallybelieve thatis allthatis required.
Themainthingthatis aimedat,I suppose, whenone talksabout
"r ule or statute to the contrary," would be the posse comitatus
type activity thatwould preclude the use of theArmyon continen-
talU.s.territorywithoutsome official finding andso on.
Mr. DODD. Is there any doubt-before we get to that-thatthe
Presidentcould requestthatas a matterof right?
Mr. WEBSTER. The President has the authority given certain
numbers of findings which he has to make, but he can invoke the
use of the Army if he makes those findings-that is the successor
Presidentyou aretalkingabout?
Mr.DODD. Yes.
Mr.WEBSTER.Correct.
?:7
Mr. DODD. Is it also your understanding thatthe Director of the
FBI could noton his or herown initiative, request assistance from
ot heragencies, butratherthattheAttorneyGeneral would have to
authorizesuchrequests?
Mr . WEBSTER. Well, ifwe found that we needed the help of the
Army or the we.had.a strikeforce mean, in
connect ion WIth the assassination of the President-s-suppose we
had a hostage situation which develops as a second or part of an
overall conspiracy to take over control of the Government. We
might need the assistance of the Fort Bragg SWAT team if we
were unable to deal with it ourselves. We want to be able to ask
thatthatbe done.
Mr.DODD. TheDirectorcould do thaton his or herown?
Mr. WEBSTER. Again, my own concept is that I would do it
t hrough the Attorney General. I would ask the Attorney General
because t here is a legal issue involved here, relying on thestatute.
I don' t have any doubt that the Attorney General would fully
suppor t it; but I think he needs to be involved in that type of
decision because it dealswithothernationalagencies.
I might ask the Secret Service to do something with or without
thestatute, and I think I would have the cooperation; butit is the
clause "that any rule and so forth to the contrary notwithstand-
ing"-Iwouldn't want to be the person who alone asked for other
agencies to ignoretheirrulesandregulations.
Mr. DODD.Thatis whyI amasking.
Mr. WEBSTER. I think that ought to come through the Attorney
General.
Mr. DODD. Thatis why I was pursuingthe question of authority.
ChairmanSTOKES.Thetimeofthegentlemanhasexpired.
Mr. DODD. May I proceed for a couple of additional minutes, Mr.
Chairman?
Chairman STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman is recog-
nized.
Mr. DODD. Whatyou aresayingto me is thatyou would proceed
through, as you see it-notyou specifically-but a Director of the
FBI should proceed through the Attorney General to seek that
approval?
Mr. WEBSTER. Yes.
Mr. DODD. So that the Director of the FBI should not on his or
her own initiative request the assistance of any-' other Federal,
State, or local agency withouttheauthoritycomingfrom theAttor-
neyGeneral?
Mr. WEBSTER. Well , that's substantially correct. I wouldn't hesi-
to ask for assistance which is available to us at the present
. nne, which they are legally able to give us; but ifthey have to
an existing rule or regulation or statute in order to do it,
en I would go throughtheAttorneyGeneral.
I r. DODD. For instance, look atthe clause, "thatany rule, regu-
statute to the contrary notwithstanding." If there were a
FBisidenbal or congressional assassination, and, for instance, the
were to request theassistance from theSecretaryof theTreas-
sry with regard to tax returns, is it your understanding that the
ecretary could respond to that information despite the provisions
............--
28
of the Tax Reform Act which deal with when, how, and to whom
individual taxreturnsmaybe shown?
Mr. WEBSTER. I'm not certain of that. I think that is an ambigu-
itythatmaybethecommitteeought to tryto resolve.
Mr. DODD. I can think of a whole variety of scenarios. We have
the BankSecrecy Act having to deal with any kind of bank trans-
actions, and thatone, of course, was somethingthatwe sortof ran
into, as I recall, Mr. Chairman, a littlebitin ourown invest igat ion
here, or theavailabiltyof CIA documents.
Mr. WEBSTER. Yes. My interpretation of thatsection isn'tthat it
is a licenseto abrogate allexistinglawsandstatutes;itis simplyto
suspend anystatuteswhich preclude cooperation, the use of partic-
ular services; and I may be mistaken in that interpretation, but I
wouldn't assume, for instance, that the third party access, the
Bank Privacy Act, was suspended by this. I don'tthink thatis the
case.
Mr. DODD. You can readita coupleofways.
Mr. WEBSTER. And I do not think there is much help in the
legislative history on that. Maybe there is and I have not seen it.
Mr. DODD. Would you careto expressyour feelings on how broad
itshouldbe?
Mr. WEBSTER. I am conservative about this. While it is a trau-
matic experience for anyone to live through the assassination of a
President, itoughtnotto be thepredicatefor investigativeconduct
II
which in essence is the declaration of martial law. I justsimplydo
I
not believe that we ought to be in a position to use something of
I this type, to suspend everything that was put in place to protect
the rights of citizens. I am not convinced that we cannot conduct
our investigations effectively, provided additional restrictions are
not laid down on us that we do not have an opportunity to speak
to, such as precluding us from using informantswithouta warrant
I
or somethingof thatkind. Thatin mymindwould be verydilatory.
Ifthe other laws are put in place, it is important that we get an
I
,I
answer but it is also important we do it in a way that safeguards
citizens' rights, and I would take a narrow construction of this
section.
Mr. DODD. Thankyou, Mr.Chairman.
ChairmanStokes. Thetimeof thegentlemanhasexpired.
Thegentlemanfrom NorthCarolina,Mr. Preyer.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask
III
several questions concerning the assassination statutes, the con-
gressional andthePresidentialassassinationstatutes, andgetclear
on that.
Today, with the Presidenttraveling more abroad and withexam-
ples such as Congressman Ryan's case, I think the extraterritorial
reachof thesestatutesis somethingthatis important.
There were press reports that the Justice Department investiga-
tion of the Guyana killings based its jurisdiction on the very
narrow possibility of finding a conspiracy to murder Congressman
Ryan, andthatanactfurtheringthatconspiracyhadto be commit -
ted in thiscountry. Is thatcorrect?
Mr. WEBSTER. I think it was not a conclusion. I think that was
theinitial opinion thatwasexpressedveryearlyon.
29
There hadbeen earlieropinionsgoingbacksever al years thatwe
have produced, and they were considered to still
Mr.PREYER.So thatfirst reportwasbased on a preliminaryview
operative, but we got a very positive opmion that there IS an
extrat er r it or ial effect, as I unders t a nd it, without t he need for
conspir acy.
ofthe law?
Mr .WEBSTER. That is myunder st anding.
Mr . PREYER. And I would agree with your final conclusion that
that wasa badlaw.
Mr. WEBSTER. Yes.
Mr. PREYER. Then do I understand it that these two statutes in
your j udgment do haveextraterritorialreach?
Mr. WEBSTER.Yes, sir.
Mr. PREYER. Thatwould be subject, of course, to the principlesof
int ernat ional law, I assume?
Mr .WEBSTER.Thatis correct.
Mr . PREYER. Following up questions that Mr. Dodd was asking
you concer ning the fact that these statutes do not have an auto-
matic effect . Each one begins, if Federaljurisdictionor prosecutive
jurisdict ion is asserted, somebody hasto decide who exercises that,
and I believe you said the Department of Justice would do that.
Mr. WEBSTER. That is my understanding. As the chieflawofficer
thatresponsibility would fall on thePresident'slawyer.
Mr. PREYER. Do you think this is the way to handle that, or do
you thinkFederaljurisdictionoughtto be made automaticwithout
anyone making a decision to do itornot?
Mr . WEBSTER. I suppose somebody is going to have to make a
finding or declaration of some kindthattheacthasoccurred which
ma kes a basisfor Federaljurisdiction;
I cannot think of any reason why Federaljurisdiction would not
be assert ed, given the base that the power is there to assert it. I
think the pressure would be irresistible and the need would be
irresist ible to resolve thequestion.
If you conclude that the mechanisms within the Department of
Just ice are inadequate, then I suppose ' you ought to address the
question and make it a more automatic approach. They have an
effect on what you would do by statute by providing the internal
mechanisms to triggerit.
Mr. PREYER. One thing in favor, it would seem- t ome, of letting
the Att orney General certify a Federal interest in it, for example,
rather than mandating it, is the question of Federal homicide
st atut es creatinga Federalpoliceforce.
h Mr. WEBSTER. That is what I meant by findings. Someone would
ave to makesomefindings.
. Mr. PREYER. Should the CIA be required to give the FBI any
which ithaswhich is relevantto theassassination of a
regardless of any security clearance involved or any
secuntyclassificationinvolved?
Mr . WEBSTER. I think that under our present working arrange-
ment with the CIA absent any statutes, absent any executive
orders, thatis whatwe have. Whether itneeds to be formalized or
not I cannotsay.
38-028 0 - 79 3
58
Mr. FAUNTROY. What if any intra- orinteragency procedures has
the CIA adopted to shareinformation with the FBI in the event of
assassination? I ask this question with the following situation ill
mind. Duringtheongoinginvestigation theCIA maycorne acrossa
piece of information which means nothing in particular to the
I
,,'
': people running the assassination investigation but the same info
r
.
mation was shown to an expert in the organized-crime area, or all
expert in the Communist activities area, and its real significance
becameapparent.
With this in mind, how will the CIA see to it that informatio
ll
gets to thepeople within theBureauwho can properlyevaluate it?
Mr. CARLUCCI. Under terms of the Executive order,
Order 12036, we have a responsibility to cooperate with the FBI in
the counterintelligence function. I think much of the information
thatyou were talkingabout would fall into thecounterintelligence
area,and muchof theinformationthatyouI thinkarereferringto
would fall underthecategoryof counterintelligence.
Thereis no specific agreementotherthanthatof theresponsihj,
itiesto organizationsdelineated in 12036. I would be gladto submit
Executive Order 12036 for the record because I think itmay Cover
someof thequestionsyou aregettingat.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Chairman,I respectfully requestthatthatbe
madea partof the record atthis point. I would hope thatthenext
member will pick up on this subject, as my time has expired.
ChairmanSTOKES. Withoutobjection, itis so ordered.
59
FULL CoMMITI'EE EXHIBIT F-1
THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1978
PART II

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Ct:NlIlAL P.OVI SIONS
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fEDERALa IGlSJI"VOL U. NO. I l-ntUISOAV. J"NU.I' 26.1"1
61
THEPRESIDENT 3675
SECTION I
DI RECT10 N. Dt1T1ES AND R ESPONSI 8ILmS ' VITII RESPECT TO TIlE NATI ONAL
I NTELU CENCE ErrORT-
I - I. _' -ationa/ Su rit] Councl.
1- 101. Purpose. The National Security Counci l (NSC) was established by
the National Security Act of 1947 10 advise the President with respect to the
int egration of domestic, foreign, and milit ary policies relat ing to the national
secur ity.The NSC shall act as the highest Executive Branch ent ity that pro vides
review of, guidance for, and direction 10 the conduct of all national foreign
intelli gence and counterintelligence activities.
I- J02. Commills . The NSC PolicyReview Committ ee and Special C OOT
din ation Commine er in accordance with procedures established bythe Assistant
to the President for Nat ional Security Affairs, shaHassist in carrying out the
NSC' srespon sibilities in the foreign int elligence field.
1- 2. NSC Policy RevieuJ Commiuu .
1- 20 1. .IItmbmhip. The NSC PolicyReview Committee (PRC), when car-
ryingout respon sibilit iesassigned inthisOrder,shallbe bythe Direct or
ofCen1J"31 Int elligence and composed of the Vice Pres ident. the Secretary of
Stale. the Secretary of the Treasu ry, the Secretary of Defense, the Assistant to
the President for NationalSecu rity Affairs, and theChairman of theJoint Chiefs
of Staff. or their designees.and other senior officials.as appropriate.
1-202. Duties. The PRC shall:
(a) Est abli sh requirement s and pri oritie-s for national fore ign int elligence;
(b) Review the National For eign Intelligenc e Program and budget pr o-
posals and report to the Presi dent as to whe ther the reso urce allocations for
intell igence capa bilities are res po nsive to the intelligence requirements of the
members of[he NSC.
(c) Conduct periodic reviews of national foreign intelligence products.
evaluate the quality ofthe int elligence product. devel op policy guid ance to
ensure qualit y int elligence and 10 meetchangingint elligence requirements; and
(d) Sub mit an annual repo rt on its activities to the NSC.
1- 203 . ApptalJ. Recommendati ons of the PRe on inte lligencemattersmay
be app ealed to the Presidentor the NSC byanymemberof PRC.
1-3. NSC Special Coordination Co,. ..itll,.
1-301. Mtmbmhip. The NSC Special Coordination Committee (SCC) is
chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and iIJ
membership includes me statutory members of the NSC and other senior
officials,as appropriate.
1-302 . Spmal Activities. TheSCC shall comider and submit to thePresi-
dent a policy recommendation. incl uding all dissents. on each special activity.
When meeting for this purpose, the me mb ers of me sec sha ll include the
Secretary ofStale.the Secre tary of Defense, the AttorneyGeneral, the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget. the Assistant to the Pre sident for
Nation al Securit y Affairs. the Chainn an of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff, and the
Directo r of Central Intelli gence.
1-303. Stnriti", Fortign /nltl/igmct Coll/um Op<ratj oes, Under standards
established by the Pres ident . pro posalsfor sensitiveforeign int elligence collec-
tion operations shall be reported to the Chainnan by the Director of Central
Intelligence for approp riat e reviewand approval. When meeting for the pu rpose
of reviewing proposals for sens itive foreign intelligence collection operations
_ . c
CArui n technical terms ar e defined in Slion 4-2.
P1DftAL UGISlU. VOL a. MO. JANUAlY 26, 1971
62
3676 THEPRESIDENT
the members ofthe secshall include theSecretary of State. theSecretary of
Defense. the Auorney General, the Assistant to the Pres iden t for National
Security Affairs. the Director of Central i ntelligence .and such othermembers
designatedby theChairmanto ensure properconsideration oftheseoperations.
1-304 . Coun'ninltlligmc,. TheSCC shalldevelop policywith respect to the
conduct of counterintelligence act ivities. When meeting for this purpose' the
members of ' he SCC .hall include the Secre tary ofStare, the Secretary of
Defense. the Atto rney General, the Directo r of we Office of Manage ment and
Budget. the Assistant to me President for National SecurityAffairs. the Chair..
man of the J oint Chiefs of Staff, the Directo r of Central Intelligence, and the
Director of the FBI.Thesec'scounterintelligence functions shal linclude:
(a) Developing standardsand doctrine for thecounterintelligenceactivities
of the United States;
(b) Resolving interagency differences concerning implementation of cou n-
terintelligence policy;
(e) Developingand mo nitoringguidelinesconsistentwith this Orderfor the
main tenance of centralrecords of coun terintelligence information;
(d) Submitting to the President an overall ann ual assessment of the rela tive
threat to United States interests from intelligence and security services of
Coreign powers and from internationa l terrorist activities , including an assess -
mentofthe effectiveness of the United. ~ t s coun terintelligenceactivities;and
(e) Approving count erintelligence activities which, undersuch standards as
may be established by 'he President, requireSCC approval.
1- 305. Rtquirtd Mtmbmhip. The SCC shall discharge the responsibilities
assigned by sections 1-302 through 1-0504onl yafter considera tion in a meet ing
at which alldesignatedmembersare presentor. in unusualcircumstanceswhen
any such member is unava ilable. when a designated representative of the
memberattends.
1-306. AdditiJm41Dulin. TheSCC shallalso:
(a) Co nduct an annual review of ongoing specia l activities and sensi tive
nat iona l foreign intel ligence collect ion operat ions and report thereon to the
NSC;and
(b)Carry out such othercoordination and review activities as the Presi dent
maydirect.
1-307. App.a/J. Any member of the SCC may appeal any decision 10 the
Pres ident or the NSC.
1-4. Nalional FurtignInu//ignu:eBoard.
1-401. E'tahliJhmtnl and Diuia. There is established a National Foreign
Intelligence Board (NFIB) to advise the Director of Central Intelligence con -
cerning:
(a) Production. review. and coordination of national foreign intelligence:
(b)TheNational Foreign Intelligence Program budget;
(c) Interagency exchanges of foreign :ntell igence information:
(d) Arrangements with foreign gove rnments on intelligence matters:
(e)Theprotection ofintelligence sources and methods;
(I) Activities ofcommon concern; and .
(g) Othermat ters referred to it bythe Directorof Central Intelligence .
1-402. Mtmbmhip . TheNFIB shall be chaired by the Director of Cen tra l
Intelligenceand shallincludeotherappropriateofficers of the CIA, the Office of
the DirectorofCentralIntelligence,theDepartmentofState, the Department of
Defense, the Depa rtment of Justice, the Department of the Treasury. the
Department of Energy, the Defense Intelligence Agency. the offices withi n the
Department of Defense for reconnaissance programs, the National Security
AgenC)' and rhe FBI. A representative of the Assistan t to the President for
National SecurityAffairs may attend meetingsof the NFIB-as an observer.
fEDllALllCUSTII,. YOL a,NO. Il-tMUl.SDAY.JANU.U.Y26.,1971
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THEPRESIDENT
3677
1-103. Restricted .lftmbmhip and Ob,trvm. When ' he NFIB meet>for 'h e
purpose ofsection 1-4 01 (a), it shall be composed solely of the senior int elli-
gen ce officers of thedesignated agencies. Th e senior i.nld ligence officers of the
Army. NavyandAir Force mayattendall meetings of theNFlB as observers.
1-5. Xational Intelligmce Tasking Cnl tn .
1-501. EstabliJhmnJt. There is established a Nat ional Intelligence Tasking
Center (i\"ITC) under the dire ction, cont rol and management of the Direct or of
Central Intelligence for coordinating and tasking national foreign intelligence
collecti on acti vities. The NITC shall be staffed j ointly by civilia n and military
personnel including designat ed representatives of the chiefs of e-ach ofthe
Depar tment of Defense int elligence organizations engaged in nati onal foreign
int elligence activities. Other agencies within the Intelli gence Commu nity may
also designate repres entativ es,
1-502 . Resporuibil,tin. The NITC shall be ' he central mechanism by which
(he Direct or of Cent ral Inte lligence:
(a) Translat es national foreign intelligenc e requirements and priorilies
developed by the PRe int o specifi c collection obj ectives and targets for the
Intelligence Community;
(b) Assignstargets and obj ectivesto nati onalforeign int dligence collection
organizat ionsand systems:
(c) Ensur es the timely dissemination and exploitati on of data for nati onal
fore ign intell igence purp oses gathered by national foreign intdligence collec-
tion means, and ensuresthe resulting int elligence flowis routed immed iately10
relevant compo nents and commands;
(d) Provid es advisory tasking conce rning collection of nat ional foreign
intelligence to departments and agen cies having infonnaLion coll ection capabil-
ities or int elligenceassets rha;are not a part of the National Forei gn Intelligence
Program. Part icular emph asis shaUbe placed on increasing the contribution of
depart ments or agen cies to the collection of information through overt means.
1- 503. Resolution of Corifli4ts. The NITC shall have the authori tyto resolve
conllicts of priori ty. Any PRe member may app eal such a re solution to the PRe;
pending the PRC's decision, the taskin g re mains in effect.
1-504. Transfer oj AU1}urril]_ Allresponsibilities and authori ties of the Direc-
tor ofCent ral Intelligence concerning the NITC shall be tra nsferr ed to the
Secr etary ofDefense upon the express direction of the President.Tomaintain
readiness for such transfer, the Secretary of Defense shall, with advance
agreement of(he Director of Cent ral Intelligence, assume temporarily during
regular practi ce exercises all respons ibilities and authorities ofthe Direct or of
Ccrural Intelligenreconcerning-the NITC.
I-G. Tilt Directorof Central In',lIig tn c.
1-601. Dulin. Th e Director of Cent ral Intelligence shall be responsible
directly to the NSC and, in addition to the duties specified elsewhere in this
Order.shall:
(3) Act as the prima ry adviser to the Pres ident and the NSC on natio nal
foreign int elligence and pr ovide the Preside nt and other officials in the Ex-
ecutive Branch with national foreign int elligence:
(b)Be the head of the CIAand ofsuch staff elementsasmayberequiredfor
di scharge of tile Direct or 's Int elligence Communityrespo nsibilities;
(c ) Act. in appropriate consultation with the departments and agenci es, as
the Intelligence Community' sprincipal spokesperson to the Congress. the news
media and the publi c. and facilitate (he use of national foreign intelligence
produ cts by the Congress in 3 secure man ner;
(d) Develop. consis tent with the requ irements and priorities esta blishedby-:
the PRe, such obj ectives and guidance for the Int elligence Community a's ".ill "
fB)lL\1IEGtSJI..VOL GoNO. Il-ntUISDAY.JANUAaY 1m
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3678 THE'RESIDENT
enhance capabilities for responding to expected future needs fOT nat ional
foreign intel ligence;
(eo) Promote the development and main tena nce of services of common
concern by des ignated foreig n inte lligence organizations on behalf of the
Iruelligenre Com mun ity;
<0 Ensure implementation of special activities;
(g) Formulate policies concerning intelligence arrangements with forei gn
governments. and coo rdinate intel ligence relaucnships between agenc ies of the
Intelligence Community and the intelligence or internal securi ty services of
foreign governments;
(h) Conduct a program to protect agains t ove rclassfflcation of foreign
Imetligence info nnation;
(i) Ensure the establis hment by the- Intel ligence Eommuniry of common
security and access standards for managing and hand ling foreign intelligence
aystems, information and products:
0)Participate in the development of procedures requi red to be app roved by
the AHorne')' General governi ng the conduct of intelligence activities;
(k) Establis h un ifonn criteria for the determi nation of relative priorities for
the tra nsmission of critica l national foreign intelligence. and advise the Secretary
of Defense concerning the communications req uirements of the Intelligence
Communily for the transmission of such intelligence;
0) Provide appropriate intelligence to departments and agenc ies no t within
the Intelligence Communily; and
(m) Establish appropriate commiuees or other advisory groups to assist in
the execu tion of the foregoing responsibilities,
1- 602. National Ftrrtign Inl<llJgt71ct Pr0/JTa.. Budg<l. Th e Director of Central
Intelligence shall. to the extent consis tent with app licable law, have full and
exclusive authori ty for approval of the Nat ional Foreign Intelligence Program
budget submitted to the Pres ident. Pursuant to this authority:
(a) The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide guidance for program
and budget development to program manager s and heads of comp one nt
activities and to depart ment and agency heads;
(b) The heads of depart ments and agencies involved anthe Nationa l Foreign
Intelligence Program shall ensu re timely development and submission to the
Director of Central Intelligence of proposed nat ional programs and budgets in
'he fonn at designated by the Director of Central Intelligence, by the program
managers and heads of component activities. and shall also ensure that the
Director of Ce ntral Inte lligence is provided, in a timel y and responsive man ner.
all information necessary to perform the Director 's programand bu dget res po n-
sibilities;
(c) Th e Director of Central Intell igence shal l review and evaluate the
na tiona l program and budget sub missions and. with the advice of the NFIB and
the depart ments and agencies conce rned . develop the conso lidated National
Foreig n Intelligence Program budget and present it to the President through the
Office of Manage ment and Budge t;
(d) The Director of Cent ral Intelligence shall present and j u..ify ' he
National f oreign Intell igence Program budget to the Congress:
(e) The heads of the departments and agencies shall. in consultation with
the Directo r of Central Intelligence, establ ish rates of obligation for appro.
priated funds:
(0 Th e Director of Central Intelligence shall have full and excl usive
authority for reprogramming National foreign Intel ligence Program funds. in
accord with guidelines established by the Office of Management and Budget. hut
.hall do so on1y after consultation with the head of the department affected and
appropriate consultation with the Congress;
R I I L ~ VOL a. NO. 1a-lHUI SDAY, .lANU.UT26.1 971
THEPRESIDENT 3679
(g) Th e departments and agencies may app eal to the Pres ident decisions by
the Director of Ce ntral Int elligence on bud get or reprogramming matters of the
National Foreign Int elligence Program.
(h) Th e Direct or of Central Intelligence shall mon itor National foreign
Int elligence Program impl ementation and may conduct program and pe rfor-
mance audits and evaluations.
1-603 . Rt sponsibility For National Foreign Intrllignl ct . Th e Director of Cen tral
Intelligence shall have fuJI responaibiliry for pr oduction and disseminati on of
nati onal foreign intelligence and have authori ty to levy ana lytic tasks on
department al int elligence production organizations, in consu ltation with those
organizati ons. In doin g so, (he Director of Ce ntra l Intelligence shall ensure that
diverse poi nts of view are consider ed fully and (hat differences of j udgment
within the Int elligence Community arc brought to the attention of national
policymakers,
1-604 . Protection of SOUTCtJ , .\/tthods and Procedures. The Director of Central
Intelligence shall ensure that progra ms are developed which protect intelligence
sources, methods and analytical procedures. prov ided that this responsibi lity
shall be limited within the United States to:
(a) Using lawful means to prot ect against di sclosure hy present or fann er
employees of the CIA or the Office of the Director of Centra l Intelligence. or by
persons or.o rganizations present lyor formerl y under contract \\'ith such entities;
and
(h) Providi ng policy, guidance and technical assistance to depart ments and
agencies regardi ng protectio n of int elligence information. including informa tion
thai may reveal intelligence SOIlT C('S and meth ods,
1- 605, Rtsponsibi/ity of Executive Branch Agl1lcin. Th e heads of all Executive
Branch departme nt s and agen cies shall. in accordance with law and rel evant
Auo mey Gen eral pro cedures. give the Director ol Cen tral Intelligence access to
all informat ion relevan t to the national Int elligence needs of the" United States
and shall give due con sideration to requests from the Director of Cen tral
Intelligence for app rop riate supp ort for CIA activities.
1- 606. Arcus 10 CIA Intt Jligrnu , The Director of Central Intelligence. shall,
in accor dance with law and rel evant Att orney Genera l procedure'S, give the
heads of the depart ments and agencies access to all int elligence, developed by
the CIA or the staff eleme nts of the Office of the Director of Cen tra l Intell i-
gence. relevan t to the nation al intelligence needs of the departments and
agencies.
1-7, Senior Officials of 1M l ntt lligtnet Commu.nit" Th e senior officials of each of
the agencies within the Int elligence Community shall:
1- 701. Ensur e that all activities of their agen cies are carried out in
accordance with applicable law;
1- 702. Make use of the capabilities of other agencies within the Intelli-
gence Community in order to achieve efficiency ami mutual assistance;
1- 703. Contribute in their areas of respon sibility to the national foreign
intelligence pr oducts;
1-704. Establish intern al policies and guidelines governing employee'
conduct and ensure that such arc made known to each employee;
1- 705. Provide for st rong. Independent, internal means to ide nrify, in-
spect, and report on unl awful or impro per activity;
1- 706. Repo rt to the Attorney General evidence of pos sible violations of
federal criminal law by an employee of their department or age ncy. and report
to the Auo rney General evidence of possible violations by any ot her person of
those federal criminal laws speci fied in guideli nes ado pted by the Attorney
Genera l; .: c) ;:
fEDllAL IlGI5UI, VOL 43, NO. lI-THUISDAY. JAHUAIT 26. 197'
3681
66
3680 1111PIIE5IDENT
1-707. In any case serious orcon tinuing breaches of security,
recommend (0 the AnomeyCeneral that the case be referred 10 the FBI for
further investi gation;
1-708. Furnishthe DirectorofCentralIntelligence.thePRC and theSCC.
in accordance with applicable law and Attorney General procedure-s, the infor..
mation required for the performanceoftheir respective duties;
1- 709. Reportto the IntelligenceOversight Board.and keep the Director
of Central Intelligence appropriately informed, concerning ilny inte llige nce
activities oftheirorganizationswhich raise questionsoflegalityor propriety;
1-7 10. Protect inte lligence and intell igence sources and met hods consistent
with guidance from the DirectorofCentralIntelligenceand the NSC:
1-711.DisseminateIntelligenceto cooperatingforeign governmmtsunder
arrangementsestablished or agreed to by the DirectorofCe-ntralIntelligence;
1- 712. Execu te programs to protect against overc lassificaricn of foreign
intelligence:
1-713. Instruct their employees to cooperate fully with the Intelligence
Oversight Board;and
1-714. Ensure that the Inspectors Ge neral and General.Counsel oftheir
agencies have access to any information necessary to perform their duties
ass igned by thi, Order.
1-8. Th C.nlrallnl.lligtnc. Agtnry. Alldutiesand responsibilitiesofthe CIA shall
be related to the intelligence functions set ou t below. As authorized by the
National SecurityAct of 1947. as amended, the CIA Act of1949. as amended,
and other laws,regulations and directives, the CIA, unde r the direction of th e
NSC. shall:
1-801. Collect foreign intelligence, including information no t otherwise
obtainable, and develop. conduct, or provide support for technical and other
programs which collect national foreign intelligence.Thecollection ofinforma-
tion within the Uni ted States shall be coordinated with the 1"81 as req uired by
procedure's agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the
AttorneyGeneral;
1-802. Produce and disse minate fore ign intelligence relating to the national
security, including foreign political, economic. scientific. technical, military,
geographicand sociological intelligenceto meet the needsof the President. the
NSC, and otherelementsofthe United StatesGovernment;
Collect, produceand disseminate intelligenceon foreign aspects of
narcoticsproductionand trafficking;
1-804.Conductcounterintelligenceactivities outsidetheUnited Stalesand
coordinate coun terintelligence activities cond ucted outside the United States by
otheragencies within the Intelligence Community;
1-805. Without assuming or performing any interna l secu rity functions,
con duct counterintelligence activities within the United Stares. but on ly in
coordination with the FBI and subjectto the approv..1 ofthe Auorney General;
1-806. Produceand disseminatecounterintelligencestudies and reports;
1-807. Coordinate the collection outsidethe United States of intelligence
infonn.ation not otherwiseobtai nable;
1-808. Conduct special activities approved by the President and carry out
such ardvhiesconsistentwith applicablelaw;
1-809 . Conduct services ofcommon concern for the Inte lligence Cern-
munityas directed by the NSC;
1-810. Carry out or contractfor research, developmentand procurement
oftechnical I)'stems and devices relating to authorized functions;
1-811. Protect the security of its installat ions , activit ies, information and
personnel by appropriate means, including such investigations of applicants,
'EOIIAllEOKTR.YOL a,NO. ll-'lHUl'SDAY .IANUAl:T26, 197'
67
THEPRESIDENT
e mployees, contractors. and e ther pe rsons with similar associations with the CIA
asare nerr.. sll. ary;
1- 812. Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within
and outs.ide the United States as are neccssary to perform the functions
described in sect ions 1- 80 1 through 1-811 above, includ ing procurement and
essentialcove r and proprietaryarrangements.
1- 8 J3. Pro vide legal and legi slative serv ices and other ad ministra tive
support 10 the Offi ce of the Director of Ce ntra! Intel ligence.
1- 9. TIl. Department of S'ale. Th e Secretary of Stat e shall:
1- 90 1. O... erl ly collect foreign political , socio logical, eco no mic. scientific,
technical. political-military and associa ted bic gra pbic information :
1-902. Produce and dissemin ate foreign int elligence rel ating to United
States foreign policy as required for the exec ution of the Secretary'sresporuibll-
hi es;
1- 903. Dissemi nat e. as appropriate, reports received from United Slat es
dipl omaticand con sular posts abroad;
1-904. Coordinate with di e Director of Central Intelligence to ens ure that
national foreign intelligen ce activities are use-ful to and consisten t with United
States for eign policy;
1- 905. Transmi t report ing requirements of the Int elligence Commu nity
to the Chiefs of United St at es Missionsabr oad;and
1- 906. Suppo rt Chiefs of Mission in discharging their statutory responsi-
bilities for direction and coordi nation ofmission acuvh ies.
1- 10. Tit, Department of t!ll Treas ury. Th e Secr etary of the Treasury shall:
I- JOOI. Overtlycoll ect foreign financial and monetary infonnat ion;
1- 1002. Parti cipat e with the Department of State in the overt col lectionof
general forei gn economicinformation;
1-1 003 . Produce and dissemi nate for eign intelligence relating to Unit ed
States econo mic policy' as required for the executionofthe Secr etary's resp onsi..
biluies:and
1- 1004. Conduct, through the Unite d States Secre t Service, activities to
determine the existence and capability of surveillance eq uipment bein g used
againstthe-President of the UnitedStates,the ExecutiveOffice ofthe Preside nt,
and , as authorized by the Secre tary of the Treasury or the Presi dent, oth er
Secret Service prot ecrees and United Sua es officials. No information shall be
acquired imerulonall y through such activitie-s excC"pt to prot ect against such
surveillance. and those activities shall be conducted pursuan t to pr ocedures
agreed upon b)' the Secretary of the Treasury and the Ano mey Ge neral.
I - II . Tiu Drpartmmt of Dt/.ru. The Secretaryof Defense shall:
1- 110 1.Collect national foreign intdligence and be responsive'10 col lec-
tion tas king bythe NITC;
1- 1102. Col lect, prod uce and dissemi nate for eign military and military.
related intell igence information , including scientifi c, technical. political. geo-
graphic and economic information as required for exec ution ofthe Secr etary'.
rcsponsibilitit.s;
1- 1103. Con duc t pr ograms and missions necessary 10 ful fill nat ional and
tactical foreign intelligence requirements; .
1-1 104. Conduci counteri nt elligence activities in supp ort of Departmen t of
Defense componen ts outside the United Stales in coordination with the CIA,
an d within the United Stat es in coor di nation with the FBI pu rsuant to prore-
dures agree d upon by the Secretary or Defense and the Auomey Gen eral, and
prod uce an d disseminat e cc untcriruelligence studiesand report s: -r ,.: ::.
ffD11A1 IEGlma.VOL a. NO. lI-IHUISOAY. JANUAIY 26, 197'
3683
68
368% THE..ESIDENT
1- 1105. Direct, 0J>C'r",((" . cont rol and provide fiK31management for t he
National Security Age-or)'and for defense and military intelligence and national
reconnaissanceC' ntities;
1-1106.Conduct, as the-executive agent of the United Stares Covemmem.
lignals intelligence and communications securiryactivities. except as otherwise
directed bythe NSC;
1-1107. Provide for the timely t ransmission of critical intelligence. 35
defined by the Director of Central Imelligence. within the United States
Government:
1-1108. Review budget data and information on Department of Defense
programs within the National Foreign Intelligence Program and review budgets
submit ted by program managers to the Director of Central Intelligence to
ensure the appropriate relationship of t he National Forei gn Intell igence Pro-
gram el ements to t he other elements of the Defense program:
1-1109. Monitor,evaluate and conduct performance audits ofDepartment
of Defense intel ligence programs;
I- J110.Carry out or contract for research, devel opment and procurement
of technical systems and devices r elating 10 authorized intelligence functions;
1- )III. Together w ith t he Direct or of Central Intelligence, ensure that
there is no unnecenaf)'overlap between national foreign intelligence programs
and Depart ment of Defense int el ligence programs and pro..ride the Director of
Central Intelligence all information necessary for this purpose;
1- 1112. ProtL"C1 the securityof Departmentof Defense installations,actlvi-
li es. information and personnelbyappropriate means including such invesriga-
tions of applicants, employees. contract ors and other persons "'ilb similar
associations with the DepartmentofDefense as are necessary; and
1- 111:S. Conductsuch administrativeand technicalsupport activitieswith-
in and outside the United Stares as art:'necessary to perform the functions
described in sections 1- 1101through ) -1 ) 12 above.
1- 12. Inltll igffl" ComponmlsUl,l=dbyI'"SlUttaryof lXfmst.In carrying om the
responsibilities assigned in sections 1- 1101 through the Secretary of
Defense isauthorized to uti lize the following:
1- 1201. Dt/nut Inlrlligmct Agrnry. whose responsibilities shallinclude:
(a) Production or. through tasking and coordination. provision of mi litary
and military-related intelligence for the Secretary of Defense. theJoint Chiefs
ofStaIT.other Defense components. and. as appropriate, non-Defense agencies:
(b) Provision of mil ilaf)' intelligence for national foreign intC' lligC' ncC' prod-
ucts;
(c) Coordination of all Department of Dd C'nsC' inte1ligmcC' collC' ction
requiremenu for departmental needs;
(d) Management of the DefC' nsC' Attache system; and
(C' )Provision offort!'ign intelligencC'andcounterintelligmce staffsupport as
directed br theJoint ChilifsorStafT.
1- 1202. KalionalStOlril]Agffl"(NSA),whose responsibilitiessh,1Iioclude:
(a) Establishment and operation of an dTt"cti\'e unifiC'd organization for
signals intelligence activities, C'xcC"pt for the ddegation of operational cont rol
o\'C'r certain operations that arC' condUCled through other tlemmu of the
IntC'lI igence Community. No other or agency rna)'t!' ngagC' in 5ignals
int elligence acti"'it iC's except pursuant to a delegati on by t he Secretary of
DC' fC'nse:
(b) Cont rol of signals intclligence coll(" ction and processing activitiC's ,
including assignmentofr('sources to an appropriale agentfor 5uch periods and
lasl) 35 required for t he direct support of military commandC'rs;
(c ) Colltion of signals iOlC'11 igl'nce informati on for nat ional forei gn intl"lIi
genct' purposes in accordance with laskingbythe NITC;
ffDEIAL IIGlsn..VOL.a. NO. lI-THUISDAY, J,ANUAIY 26, t97.
,
I
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THE' RESIDENT
In) Iw n ' ssing of signa ls intelligence data for na tiona l for ei gn int d lige nc('
flllrpO!.lScc naistent with standards for timel iness established b)'the Director of
Central hucltigence;
(l') Dis'oC'minalion of signa ls intelligence info rmat ion for nat iona l fo rC' ign
imelligence purpo ses to authorized elements of IhC' Go ..'em ment , includ ing the
military services , in accorda nce wit h guidance fro m the NITC :
(0 Coll ection , pr ocessing. and d issemi na tiun of signa Js intell igen ce infor-
mali on for co unterinte llige nce purposes:
(g) Provision of sign als intelligen ce suppo r t for the con d uct of mil ilaf)'
operations in accorda nce with tasking, pri orities a nd sta nda rds oftimel iness
as vigned b)' the Secr et ar yof Defense.If provision of such support requires use
of national co llection systems. these systems \lo' ill be tasked within ex isling
guidan ce from the Direct or of Ce ntra l Intell igen ce;
(h) Executi ng the respo nsibili ti es ofthe Secretaryof Defen se as executi..-e
agent for the com munica tions sec uri ty of the Un ited Sta tes Covemment:
(i) Co nd uct of resear ch a nd d evelopment to meet nee ds of t he United Sta tes
for signal s intelligence and communica tions sec urity;
0) Prot ecti on of the security cfits installations, activities, information a nd
person nel by ap propriate means includi ng such inves tigations of applica nts .
employees. cont ractors and other persons with simila r ass ociations with the NSA
as art!' necessary:and
(k) Prescribing, with in its fieldof au thorized operations, securityregulat ions
coveringoperating practices. includ ing the t ransmission, hand ling ..nd distr'ibu-
tion of signa ls int elligence and co mmunica tions securit y ma terial within and
amon g the dements under control of the Director of the NSA. an d exe rcising
d ie necessary supe rviso ry contro lto ens ure co mpliance with the regu lations,
1- 1203. OffKufor Ill' co/kelton of specialiirdinuU.gt nu through m:orwQwa"ct
I"0grmru.whose responsibilities sha lJinclude:
(a) Carrying o ut consolida ted reconnaissance pr ograms for specialized
intelligence;
(lJ) Responding to tasking thr ough the-NITC; and
(c) l>dt'gating authority to the var ious de part rnerus and agencies for
re search, de ..elopmeru. procuremen t, and operation of designated means of
collection,
1-1204. Tilt foreign inltlllenJu and coUnltrinl'"igrnct ,kmtnls oj ,ht mililary
snvicrs, whose responsibilities shall include: .
(a) Co llection. producti on and d issemination of military and military -re lated
for eign inld ligC'nce. incl udi nginfonnalion on indications and warn ings . foreign
cap abilitif's, pl ans and- \lo'C'apons s)'Jtems , scif'n tific and tf'chnical dC' vd opmeC' nlS
and narcotics prod uction an d tralTlckingo \\'hC'n collC'ction is conducted in
respolIst"10 national foft"ign intellige nce rc-quirC'ments. it will be tasked by the
NITC. Collection ofnat ional foreign intd lige nce , not olhC' rwise obtainab le,
o Ulsidt"the United Sta tes shall be coordi na tt' d with the CIA. and such co llC' cl ion
"'ilhi n the United Stales shall be coo rd inated ""ith the FBI;
(b) Co nduct of co unt erintell igence activitics outsid e tht" United St ales in
coo rdinalion with t hC' CIA, a nd within thC' Uni tt'd Stat es incoordination with thC'
FBJ, a nd productio n and dissemination of C' ountl:ri'ntellige ncl: st udit' 5 or
rcpoT"tS;and ,
(c) Monitoring of the dl... eJoprnC' nt , procurC'ml:llI al"d milOagemenl of
lact k al intdli gl' ncc s)'stems and eq uipment and conducting rel ated resear ch.
dndopmll1l. test and t... aluiltion aC't i...ities.
1-1205, o/fl usllillj illI},r Drparlmtnlof Dtfrnsrappropriate for con d uct
ofltl l inld li1-wncc missions an d respons ibilitir s ass igned to th t" St"crc. "rary of
Dd ells('. Ifliuch othe r offices are usC'dfor inte lligencC'purp O"i:cs. the 0,0.-: .
of Sln iolls 2- 101th rough 2- 309of t his Ordn <tppl)'to ahose offices ,,:1IC'n
u'ocd fo r (hosL' purposf."s,
ffDflALIfGISTEI, VOL. 43, NO. 11-THUISDAY, JANUAIY 26. 197.
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THE,.nIDENT
36Bt
1- 13. Thr IRparlmml oj EntTK!' The Secretary or Energy shall;
1-1 301. Part icipate with the Depa rtment of State in cventy col lecting
political. economic and technical informat ion with respect to foreign energy
manen;
Prod uce and disseminate foreign intelligence necessa ry for the
Secretary's respons ibilitie s;
Participate in formulating intdligence collection and analysi s
requirements where the specia l expert capa bility of the Department can
contrib ute; and
1-( 304. Provide expe rt techni cal, analytical and research capability to othe r
agencies within the Intelligence Community.
1- 14. Thr Ftdnal BurtalJ oj Im.-ntigaticn. Under the supervision of the Attorney
General and purs uant to such regul ations as the Auomey Genera l may establish,
the Director or the FBI .h.lI:
1- 140 1. whhin the United States conduct cou nterintelligence and coo r-
dina te cou nteri ntelligence activities of other agencies within the Intelligence
Co mmunity. When a counterintdligence activity of the FBI involves military or
civilian per sonnel of the Department of Defense, the FBI shall coordinate with
the Department of Defense;
1-1 402. Conduct coun terintelligence activities outside the Unit ed States in
coordination with the CIA, subject to the approval of the Director of Central
Intelligence;
1-1 403. Conduct within the United States, when requested b )' officials of
the Intelligence Community designated by the Pres ident, lawful acti vities under-
taken 10 collect foreign intell igence or support foreign intelligence collection
requirements of other agencies within the Imelligence Communi ty;
I-101M. Prod uce and disseminate foreign intelligence, cou nterintelligence
and cou nter intellige nce studies and repo rts; and
1- 1405. CaITY out or contract for research, development and procu rement
of technical s)'stems and devices relaung to the functions authorized above.
I-I S. Tht DrugEnJ"""""" Adminulrorion. Under the supervision or the Atlomey
General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney Ceneral may establish.
the Adminis trator of DEA shall:
1-1501. Collect, produce and dissem inate inte lligence on the foreign and
domestic aspects of narcotics production and trafficking in coor dinat ion with
other age ncies with rrsponsibilities in these areas ;
1- 1502. Part icipate with the Depa rtmen t of Stale in the oven collect ion of
general foreign political. economic and agricultural infonnation rela ring to
narcotics product ion and trafficking; and
1-1503. Coordinate with the Director or Central Intelligence to ensure
thaI the foreign nar cotic' intelligence activities of DEA are consistent with other
foreign intelligence programs.
SECTION 2
RunlcnONS ON IN"J'I:UJCENCE Acnvmu
2-1. Adhrrmu /0 LAw,
2-10 1. Purpou. Information about the capabili ties, intentions and act ivines
of foreign powers. organizations, or persons and their agents is essential to
informed decisio n-making in the 3fe'31 of natio nal defense and foreign re lat ions.
The measures employed to acqu ire such information shou ld be responsive to
legitimate governmental needs and must be conducted in a manner that
presen-es and respects established concepts of privacy and civil liberties.
2-102. PritKipln oj lnlnprtlalion, Sections 2-201 through 2-309 set fort h
limitations which, in addition to other applicab le laws, are inten ded to achieve
'lDRAL uomn.VOL a. No.1I-lHUWSDAY, JAHU....Y2t,1971
71
THE ' .ES IDENT
the proper balance between protection of individual rights and acquisition of
essenli al information. T hose sections do not authorize any activity not
aUlhorized b)' sections 1- 101 through 1- 1503 and do not provide any exempe
tion from any ot her law.
2-2 . Restrictions on Cn tai" C()IItioTl Techniques.
2- 20 I. (;, nn'ol Provisions.
(a) The activities described in Sect ions 2- 202 through 2-208 shall be
undertaken onl y as permitted by thi s Order and by pro cedures est ablished by
the head of rhe agency concerne d and ap proved by the Attorney Gen eral. These
procedur es shall prot ect constit utional right s and privacy, ensure that informe-
tion is gathere d b)' the least intrusive means possible, and limit use of such
informat ion to Ia....fulgovernmental purposes.
(b) Acuvuies described in sect ions 2- 202 thro ugh 2- 205 for which a warra nt
would be required if und ertaken for law enforcement rath er than inte lligence
purposes shall nOI be undertaken against a United States pe rson witho ut a
judicial warrant, unless the President has authori zed the rrp e of activity involved
and the Attorney Genera l has both approved the particular act ivity and deter-
mined that there is pr obable cause to bel ieve thaI the United Slates pe rson is an
agent of a foreign power .
2- 202 . Electronic Th e CIA may not enga ge in any ele ctronic
surveillan ce within the United Stat es. No agency within the Intelligence Co me
munit y shall engage in any el ectronic surveillance directed against a United
States pers on abroa d or designed to intercept .a communicati on sent from, or
intended for receipt within, the United Stat es except as perm itted by the
pr ocedures establi shed pur suant to section 2-201. Training of personnel by
agen cies in the Intell igence Commnunity in the USe of electronic communica-
tions equ ipment . testing by such agencies of such equ ipment, and the use of
mea sures to determine the existence and capabilit y of electr onic surveillance
equipment being used unl awfully shall not be proh ibited and shall also be
govern ed by such pr ocedu res. Such activities shalJ be limited in scope and
durati on to those necessary to carry out the training , tesling or cou ntermeasures
No informati on de rived from communications intercepted in the
course of such training. resting or use of countermeasures may be- ret ained or
used for any othe r purpose.
2- 203. Camerasand O,hlT Afonitoring. No agency within the Iruelli -
gence Cornmu nu y shall use any electronic or mechanical device surreptitiously
and continuously to monit or any person within the United Slates, or any United
Stares person abroad, except as permitted by the procedures established
pursuanl to Section 2-20 I.
2-204 , Ph,siro! StarcMJ. No agency within the Intell igence Com muni ty
except the FBI may cond uct any unconsented physical searches within the
United Slat es. All such searches conducted by the FBI. as well as all such
searches conducted by any agency within the Intelli gence Community outside
the United States and dire cted agai nst United States pers ons , shall be under-
taken only as permitted by proced ures established pursuant to Section 2-2 0 I.
2- 205. .Mail SlIrwillarrct. No agency within the Intelligence Community
shall open mail or examine envelopes in United States post al channels. except in
accordance with applicable statut es and regul ations, No agency within the
Intelli gen ce Community shall open mail of a United States pers on abroad except
3J permitt ed by proced ures established pursuant to Sect ion 2- 201.
2- 206. PhJJual Survnllance. Th e FBI rna)' conduct physical surveil lance-
directed against Uni ted States persons 0 .- others only in the course of a lawful
invest igation . Oth er agencies within the Intell igence Communit y may not
unde rtake any physical surveillance directed again51 a United pe rsgn
unless: . 1(. "
'lDIL\L alGlm.. VOL a..NO. 11-1HUUDAY .IAIIAn'26,. 1971
72
73
3686 THE'RESIDENT
(;1) The: surveillance is conducted outside- th e Un ited St ates and the pe rs on
bein g surv eilled is reas on abl y bel ieved to be-acti ng on behalf of 3 foreign power,
eng aging in internati onal terrori st acti vities. or engaging in narcotics produclion
or traffi cking;
(b) The surveillance is conducted solely for the: purpose of identifying a
person who is in cont act with someone who is the subject of a foreign
intelligence or counterint elligence investig ation ; or
(e) That person is bein g survei lled for the purpose of prot ecting fore-ign
intelligence and coumerimelhgence sources and methods from unaurhori zed
disclosure or is the subject ofa lawful counterintelligence. personnel. physical or
communications security investigation.
(d) No surveillance under paragraph (c) of this section may be conducte-d
withi n the Unite-d State'S unless the person being surveilled is a present
employee. intelligence agency contractor or employee of such a contractor , or is
a military person employed by a non-intelligence element of a military servi ce.
Outside the United States .such surveillance may also be condu cted against a
former employee. inte-lligence agency contractor or emp loyee of a contractor or
a civilian person employed by a non -intelligence element of an agency within the
Intelligence Community. A person who is in contact with such a presen t or
former employee or contractor may also be surve illed. but only to the extent
necessary to identify that person.
2-207. UMiJ<loMd PartUipatiun i. Domestic Orga.iuliio",. No emplo yees may
join, or otherwise participate in. any organization within the United Stat es on
behalf of any agency within the Intelligence Community without disclosing their
inte lligence affiliation to appropriate officials of the organ ization, excep t as
perm iued by procedures esta blished purs uant to Section 2-20 I . Such pro ce..
dures shall provide for disclosure of such affiliatio n in all cases unless the agency
head or a designee- approved by the Anomey Gen eral finds that non-disclosure
is essential to achieving lawful purposes. and that finding is subj ect to review by
the Att orney General. Those proc edures shall further limit undisclosed partici-
patio n to cas es where :
(a) The participation is undertaken on beha lf of the FBI in the cour se of a
lawful
(b) The organization concerned is composed primarily of indivi duals who
are not United States pers ons and is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf
of a foreign power; or
(c) The panicipation is strictly limited in its nature. scope and duration to
that necessary for other lawful purposes relating to foreign int elligence and is a
type of partic ipation approved by the An omey General and set forth in a public
document . No such participation may be undertaken for the pu rpose of influenc..
ing the activity of the organization or its members.
2-208 . Cdltction of Nunpuhlicl] Availabt. IrifornuzliOJl. No .g.ncy within tbe
Intelligence Community may collect, dissem inate or store information concern-
ing the activities of Sta te'Spersons that is not available pub licly, unless it
don so with their consent or as permitted by procedure'Sestablis hed pursuant to
Section 2-20 I. Those procedures shall limit collect ion, storage or dissemination
to the following types of informa tion:
(a) Information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations
or activities that constitutes foreign intelligence or counterintell igence;
(b ) Information arising out of a lawful counterintelligence or personnel.
physical or communications security invest igat ion;
(c) Information concerning present or former employees, present or fonn er
intelligence agency contract ors or their pre sent or forme r employees, or appli-
canu for any such employmen t or contracting, which is needed (0 protect
foreign intelligence- or coun terintelligence sources or methods from unatnho-
rized disclosu re;
'"DllAI. uomn. VOL co. NO. Il-ntlIISDAY. MNUAaY.f, 1m
THEPRESIDENT
368'
(d) Informatio n need ed solely 10 idennf.. indi..-iduale in con tact with those
pt"U0I15 described in pa ragra ph (c) of this sect ion or with someo ne who is the
SUbJ l ' CI of a lawful foreign intellige nce or r ouruerintelhgenre
Ie) Information concerning person s who are reas o nably believed to be
potential sou rces or cont acts. but onl y for the purpose of de termining the
suitability or c redibility of such prou ons;
(0 I nformation constituting foreign iruetligence or counierintel ligenre
g3thered abr oad or from electronic surveilla nce-conducted in compliance with
Ser non 2-202 or from coo perating source-s in the United States;
(g) Information abo ut a person who is reasonably believed to be acting on
be-half of a foreign power, engaging in internat ional terr orist act ivities or
narcotics produ ction or trafficking. or end angering the safety of a person
protected by the United States Secret Service or the Department of State;
(h) Infor mation acquired by overhead reco nnaissan ce not directed at
spec ific Unite d Sta te'Spenons;
(i ) Information concerning United States persons abroad that is obtained in
response 10 requests from the Depa rtment of Slate for support of its con sular
resp onsibilities rela ting 10 the welfare of those persons;
(j) Informat ion collected. received. disseminated or stored by the FBI and
m:CC' 5)3T)' to ful fill its la"'ful invest igative' resp onaib iluies : or
(ll Information concerning pe-rsons or acri ..-ities that po se a clea r threat to
any facilit) or personnel of an agency within the Intelligence Communily. Such
information may be retained only by the a({C'ncy threatened and, if appropriate.
by the United Slates Sec ret Service an d the FBI.
2-3. Adduional Restrictions and Limnations.
2- 30 I. Tax t nformation. No agency within the Int elligence Community shall
examine tax returns or tax infonnation except as permitted by applicab le law.
2-302. Restrictions on Experimmtation. No agency within the Intelligence
Community shall sponsor. contract for, or conduct research on. human subjects
except i n accordance with gu idelines issued by the Department of Health,
Education and welfare. The subject's infonned con sent shall be documented as
req uir ed by those guid elines.
2-303. Rnlritt101U on ContrOlling. No agency within the Int elligence Com-
munu y shall enter into a contract or arra nge ment for the provi sion of goods or
services with private compan ies or institutions in the United States unless the
agC'ncy spons orsh ip is known to the appropriate officials of the company or
instituti on. In the case of any company or inst ituti on other than an academic
institution, intell igen ce agency sponsorship may be concealed where' it is
det ermined. pursuant to procedures approved by the Anomey General. that
such concealment is necessary to maintain essential cover or proprietary ar -
rangeme-nts for authorized int el ligence purposes.
Restrutions 0. Personnel A"'K"'d IJJ OIAn- Agm<its. An employee
detailed to anothe-r age ncy withi n the fede ral government shall be responsible to
the ho st age ncy and sha ll not report to the parent agency on the affairs of the
host agency unless so di rected by the host agency . The head of the host agency,
and any successor, shall be Informed of the emp loyee's relationship with the
parent agency .
2-305 . Prohibitum orr Auassination. No person employed by or acting on
behalf of the-United Sta tes Gove rnment ;'hatl engage in, or con spire to engage
in, aw asvinat ion.
2- 306. Restrictions 011 Sp'rial Atl;vitin . No component of the United States
Oovem meru excepl an age ncy within the Intell igence Community may conduct
any special act ivity. No suc h agency except the CIA (or the military services in
warnme) rna) conduct any special activity unless the .. etermines, with
"DUAL UGlsna. VOL a. NO. ,a-11fU&SD.AT. JAHUMT 26. 1m
74
THEPRESIDENT
the sec's advice. that another agency is more. likely (0 achieve a particular
objective.
2-307. Restrictions on lndirtft Participation in Prohibit,d Activities. Noagencyof
the Intell igence Community shall req uest or otherwiseencourage, directly or
indirectly,any person.organization,or government agency (0 undert ake artivi-
ties forbidden by this Order or by applicablelaw.
2-308. Restrutitms 0 11Assutanct to LAw Enfurctmnll AulAoritin. Agencieswith-
I .
in the IntelligenceCommuni ty othe-r than the FBI shall not, except as expressly
authorized by law:
(a) Provide services, equipment .personnel or facilities to the LawEnforce-
mmt Assistance Administration (or its agencies) or to state- or local
police organizations ofthe United Stales; or .
(b) Parti cipate in or fund any law enforcement act ivity within the United
States.
2-309. Pnmw iblt Assulanct10lAw En!orcmlt1l1AulhoritUs.. Therestrictionsin
Section 2-308shall no, preclude:
(3) Cooperationwith appropriatelawenforcementagencies for the purpose
of protecting the personneland facilities of any agency within the Intelligence'
Community;
(b) Partic ipation in lawenforcement activities. inaccordance with lawand
this Orde r. to investigate or prevent clandes tine intelligence activitiesby foreign
powers . international na rcotics production and trafficking. or international
terrorist act ivities;or
(c)Provisionofspecializedequipment.technical knowledge.or assistanceof
expert personnel for use by any department or agency or. when lives are
endangered. to support localJawenforcement agencies. Provision of assistance
by expert personnel shall be governed byprocedures approved by the Attorney
General.
2-310. PrrmiJJibk Dissemination a"d Swagt af r"frmnalibn. Nothing in
tiona 2-20 I through 2-309of this Order shall prohibit:
(a) Disseminat ion to appropriate lawenforceme nt agencies of information
which ind icates involvement in activities that may violate federal, state. local or
foreign laws;
(b) Storageof information required bylawto be retained;
(c) Dissendnaucn of information covered by Section 2-208 (a)-(j) ro
agencies within the Intelligence Community or entities of cooperating foreign
governments: or
(d) Lawfulstorageor disseminationof infonnationsolelyfor administrative
purposes not related to intelligenceor security.
SECTION3
OVERSIGHT or INTlLUGENCE ORGANI Z.\ ncxs
3-1. r"tt/ligmct Ovtrfighl BOOTd.
S-101. MtrIlbmhip. The President'. Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB)
shall funct ion within the White House. The ]08 shall have three- members who
.hall be appointed by the President and who shall be from outside 'he
government and be qualified on the basis of ability, knowledge. diversity of
backgroundand experience.No membershall have any personalinterestin any
contractual relationship with any agency within the Intelligence Community.
Onemembershallbe designated by the Presidentas chairman,
3- I 02. Duties. ThelOB shall:
(a) Review periodically the practices and procedures of the Inspectors
General and General Counsel with responsibilities for agencies within the
Intelligence Community for discovering and reporting to the lOB intelligence
"DUAL ltomn, VOL'"NOa-ntUISOAY.JANUAIlY ..m
75
THEPRESIDENT
activities thai raise questionsof legalityor propriety.and considerwritten and
or al repor ts referred underSect ion 3- 20 I;
(b) Revi.ew peri odically foradeq uacy the internal guidelines of each agency
within the Intell igence Communityconcerning the legalityorpropriet y of intelli-
geneeactivities;
(c) Report periodically,3 1 least quart erly, to the Preside nt on its findings;
and report in iii timely manner to the Preside nt any inlelligence activities that
raise serious questionsoflegalityor propri et y;
(d) Forwar d to the Auomey Ge neral, in iii timelymanner. reportsreceived
concerni ng intelligen ce activities inwhich a question of legality has beenraised
or which the l OB bel ieves to involve questionsof1egaJity;and
(e) Conduct such investigations of the intelligence acti vities of agencies
within the Intelligence Community as the Board deems necess ary to carryou tits
functions under thisOrder.
3-103. Rtstri</ign . " Staff. No person who serves on the staff of the lOS
shall have any contractualor employment relati onsh ip with any agency within
the Int elligence Community.
3- 2. Inspectors CtnmJI and Cmeral CoU"' tl. Inspectors General and General
Counsel with responsibility for age ncies within the Int elligence Co mmunity
shall:
3-2 01. T ransmit timely reports to the lOB concern ing an y intelli gence
activities that come to their attention and that raise ques tions oflegal ity or
pr opri ety;
3-202. Promptly report to the JOB actions taken concern ing the Board's
find ing s on int elligence activities that raise questions of legali ty or propri ety;
3-20:i . Prov ide to the l OB infonn at ion req uested concerning the legality
or pr opr iety of intelligen ceactivit ies within their respective agencies;
3- 204. Formulate practices and pr oced ures for discoverin g and report ing
10 the l OB intelligenceactivitiesthatraisequ estionsoflegalityor propriet y; and
3- 205. Report to the lOB anyoccasion on which the Inspec tors Gen eral
or General Counsel were directed not to report anyintelligence activity to the
l OB which they beli eved raised questionsof legalityor propriety.
3-3 . Allo""] General: Th e Attorney Gen eral shall:
3-301. Recei ve andconsiderreportsfromagencieswithinthe Intelligence
Communityforwarded bythe lOB;
3-302. Report to the Presi dent ina timelyfashion anyinte lligenceactivi-
ties which raise questionsoflegal ity.
3-303. Report '0' he l OB and '0 'he President in a timely fashion
deci sionsmadeoractionstakenin response toreport sfromagencieswithin the
Int elligence Community forwarded 10 'he Auorney General by the l OS;
3- 304. Inform the lOB of legal opinions affecting' the ope rations of the
Intelligence Cornmunity:and
3-305. Establish or approve procedures, a. req uired by this Order. for the
conductofintelligence activities.Such procedures shall ens ure compliance with
law, protect constitutional rights and pri.\'3eY, and en sure that any intelligence
act ivity within the United States or directed against any Unit ed St ate s person is
conduc ted by the least intrusive means poss ible. The procedures sha ll also
ensu re that any use. disseminat ion and storage of infonnation about United
State s persons acquired through inte lligence act ivities is limited to tha t neces..
sary to achieve lawfulgovernmental purposes.
3-4 . COllgTtsJional l nk l/igtn! t Committees. Undersuchprocedures asthePres ide- nt
may establish and con sistent with applicable authorities and duties, inc}udi.ng
those conferred by the Constiun ion upon the Executive and
RDIULIRIma.YOL a.NO. .lANU.U'J 2t. 1971
II
I
76
.J690 THE P115IDENT
Branche's and by law(0 protect sources and me thods. the Directorof Centra)
Intelligence and heads of departments and agencies of the United Stales
involved in intelligence activities shall:
5-40 I. Keep the' Pe rmanent Select Comrmnee on Intelligenceof the House
ofRepresentativesand the SelectCommittee- on Int elligence ofthe Senatefully
andcurrentlyinformed concerning intelligence activit ies, including any sig nifi.
cant an ticipated activities which are the responsibilityof. or engaged in, by such
department or agency: This req uirement does not cons titute a condition
precedent to t he implementation of such intelligence activ..ities;
.5-402. Provide any informat ion or document in the possession, custody. or
cont rol ofthe department or agency or person paid by such department or
agency. within the j urisdiction of the Permanent Selec t Committee on In telli-
gence of the Ho use of Representatives or the Select Committee on Inte lligence
ofthe Senate. upon the request ofsuch committee;and
5-403. Report in a timely fashion to the Permanent Select Comrninee on
Intelligence of the Ho use of .Represenratives and the Select Committee on
Intelligenceof the Senateinfonnation relating to intelligenceactivities that are
illega l or improper and correc tiveactions that are taken or planned.
SECTION 4
GI:Nr:RAL PROvJSIONS
4- 1. l .. pkmn!lalum.
4-101. Except as provided in section 4-105 ofthis section, thisOrder shall
supersede Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intell igence Ac rivi-
ties ,' dated February 18, 1976; Execut ive Order 11985, same subjec t. dated
May 13, 1977; and Execu tive Or der 11994, same subject, dated j une I, 1977.
4-102. TheNSC, the Secretary of Defense, the Au orneyGenerel and the
Dire-ctor of Central Int elligence shall issue such app ropriate directives and
procedures as are necessary to implement this Order.
4-1 03. Heads of age ncies within the Intelligence Communit y shall issue
app ropriate supp lementary directives and proced ures con sistent with this
Order.
4-104. TheAttorneyGeneral shall have sole authority to issue and revise
procedures required by section 2-201for the activities of me FBI relating [0
for eign int elligence and cou nteri ntelligence.
\ VhC' rC' intelligence acti,.. ities under this Order are to be cond ucted
pursuant to proced ures approved or agreed to by the AllomeyGeneral, those
activities may be conducted under terms and conditions ofExecutive Order
11905and any procedures pr omulgated thereunder until such Att orne yGeneral
procedures are established. Such Anorney General procedures be estab-
lished as expeditiously as possi ble after the issuance of this Order .
4-106. In some instances. the documents that impl ement this Orderwill
be classified becaus e of the sensitivity of the informati on and its relation to
national security. All instructions contained in classi fied document s will be
consi stent with thi s Order .All proc ed ures promulga ted pursuant to th is Orde r
will be made available 10 the Co ngre ssional intelligence commiuees in accor-
dance with Section 3-402.
4-107. Unle.. otherwise speci fied, tho provisions orthi. Order sha llapply
to activities both within and outside the United States,and all refe rences to law
areto applicable laws of the United States, including the Constitution and th is
Order.Nothingin thi,Ordershall be construedtoapply to or interfere withany
authorized civil or criminal law enforcementresponsibilityof any departmentor
ag<ney.
4-2. /Nfl.ili."" For rbe purposesoflhi. Order, tho following termhall have
theseme-anings'
fl DIRA1l1G1ml,VOL 41, NO. lI-THUISDAY,.lAHUAIY 26, 197'
77
THE PaESIDENT 3691
4-20I. Communications s.rcun'tJ means protective measures taken to deny
unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications of the
Uni ted Sla tes Government rela ted to na tiona l security and to ensure the
authenticity ofsuch telecommunications.
4-202 . CounlninblJigmlt means information gathered and activities con-
duc ted to protect agains t espionage and other clandestineintelligenceactivities.
sabotage, international terroristactivities or assassinations conductedfor oron
behalf of foreign powers,organiutionsor persons.but notincludingpersonnel,
physical. document, or communications securi typrograms.
4 -2 03. ElectronicSUTVtukmu meansacquisition ofa nonpubliccommunica-
tion b)' electronic means without the consentofa person who isa party to an
electronic communication or , in the case of a nonelectronic communication,
witho ut the consentofill personwho isvisiblypresentat the place ofcommuni-
cation. but not including the use of radiodirection find ing equipment solelyto
determine the location of ill transmi tter.
4-204. Emplo}tr meansapersonemployedby,assignedto, oracting for an
agency within the- Intell igence Community.
4-205. Forrign Inullignzlt me-ans information relating to the capabilities,
intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not
including couruerimelligence except for information on international terrorist
activities.
4-206 . Intel/igma means foreign intelligenceand counterintelligence.
4- 207, l . 't llig", ,, CommuniIJ and Q/{"''J or Q/{tncin wi/hi. /ht InuUigtrltt
Commtl.llit, refer to the following organizations:.
(a) TheCentral ImelligenceAg<ney'(CIA);
(b) TheNat ionalSecurityAgency (NSA):
(c) The Defense Int elligence Ag<ncy;
(d) The Offices withi n the Depa rt ment of Defense for me col lection of
specializ ed national foreign intelligence through reconnaissanceprograms;
(c) TheBurea u of Intell igence and Research of the Depart me nt of Slate;
(0 Th eintelligence elements of the military services,the FederalBureau of
Investigation (FBI),the Department of the Treas ury, the Department of Energy,
and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA);and
(g) 'The starr elementsof the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence.
4-20tt. InttlJigmct produd means the es timates, memoranda and other
reports produced from the analys isofavailable info rmation.
4-209. InltrTJalionaJ trmmst activitin means any activity or activitieswhich:
(a) involves killing. causing seri ous bodily harm, kidnapping. or violent
destruction of propert y. or an attempt or credible threat to com mit such aCII;
a.d
(b) appears intended ( 0 endanger a protectee ofthe SecretService or the
Depar tment of Sta te or to furt her political, social or economic goals by
int imidat ing or coercing a civilian pop ulation or any segmen t thereof, influe nc-
ing the policyof a government or internationalorganization by intimidation or
coe rcion, or ob taining widesprea d publicity for a group or its cause; and
(c) transcends national boundaries in terms of the means by which it is
accomplished, the civilian pop ulat ion, government, or internationa l organiza-
tion it appears intended 10 coerce or inti midate. or the locale in which its
perpetrators operate or seek asyl um.
4-210, Tilt .\'DlUmaJ ForrilJ'l InltIlIK"''' ine1ude. the program. Iined
below. but its composition shall be subject 10 review by the Nat ional Sec uriw
Counciland modification by (he President.
(a) 111<program. ofthe CIA;
(b) The Consolidated Cryprologir Program, the General Defense Imelli-
gen re Program, and the programs of the offices within the .. ( of
H DRAlllOfSTH, VOL a.NO. ll-THUI$DAY, "AHUAlY 26. 1'"
II
78
3692 THE'RESIDENT
Defense for the collect ion of specia lized na tional foreign intelli gence th rough
reco nnaissance exceptsuch el ementsasthe-Direct orofCe ntra l Iruetl igence and
the Secretary of Defense agTf:'t' sho uld be exc lude d:
( c) Othe r progra ms of agencies within the Intelli gence Commu nity deaig-
nated j ointl y by the Dir ector of Ce ntra l Inte lligence an d the hea d of the
departmentorbythe Pr esident as nat iona lForeignintelligen ce or coumerint elli-
ge nce act ivities :
(d) Activities of the staffelements o f the Office of the [\jrt"cl orofCent ral
Intelligence.
( e) Activities to acquire the inte lligence required for the plan ning and
conduct of tact ical operations by the- United Stat es military for ces ar e no t
included in the Nationa l Foreign Int ellige nce'Progra m.
4-2 11. Physical surveillance means an unconsen u-d,systematic a nd deliber -
at e obser-vation of a person by any means on a continuing bas is, or un con semed
acqui sition of a nonpublic commun icati on by a pe rson not a pa rt y ther et o o r
..isibly pTe'sen t thereat th rough any means no t involving elect ronic survei llance.
This defi nition does not inclu de overhead reconnaissance no t dir ec ted at
spe cificUnit ed States perso ns.
4-21 2. SP(w! aetit,;t;, s means activities con ducted abroad in sup po rt of
na tional foreign policy obj ec tives whi ch are desi gne d to fur ther official United
Stares progra ms an d policies abroa d and which are planned and executed so
that the' ra te of the Uni ted States Oovem rnem is no t app arent or ackno wled ged
publi cly. and functions insup port of suchactivities,b UI not including diplo matic
ac tivity or the coll ect ion and production of int ell igence or re lated support
functions.
4- 213. Tni trd States. when used to describe 3 place, includesthe te rritories
of the Unit ed Slate s.
4- 214. l.'nittd States pen on mea ns a citizen ofthe Uni ted States, an alien
lawful lyadmined for permanent resi dence,an unincorporated association orga
nized in the United Slates or subs tantially composed of United St ares citizens or
aliens admit ted for perma nent res idence, or a corp ora tion incorpor ated in the
United St al es.
27
cZL
T HE \ VHIT E H OUSE,
J anuary 24, 1978.
(FR Doc. 78- 2-420 Filed 1- 2'5- 78;11: 12amI

flDlIA1IEGKn..VOL 43,NO. ll-THUISDAY,JANUARY26,1971
I
I
79
Chairman STOKES. The Chair re cognizes the gentleman from In-
d'a
na
Mr .Fithian.
IMr.'FITHIAN. I will give you one of my minutes t o pursue it if
ou want to.
YMr.FAUNTROY.I will getiton the nextround.
Mr.FITHIAN.Thankyou, Mr .Carlucci,for coming today.
Wehad some reason to believe thatthe cooperation between the
Agency and t he Warren Commission was not as complete as it
might have been in terms of the transmittal of information, and I
would like to pursue some of the questions that have been asked
here in a general sense, butI would like to pursue specifically the
uestion of what kind of guidelines, et cetera, do you have or
ihould we legislate-thatis a possibility-toinsure thetransmittal
ofall relevant information, eitherto the FBI, iftheyaredoing the
invest igat ion, or as in the case of the Warren Commission when
they were doing the complete review of the assassination of Presi-
dent Kennedy. What would you recommend if you were either
writing the guidelines for the Agency or if you were legi slating
actions?
Mr. CARLUCCI. The CIA, of course, functions pursuant to Presi-
dential direct ion andworks through the Nat ional SecurityCouncil.
Should t here be another assassination and the type of commission
set up similar to the Warren Commission we would obviously take
ourinst ruct ions from thePresidentand National Security Council.
Icannot conceive, once again, of circumstances in this day and age
where we would be less than totally forthcoming with information
tobe given to such a commission. We would, of course, indicate to
the commission,justas we haveindicatedto thiscommittee,where
sensitive sources and methods are involved and where the release
ofthe informat ion could cause us serious damage, butfrankly it is
beyond my capacit y to conceiveof us notcooperat ing.
Mr. FITHIAN. I am sure, ifhad there been some type of commit-
teemade up of memberslikeourselves priorto theassassination of
Kennedy and they had talked with someone from the
gency, and the question had been asked as I just asked it, the
answer woul d have been almost the same. That is, that "We will
Aoperate ,of course, fully,andwe workwith the National Security
,gency," or "We work underthedirection of thePresident." Yetit
IS in the case of theattemptson PremierCastro, information
: ich would have been relevant certainly to the Warren Commis-
t
10n
, was not transmitted. I am at somewhat of a"loss, like the
who never fixed his roof when itwas rainingbecause it was
h
0
dE!- good time to work on the roof, and when itwas dry weather
e id notneed t o repairtheroof.
arI am not comfortable-maybe other members of the committee
tre- t h.at .we have a system which insuresthe kind of remittingor
agansmlttmg of information to the appropriate investigative
CIA.
ncy,
Whether the Warren Commission or the FBI, of things in
ofthfiles which do relate very specifically to andshould be a part
Ite whole investigativeprocess.
lin Was t hatthatprompted my question aboutwhatspecificguide-
bires would you recommend, or , if you were writing them for the
or if. he .were on this side of the desk and you were
mg the legislation, I would be interested in what kind of legis-
80 81
lative mandate it woul d t ake to assure t hatthis was done and ifit
werenot donesomeone wouldbe punished.
Mr. CARLUCCI. If I may come at your question from a slightly
different direct ion, Congressman, I think there have been a
number of things that have been done which create t he ki nd of
climate where as I sai d it is inconceivable that the events of that
time could repeat themselves.In t he firs t placetheExecutive order
I i
has a very clear prohibition against plotting assassinat ions, but
thatis a bitbesidet he point.
Second, we have much clearer and much more direct Presiden_
tial and congressional oversight, and any kind of activit ies such as
took place with regard to Cuba in the 1960's would be known to
and signed out under a formal finding by the President. There
would be some seven committees of Congress briefed under the
Hughes-Ryan amendme nt.
There is a new Executive order which I mentioned. There are
orders out throughout the Agency t o report any wrongdoing or
impropriety both to t he Director, to t he General Counsel, or t he
InspectorGene ral.
The Presidenthasset up an Intelligence OversightBoard t otally
independent of t he Agency, report ing directly t o hi m, who can
receive anonymously ifrequired any complaints of imp ropri ety or
illegality. There are grievance and dissent mechanisms that exist
now t hat did notexi stbefore.
There is a whole series of managerial cont rols which I think are
very important, since what tends to happen in an intelligence
organization is t hat information is compartmented, andone part of
t he organizati on for security reasons does not always know what
another part is doing.
I think with all t hese changes it woul d be virtually impossible
for information or act ivity being conducted by one part of the
organization not t o come to t he attention of those responsibl e for
providing information to a commission like the Warren Commis-
sion, on the ot her hand.
Mr. FITHIAN. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for one addi-
tional kindofquestion, Mr. Chairman.
As one who does want a st rong intelligence-gat hering agency,
andas one who does believethat therearecertainthingsthathave
to be keptsecret-and I did some work in the military in this line
and I am fully aware of that-Iam still bothered by the fact t hat
despite all of the evolution of change that has taken place in t he
Agency since t he assassinat ion of Presi dent Kennedy and despite
what I think has been generallygood cooperation from theAgency
with our staff and with our committee-and I commend you
that-we still have examples- and I will j ust cite one-now this
was not t he area where we want to talk about policy, but I t hink
this is anexampleofpolicybreakdown.
When Mr. Hartcame overto test ify before the committee, all of
t he executive memoranda, agreements, discussions, and so on had
taken place, clearly. Some j ust looked at the file and said "The
I Assassinations Committee hadnegotiated with theCIA on all t hesj
matters," and no one questioned what Mr . Hart had t o say. It al
I looked good on paper. Except that your agency sent a person over
re who expressly would notdiscuss theonly issuewe were inter-
h
e
ted
in: Lee Harvey Oswald. And said so. Plainly and flat out.
eSI am t rying hard to squarewhatI understand is thebasic guide-
r es t hat you operateby, with anassurance that we can have this
of healt hy relationship between Congress and the CIA which
. so necessary and yet, sir, is so impaired by actions like Mr.
Hart' s test imony before this committee. And that is why I am
king for t he veryspecific questions on guidelines.
as
l
donot know whetheryou hadanythingto do wit h theselection
of sending Mr. Hartdown here. I would presume, accordingto your
recent test imony here, t hat since the Agency is now thus integrat-
ed as Deputy Director it certainly would not have passed you by.
Mr.CARLUCCI.Thatis correct.
Mr. FITHIAN. I guess what I am still groping for is, how do we
assure that the reality is as the perception, and that we are not
dealing wit h two different worlds. We have a real world with
certai n kind of action and a bureaucratic world which says "Do
thus and sowhenassassinationscome along. "
Mr. CARLUCCI. We must bear in mind, Mr . Hart testified in
public session. We have had extensive dialog with the committee
onclassified information.
I think our record in providing information not only to this
committee but to our authorizing committees, the two select com-
mittees,hasestablishedthe fact thatwe arenottryingto withhold
informat ion. To the contrary, we are very forthcoming, but we do
point out where the information is of such a sensitive nature that
it could jeopardize sources and methods, includinglives. In several
instances where that has occurred with this committee I have
talked to thechair man- -
Mr. FITHIAN. I understand all that. I was just citing the Hart
casevery briefly where this, in my judgment, clearly broke down.
AndI do not think it is adequate to reflect thatthis is somehow of
aclassified nature. I think someone comingdown here and talking
wLeelth us as to what theirbestassessment was as to whether or not
Harvey Oswald was thekind of persontheRussianKGB would
have interviewed had he been in Russia is. very much to the point.
Mr. CARLUCCI. That was not made dear to me. Perhaps we
should have provided anotherwitness for thataspectof thecase.It
whsmy understanding that Mr. Hart's testimony was to focus on
W atknowledge Mr. Nosenkomighthavehad. ... '
FITHIAN. You will remember there was a very'lengthy de-
memorandum from the committee that went over and Mr.
i art was going to respond very specifically to the
SSUes raised in t hat memorandum. We all came into the commit-
that day assuming that was going to be the scenario only to
we might as well have been talking to somebody from
thMr.CAR.LUCCI.I would be glad to sendsomebody up to talkabout
fa: Issues ifwe did not coverthe issues fully, and I apologize
tl
'Mr. FITHIAN, Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no other ques-
ons.
STOKES. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
e.
82 83
Thegen tlemanfrom Connecticut ,Mr .Dodd.
Mr. DODD. Thankyou,Mr .Chairman.
Mr .Carlucci, t hank you for beingup here.
I just have a couple of questions. I t hink all of us here recognize
we are talki ng about things t hat occurred in t he past . Except for
the fact t hat some of t he practices may be in operat ion t oday, We
are generally asking you t o share with us your thoughts on what
I:
mi ght be done to at least minimize t he possibility of certain short.
comings occurring again.
I would like to focus my attent ion, if I could, on the Nosenko
sit uat ion. It seems t o have generated a tremendous amount of
debateand discussionon how thatcase was handled.
I see t hree areas, but there may be more t hat you might be able
t oaddressyourremar ks to.
One had to do wit h the question of the handling of Nosenko
from thetimethathe defected through theperiod atwhich he
finally released,given a changeof identity,andso forth.
We have received testimony that was shocking to say t he very
least. I think that would be a mild wayto describe it. Others have
suggested it was not quite as bad as we were told it was . But,
whatever the degree of mishandling in the past, I would now like
to askyou about the present operatingprocedures. How would t he
agency now handle a defector of the Nosenko type, with regard to
interrogat ion,anddeterminingwhetherthedefector is bonafide or
dispatched? Is therea systemtodaythatwould handle the Nosenko
casedifferentlyin 1978 thanhow it was handled in 1974?
Mr. CARLUCCI. There is a directive out dated February 1967
which deals with the handling of defectors which lays out in some
considerable detail the procedures to be followed . Among t hose are
t imely status reports covering the defector's physical wellbeing,
psychological and adjustment problems and the like, which are
directed directly to the top management of the operation, t he Di-
rect orate, and to the Director and myself. And I can testify from
experience since I have been in the Agency that the repo rts that
come up on defectors are very frequent.
I can recall receiving reports certainly every other day on some
recent defect ors. And we, of course, are legally bound to take any
cor rect ive act ion should t he re be inappropri ate handling of the
defectors, to report any violati ons of law t o the intelligence over-
sight board and t otheauthorizing committees on theHill.
I ;
Also, the procedure for handling defect ors now is through a task
force operati on. There is an interagency committee that needs to
decide on the general policies for handling defectors, and t he
of thatcommittee reportsdirectlyto the Direct or ofCent ral Intelh-
.
Finally, the members of the different components of t he intelh-
gence community have their requirements, and all have access at
the appropriate moment t o the defector . So it woul d be virtuallY
impossible for the kind of sit uat ion thatexisted in the case of Mr.
Nosenko to be recreated. The Director in particular has been suffi-
cientl y concerned about this so t hat he gave instructions
afte r his arrival that our midcareer and senior employees in thefr
training courses should be made acquainted with whatoccurred In
theNosenkocaseto be surethereareno repetitions .
We have also enlargedandexpanded theauthorityofourorgani-
tion wit h inspections, and as I indicated earlierany employee in
can report any impropriet y or wrongdoingto anyoneof three
a le wit hin the Agency or to the Intelligence Oversight Board
peJide t he Agency, or, if they desire, to ouroversight subcommit-
oU
e
SO I t hink therearea goodly numberofchecksandbalancesto
a repetition ofthisunfortunateepisode.
pMr. DODD. I think you anticipated, in your response to my first
ues
tion
, my second question. Namely, who had jurisdiction over
Mr Nosenko with regard to any evidence he might have brought
forth to theWarrenCommission on Oswald and hisstayin Russia.
We have had the CIA saying thatthey had in fact turnedNosenko
overto t he FBI and coming and saying "Hewas not
our pri nCIpal responsibility, because It mvolved an external oper-
ation and not an internal operation." As a resultof that inconsis-
tency it appears that the Commission had less than the best evi-
dencewith regard to theNosenko testimony. In answeringmy first
question did you respond thatthatshouldnotnow occur?
Mr.CARLUCCI.It should not. The Directorof Central Intelligence
has fundamental responsibility for debriefing-the handling and
debriefing of defectors. We of course turn to the FBI for their
protect ion, and where they might have counterintelligence infor-
mation- infor mat ion on activities of Americans-we would, of
course,make themavailableto theFBI for debriefing.
Mr. DODD. This has been alluded to in several of the questions
from commit tee members here. Let me just ask it this way. As I
understand it from what you are telling me this would not neces-
sarily require any kind of triggering mechanism. In the past we
have heard from a variety of the agencies in the intelligence com-
munity that unless you ask the right question you do not get the
right answer . Here, itwould not take the FBI asking the CIA the
right quest ions, but rather, once the Agency was aware that cer-
tain infor mat ion belonged properly in the domain of the FBI, that
w?uld OCcur . It would not take the Director of the FBI asking the
DIrector oft he CIA for thatinformation.
Mr.CARLUCCI.Thatwouldoccur. .
Defect ing is a traumatic experience. Newly defected people are
somet imes in an unstable condition. We have them examined by
OUr psychiat rists and we have to make a judgmentwhen they are
for a communitywide briefing, but in my experience
at has only taken a matter of a week or 2 weeks,'somet imes 3
weu
ks
, unt il they are made available to the ent ire community.
Be sually the FBI is brought in at a very early point in time.
telfi
use
of the importance and the perishability of the counterin-
lgence information they might bring, we do bring the FBI in
e
ar ls.
to The last partof this is a bit more specific. It al so has
rni 0 with Mr . Nosenko. Mr. Hart testified that Mr. Nosenko's
wlnd was for a variety of reasons not in good shape, his memory
ques t ionable. I will speak personally here. It led this member,
of )\fay, to believe thatt here was some question as to the efficacy
as' r . Nosenko's testimony in a variety of different areas, or
isSlstance t o the Agency. Yet we have a sit uat ion today where he
on salary or atleaston a fee basisofsome kindwith theAgency.
84 85
Are you in the Agency satisfied that Mr . Nosenko is worth the
$35,OOO-plus, whatever he receives as a salary, in his consult ant
basis or whatever relationship exists? Is he useful as an emploYee
oftheAgency?
Mr . CARLUCCI. Without prejudice to the salary-and I do not
remember how much we are paying him-the answer to that is
yes . He obviously has limitations in terms of the kinds of infon
na.
tion he can provide us with.His experience now is manyyears Out
of date, but he has been our highest rankingKGB defector and he
is able to convey to CIA employees a sense of the atmosphere t hat
exists, some of the techniques thatthe KGB uses, and we find t his
valuable. He gives us a service that we request him to give. This
does not mean he is in a policymaking position in the Agency Or
anythinglikethat.He servesas a consultant.
Mr. DODD. My lastquestion is this. On page 7 of yourstatement
in the second paragraph you say, "All of our people are inst r ucted
to be alert t o assassination plots, and any CIA officer who learns
thata planexistswill reportit immediately,"andso forth.
I presumeyou are familiar with the presentst at ute having to do
with assassination plots. As I understand thestatute, explaining it
in layman's terms withouttryingto recite this thingverbatim,ifa
person assassinateda foreign leader, notin thatparticularleader's
own country, we would have jurisdiction in this country to arrest
and try that person, assuming the alleged assassin were in this
country. If the same person assassinated a leader of a foreign
country in the foreign leader's own country, t hen under our pres-
ent Federal statutes we have no jurisdiction to prosecute that
individual. Is thata fairsynopsisofthatstatute?
Mr. CARLUCCI. Congressman Dodd, you areovermy head.
Mr .DODD.Thisis 18U.S.C.1116.
Mr. CARLUCCI. PerhapsI shouldconsultcounsel, here.
Mr. DODD. Do you have t he right statute, the 18 U.S.C. 1116,
"Murder or manslaughter of foreign officials, official guests or
internationallyprotected persons"?
It starts out in section A, "Whoever kills or attempts to kill a
foreign official, that person shall be punished" and so forth, and
then it goes on and it defines an internationally protected parson
as a chief ofstateor a politi cal equivalent, wheneversuch personIS
in a countryotherthanhis own or herown.
And thengoingdown to paragraph(c)it says "Ifthevictim ofan
offense under subsection A is an internationally protected person
the United States may exercisejurisdiction over the offense if t he
alleged offender is present in the United States irrespective of t he
place where the offense were committed or the nationality of the
victimor alleged defender."
Mr.CARLUCCI. Doyou wantto repeatyourquestion? .
Mr. DODD. My question is, do you think we should plug up th.
1S
loophole? It seems to me that we have here a situation where In
our Federal courts we can prosecute a person in this country, whO
is physically in this country who had assassinated or attempted
assassinate a foreign dictator, provided thatdictatorwas not in hIS
or herown country.
In other words. if Fidel Castro were in London and he were
assassinated and the assassin was found in New York, we could
secute thatperson in New York. If FidelCastrowereassassinat-
PI'Oin Havana and that person came into t his country we have no
overthatperson to prosecute him in theUnitedStates.
JUMr. CARLUCCI. That would seem to be a question more appropri-
tely directed to the Departmentof Justice, butI would be glad to
ourpeople examine it and submit something for the record. I
hesitate toanswera legalquestion likethat.
Mr.DODD.Wouldyou takea look att hat for me?
Mr.CARLUCCI.Yes, sir.
Mr. DODD. I realize it is something the Justice Department
should look at , but since it involves internationally protected per-
sonsit seems to be an area where the CIA would become involved
toone extent or another. I would appreciate an assessment of that
statute in ter ms of t he possibility of a loophole. I am not stating
this as a conclusion on my own, but it occurs to me that way.
Mr. CARLUCCI.We will be glad to examine it and putsomething
inthe record.
[Theinformat ion follows:]

CcntrJllnldhgcncc

J anuary 22, 1979
Honorable Louis Stokes, Cha ir man
Select Committ ee on As s as s i na t i ons
House of Repr es ent at i ves
Washington, D.C. 20515
Honorable Chr ist opher J. Do dd
HOuse of Repre sen ta t i ves
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Sir s:
m . Dur i ng my appearan ce be f ore your Commit t ee on .11 December ,
Vl ew was so l i cit ed concerni ng t he
wh U. S. C. 1116 so t ha t i t woul d be appli ca bl e i n inst ances
is
en
a f or e i gn l eader i s ass ass i nated, and t he a ll eged offe nder
apprehend ed wi t hin th e Uni t ed St ate s .
bro I know of no r ea so n'why th i s st at ut e s houl d not be
de,ad ened i n the ma nne r s uggest ed . Howe ver , I r es pectf ully
comer t o the Depar t ment of J us t i ce concern i ng any i n- dep th
menta r y conc e r ni ng t hi s provi s i on.
Sins e.. .e ly, _
/ p/ / /
(/' ((;:(,(;....- .
-;/ RANK C. CARLUCCI
/
86
Chairman STOKES. Thegentleman from Connectic ut , Mr. MCRin.
ney.
Mr. McKINNEY. No questions.
Chairman STOKES. The gent leman from Nort h Carolina, 1\'11'
Preyer. .
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Chairman, perhaps t hisis more in the natureof
a comment or twocomments.
One,on yourstatementthat you have entered intoanagreement
wit h theSecret Servi ce relat ing t o procedures used in transmit ting
information between your t wo agencies, I think t hat is a very
forward step and I woul d hope t hat t he same t hi ng could be done
and t hat you will think about doing it with the State Department
and theFBI .
Going back to Mr . Fi thian's rain-on-the-roof analogy, it does
seem it is a lot bettert o workt hese things out when you arenot in
a crisis at mosphere, rathert han once somet hi ng happens.
The ot her point I was glad to hear about was you r statement
that t he compartmentalization in the interests of secu ri ty in the
CIA has been apparently broken down t o some extent . Excessive
compar t mentalization seems t o be one of t he reasons we got into
the Nosenko problem, where a small group holds t hatinstallation
closely.
And also where you have successful compartmentalization you
cannotdo what Mr. Faunt roy was talki ng about , use the taskforce
approach, where you can draw on all the different relevant pieces
of expertise in your Agency. I think t hat is a very forward step,
t hatyou have broken that down.
Let me as k if, in breaking it down, do you feel you had to
compromi se securityin any way?
Mr. CARLUCCI. It is a difficult quest ion t o answer, J udge. It isa
question of balancing equiti es. To t he degree that you make infor-
mation more available t hroughout theAgency,you do increase the
risk of compromise. On t he other hand, I feel very strongly and 1
know t he Director does, that we have an overall management
responsi bili ty, and that requires us to see that one part of the
Agency is working in cooperationwithanot her partof theAgency,
and t hat means making information more re adily available. It
means setting upcommon systems.
We stillhavea numberofdifferentfilingsystemst hroughout the
Agency. I think there are as many as 23 different systems thatwe
have to search through for Freedom of Information Act requests,
for example. There is, I think it is fair to say, a much broader
exchange of informati on throughout t he Agency, pa rticularly at
senior levels, than there ever has been in t he history of the
Agency, and the Director and I are working hard t o see that
exchange is increasi ngly effective and increasingly translated Into
improved management.
Mr. PREYER. I congratulateyou on that.
Thankyou, Mr. Chairman.
ChairmanSTOKES. Thankyou.
The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Faunt roY'
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thankyou, Mr.Chairman. e
I would like now to solicit your response to questions which W
tenderedearliertoday to theFBI Director.
87
1964 the President created the Warren Commission to look
. Int he President Kennedy assassination, and in effect it shifted
onUS ofdecisionmakingin conductingan investigationfrom the
t
etice Department , from the FBI to the Commission. My question
J
.US
do
you think that a similar agency should be created in the
IS .. d?
f 'ture or comrmssione .
UMr 'CARLUCCI.I would think thatwould depend very much upon
e circumstances. If the assassin survived you would obviously
the quest ion of protectinghis interestsin a trial, and I do not
knoW how much the Commission would prejudice his interests in
thetri al.
Should we have a situation such as existed after the assassina-
tion of President Kennedy? I would certainly have no problems
with the t he Commission approach. All agencies of Government
should be directed to cooperatefully with itandprovide itwith all
necessary information. I think the matteris sufficiently important
that it should be delved intoby impartialexperts.
Mr.FAUNTROY. Letus take a look atanotherway of handlingit.
ThePresident recently signed legislation authorizing the appoint-
mentofa special prosecutorin certain mattersinvolvingtheinteg-
rity of the President and related officials. Should this type of
legislat ion be extended at least to Presidential assassinations, in
yourjudgment?
Mr. CARLUCCI. Congressman Fauntroy, I am not a lawyer and
have not had much experience with prosecutors. My own personal
reaction is that the Warren-type commission group is more appro-
priate. I t hink it gives you a broadersetting, itgives more flexibil-
ityin terms of whatyou cango into with theagencies, andI think
you can enjoy broad credibility. We have had some success with
special pr osecut ors,butI thinkthatcanbe overdone.
Mr.FAUNTROY.Thankyou, Mr. Carlucci.
Chairman STOKES. Thegentlemanyields the balance of his time.
Thegentleman from Indiana,Mr.Fithian.
Mr.FITHIAN.Thankyou, Mr.Chairman.
Mr. Hartsuggested thatwe not believe Nosenko, basically, with
to the Oswald story. Particularly,.he said it was incredible
RCmnot true because he did not believe, as a CIA person, thatthe
would nothaveinterviewedOswald.
y Myquestion is simplythis. As an official of the Agency, whatdo
;:u recommend this committee do with regard to Nosenko's testi-
ony?Should we believe it or shouldwe notbelieveit?
wJhell; if you care to comment, if we should not believe that,
ISofcourse whatthiscommitteeis all about,thenshouldwe
leveanything elsehehadto say?
twMr. Sir, Mr. Hart's testimony made a distinction be-
U
hlS.
testimony on this particular aspect of his life in the
Ir rnon andothermatterson whichNosenkotestified.
cent indicated, if I remember correctly, that this was not a
tio
n
ra; feature of the interrogation process. In fact, the interroga-
Peo process was designed to expose him as a double agent, and
at that point in time at least were not terribly concerned
It .e Oswaldtravelsto theSovietUnion perse.
gati hlllk Mr. Hartalso indicated thatatthe outset of the investi-
on there were certain translation problems, certain physical
88
89
problems that Mr . Nosenko had, and that in the light of all of this
he would be inclined to discount the specifics of his testimony On
Oswald.
I do not think that t his calls into challenge the credibility of
everything else Mr. Nosenko said. In fact as Mr . Hart indicated he
did provide the Agency with some very valuable information, info
r
.
mation that turned out to be correct.
Finally, as I indicated, his services to the Agency, today, are
generally describing the at mosphere and general techniques t hat
are used by the CIA, and do not get into specific quest ions.
Mr. FITHIAN. I am troubled a bit more by one part of t hat
comment, I guess, than I was when I started out on this quest
Perhaps we see the whol e issue of assassinations as somet hing
more than a narrow focus, because that is the main purpose of the
committee, but I would argue the case historically that when t hey
were firs t interrogating Mr . Nosenko, whe n the Warren Commis.
sion was operating, that the request for all the facts surrounding
the President of the United States would have been ext raordinarily
important, and therefore could reasonably be expected if t he CIA
was on the ball to be a very, very important question as to whether
or not the person who has just been killed himself and who had
previously been the chief suspect of having killed the President,
that what he did or did not do in Russia would be a terribly
important thing to the CIA.
Therefore, I could not pass it off as being not as important as
some of the other things you are going t o tell us, unless I am to
agree that in your methods, your process and your sources are
more important than the assassination of the President of the
United States. That woul d bot her me deeply if we were t o close out
the investigation on that note.
Mr . CARLUCCI. If I may clarify, I think I was describing Mr.
Hart' s testimony to you, and I believe he was describing a factual
situation. I was certainly not passing judgment or giving ap proval
in any sense to the way Mr. Nosenko was inte r rogated or handled.
Mr. FITHIAN. I was not referring t o the way he was handled,
either, in terms of the focus. I am just trying to focus in on the
impor tance to t he count ry of t he individual s that the CIA had In
its hands at the time.
Mr. CARLUCCI. I would not disagree with you. I suppose if I
been making the interrogation and happened to have the expert
1s
d
necessary to do that, I would have liked to be able to say I woul
put more emphasis on t he Oswald quest ion, but I think the facts of
the matter are that those in charge of the interrogation at t hat
time did not put that much emphasis on it .
Mr. FITHIAN. One further qui ck question, Mr. Chairman, and
then I will subside.
What I am trying to get at is whether or not the philosophY
the CIA has changed basically from 1964 to 1978, and that is
Is the protection of a source more important , in that case and
future cases, than any possible assassinations of the Presiden;.
When it comes down to a real crunch it is more important 0
protect that source than it is to cooperate with the Warren
mission who is trying to get at the story of the killing in t
United States.
l\1r CARLUCCI. I don't know that you can give a categorical
t o the protection of sources, but let me indicate to you quite
ar
s
rly t hat there have been instances where we picked up infor-
c on potential violence, and in order to protect people we
a
ll1
ve
put a source in jeopardy.
hayOU have to weigh the merits in every case, and in the case of
e Warren Commission I don 't know that people were protecting
thurces. My understanding is that the information on Cuban activi-
was not provided simply because people didn't make the link-
a e between the two.
gI don' t know. I was not around, but I don 't know that it was done
to protect sources. Certainly, as I indicated to you earlier, we would
make every effort to turn over all information to the Warren
Commission, and in many cases to conduct an investigation you
don't need to know the source if you have the information.
That is one of t he fundamental principles of intell igence, why we
put out intelligence reports in such a way that we give out the
information yet withhold the source. Where it became important
for such a Commission to know the source and were the source to
be in a sensit ive position, my judgment is that in all likelihood we
would probably tell them but request that the source be protected.
They could then protect the source and base their judgments
with some confidence on the information that they receive from
the source. So the answer is that we would certainly be as forth-
coming as possible, recognizing that in some instances you really
may be put t ing people's lives in danger, and you have to make a
judgment call in each one of these instances.
Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. DODD. Mr. Chairman?
Chair man STOKES. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.
.M:. DODD. I would like to follow up on that same line that Mr.
FIthIan raised and, without in any way at all encroaching upon
may be security matters, there was at a time of the assassina-
or short ly thereafter, a photograph of .an individual who was
ongInally identified as Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico.
t tbseqUent ly, the identification of the individual turned out not
Lee Harvey Oswald, but over the past 12 or 13 years there
M been all sorts of speculation as to who that individual was in
exlCo at t he time.
thaTto . knowledge, has the Agency ever been able to identify
IndIVIdual?
Mr. CARLUCCI. No, sir; we have not.
caMr. DODD. The reason I raise it is that it falls into the same
tiotegory as Mr. Fithian's question with regard to the whole ques-
t of.sources and information.
CUr' thInk you adequately responded to his question, but I was
MOlls as to that specific piece of evidence.
Mr. CARLUCCI. No, we have not been able to ident ify that person.
T r. DODD. Thank you.
Cha!lk you, Mr. Chairman.
Aflal: man STOKES. Any other members seeking recognition?
tIght .
90
Mr. Carl ucci,on behalfofthecommittee,we want to express0
appreciation for your appearance and your testimony here toda
Ut
Also, I want to acknowledge the cooperat ion t he committee h'1,
had from you, Admir al Turner , Scott Breckinr idge and others
we have had t o negot iate many mat te rs relat ive to access.WehavS
met many t imes,andwe appreciate t he cooperat ion we have
from you.
Mr .CARLUCCI.Thankyou,Mr. Chair man.
Chairman STOKES.Mr .Blakey says he hopes it cont inues through
t he final report.
All right.
There bei ng no further wit nesses to come before the committee
today, t he committee will adjour n unt il 9 o'clock tomor row rnoi-,
ing,
[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the Select Committee on Assassina_
ti ons adjourned, to reconvene Tuesday, December 12, 1978, at 9
a.m.]
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
TUESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1978
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEEON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The select committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn Building, Hon. Louis Stokes
(chairman ofthecommittee)presiding.
Present : Representat ives Stokes, Preyer, McKinney, Fithian,
Dodd, and Edgar .
Chairman STOKES.Thecommitteewill come to order.
This morning our opening witness will be Mr . H. S. Knight, the
Director ofthe U.S.Secret Service.
Good morning,Mr. Knight,andwelcome to ourcommittee.
Atthist imeyou mayproceedin anywayyou sodesire.
STATEMENT OF H. S. KNIGHT, DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET
SERVICE
Mr.KNIGHT.Thankyou,Mr .Chairman.
I do have a very briefopening statement, but before I get into
that, I feel obliged to comment on the relationship between your
staff,headed by Professor Blakey, and the people with whom they
workedin my organization.
I would characterize it as one of the best relationships I have
seenin my long service in the Government. They were responsible
and professional at all times, and we appreciate that very, very
much.
Chairman STOKES.Thankyou verymuch.
Mr.l(NIGHT. I am pleased to have been invited to be here today.
ISecalways appreciate the opportunity to discuss the mission of the
ret Service. . .".'
.Befor.e we begin, perhaps it would be helpful for'me'to summa-
bnefly the history and responsibilities of our organization.
ag e Secret Service is the oldest general Federal enforcement
in the United States. It was established on July 5, 1865,to
all the counterfeiting ofU.S.currency.
feT?at duty,al ong witht he suppression oftheforgery and counter-
of any U.S. Government obligations, such as checks and
remains a large portion of our mission today. We were
De Ished as, and we remain, an agency of t he U.S. Treasury
Partment .
the Nation's only general Federal law enforcement agency
t he late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Service investi-
many mattersin response to requestsofvarious departments
(91)
92
of the executive branch. Cases ranged from espionage to imrnigr
t ion;violati ons of statutesfrom theSherman Anti-TrustAct to th'
HomesteadAct. e
Immediately priorto WorldWarI,theService investigated viola
t ions of U.S. neutrality in connection with the war in Europe.
the early twenties, Secret Service agents investigated the Teapot
Dome scandal.
Our Presidential protective responsibilities began following the
assassination of President McKinley in 1901. Since then, t hese
duties have expanded. Presently, the Secret Service has 17 perIna,
nent protective details, covering the President, Vice President,and
their wives and families, as well as former Presidents, their wives
andwidows.
In the last Presidential election year the Service protected 12
Presidential candidates or nominees, as well as one Vice Presiden.
tialcandidateandtwo Vice Presidentialnominees.
While under our protection, these individuals visited 4,574 cities
and towns throughout thecountry, involving majorstops at a total
of13,491 separatelocations.
The Service also protects foreign officials, primarily heads of
stateand heads ofgovernment, who arevisit ing the United States.
During fiscal year 1978 we provided security for 126 foreign digni-
taries who traveledto 327 Americancitiesandtowns.
The duration of foreign protectee trips to the United States
varies greatly, butin the pastwe have found they average about 5
days.
In addition to its headquarters here in Washington and its pro-
tective divisions, the Secret Service has 62 field offices and 38
residentagencies located throughoutthecontinentalUnited States,
HawaiiandPuertoRico.
A Secret Service office is also located in the American Embassy
in Paris. Besides supplementing protective detail personnel as
needed, agents assigned to field offices carry on the invest igative
activities of the Service in the areas of counterfeiting and forgery,
as well as threatsto thosewe protect. .
There are currently 1,554 men and women serving as
agents of the Secret Service. Our uniformed division, which IS
responsible for the protection of the White House, Vice President'Z
residence and diplomatic missions of foreign governments, has 86
I
officers.
I
Supporting these operational pers onnel are 1,149 other employ-
ees.Total personnelemployedby theSecretServiceas ofDecember
6, 1978,was 3,565.
These numbers have expanded considerably in the past 15 years
to enable us to continue to perform our mission effect ively In
response to ourincreased protective responsibi lities. .
Security of former Presidents, their wives , widows and mlDO
r
children, as well as that of major candidates and nominees f0
1
President and Vice President and foreign heads of state, have al
beenaddedto ourprotectivemission duringthistimeperiod. he
In addit ion, our uniformed division, formerly known as t e
White House Police, has been charged by law since 1970 with th
protection of foreign diplomatic missions in the Washington metrO-
politanarea.
93
l\1r Chair man, I have endeavored to give t he committee a brief
rv"iew of the Secret Service. We view our protective responsibil-
ft1:s as being among the most serious t hat can be assigned to any
and will to do! our utmost t o perform
seduties III themost effect ive way possible.
thfwould be pleased t oanswerany quest ions you or yourmembers
mayhave. .
Chairman STOKES.Thank you verymuch,Mr.Kmght.
Thecommittee will now operateunderthe 5-minuterule.
Mr. Knight, I suppose the basic concern of all of us is that no
matter what all of us do, and particularly with reference to all of
ourlawenforcementagencies, all the precaut ions taken, there is a
general feeling that ultimately ifanindividual really wants to kill
the President of the United States, that there is perhaps nothing
that can be done to stopthattragiceventfrom occurring.
So, basically I guess the question I really want to pose to you is
canwereallypreventtheassassination ofa President?
Mr. KNIGHT.I thinkourphilosophy, Mr. Chairman, is thatthere
are a number of potential assassins, ifI can use thatword, whom
we can stop, whom we can thwart. We can putenough hurdles in
their way to make it, ifnot impossible, certainly exceedingly diffi-
cult,and for that reasonwe feel we have beeneffective.
Chairman STOKES.Mr. Knight, how abouttheAttorneyGeneral's
guidelines of domest ic security investigations? Have they had an
adverse effect on this service or the FBI's ability to prevent polit i-
calassassinations?
Mr.KNIGHT. We thinktheyhave, Mr. Chairman. We candemon-
a decrease in the quantity. Now, the other side of that coin
18 whataboutthequality. Thatis a much moredifficultassessment
tomake.
I think Judge Webster yesterday testified thatthey have signifi-
fewer infor mants in place. It strikesme thata resultof that
IS sIgnificantl y less information. It is very difficult to prove what
youarenotgetting.It is like tryingto provea negative.
I am not sure I can quantify that for you, but as a general
propositionI wouldfeel it hashadaneffecton it .
STOKES. Thank you very much. I have no further
questIons atthis time. : ','""
Thegentleman from NorthCarolina,Mr. Preyer. .,' ,-"
feMr. PREYER. Following up on the chairman's question, that you
ate: thatthe guidelines must have a negative effect on the quality
Se east oftheinformatiorryou get, canyou give us anyexampl e of
prcret or FBI conduct which in fact contributed to the
of a political assassination which is no longer possible
Mer theguidelines?
Mr. KNIGHT.I amnotcertain I can,JudgePreyer.
You r. PREYER. I realize that is a pretty tough question. Perhaps
Mcould give us a hypotheticalexample.
are r. KNIGHT.. Well, let me offer these observations for you. We
WIth preventing something from happening. We have
Zero Ifany, marginfor error. In effect, we aretryingto runa
eLect operation.
94
95
Now, it strikes me that the best way to prevent something frolb.
happening is to know beforehand who is planning what, when
where, and how. '
Now, that is a very, very difficult political and philosophical
dilemma, as to what a Government agency should do in terms of
arming itself with the information it feels it needs, but at the same
time not infringing on first amendment rights of all the citizens. It
is a very difficult problem to decide.
Mr. PREYER. Along the same lines, in 1976 the Attorney General
issued guidelines on the FBI' s handling of informants. That was in
answer to charges of serious misuse of informants.
What effect do you think these guidelines will have on you-
ability to prevent future assassinations?
Mr. KNIGHT. I think that goes just exactly to what we are talking
about. We no longer get information on groups that we think We
should be receiving.
I would be reluctant to name specific groups. But those that urge
violence, those that publish tracts describing how to make bombs
and Molotov cocktails, I think those are the groups that we are
interested in-and their potential danger to the people we protect.
Mr. PREYER. I think it might be pointed out that before t he
guidelines were put into effect, President Kennedy, Robert Ken-
nedy, George Wallace and Dr. King were all shot or assassinated.
I hope it does not make it more likely that we would have future
assassinations as a result of the guidelines.
We now have charter legislation pending in both Houses of Con-
gress to authorize and to prevent abuses of domestic security inves-
tigations, as you know. Those guidelines deal with the use of
informants, with the use of wiretapping.
Should the Secret Service be included in these charters?
Mr. KNIGHT. I am not sure I understand yet whether your ques-
tion is directed to a charter governing the Secret Service conduct
or whether the Secret Service should be heard in connection with
the charter being written for the FBI.
I am not sure which way you are coming.
Mr . PREYER. I was thinking of whether there shouldn't be a
charter for the Secret Service. Certainly you should be heard on it.
But I am wondering whether a charter should be written for you as
for the FBI.
Mr . KNIGHT. I would have no objection to that. We have operated
for 113 years in effect without a charter. I know of no problems in
terms of accusations of abuse of power that have occurred in that
time. But I certainly wouldn't dismiss it out of hand.
Mr. PREYER. Incidentally, I thought your recounting of your
tory here was very interesting. I don't think the general pubhC
realizes the evolution of this agency. Very few of us still think of
you in terms of counterfeiting as your main occupation.
I think the public views you as primarily a security agency, since
that is where the public visibility occurs.
If we worked out a charter for the Secret Service, just as we are
working on charters for the FBI, what is the best way to approach
such a charter? Should the executive agencies issue guidelines
subject to a congressional veto?
Is that the best way to do it, or should the Congress work out
cific legislation, getting input, of course, from the executive
pe
s
d part men
t?
.
KNIGHT. I would be satisfied with either, with the under- e
Mr
.
tanding that whether writing guidelines in the executive branch
legislation in the congressional branch, specificity is very diffi-
cuf\ hink we need some latitudes for exigencies that cannot be
foreseen at the time of writing either guidelines and/or legislation.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time has
expired.
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentl eman from Connect icut , Mr. McKinney.
Mr. McKINNEY. Nice to have you here, Mr. Knight.
When you receive information from the FBI, is it information
that you request or do they, as a matter of form, hand information
over to you?
Mr. KNIGHT. Well, we have a letter of agreement between the
FBI and ourselves as to what they will furnish to us.
Mr. McKINNEY. One of the problems, I think, that the American
public and this committee has had is that in the tragic shooting of
the President , Lee Harvey Oswald had passed before a great many
governmental eyes, so to speak-the St ate Department obviously,
the CIA, t he FBI. Yet there was very little official interagency
communicat ion on that subject.
Is t here anyone specifically in your organization that requests
information from the FBI, or collates it or collects it and looks for
things that might be missing?
Mr. KNIGHT. Absolutely. We have a staff of intelligence research
specialists whose primary and sole responsibility is to receive infor-
mation from not only the FBI, but other Federal enforcement
agencies, State and local enforcement agencies, and their responsi-
bility is to analyze, assess and evaluate this information as it
relates to Our responsibilities.
Mr. McKINNEY. Do you carryon the same type of liaison with
the State Depart ment and the CIA? . :
Mr. KNIGHT. Yes, sir, we do.
p McKINNEY. So let me pick a hypothetical sit uation, say the
rWe sldent was going to Miami. It has a large immigrant population.
ould you as a matter of course, contact the ,FBI, the State
and the CIA to see if they were aware' 'or-Any problem-
a teal activit ies there?
I t
Mr
. KNIGHT. You asked me about three different agencies, and
e me deal with them in one, two, three order.
wIn the event of a trip of the President to Miami, the first thing
would do is notify our agent in charge, in our Miami field office,
o would then notify his counterpart in the FBI field office.
teAs YOU are aware, and without getting into technigues, we send a
am of agents out to that city prior to the President s visit.
reOne of that team is an intelligence agent whose sole
lb. IS to contact the FBI and everyone else in that com-
that may have information of interest to us.
YoIt IS a constant daily meeting prior to the visit. Does that answer
ur question on the FBI?
96
97
Mr. McKINNEY. Yes, it does.
Mr. KNIGHT. Now, on the others, there may not be a specific
request relating to a specific trip. However, there are constant
daily conversations between the CIA and ourselves and the State
Department and ourselves relating t o information which Inay
affect our responsibility.
Mr. McKINNEY. Do you feel it would be of any value to have a
top echelon board of, say, those four different agencies that would
be in constant communication?
Mr. KNIGHT. I would certainly not be adverse t o t hat . I would
endorse that policy, with the understanding that I am not implYing
what we currently have in place is less than satisfactory.
Mr. McKINNEY. We found t hat one of the problems we had with
the CIA in the Nosenko case was that the CIA at that point was so
tremendously compartmentalized that sometimes the left hand
didn't know what the right hand was doing. So, you woul d not
object to that type of board.
Mr . Chairman, I have no more questions but, I must make a
comment.
I was riding with President Ford when t he Har tford police forgot
about a green light. I don't know what you do to keep your agents
in good shape, but they move awfully fast. I learned never to follow
your natural human instincts when you are with the President ,
which is t o open the door and get out of the car , because I was put
back in the car in a hurry. But I thank you.
I think several of your agents aged about 10 years that night
when they saw that car come flying into the President's car. I
know I did.
Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentl eman has expired.
The gentleman from Pen nsylvania, Mr . Edgar .
Mr. EDGAR. Thank you, Mr . Chairman.
We have been listening for just a few moments t o your opening
statement and your responses to speci fic quest ions. I wonder if you
might respond to a more general question t hat relates to given all
that we know about the assassination of President Kennedy, and
the changes that have been made by the Secret Service, the FBI,
t he CIA, the State Department, and all the other agencies that
have some responsibility in dealing with the President's safety. Are
there"any specific recommendations that you would make, either
legislatively or policywise, that would be helpful for this committee
to consider in an overall general way that perhaps have not been
asked as of yet?
Mr . KNIGHT. I think I can reply in two areas, Mr. Edgar.
There is currently title XVIII, section 871; making it a Federal
crime, over which we have jurisdiction, to threaten the life of the
President or the Vice President.
That is a very good tool for us in terms of our protective respon-
sibilities, but it applies onl y to three or four of the people that W
d
protect. We would be very pleased to see that 871 statute
to all the people we protect, which would give us a better tool In
terms of all the people we protect. .
There is al so currently sect ion 1752. This relates to establishulg
a secure zone around the President, the will ful and knowing pene-
at io
n
of, which is, in effect, a misdemeanor but gives us an
to intercept someone under those circumstances.
a We would like to see 1752 applied to all the people we protect .
Mr. EDGAR. Are there any procedural modifications or refine-
ents that you would suggest in such things as the immediate
after an assassination, or are the lines of communication
the ot her agencies sufficient that no changes need to be made
in the procedures?
I I am thinking of all of the problems we had in Dallas with
confusion, and just the problems of in whose jurisdiction the body
was whose j urisdict ion it was to do the investigation in the early
and the relationship with the local police authorities.
Are there any refinements of those tools that you can suggest?
Mr. KNIGHT. I have one concern, and t hat relates to title XVIII,
section 1752, which is the Presidential assassination statute. I have
a different feeling about that statute, and perhaps Mr. Civiletti this
afternoon can clarify it.
But it is my understanding that in the event of an assassination
or assault, there must be an affirmative action to assert Federal
jur isdict ion, and this must be taken by the Attorney General.
I would feel much more comfortable if that was an assumption or
a presumpt ion immediately upon the act rather than waiting for
whatever time frame might be necessary for that affir mat ive act to
take place.
Now, expanding further on that, from a practical standpoint, if
such a tragedy occurs, our instructions to our people are to assume
that Federal presence will be asserted and we will proceed on that
unt il we are advised otherwise.
Mr. EDGAR. That is a new procedure that was not in place in
Dallas, is t hat correct?
Mr. KNIGHT. That is correct. Of course, at that time it was not a
Federal crime.
Mr. EDGAR. The President is shot. What does the Secret Service
do at that moment?
Mr. KNIGHT. Two things. First, we immediately take the Presi-
dent .to, I will not say the nearest hospital; because that may be a
hospItal not equipped for the accident. We preplan which hospitals
arhe along t he route. Wherever we are, we know which hospital has
W at facili ti es.
we evacuate the area, take him to the nearesf equipped
At the same time, our plans call for us to secure the scene
unt ll the FBI can arrive.
thMSr. EDGAR. So that securing of the scene is the responsibility of
e ecret Service?
c !vir. KNIGHT. As we understand it, until the FBI arrives. Any
n Ine scene.
ti Now, Judge Preyer indicated earlier that we do have investiga-
s ve responsibilit ies. I think it is important for people to under-
t hat we are primarily a criminal investigative organization.
l' yoU will permit me, as a measure of what we have accom-
Ished, last year we had over 12,000 Federal felony arrests. Then I
ar
Ust
hu r riedly add that the conviction rate was 95 percent. So, we
Whdeahng with well-trained, highly skilled criminal investigators,
o can secure a crime scene.
98 99
Mr. EDGAR. Let me askyou j ust a couple of additional quest ions
and then I will yield backto my colleagues. '
Are there interagency regulat ions established that are available
t o t his committee describing what will be done to freeze the crime
scene and who will do it, how you will do it as the SecretService?
Mr. KNIGHT.I amnot certainabouthow you do it.Thatgets
specifics. But there are agreements between us and the other Fed.
eral agencies as to who is responsible for taking what actions and
whatresponsibilitiesaregoing to be borneby whatagencies.
Those,ofcourse,certainlycould be madeavailable.
Mr. EDGAR.Does t hat describe how theFBI is notified?
Mr .KNIGHT. Well, yes, it would.
Mr. EDGAR. I yield backmy time.
Thank you.
Chairman STOKES. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
t ime.
Mr. Knight, I was interested in the figure you just quoted of
12,000arrestsandsomet hing like95-percentconvictions.
Mr. KNIGHT.Correct,Mr.Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Can you give us some idea of the type or
gamutofcrimesinvolved in the12,000?
Mr. KNIGHT. This would be for violations of the counterfeit ing
laws of the Uni ted States, forgery laws, 871, which is the threat
statute, whichI mentionedbefore, andsomebankinglaws.
ChairmanSTOKES. I see.
One of t he concerns of t he committee was some test imony re-
ceived duringthecourse ofourhearings withreferenceto activities
of the agents t he ni ght prior to the assassinat ion in Dallas, and
some testimony to theeffect t hattheagents were up late partying,
andperhapsdrinking andt hatkind of thing.
At the same t ime, to put it in balance, we had testimony that
said thatwhatevertheactivitieswere, ithadno bearingupon their
ability to be able to react to the event which occurred there.
My question t o you would be What procedures have you estab-
lished, if any, with reference to the activities of agents who are
assigned t o t he President relat ive to their activities t he night
beforeandthat type ofthing?
Mr . KNIGHT. As I recall the summary report of the Warren
Commission, t hey looked into the allegat ion of whether or not
t here had been drinking-whether or not they had been up late I
think was given .That was understood.Butmy recollection of read-
ing the Warren Commission reportis t hat therewas no evidenceof
any drinking.
Now, to respond to your question, I thinkwe are talking abouta
different era, a different time frame. It is just understood
everyone will be fit to work whe n t hey report-keeping in mInt
t hat they may well be so tired afte r the day that they are no
about t o leave.
The hours that these men and women put in are t remendous.I
don 't know of a more dedicated, conscientious group. But perhaps
thegreatestdeter rent to activitysuch as you havedescribed is peer
pressure.
They all recognize the awesome responsibility. I don't think any
f the members are going to let one or two deviate from what
o ndards t hey feel they need in orderto dotheirjob.
SUChairman STOKES. We also had sometestimony with reference to
rhaps some laxity on the part of the Service in terms of having
outhigh buildingsin theDealeyPlazaarea.
C Ofcourse, in yesterday's I commentmade
byPresident KennedythatIfsome potentialassassmhadgottenon
high roof,thathe could kill anyPresidenthe wantedto.
a Can you give us some idea of what procedures are now in effect
tocheck out that kind of situation, the high buildings and rooms
suchas t he Book Depository in DealeyPlaza?
Mr. KNIGHT. I can assure you at least in public session that we
doengage in what we call routesurveys. I would be reluctant in a
publichearing to getmorespecific t han that.
However,I would be very pleased to do itin anexecutivesession,
toset your mind atease as to exactly and precisely the techniques
andwhatwe do,andso forth.
Chair man STOKES.I canappreciatethat.
Another concern I guess we have is thatduringthecourseof the
King hearings there was evidence received that Dr . King was also
under domest icsecuritysurveillanceby theFBI.
Then subsequent t o his death the same agency was assigned the
task of invest igat ing the assassination of a man whom they had
hadundersurveillance.
The quest ion that comes t o mind is, In order to assuage the
public's mind with reference to situations of thatsort , is there any
provision under the law where the Secret Service could come in
and conduct such an investigation, so that it would remove any
type of impropriety of the same organization investigating the
death ofa person whomtheyhave undersurveillance?
Mr.KNIGHT.We have no suchauthority, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES.Thereis no such authority?
Mr .KNIGHT.No,sir.
Chair man STOKES.I see.
OK.Ihave no furtherquestions atthistime.
gentleman from NorthCarolina, Mr.Preyer.
r , PREYER.Thankyou, Mr. Chairman.
1'1 was interested in yourcommentson the assassina-
Ion.statute which you made to Mr . Edgar. That statute does not
SpeCIfy who mustrequestassistancefrom theotheragencies.
.as I understand it , thatthe FBI will be in charge of the
Se and assistance may be requested from the
rnckret Servics , the military, and other agencies. It doesn'tsay who
a es therequest.
woAi i understand it, your understanding is the Attorney General
M make sucha request.
he r. KNIGHT. No, I think-well, yes, yes, that is correct. I think
sho makes the decision as to whether or not Federal presence
the Ul
ld
be asserted. Thatis where we differ in ourinterpretationof
aw,
.. PREYER. Since the statute leaves that nonspecific, theoreti-
Y It could be either the Attorney General , the Director of the
100
FBI, or the President who makes t he assertion of FederaljuriSdi
tion.
Mr. KNIGHT. Yes.
Mr .PREYER.It might be well t ospecify thatin the statute,would
it not?
Mr. KNIGHT.I would t hinkso,yes, si r .
Mr. PREYER. The stat ut e dealing with the murder of forei
officials, which is 18 U.S.C. 116,does specify thatitis t he
General.
Mr.KNIGHT. Yes, sir .
Mr . PREYER. So t hat by implication, per haps, you are right in
saying itwoul d be theAttorneyGeneral.
Those statutesalso saythatthe assistance of otheragencies rna
be requested. It doesn'tsayanythingaboutagencies being
to comply withtheassistance.
If you make it specific thatthe Attorney General is the one,for
example, who invokes Federal jurisdiction, do we need to make it
mandatory that the agencies comply with the request to investi.
gate?
Mr. KNIGHT. I can't speak for the other agencies, but I would
assume thattheir response would be t he same as mine; thatis,we
would respond to any request. Thatwould notbe a debatable item.
Mr. PREYER. Well, I should thinkthatwoul d be ri ght. But doyou
thinktherewould be anysituation where therewould be classified
infor mation thatyou had, information relatingt o yourinformants,
for example, which you would not want t o give to the FBI or to
anybody else?
Mr .KNIGHT.I can'tconceiveofthat,Judge Preyer .
Mr. PREYER. If a President is shot , going back to Mr. Edgar's
example, andyou areon thescene, you would be firston thescene,
the first Federal presence certainly. Do you feel you have the
authorityto freeze thesceneatthattime?
Mr. KNIGHT. As I indicated, we would certainly do that from
very practical standpoint because those initial moments are criti-
cal. We would do iton thebasisthatwe areassumingthatFederal
presencewill be assertedandthat1751will be in effect.
Mr. PREYER. What about the timelag between asserting the Fed-
eral jurisdiction? I believe you indicated that was a matter of
concern to you andthatyou thoughtthestatuteshouldimmediate-
ly haveeffect.
Mr. KNIGHT. Yes, sir, I do. As a matterof course, when we have
our meetings with the State and local enforcement agencies
are assisting us in any visit of the President, that matter is IS'
cussed. 1
We makeitclearatthatt ime thatwe areassumingt hat
presence will be asserted and thatwe will need their assistanceIII
securingthescene. d
Mr. PREYER. Well , what about your relations with the local
State authorities? Is there any sort of interagency agreement n
O
\
as to howyou handlethat? r
e
What if local law enforcementauthorities, as I understand th
hllt
was an effort to do in the Kennedy assassination, indicate t 'I
t hey have the control over the body of the President and caJl
release it ?
101
Mr KNIGHT.Of course, as you are aware, with President Kenne-
it 'was not a Federal crime to kill the President of the United
dY It is now. Perhaps more germane is those folks who we
Statect who are not covered by 1751. There I t hink you have a
proch difficult situation as to who will be the investigating
rJl
d
cont rolli ng office.
n
II
It
st rikes me t hat thatshould be clarified. We would like to see
hatclarified.
t Mr.PREYER.Would you like to haveFederaljurisdiction mandat-
dto preempt State and local lawenforcementimmediatelyon the
eommitt ing of an assassination against any public figure, or how
fardown thelinewouldyou goon that?
Mr. KNIGHT. I think that is really a policy question and I am
perhaps not your best witness on it: It is a matter I think that
certainlyshould be exploredandconsidered.
As I understand it now, the possibility exists, in some of the
people we prot ect , where there might well be concurrentjurisdic-
tion.That is a Statecrimeas well as a Federalcrime.
Mr.PREYER. Well,thatwas goingto be my final question. Does it
concern you that if we mandate the Federal jurisdiction immedi-
ately appl y and exclude local and State authorities, in effect, that,
one,wecould be takingthe first stepthatwould eventuallylead t o
perhaps a Federal police force or ; two, we may be excluding some
expertise at the Stateand local level where you will find a district
attorney in a number of districts who has more experience in
homicide cases than anyone in theJustice Departmentwould have
had?
Mr.KNIGHT.Thatis a very realconcern. Forthatreason I would
be relucta nt to make a sweeping statement thatall the people we
protect ought to be covered by Federal statutes in the event of an
assassinat ion.
Mr . PREYER.Thankyou, Mr. Knight.
Chair man STOKES. Thetimeofthegentlemanhasexpired.
Thegentleman from Pennsylvania,Mr. Edgar.
Mr: EDGAR. Mr. Knight, I think we have covered a lot of terri-
10
1In terms of kindsofquestionsthatMr. Preyerhasbeenasking
an that I and my othercolleaguesasked.
t Iguess Our concern as membersof thisassassinations panel is to
figure outwhetherin lightof thecurrentand..recentassassi-
I?ns, and the changes that have been made that' you have
netImed, t hat you have at your disposal the kinds of resources
scecessary t o carry out your investigation, your freezing of the
selns, and that the lines of jurisdiction are clear between your-
{es,theFBI ,theAttorneyGeneral,andothers.
itcget from yourtestimony that as far as you areconcerned, when
queon:es to the Presidentof theUnitedStates-andtherearesome
offestlOns aboutothers thatyou protect-because that is a Federal
that you are pretty clear that the regulations, the under-
M ll{?S, andthelawsin placebasicallycoveryourneeds.
11r. NIGHT.Thatis correct,Mr. Edgar.
thinr. EpGAR. And thatwould include your need to contactand use
11
gS
Jike thearmedservices if it were of thatkind of magnitude.
r , nNIGHT.Yes, sir.
102
103
Mr. EDGAR. Some of our questions may sound a little bit
though we are nitpicking at minor points of concern. But I
you understand our problem in trying to together recom.
mendations to the Congress and recommendations to agencies in
lightofourlong seriesofinvestigativeconcerns.
One of my concerns is the quality of response in terms of the
captureandapprehensionofanassassin.
In your experience do you thinkthatyour agency is equippedat
this time, given the fact the FBI is not on the scene, to, in most
cases, given what we know-and I know each assassination is
different, but in most cases-pursue that particular event of the
actualcaptureof theassassinwithinmomentsfollowing theevent?
Mr. KNIGHT. Theansweris "Yes." .
Mr. EDGAR.Is there anythingthatyou would suggestin terms of
the investigation procedures after the assassination that might
improveyourefficiency?
Mr. KNIGHT. No; I am quite satisfied with the agreement We
have withtheFederal BureauofInvestigation. As you canappreci-
ate, one of our concerns, immediate concerns, is is this a conspir-
acy, are there others, and are our other protectees in danger from
othermembersofthatconspiracy.
Butour agreement permits us to work with the Bureau, I mean
on the scene, in person, in the conduct of thatinvestigation. Ijust
couldn't think of a betterarrangement than we have between the
two agencies.
Mr. EDGAR. Let me pursuejustsomething else thatcame out of
some comments you made earlier. I don't think I have ever met a
law enforcement officer who has requested of any legislative body
less authority to know information about groups or potential
threats or people leafletting and describing how to make bombs
andthings likethat.
On the one hand we have the need for that information to flow
as freely as possible through the agencies. On the other hand, we
havesomeconstitutionalrightsofprivacy.
We saw particularly in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
King thatsome agency activity, particularly in theFBI, was exces-
sive in termsof theirsurveillanceof Dr. King-atleastithasbeen
sharedwithus.
How do you walkthattightrope, thefine linebetweenyour need
to have information and a person's right to privacy in a free
society, in a democraticsocietylikewe have?
Mr. KNIGHT. As I indicated to the committee earlier, t hat is a
very real dilemma that I think we certainly face and you, in the
positionofbeinga lawmaker,face.
All I can tell you is that as long as we have been in business!I
am not aware of any allegations or violations that we have In-
curred. .
I guess what I am saying is our track record in this respect IS
very good. It may be frustrating attimes, but I am confident that
ourzealousness to do thejob is notgoing to cause us to be blinded
to therightsofprivacyandeverythingelse . .
I should tell you that I speak really from two directions. One IS
as a citizen of this country, albeit a naturalized citizen, and a
nt and one who cherishes those rights himself and for his
,
other hand, I recognize the position I occupy and the
that my organization carries, and in that sense I
re
s
a nar rower focus on theproblem.
ve
haSo I am torn between those two competingactivities, ifyou will.
1\1; EDGAR.Well, I appreciateyourstruggle. Thatis the struggle
hati have because I do thinkthatwe haveto be careful notto set
t a system of response that begins to move us too far in either
of t he directions, either so much in the direction of privacy
wehave no effective lawenforcement, butalso the protections
that we have under the Constitution, to move us so far in the
direction of nothavingtheabilityto be privatecitizens.
Thankyou. Iyieldbackmy time.
Chairman STOKES. The gentleman yields back the balance of his
time.
Thegentl eman from Connecticut,Mr. McKinney.
Mr. McKINNEY. Mr. Knight, I am still having some problems
with1751. In listeningto your responses to JudgePreyer,I assume
that you have some, too.
It seems to me thatthere is anareaof indecision thereandthat
we could solve all of this by justsuggesting to the Congress thatit
makethe Federal presence mandatoryatthetime.
There is not hing in the law that would state that that Federal
presence could notbe relinguishedlater.But thereis thatinterme-
diatet ime.
There is also, itseems to me, anareaof doubt thatcould evolve.
There also is nothing in the statute that says that the Federal
Government can'tcooperate with State prosecutors and officials in
theinvest igat ion.
Howwould you feel aboutmakingitautomatic?
Mr. KNIGHT. I would be much more comfortable with that, Mr.
McKinney. I guess again we are talking about a policy decision,
and perhaps Mr. Civiletti this afternoon will have, from the legal
standpoint ,moreto sayon that.
But it would remove for me what I think now is perhaps-andI
haMv
e
to emphasize perhaps-anuncomfortableinitialsituation.
. r.McKINNEY. Now I am going to give you a hypothetical
d
1tu
ll;tlOn because this fascinates me. As I said, I was in the Presi-
limousine when it was hit Hartford. I had been
idled1.nthatcarcrashbutthe Presidenthadsurvived? Would you
Cmmedlately have invoked thesame procedures? You don't protect
ongressmen,nobody protectsus.
yoIr had.been killedin thataccident, or seriouslywounded, would
thU invokedall ofthesameprocedureseven thoughyou knew
e resldent was well?
we
Mr
. KNIGHT. I think that is a fair assumption in the sense that
sib.f re there, andeventuallysomeone is going to have thatrespon-
i It.y.W,e would do itas a matterofcooperation.
thi Ifwe look atthereverseof thatandsaywe did nothing, I
11 t hat wouldbe mostreprehensibleconduct.
don,r.McKINNEY. Now I was going to askyou one more question. I
disct t o embarrassyou by thisquestion. Buttherehavebeen
USSlOns aboutthis, andit fascinates me.
104
105
The President is, of course, not only the leader of the country b
he is a political animal. The trip to Dallas was very definitelyI.lt
political trip. a
There have been many suggestions made in all the pages w
have been pouring through that various peopl e did not really
that the President should go to Dallas because it was sort of
hotbed of conservative thinking at that point . a
There was also a great deal of opinion that the President should
not go t o Dallas in an open top car and go cruising around in a
parade route.
Just what do you do when you don't think the President should
go where he says he is going to go? I know that Jerry Ford had a
habit, as did John Kennedy, of leaping out of your protect ion and
into a crowd once in a while.
I could look at the expressions on the faces of your men Who
were protecting him, and I could see that they were just going
berserk. But initially, before a trip is made, do you have any
official way of protesting the trip?
Mr. KNIGHT. As I indicated earlier, prior to any trip of the
President we send agents out in advance. At t he same time t here
are members of the President's staff, in that same capacity, in the
same city. We work together all the time.
Now, recognize that there may be a difference of object ive in
terms of our mission and the mission of the staff. But I think we
also must remember that the staff is just as concerned about the
President' s personal safety as we are.
So, there is constant discussion between the two groups as to
where the President will go, what he will do. I must say I find
them very cooperative.
At t he same time, I have to say we live in a democrat ic society.
You cannot keep the President totally out of the public view. That
is our problem.
Mr . McKINNEY. Are you allowed, by memo, t o say to the White
House, "We don't think the President should go to X community
because of certain problems"?
Mr. KNIGHT. I am not sure it is so formalized as t o be reduced to
writing, but there have been times in the past, and I presume in
the future, when we have strongly recommended that the Presi-
dent not engage in a certain activity or visit a certain place, and
that advice has been taken.
Mr. McKINNEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Mr. Knight, let' s talk for a moment
extra territorial type sit uat ions. Let's assume that the Presiden! is
traveling in a foreign country and is assassinated in a foreIgn
country. The Secret Service of course is with him.
How do we operate under those circumstances? What type of
jurisdiction have you, et cetera?
Mr. KNIGHT. In regard to the latter part of your question, as to
what authority or jurisdiction do we have in a foreign count ry, we
are there as guests, if you will , of the host government. We have nO
authority extra territorially.
I should hasten to add, however, that generally we have ve.rY,
very good cooperation from the enforcement. agencies in foreIgn
nt ries. We have maybe had one or two problems, but generally
cOUaking it has always been very, very good.
SpChairdtan STOKES. Taking it just a little bit further, let's assume
t t he perpet rat or is a national of the foreign country.
h
What
would our rights be then with reference to that individual,
o posed t o, let's say, if it is in America?
as KNIGHT. I am not sure I am your best witness on that. I
think the Deputy Attorney General could respond to that better
than I could, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Coming back then to the States, and once
again talking a little bit about the assertion of a Federal presence,
assume you have a situation such as the Dallas situation, where
ou have a rather aggressive police chief, and one who invokes sort
totalitarian jurisdiction with reference to crimes committed in
that city. I have in mind, in particular, testimony that we received
with reference to the fact that during some 12 hours of interroga-
tion of Lee Harvey Oswald, there was no recorded interrogation, no
record of that interrogation.
How would you assert the Federal presence, where you had a
police chief who was fairly aggressive in that respect?
Mr. KNIGHT. I think a part of that is the planning that goes on
prior to t he visit, where, as I indicated in the enforcement meet-
ings that we hold, that our folks spell out the responsibilities so
that t here is a clear understanding beforehand as to who is respon-
sible for what .
Now to respond to your direct question, there are what, 17,000 or
43,000, depending upon whose figures you believe, police depart-
ments in t his country, and I woul dn't for a minute try to assure
you t hat , given the various personalities, there might not be from
time to time difficult ies, but I think generally we would do quite
well.
Chair man STOKES. Let me make some specific reference to the
President ial congressional assassinations statutes which provide
that t he FBI shall be the agency which investigates the crimes.
Those statutes provide further, and I want to quote from the stat-
ute: "Assist ance may be requested from any State, Federal, or local
agincy, incl uding the Army, Navy, arid Air Force, any statute,
ru e, or regulation t o the contrary notwithstanding."
Under those statutes, what is your understanding of who may
request this assistance? Is it the Director of the FBI or -the Attor-
ney General or the President? . ,, '
asMr. K.NIGHT. Request assistance for the FBI? It would be my
sumpt IOn t hat it is the Director of the FBI.
thChairman STOKES. I guess what we are really trying t o get at, is
s at .under 18 U.S.C. 116 covering the murder of foreign officials, it
uPeclfi es that it is the Attorney General who must request assist-
snee. from other agencies. 18 U.S.C. 1751 and 351 do not seem to
any particular person or agency, and the statutes on Presi-
renhal congressional assassinations provide that assistance may be
reqUested but do not require that any agency comply wit h such
( uest.
giv gUess what we are asking is, should the Service be required to
asse the FBI any and all intelligence information with reference to
aSSlnat ion.
106
107
Let 's assume that intelligence information comes to your atten
tion, with the FBI having primary responsibility in terms of
investigation. Should your agency be required to turn over any
intelligence information coming to you?
Mr. KNIGHT. If there is doub t in anyone's mind that we would
not do that, certainly I would have no objection to enact ing that
into law. But I would hasten to assure you that whatever we have
they will have, not only what they request, but anything t hat
think might even be connected with the crime.
Chairman STOKES. I see .
Mr. KNIGHT. In other words, it is not just a matter of responding
to specific requests as the fellow said. You have to ask the right
questions to get the right answers.
Chairman STOKES. Right.
Mr. KNIGHT. We would do just whatever we were asked, plus, in
the sense that we think t hese things might be of help, we would
certainly give it.
Chairman STOKES. Without any reason to withhold anything.
Mr . KNIGHT. No, sir.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.
Mr . PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask a few questions in the area of news policy,
where you have an assassination. The chairman mentioned t hat
the chief of police in Dallas was very aggressive. He was very
aggressive in his news releases al so, overly aggressive. The Warren
Commission criticized him and criticized the Dallas police, for hold-
ing press conferences in which they released pieces of evidence
which tied Oswald to the killing of the President and the killing of
Officer Tippett. If Oswald had lived and had gone to trial, that
would have raised some real constitutional questions about his
right to a fair trial, so the Warren Commission was critical that he
said too much.
On the other hand, when you have a Presidential assassination,
t he public undoubtedly has a higher right t o know than they would
in an ordinary homicide. The press does have a right to explain
what happened to the American public and to the world, where
you have an assassination of this importance. So striking that
balance is a very delicate and t ri cky thing.
Let's say that a President is assassinated, and you are the first
on the scene, the Secret Service. You freeze the scene. You are
controlling it, so you are the first source of information.
What would be your news policy? What is . the Service neWs
policy in such a situation?
Mr . KNIGHT. Well, I suppose a flip answer would be t hat ,
much as it is a Federal violati on over which the FBI has jurisdIC-
tion, we could refer them to eit her the Bureau or the
of J ustice, but that doesn' t get to the answer of your question.
t hink we have an obligation to inform the press as to, in a sense,
t he name, rank and serial number of anyone who might be arrest-
ed.
Now beyond that, and in those initial moments, I am not sure
that we should or could give more than that.
Mr. PREYER. So you are saying you would give them the bare
basic facts. .
Mr. KNIGHT. Yes, SIr.
Mr. PREYER. But I gather you would defer any further expl ana-
tion to the Justice Department or the FBI.
Mr. KNIGHT. Correct.
Mr. PREYER. Is that a set policy of the Secret Service? Is that set
out in any sort of rules or regulations?
Mr. KNIGHT. It is not, Judge.
Mr. PREYER. Do you think that would meet t he needs of the
American public, its right to know, assuming the FBI and the
Depart ment of Justice is going to be delayed getting to the scene,
and perhaps you have had experience with the press, where there
is a major story breaking, where they are under tremendous pres-
sure to get some news? Wouldn't holding back on the news simply
allow them or encourage them to write up every rumor that has
come down the pike?
Mr. KNIGHT. I am not sure, and I say this with many of my
friends in t he room, no matter what information we furnished, that
that would necessarily decrease the speculation and conjecture.
Mr. PREYER. Well, is there anyone in the Secret Service now who
has specific authority to disseminate information to the press?
Mr . KNIGHT. Yes, sir; there is, I bear all the responsibilities. But
we do have an Assistant to the Director for Public Affairs, Mr.
Jack Warner, who is also a special agent, and has been at that post
for, I would say, 10 or 15 years now.
Mr. PREYER. But I gather that presently there are no rules or
regulat ions or statutes which govern who may speak to the press,
and specifically who would govern who may speak to the press or
how much they may say- -
Mr. KNIGHT. No.
Mr. PREYER [continuing]. In the event of an assassination.
Mr . KNIGHT. In the event of an assassination, I am confident
that the senior official on the scene, who would probably be our
agent in charge of that field office, would do what I have
Just. related, that is, give the very barest of facts, and refer all else
to eIt her the Justice Department or our headquarters.
Mi . PREYER. Wouldn't it be well to adopt some sort of general
or guidelines dealing with the dissemination of infor-
!llatlOn in this unique case of a Presidential assassination and
Incl.uding ways to correct misinformation, rather than waiting
UntIl the hurly-burly of the moment strikes you?
f Mr.. I think that it is certainly worth pursuing in terms
guIdelInes. But as you indicated, the circumstances are so con-
changing that to be too specific I think would be impossible.
rn r. PREYER. I would agree wit h that, although it does seem to
Coe working with the media, perhaps some sort of guidelines
voU be .drawn up to make sure you don't have a police chief
fal unt?ermg evidence which impinges on the defendant's right to
bar t n al, but that on the other hand, you don't lean over so far
the public's right to know, which is important if an
w aSSmat lOn IS thwarted, that should be full y met, but with some
ay of correcting misinformation. I think there was much misin-
108
formation in the Kennedy assassination, and I don't think th
mediawentbackandcorrectedthatinformation later. e
Mr . KNIGHT. I think, Judge, there is one other factor in thi
equation that can'tbe ignored, and that is that in the case of thS
President, at least, his press secretary would be present , andi
certainly think that is a facto r t hat has to be considered in th]
entirematter. S
Mr. PREYER. Thankyou.
Chair manSTOKES. The gentleman from Pennsylvania,Mr. Edgar
Mr . EDGAR. Thankyou, Mr. Chairman. I only have one question
ofthewitness.
In 1964 the President created t he Warren Commission t o look
into the death of President Kennedy. In effect, it shifted t he onus
of decisionmaking in the investigation from the Depart ment of
JusticeandtheBureau t otheCommission.
Do you thinka similar agency should be created in thefuture if
in fact thereis anassassination? '
Mr. KNIGHT. Well , it strikes me that there are two important
things in the quest ion you have just asked me . No. 1, will an
investigation ensue with the hopes of successful prosecution, and
will the defendant have a fair trial and, second, will the American
people have confidence in theagencies that conduct thatinvestiga-
tion?
Unless there is overriding evidence or indications that t he J us-
tice Department is in someway connectedwith theassassination,I
would prefer to see it left in their hands so that the rights of the
accused are preservedas well as therights of theAmerican people.
It is possible, I would not rule it out, that circumstances may be
such that a Warren Commission or a special prosecutor might be
preferable. But my rule of thumb thinking would be to leave it in
theestablished criminaljustice procedure.
Mr. EDGAR. Thankyou.
Iyield backmy time.
Chairman STOKES. The gentleman yields back the balance ofhis
time.
Mr. Knight , let me ask you this: There are a variety of penaltY
provisions applicable to Federal homicide statutes. A recent Su-
premeCourtdecision, Furman v. Georgia, hasdeclaredthatmostof
them are probably unconstitutional, capital punishment
in the context of either Presidential or other political assassm
a-
fuM. .
My question to you would be,do you favor capital punishment In
theeventor in theareaof Presidentialassassinations? .
Mr. KNIGHT. I have a difficulty with capital punishment, if it.
1S
mandatory, and I base that only on the sense that perhaps jurIeS
arereluctantto convi ct, if theyknowby so doing, theyarein effect
killing someone. I am not convinced either. And I again beg youi
indulgence as not being your best witness on this. But I am nO
r
sure that , in the case of an assassination, it is necessarily a det
e
. -
rent, which is theoretically at least part of t he factors involved In
punishment. . e
Chai rmanSTOKES. I guessone of t he concerns thatthe commIttee
would have in that particular area is the questi on of kill ing
assassin as a result of a t rial and a finding of guilty, and then,
109
course, not having him available for anyother reasons lateron, in
light of ot her information that may come to light. That, of course,
isone of ourconcerns, in terms of tryingto draw up anyloopholes
in the law.
Let me ask you this: The Congress has in recentyears enacted a
variety of stat utes dealingwith access to t hird party records. Some
ofthem werementioned earlier. Butthemostrecentone, theRight
to t he Financial Privacy Act of 1978, makes an exception for cer-
tain of the Secret Service' s protective functions and foreign coun-
terintelligence functionsof theFBI.
Do you think that similar except ions would be helpful or neces-
sary to assassination prevention or investigation not only to this
actbut ot hers similar to it?
Mr.KNIGHT.I would thinkso, yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES.I havejustonefurtherquestion.
In 1964 President Johnson created the Warren Commission. By
virtue of the creation of the Commission, the onus of decisionmak-
ing, in terms of t he investigation, was transferred from the FBI
over to t he Warren Commission, and, of course, in terms of the
overall investigat ion, particularlywiththeFBI havingtheprimary
responsibilit ies, that appeared to create some problems, and I was
just wondering ifyou haveanyviews with reference to whether, in
the eventsuch a tragic occurrence everdoes occur again, we ought
toconsider havinga Warren-typecommission.
Mr.KNIGHT.My mostimmediatereactionto that,Mr. Chairman,
is that I would prefer to see it remain within the established
criminal justicesystem, unless therewas strongevidence or strong
indicat ion thattheycould not handleit, or weresomehow involved
inthe assassinat ion.
Chair man STOKES. I guess one of ourconcerns in thatareais the
public percept ion of things at that moment, with the kind of
trauma t hat comes from such an occur re nce. And one of our con-
cerns,ofcourse, is thefactthattheAttorneyGeneral is thelawyer
for the person who is next in line for succession, that is the Vice
President , and ourconcern is whether t hatkind of impropriety, or
at least appearanceofimpropriety,ought,tobe removedandlodged
maybe in a specialprosecutortypeofsituation.
Mr. KNIGHT. I certainly think that is a valid concern. I'm not
thatjustby virtue of having thatoffice he necessarily has
obe I thinkyou would agreeto that. . ' .
ChaIrman STOKES.Yes. ' :':,,, ' -r "
Mr ..KNIGHT.Itis moretheappearance.
ChaIrman STOKES. Right.
Mr. I agree with you t hat there are certainly some
\VhPle In thiscountrywho would look askanceatthatrelationship.
e ether that requires thatyou set up an entirely new and differ-
k
nd
separateoperation to handlet hisis a question thatreallyI
thIn of a policy nature that someone else could better answer
an myself.

STOKES. Thank you very much. I have no further
est lOns.
goes anyone else seekfurther recognition?
r. PREYER.Mr. Chairman.
111
110
Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from North Carolina, !'.i
r
Preyer. .
Mr . PREYER. I would just like to ask one question, following u
on the chairman's comments about the exception in the
PrivacyAct--
Mr.KNIGHT. Yes.
Mr. PREYER [cont inuing). Which we justpassed atthe end ofthe
session for certain of the Secret Service's protective functi ons and
foreign counterintelligencefunctions.
Have you drawn up any rules or regulations relatingto how you
would dealwiththatexception?
Mr. KNIGHT. Not as yet . It is my understanding thatthat act is
not in effectfor anotherhundredand-well,perhaps 100days now.
Certainlywe shall.
Mr. PREYER. Good. I amgladto hearthat,becauseI do think it is
not the intention of Congress-Mr. Edgar brought out this point -
to just allow a blanket search into an individual' s bank records.
The question of invasion of privacy is an important one, and I
believe that you answered Mr. Stokes that you felt this sort of
exceptiondid needto be writtenintootherstatutes.
Mr. KNIGHT. Yes, sir ,I did.
Mr. PREYER. Such as medical records, insurance records and so
forth.
Mr .KNIGHT. Right.
Mr.PREYER.As well as bankrecords.
I would think that it would be very important in getting Con-
gress consent to writeexceptions intothose areas; thatCongressbe
convinced that you are seeking blanket entrance into the recor ds,
and that it would be important that you have some gui delines
drawn up to make sure thatyou recognize the rights of privacy as
well as theneedsfor security.
Mr. KNIGHT.Yes, sir.
Mr .PREYER. Thankyou for yourtestimony,Mr.Knight.
Mr. KNIGHT. Thankyou.
Mr. EDGAR.Mr. Chairman.
ChairmanSTOKES.Thegentlemanfrom Pennsylvania, Mr.Edgar.
Mr.EDGAR. Thankyou.
The question of capital punishment was raised, which begs the
next question,which dealswithguncontrol.
Have you personally, as a law enforcement person, had any
vie". s relat ing t o how any form of gun legislation or gun control
mightassist you in thepursuitofyourduty? .
Mr. KNIGHT. Well, as a preliminary to answering that questIon,
as you are aware, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firear ms en-
forces thefir earmslaw.They are in t he DepartmentofTreas uryas
we are in the Depar tment of Treasury. Treasury has taken a
position on the subject that you have asked me. My standar d
response to t hat questi on, and I don' t mean to say standard in th'
r
sense thatI dismiss it, because I don't have the answer. Ideallr ,\
we coul d prevent t hose who are mentally ill , those with crimIna
records, and t hose who have a propensi ty for violence, from pos-
sessi ng or having access to firearms, you know I woul d be in favor
ofsuch a thing.
Iam not atallconfidentthatwe canlegi slate or draw up laws or
rhaps evencreatea monstrous bureaucracy to administer it t hat
peul
d
be effective, so in thatsense, I cannotbe responsive t o your
WOestion, except, justsome of my personal thoughts on the matter.
qUMr.EDGAR.Thankyou.
Mr. Chair man, I would just like to say I have been personally
ressed with the Director's comments this morning, and his
in sharingwith us his thoughtsabout the issues, and I
no fur t her questions.
Chairman STOKES. Mr. Knight, letme on behalfof thecommittee
concur in the remarks of Mr. Edgar. We also woul d like to t hank
yOU not onl y for your appearance here this morning, and the hel p
and assist ance you have provided this committee here today, but
also the cooperat ion you andyourentirestaffhave given Professor
Blakey and all of ourstaffpeople during the course of the investi -
gation, and we appreciate very much t he kind of assistance t he
Servicehasgrantedthiscommittee.
Mr.KNIGHT.Thankyou verymuch, Mr.Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Thankyou,sir.
There being nothing further at this t ime, the committee will
reconvene at2o'clockthisafternoon.
[Whereupon, at10:25 a.m., thecommitteewas recessed, to recon-
veneat2p.m.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
Chairman STOKES.Thecommitteewillcome to order .
The commit tee's witness this afternoon is Mr . Benjamin R. Civi-
letti, Deputy AttorneyGeneraloftheUnitedStates.
Mr. Civiletti, welcome to our hearing, and at t his time we will
accept your presentation of your testimony in any way you so
desire.
STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN R. CIVILETTI, DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL
Mr.CIVILETTI.Thankyou,ChairmanStokes .
I have a short formal statement , parts of which I will read and
Introduce in its short entirety into the.record, and t hen I will be
pleased to addressany quest ions or subjects or issues which will be
of as!';stance to thecommi ttee.
l knowyou have alread:y heard fro.mtheBureau andthe
. A and the Secret Service concernmg their needs plans to
respond on this seriesofsubjects.
As you also have heard, the Service and t he Bureau have the
l!lJ. mediate operational and specific stat ut ory responsibility for the
of the President, on the one hand, and investigation of
a assassinat ions or attempts as well as other crimes
gjlnst U.S. officials, and foreign officials andguests, on theother.
h would like to discuss briefly current Federal authority to
andle political assassinati ons.
tiOur. Current legal posture wit h respect to Presidential assassina-
l\ons IS very different from what it was in 1963 when President
i nn.edy was assassinated.
kid
t
IS now a Federal crime to kill, kidnap, attempt to kill or
nap or assaultthe President,thePresident-elect,theVice Presi-
112 113
dent-elect, the individual next in order of succession to the Pres'
dency if there is no Vice President, a Member of Congress 0
1
Member of Congress-elect. r
The criminal code reform that we have proposed would cont inu
this coverage and extend it as well to Supreme Court Justices and
Cabinet members. In addition, many crimes that could likely be
termed political assassinations may be prosecuted federally under
the civil rights laws.
Itis now also a Federal crime to kill or attempt to kill, kidnap Or
assault foreign officials in the United St at es and protected foreign
guests and their families. The proposed criminal code again would
continue those provisions and would add a provision new to the law
that would make it a Federal crime to conspire within the United
States to assassinate a foreign official outside the United States.
We believe that the current statutes very clearly establish Feder-
al authority to investigate and prosecute these particular political
assassinations. The statutes provide specifically that the exercise of
Federal jurisdiction suspends State or local jurisdiction un t il the
Federal action is terminated. .
The statutes charge the Bureau with handling the investigation
and authorize the FBI to request assistance from any other Feder,
al , State, or local agency, specifically including the Army, Navy,
and Air Force, notwithstanding any other rule, regulation, or stat-
ute that might limit the assistance those agencies would ordinarily
provide, such as the Posse Comitatus Act.
We are, therefore, in a position where we can call on help as
needed, but where it is clear that the Federal authorities will be
conducting the investigation ent ir ely.
Director Webster has already discussed with you particular oper-
ational plans and arrangements currently in force that could be
put into effect in the event of a Presidential assassination.
Basically, I think it is the major case or major investigation plan.
Because we are aware that the Secret Service would already be on
the scene before the FBI would arrive, the FBI and Secret Service
have a working understanding of procedures and practices to
assure that the area is secured and evidence retained. These proce-
dures and others are currently being reviewed by the Secret Serv-
ice and the FBI as to their efficacy.
There are three additional points that I know are of concern to
this committee that I would like to mention.
First, the question of access to materials in the possession of .thj
media. Itis very possible that any incident involving a
assassination or attempted political assassination would occur in
the presence of the media and be recorded at least in part on film
or tape.
We are confident that in the unhappy event of such an incident
the media would be cooperative with us in providing us wit h anY
recordings, photographs, tapes or other materials they might have.
The Department of Justice has available to it the power to subpen:
such. materials or , if necessary, to search for them, and woul d us.
those powers in accordance with the applicable law and
mental regulations, if necessary, in the conduct of a complete In
vestigation.
We expect , however, as has been our experience often in the
!lst that the media will share materials with us and provide
Phatever assistance they can to our investigation.
'IISecond, I am pleased to report that in recent years we have had
onsiderable success in obtaining the cooperation of foreign govern-
in some criminal investigations that have required their
help. We anticipate that we would be able to call on foreign gov-
ernments for assistance in our investigation of any political assassi-
nation in this country, if the need should arise.
Finally, I would like to turn for a moment to the question of
accesS t o third party records. Recent laws such as the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 place limitations on access to bank
and ot her records by Federal law enforcement officers.
However , the restrictions in the new privacy law do not apply to
grand jury subpenas and, further, the new law makes adequate
provision for immediate access to bank records in emergency cir -
cumstances in which serious physical injury or property damage is
feared, as well as for the Secret Service in its protective functions
and for foreign counterintelligence investigations.
We believe that our needs to obtain prompt access to third party
records in any investigation of a Presidential or other political
assassinat ion are not incompatible with the current statutes which,
for the first time, give recognition in the law to the expectation of
privacy with regard to those third party records.
I know that there are many other issues that can be discussed
about how these investigations and prosecutions mayor should be
conduct ed, and I will try to answer any questions that you might
have and discuss whatever issues you would like to raise, and
unfort unat ely I will have to say in some instances I am positive
that I don't know the answer .
[The full st at ement follows:]
. .
114
115
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. BENJAMIN R. CIVILETrI . DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL
.'
.
' . \.. DX
l ':'.,

REMARKS
BY
R. CIVILETTI
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
BEFORE THE
HOUSE SELECT ON ASSASSINATIONS
WASHINGTON, D. C.
DECEMBER 12, 1978
I am pleased to have the opportunity to contribute to
. f ina l phase of the activities of your Committee. I know

tO yOU have already heard directly from the FBI, the CIA,
at
and the Secre t Service concerning their needs and plans to
respond to Presidential and other political assassinations.
Toe secret Service and the FBI have the immediate operational
and speci f i c statutory responsibility for protection of the
president , on the one hand, and investigation of Presidential
assass i nations , as well as certain other crimes against U. S.
offi c ial s and foreign official guests, on the other. I am
oere to discuss current federal authority to handle political
assass inati ons.
our curr ent legal posture with respect to Presidential
assass inations is very different from what itwas when
Pres ident Kennedy was assassinated in 1963. It is now a
Federal cr ime to kill , kidnap, attempt to kill or kidnap,
or assaul t the President, President-elect, Vice President,
Vice President- e le c t , the individual next in order of succession
to the Pr es i dency if there is no Vice President, a Member of
Congress or a member of Congress-elect . The Criminal Code
reform tha t we have proposed would continue this coverage
and extend it to Supreme Court Justices and Cabinet members.
In addit ion, many crimes that could likely be termed political
-r ...
117
116
assassinations may be prosecuted federally under the Civil
Rights laws.
It is now also a federal crime to kill, attempt to kill,
kidnap or assault foreign officials in the Uni ted States
and protected foreign guests a nd their f ami l i es . The
proposed Cricinal Code again would continue those p rovisions ,
and would add a provision new to the law that would make it
a federal crime to conspire within the United States to
assassinate a foreign official outside the United States.
We believe that the current statutes very clearly
establish federal authority to i nve s t i ga t e and pr o sec ut e
these political assassinations. The statutes p r ov i d e
specifically that the exercise of federa l jurisdiction suspends
state or local jurisdiction until t h e federal a c t i on is
terminated. The statutes charge the FBI with handling the
investigation and authorize the FBI to request assistance
from any other federal, state or local agency, specifically
inclUding the Army, Navy and Air Force, notwithstanding any
other rule, regulation or statute that might limit the
assistance those agencies could ordinarily provide. We
therefore are in a position where we can calIon help as
needed, but where it is clear that the federal author ities
will be conducting the investigation .
Di r e c t o r Webs ter has already discussed with you
part i c ul ar operational plans and arrangements currently
in for c e t ha t c oul d be put i nto e f f e c t in the event of a
pr es identi a l as s a s s i na t i on . Be c ause we are aware t hat the
sec r e t Service wou l d already be on t he scene before t he FBI
would arri ve , t he FBI and Secret Se r v i ce have a working
unde r s t a nd i ng o f procedu r e s a nd practices to assure that the
are a is s e c ur e d and e vidence retai ned . Those proce dures are
curr en t l y being reviewed by the Secret Se rvice and the FBI.
There a re three additional points t ha t I know are of
c oncern to t hi s Commi t t e e t hat I wou l d l i ke to address
brie f l y . First i s the question of access to materials in
the possession of t he media. I t i s very possible that any
i nc ident i nvol v ing a pol itical a s sassin a tion or a ttempted
pol itical a s sassination would occur i n the presence of the
media and be rec orded a t l e as t in part on film or tape .
We are c on f i de nt t ha t i n the unhappy e ve n t of such an
i nc iden t , the me dia would be coop e rative wi th us in providing
us with any recordings, photographs, tapes or other materials
t he y might have. The Department of J us t i c e has available
t o i t the powe r to s ub poena such materials or, if necessary,
to s e a r c h f or them, a nd would us e those powers in accordance
wi t h t he applicab le law and Department regulations, if
-r . < r . ~ . ;
119 118
necessary in the conduct of a complete invest igation. We
expect, however, that the media will share materials with
us and provide whatever ass i stance it can to our investigation.
Secondly, I am pleased t o r eport that in r e c e n t years
we have ha d considerable s uc c e s s i n obtai ni ng t he c ooperation
of f or e i gn governments in criminal i nve stigations that have
requi r e d their help. We anticipate that we would be able to
call on foreign government s for a ssistance in our i nve s t i ga t i on
of any political assassination in this country, if necessary.
Finally, I would like to turn for a moment to the
question of a c c e s s to third pa r t y r e c ords . Re cent l aws such
a s the Right to Financial Privacy Act o f 1978 place limitat ions
on access to bank a nd ot he r re cor d s by federal law enforcement
officers . However, the restrictions i n the new privacy
law do not a pp l y to grand j ury s ubpoenas . Further, the new
law makes ade quate provision f or immediate a ccess to bank
records in emergency si tuat ions in whi ch s erious phys i c a l
injury or property damage i s f e a r ed, a s well as f or t he
Secret Service in i ts protective funct i ons and f or f ore i gn
counterintel ligence investi gations . We belie ve that our
needs to obt ain prompt a cces s t o t hird party records in our
investigation o f a Presidential or other pol i tical assas s i na t i on
are not imcompatible with the current statutes.
I know that the re a r e many othe r i ssues t hat c a n be
discussed about how these inves tigations and prosecut ions
should be conducted, and will try to answer any questions
that you might have a nd di scuss what eve r i ssues you would
like to raise.
hair manSTOKES.Thankyou verymuch, Mr. Civiletti.
Cam suret he committeewill havesomequestionsfor you.
couple of witnesses previously have sortofdeferredto you, soI
sure we will have some questions for you in many respects.
aJJ.fhecommittee will ope:atenow underthe5-minuterule.
First let me askyou this:
Doyou re ally feel that under existing statutory law with the
gulat ions now in effect that we can effectively prevent political
re assinat ions from occurring, or would you have to say that not-
whatever we do, notwithstanding the statutory law
w
nd
allofthe lawenforcementproceduresin effect, thatifsomeone
:eally wants to kill the President of the United States that in all
probability there is verylittle that canbe done to stopit?
Mr.CIVILETrI.No;I wouldn'tagreewiththator saythat.I would
saythat solong as a publicfigure or officeror official goes aboutin
the public, in the manner of the public officials in the United
States, Federal , State, and local, then the duty and burdens of
prevent ing attempted assassinations or guarding against them are
increased many-fold. I think t hat given the fact that our public
officials in our democratic society do travel freely about the coun-
try and in the public, then there is exposure to risk, despite the
fact that the Secret Service takes enormous steps, including plan-
ning and making contingency plans and special training to guard
against assassinat ions and assassination attempts, as do other
agencies and groups in a support capacity to the Secret Service.
So,I guess my answer would be that it's not the law so much
that provides any inadequacies nor is it the quality of the protec-
tiveservices thatprovide inadequacies. The risk is imposed by the
nature of our Government and our country and our historical
characterist ics of free movement, participation with the public,
itemsofthatkind.
Chairman STOKES. We have posed a question to several of the
other witnesses in the past 2 days with reference to the Attorney
General' s guidelines that have been set up for domestic security
Invest igat ions.Thosearepresentlyin effect, aretheynot?
Mr.CIVILETrI.Yes, sir.
Chairman STOKES. Andcanyou tell us whethertheyhavehadan
at.dverse effect on the FBI's ability to prevent political assassina-
Ions?
Mr. .CIVILETrI. I cannot tell you that as a matter of empirical
I can only relate two things: One, second-hand informa-
Ii0\more or less from the Bureau and others, and then, based on
edexperience,my bestestimateof things.
intirst, t hink that everyone acknowledges that the quantity of
tio now obtainedas a resultofdomesticsecurityinvestiga-
.1S a fraction of what it was 3 or 5 years ago. To the extent
info In loss of quantity there is a possible loss of a piece of
thinkrnatlOn or so which proves out atsome point to be valuable, I
You h everyone would concede that merely by the loss of quantity
S ave lost some capacity.
such
cond
, I think that the Bureau feel s that the guidelines are
produthat the lessening of the information which they now obtain
gOOd. ces from an evaluative point of view information which is as
as the information they received in the past in terms of
121
120
quality and in terms of having relevance or predict ability to lik
cri mi nal acts against public officials, and that qua lity
is transferred from t he Bureau to the Secret Service. 101)
I have heard it said, although I don't know if it is accurate t
of all the infor mation transmitted in the past from the Bureauhat
the Secret Service only a small percentage was relevant and USe to
material and that it is the opinion or viewpoint of the Bureau t{UI
although the mass of material is no longer collected and
ted to the Secret Service, they are still giving them, on a relatiit,
basis, about the same amount of relevant or qual ity materivi
I think, again, on hearsay, that the Secret Service may have
a.
slightly different view and may feel that the loss of capacity thati
fir st mentioned makes their task more difficult. The Secret Servic
might like t o see the domestic security investigation
modified in some way for this particular circumstance.
My judgment is that the Secret Service has not done an evalua.
tion either historically or at present of the quality of t he domestic
security investigation information in 1978 or in 1968, so that their
good faith expressions are based more on feeling t han on hard
analysis, if they have those good faith feelings.
Furthermore, to the extent that the gathering of infor mat ion on
the activities of individuals or groups can have a prevent ive effect,
then I t hink the present domestic security guideli nes, which
impose a standard of either the use of force or violence or conduct
which will involve the violation of the Federal law in certain
specified areas, strike a fair balance to allow the collect ion of
material and relevant information.
The caveat I have to that statement is that a grave difficulty in
both maintaining security and conducting investigations arises
from the unpredictable nature or often unpredictable nature of the
threat posed. To change the domestic security guidelines to broad
en the amount of information in the hope of increasing the return
of quality information, I think, would be very dangerous to some
basic rights and constitutional rights, because in order to have
perhaps more quality information we would have to expand the
nature of the intelligence gathering beyond that which most judg
ments would say would be intrusive.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much.
My t ime has expired .
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.
Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We appreciate your being here today, Mr. Civiletti. 0
I think what we are trying to do with these hearings is, one, t
assure as far as possible that assassinations like the ones we ado
e
investigating don't happen again and, second, that if they. le
happen they can be dealt with, with as little confusion as posyre-s
and without the kind of confusion that was present in Da
On that second point, we are exploring questions about
tlo
the law is adequate now and questions about autopsy, ques
about news policy, and so forth. 'J1g
On t he first point , whi ch is what Chai rman Stokes was
you about, what we can do to prevent assassinations, now I WO
like t o just ask a few more questions on that point.
have commented that you feel that domestic security guide-
fOu ight now are adequate and that what we may lose in quanti-
lineS r may make up in quality, which I think is good to hear.
ty -:ntaHy even before we had the guidelines , when there
any' of. these restrictions, I think worth noting that all
we
r
h se assassmat lOns took place at that time, the King assassina-
or t two Kennedys a!1d Wallace. . .
addition to the guidel ines which some
said inhibit our ability t o protect the Presi-
WI t there IS pending in Congress the new charter legislation
would attempt to prevent abuses of electronic surveillance
w dabuse of using t he tool of informants, for example.
anDo you have any comments on how this charter provision should
be worked out? Do you anticipate that the Attorney General would
'ssue the guidelines or an Executive order would be issued subject
a congressional veto or is it your thought that Congress should
a forward wit h that legislat ion?
g Mr. CIVILETTI. Essentially, my views-and I believe they are on
all fours with the Attorney General but I have not reviewed his
statements closely before coming here, and if they are different
then they are different- one that I think the charter ought to be a
statement of principles, covering not only the scope of the FBI's
investigative activity and duties but also announcing within the
FBI certain standards, including principles which are prohibitory
in nature. The charter ought to cover the general range of the
FBI's responsibility, for the investigation of domestic law, Federal
law, for foreign intelligence in the United States and, to a certain
extent, foreign counterintelligence, although that may be covered
bythe intelligence charters which are also being worked on.
As to the domest ic law enforcement charter, I think it would be
a mistake for t he Congress to try to enact into statutory law a code
or ,a code of conduct or set of rules or regulations which when
finished would look like the Internal Revenue Service Code to
govern the actions and responsibilities of the Bureau.
Rather, I think after the basic principles and prohibitions and
shhere of duties and activities are thoroughly covered-and I think
t at can be done in a manageable ' form-then the regulations to
out t he direction and the intent and the force of those
should be promulgated by the Attorney General and
reVIewed under some process of approval or rejection or mutual
by the appropriate congressionalvcommittees and the
ic, III due Course.
reMi' I,>REYER. One principle that might apply in such a code or
atlOns might relate to this, and I would like to get your
Jrnent on it: .
veiU
nder
t he present guidelines the kind of domes t ic security
ag ,ance t hat was used against Dr. King would never be possible
I believe, but suppose, if the FBI does have aut hority under
guidelines to conduct domestic surveillance, a
Was er of some group that was under surveill ance, as Dr.
as thwl;lS assassinated, do you think the FBI should be disqw;1hfi ed
the [e lllvest igat ive arm to investigate the assassination in of
Victi act that they had the group under surveill ance to which the
rn was a member?
123 122
Of course, the argument has been that the FBI should ha
disqualified itself from investigating Dr. King when they had hive
under such intense surveillance. ll)
Mr. CIVILETTI. I don't t hink so, myself. You are absolutely right
we would not have another circumstance like King beca use th '
COINTELPRO type of activit ies and the investigation which wa
e
conducted with regard t o him are now abs olutely prohibited as i
think they probably were then. '
But, you trade off a potential conflict of interest in your fact
circumstance against the experience, the ability, the training and
the system that is in place within the Bureau, as opposed t o either
an ad hoc group or a group which has a substantially different
responsibility, and I think it woul d be fair t o say lesser abilit ies. In
that trade-off I would st ay with the Bureau and think we would get
a better job done, more complete, and let t he job stand on it s Own
feet with the Bureau's attention t o facts and its thoroughness
rather than under the appearance of conflict or init ial suspicion of
conflict go to a different group and then have the job really
botched in substance.
Mr . PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Civiletti.
I see my time has expired.
Thank you, Mr . Chair man.
Chair man STOKES. The t ime of t he gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Indiana, Mr . Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Civilet t i, we are happy to have you he re today and I would
like to ask you specifically with regard to your written testimony,
on page 2 where you indicate that the proposed criminal code again
woul d continue those provisions and then t his is the part I am
interested in, "and woul d add a provision new to the law that
woul d make it a Federal crime t o cons pire within the United
States to assassinate a foreign official out side of the United
States."
Is it your interpretation that the proposed code that is now being
worked on in the Congress, as it now stands, would then make it a
Federal crime to conduct the kind of activities which the CIA
conducted against Premier Castro?
Mr. CIVILETTI. If we are talking about domestic law enforcement
and without any other conditions attached, time of war or other
kinds of circumstances in which there would be ot her facto rs, then
a plot or conspiracy in the United States t o assassinate a foreign
leader would, under the code, be a crime.
Mr. FITHIAN. Whether the conspirators were working pri vatelY
or for a Government agency; is that correct? Is that what you are
saying?
Mr. CIVILETTI. That is what I am saying. But the only hedge aIIl
putting on or condition I am putting on is that I am limit ing I.t
domestic law and not speaking of times of attack or war or thI ng
of that kind.
Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you. I
It is my general understanding of history that leads me to
that in the pas t there have been a lot of questions, some cal 1
territorial turf questions , between the various agenci es.
In wondering if you could shed any light on what the role of
I Attorney General would or should be with regard to differences
the inions between the Secret Service and the FBI as to what kind
of the FBI ought to regularly provide the Secret Serv-
?f 1 with regard to domestic security investigations and information
Ihe't they might develop as a result of that. In other words, infor-
t a
tion
that might have some important impact on the way the
Service attempted in this or that city of the United States to
ovide for the President's protection.
prMr. CIVILETTI. I have two answers to that. The first is that the
Attorney General has played and does play a very important role
. attempt ing to coordinate, to communicate and to break down
differences which may be considered to be detrimental to collective
law enforcement efforts, and to eliminate or ease the level of
territorial differences or turf battling.
Of course, almost by design, it seems, within the Federal system
we have a lot of independent agencies and groups and bureaus, all
with separate law enforcement authorities and duties, and a good
many of them in separate departments entirely from the J ust ice
Department , and I cannot help but t hink that that is by design and
not simply by coincidence.
So even in t hat good faith effort to break down barriers and to
communicate well and t o have memorandums of understanding
and clear guidelines applicable to everyone, we have to have some
sensitivity to the fact t hat we don' t have one Federal investigative
agency, and I think neither the Congress nor the executive nor the
Amercian people want that, and we have to preserve, to some
extent, the independence and independent responsibility and duty
ofthose respect ive agencies.
Second, the second answer is that I think that the Attorney
General has t he duty and the responsibility in his legal role and in
the delegated function of it from the President to the top law
jpforcement official in the U.S. Government, to promulgate guide-
ines or regulat ions or directions, which are binding on all law
enforcement agencies or bureaus so far as they relate to their
with the public and to investigations which are under the
JUrISdICt ion of title XVIII of the code. . '
. or not it' s either necessary or desirable for that respon-
to be exercised in all instances is another question, but in
lIS Instance I think the Office of Attorney General is a sound
a
k
e
to rest the responsibility for the collection of information. It
es Isense for us not only to protect the security of the country
offj ly and its people but to protect the occupants of high public
Procs rom risk of assassination, and for the Attorney General to
the standards and guidelines under which such infor-
investigation, surveillance or other techniques is
that should there be and if there are irreconcilable
stan s'hfor example, between the collection agency, in this in-
thence} e FBI, and the operational agency, the Secret Service,
resolul. s appropriate that the Attorney General determine the
and b?n of those disputes based upon information and direction
received from both agencies, if the disputes cannot be
ve directly by the FBI and Secret Service on their own.
- --- - - - - - -
124 125
ChairmanSTOKES. Thetimeoft hegentlemanhasexpired.
Mr. FITHIAN. Mr .Chairman, I ask unanimous consentto proceed
for one additional combinedquestion in thisarea.
.Chairman STOKES. Without objection, the gentleman is recog.
nized.
Mr. FITHIAN.Whatspecificallyis theDepartmentdoing to insure
that the Secret Service, say, is getting t he kind of intelligence
information thatrelates t o thesafetyof the President , andwhat Or
how do you determine specifically whatgoes into that- what kind
ofinformationis requested?
Doyou havespecific officers in theJusticeDepartmentin charge
of this? I would like to know with some specificity what is, in fact
beingdone. '
Mr. CIVILETTI. Well, as I may have indicated from my general
statement, we have not yet been, except perhaps for a letter reo
ceived at the end of last month, presented with an exhaust ion of
discussion between the Bureau and Secret Service directly on the
amendment or modification of their memorandum of understand.
ing which covers the transfer of infor mat ion from the Bureau to
theSecretService.
We have not been presented, an issue has not risen to the De-
partment of Justice's, to either my office's attention or to my
knowledge to the Attorney General's attention, which would reo
quirea mechanismor anevaluativeprocess rightnow to determine
whether or not if a claim of irreconcilable difference were to be
made, how bestto evaluateandresolvethatclaim.
I haveseen the attitude, shall I say, or a viewpointof the Secret
Service on this subject. I have al so seen that they intend to and
are, as I understand it, meeting with the FBI to see if they can
resolvewhateverdifferenceson thissubjecttheymayhave.
Ifthat, as it mayturnout to be, does notresultin a resolut ionof
differences, then either my office or the Criminal Division or the
Office of Legal Counsel will assign an avenue to begin meeting
with the Secret Service to hear the data they present, the studies
that they have done with regard to the quality of the infor mation
thathas been transferred in comparison to t he quality of
tion transferred in the preceding 10-year period, to deter mine I
possible how they relate or project the quality of the int elligence
information to theriskwhichtheyareguardingagainst.
Rightnow I have no knowledge, I haveseenno studies,I have no
information which indicates that an increase, for example, in
number of security investigations of one type or another by t.e
Bureau would lead to any positive increase in anylevel or perceiV-
abledegreeof protectionafforded to anyhighofficials. f
Now, it may not be possible, under our analyses, in our state 0
the art, to do that in any kind of mechanical or precise
But I certainly would be greatly interested in numbers of InC
I
dents predicted or statistical analyses which show that by
in some way or series of ways increasing the number of domes
security investigations, that that would help to increase the sec
rity or protectionofthePresident. I
Unless it has a direct relationship, a meaningful one, then
t hinkthatthecasefor remedialaction would notbe made.
q
If I were responsible for protecting the President or the Vice
p e<:identin an immediateoperationalsense, I would be advocating
ri pushing within that responsibility for as much information as
3ncould possibly acquire in as great a volume as I could get it ,
the task is so difficult and overwhelming, and because the
onsequences of a failure of information are so devastating to the
count ry andto thepublicandto theworld.
c So that as an advocate, were I the head of the Secret Service, I
would want, if even from anotheragency, or perhaps I would want
toget the resources within my own agency, and the power within
myown agency, to conduct the most elaborate intelligence system
consistentwith statutes passed by the Congress and the rulings on
theapplicable lawby theAttorneyGeneral.
So I am not surprised, in other words, by the Secret Service's
simple comparison between the present level of domestic security
investigations and the information obtained from them as com-
pared with 5 or 10 years ago and the resultant view of the Secret
Service.
ChairmanSTOKES.Thetimeofthegentlemanhasexpired.
Thegent lemanfrom Pennsylvania,Mr.Edgar.
Mr.EDGAR.Thankyou, Mr.Chairman.
Is there a specific person or groupof personsin theFBI respons i-
ble for seeing to it that the Secret Service or State Department
gets all rel evant informationpromptly?
Mr.CIVILETTI.Yes, I believeso.
Mr.EDGAR.Who arethosepersons?
Mr. CIVILETTI. I believe it is Mr. Migosa's office, which includes
thedomestic securitysection.
. Mr. EDGAR. Is there a corresponding person or group of persons
In the Secret Service or State Department whose function is to
receiveinformat ion from theFBI?
Mr. CIVILETTI. I believe so. I don't know the proper title, but I
it is t he research and intelligence section of theSecretServ-
Ice.
Mr.EDGAR. Has thedepartment,SecretService, or State Depart-
menr entered into any agreements with one another which set
for transmittingthis kind of information between
eagencies?
thMr. TheFBI andtheSecretService have. I don't-think
beere IS any other agreement or memorandum of understanding
A tween Just ice and theSecretService other than thatagreement.
to t he Stat e Department, I don'tknow ifthey have a separate
b t with the Secret Service or not. I assume the CIA does,
U havenot seen it or reviewed it myself.
EDGAR.We have been listeningfor several days to a number
Yo dIfferent persons who aretryingto give us some input, including
on what kinds of recommendations or directions, alter-
In exist ing law or specific kinds of suggestions you might
asve I? procedure or law thatcan help us in case there is another
or theprocessofpreventinganassassination.
Par IS rnorning and this afternoon I heard the words of the De-
eel t
Ment
?f Secret Service, FBI , CIA, different legal coun-
. Ymind quickly goes to a game board that would have all of
126 127
those blocks listed and an event like the death of a Presi d
occurs. ellt
The question on my mind is, Do we have in place on that li
board sufficient direction so thatwe won't have the kind ofchttle
semichaos, thatoccurredattheexperiencein Dallas? aos,
Are we able and prepared, in your opinion, to respond withcle
lines ofauthorityandwithclearindicationas to who is responsibj t
for securing t he scene, for doing the investigat ion, for monitori e
it, so thatwe don'tgetourselves in the predicament thatwe
ourselves aftertheDallas assassination?
Mr. CIVlLETTI. I think yes. I cer tainly think much better tha
1963. I t hi nk that the adoption by the Congress of title XVIII
section 1751,and t heot he r sect ions which relate to it, whichclear:
ly give, and were intended to give, the authority to the FBI to
supersede all ot he r authority for the investi gation of an assassina.
tion, an attempted ki dnapping, whatever, put us in a better ops-.
ational plan, a better course of action plan, with fewer players
manyfewer playerst hanexisted in 1963. '
It is really a very simple, in my view, legal basis now for pro-
ceeding. I think t he Attorney General-and even this may not be
necessary-butin the event of an act which falls within the stat.
ute, if he makesa simplestatement, declaration or assertionofthe
authority of that stat ute , and even in the absence of that, I think
theassertionby t he FBI on thescenewoul d be sufficient .
Then from that point on, under the Bureau's established major
case planning and major case operation, the operat ional heads of
the Bureau, with hourly reports insome instances to the Director,
would take over all facets of t he investigation.
I beli eve the reading and intention of thatsect ion, as well as the
section with regard to Members of Congress and Members ofCon-
gress-elect, which is substant ially the same,would be thatit would
supersede all ot her applicable law and all other applicable State,
local, or municipal authorities.
Mr. EDGAR. Doyou have anyspecific recommendationsofchang-
inganyofthatstatuteor procedures, so thatthedepartmentmight
playadifferent or more efficien t role?
Mr. CIVlLEITI. Well, I don' t know if it will require statutory
change or not. There is the I-hour period, maybe, or half-hour
period, or whatever- and I don't know, it depends on where the
incident occurs-between the transfer of operational control fro
d
theSecret Service to theBureau,from t he Service's protective and
security services to the FBI investigative and containment an
confinementdu ties.
I believe that that is one of t he areas dealt wit h in the FBI-
SecretService memorandumof understanding, thetemporarytran-
sitory short period of time of t ransfer, whi ch is being worked
Now, it may be that that should be changed somehow so t .a
there would not be that gap because a lot can happen in 15 mIn-
utes or halfan hour, unless it is clear either by regulation ?r by
theagreementthattheSecretService is delegated theauthorIty
act for theBureauin the same mannerand form until the Bure
a
chiefarriveson thescene.
Mr. EDGAR. Thankyou.
ChairmanSTOKES. Thetimeofthegentlemanhasexpired.
gentlemanfrom Connecticut,Mr.Dodd.
The DODD. Thank you, Mr.Chairman.
Civiletti, I hB;ve just a couple of questions I would like to
toyOU first, If could.
add CIVILEITI. Yes,sir. . .
DODD. In all our discussions we have talked about the
. and who does what, andso forth, whenan assassi-
IOU 'onwould occur.
nait occur red to me, in t hinking over this whole process, and what
might be promoting as possible suggestions to improve the
w:d rly procedures ifsuch anoccurrenceshould happenagain,that
?ailseemed to be prefaced on assassinat ion.
It Is it your understanding t hat if the President were to die, the
deathofa President- let's assume afterproper investigation it was
determined to have occurred by normal causes-would t hese same
procedures apply or does it take a conclusion at the very outset
thatan assassinationhasoccur red?
Should a President have a heart attack-andas I am sure you
would appreciate, and as everyone on this committee does after 2
years that should that occur-Ihave no doubt in my mindwhatso-
everthat there would be an immediate conclusion on the part of
manyin this country t hat there was somehow foul play, and t hat
therewould be demands for invest igat ions,and so forth.
Is it fai r to ass ume t hat t he responses t hat would be called for ,if
itwereclear,as we saw in Dallas,witha shoot ing, that thesesame
procedures would come into play under a set of circumstances such
as Ihaveoutlined?
Mr.CIVILEITI.I amnot sure.I t hink not.I thinkthatthepresent
statutes may not provide, in t he absence of any indicat ion, any
facts of any nature or kind, to indicat e t he potenti al of a violation
of the principal t hree provisions- assassination, attempted assassi-
nation,or kidnapping- t hat t here reallywould be putin operation
full-blown investigatory powers envisioned by and ready to be in-
vt
ed
.bythe facts which woul d indicate a violation of the stat ute.
think not. If the President were to die on an operating table
undergomg a serious operation, or to die in his sleep of a heart
attack, with no indication whatsoeverof'aviolationofthe statute,I
amno.t su.re the stat ute is broad enough to permitall t he cri minal
InvestIgatIve authorit ies ofthe FBI to be geared up.
8fiMr. ,DODD..I you would agree t hat I pot be far
SO eld m saying that If thatoccurred there would be anoutcry for
Ine sortofaninvest igation.
Would have t o aut horize such an invest igation under t hose
Mumstances-thePresident dying in hi s sleep?
Ce r. CIVILEITI. One of two people, I guess. Eit her t he Attorney
n
Cenerai or the Dir ect or of the FBI. In all likelihood the Attorney
all , one of hi s plenarypowers,broad powers,to conduct
MrVestIgahon.s and t oenforc. e the law,and so forth.
that .l?ODD. Is It yoursuggestion thatwe oughtto stay away from
of scenario in ter ms of dealing with this particular
is No; I don'thave a suggestion.Thatis a concern.It
indicPfhc
y
Issue of how far t o go, in the absence of any facts t o
a e any kind of cr iminal act or foul play, and all facts appar-
128
ently t o indicate a natural demise, of what t he Congress Want
do, or what the Government ought to do to insure that it is wh: t
tt
I can see arguments both ways, a special inquiry to be lllade
special statute, because of the import ance of the office, even in tha
absence of criminal indications, just to be certain and confide e
and not leave that kind of a determination to the normal
processes which now exist in State law or Federal law. I
Mr. DODD. Yesterday I raised two questions to Mr . Webster. 11
pointed out, and I would agree, that more appropri at ely thee
should be addressed to you . Y
The first has to do with the issue of capital punishment. It would
appear that as a result of recent decisions, one by the fifth circuit
and an earlier one by the Supreme Court, that at least at this
particular juncture the status of capital punishment is somewhat
in question.
Under the present statute, with regard to the assassinat ion of a
President, that is one of the options of penalty.
Do you envision making recommendations to the Congress with
regard to the capital punishment statute in the upcoming Con-
gress, or would you care to comment at this particular junct ure on
what you think this committee ought to be recommending in its
final report with regard to what would appear at this particular
juncture to be a gap in the statute?
Mr. CIVILETII. First, I would agree that there appear to be sig-
nificant frailties, constitutional frailties, to section 1111 of title
XVIII.
I think that the Department has testified on at least two occa-
sions in the 95th Congress-and I am sure the testimony will be
the same in the 96th Congress on similar bills-that t here is a
statutory met hod, setting out processes and procedures and clear
definitions, to provide for amendments to section 1111 or other
murder statutes so that a death penalty consistent wit h the consti-
tutional mandates of the cases to which you refer can be enacted
and can pass constitutional muster.
I think that we have testified, I believe, on three occasions to
that effect. Furthermore, I think the Attorney General has indicat-
ed on at least a couple of occasions that his own view is to that
same effect.
Mr. DODD. The last question I have that deals wit h
questions, has to do with the handling of a person apprehended. 1U
the United States who was allegedly an assassin of a foreIgn
official.
I am looking at this 1116 provision, the murder or manslaughteJ
of foreign officials, official guests, or internationally prote
cte
persons. . n
As I read this statute it would appear that we cover the
wherein a person apprehended in t his country allegedly r
ed a foreign official, either in t his country or in a country ot e
t han t he victim' s own country, and we could proceed to
However, if we apprehended a person allegedly involved 10
assassination of a fore ign dignitary in that dignitary's own
then we would be precluded under this statute from procee In
with the prosecution.
129
That is my int er pret at ion. I am not suggesting that it is absolute-
rrect but I would like you to comment on it , if you could.
ly key paragraphs I am looking at are paragraph (a) under this
ute the first sentence there, "Whoever kills or attempts to kill
stt;,treign official, official guest, or internationally protected person
llh 11 be punished," and so forth.
s Then going to paragraph (b),
For purposes of this sectio n-
And then it goes down and defines in subparagraph (4) an inter-
national prot ect ed person-
a chief of state or politi cal equivalent, head of government or foreign minist er .
Whenever such is .a .count ry ot her than his own and any member of his
family accompanymg him .
And t hen going down to paragraph (c) where it says,
If the vict im of an offense under subsection (a) is an internat ionally protected
person the United States may exercise jurisdict ion over t he offense -
And so fort h.
It seems to me, after reading that, that we would be precluded
from prosecuting someone in this country who was allegedly in-
volved in the assassinat ion of a figure, a head of state, in his or her
own country.
Mr. CIVILETII. I quickly read t hrough those provisions, and I am
no expert in int er national law, but your inference seems to me to
be one that is-at least from that quick reading-seems t o be
correct.
If it is, and I would have to study it to be sure , it may be under
the theory that in the instance in which there is the exclusion on
the basis of comity, t r adit ions of international law, extradition
treaties and t he rest, t hat t he count ry of the offici al's status and
residence ought to be the one that has t he authority to prosecute.
like circumst ances we have insisted upon that with other na-
tions with whom we have dealt, so as to allow perhaps as is fitting
the citizens of t he country in which the public official is a public
t o be sat isfied that the perpetrators are tried according to
e in which t he public official operated and lived, and in
our .mstance that we may be able, free of any prosecutions by
fOheign gover nments, t o have retur ned t o the United Stat es anyone
h' hhas attempted or succeeded to assassinate or kidnap a
Ig public official of t his country. _ '.
hDo?D. 'I'hat thought occurred t o me as I wastrying t o figure
th tw Y It might have been excluded. But it occurred to me that
i would probably be t he case even under t hi s scenario:
Or f a head of st at e were assassinated in a country other than his
her
con own, that I would assume that same set of circumst ances or
statcerns. would be raised, t hat the coun t ry in which the head of
indt ci esided would probably want the opportunity to prosecute the
I VI ual, and that the ext r adit ion process would proceed.
t her efore caught up wit h why we should eve n have that
ar provision if that t he case. .. .
Unit 'dCSVILETII. Well , In some Instances that IS different In the
Withe t ates as to other fore ign countries because, as you know,
toriali ome special exceptions our law does not apply extraterri-
y.
130
In a great many European countries and foreign countries th .
law does apply extraterritorially, their criminal law. It follo;"s
citizen, wherever he may go, and when he commits a crime .e
another country, that is a crime of his residence count ry as well II)
his temporary country. as
That is not true generally as to United States law, criminal law
and as a result our agreements, our extradition treaties and ou'
memorandums of understanding with foreign countries are differ
r
ent in material degrees from those agreements between
countries exclusively.
So it may have been with that difference in mind in this section
the Justice Department recommended and the Congress passed
and the wisdom was such to enact into law, this 1116, to close
gap which otherwise would have existed, so that we would have
authority in this country to prosecute perpetrators who offended
for example, a public official, either in a South American count ry
or some other, who was a European official, because our statutes
and our extradition not being geared t o extraterritorial application
may not have been sufficient to allow the ease of return which does
apply when the act occurs by the perpetrator in the public official's
own country.
Mr. DODD. Could I ask you--
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. DODD. Just 10 more seconds. I appreciate your response. It
sounds sensible enough to me.
Could I ask you to have your staff take a look at that for us and
if you are correct, I would appreciate a memo, if we could get that,
explaining it .
Mr. CIVILETTI. I will be glad to supply it to you. It may be totally
incorrect.
Mr. DODD. It sounded awfully good. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Mr. Civiletti, let's move to another area.
Assume that the President is in a particular city here in the
United States and that he is fatally shot. Under existing statutory
authority the local authorities-or does the Federal
have the exclusive power at that point to conduct a forensIc
autopsy?
Mr. CIVILETTI. Well, as I read and understand not only this exact
language, but also the legislative intent of the assassination
utes, the Federal Government would have that exclusive authonty
superseding all other law. .
Chairman STOKES. All right. Is it your understanding that It
would be performed by Air Force pathologists?
Mr. CIVILETTI. That is my understanding. Not by statute, but b)
the existing agreement between the Air Force and the Federa
Bureau of Investigation.
Chairman STOKES. OK. e
On that point, there has been some concern-and if you haVe
any views I would appreciate them-with reference to whether
Attorney General perhaps ought to be able to set up an indepef;
ent panel of pathologists, so that in the event of this kind 0 . J1
traumatic situation, accompanying it, would not be the realiza
t lo
131
at the is such 8;n a,utopsy, in light of the
th sibili t ies of militarily mvolved assassi nat ions, et cetera.
POMr. CIVILETTI. I have any view on. t hat. I am not
faJ11i1ia
r
wit h the Air Force people. But If they have a substantial
. tit ute or unit and they are scientists, my guess is t hat t hey are
first and military second or third even and that it
SCi uldn't as a practical matter, make much difference.
WIt may be a significant difference in symbolism, perhaps, and
that to be weighed and considered, but I don 't have any
strong view.
Chairman STOKES. Let me ask you this, on t he sa me question,
dealing wit h some degree of independence.
In 1963, when President Kennedy was assassinated, of course the
Warren Commission was set up by President Johnson t o conduct
the invest igation.
The effect of it then had the onus of transferring to the Commis-
sion the invest igat ive and decision and policymaking authorit y
while at the same time the FBI had the investigative burden in
terms of the invest igat ion.
Do you think in the future, in the event t hat this were to occur
again, we ought to have a similar type of commission or ought we
to be going towards some type of special prosecutor route?
Mr. CIVILETTI. I don 't know the answer with regard to the com-
mission because it is hard to predict the kind of event which gives
rise to t he invest igat ion. In some instances a commission pre-exist-
ing would get in the way of an investigation, and there would be
again a diffusion of authority and direction.
On t he other hand it may be highly desirable t o have the t heo-
retical benefit of a totally independent review or analysis at some
point of the actions taken by t he FBI or by the prosecut or' s office,
or by whomever is involved.
It is difficult to think of all the hypotheticals in advance and
then make a sound judgment. At least it is difficult for me.
I assume that the Warren Commission at least was intended and
to have that kind of independence and impartiality, espe-
m picking the most respected jurist.. the Chief Justi ce of the
nited States, as the head of it . .
WYet either through circumstances or events or experiences, t he
wiiren Commission certainly did not serve that fun ction entirely
e ,or at least as it may have been designed to do. - ... .
rnSo, I ar,n doubtful that any given commission desigiied now will
whet entI rely the goals or the intentions that we now envision
traen don' t know the crucial thing, which is t he nature of t he
wsactlOn or the act or the activity.
kno e know the mood of the country at the t ime. We don 't
If the. event will be inside t he United States or outside. We
valid.; now If the unknown factors which affect the credibility and
for I Y of t he process are such as to overwhelm a simple approach,
look:xample, a perm.anent be
time d upon perhaps Itself as an inst it ut ion of ht tl e credibi lity over
As' anot her arm of the Government, so to speak.
the p 0 a special prosecutor, I have a firm view. The prosecution is
resentat ion of fact and law t o a trier of facts on the merits. I,
132
myselfdon'tsee any need or requirement thatwould aid the proc
ess by havinga special prosecutor. -
In fact, I can see thekind of traditionalargumentsthathereYOll
would notwantto havesomeone who was nota regular prosecutor
well -trained and experienced, and in the Department of Justice'
because you would not want to wait until he had set up his
and established his procedures and withstood a fight about who he
wouldbe andthe rest.
So, the prosecution part of this, I think, as a general matter is
not as troublesome to me as some of the other issues which the
committee hasgrappledwithandis grapplingwith.
ChairmanSTOKES. Thankyou. My timehasexpired.
Thegentlemanfrom Nor t h Carolina, Mr. Preyer.
Mr .PREYER.Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In your statement, Mr. Civiletti, you point out that should an
attempt be made to assassinate a President today, the legal sit ua-
tion would be quite different from what it was at the time Presi-
dentKennedywas assassinated.
We now have an assassination stat ut e relating to the President
and Vice President. We have an assassination statute relating to
Congressmen. You make the very sensible suggest ion that that
coverage ought to be extended to Supreme Court Justices and to
Cabinetmembers.
There could possibly be an amendment on the floor to exempt
one or two Cabinet membersfrom thatcoverage. Buton thewhole
I thinkthatthatis a sensible suggestion.
Those t wo statutes that we now have, the assassination statute
for the President and Vice President and for Congressmen, both
startout like this: "If Federal investigat ive or prosecutivejurisdic-
tion is asserted * * *"-so someone has to decide at the outset
whethert he Federal Government will assertjurisdiction andmove
intothecase or not.
I take it that that decision is made by the Attorney General?
Mr. CIVILETTI. Yes.I thinktheintentof thestatute,atleastfrom
the brieflegislative review thatI did with regard to itin anticipa-
tion of this testimony, was that it be automatic, and I think that
theBureauandtheAttorneyGeneralhavethatview in carryingit
out.
I don'tthinkitis a question of weighingfactors anddetermining
whether or not you do it. I think there would be an assertion
immediately.
Mr. PREYER. So you think the Federal jurisdiction under
statute attaches automatically, that there is no discretion in It.
Mr. CIVILETTI. I think that was the intent. I think that is the
practical effect of the FBI's operations and of the Justice Depart-
ment'sviewpoint.
Certainly in niceties, if I were redrafting that statute and
was the intent, I would put that exact language in. But I dont
thinkthatthereis a frailty in thatregard.
Mr. PREYER. I wonder if the statute shouldn't be made a little
more clear on that. To just read it, and with the history of the
concurrent jurisdiction, of State and local jurisdiction in these
matters, I would think the way it reads right now that the State
133
ld have the power to investi gate until and unless the Justice
",ou rtm
ent
assertedjurisdi ction.
I gat he:r from what you say clearly your belief t hat
au aljurisdictionshouldbe automaticm thecase.
fettCIVILETTI.It shouldattach, itseemsto me,immediately upon
oftheacts.
ther. PREYER. The statute has another pr:ovision in regard-
. .r.\equesting assistance from other agencies.It reads, Assistance
109 be requested from any Federal, State, or local agency, includ-
Army,Navy, andAir Force,any statute, r ule, or regulati on
contrary notwithstanding. "
toWhat is your understanding under that statute of who has t he
'ghttorequest thatassistance?Is ittheDirector oft he FBI,or the
AttorneyGeneral,or t he President,or allofthem?
Mr.CIVILETTI.Well, it is clearly the Attorney General. Probably
if delegated, redelegated undertheFBI charter, or some otherrule
orregulation,t he Director of theFBI, andto t he extent t hatthere
is not a restrict ion on the President, in some express manner ,
ordinarily the President has all the authorit y of the Attorney
General,ifnotmore,undertheConstitution.
In most instances, he has delegated t hat authority out complete-
ly to the Attorney General. So, I would think that under this
specific st at ute, as opposed to the general application of t he mili-
tary,that t he Attor ney General and the Director of t he FBI woul d
be able to call upon t he equipment, special equipment , flights,
military forces, to maintain the premises or things of that kind,
withoutPresidential authorit y.
Mr.PREYER.If I could askone more question about thatstatute.
Since they are new,I thinkwe need a little history behind themto
clarify them.You are certainlyin thebest position to give us that.
It says thatprovision atthe end thatyou can request this infor-
mation, " * * * any statute, rule, or regulation to the contrary
notwithstanding."
Is It your underst anding that , say, you request assistance from
SecretaryofTreasuryto getincometaxreturns, andt hat there
provision of law from the Treasury Department or regulation
Wtalch says it would not be available to you under these circum-
s nces?
t his law override thatTreasur y Departmentregulation? Or
bankrecords case that you were asked aboutearlierhere.
....n...) this overr ide all of our other laws t hat permit' l3f;l Cords being
'''aue available? "
CIVILETTI. I don't know the answer to that. I tend to t hink
Felit was designed to override State law as well as conflicting
Co'::tal law applicable to theuse of themilitary,such as thePosse
j"latus Act.
unctould have to research the legislative history because it is
WOUWab from the face of the statute whether what you suggest
hroa e true or not, to determine whether or not the inte nt was
he d so as to override the protective statutes which have
en
If .a either beforeor sinceitsenactment.
ptobit dId,.or if it was designed to do that, I don't see much of a
the wit h it myselfbecause of theinfrequency oftheexercise of
rUSIOn andtheneedfor it.
134
However, as we noted in the Bank Privacy Act, we thought .
Justice so much of Treasury's arguments on behalf of the SecIII
Service, that we recommended to Congress, and they agreed
the Secret Service in its security function be exempt th
t
restrictionsof theFinancialPr ivacy Actof 1978. e
ChairmanSTOKES. Thetimeof thegentlemanhasexpir ed.
Thegentlemanfrom Indiana,Mr. Fithian.
Mr.FITHIAN. Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
Mr. Civiletti, I am interested in your understanding of jurisdic
tion and assumption of jurisdiction in the case of non-Federai
officials. In the case of Martin Luther King, I believe, t he jurisdic.
tional authority rested on his civil rightto travel. Thatseems toa
layman as kind of a far reach to getto a position where you could
actuallytakeaction.
There are two or three questions. I will sort of group them
together.
Would it be more direct and more specific to recommend or to
draft a homicide or an amendment to the Federal homicide stat.
utes t o deal with this, rather than to go t o t he extentof t rying to
workundersomeone'scivil rightsamendmentorcivil rights?
Thesecond partof thatis, from your perspective, is this general.
ly leftthatway, to permittheJusticeDepartmentandthe FBIthe
maximum flexibility as to whether they do or do not get into a
case? In other words, you don't have to invoke the rightto protect
someone's civil rights, I take it, but you would have to invoke or
you would have to apply or comply with the homicide statute?
Mr. CIVILETII. No. The answer to the first question is yes, and
theanswerto thesecond questionis no.Sure, itwould be,in terms
of investigation and prosecution, more simple to have a specific
crime applicable to the action thatyou wanted to prohibit as well
as the subj ect that you wanted to protect. A homicide statute
dealing with some narrowly described group, which might be sig-
nificant to the national interest, or frequently engaged in inter-
state commerce, or related to any other traditional Feder al jUrIS-
dictional hook, could be designed and promulgated, and would
make, to a lawyer as well as to a layman, the investigation in the
Martin Luther King circumstance one that was more clearly
withinthe reachof thespecificstatute.
Mr. FITHIAN.Doyoubelieve--
Mr. CIVILETII. I think, though, that the reason that t hat is
true now has little to do with flexibility. Ithas more to do Wit
federalism and more to do with theidea, which is somewhat weak
d
ened in the modern world, today's world, both in terms of law an
practicality, that there ought to be a direct, immediate
interest before the Federal Government passes particular ly cru
t ll
-
nallawswhichareduplicativeofStatelaws.
So I think that the attitude traditionally and hi storically has
been that ifthe subject matter is covered by the common law
t he statutory law of the respective States, that there have to.
sound and good reasons of one kind or another directl y
the Federal interest in order to get the Federal Government Inrt
that jurisdiction in a duplicative fashion. And when you s18.
moving away fr om high Government officials to public figures, I
t
........
135
rues perhaps difficult t o det ermine whether you are not pass-
a gener al Federal homicide statute.
regard to flexibilit y, I t hink t he unifor m approach, despite
of any statute,t he unifor m int er pret ation of t he
tbB is and has been, I t hink, to t he !1at ure of the
la
w
cific
cr ime, that part of t he constitut ional aut hority t o en force
srlaWincludes t he exercise of discretion in enfor cing the law as
t B
such
issues as how many t imes, how frequently, which cases,
toder what criter ia t o pr osecute or not to prosecut e. So it is not
anyone would want or would have more flexibility under a
lvil rightsstatutethan a homicide statut e.
CI Mr. FITHIAN. Absent any changes in the Feder al homicide stat-
utes doyou think thatthedevelopment of guidelines which would
outlinespecifically when t he Federal Governme nt will asser t j uris-
dictionwould be helpful?
Mr.CIVILETII.Itmightbe helpful. Again I assume you ar e speak-
ingabout some type of expression or guideli ne under exist ing law
as to when the Government would int endor under what criter ia it
would int end to invest igat e attempts t o assassinat e ' or kidnap
publicpersons, notnecessar ily Federal officials.
Isthat the thrustof what you were saying?
Mr.FITHIAN. Yes.
Mr. CIVILETII. To issue a guideline to say, if not in st at ut ory
form, th en what it is t he Depart me nt of Just ice and t he Bureau
envision as their responsibility, and how t hey int end to act in t he
area.
Mr. FITHIAN. And at what poi nt t hey woul d exercise or clai m
jurisdiction,whetherornottheywould toler atejoint jur isdiction or
concurrent investigations with t he States, how important t he indi-
vidualwould have t o be by some defi nit ion as t o whether or nothe
then would fall underthis or shewould fall under this.
Mr. CIVILETII. The reason I hedged the answer is t hat the coun-
terargumentto guidelines, despit e the factt hat t hey are he lpful in
many ways, is that if they are less t han t otal invest igation and
prosecut ion, they leave open beneat h t he gu ideli ne t hreshold an
area .of jur isdict ion which has been precommitt ed to not being
To a certain ext ent , t hey then give the public a sense or
a sense t hatthey have a license at leastfree
ar e eral below thresh<;> ld: And that is. ..general
argument , not. particularl y relatmg to this mstance, but a-general
wf::f!1
ent
which the Justice Department is sensitive t o, in not
t
$5OOln
g
to spell out in each detail- if the case involves less than
cO, are not going to invest igat e and prosecute federally; if
someone younger t han 10, we are not going to
Proseute, If It mvolves someone olderthan 90, we ar e not going t o
rent cure, and all t hose other fact ors-because we want the det er-
Want v: ue .ofthe stat utes to apply to everybody. Per iodically we
Partie Ishift the prosecutive effort , eit her to make examp les of
he u ar whi ch have become epidemic in a certainarea,or
cau
dial We t hat a ser ies of prosecut ions would have a rerne-
So gUIdelines, ,Prosecutive guidelines, although t hey are
Which h Y under st udy m the Department, impose a down side
as t obe considered.
.........
136 137
Mr . FITHIAN. Wouldn't t hat same argument apply to try]
draft a Federal homicide statuteto coverthesepeople? ng to
Mr. CIVILETTI. No; because you would have the ot her avail
invest igat ive hooks which now existto supplement,say, a narrable
drawn statute. I don'tt hink anyone would want to make the; Wly
mentor really recommend thattheGovernmentoughtto have rgu_
FederalGovernmentoughtto have, broadinclusivehomicide
t igative and prosecutive jurisdiction which would duplicate the
States. So I think that the argument of license would not
available in a narrow public person's statute, although I rnys
would not recommend it unless perhaps it was very, very
Chair man STOKES.Thetimeofthegentlemanhasexpired. .
Thegentlemanfrom Connecticut.
Mr .FITHIAN.Maybein hisabsenceI could asktheot her question
I havein mind,Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. The Chair recognizes the gentl eman from
Indiana.
Mr. FITHIAN. This is a question that pertains to an earlier set of
questionsthatI had.
Specifically, if the Secret Service, let's say, in the case of oneof
the names of all the securit y risks or individuals whom they Con-
sidered, whom theFBI considered securit y risksto thePresidentin
Des Moines, Iowa ,or wherever ,because the President was goingto
travel t here, and the FBI, for whatever reason, wanted to protect
either the source of how t hey developed this name or the name
itself, the name of this securit y risk, by not supplying the name,
what could and what would you or the Attorney General do ina
case likethat?
Mr. CIVILETTI. Supplythename.
Mr .FITHIAN.Thankyou.
Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.
Mr .DODD. Thankyou.
Mr. Civiletti, there is another provision of anot her statutethatI
would like to bring to your attention, the Financial Privacy Act
that was passed recently which provides exemptions from disclo-
sure to Governmentauthoritiesauthorizedto conduct foreigncou:n'
terintelligence, theSecretService for the purpose of conduct ingIts
protective functions and so forth, and I would like to draw y?Uf
attention t o provision B, having t o do with the Secret
As I understand it, theSecretService does nothave theauthorI-
ty to investigate or to serve in any sort of counterintelligence
capacit y, on thedomesticscene.
I would wonder why we would want to extend the exempt ion
theSecretService,particularlyherewhen it is narrowly defined
its protective functions, in light of the fact t hat they are nO
engaged in theacti vitiesthat I mentioned. ir
Mr . CIVILETTI. I don't think there is a prohibit ion against th
el
I
engaging in intelligence or infor mati on collect ing activity at all. r
don'tknow of any st at ut e which prevents them from doing that0t
restrictsthem from doing it firs t hand, and in factitis curious
over theyears the Secret Service has n' t seen fit to develop its 0 is
sources and methods in that direct ion. And I guess the answerr
e
that because there have been so many more FBI people who a11'
actively charged with counterintelligence and with domestic seC
nd antit er rorist activities, it is sounder , more economical and
rity more efficient to havethe transferoverof relevant material
J1lrmat io
n
from all lawful intelligenc e gathering to t he Secret
ill or'
ce
so t hat it can fulfill its functions of protecti ng the execu-
and its ot her security functions. I guess that is t he answer.
tl
veS
DODD. Didn't the guidelines t hat were promulgated limit

r
kind of act ivit y specifically to the FBI and exclude ot her such
thanciesfrom engaging in thatki nd of acti vity?
ag'Mr CIVILETTI. I don' t thinkso;no.
Mr'DODD. I don' t haveitin frontof me.
Mr' CIVILETTI. No; I have the domest ic security investigations
guideiines before me,butI t hinktheyapplyto thefunctions andto
the nature of t he activit ies, particularly by t he Burea u. I don't
think there is any provision that says that for other missions
another law enforcement agency or bureauor groupcould provide,
can conduct what would be known as eit her domestic security or
intelligence invest igat ions under similar standards or the same
guidelines.
The reason for t he exempt ion was the Treasury Departmentand
the Secret Service's argument thatwhen they receive information
as a result of domest ic security invest igat ions, to check out that
informat ion, and particularl y because of the nature of the execu-
tiveswho travel, they have to have prompt and immediate access,
to follow the leads and to reduce the risks or to find out more
informat ion, to t he kinds of records that are available in not onl y
financial insti t ut ions,but employment records andall ot hers.
So it is not simply t he initiation, but it is the pursuit and
evaluat ion, once the leads are obtained fr om t he collect ion
agencies.
Mr. DODD. I might point out this morning the Secret Service
testified that t hey were formul ating regulations as to their access
under this section, which woul d limitthei r access, so as to prevent
i:useof individual ri ghts. The Director said he would like a simi-
r exemption, except ion rather , to other acts enacted by Congress.
Mr.CIVILETTI.I am sure thattheirposit ion will be the same with
to health records andemployment records andto t he whole
senes ofprivacy init iat ives. . .
thMr. DODD. Will your office have any input into thatat all, or is
at somethingt hat will come solely from t hem?
hMr. Yes; we will have inputin t wo ways: One,we will
Dave a .vIewto express in the process in t he White House; in the
Office, which is dealing with t he general issue of
palVf!-c'y pursuant to the Pri vacy Commi ssion report. We
m that particularseries of init iat ives, as do most of the
iva departments , and I have at tended a number of t hose
ings.
art
cond,
we will have an input on the appli cabilit y of t he stand-
recoand mechanisms set up in t he Banking Act to ot her types of
prop
rds
d
when
are the subject of specific pieces of legislat ion
eXec by different committees in t he Congress or by different
Fu lVe commit t ees.
be : example, there are reasons or some arguments which could
thOseade Why t he model adopted for financial record privacy, and
except IOns andexemptions and thetests and thetimesandso
138 139
forth, should not be determined on an administrationwide basis
be immediately applicable to all kinds of records. Instead, a polito
determination might be made to leave some type of model cy
standard for evaluation as each particular category of records
presented, such as employment records or health recor ds or
other t ype of record, subject only to the principle that t here be i.
certain instances recognition of anexpectation of privacyand
thatmeansin termsof protections.
There are arguments that are less or more strong from a law
enforcement point of view, and from the point of view of Treasury
and many other legitimately interested agencies, depending on
whether you aretalkingaboutone kind or subjectmatter of record
or another.
Mr. DODD. Thankyou.
ChairmanSTOKES. Thetimeofthegentlemanhasexpired.
Mr . DODD.Thankyou, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Mr. Civiletti, I am sure you are familiar with
the fact that the Warren Commission was quite critical of the
Dallas Police Department, with reference to many of the state-
mentsthatwere madeby police officials relative to theguilt ofLee
Harvey Oswald, to the degree that had there been a trial in his
case, in all probability there would have been the assert ion of
violation of his constitutional rights by virtue of this type of preju-
dicial releaseof information.
I would be concerned in knowing what the Justice Depart ment
policy is with reference to the dissemination of news regarding an
assassination, in theeventthereweresuchanoccurrence.
Mr. CIVILETTI. There is a tug between two sound principles, in
answering that question. The first principle, which the Attorney
General has reinforced and extended, is that the Justice Depart-
ment, in criminal investigations and prosecutions, in accordance
wit h standardlaw, butin greaterdetail in application,should have
nocommentwith regard to invest igat ions,andno comment even at
t he time of the public disclosure of particular dependents through
chargingor arrests or public searches, on theguiltor innocenceor
details of facts which relate to evidence or the determinat ion of
guilt or innocence. And the Attorney General has applied, both
the U.S. attorneys and to the FBI , a standard that limits pubhc
comment to a simple recitation of the charges in the indict ment or
of the limited particulars available in a public document, such
thearrestwarrant, atthe time of the prosecution, andhasins iste
t hat therebe no othercomments.
Now despite that insistence, from time to time you will read in
the paper of a prosecutor, an assistant U.S. attorney or someone
else who goes beyond those rules, and t hey are called by the head
of t he PIO Office, or in some inst ances written to by me or by
Att orney General, r eminding them, and in effect r eprimandlOg
them, for havinggone across thatline. So thatour view consistent
with that principle, sound principle, with regard to
to the extent that it was a criminal invest igat ion and involve
potent ially a prosecution, would be to forb id thecomment.
On the other side, in those instances where t here may not be a
specific matteror a specific suspect or a specific courseof action
prosecution or investigation underway, but somet hing occurs t ha
mes un der our jurisdiction concerning an intensely newsworthy
COb'ect, a judgment is difficult to make as to whether or not there
i. public right to know, under some principles, first amendment
ISrinciples or other principles. Largely that often is determined in
ihis second area almost by default, by the ability of the press and
the media, despite whatever rules are in existence, to obtain good
ources and obtain facts and infor mat ion through hard work, dig-
andt he rest. Sometimes in thatinstance it becomes a necessi-
ty ack nowledge.a action in order to PTe-
vent wild speculat ion, mis leading or mflammatory rumors which
are floating aroundina volatile circumstance.
Sothe line between the two, between when it is important and
roper in a highly explosive and inflammatory situation t o ac-
knowledge and pr ovide sensible general information, accurate in-
format ion, and the other duty not to prejudice or hinder or inad-
vertently even handicap an investigation, is one that I could fore-
seein t he circumst ance of an at tempt ed as sassinat ion or assassina-
tion of a high Governmentofficial not to be ent irely clean cut and
easy.
My own judgment would be that the Attorney General, because
ofhis disposit ion and his efforts to enforce his press policy in the
rest of the department and the U.S. attorney's office's, would be
inclined toerr,ifwe er r , on theside of prot ect ing theinvestigation
and the nonpr ej udice of all the r espect ive rights involved. But you
can see the kind of difficulty in t he great tragedies and the r esul-
tant mas sive inquir ies concerning t he Guyanian and Congressman
Ryan' s deat h.
Chairman STOKES. I suppose then in act uality, t he precise situa-
tion which existed in Dallas as it relates to the local authorities
would st ill be t he same today really. There just are no rules or
regulat ions.
.Mr.CIVILETTI. I amsorry, I didn'tmean to give you thatimpres-
sion, There arewritten guidelines, directions by theAttorneyGen-
eral to all U.S. attorneys, which al so have been di rected to the
alt hough-I saw a draftabout 2weeks ago-theyarebeing
and spelled out. mor e clearly. -They would be generally
apphcable to all SAC' s and other Bureau personnel as well as to
the Depart ment of Justice, and they setout expressly prohibitions
and allo.wances in the handlingof pressinquiriesand press matters
cr iminal investigations andcriminalprosecutions.
fi 0 t hink that thoseguidelinesanddirectiveswouldbe looked to
in the responses and for the formal communications they
oudgener ally be followed.
r I am suggesting is thattheywould perhaps suffer some in
iob
ctIce
, because of the enormous pressure that would be brought
C on the department.
Mhal: man STOKES.Thankyou verymuch.
T Yt ime has expir ed.
Mhe gentl eman from Nort h Carolina, Mr.Preyer.
F; ' PR.EYER.Thankyou, Mr. Chairman.
We up on that point, I am encouraged by what you say.
.ed Mr. the head of Secret Service, this morning
hIS news pohcywould be, anditin effectwasto give informa-
140 141
tion in the nature of name and serial number, and refer it to th
JusticeDepartmentwhentheytookovert odo therest. e
I am encouraged that you actually are considering this in th
form ofwrittengui delinesto offerguidanceon it. e
Generally, I agree stronglywith yourposition aboutno comment
on guilt or innocence, but I would hope, in the case of a Presiden.
tial assassination, those guidelines will take into consideration'
that where a President is assassinated, and you are dealing with
the transfer of power and the need to make sure that it is a
legitimatetransferof power, thatprobably we have to lean a littl e
moretowardthepublic'sri ghtto know in thatinstance.
Generally, I am notin favor of double standards,butin this case
it seems to me we do have to work outsome way thatthe Ams-],
can people can get, in an orderly way, information on that, and if
we can also figure out some way, I hope your guidelines will
considerthis:how false information canbe corrected.
In the Dallas situation there was a lot of false information, and
as far as I know, mostof it is st ill uncorrected in the source, in the
newspapers, for example, thatputitout.
Let me justaskoneotherquestion for yourlegaljudgmentonit,
which is not directly related to what we have been talking about.
The Presi dent recently signed legislation which authorized legal
representation of the Senate. The House did not go along with that
in the conference, so it was left just that the Senate has legal
representation.
We have found in the assassination hearings that the staff has
quite a few, has run into quite a few problems, in going into court
and askingfor immunity orders or habeas corpus orders, and that
something like a House legal representative would have been very
useful.
Doyou haveanycommenton whethertheHouseshould dowhat
the Senate has done, that is, authorize a legal representative for
theHouse?
Mr. CIVILETII. No.
Mr. PREYER. You are a very wise man, Mr. Civiletti. Thankyou.
ChairmanSTOKES. Thetimeofthegentlemanhas expired.
Thegentlemanfrom Indiana,Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN. I haveone additional question,Mr. Chairman.
Would you personally favor the drafting of a code of conduct for
attorneys who accompany clients before an investigative congres,
sionalcommittee?
Mr. CIVILETII. I don't think so. I think that I would probably-I
don't know the experiences that you have been exposed to and
suffered throughor found intolerableor very distasteful, whateve
d
But the only two things that spring to my mind in that reg
ar
,
would be rules perhaps, rather than a code of conduct. I havent
given anythoughtto it,butrules of theHouse mightbe
which would atleastbe directed toward two things: One, multIPe
representation, which I think is a problem with which the code of
professional responsibility does not adequately deal, and, seco
nd
f
rules which relate to the demeanor and conduct, the method 0
giving advice and counsel to a witness, particularly during
course of testimony before the committee. As you know, in mO
s
circumstances of witnesses testifying, other than in congressional
itte
es
, once the inquiry is underway, and if is a presid-
CoI1l'fficer then counsel is not allowed to communicate constantly
irt%; the or to interruptthe interrogation, or to impede the
WIt ioning, unless it reaches a point of some different subject
or whatever , unless special permission is obtained from the
ll1
at
'
d
ing officer, be it a judge, a magistrate or some other official.
I would suggest that those, and perhaps many others, but
eare two areas thatcould be or might be dealtwith by means
committee rules, rather than trying to enter the
o of a general code of conduct for lawyers who appear with
or on behalf of clients before congressional committees.
cII would t hink as a general proposition, aside from the specific
. terrogat ion and fact finding, thatas to general conduct, conflict
11; interest , dut ies owed to the law, duty not to misrepresent, and
onthe other ethical considerations thatare included in thecode of
arofessional responsibili t y, that in the event of aggravated viola-
iionsofthose et hical or. directives, the ought
toexercise Its authority by invoking, to the extent possible, the
disciplinary procedures and complaint procedures available for all
other kinds oflawyermisconduct.
But I do t hink there are some legitimate rules thatcould be set
out such as the two that I mentioned, which would apply specifi-
caliy to congressional hearings and might deal with problems that
otherwise do not violate the code of professional responsibility of
lawyers.
Mr. FITHIAN. And you think that ifsomething were worked out
in those two areas,thattheCongress could balancetherightof the
witness to adequate advice and counsel on the one hand, against
impeding an invest igat ion or obstructingan investigation or delay-
ingan investigat ion on theother?
Mr. CIVILETII. I think a rule could be devised which would be
sound and lawful to do that, and I think it would help. I am not
t hat a rule alone would completely resolve the difficul-
ties thatare inherentin a lawyertryingt o do everythinghecan to
protect the interests of his clients or client in a semiadversarial
and the members of the committee and their counsel
find the facts as forcefully andquickly as theycan. There
wl stIll be difficult ies,but itwould helpI think.
M
r.FITHIAN.Thankyou.
Thank you,Mr .Chairman. . . . .
STOKES.Thetimeof thegentlemanhas'expired.
M eBent leman from Connecticut,Mr. Dodd
Cr. . ODD.I have no furtherquestions.
STOKES. Mr Siviletti, let me refer you to partof your
on page 3 of your prepared remarks. I am going back
You mamto the media aspectof the former question thatI asked
course you mentioned in your tes timony that it is very
any incident involving political assassination or at-
rued} ed polIt ical assassination would occur in the presence of the
Yoa recorded atleastin parton film or tape.
ity th then go on to say thatyou would expect and in all probabil-
tile media would be cooperat ive with you in terms of
et Cet estIg:'lt lOn and sharethose types of recordings, photographs,
era,Withyou. Butyou also cite thefact thatin theeventthat
142
.did not, that in all probability coul d reSort t
j udicial process. And I guess the question that points to is the
you are invest igat ing an event, such as a political assassinat i here
become involved in confrontation in the courts, and the to
delay that would ensue as a result of that leads me to wond
n
. of
whether or not in a relative period of calm such as the
t here any possibility or any merit to the suggestion that Sorne IS
of an agreement be worked out with the press relat ive to SUCh
nd
situation in order t o try and avoid this type of confrontati a
n
realizing re.cently we ?ave had cases where the press h,
been very Jealous of Its prerogatives m terms of assertion of
rights to certain materials? 1 s
Mr. CIVILETII. Certainly I would favor discussions to reach SOm
kind of a voluntary understanding with responsible members
newspapers or media or press or whatever, which perhaps would
not have the force of law, but certainly in which each side would
be honor bound. That might be worthwhile.
I would oppose a broadening or increase in Federal authority
to secure, through preemptory means, materials or mformation or
work product of the press or the media, even in the event of
allegations of, or suggestions of, or the occurrence of, kidnappings
or attempts to assassinate, or assassinations of high public officials.
Mr . CIVILETII. I might further answer, without comment ing on
the investigations themselves, that as you know perhaps, in some
very newsworthy investigations we have had absolute cooperation
from t he media with regard to availability and the use of materials
which were relevant to the occurences.
Chairman STOKES. Let me ask you another question, sort of a
spinoff of the question being posed to you by Mr. Fit hian relative
to the appearance of lawyers before a congressional committee.
The problem first came t o light during the Watergate hearings,
of course, where there was joint legal representation by one lawyer
for more than one wit ness appearing before the commit tee, and
this committee encountered the same kind of a problem from the
viewpoint of the possibilit y of t he conflict of interest where there IS
such joi nt legal representation, and there being no law applicable
t o the situation under congressional rules and regulati ons we
resorted to bar association ethics and excluded such representatIon
on t he basis of bar association ethics.
I wonder if you would have any comments wit h reference to
whc t her t here ought t o be some r ules or regulations or law
in t hat area? I might just add with reference t o you r grand JurIes
as well as our executive hearings might be applicable here. d
Mr . CIVILETII. I am reasonably content with t he soundness anr
t he operat ion of Federal grand juries now. We have adopted oV' e
t
the course of the last year a great many improvements to. m
ee
e
criticisms of apparent defects or alleged capacit y for abuse In th
t.
grand jury process, at least 10 major changes adopted by Depa
r
e
ment of Just ice regulations, so I am reasonably content with
authorit y and use and safeguards t hat are presentl y available 1
the Federal grand jury process. JlI
Certainl y multipl e representati on is a concern there. But I a
reasonably content with the way t he grand juries are now.
143
It'\., trouble is a quid pro quo of a bill or procedure for nonmulti-
resentat ion by a lawyer in the grand jury, and t hat is
pIe I think is not in the best interest of our syste m of
9O[1le
iL1jti
d:fi
nitely think, though, that a congressional r ule or House
which prohibited multiple representat ion would be in the
ru!\ of the code of professional responsibility for lawyers. To the
SPlrI t hat it was-and you woul d have t o look at this quite
nt
t he extent t hat it was effective to prevent the transfer
c0the communicat ion of at t orney-client information obtained by a
ore-o -
one
relationship to ot her clients or attorneys, again singu-
n
r:rIY represented one-on-one, then I t hink it would be beneficial.
The t rouble with it as a panacea is that it is t oo easily avoided
'Il1ply by a consor t ium of ot herwise independent clients or inde-
lawyers, so t hat you would have to have that extra protec-
tionand it would have to be a valid and lawful purpose, one which
I think could probably be designed.
We are somewhat protected, at least t here is the second and
third-hand protect ion of the fact that the grand jury, being a secret
investigat ive body, can move somewhat more quicky with regard to
witnesses.
Chairman STOKES. I have just one additional question.
As you know, t his particular committee goes out of business
December 31, and a couple of matters have come to the attention of
the commit tee during the course of its investigation.
Specifically I would have in mind the Bronson film which has
just been t urned over to this committee about a week or so ago
with reference to movi e photographs taken of the book depository
window, and then an acoustical tape which this committee has had
before it with reference t o the shots in Dealey Plaza, and for a
committee going out of business in a few days and certain ques-
tIons being raised' wit h reference to materials of this sort, my
question would be whether the Department would be in a position
to perhaps pursue further an additional investigation relative to
maten als of this sort?
Mr. CIVILETII. As a general matter, my answer would be no.
As a gene ral policy, the Department of Justice seldom turns
dOwn exploring at least or reviewing a petition or reasonable re-
qUest or whatever .
a own view is that the committee's work has substantial
. one well and really remarkable. Of course, we"'have had in
to substant iated other efforts which have gone on prior
the Dcommittee's work. In the instance of the Reverend Dr. King,
SO did a partial study analysis which was completed
I believe around June of 1977, prior to the change in the
UInlstrat ion. To some extent, even where we have investigated
senndly. and. prosecuted soundly and there has been conviction and
worYd;,cmg, incarcerat ion and the rest, to some extent in the best of
hum t here is always a question of the imperfection that attends
Prodan events as opposed to mathematical calculations or scientific
Cert or results. It becomes a matter of the public will to a
dUti:
1n
r xtent , but also a matter of judgment that falls within the
as toS 0 any particular department or agency of the Government,
how far and how fruitfully questions which always surround
144
human events can be tracked and explored to a useful or frUitf
purpose. \11
I don 't pass judgment on the Bronson film or the acoustical t
or whether or not they would be wort hwhile to experiment with
ape
examine in themselves, but as a general proposition I would thi Or
that there would be little dispositi on unless there was a sUbstant!l1
showing for the Department of Justice to begin any general
tion or investigat ion in t hi s rega r d. a,
Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much.
My ti me has expired.
The gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. PREYER. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Mr. Fithian?
Mr. FITHIAN. No; I have no quest ions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Mr . Dodd, anything further?
Mr. DODD. Not hing further, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. Cert ainly, Professor Blakey?
Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Civiletti, there are some really minor legal
questions that have occurred from time to time from the staff.
I wonder if a letter was written to the Department we could
expect a reasonably prompt answer for some?
Mr. CIVILETTI. We can probably get it t o you ar ound the first
week in January.
No, I am kidding. Cert ainly, Professor Blakey, we will be glad to
respond prior to t he expir at ion of your efforts and duties as soon as
we can.
Mr . BLAKEY. The hour is lat e and I would not burden anyone
wit h what would look like baroque det ail.
Mr. CIVILETTI. Thank you.
Chairman STOKES. Anything further?
There being nothing further, Mr. Civiletti, on behalf of the com-
mi ttee, I want to thank you for your appear ance he re today and
all of t he cooperation you and t he Department have furnished this
commit t ee.
We appreciate it very much.
Mr. CIVILETTI. Thank you, Chairman Stokes, Congressmen.
145
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL S UBMITTED BY MR. B ENJ AMIN R. CIVILETTI
THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530
J a nuary 9 , 19 79
Hono r a ble Loui s St oke s
Chai r man
Se l e c t Commi t t e e on As sassinat ions
un i t e d State s House of Representatives
Room 3369 , Annex 2
Wa s h i ngt on , D. C. 20515
De a r Chair ma n St okes:
Th i s i s t o clarify one o f the i s s ue s t h a t I dis-
cuss e d i n my test imony be fore yo ur Commi tte e on
De c e mbe r 1 2 and to provide a f ulle r explanation of
a que s t i on of l aw t ha t I was asked by Co ngressma n Dodd.
I wou ld a l s o l i ke t o respond to the q ue s t i ons r ai s e d
i n Mr. Blakey 's l e t t e r subs e que nt t o t he hear ings.
First, i n t he ear l y portions of my testimony and
i n my wr i t ten s tatement, I referred t o the Department ' s
a ut hori t y t o c onduct s e a r c he s o f t he me d i a f o r mater ials
in t he ir po s ses s ion t ha t might provi de informat ion
r e l e va nt to a n i nve sti ga t i on into t he as sas s ina t ion or
a t t empte d a s sas s i na t ion of a pub l i c official. To avoid
any po s s i ble misunderst and i ng o r mi s interpretation of
t ho s e state ments, I wa nt t o make i t c l e a r t ha t when I
s poke o f exerci s i ng ou r sear ch powe r s in a ccordance
wi t h t he app l icable l aw a nd r egu l ati ons , I ful l y i nte nde d
for s uc h s e a r c he s t o be c overed by t he l e g isla tive
p ropos a l be ing devel oped by t he Crimina l Divi sion which
was announc e d s oon af ter t he hearing on December 12 .
Unde r t ha t proposal genera l ly , s ub poe na s wou ld be required
f i rst before a searc h f or mater ial s i n t he pos session of the
me d ia , and we would be prohi b i ted f rom s e a r c h ing for work
p roduct mater ial s o f t he p res s.
Se c ond , I wou ld l i ke t o appr ise the Commi tte e o f
t he r esul t s of furthe r resear ch "i nto t h e que s t ion raised
by Mr . Dodd c o ncerning t he apparent a nomaly tha t
18 U. S .C . 111 6 c onf e rs Un i ted St ate s j ur isdict i on over
i nd i vi dua l s who commi t various cri me s agai ns t
nati onal l y p r o t e c ted persons i f t h o s e
outs i de t he pers on ' s home c ountr y, whe ther "i n ' the
Unite d St ate s or else whe r e , but doe s not confer
146
147
Uni t ed States j ur i s di c t i on ove r p e r pe t r ato r s of s u ch
c r i mes i f t h e c r ime s o c c ur i n t h e protected pers on ' s
home count r y . I now un de r s t a nd t h a t t h e anoma ly y ou
s uggest i s i nde e d t he l aw, though f or di f f e r e n t reas on s
t ha n t ho s e I h ad pos t u lat e d i n my t e s t i mony . Se c t i on
11 1 6 wa s a mende d by Pub l ic Law 94 -46 7 on Oc t o be r 8 ,
1 97 6 , in order t o imp l eme nt t wo i n t e r na tion a l convent ions
tha t h a d b e e n s igne d and r atifi e d by t he Uni t e d St a t es ,
t he Uni t e d Na tion s Conve nti on on t he Pre ve n ti on a nd
Puni shment o f Cr i mes agai ns t Int ernat i ona l l y Pr o t e c t e d
Pers ons , Incl uding Di p loma t ic Agen t s , a n d t h e Or gani za t i on
o f Amer i c a n Stat es Co nve nt i o n t o Pr e ve nt and Puni sh t h e
Ac t s o f Te rrorism that a r e o f I nt ernationa l Sign i f ica nc e .
Both con vent ions c arr y a l t e r na t i ve prov i s i on s t h at i f the
p e r pe t r ato r of an off e ns e a gai ns t an inte r nati onal l y
prot e c t e d pe r son (defin ed a s i t is de f i ne d in Section
111 6) is f ound wi t h i n t h e b orde r s o f a s t a t e tha t h a s
r atifi e d t he c onvent i on , t he r a t i fying s t ate mus t e i t her
e x t r a di t e t he perpe tra t or o r t r y him un de r its own l aws .
Ne i t h e r o f these conve n tions is s e l f -execut ing , so that
Congr e ss h a d t o t ake act ion t o impl eme nt t he m, wh i c h
was a ccompl ished by t he most r e cent a me ndme n t s t o
Secti on 111 6 . Th e a noma l y that Mr. Dodd poi n t e d o ut i s
the r esult o f the defin ition o f "internati onally pro tect e d
pe r s on" under thos e conven t i on s , wh i ch a r e conce r ne d
s o l e ly with the pro t e cti on o f f orei gn o f f i ci a l s tra ve li ng
ou t si de t hei r home c ountri es from t errori s t a c ts.
Finally , Profe s s or Blake y i n h is l ette r r aise s t wo
ques t ions r ela ting t o possib l e l e gi slative initiatives ,
one concerning the condemna tion o f items r elating t o
pol i t i cal ass a s si na tions t o pr e s erve the h i storica l
r ecord, and the other c on ce rning for f eiture o f the
instrumentaliti e s o f the cri me . The f orfe iture o f
f i r e a rms used in a c r i me that v i o l a t e s t he fede r al
c r i mi na l l aw i s mandate d by 1 8 U.S.C. 924 (d ) . I n
addi tion t o t hat provision , however, it may be t ha t i n
t h e s pe c i al circums tance s o f a Presi dent i a l a ssa s s i -
na t ion , ce r t a i n o t he r ins t r ume nt a l i t i e s o f the cr i me
or items r elating t o the cri me wo ul d pr operl y b e t he
subj ect o f f orfei ture o r conde mnation . We wou l d be
r e ce pt i ve t o na r rowly dr awn l e gisl ati v e prop os al s
t hat s pec i f i ed with s ome p a r t icu lar ity t h e t y pe s o f
items cove r ed, though our e xperie nce wi t h t he for f e itur e
stat ut e s c a ut ion s tha t t he y be q ui te s peci fi c a s t o
t hei r c overage. Th e Crimi n a l Di vi sion o f the De partme nt
o f J ust i c e would be very will i ng t o r e vi e w and wor k with
t he Congre ss in effort s to de v i s e an appr opri a t e f or f e i t ur e
a nd con demnat ion s t a tute .
I wa nt t o e xpres s t o y o u aga i n my appr e ciat i on f or
t h e work o f the Se l e c t Commi tte e on As s a s s i na t i ons.
Ve r y tru l y y o ur s ,
? LJ /. , / h -;'"
1-*" {l';'
Be n ' i n R. Ci vi l e t t i
De pu At t or ney Gene r a l
Chairman STOKES. Thank you.
The Chair would like to make some closing remarks.
prior to those remarks I would like the statement to appear on
he record that some of the questions raised in these last 2 days of
t arings and the answers given by the witnesses have posed some
hether serious issues relative to civil liberties and to address these
the committee has contacted the American Civil Li-
berties Union.
Unfortunately, prior commitments prevented the union from
having a witness available to testify in these open hearings.
However, they have consented to submit a statement for the
record, which the committee will be glad to receive.
. (,:}
148 149
STATEMENT AND MATERIAL SUPPLIED TO THE COMMITTEE
FROM THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
AMERICAN CIVIL LlaRTIES
W.. hlngton ornce
Jan ua r y 29 , 19 79
Mr . G. Robe r t Bl ake y
Ch i e f Co un sel
Se l e c t Committ e e on As s a s s i na t i on s
U. S. House of Re pr e s e nt a t i ve s
333 1 Hou s e Of f i ce Bu i l di ng , Ann e x 2
Washi ng ton, D.C . 20515
Dea r Mr . Blakey:
We wa n t to thank yo u f or the to expres s o ur
vi ews on th e o f t he Hou s e Sel ect Committ e e
on Ass a s s ina t i ons . Th e iss ue s wh ich mus t be r eso l ve d are
q ui t e i mporta nt. Obv ious l y ma ny of t hem rai s e s ub s t a nti al
c ivi l l i b er ti e s i ssues :
lVi t h r e s pect t o yo ur we s ubmi t for your
c on s i de rati on ACLU po lic y s t a t e me n t s wh i c h ma y be r ele va nt
t o t h e r esol ut i on o f t he s e mat t e r s by t he Con gress .
I . Le g i s l a t ive Re c ommenda t i on s on Issue s I nvolving the Prohi -
b i t i on, Pr e ve nt ion a n d Prose cut i on o f Assas s i na t ions and
Fede r a l l y Cogn izable Homi c i de s
A. Proh i biti on a nd p r e vention
1. no comment
2 . Th e Judiciary Commi t t e e s ho uld process for e ar ly
cons ide rati on b the Hous e comprehens i ve l egi s l a t i on
t hat would codi r e vi se and r eform the Fe dera l l a w
o f homi c i de , s pe c i a l attention t o a ssass i na t i ons .
Th e Commi tte e s hou ld g ive a pp r o pr i a t e a t ten-
t ion t o t he r e l a t e d off e nses o f con s p i racy, atte mp t ,
ass ault a nd k idnappi n
r
i n t he c onte x t o f assass i na t i ons .
Such shou d be p r o ce s s e d inde pendent l y of the
propos a l s f or t h e cod i f i c a t ion , or
r efor m o f t he Fede r a l crimi nal l aw.
Comme nts:
The ACLU oppo ses t h e c u r r e n t pr o posed r e vision of
t he Fe de ral c riminal l aw. Th i s o pposi t i on i s b a s e d on
t he un j usti f i e d e xpan s i on o f t he c rimi na l l a w a t t he
e xpense o f civi l libe r t i e s a nd t he r ights of defenda nt s .
600 PennsylvaniaAvenue,S.E. Washington,D. C.20003 (202)544 1681
John H.F:Shattuck,Director JayA.Miller,Assoc iale Director Kal hleen Mi ller,Legislal lveRepresenl al lve
Pamel e S. HorowItZ, Jerry J Berman, Legislahve Counse l Ellen teuzer, DaVid E. Landa u. Slaff Counse l
Norman Dorsen, Chai rperson, Board 01DireclOtll Aryeh Ne", r, Exec uhve O,recl or

i nc hoa te crimes of attempt of c onspiracy have been
The art icu la r concern. In the past, the combination o f
of e;e c r i me s and s ubs tan tive offenses have l e d t o co nsti-
t ht i ona l defic i e nt prosecut ions s uch as the ca s e against
t Ut Spoken p ublic cri ti c s of the government for conspiracy
OU i nc ite dr a f t r esis tan ce . Moreover, i nc hoa t e offense s
tOve bee n used t o j us t ify i nt rus i ve inves t igat ions i nto
po l i t i c a l activity. The ACLU the expan-
o f Federal i nc ho a t e crimes.
The r e vision o f the Federa l l aw o f homici de and ki dn a pping
do not d i r e c t l y present a c i v i l l i b e r t i e s issue. However, any
expa nsion o f c r imi nal law must serve compel l ing
governmental
s ee f rom t esti mony on t he proposed Feder a l
cr imi na l Cooe; 1 .
(a) no comme nt
(b) no comment
(c) no comment
(d ) Th e penalty to be provi ded for homi cide and the
relat ed of f e ns e s , incl Ud ing t he a ppli c a bi l i t y and the
const itut ion al i t y of t he death pena lty,
Comments :
Th e ACLU oppo s e s t he de a t h penal ty i n any context
becau se it denies equal protec t i on of the laws, is c rue l
and unus ua l punishment, and removes guarantees of due
pr ocess of law. See ACLU Po l i cy 1234; Appendi x 2.
(e) no comme n t
( 0 no c omme n t
(g ) no commen t
(h) no c omme n t
( i) no comme n t
(j ) no comme n t
(k) no c omme nt

150
(1) no commen t
Comments:
The ACLU is c urrent ly l i ti gati ng the extent t o which
such a trus t is an i mpermi s s i ble bu r den on Fi rs t Amendment
r ights in the c onte xt of civi l l i t i gation . un ite d States v.
(No . 78-165 1 E. D. Va . 19 78 )
(n) Th e applicab i l i ty o f t h r e at and phy sical zone of
Eotec t ion l e gi s l ation t o persons unde r t he physical pro-
tect ion o f Federal i nve s t i gative o r l a w e n forcement
Comment s :
Zones o f s a fe ty al s o r a i s e Fi rs t Ame ndment questions
sin ce t he y may be used t o shi e ld o ffi c i a l s from l a wf u l demon-
s t r a tions or otherwise i nt erf e r e wi t h ci vi l lib erti e s . See
Sher ri l l v. Kn igh t , 569 F . 2d ( 19 77); Quake r Ac t i on Group v.
Hi ckel , 42 1 F. 2d 11 11 (19 69 ) .
3 . Th e a r o r iate conmi t tees o f t he Hou se sho u l d rocess
for ear ly c ons 1dera t 10n y t e Hou se ch a r t e r l e gi slat10n for
t h e Ce n t ral Int ellige nce Agency a nd Fede r a l Bureau o f I nve s ti -
gat i on.
Comme nts :
Th e ACLU strong ly endorses t he enac tment o f charter
l e g islati on whi ch s pe l ls o ut t h e a u t hori t y o f t he a ge nc i e s
and p laces l i mi t s on t ha t a uthor i ty t o pr o tec t c i vi l l i be r t i es.
La st year t he ACLU e ndorsed c ompr e he ns i ve c ha r t e r l e gi s l a t i on
f or t h e CI A a n d FBI introduced i n t he House i n t he 95 th Congres s .
H.R. 60 51 a nd H. R. 41 73 . H. R. 41 73 h a s r e c ently b e e n i nt r o-
d uce d i n t h e 96 t h Congres s (H. R. 261 ) . At t a c hed a s Appendix 3
is a commentary on H.R. 60 51 i n First Pr i nc iples publ i s he d by
the ACLU's Pr o jec t on Na t i ona l Se cur i t y .
The
t he
t he f o llowi nq iss ue s i n consider i n a Uu res s r r
l Qrn c 1 ::..... , ....... .... .
151

AS y o u know, Congress is considering separate
r s for f o r eign intelligence and domes t i c intelligence.
chJ r t ea i s e c i vi l liber ties quest ions. The ACLU has testified
&o t h. r a llY on S . 2525 the f or e i gn i nt e l l i ge nc e charter
cr 1t 1Cl 1245 in t he House), argui ng t h a t it de p a r t s from the
lH: R" pa l
s
i n cor por a t e a i n H.R. 60 51 b ut a l so f rom the recom-
o f t he Church and Pike c ommt t t ees . attach our
n on S. 2525/H .R. 11245 a s Appendix 4 . Also we
t es t 1h a c ompa r i s on of the various proposals for your consi -
attJt\ on as App e ndi x 5.
de
r J
(b ) The r ela t i ons hi p between t he domestic
and t he 1nt e r f e r e nce w1th the exercise of ind1v1dual


Both l e gi s l a t i ve l y and l e ga lly , a distinction has been
dr awn betwe e n na ti onal secur ity o r fore ign i ntel lig e n c e f unc-
tions an d "dome s t i c i n t e l l i ge nc e functions ", the latter ' being
invest i ga tive functions directed a t domestic terrorist or
ass J ss inat i on when t he subject of inves tigation has no substan-
t ia l "for e i gn c onne c t i ons . " These investigations are the sub-
ject of a separate FBI charter t o be i n t r oduce d this year by
the Admini st r a tion and c on s i de r e d by t he J Ud i c i a r y Commi ttees.
The ACLU has t e s t i f i e d on the pricipals that should be incor-
por at ed i n s u c h a charter to protect civi l liberties, which
is attach e d a s Appendix 6. Since cons titutional rights are
al so invo l ve d i n the exercise of the foreign i nt e l l i ge nc e
(e . g . Mart in Luther King, Jr. was i nve stiga t e d because
of his a llege d connections with the foreign dominated Communist
Par ty U. S . A. ) , the statements submitted above with respect t o
the foreign i ntel ligence charters should be considered here
as we l l.
-r ....
152
153
Conunents:
Bot h the f o reign i n t e l l i gen c e c har ter and domestic
FBI charter mu s t establ ish t he ba si s for inve s t i ga t i o ns and
t he s tandar ds and proce dures to gu i de t he us e o f covert
inves tigat ive t e c h ni que s . From ou r point of view, these
mus t be a l on g the lin e s r econune nded i n H. R. '6 05 1 and by
t h e Chur ch and Pi k e Conuni t tees. Se e t e s t i mony a nd state-
ments under (a ) and (b ) a b ove .
Since t he ena c t ment o f the Fore i gn Intel l i ge nc e
Su r ve illance Ac t o f 197B , PL- 511, es t ab l ish i ng a wa r rant
for nationa l s e curi t y wireta ppi n g i n t h e United
St at e s , Con gr e s s ne e d on l y address t h e c onduct o f e lectronic
surve i l l a nce t a r ge t e d aga i n s t c i ti ze n s a broad. We would
r e q uire a wa r ran t r equ i r e me nt a l ong the l i n e s of PL-5 11 as
a minimum pos i t i on , a s d isc us s ed i n our t e s t i ma ny on
S . 2525 and H. R. 11 245 ( s e e ( a ) a bove) . The re s houl d be no
" dome s t i c security" except i on e na c ted whi c h depart s from
Ti t l e I I I r eq uireme n ts f or e lec t r oni c s urvei l lance of
crimina l acti vi t y as t h e r e now i s f or na ti on a l secu rity
wiretappi ng . Wh i le t he ACLU s uppo r ted t h e e na c tment of
PL-511 a s a modes t " i mp r ove me nt" ove r c ur r e nt l aw, we
con t i nue to o ppo s e a l l e l e c t ron i c s u r veil l a nc e a s a general
s e a r c h ba r red by t h e Four t h Amendment . For y our cons idera-
tion, we a t tac h o ur t e s t i mony on PL- 511 (H. R. 73 0 8 i n t he
95 th Congr e s s ) a s Appen dix 7 t o expl a i n our pos i t i on on
e lec t roni c sur ve i lla n ce.
Howe v er , we wa n t t o p oint o u t f or e mph a s i s s a ke
tha t we wou ld r e q u ire a j Ud ici a l wa r r ant f o r t h e us e of
i n f or mants t o i n f i ltrat e groups r e a sona b l y b e l i e ve d t o be
enga ge d i n Fi r s t Amendme nt a c t i vity who are s us pec t e d of
e ngagi ng in c r i me . The wa r r a n t wou ld al so cove r i n f i l t r a -
tion by un de r cove r a ge nt s , bu t not app l y to i nve s t i ga t i ve
us e of c on f i de nt i a l s ou r ces , wa lk- ins , or o t her s i mila r
i n f ormant s . I n t hi s r e ga r d , s ee our t e s t i mony on t he
FBI chart e r, Appendix 6 a nd our conune nt s a nd t est i mony
on S . 25 25 , Appendi x 4 .
lle nt s :
Wh i l e the ACLU h a s not addressed thi s q uestion
1 we be l i e ve we h ave covered the p rob lem in part
direct cons ideration of the need for a special
i n our when i nt e lli ge nc e agency officials are resonably
pr os ec ud to h a ve en9'aged in criminal act ivi ty. In our
be f or e t he House J ud i c i ary Commi ttee l a s t y ear ,
t es t l mued in f a vor of l e gi sla t i on es tablishing a t empor a r y
pr osec utor mechani sm, wh ich even t ua l ly was enacted
VI of t he Et hi cs i n Gover nment Ac t o f 197 B. We
Tl s t a nd the spe cial prosecutor t o be able t o appoint
under , t
' r
e
i nvest l ga ors.
or h1
Howev e r , i n a rguing f or a special prosecutor , we
mrnended one a ppo i n t e d when a ny offi c i a l or agent o f
a ge ncy was i nvolv e d in crime because o f
con fl i c t s of i nt e r e s t p resent in a l lowing the
De p a rtme nt t o hand le the investigation or prosec u-
I f l e gi sla t i on extended the jur i s d i c t i on of the
t l eci a l pr os e c ut or as we r e c omme nd , t h e n a special prose-
woul d be a b l e t o a ppoi n t invest igators i n s ituations
where i t wa s ne ce s s a r y . We attach o u r t e s timony as Appendix B.
Comment s :
The ACLU i s de e ply concerned about t he s e issues and
woul d favor t he i r r e solut i on in l e g i sla t i o n , s o l ong a s t he
res ult i s not t he enact ment of an Offi cial Secre t s Ac t or
an expa ns i on o f the i n formant privi lege .
Wi t h r e s pec t to " s o ur ce s a nd methods " , we submi t
t es t imony o f ACLU o f f i c i a l s wi th r esp e c t to expansion o f
the es pi on a ge l aws , CIA secrecy agr eements a n d prior res traint,
and , i ssues i nvo l ve d i n l i ti ga t i on i nvo l v i ng c l a s s i f i e d infor-
matl on as Appendi xes 9, 10 , 11, 12 , and 1 3 .
Wit h r e s pe c t t o " i n formers pr i vi l e ge " , we submi t
Pl a i nti f f s ' Memor a ndum i n Oppos i t i on t o Fe deral De fendan t's
t o Re c ons i de r J une 7 , Or der to I nf or me r
l Vl l e ge in ACLU, e t . a l v. Ci t y o f Ch i cago, 75 C 3295
Di s cov e r y wl th 74 C 326 8 & 76 C 19 B2 ) (ND Il l. )
PPend ix 14.
" ,

154 155
CO ( g ) ( h) no comme nt
Comme nt s: Whi le the ACLD does not ta k e a p os i t ion here,
we s i mp ly not e t hat thi s i s cove red i n Ti t l e I
of S . 2525 , H. R. 112 45 .
B. Pro secut ion
1 . Th e J udici a r y Committ e e should cons i der the impac t
o f t he pr ov i s i on s of law deal ing wi t h third- party r e cords ,
ba i l , and speedy tri al a s it app l ies t o b ot h the i nve s t i ga -
ti on a nd prosecut ion o f f ede rally congi za b l e h omici de s .
Ge neral Recommendations for Congressional Investigations
Commen ts : III .
no c omme nt
A.
Wi t h respect to third p a rty r e c ord s , t he ACLD i s
on r ecor d a s favoring strict s upoena and wa r r a n t r equi r e-
no comme nt
B.
ments t o p r o t e c t pr i vacy . Se e t e sti mony on FBI c harter ,
Appen d ix 6 .
c omme n t
C. no
Wi t h r e s pect to bail, the ACLD i s opposed to p r e ve n-
no comme nt
D.
t i ve de t e n t i on . Se e Appe ndi x 1 5.
E.
no comme nt
F. Appr o pri ate c ommi t t e e s of the House should c ons i de r i f
r ul e I I of t he House s hou l d be amended, so as to res trict
t he cur r e n t access by all Members of the House to the
cl as s l f i e d i n f o r ma t i on in tne possess i on of any commi ttee.
Comme nts:
Th e ACLD wou ld oppose any restri ction on Congressional
Th e ACLD po s i t i on wou l d e xt e nt t he l egis l ati on t o
ac cess to c l a s s i f i e d informati on, whi le permitting the Congress
a ny a s sassination r e a s onab l y bel ieve d t o i nvo l ve a ctiv i t i e s
to fas hi on r u l e s to protect the informat ion from disc losure.
o f the i ntel l i gence ageni c es. See t e stimony , App e ndi x 8 .
IV. Rec omme nda t i on s for Further Investigation
I I . Admini s t rative Recommenda t i ons t o the Ex e c ut i ve
A. no c omme n t
A. n o c omment
B. no c omme nt
B. no c ommen t
C. no c omme n t
C. Insu r i ng t hat i ts fair tri al /fre e press gu ide line s , cons istent
wi t h a n all e ged o f f e nde r ' s rl ght to a f alr trlal, a l l ow l n f or ma-
t l 0n about t he f a c t s a nd clrcurnstance s s urround lng an assaSSlna-
tlon pr omptl y be mad e p Ubl l C, a nd p r ompt l y be c orrect e d when
e r r one o us lnfor matl0n l S rnlsta kenl y r e l eas e d , a n d
Comments:
Se e ACLD po lic y , Append ix 16. r , ~
~ :
The ACLD would stress the "vo l un t a r y " nature of
t he agree me nt s .
Commen ts:
156
157
If you have further questions, please do not hesitate to COnt
us at our Of f i ce . With respect t o tho s e r ecomme ndact
tions whe r e we offered n o comment , we do no t wish t o imp l y tha-
the se mat t ers do no t r a i s e ci v i l l ibe r ties q ues t ions, b ut onl a t
that the recommendations as f ramed were too ge ne r a l in na t ur e Y
to r aise a specific civi l l iber t ies i ssue f or us .
;I
f ry J . Be rman
egislat ive Counsel
Enclos ures
f/kL. V
restraint.. incarce!'ati on, or such collateral consequences of
ff(:oJh
t a
s under current law, the inclusion of t heirfingerprints
arr
es
'
,
1I1 cr:1Jll
e
cont r ol data-banks and the r efusa l bv public or private
anpl Oyers to hire than on the basis of their brush ,,'ith the Iaw,
2d 933 (D.C. Cir.1973).
C.
Asecond way in l1hich H.R. 6869expands f ederal j uri sdi ct i on
over cr ime i s t.hrough the establishnent, for the first time, of a
cOllprehens ive approach to inchoate cr-imes .
The criminal l awhas wrestled long and hard with the problem
of lihen t he Law may intervene to prevent criminal corduc t b.y
j)n!Xlsi ng sanctions against activi t i es which l ead up to the actual
cr 1rn1rol event . 'TheACW aclmowledges the importance of crime
prevention arrl t he logic of puni shnent l'lhich protects t he i nnocent
public before r at her than after ccmpletion of t he cr1m1nal act.
At t he same t ime , we believe that t he so-c al l ed. inc mateoffens es--
sol i citat ion, at t empt arrl conspiracy--offer unparalleled
opr..ortunities for over-zealous Law enforcement which invades
constitutional guar-ant ees of freedem of t he press , free speech,
fr ee associat i on l'lithothers, and due process of Law,
'The combination of overbroad inchoate lvith substantive
Offenses can l ead t o const i t ut i onal l y defi cient prosecut i ons ,
SUch as tl:e case against outspoken public critics of t he goverrmcnt
fo ..:'.
r consPiracy t o i nci t e draft r esi st ance . See United States v ,
416 F. 2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969). I n such cases the conduct
.
. 0 a criminal of f ense is r emoved from any act.
In 1t 1
so f cr iminal , ard the links connectmg t hemmay consist
ent1r el
Yof pUblic and const i t utionall y pro t ect ed speech and

Such prosecutions move f ar aI"ay from the r,eneral
158 159
r-or!XlSC'S of t:10 cril'lin<ll Lau ard the t hoor-tes urxlor
of'f'onscs IKlVC been held
fee v.
353 U.S. 301, IH12 (1')57) ''7(l)' cv",r" consptr-ac: is by 1ts vei-v
natur-e secr et : a CIlRe can h,well" he sunrosed "']>e1'o ncn C(ll1CC'.\'t
tor:etllCr for cr-ime arrl advert tse tlle1r our-pose 1:':) the 1'Ol'lrl.,.
uncuestdonat-LyIns a stake or debwr1T1[';
""10 seelt to urrlermlne itby cr:ll'li.nal activity. rtlt 1t Ins
at l east as ['X'c.>at a st ake i.n c.IeanLv r.ar! .-j,nr; tIll? lil:l1ts of t'o
criln1nal sanct.ron. Lavs v!hichmake contr-over-sfa'l sr-ecch of'
cr1m11')'111ty L'1.Ve no ptacc in our constttut tonal svstem.
1. Cr1m:tnal Attemnt
SecUon 1001 Nould r;lve the fpckral f,overmiO'nt for the f:l.l' st
time an across-t.he-board attC"'1pt statute apnlicablc to all other
offenses. Such a statutemay have the' v:l.rtue of untrormtt v, but
itel:lrectlj r.onrres sional attention at"ay fran the salutorv effort
to detcrmtn v, inr-esrect to rorticular cr-imea, l.hether an at' t emnt
statute i
r
, or necessarv. no \':0 rpally l'!:l.'1t to punish
unsuccensfu'l attempts tomake a false oral statement, denons t r at e
to influence a .1udiclal proceedinr; or disclose r:ov8rnnent
information? Are such prosecutions an intelligent use of limited
resources for canlJattiP.[; serious crine? "oreaver , the ACW
bel.Ievee tint punishin.."; attempts to incite corduct
seriously :!.ncrea :}es the darl(:er of r.overment !JC'osC'Cut:l,on for
advocacy nlainly protected hy Pirst ftmenrn'lent.
lOOI (a) of E."'. (.86C'J--l1J:e but contrary to tl'Jl:>
3r'OI'1I1 Cormd,s:.ion roccnmerriatdon-def'Ines thE> conduct; sufficient
to constitute an attermt as "more than mere,P"t"par.ationf'r'Or:'am
that 1n:l.icatcs his intent to the of the crimE'. -'
&lch a stardard could affect1TlIU1YT.':l.rst ftmE'mment activities frOM
t )lelr berinnin;. Pol' examol.e, TTl3Jdno; arr-angement s for a
,1C Assel"'hlv 'it ir!flClJ'lTlatory statement s l"cre to be made
11

lU' r:uably be enough to const.Ltute an att Jl1 pted J.ncitement

\<'0ul
rl
reporters r:at herinr: information for r eports on iS5lles
t o r i ot .
of vital public interest m!r:ht be suhj ect t o prosecution for
t t(1'1l1ts to obtain clas s ifi ed information H their research annoved
s()l'leOne in RUthority
'J]lC RE"mt e improved this sect i on by an anerdrnent defininr: the
un ty corouct as "in fac t . . a substantial st ep toward the
ccnrdsslon of the cr:ll'lc . ' Never t hel es s . the oualt fication "in
f'lct' means that the actor need not knowthat his or her corrluct
a step, ' . a fl m" 1s urrl ersc ored by t he absence
or an:, definitl on of "substant i al step ; " I n line " i t h ncth tJ, E'!
C1J.ITent practice of f ederal court s and r ecoornerrlat i ons of t he
8r'o"111 Conmission and the f5A , D. subs t antial step should be de fined
as an" corduct ' st r onr:ly corrobor at i ve of the f irmnes s of the
actorI s int ent to cor:!.nl et e t he comussfon of t he of f ense" (Prown
Commi ssi on Pinal Report, 51001 (a) (emnhasis added ) .
2.
I n o':'finl ng cr iminal consptracv , Section 1'1112 not onl,v does
nothi ng t o l imitt he vague am overbroad nature of current Iaw,
but al co pr oposes an expansion in the consnl .racv lawbv i1'ltllicltly
cl1rnl natJ. nr: t hi> r-eoulrement t ho.t a consotrator rove t he intent
to CClW1Jt the of f ense .
-r" r( t;.
As lonr "p.o as 1025, the federal .j U0. c tar" expressed serIoue
concern conspi r acy pr osecuti.ons 1,,'ere ran(l:i nr; far beyond
t he l egitrrnte purposes of consrur-acv Im'..-t o prevent the
cotatl .
ishnent of (';roup schemes for coopcratIve
bCl rl/." Used "arhitrarily am Annu'1l Pl'ro rt of the
160
Attornev r-eneral f or 1925 at 5-". twentv-f'f ve vear-s Utter.
J ustice agatn warned trnt "loose pract ice as to
offense constitutes a serious threat to fairness in our
administration of ,justice.I Vrulel'itch v. United 33(, U
44n. 4lJ6 (19lJ9). T\'ltmty-five more vear-s have passed.
prosecut.Ion f or df.ssent and mere advocacy vet
more crlticiS/'1. l'E>vertheless. 'Ll'l. . I':R6
a
l eave consnn-acv
i n much the same state of confusion arx:l overbreadth. sUhject
to the same fl ao'ant abuse> . as it is nOIJ
Under Sectio!1 100? , conspirrtcv occurs when sCtlleone "ap:rees
,.,ith one or more rer'sons to enr;ap;e in corduct , t he per formance of
which woul d constitute a crime or crimes, am he or one of such
persons in fact eneages in anv corduct Inth intent to effec,t anv
objective of agreement . '
Under this broad f'ormu'lat f on a person can be charged ,dth
conspiracy even ifhe or "nr noes not i nt em t o commita crime
by ene.aginr; in 'an.'!comuct" to effect "anv objective" ofan
agreorent, 'Thecurrent on consruracv , 18 U. S. 371. re-ovtdes'
in pert inent part: f one or more ner sons consnire t o corrrnit
a crime . . . ard one or more of such persons in anv wav act s to
ef fect the object of the conspiracy each shallbe" r.;ullty . Accord-
ingly, the fuprerne Court has repeatedIv held t hat: "A convi ct i on
for cOT1!>p1racy umer 18 U.S.C. 371 cannot be sustaIned unlef' s there
is 'proof of an i\aree;nent to comnit an of'f'ense " . . ;' Unit(}
v . lJ 20 U.S. 671, 686 (l Q75) . This of intent
ras been deemed ,'Iurdament.al ' . f ee Tnrrarn v . United ,':mtes, 3110
U.S. (i72 , (77 (1959) . 'The fu pr eme Court 's dedsion i n Feola,
expressly maintair.s this r-couir-ement , the contr ary implication
of t he '1cport not!'llthiltarrl1n[':.
161
cur rlcei si ons est abli sh t ha t i n order to f',llf'taln
a ,judf'Pcnt of convi ction on a cmrrte of con- r-rr-ncv
to violat e a f ederal statue , th
n
Government
nJ'ove at least thP. derr ee of criminal intent
neces sa r y f or t he suhstantaive of fense itself
[ lJ ?OU. S. at 686] .
f\lI't hC t J:eCcurt in ' Feol R' dcclinej"to'addrebs tl':e'C'\l('f,U0'1
lTlOr E
;:
of l\'hcther it is f air to penalize parties to an ?t':reE!'1ent to
en:O;1l[je intent i onall:1 in appar-entIv innocent conduct I"here the
uni nt cmed r esult of enr,ar:ing in that corriuct i s t he violation
of cr1r.Ji nal statutes. " [ 1120 at (;01,. ]
Umer sec. 1002, a person can he guilty for cl'1l".. Clp:inp, ill
con::luct t hat consi der ed by i t sel f i s ler;al. For exampl,e , A am
Bconspire to rob Cl bank. Aasks C to drive Aand Bto the bank
on the nretext of obtaining a loan. c, ip;norant of the r-obberv
pl ans, drives Aard B to the bank. C has nOI" cormi .tted
a cr:lJne urder Sec. 1002': by ar;reeinr; to ertfl:;>J:,e in corrtuct , the
performance of WhiC!l vlOuld consti tute a cr-Ime, ard engaginG in
corduct \"ith an intent to effect an objective of the agreement .
ry The Senate r.eport has obscured the change discllssed
above by i t s treat ment of the SUpreme Court 's dec I sIon in Feola.
supr a . '!'he senate Repor t Sllgccsts t hat the (' .curt 's decision--
in t hat case is di spositive of t he matter :
"\'lith r espec t to sc ienter, thE> Supreme Court has r ecent ly
r esolved a confl i ct aJllOng 1;he circuits on the issue
whet her of the jurisdicti onal factor i n a
conspiracy i s an es sential element of the c narrte . [Peola]
The Court held that . save f or unusual cirCumst ances ,
such knowledge need not be proved urder 19 (i .S .C.
The proposed Code is consistent v-i th,r view. . . . ,-
(Senate Repor t . p , 162) . '
Senat e Reportmi sr epr ese nt s t he Peoladeci s i on and misstates
e relationship of that decision 1002.
a I n Feol a , t he Court was f aced the question of Nhpther
person could be convi ct ed urrler 1; 371 f or to "cOJTlTlit
offense against t he United States. " ':Ihere -the person di d not
t t hat t he of f ense he concededl y conspi red to cc.mni t haprened
o be a f eder al.'d'fense . ':!'he Court held that t here wa s no specific
162 163
An ar1ditiom.l consrdr-acv m-ot-Iem i.s cnrr:!.e(] fort"am rrrtll l'x1",tjJ1!," di :.cUGs1cn of political t actics "rluch 1!l1f'ht, mvol.vo COI"1.1iS510n of
lHIJ. lJ.tl'Ol lf!' .h the Si::th JlJ1lC' lxlr'l 'nt l;X'ar:tn the ri[':, ,t to
tri al in the dil:trict \:11e1'(,thf:> crime vas connut.ted, f\ consrrtrnc -:
prosecution 1:lr'\V be l11'oUf-;'lt <lnyt,rhere any conG\' i r.:tt ol' diel ,1lW act
to effect an objectIvc of the conspt r-acv. in t he case,
the ':'Ovel'r.ment chose to tr-v tho CRf'C in Poston nltilollr:h
several of acts C' VU"f!:ed in thf' irxlictl1ent tool: "lace in 11c1:
York ard D.C. 'The procedur-al UI1" of consrdr-acy
permitsthe p;ovcrrment to enr.;aC;<l i.fl forum-shoppinr.; f or t he plac e
I'Ihere a convict ion 1s thourllt rost lilcely to he obtained.
'l'he political misuses of consntr-ac v lC" 'fhave been
demonstrated i n the las t years, 'l'tie more orddnarv abuses,
against l es s puhl1cized deferxlants, as l onp: as
fi fty years ago. One test of any rev1sion or i-ororn of the
Federal Cr:lm.t'1il.! Code is to f'J"apple ard end
the abuses of toool. H.p. F8f.9abdicates
Cone;ress i onal responsihil ity in this criti cal area of t he Lavr,
3. Solicitation
Section 1003 (a ) makes i t a crime t o "ccomard , entreat, i reuce
or otheruine endeavor to oer-suade" arother person to do sonet.hirr;
lo'hlch constitutes a criminal offense under "circumstances stronr;ly
corrobor ataive" of an intent t int tbe other per son enr.:ar.:e i n the
prohibited corrtuct . '!he solic:lt or need 0:11y int end t Mt t he
conduct occur' he need rot kno- trat it is in fact a crime. 'Irus
under 1l.R. 6869. a person could be pros ecuted f or encOttrf\,n;inp:
soneone else to enr:l;;;c in conduct that he thinks is const itution"lllY
prot ected. 'Ry t
r
J0 t erms of t his al l-embrac1.nr, nrovision flny
-----------------,--- - ---------
intent requirement that Feola knewthe officer he assaulted vas a
'f ','f.cral ae:ent . Thus, Feola is iITelevant to the proposed
except insofar as itreaff1nns the principle that intent to cemnit
a crime i s r equired for a conspiracy conviction under 5371.
Dfl offen:>e coul d '.:' e t he bas i s of a cr1m!.nal prosecution .
;,olicitat10n an entircl" new f ederal crime . It i n
unnCCPSS<'lT''v because ot her of curr-ent la'" cover
t!lOse situaUons ther-e s0licitation ac tually r esults i n cr-Intlnal,
corr:! uct . 'T':IUf> , at present, ifa sol i c i t ation i s succ essful , the
solici tor coulrt be cr-irunal.lv liabl e as an ac ccm
nl1
ce . . If the
solicitat i on does not r esul t i ll t1':e cemniss ion of a crime> , hut
l'le I)('rson solici t ed ap.:rees ard ther eafter crmni t s an over-t act ,
solicitor could be char:::E'd 'l1t '1 consotr'ac v .
t
In proposinr; a sol tcftat Ion stat ut e . t he Bro"m CorrmiSf\ion
1nterdo1 t o provi de puntcrrnent for t rose "Tho i nstirate offenses
an:l tl X'r et y er e t ruly culpable . (:' brk3J;u;; ' Paris ,Vol. I at 358 )
r:ut t erms l ike "endeavor t o persuade' cast a r-uch t!i(ler net , en
the ir f ace t hey ensnare the speaker f or nothllYl; r-ore than speech,
\:''0n no ot: \er cr i minal act occurred. 1::/deletin[" the
Ccmni s si on ' s r 00ujr cr.ent of an over-t act t o"'C!M the cOIlT'liss10n
of a cr-ime the person sa Hcited (sec Final 'Report !lection
l(103 coul d he used t o punish advocacy ':'hich does not r esul t
In ,-ID,: l ad ,,:;s act i on . Thi s t.road f'ormr l.atdon i s soua rel v in
crjrJ' lict v'ith the First JlJTlem1'JY'r,t . Sec, e.F,., v. Oh10,
3()5 u.s. /j411 (l C) G9 ) .
Alt hour;h Sec t i on 1804 (0) (2) of the proposed bill r-erdens the
ofl' en:;;es in Chapter 10 to a fe\'! advocacy
(obr;t r-uct int:; mil i t ar y r-ecrutt ncnt , inc!tj,r.g 1'.1.Itiny, a
riot ) , 1; hJ. :; i s h'lI'dly t o safe::;.lD.l'ct Cl[:Qi nllt ovcr-reachins. .
'. ()lJ.cJ.t at1on shoul d IIOt be applicable as P. ff'neral npovisi on:
t he 0nt1re bll l shoul d be.cxanunrxl to det.ermlne I../hether
l>... ....l i.r particular instances r-ather- th..<>Jl h:'
- --
164
generalization. At the very l east , in accord '.'ith t he JIro\'ffl
CO!TJTIi ss i on reccemerdat ion to solicitation,to the
oa I a particular crime "Illich is , in f act , a f elory, " t ile
solic1tation of crimes I"hich are not f el oni es sbould not bo:' an
offense.
D. F'xoonsion of flc>.sis of
Crimes
Afourth way in ,..htch H.R. <:;86n exparris federal power- to
enforce the criminal law is throur;h expansion of the scope of
traditional substantive crimes. Under H.R. (,869muchof criminal
law enforcement I'/ill be federalized. Coornon cr1J1rlnal offenses
have traditionally been r-eserved for state e:overl1'11ents. The.
federal goverrment i nt er est should be limitEd to t ro se cr-Ines of
national concern. many of the offenses ''hose jurisdictjon 113
expanded by H.T:l. 6869 may not directly affect civil liberties
interests, the expansion of federal police pouer- 1'.'1thout the shol'/il1P'
of a sovernmental interest I,uuld be a
constitutional
'Ille jurisdictional basis of robbery (Sec. 1721), for example,
is exparded in tvo I'/S.Ys . Current fedr>ral 1av makes r obber-y (non-
bank) an offense only ifi t affects int erst at e conmer-ce under the
*1
Hobbs Act. 18 U.S.C. 1951,- '!he Hobbs Act has been construed
to limit the offense to racketeering. See United States v .
Yokley, F. 2d 300, 3011 (nt h Cir. l Q76, United States v. Gilbert,
548 F. 2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1977) , cer-t , deni ed , 5lJ L. lli . 2d 71
(Cct. 3, 1977) . Sec . 1721, however, lroul d 'overrul e these cases
am mamat e a hroad interpret ation of the federal robr er y statutes
(see Senate Report '. 620 n 28).
There are a number of other speciali zed ro bbery statut es
ttealing 1'.'1th banlcs, property owned by the Ijnited seaces, mail,
etc. See Senate Report, p. 616-617.
165
'tied to prove the complainant's prior unchastity. "Unchaste witness"
perrJ11ctiOns which permit an inference oflessened credibility from the fact of
sexual activity are based on no rational inference and violate a complain-
right to sexualprivacy-justasa"chastewitness"instructionwould violate
sfcndant' s right to a fair trial if invoked by the prosecution. A statute, for
e pic, which makes admissible evidence tending to prove tha t the complain.
been convicted ofa prostitution offense, or even evidence concerning
all'orconsensual sexual relat ions between the complainant and the defendant,
the necessity of showing a relevance, unconstitutional1y
on the right to sexual privacy ofsuch complainants. [Board Minutes,
February14-15,1976.]
Policy #233
"
Discovery Costs in Government Secrecy Cases
Thegovernment should pay allcosts, includingfees, transcripts,depositions,
and copying fees, arisingout of discovery in any casewhere it isal1eged that the
government is withholding or keeping secret information which would, if
disclosed, reveal illegal acts by government or government officials . This is
particularly aimed at the.costs of copying materials produced as the result of
discoveryinsuch cases. [BoardMinutes,March 5-6, 1977.]
Policy #234'
CapitalPunishment
The ACLUopposes the death penalty because it denies equal protectionof
the laws, is cruel and unusual punislunent, and removes guarantees of due
processoflaw.The deathpenaltyissoinconsistentwith the underlyingvaluesof
democratic system-the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness-that the
of the death penalty for any crime isa denial ofcivil The
Umon believes that past court decisions to the contrary arein e'itor, andwill
seek the repeal of existing laws imposing the death penalty and reversal of
con' .
V1chons carrying asentenceofdeath,
, The existence of the death penalty for crimes results in discrimination
.the poor, the uneducated, and members of minority communities. Its
asthe result ofracial bias iseasily demonstrated by the statisticson
167
166
executions from 1930 to the present.I The greater likelihood ofits imposit'
upon the poor isdemonstrated by unimpeachable statistical analysisand ,
other thingsfrom the obvious fact that the financially ableaccUSed
cnme may employ legal counsel and compensate them fully for the exten.a
efforts necessaryto pursue the many remediesavailableto those under
of death. But the poor,although they toohave the right to counsel, haveOnl ly
that counsel which is volunteered, or which iscompensated by the state.It
unrealistic tobelieve that such counsel, while dedicated, can give the kind, rangIS
and detail ofservicegiven by counsel compensated at the usual rate paid
mostcompetentlawyers.
Thus, in the case of the penalty, the punis?ment does not fit the
crime. It is, in fact, aconstitutionally prohibited dema, of equal protectionof
the law because it results-regardless of the written provisions ot 1Ii..
permitting it-in imposition of the death penalty almost exclusively upon
.ocicty' smostdisadvantagedmembers.
The Union also believes that contemporary ideas of the significanceof
iuman life make imposition ofthedeath penalty crueland unusualpunishment
. hich is prohibited by the Constitution. To retain the theory that thedeath
enalty is not cruel is to ignore the persistence ofindividual and collective
onscience which says that death imposed by the force of the state isthe
Itimate cruelty upon the person whoselifeistaken.Generalpublicabhorrence
r the death penalty is revealed by the prohibition or narrow limitation of
ipital punishment instatutes, andby thefrequent reversal ofguiltyverdictsfor
chnical errors which to laymen and lawyers both seemsimply to reflect the
.urts' apprehension that to permit the judgment to stand would result inthe
iding ofalife.
The irreversibilityofthedeath penalty meansthat error discoveredafterthe
-nalty has been imposed cannot be corrected. One who suffers the death
.nalty, and subsequently is found to have been improperly convicted, has been
-nicd due process oflaw. Moreover,because jury panels in capital casesare
Iccted partly on thebasisofabeliefinthe death penalty, thestate isprotected
ainst a jury biased against capital punishment, but the defendant is not
otcctcd against a jury biased infavor ofit. So too does the existenceof the
' ath penalty have a deleterious effect on the administration of justice. The
celltiveofacapitalconviction actsasaspurto theuseofunfairorevenlawless
c thods by police and prosecutors, to which is added blatant and emotional
.vcrage by the mass media, all combining to make a fair trial impossible.
Minutes,October2-3,1976.]
'I f the 3,859 persons executed for all crimes since 1930, 54.6% have been black
bcrs ofother racial minority groups. Ofthe 455 executed for rape alone, 89.5.%
'e n nun-whi te. As cens us data clearly reveal. blacks in Americansociety have consl
sten
of
' prevented approximately 10% of the United States population. (Source: Bureau st
risons, National Prisoner Statistics, Bulletin No. 45, Capital Punishment 193068,
)6 9, ) Of the 392 persons on death row on August I, 1977, 50.8% were non-
w
:1/
nt inuing the classic pattern of racially discriminatory imposition of the death
<;L1 urcc: Death-row Cen sus, August I, 1977, National Coalition Against the Death pen
.Further Infonllation (not policy)
In the 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court had ruled
t absolute discretion on the part of the sentencing aut hority (judge and/or
) to impose the death penalty orlifeimprisonment foracapitalcrimewasa
of the Eighth Amendment bar againstcruel and unusual punishment.
;ecourttherebystruck downvirtuallyallthe thenexistingstatedeath-penalty
tute. The Court , however, failed to rule on the underlying question of
s
a capital punishment wasinherently unconstitutional.Some 36 states
;ereUponenacted new statutes, providingeither for the mandatory imposition
f the death penalty for capital crimes or setting forth certain criteria to be
by the sentencing authority before choosing between the death
sentence orlifeimprisonment.
In 1976,the Supreme Court held that the death penalty didnot invariably
violate the Eighth Amendment. It held constitutional a number of state capital
statutes that provide for aseparate post-conviction sentencing hearing("bifur-
'cated trial") at which the jury chooses between a life inlprisonment or death
sentence after considering the aggravatingand mitigating circumstances ofthe
particular case ("guided discretion statutes") , Gregg v. Georgia; Proffitt v.
Florida; andJurek v. Texas. Theavailability ofappealofthe deathsentencewas
declared another requisite of aconstit ution allyvalid death-penalty law. At the
same time, the Supreme Court held that death-penaltylawsthat provideforthe
mandatory death penalty upon conviction for certain crimeswere unconstitu-
tional, Woodson v. North Carolina; Roberts v. Louisiana. Subsequent to these
decisions, the Supreme Court held in Coker v. Georgia (1977), that the death
penalty could not constitutionally be imposed fora non-homicidal rape of an'
adult female, nor mandatorily for the killing of a police officer in the
performanceofhis duty,Roberts v. Louisiana II (1977).TheCourtisexpect ed
torule shortly on whether capitalpunishment isconstitutionally permissiblefor
felony murderwherethe defendantdidnot directlycommit thehomicide.
The Supreme Court has now clearly ruled that capital punishment is
1) for murdercommittedby the defendant,2)wherethesentencing
Involves a jury process ofconsidering the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances of the particular caseand3)wherethe death sentenceisappealable.It is
knownwhether the Court would hold traditional capitalbut non-homicidal
(such as treason and espionage) to be constitutionally by
ealli. '.- ' ,.'<
G Numerous states have amended their capital statutes to conform to the
et aI .holdings,and states now have death-penalty lawson the books .
Fngress is in the process of rewriting the death-penalty provisions of the
I Criminal Code to conform to the SupremeCourt'sguidelines.AtMarch
978 Over 440 persons were under sentence of death in 24 states, but only
Gr
e
person (Gary Mark Gilmore, Utah) had actually been executed since the
Co decisions. The marked racialbiasin the imposition of the death penalty
nt!nues unchanged, with about half the people on death row from minority
168
communities. Current research tends to bear out that racial discriminatio .
capital punishment extends also to the race ofthe victim ofthe murder n
tn
th
overwhelming majority of persons sentenced to death having killed e
victims. Ite
Policy#236
Prisoners,Parolees, and Ex-Convicts
(a)Prisoners remain subject to the Constitution and while incarcerated
should suffer only restrictions ofthoseconstitutionalrightswhicharenecessary
concomitants to the valid pur poseof incarcerati on.
When the state incarcerates an individual, it takes responsibility for that
person's fair,safe,andhumane treatmentasstate action pursuantto tbe.Fifthor
Fourteenth Amendments, and it isforbidden cruel and unusual punishmentby
the Eighth Amendment. Yet the National Commission on the Causes and
Prevention ofCrime has cited "scandalous conditions" existing in the nation's
jailsand prisons. Such conditionsviolate the rights ofprisoners to the decency
and respect to whichthey areentitledevenwhen they arebeingpunishedbythe
state.
But the state is obliged to offer more than humane punishment to a
prisoner. Society expects that upon release from prisons an individualwillbe
able to function asalaw-abidingandproductivecitizen; anditlooks to thestate
to rehabilitate prisoners in preparation.for this role. Nevertheless,accordingto
the Commission, jails and prisons "have been indicted as crime breeding
institutions."The public's growingconcern with the apparently risingincidence
of crime, much ofwhich isrecidivism,isan indication of a need to find truly
effective methods ofrehabilitation. Yet the Commission found that "programs
of rehabilitation are shallowand dominated by greater concern for punislun
ent
and custodythan forcorrections.Thuscorrectionaladministratorsareoftensaid
to be presiding over schools in crime." It is time to reverse the emphasisof
correctional institutions from "greater concern forpunishmentandcustody"to
greater concern for rehabilitation.Suchaneffortisessentialto reducecrimeand
the violence it spawns. For crime and violence too easily become the basisfor
officialactionswhichdirectly violatebasiccivil liberties.
Indeed, punishment ought not to be a part of the purpose ofpretrial
detention that results when an accused isunable to make bail. (See policyon
Bail.) In the smallnumber of caseswhere pretrial releaseisnot possible,every
effort should be made to remove the punitive aspects of pre-trial detention in
keepingwith the presumptionof innocence.
The opportunity for rehabilitation isundermined and the civil libertiesof
169
3
First Principles.
NATIO NAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
MAY1977 VOL.2, NO.9
In th e NeoW!o, p.11
Hum-linRights: ADomestic The Indidmmt TheFBIonTri..l,by
In the Courts,p. 13
Agendil by Robert L Borosage. of an FBI Ma n, Mor ton H. Halperin. p. 16
AlsoIn
In the Literature,p.14
p.7 Chicago Tribune. p. 11
ThisIssue:
A Law toControlthe
IntelligenceAgencies: H.R. 6051
TheLegislationSupportedbythe AmericanCivilLiberties Union
BY CHRISTINEM.MARWICK
wilhin the United Statf'S. And t he intelligencebureau-
cracy h.ilestablished a record of being unable to pr edict or
prevent violence and of producing unrelia ble intelligence
AFTER INVESTIGATION,
LEGISLATION
anaylsis .
With !Ouch 01 record, the c:kfmden ilnd their
acknowledge Ihat reforms must be ITIo1de. For thei r
The recent official have given us iii well-
defmden. tM agenda is "restoring conhdence" in the
documented. if tnccmplete , record of programs.
agencin; for tl'leir crilio, the goal ill restorin g consutu-
of N! ional wcu rity but which were a front a1 assault on tional va lues As a result. a great many
principln of open and responsible gover nment , bot h
which the agenei"- ca rried out in the na me
proposals will be contending on Capitol Hill in the
at home and abroad.
coming year. For its p.Jrt. the American Civil Liberties
'The Ii !.! of COY""I operations unearthed in thew inves- Union strongly supports the Pedere l Intelligence Agencies
Control Act of 1971, Introduced as H.R . 6051 by Rep.
swq:>l unde r 1M carpet . Our law enloreement agencies
bp tions is 100 vari ed and t oo threatening to be "asHy
Her man Boldillo (D.-N.Y.)and seventeen co-sponsors on
April 5. 1977. This is only the first of the legislaHve peck-
Invt\ligations an d into the cloak a nd dagger game of ages which are expected to be put forth in the coming
political intelligence : tht')' have attacked the civ il rights. months . Rep. Ron Dell ums CD.-C.i.l h.as also introduced a
peace, and other movements . Files have been amassed to bill which illIdenncal in most of its provisions to H.R.
blackmail members of Congress a nd other inOurntial 6051. Ot her membersof Congress art' also submitting
Amtrl u ns. The CIA has overthrown democra tic govern- their bills. both t he White House and the Senate Intelligen ce
and installed brutal dictatorships, while the Intel- Commit tee have bills in the drafting stage'S. and when the
Ilgffl ct' agtnd n of foreign powers are allowed to operate Hou se Intelligence Committee(wh ich is expected to be set
NlW diverted thei r resources from criminal
It isat all timesnecessary , and mo re particularly soduring the progress
of a revolut ion and until right ideas confirm themselv es by habit. that
we frequently refresh our patriot ism by reference tof irst princi ples.
THoM.....sP.....INE .-.. :,:::,: '
----
--
170
FlRST PRINCIPLES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVlL LIBERTIES
up lOOn) pot. undtorwlY. theftcould be . t ill encehersd of
propotal.
uchbluep rin t for reform will 51art with diffe-'n'l' n-
lumptions .bout tM Nturl' of 1M problems and the
rid;., th.t are involved. The administration's bill. for
rumple. will .Imnst try to end le"king, while
H.R. 6051 f'n cour.qft blowing Ihtowhistle on lrnproper
cpereuom.
with .11 ltsi,lolItion. 1M diflrrml proposal, must No
locked at not only for whit they ostensibly set ou l to
OIIttomplish, but for thr ir hiddffl content - the loo p-
boles . A IfOIisl.tivt' progrollm constructed 01 wt' ll-intrn-
uooed half-me ures .nd ccrnprcrnised by loopholes
would wt up "ref ormed" inlrllipnct' community th.t
could rf'ildily breed ..mt' abuSon of d.nd"linr poWf'r
the rut,..n! fu ror din dc;own.
A MAJOR OVERHAUL NEEDED
We TniIIy nt'vrr . b lto10 IC'CUf.lt'ly USft.!o the full
edenl of the damagr th.t the- v.riout
iIlgf'ndn hillYf'doM', bul tile grillvity of tile unilln,,,,,fftd
qufttions it Cf'rtillin, To wllilll nlffll. for in,liIll"Ia. hiIlve
thew opeu lions iIlctuilllly crNtl'd violenct'l Don ill
gov",nmml which usn trrror to it. own fOndsstut .In
l'pidf'm k vf lerrorisml What would domeslic polilia
now look but for iIllllicla on civil righh
H.R.6051
The Federal Intelligence
Agencies Control Act of 1977
TideI - mds dOrnfthC polilkal invnhg.l tionl; iIl llows
only the inVftlig.ationofC'rimft.
TitleII - limitl .lind re'Kul.ltft the kine of
tKhniqunthilll.r.
TitleIII - rdomu tM CtA. I?NIming it 1M Forf'ign In-
(orm.tion Sf.rvn . outlollwing cove-rl oPf'l'-
.IlioN. iIlndlimiling it 10 oiNilyring
from Ihniullndopm
TilleIV - rn-15ft the tncyIytlnn by Iimitina tMkind
of infonn.ation t NiI c.n bto d.luifil'd ;"nd by
JmyinSdusificationto any oi official

TitleV - outl.lwi oWciilll deit.nd deni.1I,
TitleVI - protll'Ch gOvtnlmml I'fI'IplOYf'f'l who blow thll'
whistle on iIIrg.llaKency
TitleVII - RIll up .. lempor.uy &pf'riiIl1 pl'OlUtor with
jurildiction OVf'1' I.... mm" of the
.,mcin.
Other Provisions of the Act:
crimiRJiI pen illltiesIIgolinsloffici oilswho violillle thll' Act .
giV" victlml a IltlltUtOry b.ulilio Ilue for dolrn.lge.
r.quirn oWf"iight of the inlelligma iIlgman _
public budgd'Il, oiudits, wolrrolnl
piIlpeTtraiis .
And would tM War hIVe ended ve..,.._ I' ,
the inlelligencr agmci" h.t.d not foughl thIP iJ
mcvem ent j
Even wilhout fiolll an swft'l, to Iluch qunt iona.,w.
know now that thll' intelligence oixmdn hill "'e
involved in theM prob1ftn1 to lin ominol'" dII'g,"" II i,
clear th.it the sy stem Ihilltengmdered th..pr ogr illrnl '
threatfflinx 10 Wilrrillnt 01 milljor oVlI'fhilul. M.
nhortins individuilll s who It . ff such a IlY"nn lhat t;:'Y
should nOI abuse the broad powers So along wilh
dllndt'Stinf' app.arillius will chillnge nothlnK . II
The AClU-b.J,cked Intelligence Agmcy Control ACI
would M such iIlncverh..ul of the 'yslil'rrl. As
the outline of its provilions on thi s ,holNt . it
would dramaticilllly chanaf' the FBI. CIA . ..nd IhIP
systnn; control invntiSiIltions; md the "plolu'lb..
df'nioll" ; whislllPblowing; put cr imina l P'"la hitt
on officiillis who viol.alll' the law ; and bk up I .... n'iI'fl.
h.andll'd applicilltion of dw I.w with .I prOWCutor
The changes would m'er..tM Cold Wu a..umptioN
tn.t full'led the buruucrillCY'1lprosram
iIlnddemOCTiIltic polilial iIlctivity in the firs t
In its st.Jtemmt of purpolle, the bill "'ada
NlI;on.) IUrity .nd 'No"nfot'CnlWnl of L.w.,..
e.mti.1 to .ny 1OC'Wty; bUI the r-.d to Khinrt' It....,
loaA cannot justify dcparlllrt hom conttllullona! ""
ttr<llinl. Drdemocnll c prindpkt.
This is the b.uic tumolround - H,R. 605) woul d II'nolCl a
of conttilullonoll prlnci pln, a Bovt'rnm",t01
chks<1lnd bal"ncnand gU<1lrllnlftdrighlt whenther.hoi,
bftn ill V<1lcuum
It not beenunderstooduntil rmtly Ih.lt IhIP
burtlolucrillCY WAS pUI tOKrihf'Ton an iIl lmost
illd hoc N,is, liIlrglFly by C'Xil"Culivll' (iilll, 1M M'CTC'C)'
system ts simililr CTeoiture.without ksisJa tl'd limits
Until now ha s bfton no ..nOllS rifort to det.rmIM
how Ihill iIlppU.IUI. whi ch iIlmounlS to 01 c101ndn.ttnll'
branch of govemmmt, fils Into II conatil utlonal frarTlt'-
work . it Wol$ that con st itut ion..1 itemll
"urn 01$ rniI"Cks lind b.J.anC'f'S. public.ccountl"lof
npmdilurn. the Bill of Righll. lind 1Mfom en policy
rnponsibilitin of Conwns could M wi ..ide on behalf
of the "nilltional wcurity.'" In this OM iIlf'N, it wal
simply usumll'd tholt Amman off ici..ls (unlike any
others in hiJtcory) rould bII' trusted not to iIl bu. III'CTfl
poWffS.
YII't WII' find tha t in exchange for a syst em which
II"XpKtl'dUI to giVl' up constitutional principln we hiIl vt'
gottm a dismoll rPCOrd Ihat undll'BCorn wh.l1M-
constitutionoll supposcod to ptf'Vt"Rt.
The Act m.kts major changn in tM ways tNI thnc'
things bftn hlndll'd for dKiIldn. TIwwchill "l" '0
in Ont dirtion - in the- IUpport o( cconstitutioNI
values.
CONTROLUNG DOMESTIC
INVESTIGATIONS
Title I of H.R. 6051 prohibits dOml'lltic poli ticilll intt'lIi-
genCIl'outrishl by 1111 iIlBft\d" _ CtA . FBI. IRS.
NSA , Mllitolry Intelligenct' . In.If'1'in of prov i' ionl aimed
.. t the FBI. the Il'Iillloition ensumthilll thll' Bu-
rnuwould M iIluthorized to conduct on 'y cri mi nallrWf'Il
ll-
giIltions.
171
MAY 1977
r<uti"e b rillnch hen. in the p.,t th.l.l
11It' int "Higenee mvntlg,illtlons Wt'Te not c:n
minoll
oInd si ntt the wlFre
to used in criminal prosecutions. II w..11
n<" s\l o!lstitutiorwl to collect of filn on thIP .
j'l\1l unChli,.1oIcl iviti n of The upsh.OI of thiS
ItS, 1po thil .a susPf'Cled crimlnclll hold protecnon under
Amendml'nt. but that the politically active
t'nd with "s,imple" surveil-
(Ju I fk,wt'rtd int o somethmg eup hem ist ically labe lled
.ction." whic,h could. at the of thlF
P:.aUcrilltll, be usedoIgalRst people exe rcISing Firsl
bu dmrn
l
political right s. The FBI's COINTELPRO
!JnII' n f'flts pr oVOC41 tC' ur, fo rgf'f'}'. cha racter nwuin.ltion,
uttd OUt prnsU I'f" on employerll, and other
orckr to any poMibility of. s:ome
aiminal conspiracy at some unspeclftl'd future
timr; org.lniutiom wert'
bfCa tM)' mighl one d.y iIlCqu II'f"
u"
l.aw enfolU' ment ageoors to mforcing thIP
liIlws would b<II' <1 moljor ch<1lngll' ovC'r eurrmt
Ulority. While levi did lech-
.,11 lIy .abuli,h the- FBh Intn-nal 5K.urity Branch, what
h",ppened WoI' l h.oa t its politlCoil inlelligt'na' func-
:,0", were tr.aruired to tM- 8urt"iIlu's Gmeral Invrs tig.l-
liON Di,i, ion. H,R. 6051 would clea r up ;"ny iIl llexe<!
.ambiluity .Ibout the li mita tions of thf' Bureolu's prop"
mluion by il Fed.rral of Crimi noll
Inv" tip tion (FBCIl. Both po lit ical su rvri llanclP oInd
odc tion spific41 l1y ba nnt'd.
Sinn' Kpionage. sa botage, tC'rrorism. and treason .Ire
crimn. lhe FBCI would bf' to pul its rn ourcn into
. uch bona fidf' law breaking. It could turn
rnourC'n to l ht' .. of fomgn powm In. t Opt'l'.. lf'
WIthinlhe Unitf'\J St ates - the Chi INn DINA and tht'
KDI''''''" CIA come to mind as reoldily al tM So vit't
lJnion'll KGB,
Another CTit iul chan ge which the Control
Actpl'ovldes for is the of the "sPftCh crime" -
)B U.5. C.1210) (1M- Riot Act) . 2385 (IN- Smith Acl
qllMt iIldvOColling violf'nt overthrow of the govf'TTtmmt).
i lJ86 lltJe Voo rhis Anti-Prop.illgolndoa Act) , .Ind Ii 2387
nd 2391 (Ihe Military Sediti on Acts).
Court long .Igo sloltule such .a n.arrow
r rt1<1l til'ln tholt conv ict ion und them could M wnn
l' nly If I.... sPftCh cr ime accomp.J nif'CI othIPr crimn which
.art punishable under ot her. morll' co ncrete statute. And
.al though the FBI and l ustl ce Dl!partmf'nt tJoIve undC'rstood
thai they coul d not wi n co nv icti ons unde r thew loaws.
IhII'y h.lYe bftn abl e to use thnnas a pretul for invnti
ttllna politicoll oIct iviti" where Ihn-e was no of
.any <Ilctu. l crimin<lllactivity. Most reotly. under
Guidelines which thm -Att orney emer<1l1 Levi istul'd to
comel FBI oIbu1n. the ilprech cri mes coin still uw<! as
a p,rett'lI: l for a "cri min..I" inv"'tigilliion of legiti male
po!lhCiIll activity. Unlns thew ICiw, a re the
BUfQu would ' till ha"' e its loophole for invntig<1lting
pohlk.al spt'll'Ch.
t Tille Iof 6051 iIl lso outlolw, the seltive invntigol-
IOn pr OU'CUlion of crimn. i,r..
::: ,exerci' ing the-IrFIrst Ammdf1'Wnl rjzhtll
of N' for wr ongdoing. IRS's t.axiitudits
un;:; adversarin of COUI'H the classicex-
The FBI'Il .uthority to conduct RCurity inves,
tigoltions woukt . undn' the Intelligence Control Act . M
t rillnwnrf'CI 10 the Civil Service Commission. This non-
criminal function h.uin rife given Ihe
FBI the chance to IC'e that IhIPchoice of public serv-
.nl.reflects the Bureolu', values . H.R. 60S) also requires
lhal Civil Service protect the- priv..cy of thne file and
thil t these !nvntig.ll ionl molY be carried out only with
thIP of the prospective employee . This
would c1 COM' one of the inle lligmcr' bureaucrecv'e current
loopholes : they ca n presently Investigate .anyone by
c101imingthai IMoyare considering whether to otter him
or her illlob - whet her or not that scblect has any
int""t in Iluch job.
Thnr .Ire cha nKes in the FBI'I mission ; Ci re also
fW'Cnwry rnillngt'S in the Bureolu'll wructure.
Fil"it oInd forett'lO&t. unl:kr H.R. 6051 thll' in office
of the Di riI"Clor is limitf'CI 10 lix yea". It mUilt M
poMible to repNl '.EdSonHoover's running the Burll'oIu
""ith illnIron whim for nea rly hilllf illC'C'Tllury. And illS <1ln
oIdditiof\<1l1 to IIw prcuholrllies of
ils future [)irmo". the Act woukt upgrilldf" ovn-sight
I'l"Sponsibilities 01 both the AttolTH!')'Gmer.1and the
newly ntillblithl'd Inspector (;mer.al for the Bureoilu, ThIP
AG would to .authorize in wrili ng (.Ind tmnfor.be
<1lccountiitble fori iIlnycrimin.ll which might
.Ilso involvf' Fir.. rights. Alongwith the In-
,pector the Specia l PrORCUlor , congrf"Uion<1l1
o\'f'uighl committen. .Ind the Ceneroll AccountingOffice
(GAO), the AG would bC' to revif'w FBCI worki ng
fiI" : rwve r .gillin would it be pouiblefor iI Di rtorto
ronfioliwtehis or her hold on office by away
dread",wo rth of personiit l inform.t1on on innumtioll
Af1'Wricans. or to conceal a progrillm the linof
COINTEl PRO from 01 succll'Uion of
The Intelligencf' AAmcy Control Act controls
wh .. t molY be pUI into inves tigollOry filf'1l oInd makes I>ure
thillt privillCY inler,",ts oil"'(' t..kf'f'l C.ff" of: no irrelevant.
follM'. ddam.atory. or Fil"$l AmmdrMRl-prolmf'd informill-
tion millY be included. Invn ti&4l tory file which
bftn d010lPd will be oIv.ilillb" only (l) to the Inlpector
Gm",,,1iIlnd oversight commilten; (2) if the- file .Ire
wilh illv.lid IUbpoll'nillor ..arch warrillnl: or (3)
if the- sub)C'ct of the invotiplion rrquest ll oIICC'tH to hill
or hll'r file . Sina thll' Act req uires thillt, .il( month. .1ft",
.. n invnl igoltive fiit' is c1C1e11'd ..nd i1PiIlled. subi11 must
M notifif'CI in wriling of the- ellistenet' of their il ln and
of their right to WC' lhem. this molk" certain }hoil
citizens will be oiIb lll'to ovrrs thf'ir own righh iIlnd hold
the gov",nmmt oIIccount.ablll' for thl- informilltion thai Is
collected on thll'm. Al l c10wd fil", must be' df"troyed
within tm
. Money _ Ihe pOWf'fof thl- purv - is oInolhf'r mf'iIlns
.Of oversight and conl rol of oInygovlI'rTlmentagency,Thll'
Act would require 01 drtailrd FBI budgt't bII' published
iIlnd that yeuly iIIudils by Ihf' ACs oUiet' and by Ihe
Gener. l Accounting bt- conductl'd. Thi, mC'iIl n,
thillt there will M ",tillblished structure for judsing lhe
FBI'I -actual cffectivf'nl'$s in c.arrying out ill iIluthorized
mil&ion.
And finilllly. in this iIl nd athll'r Titln eX thf' Act. thf're
0Ir. deolr criminoll iIlndcivil pm.ltin whic h will be
broughl into play if the nII'W inldligrnce and offici.al
dll'Uit l.awl .Ire brohn, Not only would official" be
li;"ble in crimin.ll court to IC'nlencn lind stiff
finn, but Acl oul -xplicit iIluthority for the-
172
173
r ... .-rO D " . ,I""'101 C('- NAn ONAt SECURITY AND CIVILLIBERTIES
victim. 10 in civil court for al.inst the'
off ici.. lnd 1m. go v"nm",nl i tK'lf.
CONTROLLING INVESTIGATIV
PROCEDURES
II of the Inlf'lligf'na- Agency Control Act woul d
put contro ls on the investigativl!'tech niqu es
which the government an use a8'linsl who are
not the-"8mbof.a fomgnpower . Basically , H.R, 6051
provide-st N t there .. no P1Ccf"Ptions to the Fourt h
Amendment. which that "searcbes ..nd seizures "
an becc ndected only jf are "reasonable" ,lind .a
WoIff.nlhBbeenobtainedby ronvi ncing an irn-
paruel judge- rhoi! there is proba ble CU te 10 believe
lNiI a crtme hat been or is .boul to becommitted.
Under H.R. 6051 cenatn inves.ligatj vf' technlqun.a"" pro-
hihill because tMy art' inberently unreasonable. Other
tK'hnique which are .aUowft:!' onl y with warr..nl s, and
while wa rr.. mts have rever been <II Ihlt'}' al least
ensure ltal citiuns U!' en titled to a paper tria l .
ElKtronlc . urvelL.nce . TM bill wou ld outlaw electro n-
ic such as and bup, and It mil;kes
cleo", r that. co ntrary to the claims 01recent il;dministra-
nons. ia no Hlnhrrmt i1uthonty" 10 use
thl!'m. Al the WrM time', the Act would J..y 10 resl the-
National Security Ni,mcy'. clai m tha t it h..oIUt hority to
USIe its oomput",,- to NVfSdrop on Iih!'I'oIlI y il; 1Ithe intf'T-
nationa l e-Iect ron ic commu nK.iitions 01Ame-ricilnl.
1ne-re- co,*itulioNi I an d pr.lcticill l te-.II OM for
The Fou rt h Ame-ndmml
forbids lea rCM, il; nd .archnby rtmronic
instrum\ts;ut' inhn-en tly unre-a.lOn""ble becauwthey .Ire
11wy pick up infonnation on rvrryone
who OYfl"hftlrd, whether or not t hey a"" . ubject. of
the- invel tiption. And even whm pick ing up ltv oonv....
u tioNi of the subj1 of the- inve-Hption, micro-
phonn mUll pick up nrnything that is he'ltd, iIInd
not men- Iy wai t for poKi bw rv idl!l"lcrof a crime .
Electronic IkHvt'i l1ancr can not the tf'St of ru son -
able-ness: il it. ",nalogo us to a wa rrillnl into a
to look for spific rvldmce of il crime bul
mov ing rvrrythiRJ in it down to the policr , til;tion.
And althouth the govll!mment mak es many UM'l'tiON
the uwfulnas of...ch . urveillance, iI hu not bft-n
to demonstr. te th.at moush rr lf'Yant crimiNl infor-
m"'l ion - rilltMr than t11i11i111ing on proplr's
persoNI and political lives - is picked up t h.t the tech-
would &urvive ill .a.N1lysis.In .dditl on,
much infonnatiQn i' aV.liloi ble thro ugh otheT me.l ns.
Infonnrn. Under st ion 202 01H.R.6OS1,
('"Misreoprnmtali on ofMe-mbeorship in Groups")
art' prohibited. Thi. is a d ram.ati c turmround from the
currt' nt legal , itu.tlo n, which provides only illOim'ly p""
of oontrol on tht ulorof p.ilid informenor undercover
a8ft\!s in et ther cri min,a] or non <rimin oll inveltiptiona .The
Intell igence Co ntrol Act would, for 1M- fht time , pro--
vide protect ion 10 Fint Amendmcmt groUpi. At long a,
the governmmt is flft to !rgit im.lte poli tica l
orga ni1.atlo,.., they can contro l over the
dKi:sions that au m.ade, nom without compiling doasirn.
For as an invl!ltipti ve techn ique, the informer is far
mort' int rusivt than . bug or wi m ap. An info rmer c.. n
CONTROLLING FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCEACTI VITIES
Tbe mOIl ch..ngr which the IntdliBft\cr
CClntro l Act puts Iorward Is in which (t)
..mends the Security Act of 1947 (SOU.S.c.
14031, (2)renames tM CtA the FonoignInforma tion Serv-
ice (FIS), ..nd 131ml irely elimin.a.ln 1MCOVeTt i1ction
ml.sion of U.S. fo rri gn intelligmtt . Th Is would rne.ln
tholl, e-xcept in a dec lued Wol r, thrrt' would be no more
activil ies .abroad - whet her ovuthrowing
gov trnrmonts. co nducting advmtulft, bribing
or blolckm.a.ilin, forrign officials , or It. TWW
miMion would be limited to oollt'cting data from open
SOLI ras and from tK hnial mHOS such a.I spy wte:lliles,
and, moat importantly, ana lyzing it.
In the wak e of reunt l"tVeloitions, the time has come
to subjt the coven operations mythology to IOTM
l'ftV,a]uation. Too much hili brem wi thout proof
for the utrfuln"'of such operations, a.nd t oo little Nt
be-rnacknowledpd about hidden cost . looked ..t
afrnh, it bom("l clt ar IN I they iI;"" not only obsolete
in toda y's wo rld, but co unterproductive.
Th t U.S . got ..long wit hout illspy il;pparalus unt il the
CIA Wa.lcruted 10 respond to Co ld W.u thnats, yel
the Agrncy has bftn unsucaulul ope-rilltingin closed
..nd powerful societies wch the Soviet Union ..nd
ChiI\ll . And the pub lic reco rd now shOWI such curiou'
bpltlin its iII bihty to ana lrse its daLol as whenit mls
placed the Red Army for two WMks while the invujon
of Cuchoslova1da wu underway . It is tfllf! tholl we Mf'd
",liable on lhe USSR ;lind ChlfUl, but it is
otqua lly true tNt inform.tion is obLolirwd by
tKhniq un 5uch as u telli te photogr.phy ..nd usinc open
sou rcn. rattm- tha n obsol ete (an d/or non -exlst enl )cloak
an d .,oItions.
The CIA', "succn.-s" hut insttad il;1l bn in
countri", which a rt' not a to the U.S. , bul which
bftn try ing to be- politially a utonomous. TheM!
rnded up d.lmaging the U.S: , sla nding interNtiOn-
ally - the rs l;ablished TK"Ord of ovenhrowing drmocntic
go vtmmmts and repl ol cing IMm. with brutal
h.u not bftn 10ft o n the respomible citizens of other
countries. It h.ls bftn d.limed that such covert acti ons
- chdP becauw tMy .IIlowed 1M U.S. to iuue a
, om' bl denial " (If involvemen t. But the act u.ll m ull
pl.lutJ e 1h.lt we ha ve a fomgn policy that is based on
holt IraN p&lYnllit'! over the ..ct ions 01 what has
be't'n..ruthl...gi ..nt . For a Io ns time, Amen-
tOO oIten not bern ..ble10 undrnt.and tM .IIlti -Amni.
ha::hic.h blamed a ll iII, (even perh..p' some which
of our doing) on the U.S. Now tha i we
tomrlhing of the record that the CIA ha, t'St.lb-
:'tdfor us oversees. we mu st now try to ers ure that
, .. thing of the put .
II tt1 action - Ilaging coups .andburning sugar
0'1. _ i. now widely admitted, I'Ym by adminis.
rd::;i8ure1, to be- but what about
Ir" 'oM8I' 7 The answer is thl t there I. no way to draw
-t
l
bftwroe' n "'tlmplt''' f'Spio n&gt .Ind plo lti ng coup.
.. .. . t..rt . 'Pia. ere notori ously un""l"' bk . Double
.lffill with their own "".. sons for telling stories,
b nd. But even if your .l8mt has not been compro-
by one or more other powers. then is st ill the
quettion of how much 10 tru st " is o r hrrjudalnf'l'l t.
s.telUtlPphoto gr.lphy. by contr ai l, offers the ana lysts an
obft.lVI' record 10study.
Strondl v, given that Ihe AgI!'l"\ CY in too mil;ny
rwportI 10 arw.lyu , a ril;tional spy system would Ii mil
.belfto only thorrpo fts are- most ulftul _ and
I......Infrom people who ..re In tM drcles of
own cnu ntriel. To buy thea "a.m.," the CIA uses
bribery, blackmail. and "s imple" np10rwpis
tMrd"ort' .. Ie.:hnique wh ich controls and co rrupts the
forn-" 10\'ernmml in a way htt lt'different from urcheslrat-
i,. ... coup
Tturdly, IesNlalive Tf'Cord established whm Co n-
IfIPU IN't up the CI A in the lale 'oWs shows lha t they
bdil'wd that IhPy WPfe up an oraaniution only
fex CfIllecti RJ lindudin,g by oUl d aNolyzing
tbt. Authotiution to conduct soon cut its
own loopholes end Jt WAJ but .. short ,tep 10 focus.l118
the A,mcy', raoutc't'S inlo controll ing MId/or choosi ng
om,n sovernl"lel'lts.
have ..110 bem hiddm domestic costs , which
not hftn fully own! up to, for thew ..etivilies.
"IlkCIA', WUfoil rt' has wuped the cons tilu.
hon,aJ procns in our own If the Corn.lilu_
lion !i ves only CO"UP\.& the power to pu blicl y ded .. rt'
.... r. anour ')'Stem ofgovernmmtbe-wid to _
b'hve.n Ihe li nn- give thePr.-sidenl po\ftr 10
k'O'tI: w..r1 The CIA's oPft'"..lIons have comt home
in otherWily, in ""a)'s tNl il;re e\'f'/l mort' ominous
thin dorne.tic political survei narw:e project , Opera.
lion CHAOS The Walf'Tg..at e for were
QA ptOpie. i1ndWI' do nol hne.Intlsfiletory
hplarwtlon of iust wha t they INtre trying to do. We
Also now have lhou tatl ds of Cuba n rftUgft'l th.l the
OA trained in lerron. t tK hniqurs , such .,blowing up
Castro', 'LIIolrm inm es ; it sh ouJd not bt- surprising that
thlItrol.inifl& hal ' Pp.lren tly begun to be turned to intf'rna -
:;n..aJ domestic terr or , IUch blowins up airlinetl.
S the- "'me token , the InleJligma lIgf'ncin (KCIA,
AVAK, DlNA) of fOT'f'i BJl powers which allo w the- ClA
10 optr..le in lheir countries, rxpect 10 be iIIUowed to
the Uni ted Stolte .
. finally , Vot es which ..re CoIISt for Clmp.1llgn
whi ch are merely cover storin mockery
.. rt'public b",wd on informl conwnt of the
1OvU'ned, Wilh list of our policy failura

MAY1917
'Gtf, 'fT)\/ Ln( IF' 'lOtJ'P SEfIlA6/IOST"
..... , -
1976 by Herblockin the Washinl'onPOM.
smft".. in Iry,H R. 6OS1 concludes that can no
lone'l' afford an ingrown dedslon-m.akins prOC'nlth. l
vili lues ..t0U&hn...." and outdatrd myths mo re !han rt'... on
..nd dispaMion"'te an.lylilof info m\.Itlon.
In addit ion to the cholngt In the CIA miss ion ,
the Control Act put, fO",,'ard lOme
. peciJk limitations on AS It spific.ally pro-
hibit s. for n.ample. tlv 11M' of orpniuations, co lleges,
the prns, rt'l lsioul croups, or individu.lls in
cov et'"tactivitin. The AS would, hOW't'Vn,c..aU')' ou t
countntlp'ion.qeabrNd, oil the FBCJ would.1home .
The Con tro l Act would .1150 put an m d to
cb. im th"'t the budgets from
the CONCitul ion', tt'q uirnnmt for ill publ ic attoun ting of
expmditurt"l. The pmamt CI A hat had no or
exte rna l au dit s 01 its ope ra tions (too dangero us to the
n.tiona.1 K'CW'ity, Ihry wy), Inst ud of a nputa .
tion, the- CIA h.u a Smindy mdl.,. . rieolof allega_
tions of qun tl ona.bl. dealings in its proprieta ry comp.iln-
iesand In the hemin .aswell as so me Otuptivt
budgttins pr.etices wit h DoD .Ind NSA . 11wbill wo uld
require Ihat the Office 01 M.anagemmt and Budpi suD-
mit .. budget for the intell igence burt ..ucracy ....whoie-,
as wt'll ..line-itnn budget s for each forrign il)tf'lIipnce
agency. SLtch bookkeeping would be:the .:,-;! .'
bqinnina of il;nd m..ldng SUI't' that th-r-
public is ge-tting what it it payi n,for,
175 174
FIRSTPRINCIPLES, NATIONAL SECURIIT AND CIVILUBERTIES
MAYl91'l
of ilIq..1conduct, or failt to report iUltpl
then th.t official would be gui lty of .a cr iminal
TOWARD A RATIONAL
CLA SSIFICATION SYSTEM
Even itt. ..dmit thilt the presen t sec recy
syllnn di M-ii i" fil' 100 much infonn ..t ion, beth as oJ
ma tter of routine and in order to conct>i11 controvffll.a l
..ctivilin. Sucensivl' poll-War Prnldtnll have. by only
Ihll'.lILI thori ty of Executive Orden. set up thi, !>yslll' m and
made ;I frw inef fect ive. face-WIvinM, gest ures aga inst
massive oVll'rc!.asaifjcoiIlion. In essence. Ihl' prnidcncy h.ll s
given agencies 1M- right to secret .ny inlorma-
tion which might. by some stretch of the im.agiNilion.
d..mage the na tlona l 5urity to ..ny degree ill .11. No
where does the prnidenliOl l I fl tll' m louK,gt"!.1 Iha l IMo
public's right h i know shou ld be wll'ighf'dili':.im.'
P'C'"iblll'"damage."
Titlll' IV would inject so me rt'ality principiI' into the
question. First . for ..11 Ihll'fu" ilboul Irill, which NYii'
con tribull'd 10 puMic thf' f')I;f'Culi ve- hot s nol btf' n
..blf' to po int to OM'Ihal h..s <lctu..lly n.illion.ill
H'CUrily r.ilthft' Iholn ..-d $Omrgovrrnmrnt
TOOr rt'1l'l ol ins .I conwn.u1oIh..t kinch
of infonnalion should nol bf' lr .il kt'd, oInd th"" .arf', in
fact , thf' only kind s of K'Crt'ts .a syslf'T'n
pro'f'CI.
H.R. 6051 would <l mmclth,. of Inform.ation
Act to providf' Irgid.illed, r..lhe-rIh.1In rl(t'CUlivr, daMi
fic.ation . yslf'T'n which would rod I"'r prf'trXI fOf
cover-u p and rlC'rnd publi c deb.iltr . The nrow
.y!olf'fll would on ly 10 1) thf' techn icill dt-t.ail. of
wuponry, 2) tK"'nkill df'tilil, of 'olctieill militilry
Opnilliofll in timr of drcbrt'd Wilr, ilnd 3) ddmsivr
milil .u y contingn1CYp"'ns. In othf'r word s, spific fAcfs
.bout ddrnM' would bt' It"Cfrot. but informilt ion
. bou l thf' for ri sn policy dC'Cision. lhil the- public i!o
npt'C,n1 to support would nol bt' . In ilddit ion , Ihr M'W
dnsific..tion indudn iI filil-s.lfr mKh..nism - no
information which 10 rt'1.lr to illeog.al or uncon-
sl ilution.ill .activity in by <l ny officiill of thf'
Govft'nmt'f'lt" could bt' propt'r1y
a r.lional. limited, .00 m.an.gf' ..hlr
tion syslr m wou ld ..110 improvr the weurity of grnuinr
wcrf't . When evrrything is c101nifif'd, noth ing is daMI
.\Od thrr r i' no dfrctivr prOlf'Ction for If'gitima'it
..<nt. But by limit ing Ihe et.nifka lion ,to1l mp to Ihose
frw documrnb 'ho1l l fir' critic.al WI'
would not bt' filud with thr rXOI mplr of tht- govft' nmr nt
rmployre who Colrtf'dhomr boxt'S full of d assifit>ddocu
mrn h that nobody miu ed .
BLOWING THE WHISTLE
Titlf'1;V VI f'f'quire protf'Ct blowing
whi5tlr on impropt"l" govf'mmrnl Titlr V
wit h Ihf' quftlion of decrit," it mdJ thr
_ the officia l lir - <I n ..cC't'pted
of m<lnipu l.il ting public opi nion. Undrr ils prov l
ions , if offidll knowingly covrn up an illrpl inlel-
Iigmct' <lctivhy, lin ..bout it , obs tructs invntiption
Tule VI approac hes the problem from I somewl\.ilt dil.
frrrnt prrspcc tivr - N mrly offici..l, who In
the p.1st blown the whistlr on their or thrir
organiz.. tions have done sertoce dolm.g, to Ihrir U rt't'l'1.
This has been true even in caSt"S whe re thr whi!otlrbl ow_
ing cons isted of reporti ng to Congress - !ouch.IS the
case of Emnt Fitzgr r;llld, who reported on the C-S cost
overrun. It took congrrssloNI action to ensure Ih.l
blowi ng tht' whistle W<lS not ;II luxury he paid for by
1000ing his job.
Under the- lntelligence Agrncy Contro l Act, whrrt'
whistle-blower has bern dismissed, demoted.
rt";IIssigned, suspended or l'f'prim;llnded, the burden 01 '
proof would be- placed on the agmcy to show thOll thf'.M.
actions were not tilkrn in retali at ion for the whi stlrol ow.
ing. And und er Tit le VI. such an officia l would be
rntillc.-dto sur in court for for
..nd for the cost of mforcing his or bee righ ts in COUrt .
A SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
Cu rrrnlly, the Dep.artmmt is thr only mrolm of
prOM'Cuting Intrlligltntt offidals.who holvr vlol<llecllhe
Ioll w. And alt hough we hav r .II lu t gollen Oln indictmrnt
of an FBI agen t (who violated I"'r law .and
Hoovr r's own proh ibition on ' 'black lob. ") lhe
fact is th.at this is <I singlr r Xdmplr in t"'r of <I long
list of criminal act ivit in. Thr lust itt Dep.rtmrnt h..
instead el(plicitly decHnr<:l to prowe utr many insl.nct1 of
documenled offida l cri mes. It would serm thOltWillngalr
providn a In.son hen - in prosrcuting the While
offici. ls it was nrss.ary to t.akr thlt inveshgalion
out of Ihe Prnidrn!'. Just ice Drtpartment and givr it 10 <I
Sprci.al PrOSKUtor who would h<l vr no rra l or
connict ot interrs' .
H.R. 6051 would Sf'1 up the officr of Trmpor.:y
Special PrOW'Culor, l.asli ng fi w yeu, and wilh rxdu!oive
jurisdiclion OVft'violatiom of thlt loIw dra ling wilh inltl
Iigt'f'ltt and countrrintrtligeonce. P.ilstcrimes would not of
COUTSItbr cowrtdby thrprovisiON of H.R. 6051. but tMre
Olrf' unen forced 100WS .alrudyon the books - depri v.tion of
civil or constilution.al rights . illf'g.al teUCM-s <1 00 IWtzum,
unlawfu l . urvf'iI1<1n(e , obstruction of just ier . vi olal ion of
thf' posl.oI llaws. thr deslruction of public records. pt'rjury ,
falM' slillr ments , and cons pirilcy 10 commit ilny .and all
of thr abovr.
CONC LUSION
The situa tion in thr pos.t.wilr era ha, beorn thai lhe
inte-lIigmclt .agmcin havr bern given greil! poWft' oI nd
politrly askt'd not to dbusr it. Unless rrforms are rnaclt'd
thit will <lctu.illly limit th.atpowrr and rnforct' Ihr law,
wr will bit allow ing Ihe wmr kinds of opt'utions 10
spring up <lgain ona pub lic intt'fftt wanrs. And If thrt'f:
is a nr ld timr. WI' may not bt' 10 lucky OlS WI'N ve
brrn in thi. round , Wit h.1vr no gu.ar.antre tNt noet timt
Ihr da mOlge to Ihr body politic would not bit perm .
anmt
TM How for 01 majo r is now .
Human Rights: A Domestic Agenda
BYROBERT L. IlOROSAGE
FrftO from Ihr crimn .nd of past OlIdminislril -
I01"1, prn,i drnt Cartrr h.I. used humen rights a. thr 801-
lor .iI Amrric<ln fomgn policy. He hal nOI
10 decry thf' shcrtccmtngs of others. to en-
courasr them in the palM of redempt ion. Bul in pcli-
tk:I at in minislry, hypocris y is a common currency. <I
(ounlrri"f'il coin which breeds .uspidon .andcyn ki sm.
Thr prlt.ch mu. t either reside above reproach. or
rnovinS 1('1 new territcnes. President Carter hi. indica.tt'd
hif Inlention to spt'ak out ff'J"f'OlItlly <lndfl'ftJumtly on
human rishl' viol.lion!o .round Ihlt wor ld. To do 10 rr-
quires I....t the tab major strp:!. to pro-
wethum.n rightl .II homt'oIn hi. sperch btriorr Ihr
Unilt"'J N.tions Assembly, lOr Prnidmt rK0S-
niml thr principiI' :
W.. In tM UMrd St.ln .cupI ili a rnpons,ibilllyIto
10I1n" h"'l1\In riPl.1in 1M fulJnt .nd most ronstf\l(
UVl' M1\. . . . I know pn'"hIpe _II .anyonrth.at
our tdea!. 11\ thr Mt'. of h UmMl ri3hlJ h.vr fIOl .aI-
"'.y. hftn .1I..lnrd in 1M Unllt'd St.1", .. But Ihr
Amrrklll propM h.ve .nabKJmarommilmml 10 the
hill ru hulton of I....ktrala. w. drimnined
, t.Afono II,) ckal with our dd'ic.imdn quICkly "I'd
orm1y. '
Thr admlll iatn iion h.,yet to define a human rights
qrndi lor tM Uniltd Slo1Ites which will improVit our
own human r ights record. Any numbf'r of itrms might
eomlorably nestle in a hUJ'tl oi n rights progr<lm. rangil13
from tlw riahb of Native Anumcollns to w1f-ddt'TTTIina-
Hon 10contr olling corporatr pluoof"l' abrNd. 1lIf' initial
Itf'pI of domntic human ri&hl1 progrilm may bet be
dft ll'Md by thr Pli ndardl wh1ch we haVItb!l d oul for
otlwn. Thr Administr.tlon '. own languqr slJ88f'Sb WY-
n-a1 .aru. of act ion
P.....ge 01 Intern.llon.1
Coven.nts on Human Rights
IroniCollly, thr Unlttd Stat .... NS yrt to any of
tt>.. major covmanls on human rights , in-
c1udina thl' Intft' noi tioNlI Covenants on Economic, Sod.a l
Riahls ; on Ci vil and Politk<l l Rights ; on 1M
Eliminolhonof AllForm, of Rilci.ll DisCTiminoition; and
onIhw PrltVftl lion and Punis hmmt of thr CrimI' of Citn.
Otidt. Thewdocummtl codify thlt Univnul OKluiltion
of Ris ht ., thr ge'lrr.ally ilCCt'pttdItiltrmml of
Robw, L Borowg..u Dir'orof the C""r.rfor Nfl/ion,,/
St
Olrlt
)' in Was hln, to" .
rights recognued by the intft' n.tional rommunity of noll -
lions.
In thr lat. forti n , the United 51.1.... pl.a)'f'd I m.jOl
pert In . tre ring the Unfversel Declarauon to un&nimou.
approval in the Qe.nft'ill Atwmbly. In this country, how-
ever. ratlfic.lionof the covmanbh... Icundered for
yr oi A on tbe . hO<l I. of Southf"l'noppolilion .Tbe
of tM Stol'\l lr .....ve combined wilh conwrvat ivn in
lhe Amft'k.an Bar AHodatlon 10 block pus.lgr of ilny of
Ihr moljor 11M' Soulhern WfI<1tOrs acted on !hI'
gft'If'T"<l1 principII' ff'drra l mtddling in .1<lln'righb
was bOld rnough wilh out involving international opinion.
The- 11'1<11conwrvalivn oppowd "tificat ion beeault' thr
t ruties milht infrlngt upon thr domnl ic jurisdiction of
thr Unllrd Stilt", lind mort' to thr point, might I..... d. in
lhe words of ABA Grorgr Finch, to
ism by treilly,"1 In the McCart hy opposilion to
the lnlrm.lliionoll covmanb ftnw $0 hot, lha l 5rrtary
of Stiliit Dull" Infonnr<:l the Uni tt"d N.tions thr
U.S. would not sign .ny of Ihe Intnn.tion.l humoln
Jis ht . covmant . Since thill time. Amrriciln .poknmrn
Iv ... r bren undrntandably hnitant 10 olhet'l OIbout
thril' inlrrnational human ",hi' obligoitio....
Obviously Ihr first IIrm on any domntlc humoln rightl
qmda is tM pilUilgr of 1M malor Intrrl'\ltioN,1 covr-
nAnts on hum.n ri&hts. President C.rln hal informed
tM Unittd NoitiOns Gmeral Aswmbly thai he would
bring r.ilCh of thew inslrummts befort' the CongTCM. His
SUCCf'SS or foiilure in p ining ratification will nOhcnbly
influft'lCl' the tt'flot of hi. von ilbro. d. In addition , bolh
tM KOnomic ilnd the polittcal COVt'f'lants provldr for rr-
ports to thr U.N. on "the melllUI't"I... adopted which
giVIt nfret 10 thlt righlS recosnizr<:l hrrrin &nd on the
progrftS m<lde in thr rnjoymml of thOtof' ri&hl' ,' " Thr
administ ratio n'. report. will no doubl rrcriw cJ()tIf' scru-
tiny in capitolls throughout the world,
Shedding the Cold Wor Leg.cy
President Cartrr has made- thr Sovin Union a primary
targrl for his commenl. on human righl' Hit . hould do
so with care , for ovt"l'the lona: years of dw Co ld War ,
wr holve comr to mirror our advrrNry In milny W<lyw. .
Some' 01tN'woTlt ItXcn-. of thr McC.,.thy Pft"lodin
thti country hanalrudy bftn intrrred, but many still
ranain, and nquire <I prom'
For eXilmpllt. Pres ident Carterhas criticladthe Sovlf't
Union for its MW'rr rntrklionson freoe trawl. n..Hrl-
s.inld Acmrd., signrd by tM U.S . .and Ihirty-
thr othn' counlrin, call for thlt J"ttidpol;ng sta tes 10
--
176
177
--- --... - ... N.... SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 8 t"tuNLlru;..,;J ;
'--- - - - - ----'----'----''--- - --- - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - -
MAY 1977
"filcilitate freer movement and contacts among perscre of the Supreme Court, and which SBVe prim.arily to pro.
t he p,lr ticipati ng 5tolln. . " Th e Admi nis l rOiti on intends 10 vide FBI wit h .a statutory excuse for politiCilil I SPYing'
Iccu s on this. issue in the d iscussion of the accords.
scheduled For this fall.
But Arne-ric..n I..w!o on immi gr.ill tl on an d tr ade are iI
complex web of political restrain ts and restrict ions. For
example, the McCarril n. Walter Act of ]952 (8 U.S.C.
17(1) defines of indiv iduals who are ineligible
to recei ve a tourist or immigrant visa 10 ent er 1M
Llnlted Sia l". This list includn mitniaC'1.beggars, pros ti-
ruin , dru g addicts. people wit h communic able d isea50t'5
- and anarchi..ts and communists . In 1911, the Supreme
Cour t epbeld the government's r igh t to deny a visa 10
the- reputable Belgtan m.uxisl Ernst Mandel . In 1975, Dr.
Giogio Nilpo lil.ilIno, the principle economics advisor to
tlw h..li..n Communist Par ty wa! demed vi$.ai when he
attempted to enter for a lect ure tour. u st year, a for-
mer member of the British Communist Party received
similar treatment . "I want to go to yo ur wonderful
country, " C".reorge Mucha i!, the mayor of Ma rseilles and
leader of the French Communist Par ty recently said.
"'But they will not let me do it because I am a di rty
Commcmst ."
The theory of the McCarr.an Act is that sub-
vt' n ive ideas communic.ble dist'ilses, and must be
qUilrantined from !uSC'e'ptible ears in this country, the
bas tion of fM! n prnsion. It is a not unknown to
the gua rdi.aM of the Sovid 01$ Clearly the'
McCa rr an Act should be m:Jrawn to provide strictly
IimitN catego rin of penons who may be I!'Xcl uded from
mtry, prima rily for conta gious diseasn, and not for con-
tag ious ideas. Polit ical belief or as.'\OCia tion shou ld have
no b.asis in exclusion decisionS".
Relatt'd to the McC.arr.an Act is tM Trading with the
Enemy Acl of 1917.
1
In its prnent fonn, the Act pro-
vides the with virt u..!ly unlimited power to """
st rict economic nchangn bet ween the U.S...nd its
min." Th is latler CiitegOry now includel Cub a, North
.and North Korea, in spite of th" .absence of
ilI ny hOltilitin with those countries. Succt'Ssive
administrations have uSord the Act to nguloillte " chillngn
for politic.1 pul"pClWS, "tnrequiring thill t citiuns obt.ain
a license to publi utions or films from the dnig-
noill ted countrin. Those who apply for Hcm,," become.
nn!'dleM to say , prime suspects for FBI surve illance, .a
nice twis t worthy of the KGB. Th" Ho uM'Committee on
l ntffN.t iol\ill l Relililions is now consider ing propos illl 5 to
amen d the n-Ievant HCtions of the Act. Agoilli n, the Prn i
dmt' s OIut hority to impose controls on inlernoill tional trade
for poli tical pul"fl'O'n in peacetime shoul d be eliminillteocl.
The rest rictio ns of the McCoilir ran Act ilI nd the Tr ading
with the Enemy Act .are but two str.ands in a web of
regulilltions which c.an be oilI nd oilIre invoked to ob$truet ex-
bet ween U.S. citizms oilInd thOilt in officially "un-
approved" rountries, or with suspect po liticoilll back-
grounds. The entire range of troill vel restrictions should be
revieloW'd pri or to the f.all mff ting on th" Helsinki Ac-
cords.
AnoINT legoili CY of the Cold War are the ma ny st.atutn
restricting the of communists and subve....ives in
this country. The schedu led reform of the federal crimi-
nal loilI ws will moilIble the administroill tion to support repea l
of the "speech crimes, " the v..rious sedition acts puwd
over the ye.an, which have already been eviscer ated by
FBI Director Clarence Kelley has variously admitted thi '
the were "designed for the Civil Wa r tt.a, not I
t he Twentieth Century," and bad been "reducNi to ill
fragile shell by the Scpreme Court ." But neither dn-elop-
meat has prevented the Director from using the laws to
justify FBI political investigOl t ions. I legi&lation hoill J al-
ready been introd uced in the Congress for re;:.-eoilll of
t hese loilIws as part of the process of rechart"ring the FBI
With ilId.ministration support, these rehce m...y be swept .
awa y With lit tle trouble.
The Freedom of Poli tical
Expression
Of al l of the rights guara ntftd. by the intematioT\ilI
con ventions. President Carter has placed the greatest em.
phas i! on the rights of free express tcn. of peaceful as.
wmbly .nd and of freedom from arbitrary
Inter ference wi th indlvtrluilll privacy . Thew are right!
gu.aranteed also by the U. S. Constitut ion. Theyare area,
wbere the admi nistrat ion feels that it can "speak from
strength."
But formill legal protKlion offers no f\f'C'e'S.Sary guara n.
oilIgainsl abuse. At best, legal gua rantees are medici.
noill !, useful only if app lied, ilI nd Ihey .are applied onty
oilI Fter the dilmage i.s done. The vicious tong which now
rules Ch ilr booilIsts ill const itution with one of the Most
set, of consti tutiona l guara ntees in exi5tenC!', and .a 5..iIIV.
ings clause which renders them all irrelevant. The Soviet
Union 011500 has extensive leg.al guarantees of rights which
Sil!'tm honom:J in the bn'ilI ch.
Presidtnt Coili rter has " pressed his concern for the fOlIe
of the courageous din idmb in 1M Soviet Union. the
sma ll numbt't of intellect uals who the regime
and .are h.:a rr ass.ed, oilIrrnlf'd, and sometimes npel1ed by
it. Th e Pres.ident should also show some conO!m for the
citizms of oilI nother country which hu historiCoilllly uted
its police ilIgmcies to spy on and disrupt the activitin of
individuoili ls lill belled illS "dissidents:' Thoillt country is the
United
The Senate Committee on the Intelligence de-
tailed a .mall part of the ..buses of the intelligtnce ...gen-
cin in it. sn-en-volume report loilist yeu. Domntic
sidentJ" were the victim! of informers, wiretillp' , lTIilIiI
openinga, cab le intn ceptions, l.1x probes , provocations,
mtr.apmmts. , grand jury invn t iga tions, COnspirilCY indict
ments .and mass ive survri llill nce by the FBI. the CIA, tM
Noili tiona l Security Agency, military intelligence, the IRS,
the Ju!tiO! Depart ment .and !ta te a nd local police "inlei
IigenC'e''' units.
As in the Soviet Union, the government wmt far be-
yond mere political voyeurism. The gOVe1'tuT'If'flt planted
InfonneTs to dit\rupt citizm s roups . It aided vigilantes in
..uo1cks on innocent citize ns . It ordered the burning of
private proper ty. It tried to foment riots viole11c" . It
set citizens up for censure ilI nd somrtimes cruel punish.
ment by planti ng false infonnation. 11 wrote anonymous
oilInd un true let ters to .;lIS.sociatn and employers to get citi
zens in trouble. It broke into homes and ransacked of
ieft. It instituled ta x audits .and grand jUry probes to
distract and harat\Scitizens engaged in political ilIetivity.
Freedom From Want
The U.N. Covenant on Economic, Sod.al and Cultural
. II aHirmI the idu l of free humMl bangs mjoyins
from fear and want. " The covenant includes a
'1 of rightJ 10 enforce tha i end. Article 'I I'KOgnizn
right of everyone to of lust a.nd fa-
vorable condi tiOns of With f.alr which
uaran1re ill decen t hVInS. f'qu.aJ oppcrtcn rty, and. equal
8 for equal work amons men and women. Arti cle 11
the right of "everyone to ..n adeq uate .t.and-
ardoJ livina for himself and his family, including
.dequate lood. dothing and housiftA. , . . Jt also rec-
ocnizet the right of everyone 10 be Iree
from hunger." Artacle 12 the of every-
one to tM enjoymmt of the 'highest .toillndard
ofphysiaJ and mental health. "I
1'MIeprovisions are derived in grea t put from the
obfed ivn ann ounced by Franklin Roowveh on the eve
01World War II. Roosevelt caUed for the protection of
four .-ential human fTftdoms : the freedom. 01 speech, and
oi wonhlp.and the freedom from w.antand fro m fe.ar.
To provide for th" third. he detailed an Economk Bill of
Riahb, which he portrayed u a supplement to our poli-
tical blll of rip ts. Roosevelt ret urned 10 his theme reo-
pelttdly durins the war, tnilIki ng It the grand objt.ive
f(lf the United Sl.1t" in the postwar yean. Roosevelt'.
vision, and indeed.his language wen imploillntt'd in the
intftTlation.i.lconventions .aftrr the w.ar,
But Ln 1M United SlAI tes, the Roo..-velt progr.am w...
w ttered by the Cold War. The humoilln risht. coven.anls
01the U.N. ignoml, in no .mall p.lrt bPcauw 01
C'ONa"Voilil ive fean of their ".ociali.t" tone. The domntic
economic bill of riBhts W.Ii abandoMd for
b.uN on .anli-communu.m and exp.a.n.ion abro.ad.
Yet In mOlt natiON of the work!, particula rly tM de-
w10pinsMUora, economic MKtKlCiaI rights are Kiven
priority OVa' political and civil guar.anttu. 1be irony of
pranlft'lna .a free ptftl to one who cannot is apo
to al l. It hit become the Ammcan role to dd-end
the ImportMlce of polit ical civil righls q.ai nst Ihe
tendency 01 dneloping l\iIl tions to slight them In the
Itrl.lqJt for economic .dvancement. To play this role n-
ttet iW:ly, however, the Administration must first Uaow
lb own.ensitlvity to the of Konomic f'i&ht.
bothabra. d .and .II home.
On April 29, Secrd.ary of Slate Cyru. VanO! .truggled
to define the Admlni' lrill tion's human rights poa,tUl'f), oilInd,
for lhe fir. time, forward ed a formal definition of the
ripll which the Administrat ion felt wen mcompaued in
human rights guaranteon. VoilI1lce included not only
(al and civil righ t., but also "the right to the fulfillmmt
01 . ud\ vitoll ne.eds a, food, shelter , ht'.lt h and edu-
CoIli!)n... Vance', slate ment constitutes the first fonnal
admini. tration recognition of economic lind sod.a l rights.
Th, Se<-reta ry admitte d that fulfillment of these rights
depend on the ".tale of a nation', economic de--
oprnent . , . . For the Unitt'd Stolle., wit h the most
economy in the world, fulf illment 01 these-
Is mUS!. now first priorit y, These guar-
are alia thenext oblect ive of the civil righ lJ
OVerntrlt and tJwwomen', movment. Wit h the a-
peered p"aage of Ihe Equ.aJ Rights Amendment In the
nnt few yean, d, iu,.. dtlcrimination agaiNt minoritift;
and WOIT'Ief\ will be ended, but the .tigma of sme:r.ations
of discri mina tion will ,tiJI be "'It.The guara nteft of
equal opportunity a nd equal tn' alment in fact can be en-
forced only by the finn guuantee of economic ilm!
socia l rights to a ll Americans .
The 1e-.ding advocate of non-violence and equ.aIM >
ity was spied on, bugged and wiretapped, had his name
sluered by vicioUi 'landen, MId had the government at-
tempt bribery, exto rt ion and finany a death threa t 10 get
him to end his political activ ities. But wha t Me r un
Lut}.er Kins. Jr. experjenced was mild compared to the
government program run asainst Fred H"mpton and the
Black Pantherl in Chicqo. The Panthen were- infiltrated,
thrir programs Wft"e disrupted, their !iva enda ngered by
varioul at tempts of the police to Ipark g.ang wa rfare .
Hampton himseU was finally killed in a h..ail of police
buJlris n he slept. The full extent of government reo.
fpoNibiJily for hi. death h.... nol yet hem FinaJly esteb-
Jnhed. bul the evidence indicates that the FBI had de-
cided to Fred fUmpton . And all of thIs took place
not beca use he w..consideTed violent _ FBI memos diJ..
miss thai muge - but because the Bureau fe.ared he
was 100 popular .and too charisma tic, and th.at the P.an-
then might pina large foUowlng in the IluDU of Otl-
,,",,0.
Only in the past few yean have the outlines of iIleg.a1
politic.al 'Pying and disruption been npowd. To this
diy, little . ignifk .anl ch.anp hlll taken pl.ace. No lep.-
lahon has been paued to limit the activitin of the in-
teiligence by law, TI\e only have been
a wries of e'lo.KUtive or bureaucratic diredivtl, which
generally the Justifications UHd for poUtical .py _
ins in the p.lst and legitilNte the unlawfu l for the fu.
tUte. Not surprisingly, theFBI ,till Ipin on citizenl en-
gaged in political actiYities. n.eCIA Itill runs IKret
checks on "potential" recruitl . Gr and juri" are- ,till used
10 ha rus politkaJ "diMidents:' Loca.I and state police de-
partments continue to survtiJ political activity that
should beprotected by the First Amendment.
Thow actively oppc.d to government poLicycan still
find themse lves the target s of lovemment lawkunns.
Fftninist group' in New Haven, Connecticut and Lexina:-
ton, Kmtucky leanwd only last year about thee of
the grand jury to imprison politica l .ctivu.11 without
triaJ. Puerto Rican nation.a.lists an' bei ng taught the wme
Inson this yur in New York. N.alive American. at
WoundN Knee .and elwwhere continue to be the ta rgets
of m,usive governmenal dilruptton. lA Rua Unida , a
"dissidmt" politicaJ party in TI!'X.;lII .nd New Mexico, can
detoillil the continuin8 ties.between locill, sUite .and n.a-
tion.al police in political haralsment.
If the Soviet Union i, to be cmsurPd for its
of .a thouynd "dissident" intellectua ls, then surdy this
country must be ..si'milarly judged _ not on how it trea tl
the placid majority, but on how it responds to dissi-
dent few. If tha i is the proper measure of freedom, then
Itw formal prottdioN of the Bill of R1shbhave filliled
to cunthe abuwof political and civil rights in this coun-
''Y.
What I. needed is a st rong dose 01 prn- t;ntive medi -
cine . Over the next two yean, the Will legit-
lat e new charter. for all of the fnJenl
--
10
179
178
MAY 1911 11 FIRST PRlNCIPLES, NATIONAL SECURllY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
c,"-. In addition. '" ilga ln!d local and ,t.lt' p0-
lice Ipyi nS will toi le place aCTon tnt' country. Al noll
nonal leve l _Urntion will be paid to LEAA.
the Lew Enfor cemml Auilt.nee Administrati on, which
pbyed mollor role in mcouraging the gr owl h of local
po lice intelligence unit s. lqisl",tion 1'1<1' i1lriPildy been in
troccced which would Itt 1M feder.1 intelligence egen-
anout of the busineu of po litical spyin&. pro hibit poli-
neal informen . and ban wl rdap'. It would .1.0 ma ke
offjd.als pertOn.ally retp onsib. for viol. ting the charter
pr ovisions of any ;ntelligKlCt' age ncy . IRer u sing suppo rt
now for the ",OOlill on of LEAA.
Thus Iar, the Co1Irlf'r hu not been
hea rd on the v.rioul qufttions of inle lligmct' .seney ..nd
police Mor m. But if the r rnide1'l t h 10 support the
righb of diuidenb abroad, Ihen 1'1" mu sl m.h rertal n
thilt the govrrnnwnl slOp' infr ingin g 1M- righh of cili l('ns
. 1home. Th e refor m of 11'1" inlell igence .nd police oiKen-
cit's will provide primolry Inl of the oidminist roilion',
de1: ...rmi nalion to huld ih.,,1f 10 high ..I;mdoirlb in the-
01 human ri$h l'.
Prnidml cOil n now murn to the promi!ot' of
ROOW'VI'It m ore IhOiln Ihirty yt'.n Ihe f.ct. He will
find, howtVt"f, 11'1.1 ib fuHillmm! will no l be "",y. Re--
cent tr m ds h;lve moved Ihi!' co unl ry furth...r aW<lY from
gu.r. ntnei ng Ii'll' fundOilml:f\ul Konomic r igh ts w
sa ry 10 hum.n frdom. Unemploymtnt rnnains . 1 0 '0' "
, .. of the wo rk foret' , which mean , th at 1OTnt' rig ht mil-
lion plple M't'k bu l u nnol fin d work. Thi\ figure ltrul
ly undnn tim.ln the pr oblem of Kua rOil nlf't'ing ""ploy-
T1lft\ t al fair rtmunn alion 10 .11 who can work. A
1910 congnou ion.l nl imOil le of employmmt in Sl C'eI1lr.1
cili n n limatcd 1""1 an ;ln u xt' 01 3O.S" of Ii'll' l.bor
for et' wa. ei l hn unemp loyed , diM: ouraltt'd .nd no ' ongn
Iftking work . or p.lr' -lime emp loY'"" who co uld nol
find full-tirM wor k. " In 1972, Kono misls ca lcul.ilted thai
somt' 40.. of the popul. rion w..s rx eluded from "usef ul
pai d employ men l at dfant liVing By 1915,
.orne 26 million people lived bel ow lhe oHici ..lly defined
po vnty level . "
Necdlna 10 u Y. untmploymenl f..lI, moTt' tw..vily
upon minorillt's .. nd woml . The unnnplo)'1'M1't r. t"
ilmong blolcks is twke tNt of whiln. and has l'ftfJoiirwd
the u me sinCt' World War II. Both bl..ck and whilr
wom...n are un l!'fJ\ ployed oit , ignlficilntly higher roitn Ihoin
black or whltr mm. Th e gu.lroinlt"t' of usdul work
mains to be re.ched in thi , Klc1et y .
In reC"mt yeoiT1, unem ploymmt hois been oiccompilnied
by M'Vt"Te infl atio n. a crud l.\ l; on all thOllt' in lowr r in-
come broilckeh or on fixed incomn. MoreoWl' , b.1,ic ne--
assil in _ food. housin&- t'f'It'rgy oind huh h un- led
Iht' surge ovn l he past five yrollT1 . " Th e rt"-
suit i, tNt oidequOill e food , ..heli n , and he-illt h Coi rr oirt"
ou t of Ihe tt'oich of .In inaea"i ng number of AmmCoins .
For exa mp le, whm oi lowerjncornt' foimily foiCt'1o ri, ing
food cos.ts , it find s it coinnol "'ubati tute down" to
ch",apt' r foods. M\d mu st reduCt' consumpt ion. Acco rding
to Ihlt' Select Commi lt t"e on Nutril ion oindHumoin Nreds, an
ntimal ed 1.6 milli on pt'Ople bel ow the poVt"Tty ItVt'1 now
suffer fro m maln ulrition. II
In his finl fireside chat , Prest dee r Culrr tmphOil, izrd
'ho'
Infl.lion h.I hil 1.1, hoIrdftl not In the luxurin bul in
lhe - food, htillt h . nd hOln ing
You _ II t'wry limt' you ao lhoppina ...I un<r.
lund 1h.l1 unempJoynwntand infl.Jtion . . , do..
p"1 harm 10 m.Jny Amniu.nfamilin. .- ' .
Th e Ad mini slration may no w esta blis h the fr ilmt'Work
for eccn ormc an d weiil l righ ts in this country. for iI
s uarantff'd level of sod al jusliCt' which can stand ill an
example to others. Some of the pledges have alr eady
been made in piecemeal Iashl on. Th e Emp loymml Act of
1946 recognized l he value of a job for tV")' able perso n
(oihhough it WOilS explicitly chilngt'd (ro m a Full EmJHoy-
mmt Act in the Congress ). Th e Housi ng Act of 1949
recognized a national ob ligoilion to prov ide -. denonl
heme and oisuitable livi ng environmrnt for every Amt'ri -
Coi n fOil mily . ..- Th e Socia l Src urity Act Of 1935 rnovrd
t owar ds gua rointlt'dng Oil rr.inimal ,t.ilndard of Iivin(l: for
evny Amt'ric Oiln. The is plt"dged 10 pil"
univn wl heillth cart" Iegislalion in the neilr fulure (ill-
though act ion on !he Iegisloilion hilS bftn POSl po ned for
the prntnll.
Thnt' fundammtal objectivn should be oiclnowl t'dgrd
as Ihe ba sis of .a domest ic Konomic bi ll of righ ts .
Prnidmt should sttk to gua ra nt"" an enforct"able right
10 work. to eat. 10 dK"t'Tl1 sheher, ilnd to heilhh Cilre for
a ll Americans. The ad minlstroilion can pr ovide Iht' frame.
work by ..ccrpling Ihi!> rn po nsibili ty a s put of its
mnlic oigrndOil on t.umoin rights.
FOOTNOTES
1. W., hingtol1Polt. 18 Marth 1977. p. 1.
2. QuOlrd in Van Dykir , Hwm_ RillatJ . 'M UnilN SI"t" /I>ld
Ih,. World Comm,miry. (19701.
3. Artklll'16. PiI&qph 1 of tht Inlt'l'l'lAtioNl Cown.Jn1 OC'I
Economk. Soci.aJ.and Cultural Ri$hll.
" . Ht'I..nl.l Ac<:'Of"Cis
S. by Rep. Rot>t't l Drinan. Col1grlfUioM Rorll
3/9 171. p. HI904.
6. TudinS wilh 1M Enormy Acl.
1. Tht IpftCh Cril1Wlinchx Riot Act. 18 U.S,C. S2101:
1M St'd\ l ion Co Mpir.JCy SUiIUII!, 18 U.S.C. S23&4; Ihl! Smilh
Act . 18 U.S.c. S 2345: 1M Voo rhis Act . 18 U.SC. S 2380: Iht'
Prf'tinw Mil itary $edition N t . 18 U.S.c. S 1381; and IhI! p.
It'mion of lhe W. rt ilfll!Mili tAry Srd ilion Acl 18 U.S.c. S2391.
8. Quott"dIn The Cenwr for Naliof\.JI $Kurlty Sludi,.It ..J.
'" UnD' 0 COl1trol th,FBI . p. 1.
9. Intt'm.l ionoi l COVnw'\ l on Economic, Social and Cuhur..1

10. WlIIIhil'tgtol1 Post. April 30. 1m. p. 2.
11.William Spril\&.rt .1. of ltv Undt'TflflPloytd ." Tht'
N,.", 'York Tim" MlISlRil1,. NOVflflbtr S. 1m. pp. 42flO
12. "'Full Employnwnl .t UvinC Wac",:' Mlall of 1M AlfWri
u n Acadnni c of Political and SocUll Sciencr. MMch 1915. p.
\04
13.lestt'r C. Thurow. ""Economic Propnlof Minority
0111111,."". MaKh-April. lcno .
1". DtI.a!1rdin 5lud"_ conductt"dby 1M b plor.lory Project
on Economic: Aht"fTl,lltivn.
LS. Nldntioll .,11 HNl tlt, SI!'\t Commit1ft' onNutnuon
.ndHul'l\Ml Nt'Il'ds.Vol.n, 1916. p. 81.
16.Quoted In Bannon, 10.Jtl. A W orl:inS &OIl O'"JIfor ",,",tl-
01111' , (19m, p. lb.
TheIndictmentof anFBIMan
ThiJ ,dilorilll LJrrpri" ', d courtf'Sy0/,h, Chicago
Tribunt', .4"riI12. J977.
Agt'l'l!S for tM Federa l Bureau of Inves tigation in Wash-
Ion nd NewYork art' reported to be very much upse t
;;:"1,.1,," New Yorkgrarsd juryh..s indicted oi now retired
fBIsupt'rvi wr . John J.Kt'amt")', on five count, of conspir-
acy,obstruction of correspondence, and iIIrg10l wire lapping.
Tht .u'lfd offt'f\Slt'lare dated between 1910 and 1972.
PAr. Keoimt'Ym ind .
Whal tw tM G-mt'R upsrt i.. t hat this is thefirsl time
,....eI" INI en FBIage-I'll hoilbeenindietf'd on frlony coun ta.
Bul Mr Kumey is no l Ii'll' o nly FBI ..gm t Iobout whom
therr ha.. bftn t. lk of iII"SoIlwil't'tappi ns etc . "A lot of us
did tome of thew th ings in the pul: ' ont' agenl w.id . "A lot
01uaart... yins. 'Thrn but for lhe graCl!'of God go I: ..
qu otati on from '1'1 agent is Ihis : "Who'..
allina 10 lpa.k up for the Wt'ye bon selling kicked
.round by Congt't'U and the prn.sfor two ye.il. ,.now. and
no OM' 10duend us ." FBI DsrKIorO <1 tmCl!' M.
Krlley I, 1'101 ifXprctt'd to tt' t. in off ice much longt't and hilS
f'(lttwfl shadow of J.EdguHoover' , fOnRn cloul . And
the Departmentof JUltiCt' has had loiwyenwor king for ttw
prcsecutlcnof Mr. Keoimt")'.
Of COUrN'the bestdtfenw again$1.ny choirS" is demon-
strable Ianccence . But moiny veteran FBI..gmt tacks
thai deteese. Th ere art" matt er-of -fact rrp orl l Ihoil 1'101 many
yt' a", ago i1lega lt<1ctia by FBI weft" not only
condonedby their luprrion bul mcouraged .-
somet ime.f't wardNby cuhbonu...
In all th is there i.. so nwt hin.no,", offftlaive than
oiny poesibl e uNaimt'M 10Mt. KN Tnt")' , whom not rv m ..
u<11oulprosecutor could ch.-r.ctmua. the penon mlol
rn po na.ib lt' for whaltVft' iIIqal tactic, the FBIformerly
IPmployed . WNtit. m05t offftUivlPi, that a fedt"Talb w
mf"o/UmmtaFOCYshould repeatedly act iIIrgaJly while
enjoying total immunity from ptoeution.
A counlry lhal hh Iftn impellchmmt choirs"brought
ap inat .. Prnidenl.. nd the conviction and Sft'ltmcing to
prison of " 1'1 altomf')' Bt'Tlft'alllohn Milchellil.not going10
bto horrified by the idalha t FBI.gt'Tlb a n be i'l"ldictt.d if
ttwir conduct wurantJ It . Sowha l if FBI.gentsare shook
up1 They nt'If'd to be ahookup ,",oo&" to know tha t IhlP)'
are suwo-<! to be law .bidinsthnnwlva and thoil thry.. l't'
not Immune to ptoeullonif they art' n ot .
C1A1AcnvmES IN AUST'RAUA .
Attordi.f'II 10 Otrilloptwr Boyno.
charmr.aitrd In Stodwdl'l ClpI!'R
Rttt'r. (WlIIh,"J'fOftPo." "/lO I71 ;
it could be Tn'ftMd Wilhoul
(W.Jr.irttort In The
OIl trial ill Callfomia for apiOll.lp .
1MCIA "". manipulatina
Wa ltingtmf Poll . 4IUI71. p. 31 Po.I. 41'la171, p. IS; W.hillJ1'oll
".,412'9171. P 161 News
It. A.....a1i.Jnlabor union 1Mdrr- aAI8UDGlT CONTROVERSY.
1hIp.inhlt,.tina unioN. and Accontina 10 .ourc:n ckMtto tN
Itn......Tlw judp OYft-
r-uJ.d.,.....NM'fll ri"fortllo
pn. of 1M Auslr.h.n
""tnr\Cft, (Nn.> York Timn .
p 18)
QA / ACENT RESIGNS IN
nsT Rntplln. aft" 12 YNn
CiA opt'r.llvt. JohnSiock-
..,.. CIpI!'Tl 'eUn to Ihr
TIt'WOA Director, Sl.nJitld
O AlBUDCET; PUBUC OR
SECRET7 CiA Dil'fflot Sl.aRl flrld
Sen..le- InleU. nar CommJlt... . IN
CU lt'!' Adminlslr.tion hal
$6.2 billion for IN 1m bu.1for
1M nation', Inlt'II.ipnc1o oprratiON.
Tlw SmaM Committee rJUMd 10
dmy or conflTm I"fiaure. (N".
York Ti..... 4111T! . p. 1; W _ .
;1111" PosI, 4/ 2111. p. 2).
QA/N[Jl.GY CRISIS. Prnidtnl
Cart.r thr C1Anllmatft
ollhe worldo.ll_u.alionin ordotr10
P'flI!'T"ii1tt' suppo l1 for hil i IWW ft'In'IY
P'0If1lm.Tht CiA rrpol'1 pm:licted
that1MSorirt Unionwillbr com-
pl!tina Wllh1M TI'II of dw world (or
Middle e.t011 by lhe 1Q80s.
(W.ltinj1OftPo.t , 4119/71, p. 1;
York Titn_ , 4119171. p. 24)
Tunwr , b.pl.lnina 1M rUIOTII fot
hAs d.p.rturt' . The wit". in
It.. 1V.. Post. PYft nun'll!'t-
Turtlt"'I"If'IIified bIl'fott' the Sl!'Nle
Commillft that Presl-
dlt Cartt'r would not object 10 OAlENGLISH LANGUAGEPROP-
GUI ft.Impln of .nd
lion'WllhinIhI!CIA, and
cnlic:arn.IICIA', involvnnrnl in
Anao!.I. Sloclwt' 1ldlscloKd. for
Inewlcw, 1h.Jltht' CIA pursed lhe
filet of o..vid euR. ln .anAmk..J.n
in rt'(T\lihna
lOr ArI&o;" Ul .nlKip.lll On of
Dtp,ar1mmt ftqunl fOt' in-
1000000lKlt'l COfICftnITII him. CiA
Dlrwdor TurMl" and IJwSmal t'
Commlltft hive Mid
Ih.y'Will inYfttical e IN l pedfloi::
rdIl'uI of the ovwall COfol: of U. S.
intt'lIlpnce opn- ation . \Vhilll'
TUrnt'T laid tht' admln.lsln lion be-
IMoYft publicWna Iht oIQTI!'Pte
community bu. t
would lwIprr-Iore public conii-
ikner, Sm. H.athaw.y afJUI!'d it
mia,ht hul1 CIA'I cndibility.
Morton Halprrtn 01 CNSS tnufl,rd
thr foilowiJlc doIy tNl the
heurr fOfeh of dahlinlrllipnCl!'
qendn should hi! m.Jde public:
"Ihe public Is mlilWdto know and
AGANDA.Rep. Don&:Iw.rds, co-
C. .I halbftn Informedby the
CiA lhal it willrnd cOV'l!'l1 fundlnl
01 EnsIiahlansuqr boob at part
01 it, oprnUoM.
E4"".rdt 1Nmtd 01 Ih. eN,..In
policy b.1*of tus inqui.... into
a reaml book a1t1calof S&tv.oor
Ahnde. which had bMon
*-d in Brit ain by ForwnWor'd
Fwotw- . TI'pO.wdI)' CIA 11.1_1-
optratkln. Prfot ''' .
to 1961. IN Apr,cy had I t ' ;'
181
180
(conti nur d)
11
In The
News
RRST PRINCIPLES , NATIONAL SECURITYAND CIVILLIBERTIES
FBI/ INDICTMENT Of AGENT,
LEGAL FEES. In tn ti mon y belen
1M SYtt' Appl'Oprioltionl Commit-
tee. Atlome')' Gcrwul Griffin Bell
Mid tNt .ny FBI .sml. indlctni
fOf activilw. wlll"10111' thri r
Iile ,",vinp ddendins thrm.lvn
..... imt tht' crlmin.1 ct........
baUM lhe JUitice holt
paid for IIw dl'fft'IM of
mcourapd or undrrwritl f'f\
publ ical tor. of mon It'loln 1.000
boob . bo ut 2,5.() 01 whkh Wft't' in
EJWiah. (Nrw York Tim,.. , 4" 'T!.
p. 34)
CIA/ PRESIDENT BLOCKS MICRO-
NESIA REPORT . urt.,
blocked lh. nol., of .. Sn\ah! Inl. l
1/p'fl':e Co mml ltft rrporl on CtA ',
-
lEAA/UNDER RlVIEW. A loinl
JustiCl'/LEAA lhJdy ITOup Will
t'QmiM tM l.EM .nd male
lY'COmnwnd.llli011l to AtlOfl'IIry Gen.
ltTal Griflla Bell COl'tCf:mi nc I_
.pncy1 futwe. l.E.AA 1'1-. COnlinu.
l1y bePncrili dud for w.tine
m OM')' on poorl y . TId
Ineffeclive protKts. fW/lShi"gto"
PO'Jt. 4/ 9111. p . A1)
----.
ASSASSINAn ON I
cP-
PtD
JVa:y. Joe' Dion _ I
O
SlIoI m:
.- .,.tt.c_m) Cubl n f"UW livina m .
,.".,"-y' MI tr" "'ikodfor
10 ,,,,1Iy bdOl't' p'.nd JUry
.. .-.111'11 IIw ---,rwllon of

J.ett'lwr . H, . nd other nwm
.,.,. 011M(liNn nile community
IllJI' Itwy bt' lln'Ir It'll!'It.nd
1'Jll' .I '1ilh l fll Into thll'
aM, AltorTll'yGenna! 8t'1l hal,..
jted .. reqUll'lt by Lftellft"l widow.
INbod. tNl pl'WKUlor be
"ppointed 10 wort.: orr. IIw mY8 lip
tio n. (W ....hi"l tOfl Po,t. 4/2 11T! . p.
11
MAIL OPENING. The U.S. Potta!
* propoIII'd rqu"'liont
th.1 wou ld proh ibil In lll'Ta'plion 0(
open ina of lnoIil by U.S. fOif'l'tP'l
..ponrin wlthoul fed-
MAY 1971
PIUOR RlSTRAINT. Tlw ' utto
Ot'r l. dtcbned to y... . _ the
in junct60n ..iNt fonnn' CIA
t>f fid&l Victor Marctwt: tt which
Iimitt h it ri#Jt 10 I pr.k on CIA
m.t.d TnoIll.,.... Ho wt'Yft'. 1rI .
H'PoI r.le action It lifted dw injunc
tion 10 pn'mll M.,dwui 10 tnhfy
In an 1n.l ln Lo. An.I....
(tAt ter 0" file . t CNSS , W..lli",..
10'1 Po,.,. 4/2.1f71, p. 86 )
IJ
In The
News
(co rlti rtuPd)
l u rwillanC'f oICli vilW. of M kronnla,
.. U.S. protKloralt . Sc-nllor
a,ftd 10 withhold 'M r?pOrl ,
dr.phe dw Sma le Comm;Uft". '101.
10 me... il . Aoco rdirll 10
inMdr 1OUT'C'ft,.I I iIaue II 1M Ston,It'
commiU"', condlaion tlwCIA
twd IOUrcw in.. the
KOYffnmml .. nd hadpt'Ntrllttd 1M
inlt'ma1 polIt ic.!
(W. hi".r'0 n Pml , 4J.)O/17)
FBI/ PROTlST Of AGENT
lNDICTMENT. FBI Dirtor o.r
C"f'Ia K.1Wy .ked Altome')' Gmn".al
Bell 10 rTVkw tM of
FBI citina tM
offid.l l unOrr crim in. l indi ct mmt.
Bt-Il .I so Mid Ih.1 1M Jus tice
[kpoll'tmlr'nl Hdnpll'T. l el y n-ds
chirtltT fOf the FBI.
(WlIBlli"gto" Po.l . 4/27 1Tl . p. A1)
LECISLATION / INTUUGtNC(
AGENCY RETORM. H.R. 6OS1
h.- been Inlroduct'd by 17 morm-
ben 01 tM Hou w of
wnl.l\yn. It would proh ibil
pohtka! l urwiliMlu. restrict I_
FBI 10 criminal pro.
kd IOYft'l\JMI\t whistle b1owen.
.Ilnd eNCt ocher proll ibtl ions thtit
would hdp to mel IOYWnmenI
c..- ,.roup' . oIlldare .. 10
IIIDIll.... dt velopmenl l In Ihe
fOL"/l.rr()ItNY FEES. CU1If'O D.
f.IJ No 75-22J9 lD. C. Cl r.
)4 . l m l . and N.,iort", ilM
,rcM-",,,,...,,r,,',, "
..-' No. 10-1453 lD C. Cir.
AlIt '" 1m }. In twO npniont 01
delnlonil brCJbn down inlO ...
rnrnts of no more than 2 pqn.
Judie p.. -ur ordmd aU
of dw perIONIl
file of ,.onw me-d nl'n tI
uni ni d lici bW."
11"1'.1 court wan.n! . ( WlUhi""ol'l
Po" , 4/ 91Tl. p. A3J
_ Iso deniN . Tlw cou" ..... nlfd
pUlnliff'. mot ion 10 cmJfy dw
et.. fe. of dld.r.lory
an d inJuncti" rYhIf .nd RTtil6MI

""how lNIil w. r. ndomI y ClJlIftI'd
In The
Courts
QA/RECRUfTMfNT OF M RON-
ARIES. N".wy tb.t
IC'Cordu'l to inIPlhF"(t' IOUfCft, lhe
CIA .. (OV'I' rtly ....pport 1rc "fom 10
RCTUil 01 mm:r,..M in
1M U.S . .and Brilain 10 fiKhl In
bin-. 1M CIA dtn ... bolh Ih.t I'it
pl'OY1dlnll fund. 10 ,,""l'\Iil ml'rcnwr
'" and .... Ih., it iii not co-
0Plln11rl1Cwilh l he- hd li
on .n I nvro.t iAoII l ion of David
Bufkin . who N yt he mn-clI'r'IoIry
rrullll'f . rW,u " i'lRfO'l /'0'1,
4117171, p. 10; W'I'''i''Jl:f On Po# .
4119171, p. 121
FBIIINDICTMENTOf AGlNT.
Fornwr FBI John 1CnrN)'
wu indicted on April 7 by .. ftdrral
p-uu:! jury in New York on CN.,...
of dlrKtinl FBI "p'nl. In .. Mttt1
mail opml n, wirll't.. ppi1'l&ope1'-
Ilion durin, .....rch for We. t1wr
Undrrpound fu,ilivn from
1m . AUorMy Ctnft'.1 Griffin B.U
comnwnlt'd : "M y own dt.ll1Ip wi lh
tM FBl ln lhe . hort lime tN. I 1 hoIvt'
bftonAlIOf'N')' Gc1wr.1 IUIl.ln my
oVt'n1l rnprct fOf d....FBI.nd my
linent' t ruM In 11.... hish M. ndan. of
tnpont.ibllity dnnon-
ICr.ted by 1M mm women who
N.Vt' 1M honor 01M'f'Vina .. FBI
apnls ." lOoJIDIk't' ""- R"'-,
April?, 1911; W""I"JI:'''" Pott .
4/8fTl. p. AI : N_ York Tim...
FBIlCOINTU.PRO. The FBI h.d ..I
k. OJ infomwnl. in 1M
fClfPolqo Stodw-. in tM cour.- t>fit.
6)'"r in,,"llp llon of It. W.hilll'
10n-b&Md Ihink t.nk . Tllou.nd. of
doll. n Wf'f1' . pmt by 1M
moml to obt .. in infOflNlion about tM
IMlltut e, n'IOlII of which w.- ..vail
. b w 10 tM publlC.. I no CN.rp .
( W. hi",rto" Po. r. 4/2 11Tl . p . A9 1
FBIIINVESTIGATI ONS Of
AGENTS. TM JUltice DPp.flm ilrTll
h.. d".Ilred John M.Il loM , n;MoId
of 1M FBl' l New York F.. 1d Offief'.
of wrong -do ing In 'b l. ck b., lobI
H
bt'IWt't'Tl 1971 .nd 1913 . (WflShi"g .
to" /'osI, 4/3 1T!. p. All
FBI/ INfORMERS. Accordi"l 10
hln me.-rd to wOftUln
uRdorr the FTft'dom of InfOl'mollion
Act W"konw W.son I'f'PrlrWllt...
livll' I'q)Ortf"CI twrf. mlly b.Kk
,round to 1M FBI In 19?O. (IN
"'"set" Ti"'n. 413fn, VlI,
p . 5)
HOUSE ASSASSINAnONS COM
MITTEE. D.C. Dt'kpte W.Il ltn
F. u nlroy nwmbft' 01 lhe Hou.
A-a!n.ttloM Commi llft. Nt cril l-
dud tM pTftl for reportina lNt
Ihe Comminft "- produced liltlt'
MW infOlTl"lollion In its InvntiJ,ol
tion . Faunlroy .ugnled lha l IORW
jOW"l\olli5ts !NIl' be acti1'l&undtT lhrr
influrTlCt'01dw CiA. (Washi"grO"
FBII INVESTIGATION OF WIRE-
TAPS. Pnwnl and 'onne,. qmls
of tM FBI haw t-n M1bponlM'd
by IIw New H.vm Polke Comm"
.. JW1 of ill Invnl iption
InlO .U"l"'d iIl,.",,1 wird.ppina by
tIwcily ', polin bII't_n 1966 .Ilnd
1m. rNnD York Ti"'ft, 4/21 / T! .
p. IS)
fleeted"' mor.ale al ltw Ou"'.u. JOO
FBI I:pTIIS abo C'XpT't'MlId IUpporI
for John Kt'ame')'. the FBI
...,nl indicted by rallyi"l
on 1M I IIrJ* of fedna! court
tlOUM' in New York City. {We ll
i"gtOl1 PoJI. 4/15 1T!. p . All
.urwilt..nce of "wful poIllial
Ktlvitln. (Soft !ht' art kH Clfl pqe
one.of ARST PRINCIPUS. )
(WlIDhirwto" Post . 416/n. p. All )
LrTWER ASSASSINATION fetA
CONN ECTION . Edwin P. Wilton.
fonntT CIA OJ:'f'' rati w .00 Pfftt'\'li ly
hNd of an aJ'IN nport butirwM.
borcanw dw rww focw of the Lt'td,,",
Invnliloilion. \Vilson ...Jrqdy
undlT inwstipdon for allqedty
tryinr; lo recruit Ih1ft Cub... Iut
)'eM 10 lull .IlnOpporwn l 01 Col.
MlIoImmlr Qaddafi of Liby. ; Ihtr
"mil' Cubm. arriV'f'd in WolihiTIIIClfl
ltuft ..ays bftOTll' lII'tdie'rw. ___
.in.leod. In .ddition. Wll.on w.
suppo-ny in Conl.Kt wilh lndividu
.1. with in 1M CiA who hadoIC'CftI 10
!XtotLItion df'vicn .nd had
conlnct 10 ..II Ihll' Ub y.n JOv,rn'
nwnl llimin, pencil. lto
H pport I"nor m .K1ivity for theTft. t
of 1M century." A1m051IWO_ /1.1
. he r this CiA Dlrlor
T urnn- find two CIA
t'TnplO)'ft'l t h..t h.t provided
utLIut hoT'ind u.sistt0Ct' 10 W1J.on
vtd OCMformtT t'TnplO)'ftl wllina
nplOloivt' dtvicn .nd olM mltmaI
OWtw . (WlUlliJlgfoPl Pf" t.
4/12 ln. p. 1; WIIBJli",rOl'l PosI .
LEGIS l ATION tWlRrrAPS. n.
C#ttT ad mlnillr.tlon exptt1ed 10
uk for Je.pt1.ll lion requ ir.
Ire w.rran ll f or wilet . pt in
Invntia.lionl of fort'ill1l inlellipnu
oICtfvitin in tM U.S. The ACLU
..nd ochft' lVoupt .ct!ve in the
fish l "Pintt dw Lcovi Wlm.llP bill
In 1M 1..1 COngrftl.ll ft' . fraid Ihlt
Ih. new bill may haw lOTTIe of
Ihtr n.WI of Ihe e.llrlift' bill . (WlUh-
;"1'011 Po." 4171T! , p. A12; NnlJ
York Tim". 4/21171. p. 15)
FOIA/VAUG HN OROR. lafj, o.
0'" a_, No. m .D.c. .
M.r.orar.dum OrdPr , Apr . 7.
1m) Fuldll'll thll " hit unl.i1ored.

eat.- _ Wt'll as tN MTkIut
.nd Incom6Itendes found
In thto alh dnitl ,.. 1"- IOwrn-
InftII otfninp Intufflriml , lhe
COlI" ordlrfd dtulI.d Indn .nd
IIlthf
q
li Ol'l undrr V.uk"" reqwrtne
..-1I1e dnoli led 01
R)lAIVAUGHN ORDER. W.bn""
Drpf 0{ '/dlic,. '70 C, . .540'1-
('$ti 0 N.V M..r . 22. 1911)
",,""<I opinion and ordPrl. In
Fnrdom 01 lnfurrNllloa Act c_
tcw dwFBIh&.. on bl.Kk intellK-
tu.I/. rrlltwo prnod 1Qlt-1929. the
""*" daub ! thai IN
POIA. .....kIn/b 1 I1Jlor
.... lKUrity mfOl1l\olltOft could
' 1 cndull ty to __
thM _y dor:umenu. IO\IIht by
"""""1ft . concwTIinI b1..
t-a. ," k.,. brIlON ..... could
..... '4J'CIft our I\oIl ton.a dft en.e
Of forft,n polic)o." Thit COUIt
tlw FBI 10 .ubmil
V-e/m IhoWVlC Idrt.tiled indPina
Iftd ..-rIIlC..IIClfl ! fur lhit withheld
....-.
,... T..'" tfw oI W. tdJna; 01
.... . .tdr.-d fM 1M
,... ... to) tlw Court of Appeah.
far tfw D.C CltCUIl. T1wcourt
WId INI f .... 10 bt awarded. a
,..... """rwc-..ry. wtwre
piaWlIf . ,u ,l h..:I - CWMI1W d
t1 ' 11'1 tN JOwnurwr'lt dtriai on to
__ ,.."...... docunwnt l . It..
NOIIUI,....,IIN.l plaJnhlf lUbIt." l w -
'" p"""_1 Nt bftr1 nwt and rhit
_r.1 its diIa"iun award
...
StJRvmlANcr. "'fril... PIpIor ',
1Wty M8'tirt . (E D.
P . F.b . 25. 19111 (Complaint ).
a ..me. of un10lwful entrift,
Inlo p1olllt1ti,ff' 1 ra idenct' bffwwn
Oct . 1975 and F.b 1977 which
Wt'tII' dNipwd to InUmld,.", .
nd C'IlIff'O. tN lUil .....
lhal the TIIid1 be dK...red IIMpI
.nd thai fPhlladt' lph"
poln oHicft's and . nd FBI
apnld be mjoinf'd lram furdwr
r. lds .
SURVDUANCt.. "'au D. FiItc".
IT!..(ll')4?\O fS.D.MIII _. F'f'b IS.
1977). T1w Aau oi M W-ipp/
oIJId oct. p1.inti!ft h. ve fill Mlit
..iT'lll prnml fomwr olflcWi
of tlw M_..pp' SI.",
Co mmitainn . tIwStolle At IOTTllr')'
GftwraI '1 OrpnizN Crime Intdll.
pnC"I' Unil. !hll' Hihw-r
Idf'nliliul ion IkttNu. .and Mi ...
. ippi 5ecrt'tary of SUite
1h.1 tlwy ilI. ly aathend and
diMemil\olled InfOllrillhon on pol iti.
cal .IlClhnlCt and th.lt IJ-,e
IUrvril lance ' liII CUallJ'lw"C.
Iudtit' H.arokl Nt '-Jed
temporary rntrain1na O(d 10 p'"
Yft\1 the State 'ram -'OTlnc thtr
m.
SURVDUANCE. DrtWT V. H,I ,,".
C.A. No. 75-224 (O.R.I. Apr. 1.
19T! 1. In oIJI ACLU lUll ( ARST
PRINCIPUS. M.y . 1976) in'
from tlw CIA mail open ina pro-
1I'&m. the court In IPn&thy
opi nion dnl iN lhe dl'fmdant'.
mot ion 10 dil mi. 'or of lurla-
diction, Impn:!pf'l' ""Uf' .nd inIuf
fkit'ncy of procnI. T1wmotton 10
dismia on of thit currml
FBI DiA'Clor In his oWd.l1 G1IPKity
Morb _ 0.4. No . :7S-l735 to.D.C ..
Noy. J . 1m). II now A'portfd .1
t26 F. Supp. 108 (D. D. C. 19161
n. court dIc luwd 10 Cfttify
d-. .... who. nv il w_ opnwd
ba.. lhey '"" Clfl a ..teh lilM.
SURVDllANCE. 0-0""_
HOIWY'I"" I. '''c. No. 4-T! Q y. 152
fD. Milln . Apr . 21. 10m (Com-
plainll. AO-U dais Ktlon tuft fe.
damapt .I'd '".-at"" ,.,..
artl&rw from toInl FBlfHorwywelI
cffon 10 infihule and ct.n..p1 'M
anll...,. Proit"" of 'N
pWntifft
CASES REPORTID
SlJRVDU ANCE. H_ pfOft to.
H..,.. . No . '" C 1164 (N.D.
Ul. . Ordar of Apr . IS. 19'1'T1 . In
lhit lUll lt emm 1na from d.. poln
raid in whkh 81... k r.nl frwd
Hampl Clfl . nd M.rk ClArk....
k UAPd 1_ flRST PRI NCIPLES.
No v. 19161, ,....aJ diltrkt court
JudI" Sam P.Try w.m-.d chal'Jl'l
...,,, . 21 pra-I and fOl'1Ml" ILIIII'
and It'drroI l offk .... He WI In tht
H il only tM wwn police oHict'n
who f1mJ inl o lhit .partmmt
4/8 1T!. p . 1) Post. 4/24 1T! . p. Al) 4/ 27171. p. 1)
. :-
.'< '.,
tt ' ;'
----
182
14 FIRSTPRINCIPLES , NATIONALSECURITYAND CIVILLIBERTIES
New Docu-
mentsAVAilAble
from Center
forNQrional!X>cun',y
StudiesLibrary
In The
Literature


nwnlS on 1M womm', libn.tion
movmwnl from 1969 10 1973 Ni""
bft.n Ihcoy .how nlC'n.iw
UN' of iTlfonNn's In both loca r and
n.llion.1 P"OUP"around
th.. country . includifl8 thOMwurk
Ins on .bortion .Ind ri p ta
ql,b.tion. and dey care cenh.,..
Ahhouxh Itno In
t he-likot of vlo,"- or lhrul 10
nall on.a! lM"Cur lty . u- the
Iwlification. slwn for such inv",'!.
plionl.
fBI COIN'TD.PRO DOCUMENTS
FROM SWP LAWSUIT
"TlwPolilkaJ Richls Drf_Fund
111M IIv,.lI..ble on Apr. 6. 1m
15,(0) p.l8n of filn OOcunwnllna
FBI .ctivity.
Amona od'll'l' t hinp, lhe docunw:nl'
thow t hat thl- Burt:au UMdd1sMon
.Ion within IhC' ChUKh 10
try 10 Ioree unc.lI.lion of .an .nti-
Artld.. Tlw N..w A-rlcan brformation
8,0'lh&h.. In Brooklyn. by Di<lne Rl'volulion, by J,lnwt M. N.aush-
IUvitch, TJwNN R",,,,blk. M.rch Ion. Nrw York Time. April 10.
12. 19T1. p. l e oBrooklyn Coli.... 19T1. p. 4E. IhI' tremt'nd-
poltliul prof.-:Jr MKh-I OUt MICU'M 01 IhI' K>IA in
S,h..,'. ,.dmillN conloK1 wilh IIw IfII up the now 01 InfDn1'Wltion
QA hoIa collq..- urgina from goYt'f"nmmt filn .and I....
dooplin.ry ..cuee ..pi"" him. and ot.ln.rctioniat.lIiludt' 01Kimt'
the .. ulhor poinl. to reedfOf
KtNlrr proIrclion q"Ilrw tM
infihr..lion inlo 1M .I' Out u . t. of thl'l.t.nd, by 8t'rnMd
ditmic community. whilt' ..voiding D, NoMitr r. NnD York Rrvino of
1M d'l ..rlt" of .I McCarthylam of Boob. April14. 19T1. p. 31. Oi...
1M ,"I eu...1Mdrport..lioN of Philip
.and MUk HOIWf'INII from
Tht' FBI T..k..Aim ..I AIM, by Brit..in. nd how Brit.aln, sece nty
Elliol K.nlt'r. Sn>r?tDwys. April .Y'o'"" ..nd Officl&! 5t'crt'ts Act
11. 19T1. p. 7. An .Kcounl of .. maHrt' .
poP-iblt'mUrOrr fr.Jnt'-up in C..!I
fomi ....nd II'COflnt"Cliona wilh YOIII" R...." To Your RKo,,, by
fBI Infihr..IIOfl andd.rupllOfl of Ann F. HoIrtt'r..... d SIt'phm P.
AIM. H..rt,., . 19T1. 25 p'#'. PrOC'tdurn
.and.ailitfor pining acu.to .and
Ho.... 10 FornItI..FBI.--tlhor .amn'ldil'llyour ptnDnoIl rKOrdi in
CIA inlo Rnolt.lina What Itwy JOVtTTUnt'nt . IChool nd cndil
HoIylt On You. by Pt'tt'l' Ba-kind. filn , SJ .OO/ropy. from S. H.ar1,.,.
MOl",.,. Ion,. . Mol)' 19T1. p. U. 801 17222. T.mpa. FL33682.
Uwfw ..rt"'" on wlwl to I' 1prc1 RoiIln for bull ordll'n .
from Itw burulKToIC'Y wht'n uunc
1M K>lA.
t...w Rl"rit'w Artkit'
1nl:.DI&ft- Act lnt".. nd tN
Rlchl. of Ammc_. by fnodmck
Tlw Umkl 0 10bMMkm: Fencli'll
A,D. Schwartz Ir.. prinlrodin
in IN "'Nallon&! s..curity.. Oatar. .
."dCr'UiJ, ..nd in nllt
H.rl..an Ckwl ..nd .,..d StUoll rt Grny
RtmJ of .1...0. of ,h, &, of
Brown. 28 Admi". L. Rrv . 327
,h, of Nt1D Yo, k. Vol. 32.
(Summt'r 1m).
No. 112. '.n.lft'b. 19on. Tlw ChWf
Coun.1 10 In.. Church Commillft'
on Intll' IUgt'nce Acti'lilln outlirws Go-mnwnl PublkatlOnt
Itw Jllt'pl .nd/o r ulWlhic.l tlvl -
lin of thl' inlt'1lir;enct' .apncWa Crlmin.alJuMtce lrIfornwtlon Con
whkh Wt'ft' loI;rZt'!t'dat 1M ww- trol .and Ibl' ProlUon of PrivK}'
..bldlns, H. ul'J" lh.Jt Act , Ht'Minp ado theSubcom-
v..riold prncriptiON ..plnsc qt'I'Iry mltlft on CI",i1 MId Corali hltion. l
IbuMs ..oould begiv", In WfJII! Rich"of tM CommltlM on t1w
"-0. Judiciary. HOUM of Rrpm...nloltivn.
94th Cons.. hI SrM. on H.R.
M_ An.ric.... 1&...... [Hrty 8227, Jul y 14. 17, ..nd 5.
TrkUtI" , by Ropr IUpoport. In 1975. Would proll'C1 thor ronsUlu-
Motltf"r /on,.,. April 19T1. p. 19. tiol'loill fil;hlt Ind pri"'olICy 01
1M "Of')' of D.rth.Jrd Pm')'. olin indi",kI'l&Alt upon whom crimin.al
lnfomwr and a8ft'l1provoamn for lustle. lnform.ation h.aI bMn collom
IhI' fBI In IhI' 1.01 Al'!Fw.black rod and control 1Mcollt'ction.and
mOYC1lWl'lI . d....minolllion of tuChInf ofTl'\,il t ion .
-
WAf conJt:rffI' a' Catholic:Un\.
"nily in WMh ingt on In 1971. n.
FBI..I,.;)rekouoed dacumtTllt
Ihowinl thai IIwy ronduet!Pd II
COINTELPRQ-typr Ikln in Fwb.
ru.ry 19'12; in .. .worn aUId.r.'111
given In 1MSWPCAM',
1MFBI "olIN INt no .'Jl"[t. of
lhit SWPCOiNTElJ'RD W..,.. C'OIt.
linlM'd.f lltr April. 1m , For
copin. pl,_(0" "'(" PROF.
649. COO"," StQhOll. NY, NY
'''"''.
FOI e- Uti , IMI . 1m
by 1MtOl Commltt", 'of
1M h_lie-. Orp.Irtll'll'flt. MIY be
oblol;ined through Mr. Rob.." l.
SoIlo.chin. o...irm...n. FOI Corrunlt_
tee, Room 5234. D.p.rtrnrnt of
Justke . W.as.hinxt on. D.C. 2OSJO;
Dr through IhI' Subcommltt... on
GoVt'fT'lIDltnl Infonna lion ..nd Ciril
Righll. B140C R.aybumHou.
Office BuildinL Whif\Clon. DC
zesis,
Forrir;n lntdll... 1ICI' Survrlll.nq
Act, Hr.arinp 8t'forll'the Subcom_
mnreeOn Courb . Civil li btrt ....
.and IhI' Adminlslr.,ionof Ju.IQ 01
Commill", on Ihll'
HOUM of }kpr...nl.1ivn.941h
Cona,. 2nd $1'11 . , April11, Moly5.
.and JUfle' 2. 1970. A bill to..m..nd
Til'" le . U.S.Codr. which would,...
tinct dt'ctronic rv.III.""'01Amt'r
ic.an(iliu1'...10 C w"""pl'Ob.b'"
UUM' for criminAlactivity .......
.nd limit. "KUliw d-.cntiOfl In
- n.aticrW 1t"CUrily wim.apt.
Proviskmt For A SpKI.al rr-
cvlor , Ht'Mings Brfon II... Subcom
miltt'e Ofl Cnmin.! '.he. of ,"
Commillft of Itw ludld..ry. &uM
of Rq:!T'II'WI'II.liYft. 94th Core .. 2d
Sn.!..on numrroutbil l, 10 pro-
",kk for.5pt'cl.1 l'rowrulor. July
23. AUS. 26. nd 1. 1976.
Cilmpilign To Stop
Gon-mment Spying
The Cilmp.lign is now pub-
lishing iI monthly nrwslettrr,
Org,,,,,izirtSNotts . II is . vilil-
ilble frw to people org.;1lnizi ng
ilround the iHUt" of gOVft'T\nwnt
spying. Conlilct them .. I 201
Mnsachutdts Ave ., NE. Rm.
112. Was.hingt on . DC 20002.
(202) 547-4644 if you wou ld
like to be indudrd on their
mililing Iisl .
183
15 MAY1971
--- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---"
PUBUCATIONS AVAILABLE FROM THE PROJECT ON NSItCL
.-;


I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
iI)Unl


I I II I I I I I I II I I I I I

II IL!..IhiiL :! H!

! J IU J- 1 . t t i it
ttl
I It i i ! II pt a! Ithl
lsi
H

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11
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lllWlSMlN L:lVNOUVI'OtQ;tNlJOr:XJ]] lU SlDPIlJ:JVDtoa:>I1UJ.N
I
WM tNt tM dec ision to indict thowFBI Itripped .w.y from officiillis of FBIand
Point
Jil'ft'l1I allflrdl y involvrd in hurgluin. wiret.aps . other intrl lige'l"lce .azencin the ir wnw 01immun
m..il OP"' inS- in connt"C1ionwilh the Weilther ity , of beingbt-yond the Iillw. l hilt h.al ch.rter-
OfView
lIndrf'l round umeOI her Allomey Lnl" tht1r beNvior. For tlwt iII 10nt il is.
d"ion 1'101 to indict ilny or thOM' involvrd in the import.nt ' 0 1ft thi s. invesHg. tion throUJh to from
(lA opening progum lhe indictfM'nt .J.nd Irial of ..II of thow who.c-
Th. \'.... r. per jus tifying deci sion to in- cord inl to It.ncb rd prolK'Utoriill cril er iol. would
dactFBI bul not erA OIgenls will not s.1.and as norma lly beindktt'd..
1MItulia Drp .rlment' s moo wnsitive showing Other pro gr.J.ml now concrdrd to be illepl or
01ronm'1'l for the rig hts. of citizms u they r.isr SOmf'WN I diffrm"ll qun
olnt Into connict with the governmmt's pernp- hOM. There is, for ex.ample . II conflicl betWft'n
lion of Nt ioMI $'Urity requirements. Nonetlw cond uct ing cri min.al prowcutioM .and millking In-
n .lhe Paper donNvrone point : the was formati on public so that who the
KIm. .bou t the rights or tM Pmi subject of iIIt'gill surveill.. ncr iII nd manipul.tion
dtrtl 10 cond uci intelligence opt"l".J.lions coli n be COmpt'T'lSilI.-d in .. ppropri.te Wolyl , c::;..1
1(1pttt infonn.aUon .about govt'rn- tin g the full story out. doing lomething for Ihe
rnt'nb . II il Ihis th.J. 1 the CIA mail victims. .and dnr:rmining how lo prevenl futurr
upeninIC program from Ihe investigation of the outragn llft'mS to m" to be more impo rtanl
WiNlher Undu groun d . Th e l.J.lter WOllS. pure and tholl n conducting cr imin.1 inves.tigatlons un I""
IImpl. . .. domnt ic cri mi na l invts.l lgati on .J. nd the viol.. tions of the loIw wt're unambiguoul iII nd
there hili f'lt''YC'I' bn the slightesl doubt ilbout the rnpoMibill ty clear.
ttl. rfquntmml to follow th. dictiltn of the The Attorney General thould considrr offrrlng
Fourth in such inve.tigalions ilnd the FBI .nd other ilgencin .. fr.ad. In
lhal the FBI musl sure a warrant before mahon to lpeciflc program. : lhe threal of pr o-
:n-:iII r" mml'd, phones ilr. liIpped. or INil sution would be removt'd in return for COOPft' -
ation in edtinl oul the facti &nd providin g
indictmml for the finl time of iII n FBIof compmytion from fut\d. for thOM'who
hd.J for "ctiYil ifS con nrc tt'd wilh his officiill wer r d.m.J.grd. 'The deci sion not to pr oweutr
II " 1'1Ktion of the grnte'St importilnce. should 1"101 borne. .Ill it hill in the CaM of tht'
d It It gOft Withou t s.ying th..t the agmt in nuil open ing. a to df'fmd lhe prosrilm.
1Ct f'd In<!oth,.,.. tNt m.. y follow mu st be Pff'- Ratht"l' . it s.hould millle it pou. ible for Ihe gov-
Innoanl until and unles they are found er nmmt to iIIdmil hum .. nd compt'T'ls.l te the vic-
1\11ty by iI jury. the very lIel musl Nve lims.
fj:.t:. :
184
F1rtIPrind.... 122 Muyland AVlP1'lut , N.E.. D.C. 20002
itpublitJwdbytN
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Union Foundation and lh1'
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Non-Profit Org.
U. S. Postage
PAID
Permi t No.45490
Washington. D.C.
Perhaps it is a universa l truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to
provisions against dange r, real or pretended, from abroad,
JAMESMADi SON TO THOMASJEFFERSON. MAY 13.1796
Point
TheFBIonTrial
of View
MORTON H.HALPERIN
The fact that AnorMY Crneul Griffin Bell
friends on the Hill seek to undermine dfl"Clivt'
reforms . And with crimes of parlic ular intnt'S1
dn.t'rvC!o high for resitling tremendous
to the Whit e Houw or the Justice !Apar lmmt.
prnsure not to indict FBI official, for allegedly
rbe FBI can choose to draa their feet.
carryina out oper ation, in clear violation of the
When the Att 01"MY Cen eral is told thai "the
I. aw tdl, u, a good deal ;IIbout tM environment
morale of the Bureau will suff"" if FBI agmts
in which wnior official , of tM executive bTitnch
a ft' indi cted or forced to If''Sti fy against eilCh
must optnle. It nnphuius al so tM reed10
185
TES'1'I
,
of
,JERRY J. BEHlj1'..i-.J 1 LEGI SLATIVE COUl:SEL
JOHN H.F. SHATTUCKI DIREC'rOR
CIVIL LI DF: R'l' I S UNJ:ON

on
1
'j'dE: nn.'ET.!,TGJ;!WF.
AC'I'
S.252S
other. he must listen . The morale of an agt'f'lC)'
leu nftI by the agencies of the
develop diff"lP1'lt pt'OC'l"dum10 deal with taw-
is a concern. but he411'0 cannol iX-
United Statrs governmml.
nore 1M implicit "undermine my monl..
II i, obvl ou,ly nl"Cf"Swry that tM Justice Dr-
1.x,fore
and I will undermine your f..ver ite progr;llm,."
Parlmrnl trrat FBI agmt. as they Irr.1 other
All of this suggests the need, argued many
citizrn s and to recommend indiclmmts to th..
times before in thi s column, for a IIpKial prose-
jury when Ihe evidence
curer to monitor the intelli gmcr agencin. Per-
haps it is not too much to ask thai , h.aving
fl\Us!beclear 10 Judae Belland hi' ....sOOatn;
.uggrsb a vio1.ltion of the I. ws. Th i' TIl E SELEC'],' J':L'TLE G21\! CE
now gone through thi s painful '1' isode. Judge
the .rgummUl art' presented conciwty in the edi-
Bell and his senior associates willTt'CogniztthaI
from the CMcQgo Tribun.. repneted in
tt. prosecutor proposal is not inll'f\ded
thi, inue of First Principl, . 18, 19'i 8
10 u sl ..ny doubts on the integrity of the [u..
Th e hidden (Qt.l' of the Ancrney Ge-nrral' ,
uce 'Department. It is simply based on the or-
'"........1 Sft kinl Indict ment not found in compromis-
confl icts, wh ich tMy too musl now
ing an rven-ha ndt'd rul e of law. thry aft'
feel. in both doing their dut y as prosut oA .and
Ilft'ding to work with the FBI and ether intelli
FBI day in and d.yout on .. r.nge of m..uers. genre agenci es.
1, With the national ieCUrity wiretap legis-
(-2;'i found in his need to wor k wil h officials of the
The f.ct tha.Ithe particular ly rankled Bureau
u-_"...... ...

(continlM'don pol'" lSI

....._ lat ion. for exa mple, Burt'.u agmts and tOOr
r :, :rJ::
--
186
Mr. Chairman:
I, e " e"l c ome the opportuni ty t o t e s t i f y befo r e t his Commi t t e e
on S . 25 25 , the "Natio n"l Inte ll igence Reo1:g;lIli zrl t ion a nd Reform
Act of 1 97 8 . " l egi sl a t i on is o f vita l c onc ern t o the Amer-
ica ll Ci v i l Li bertie s Uni o n }md s houl d be t o cvery person conc"rned
wi t h t he p1:ot e c l i oll o f . rights a nd lib8rt i e s gua r a nt eed
by the Cons titut ion .
' Today, we test ify ge lle 1:nll y on S 0 2 e of t he c ri t i c "l i s s ue s
rai scd by t hi" conp Lex l e g i !;l " tj on t o demons t.ra tc thz, t it
ha s truly e ll:>1:m-:>l"; consequence s f o r c.iv i.I l i be r t i e s i n t h i s CO\1n-
t. ry, Of COU l:!:( l \ ! C cann ot con si do r Lmpo r t a nt; j S S ll C I CV0n
in general terr .s. The Lc qi.s La t i.on COVe r s t oo muc h ground .
Howovcr , \ ; e hav o prcperr-d nn c-x t.cn r.Jvo 1,1f' :T!0 t'":l n d l '.i:l for t.ho
Commi t. t e e an d the strtf f thut ,.nnl y z e s t he l c g ielat j Dn i n f:O:i10 c1 e-
t ail a"d su!.'r.. i t it f'or t he rcc cr d and f or you r c ons idorat. Lou . J;u,, (' -
f u Lty , t he COl1' mi1 tee \Iil). r e,icl positi vcly t o i t s man y r e c o::une n' !a t -
ions f or Ch.l llJ C in tl .c c har t er .
ne caus o ou r r cma r ks arc hi ghl y c ri t i c a l or this d ra ft leg-
isl a t i on, we wan t t o f i rsc s t a t e in no un c e r t ain t erms tha t we
str ongl y suppor t the work o f thi s Commit t e e in a ttempting t o
l e v i s l a t e contr o l s a nd r estr ictions on United St a tes f ntel l i gence
a ctivi ti e s a t home a nd a broad . Moreover , we stand r e ady t o work
I"';lh this c ommi r t.eo , i t s s t a f f , and t he Congr e s s to improve t his
l egislati on s o that itenha nce " . r a t he r t han erode s c i v i l l i be r t i e s ,
as we wor ko d to i mpr ove t he Foreign I n t e l l i ge nc e Sur vei lla nc e Act
S. 1 5&6 . On the othe r hand, we are prepared to put .e ve r y r esource
187
O
ur d i s po s a l t o wor ): actively to defeat any legislation which,
at .
. Lhe name o f reformi ng our i nte l l i genc e agencies and restricting
111 . ' .
t he ir ac t ivi t i es, un ne c e ssarily enhances. t heir power s a t t he ex-
cn
Ge
o f cons t i t u t i onal va lues a nd democratic pr i nci ples.
c ontr" r y t o t he t e st i.mony of o ther t.ncnues this"
com.' ;!i\. t e e, p art Lc u LarLy s ome who wer e invo l ve d in past int el-
j i!JeneCl ac t. I v i t ies .,hich t h r e a t e ne d t he very founda tions of our
cons tiluti o:l a l d emocracy , we believe that S. 2525 voul d
!:9 ;nuc:h, reslr.!ct too l it tlc, and fails to''1'o l1ibi l of the
ac Livil i e s t ha t led to abuse in the past.
As ollr dct uiled a nalysis S . 2525 appears to'
aut.ho riz i.ntr usivo irn:csti9a of Amcric.:c:n ci tizcns, e tLone
to ndeqllatQ c ont rol s on cortilin intrusive i nvestigative
autllori z0s forms 'lprCVclltive action" tactics and
i flil " t o prohi Li t some o f the i
l1l
el lige ll c e a c t Lv.it.ie s wh.i c h the
publi c re cord dcrnonst.ru tes are e spcci aLjy threatening to civil
Li berU cs The policy acsumpt Lon under lying such aut.ho rI zat i.ons
must, be 'clos.cLy examined.
The Poli c y Choi ce
S. 2525 ref lects a pllblic policy decision abollt how count-
eri n tel li ge nc e and foreign i n t e l l i ge nc e act ivities should be con-
duct e cl in the Uni te d States. Because basic ci,.,il rights and con-
s t i t u t i ona l li be r t i e s are at s take , pol icy assumptions as to ex-
ac t l y wha t i s r e q ui r e d to adequately protect; the nation from " f o r -
eign l hre a t s " and advance our national d e f e ns e "nd fore ign pol icy
<l i ms must be c l o s e l y cxcmi nod and tested. Just a s the courts
reqUire when bal a ncing inter e s t s i n t he First J1mendrnciYt
we
must ask whether the i n teres t is compel li ng and whethe =
" '\ M I :_t.h"
188
ress i nt r us i ve means would suff ice. Toda y we wil l argue that
thi s l e g i s l a t i on may be premised on a poli cy c ho i c e which i mpe rils
c ivi l liberties.
S. 2525 is represented as a " foreign bill, and
yet Title II broadly i n te lligenc e agencies to inve st_
igate Amer icans to det ect and, c ou nt e r f o r e i gn t hr e a t s . Itpermi t s
fo r e i gn i n tel l i genc e t o be directed both a t f o reign thr e a t s and
at a t home not engaged in c r i me .
. Whi le we are not experts in c ount eri nt e l l i ge nc e , we have ex-
haustingly reviewed the r ecord of the Church on thi s
issue. count e rinte lligence, a s descr i b ed in the Com-
mittee's Final Report, Book I , showed the FBI Count e r i n t e l l i ge nce
Branch t o be sepera te from the inte r na l sec uri ty branch . It focused
on t argeting f or e i gn governments , ho s til e i ntel ligen c e s e rvi ces,
and other f o r e i gn threa ts for i nv es t i gat i on and survei llance.
Ci ti ze n s we re onl y targeted whe n t he i r i nvo l v eme n t i n ho sti l e
f ore i g n activities was established. The CI A had t h e same f oc us.
As described in the Report:
The more traditional CI A policy ha s been
to monitor hontile intel l igence s erv ice s
and then , on l y if it t he r e b y l e a r n s o f t he i r
i nv o l vement wi t h parti c u lar Americans, to
those Aner ican s or r e-
que st a n inquiry here. Ge nerally, CI lI ha s
not tried to wozI; backwz rd from a survei1 -
r: ':(1- Larice o f t r av e l i.ng Ane r i c a n s who s e ome d lik-
ely prospects in order to see ."h a t kincs of
c onne c t i on s coul e be f ound.
189
The other e pproa c h (d e s cribed by one CI ;. o f f i.c i a 1 as the raor e
.efficient" npproac a ) i s for i nt e 1 l i ge n" e se rvice s t o "wa t.c h
(t he i.r) ci t i z e n s to see "ha t t he y are do i ng . " To b e e ven
po r syst emat i c , t he "wa y to l ook f or f o r e ign di r e c t i on . . . i s
c
to star t at b o t h ends o f tha s usp e cted c o nne c t i on."
We s ubmit t h a t Titl e I I, wi t h i t s minimal s t a ndards for
t a r ge t i n'g a nd r e s i de nt a], i e n s for i nt r us i ve i nves-
t i ga t i on, and i ts c ol l ate ral gr a n t s o f a u t hority t o t he
c i e s to invest i gate c iti ze n s base d on vi rtua l ly any o r 7,i gn
"c ontact " o r po ssi bl e "target s " o r "obj e c t s o f
or even as "p o t e nt ial sourc es" o f ' a s s i s t a nc e a ppea r s: t o a dop t
t he other more d a nge rous approac h .
Iti s t roub ling t h at t h i s policy i s embo di e d i n S. 2,,25 in
the fac e of t he Church c ommattee r e c ord t ha t thi s v ery a pproach
was us e d by t he CI lI in c onduc t i ng Ope r a t ion CHAOS. Accor di ng
to t he Re port :
Cha o s s ought t o si f t thr ough t he l e ade r s a nd
mor e a c t i v e s e gme nt s o f domc s t i c pr9 tcs t move-
me n t s in orde r t o l e a r n of t r a ve l and other
f ore i gn c on t a c t s a nd then to i nves tiga t e t he
poss i b i l i t y t ha t t no s e l\t:lcricans were s uppo r t -
ed or c ont rol l ed by for e i gn pover cv "
I n oth e r v.or d s Ope r a t ion ClJP.OS vork c d bachlar.ds. lind s o d i d
t he FBI ill c onducti ng its :INe w Le ft " i nv e s t i g &l i o ns o f tIl e a nti-
\ ,'i l.r. movomc nt . The ef f i c ac y o f t hi s approac h , whic h a t\c:npt s to
prove a ne ga t i ve , is t o que s t.i o n . That it i f; v ery f;\:e c tJ -
It r e ouLr o s many , i nVl' sti g a t i oll s and
ing is not.
... ",- " Il: t;,"
190 191
f i l e D. ft5 n i c na t d Ohe r t Dclifi c d :
TO r ospond IIi t h a ny degr ee o f I:nO'.<l e d ge a s
to t here i e s ign i f i cRnt f o r e i g n i n-
voLvernen t ; i n a gr. oup I a 1il T.' gC number. of pc o-
p le , one hRS t o kno >!het her CRCn a nd cvery
on e o f t 110Sp. pe r son s ha s any ccunec t Lon ,
h av i nq c hcc k ed maJ1Y , na ny narnc s and coming
up with no s igni f i c<1l\t c onnoc tLo n s , one c an
DRy ,d t h some degre e o f conf Ldenr- o t ha t the r e
i n no s i gnif i c ant f ore i gn i nvo l -
vcmen t . \'li t h t ha t: g J:o up o f ind i.v i duals , Dut
if onn not. chec k t he namo s , one hit s no
1"' ly (If: t ha t. , wi tho1.' t a c ontrol led
p c not. ra u i on i,']c:nt. or t ile, r n1 by t h" t: <] 1:0 Up ,
o r a c o n t rol p l?l1 e lr' uli on " 'lent o f t he KGB
a br o a d who ...orks on t he d c; s k >!h i c h dea l s wi th
the s e r.la t l e r s t hr o ugh us .
Th i s po lic y app roac h , to d i rect t he a gen t s to "c heck t he name s "
is mani. I' e s t; t.hrouqhout; t.he s peci f i c a u t ho r iza t ion s in S . 2 525.
t io na
As o ur d e t a i le: d a n nl y s i s demons t r atec, S . 25 25 a ut horizc s
a b r o a d a r r a y of i n t e l l i genc,e nct i vLbi e s whi c h c oul d pcr mit t hc
a ge nc i es t o investi ga t e a nd ' a t t a c k " bot h e nds o f t he suspe ct e d
( f or e i gn ) con ne cti o n . " The scheme c oul d de va s t a ting f o r civ i l
i l l a t i me o r Go cial c r i s i s .
I' i r s t , t he draf t l e g i s l a t ion a ut horize s Lnt.rus Lvs inve s t i ga -
ti o ns o f and a l i e ns f or count e rint elli ge nc e ,
c o u n r t o r ror L s m , p ur pouos t c and f o rei gn"i ntell i ge nc e without reas on-
a b l e s uep ici o n o f o ri n i n viol a t i o n, of t he 'f'und a ment a I p r Lnci p lc
t ha t law abi di ng a r e enti t led t o bc fr e:e f rom qo ve r nmc n t-
of other inv cs t iga t i o ns- - - "rc c r uit:r: c n t , l1 . "c ont ac t , "
I'po t e nt i al s our ce i nquiry , '!
e c t i o n o f - - - wi t hout c ri mi na l nexus ,
"pr
ot
Al t hOC9
h
l i mi t c d t o r c l a t i ve l y l e s s i. nt r u si ve t e c h n i q uc s , the s e
inve s tiget io n c pcrmi t e xt e n s ive do s s i e r bu i l d ing.
ll.11 of thc'ne Lnv ccti. qat Lo n s thr e ate n fundamental Fi r s t l Jncnclr,\-n t
right s.
'l'be a :rl'uY or i nvest i gat ive t. ec hu Lq ue s p l aced at the dispo s a l
of t he e g cmc.i e s 15 for mi d able . S . 2 52 5 a u t hori z c s in t?r-
' vieWS, confJ.dentiai ptlys ical
inr.pec l i o n of a ll t he c e nt r a I i i l<: 9 o f a ny Fe d e l' a l agenc y , phot.o-
9
1
"ilp!1:lC sur vei Lla nce, c he c ks o f al l 12t\; c r. forccncn t a nd in-
{ i lc s . 'i'hc s c a r e t hc "les s \':it h
only a li li. t 2. p e r s o n i z e ngnSj(?cl in ac tivity
.\Jhi ch "may Lnv o Lve " any ..cons pdr acy , n or e Ln t r n s i.ve
t"chni C)l' C5 may b e e:lI1 p l o y"d - - -i':rouncJ t he: C10 e!; phy s i. ca L surv ei 1-
lance, sys tcmat I c o f ma i L c ov ers , ex cmi.n a t i on of a l l
publ i c and private hank, hc alvh, tax, c r od lt and o thor
c o nf idc n t i a I z cco r d s in the;; p o s s.os s i o n of any ag e nc y , a nd in{j
by inf on"c r,,: thou g h t h e: Pl 1b J.i c r e c o r d e st abli. s hcs tha t mo st o f ,
t hese t.cchn i q uos a rc ClS int rus i ve as , o r ar c iUHl l ilCJOU S t o, tec hn i q uos
l hat requi r e il wa rrant , S. 2 525 " o n ld no t adoqua t e Ly c heck e xe c ut i ve
di s c r e t i o n .
In the nDme of re for m, S. 2525, al beit wi th a 6
il j Ud ici a l wa r r a n t; r e q uirement, ' woul d a nt hor ize rr:ul t i ple pny si c aI
s earche s , phys ica l searche s by surre ptit i o u s e n t r y , and who l e s a l e
mail o peni ng in v i o latio n of Fourth Amcn d r.1e n t r c q ui re mo n t;s ,
. :r . ..
provi s i o ns ' i e g i t i mi z c here tofor e a scume d to be i l lega l .
192 193
Most d is tressing , S. 2525 author izes pr e v e n t ive ac tio n. "

i n t e r p ret these pro vi si o n s t o pennit inte l l igence age n c i e s to
violate t he law and engage i n COI NTELPRO-type ac t iviti e s.
Mo st, i f no t a l l, of t he p r o h i biti ons in the cha rte r ha ve
exc e p t i o n s whi c h c ome c los e t o sHa llqwi ng the rul e. Fo r e xample ,
i n t e l l i g e n c e agencies c oul d no t i nve sti ga t e a n y Un ite d St a t e s
person solel y becaus e he o r she i s cx;.;ercisi n g c onsti t u t i ona l
r i g!l ts , b ut t he br e a d t h o f a ut ho r i z e d i n ve s t iga t ions rend e r s
the proh ibit ion meani ng l e s s . Eve n t raditiona l pro h i b i t i o ns ar e
a ba ndoned . Fo r exampl e , 2525 g i v e s the CI A br o a d a ut ho r i t y
t o c ond uc t a c t ivi t ies i n t he St a t es wi s e l y prohibite d
by c ur r c n e ' l a w, i nclud i ng t r a d i tional l ill-I e n for c e me nt and in-
. . .
t erna l s ecur ity f unc t i o ns .
Th e pr a cti c a l effect o f t hese a u thorizat i o ns c oul d be read
to perm i t ma n y of t he a bus e s in t he Chu r c h Re po r t .
Ba sed on our deta i l e d 'ana lysi s , He bel i e ve t h i s l e g i s l atio n, if
it h a d b e e n t he l a w at t he t i me, wou l d ha ve l e g i t i mi ze d :
Op e r a t i o n CilAOS, t he CI A program to de t e r -
mi ne t he pos sible c on ne ctio n s of the
auti -"'.. ar moveme nt ;
Operatiom . and RESl STA:ICE, t he CI A
pro qreras t o p r o t e c t i t s i n s t al l a t i o ns fro m
physi cal threat",
The FBI investiga tion o f Ma rt i n Luther
J r. f.o.&,;. '''c c r:s pi r i ncf ' wi t.h t wo cornmnn i s t; a s-
soci a to n v..he t he r-' !11 wou Ld h av e " r oasonab I y
bel ie ved" to i h in-
t ell i ge nc e nc t i v i t y " ,involvi ng poss ible v io-
l a t i o n of the S;;li t h Act: '
'rl '" FBI 's COn , TELPRO p r ogr am t o d i s erecl i t
or. Lu t. h er Ei ng , J r . by di s s emi nat -
ing cle r o ga t o r y a bout hi s pr i v-
a l e l i f e to SCLC, o stensi b l y t o p revent v i o-
le nc e , no t be caus e o f his First
e ne ment activitie s; a nd
rl-)I ' s COI NTCLPRO ope r a t i on s ag " i nst,
the CO:Ttfil uni s t Part.y, Uf,l\, the Klux
Kl an, t ho Blac k Panther Pa r t y , a nd 1'1- .
<, ment.s o f t he IleH L,j,f t b e l i e ve d to be
e ngage d in fiahot2ge Hnd j.ntcrna tiona l
t e r r o r i s m o n b eha l f of /l a no i.
Of He a r o ..a br o a d reading to these authori zat -
ionS in the legi sl a tio n a nd downpl ayi ng t he pos s i b l e s alut a r y role
of the r eport i ng a nd o vers i g h t mechani sms i n the b i l l. h"hil e we
knoW t ha t t he C'Jrnmi t t e e do e s not i n t e nd t o authorize, but rat. h or
to prohi bi t , the abuses of the pa s' t , we a re all awa re t h a t i nt e l -
lige llc e tlgen c i c s , e s pec i al l y in t i me s o f c riai s I r ead even na rrov
au t hori z a t i o n s b r o a d l y . Whe n br o a d aut ho r i za t i o ns a rc grant e d by
ztat ute, t he d a nge r t h a t t hcy wi l l be con st ruo r; i n a wa y t ha t
unde r mi ne s c ons t itu t i on al r i g ht s be c ome s p a r t i r.u) a r ly a c ut e .
We Houl d r a t he r p ut our t r us t i n stri c t c r i mi na l standards
ancl c l e a r proh i b i t i o n s , nei t he r of whic h arc suffici e n t l y c on-
ta i ne d i n t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n . While S. 2525 an impr o vement over
the Exe cutive Or d e r i s s ue d by Pr e s i dent Ca r t e r i n J a n ua r y (1 20 36),
S. 2525 as dra f t e d ret reats s ubs tant i all y f r om the r e c omme nda t i o n s
of the Ch urch Com:ni t t e e a nd c o ul d be g i n t o ero d e c e r t il i n c o ns t i t ut -
tion al p r inc i pl e s .
We u rge thi s t o de t e r mi ne whether, f aced with
for eig n threat s o f e s p i onage and i n ternati o na l t error i sm as t hey
really e xi st , t he broa d in t h i s b ill a rc ne c e s s a r y .
The agenci e s t ha t they are a nd t llil t the b i l l is far t o o
restri c t i ve , su sp ec t t lic'y arp not. It. is o ur herre < f:h d t tOt'SC
194
195
FOR I NF0i\1I/\1'l ON CONTACT: .I ERHY J. HER!:J\fl
hearings ca n e l e va t e de bate on this issue above t he l eve l of as-
ger t i on ilnd unex amined as sumptions by r equir i ng t he agenci es to
subs t an t i a t e their ne ed s on t he pub lic record . Then t he validi t y
o f the poli cy possi ble alternati ve s t o it can be i ntell i gent l y
de t e r mi ne d . ot he rwi s e , we fea r tha t t hi s Commi t t e e , the Congress ,
and t he publ i c are being a s ked t o endorse a f undament a l po li cy
assumption wi t h possible serious and da nge r ous cons equence s without
a pu bl i c r e cord to s uppor t it ..
Our comments today arc critical of. S. 2525, but not o f.
t hi s e ffort to fi nd a \..ay t o f rame a rat i ona l i nt e l ligenc e
s ys tem i nto l aw, withou t sacr ifi cing our c ivi l If
prope r standards , procedures, 'and pr oh i .bi t.ions arc incor porat ed
in t hi s l eg i s l.a t i on , both nat ional s f;eur i t y an d c ivil l i be r t i e s
c an be protected .
We cer t a i nl y do not wa nt t o cont i nue with r ule 'by " i n-
he ren t power" an d executive order. \"I e h ave s tated t. Ltne and
aga i n tha t exe cut i ve or der s c annot ou r cons tit utional
l i be r t i e s on a firm found a t i on s ince t hey SUbject to change
But we are a lso guided by a corollary in think-
i ng about the cha r t e r s . \';e wouLd O?pOSO a br oad l y permi s sive
s tatute , since i t off e r s even l e s s pr ot e cti on for c i vi l l i be r t i e s .
For unl i ke a f lexible exe cut i ve o r de r, a s tatute i s f ar mor e di f-
at any moraent..
f i c nl t t o al t e r .
Tha nk you f or thi s opportunity t o present our views to t he
Conrni.t tcc,
LEG1 SLlITIVE COUl'S;;..
r[-'I",:" '[(J!\ ['n r .:r\rcn n nrrrrr:--.[r"J
j)J ." ... ,,,"-: ..., J \;; IJ\./ b U
;;...-
Office
m:r1 0 Rl.NDut-l July 1973
:;;.--- -
Sena tor. Birch,Bayh
Cha i r man , Senate Sel ect Commi t t ee on Int ell igence

Se nator Wal te r D.
on Cha r t e rs and Guidel i ne s
FHO:':: J.meriean c i vi l Li ber t i e s Union and t he Center f o::-
Nation a l Se curity Studi e s
RE'
S. ' 2525 and n. R. 11245 , t he "Nat i ona l I ntel l i gence Re -
organi zation and Reform Act of 1978 " .
I ntrodu et.i on and OV<: 1"\' ie\V
This sets fort h our i ni t i a l coramarrt s on 5. 2525 , t he
"Nat i onal Int e ll i genc e Reorganizat ion arid Reform l,ct of 1978" in-
t roduced i n the Wl ited St at e s Senat! February 9 , 1978 and i n t he
Hous e of Repr e s entatives (H. R. 112C5) on March 2 , 197 8 .
secnuse t he d r aft, cha r t e r has bee n Ln't roduccd a s a "dLs cnsuion
paper ", we wi l l de fer a compl e t e anal ysi s o f i t s provi si ons an d
ins tead f ocus on the cri t i c a l i s s ues raised by the draft l egi s -
l at i on . The memorandum is di vi de d into t wo part s t o f a c i l i t a t e
thi s di scus s i on . The fi r s t c ov cr s t he p.rinci poI concern of the
hCLU, t he ri ght s o f l.mer i c ans at horne and abroa d an d t he rights
of res i dent a liens i.n t h i s COUlltry as t hey may be affected by t he
f or e ign and domest i c i ntel l i gence activi ties t ha t wouLd be au th-
or i ze d and i n some me as ur e r e s t r i c t e d i f t hi s seve n- title lcg i s lnt
ion ...er e ena cted into 1a\V . 1'he s econd par t e xamines t he draf t;
char ter ' s pr opos e d autllorizati on of c ov e r t ope r ations abrOi\d ( I's pe c -
i a l act i vi t ies" ), s ens i t i ve c Land c s t i nc espionaqc aeti.vities, and
par amiJ.i t ary o per a t i on s and hov t he l e gi s l a t i on a t t empt s to r e s t r i c t
or pr ohi bi t c e r t a i n of t he s e ac tivities .
t,:.:;.'
TABU; or C0 1, Tl:ii T FO).T.O'.;S TEXT
600 Pennsylvania Avenue. SE . Washington, D.C. 20003 (202) 544 1631
t. H. F.,Sh:\!:uck, f.... . rl.llt6l,-Af;soci;:;c Kathlr:'c:n. fv LC[lislat:ve . .
c. Panlela S Horov.itz. Legl slallve Counsel . Ellen l.eitzer, 5l a:f Co.msel JN ry J. Borruan, Legls' 3"vCASSOCI:""
NormanOorscn. [lo.:l rd of Directors Aryeh Neier. l)"CCU('vc: Oiroc!o(
- -.
196
197
Nhile t he ACLU c on t i nu e s t o s t r on q l y supoort the congre s s i ona l
cT f or t t o ..
5liOabr:oad, we o.. 12.Lect to
i nt r oduce d . Cont r a r y to ot he r Vi i t nesse s wh o have appe ar e d before
the i n r e ce nt months , we do not be l ieve t he proposed
cha r t e r s are over ly r e st ri c t Lve , On t he he lieve the,
c ha r.!.".r:.s. au t horiz_e 1. 0 0 much , r e s tri c t too I HTl e , an<r=ErohI brt-

Ce rtai nl y, the d raft c har t e r s do not i nc orpo rate t he po sitions
ad voca t ed by t he ACLU and which a re se t forL h in l e gi s l a t i on
i nt r oduc ed in t he House (U. R. 6051 Dnd R. R. 4173) i n t he spring
o f 1 977 with over twe nt y co- s pons or s . Tha t l e gisl a t i on pr o-
poses :
(1 ) a ban on covert and parami l ita ry op era t.ions except
in t. i me o f war . s. 252S'wou l d a uthorize both and
euphemi s tical l y r ename them "spec i a l act i v itic s";
( 2) 'a ban on human cspionagn except in t I me of war, S .
25 25 would a uthci r i ze sensit i ve a nd othe r c lande s -
. tine coll e c t i on a c tivi ties a t home an d abroad ;
( 3) 11 ba n on t he use o f i ndepende nt Ame ri can i nst itut-
i on s , inc l ud i ng t. he vrnc d i a , academic . communi ty , and
re lig i oll s organiz ations i n c overt act i vi t ies . S. 2525
pe r mi t s s uch us c i n a number of c ircumstances .
( 4) a r equi r crr.ent t ha t Lnt r us Lve intel l i gence i nve stigilt-
ions of U. S. pe rsons and r e si dent a l i ens be condu c t ed
under a "r e a s on abl e s us pi c ion " o f s tanda r d unde r
s tric t pr oce dure s to mi.n.imi.ze inter f e r ence '.,oit h Law-
ful poLit Lca I a c t.Lvit.y , S. 25 25 doe s not incor por a t e
the II r e as onab l e fius picio:1 " s tandar d i n maj or c ou nt er-
i n tel ligcnce , count e r t er ror i s m, an d fore ign i ntel l i g-
enc e i nves t i gn. t i oJ) fo , permi.ts i nt ru s i ve non- c r i minal
of U. S. per s ons i n a numbe r of cir cum-
s t an ce :; , a ut hor i ze!l othe r no n-crimi na l i nve s t i gat i ons
of u . S. pe r s ons , and a l l res i dent a liens t o
.. i ntr usive i nve s t i gation under non - c r i mi nal s t andar ds :
(5) a ba n on the usc of unde r cove r aq ent s 01: Lnforrne rs in
l awful pol i t ical or gani zat i ons. S . 2S25 pe r mi t s thi !l
f or purposes of "c ove r " aJl d i nve s t i gative purposes;
(6) a j ud ici al wa r r ant for under cove r or i nf or -
mant i n filt r a tion of or gani za t ions s uspec ted of c r i me..
s. 2525 i mpos es no independe nt check on the ex ecut i ve 1n
the us c o f thes e intrusi ve investigat. ive techn ique s;
(7) a ban on a l l e l e ctroni c sur ve illance and a j udi c i a l WBr-
r an t ba!led on t r aditional probabl e c aus e o f a c r i me for
ma i l cove r s , mai l openi ng, and physical sear ch , S. 252 5
i ncor porate s t he j udi c i a l Vl arranL for e l e c troni c s urvei l -
l ance ba s ed on l e s s t han proba ble c aus e of cr i me con t a i n-
e d i n t he Fore i gn El e ctr onic Surveil l ance Ac t o f ] 97 8 (S,
1566) and more intrus i ve mul t ipl e phys i c a l
s e a rche s and mili l ope nings unde r s imilar p rocedur es . Mai l
co ve r s a r c not s ub j ec t ed to a wa r r ant r equi r ement ;
( 8) a s ubpoen a or for t he i.nspect ion of
conf i dent i a l an d pr i va t e r e cords . S. 2525 permi t s i n-
. s pec t ion o f al l r e cor d!l i n the c ent r a l f iles of a l l fed-
eral agencies , t ax r ecor ds , med i c a l r ecor d s , bank an d
cred it r ecords wi t hout s upoena or warrant and o f t en wi t h-
o ut s u s pi c ion o f crime;
( 9) a prohibition o f COI NTELPRO or "pr event i ve ac t -
i onII o ther t.han cxerci se o f t. radi t iona l powe r s , s uc h
as t o warn victims and arro st; s uspe c t s . S . 25 25 aut.h-
o r i z e s a.ctivi ties to "oount.er" (!r.pi onas c and "p r-eve nt;'
t e r r or i s m, i nc l ud i ng au t hori za tion f or i n t e l l i genc e agents
t o i gnor e or viol ate t he l a" unde r cer t a i n c i r cums t ance s .
l, t t he same time t he pzopo a e d bi ll " p r ohi.bi t s" COU; 'i' J:L? iW:
even det:0rt.s
rni n i mal
ilndPi.);e Commit t e e s t o or ev e nt; " r ecurrence of tTl(! mus si ve ab -
usesof r i qht s a t horne
t cd- lJY1f:S-:-rnt eYH gc> n_':._" gcliCI.'!E.' re co::l-
mended:
(1) limi t i ng c ove r t ope r a t i ons t.o ext r aor d i nar y circum-
s t a nce s in " hich t he r e is a "g r ave thr e at " t o nat -
ional sccuri t.y, s. 2525 permi ts c overt operat ions
whe never t he president find ,; them "e s s ent i a l " but
not onl y to secur ity but to the much broader
" f or e i gn po licy interests of t he Uni t e d States ;
(2) pr ohi bi t i ng paramilitary operations exc ept j n t i me of .
wa r (a reco mme nda ti on of t he p il: c Commi t t e e ) . S. 2525
woul d authorize t hem;
(3) r equi r i ng, except f or l i mi t ed pr e l iminary inve s t i gat -
ions , that i n t e l ligence agenc i e s have ' r e a s onabl e sus-
pici on" of c r i mi na l ac t ivi t y t o conduct int r usive inve s -
t i gilt i ons o f c itizens and r esident a liens. As
S. 2525 depa r ts from th is a number of c ir-
c ums t anc e s ;
"." .,
199
198
) a j udi cia l warrant r equir ement on pr ob abl e cau s e
of c r ime f or \-l i r ctapp5.n'l , mai l opening , an d physi c a j
s e a r c he s . S. 25 25 depa rts f rom the s t r ict probabl e c nuse
of a c r i me s t anda r d i n aut hor i z i ng the5e t echni que s for
s urve illa nce aga.i.rls t U. .. re sident a liens;
( 5 ) s tr i c t t o min imize t he a cquisition , r e t ent i m,
and di s S8mi nati on o f information . S . 2525 ' s mi ni mi zat i on
proce dur e s a r e exceedi ng l y br oad .
(6) a ba n on or preventive ac t i on . S. 2525 au t h-
orizes cc r t a i n of t he s e act ivi t i e s .
t e t he s e sUb';!anti. a l sho r t comi 2525 docs modeslli
J.lnpr ove on ExcoutJ. V' Or de r 12036 on Uni t ed States I nt e l l i gence
by t he Ccu:t e r Admini s t rat i on on J anua r y 2-1,
u n: .
(1 ) thc Ca r t er Exe cutive Orde r pe n ni t s cove rt ope rat i ons
"' he never the Pl:e side nt de ems t hem "impor t ant . " S.
2525 r a i s e s 't he s t andar d t o "e s s ent i a l";
(2)' t he' Carte r Ex('c ut i.ve Orde r permi t s i ntru s i ve i nvc s t-
i ga t i ons of U. S. pe rsons "nd r esi de nt a l iens I-J he ne ve r
they arc " r e a sonabl y be l i eved to be act i ng on beha l f
of a forei gn 1' 0 \-101''' cven if t he a ct i vity i s wholly
l awful . S. 2525 mor e c l o s e l y re l ate s 'counter i n t e l l i g-
e nce and coun t e r t e r r or i sm invest i ga t ions t o sus pe c t ed
c rimi na l activit y ;
. ( 3) the Car t e r Exe cu t i ve Or der per mits the At torney Gene r a l
t o c pprove war rantless e lec t ron i c s urve i l l anc e , t e le-
vi s i on moni t or i ng , ph ysic a l sea r c he s (sur r ept i t i ous
ent rie s) , and mai l opening whe never he ha s "pr obabl e caUS0"
tobe l i eve a person is an "a gent of a for e i gn power " wi t h-
out defini ng ag ent of a f or e ign powe r . S. 252 5 p r op ose s
a judi c i a l war r an t ' r e quirement for t hese i nt r us i ve t e ch-
nique s.
I n addi tion S. 2525 manda t e s a pan opl y of r eporting r equi r ement s
a nd e s t abl ishe s exe cut i ve and congre ssiona l ove rsi ght mec hani sms
not f ou nd i n t he Or der . Fi nal l y S. 2 525 do cs wha t execut i ve ord-
ers cannot do i n s et t i ng f or t h c r i mi na l pe na l t i e s for of f i c i a l s
who vi ol a t e it s provi s i ons an d c i vi l r emedies for vi cti ms o f i n-
t e lligenc e ag ency abuseD. (Unf or t unate l y , unl i ke H.R . 6 0 51 , S...
2 525 doe s not e s t abl i s b a t empor ar y s pe e ial pr o s e cut or t o prose cut 0
vi ol at i ons oul: l e ave ii t he a uthor i t y i n the han ds of t he At torney
Ge ne r a l de s pi t e i nher e nt confict o f inte r e st . )
0"cr1' iding qu e stion Ls whe the> l' the s e mod e s t Lmprovcmerrts over
ThCr cnt pr a c t i c e propa sed i n S . 2525 argue for i t s int o
cur l'n i t s pre s ent r orru, \':e think not.
l"\\'
fi r st, whil e S. 2 525 woul d do away wit h t he sweepi ng c lai ms
of i nhe r e nt power cont a i ne d i n t he Ca r t er Execut i ve Orde r ,
the st a tut e \'Iou l d be f l ex i ble> en ou gh t o per mi t the
Ilr an ch and U. S. i nt e lli gence agencies ..
Lv mllcb.....f. \o.. g.o
p"Q. ':@' "'hi le some o f t.he s e ac t ivi t i e s may be r equi r e d to pr o-
t ec t. na t i ona l Dccurity , t he re .is no pUbl i c r e cord which s a tis-
Li e s t he bur den of pr oot .0;', t he i nt e l l i ge nc e communi t y to es t..
ilbl i s h t he "ne c e s s i t y " o f t hi s b ro ad gr an t o f authority , or to
count e r ba l ance the Chur c h CO!,Yui t l e c f indi ngs tha t man y of t he l;c
ac t i vi t i e s \-I er e Ilot onl y dangerous but was teful , counterprod uc-
tive , and unneces sary .
Second, in the abs ons e of a o f "compe l.ling
jntc r es t
l l
or t hat I' l e s s i ntru sive me an s " woul d not
su ff i ce , we be l i ev e many o f t he a ctivi t ies arc con-
.stituti.onaTli..
Third , ttlC qrants o f danqc rous author jty in the
not rcgui:-ec
illt crc;. t s . The ilb.1nuoni ;,: cn t o t t.riJrli tiol)r.) c c-uutcr i.nt oL
Irqe nc e ooLi cv i n f avor o f
ls r: ot 'li lTs
olJi e c 'ti on , and a s d i sc u sced in Par t One o f t he momor encum,
t he cons t i
i n the c lwr t cl:._._ -
Four t h ,the f l ex ibl e s t andard" i n the l eg i s l at i on a s -
s e l f- r e s t r a i nt Oil t he pa r t of t he Execut i ve Branc h .
Thi s i gnor eH t he l essons o f a nd the Church
Co.nmi t t.eo fi ncii ngs that eve n well -int enti oned i ntel-
lige nc e agents , espe c i a l l y in t i me of c r i s i s , i nter-
pre t ev e n narrow grant s o f au thor ity broad ly .
Fif th , t he l e gi s l a t i on' s pref e r e nce f or r epor t i ng
and over s i ght r at he r than cl e a r r e s t r i c t i ons and
prohi bi t i ons i gnor e s t he h i s t or i c a l fai l ure of Con-
gr e ss t o ove r s e e t he i nt e l ligen ce communi t y i n the
pa s t . the cas e v.. i th v.. hi.c h overs ight commi t tce s may
be coop t ed or c apt ur ed by t hos e t hoy s eek t o ove r -
s ee, a nd t he con Di de r abl e d iff i cu lty i n ex er c i s ing
ov e rsi ght ' r e s pons i bi lity wi t hout c l e ar s t anda r ds t o
. ,!pply.
I;::
200
Fina l ly, we arc we l l a Wnr e that .exe c utive o r de r s
c a n not p l a ce ou r c onst i t u t i on a l l i b e r t i e s on a f irm'
f o und at i o n since they a re sUh j e c t to cha nge a t any mom-
ent, we would oppose the charr.er a s d r n f t e d on t he gr o und
t hat a permissive statute o ffers even less pr o tect i on
for c ivil l i b e rtie s and de mo c r a t i c val ues . Unl i k e
a fl e xi b l e execut ive "orderI a statute i s f a r mo r e
di f ficu lt to a l te r.
Based o n the fgr.egoi.!!.9.....onunen t s a l}9
r ec omme ndat Lon that S. 2525 s hould be re draf t.e d -
to r e f:1 aild'iiiOre
a s propose d
r e ma i no(';r o f thi s m('; mornndum.
..
Purt One
The Riqhts of Ame ricun s a n,d Resident Al i e ns
Although S . 2525 purpor t s on l y t o aut ho r i z e and e stah li s h a stat-
u tor y for t he c onGuc t o f nS.opposcd to
" int e l l i ge n c e activi t .ie s", the le,g i s lat i o n grant s 11 . S . i n t ell
a g c ncicn e xte nsiv e wh i c h may i n t er f e r e with or o t h e r wi s e ad
v e r s ely af fec t t h e ri ght s o f Amer icans a t home and abroa d nnd the
r i ghts o f resi de n t a lie n s i n t h i s c ountry . The s e incl ud e the a uth-
ori t y t o Lnv e sti qat,o Amer i can s a nd resident aliens f or counteri ntel-
lige nc e , c o unt e r t e r r or i .:m, a nd fore i gn i n t elli ge n c e pur pos e s (Ti tl e
I I) , t o employ int r u s i v e i nv e s t i ga t i v e t e c hnique s against t a r ge t s
of i nv e s t i g ation (Title II , Ti tl e III ) , to maintai n and d i s s e mi na t e
n on - pub l ic i n formllt i on gnt he r e d f r om these i nv e s t iga t i o n s (Ti t l e II,
Title III) , to enga ge i n f o r ms of pr. e ve nt i ve a c t i o n to "counter"
espi o n age a nd sabotage or t o "p revent " i n t e r na t i o na l t e r r o r i s m
(Ti tle s I a nd I I ) , nnd t 6 u s e i nde p e nd e n t institutions for pur-
p o s e s o f r ecruitment a nd cov e r , and in cert a i n cir c ums t a nc e s ,
for op er at ional a s sistan c e in c over t act i ons and c l a nde s t i ne
i nt e ll ige n c e a c t i v i t i e s (Title I a nd I I ) .
Al l o f the s e a c t i v i t ies mus t i n our judgme n t be r e q u i r e d t o
me e t a thr e e part t est i n order to determine whe t he r 5, 2525
a c h i e v es i t s stat ed pu r po s e o f p r ot e c t i ng " i nd i v i d u a l s aga inst
v i o l a t ioris a n d i n fringe me nt s of the i r c o n sti tutional righ t s , "
( 2 03 ( 2 ) . Th e f irst t e s t is whe t he r e ach i nt e l l i ge nc e a c t ivity
shoul d be a u t ho rized at a l l , Fo r in t he a bsenc e of. c omp e l l i ng
int e r est s or e v idenc e t ha t l e s s i nt r u sive mea ns would no t su f -
201
. c it ctiv it1f' S \!!i i c h acl vc r s c l v a f fc ct o r .i nt o rfere t. he
,:', ,, \ ( . ( icons <\1 (s ucu it!. -;
not bo 0 :
t os t .\ !" wh o t.h o r o a c n Ln t o l I lCjC1ICC." act i V ] t y )s t .-
; .
ot t h e s o t he k i. nd s 0 1. a b u s o s 0;,
t c pub l j c r ocor c oul d not; h e repc n t.ccl . Fi nall y , e a c h acti vit y
t-? rr.(:.:l!; ure a b y t bc i;J sc.: n cy v hi c h e u t. ho r ized t o conduc t; it.;.
C;-:;-:f7l; )]C", s o riou s c i v i l J i hc r ti('! s qucs.tLons. a r c r ai sed hy
Ly t o t he' CI A t o i ..;. t j gCJl (; or '.: c o u n t c r'" o r ":
v e nt" c ::.pJ o lla g c or t errori. sm \,:h(:n o r r e sid e n t; al i c ns
b8 iII VO) because of t he c x c c.s si.vo ::0.cr c c y nod , ins1112l' i or, f rorr,
...C C() ll l'l t d b .... ] j t y 9 ro e t o u q c i s y ; rig t l.esc s ts I n d o th s.c on e , t. e
t u r n t o t he raaj o r pubLi .c p ol icy a nd con s t.itut i o n nj r ig ht s
hy t he c nar t.or t
h . r.9r. c
j,:(diH,l'<1 clg.:tin st "',i' \(:ri c.: i1r. s at; i lJtd ' ,'\ b-
t .' /\1) ._._._ . __. _- _ . _ - _ - - . _.--- ._

I o f S . liOlit. '2(1 it g c n c j O:- : 5
arc- y i l utho"j'izc d t o i)) f or c i gn j I: L0 ] ]
and c onn tor t o rrorin-n a ct Lv i .t.Les (51 ) ) 1 ) .
t J IC " coLl c-cri on' (I f a ny and a ll .i nfo r raat i on
j IIi Y1 ':1 " to P O! ;i l i v e itboul for o i q n qov ern -
{" ! o l' p i Cjn .i n t.c Ll i. q cmc e .i n forraa t ion." (] 3 ) , t he
t.hrcat. thoy PQ$C: t.o this count r y i. n c oriduc t. Lnq os pionnqc or
o t.hc-r i nt e l li g (:n cc i: l1c1 .i nt.orn... ati on.i l t crror inm
(count.cr tcrror i sia i nt c:l l i gc nc:" (!:)), l'1l 15,lC' t ho S C0i) 2 of
.i tvqui.ry i s br oad , GI n(1 by t.he
r-nt i t ic n by C(, VC1-t mCCl n.s St, 1 3 , the
focu s o f
I ror .
...._- -- - ---
Ti t l e II Rl, i f t s fcc us of "fo r e i gn intclllgC'ncc adding
it po ssi bly n ew a nd d zmqe r o u s d i men si o n to it . 't i t l e I I a ut h -
o ri z c s t he PBI a nd CI A to c o nd u ct; c ove tt; Ln t r us i.vc
unde r f l ux i b l c s tanda r d s to c o l l e c t f or e i gn i nt e l l i ge nc e , co unt -
terLnt.c Ll i g c nce, and c oun t o r t.e rror i sm i n tcl l igc nc e froru hr!lcr Le an s
a nd porme ne nt; r e sidcrrt; aliens.
v o vi c w t h e invcs tig.3tive s c h e r:lc o f Ti.t le I I , b el iev e il
poli. cj' t l S be e n a dopted \,:!d .c h h a s potential ly
Gi11tqc r Ol.t::; f o r q i v i l lih:: r l i c fi i n t hi. s c oun t ry.
dr a f l e r::; (, f l h i s l c g 5sl ut-:i o n . filc , id Hit. h 'a pol icy c hoi c e b"b :c,, .
....:.
:t.':"
202
l i mi l i ll ':1 our i:l( j c nc i e!-:' to foc u siuq c ount.:--ri :lt(:l
cc: ror 0 i::; :'1 t hrr-et s )):1
il tocus on citizc n s , hi1S c hos c.n t hz mo r e
.
'l'r a d j 1. )cl1I : :1 c o un Lc rin t.e Lk iqc ncc , i n C h u r c l.
}' jn:t ] J::, ;)o :::l. , h ::. .r:li le:
) 1\'':0::: J .... (!:lO, otr: -:r f O:.ci:j'i': t }l!.. ..s for .. :-.
ii Ut/J.i i tdc f si r: '.
mi t.t .cr: .
U'f hC' V OJ ' C r r a di ti o n n I CJI, po Li. c y h :' (" i t o
n o ni t or ho:... t:ilC:' t.h en,
on I y i f j t:. rncrcby of t.hej }." l l IVO ) \ "C!:' <,: i d :
,.]i t!: pD. l t:i c lll.?ll: t o i n vc s l.:.i g ci t c Lh:'"Js e
o r CU' .i.nrj ui. ry h (:}"(J _
(:rct l ly , C) ,\ not. t o \":ork b:--:,c !:..:a :! ';,:l
it e)f t r avo I if: (j \-::10 !: 0 i:; :" f,'d
l i }: e]y P; -(); j"('C:t.: i n o :..d cr to E:C!-C of
c onnc c:l. i on s c ould b.::: fOi..H10."
On t he: t h e n orc 'I effie;. r;T.L" 2c c o rtl).n9
1..0 Cl l , o I LicieLs: , i.s to 1l\:( : : .C } I . " La F ll ;'l t they
, \) : 0 ll c.i ll 'J.II 'j' O h e C V(,: j) s.yst ..i('" , t h..::.! :'\:ity t el for
f o r ciq u c1;i.r c. ' c t i u n.. . i 5 to ill'. (n..:1 :. .;. of. t.he
c on n<:: ::.: Li. () ;l . ",
":c tha t'. Ti LJc I I I \-: i.th i t:!) :-.L':f,c1cl1"(is f o r t.c1rg0t-
. j 1"1(] l.!;l,:,r .. i ,:nc1 i l) i. c ns f o r j i:\ "c.:;tj
' l ! \cl it s Cj ;-anL of aut l.ori t y to Lh e to c ol Jc.ct;
c:l l "pubLi.ca Ll y
Cl nd "ta rqct. s" and 'ldl2."el op sour ce s" i. s the .st a t n to Iy
o f th is epi:.r o;IO:;;:I.
l': hitl .is )."!:-l St i!; thct, hi ::; t b i t;
in til'.:! l il l :t:: of t !lt:! Ciaufci, CC'!' ':.Ij Lt '-'2 r( :cc.r d L1!::: l. i t \-."{"!s
t hi s vcr)' itp;x:::oach \/:licl! lIH: i tt C0ilChh:::: Lin:J
CiJl\OS. l-.c.:corclj.lH) 10 t he rcp ":l r L :
II CH.\ 03 to [ 1. t:h r ou:Jh Lhe c:nd
more ilcti\ "e Lfi cd: pr o t e!"; L movc-
1:lC'J IU; in (): :ti c r t o } CiU: 1t o f t )",;;, vcl
fo rc .i s n CO!1t cl>: ;t !" .; Cll ld l hcil t t l tho:;
i t y t tl ,) ! ;..: ! !;UP2()'l.-
(:c1 ('1." C(':lt :o ) ] t:d by .. {JIl II
l.tl 0 thct" Linn Clil-.O;' \-:Cl j-L( ' (1 !\:1tl [.0 (1i.ll
f hc l' ill i n i Ls J.c':"' L
tjej0.li(l tl of: 1I 1C! ItO\' ( ; ;IH.. il :='. \:hi l ( ):,('
" (:efic.i en l ,II it c\ ] 50 fcl. r rl :J ;: n ::l i llt
203
In t he mos t s t renuous t e r ms, ve ur ge the Conunittee to r edr a f t
the i nve s t i ga t i ve sections of Ti tl e reflect incorpora-
t i on o f t he "Le s s i nt rus i veil t.radi tional fo r rns of c o u n t e r --
intel lige nc e.
wi t hou t compe l li ng necessity , an d i n v i ew o f t he availabi lity
of l e s s i nt r us i ve means , t he Correnittc c s hould r ec1r2.ft th"""
secti ons on c i vil grounds a l one . In8te ad o f Ilp r o t ec t -
i ng i ndi vi duals aga i ns t v i o l .i t i on s e nd inf ri o f t.he i r
co ns t i t u t i ona l r i ght s " the ov e rbroad i nve s t i ga t i ve i n
Ti t l e I I wi l l "c h i l l speech " by mak i ng c itizens fearful of
rcp ris'l l f or e ngaging i n Ul1? Opul a r advocacy a nd r Ull rO \lghshod
ove r t he: pri vacy o f po Lit.ic a I a ssociations Cju 2,:::-anlccd by the
F{r s t lJl1c ndme nt . e . g . Bates v, Little 361 u .s. 5 16
(1960); t!A!lCP v. The authority
to illvc s t. i 9 a t e c i t i ze ns an d r c s i d c ' l t a liens witllOllt
s us p i c i o n o f c r i me v iol u lC:!s t he Fourth Oh i o,
392 U.S. 1 (1968). F'u.rthcr'more, part.d cuLar care must be rakon
t o. c r a f t st and a r ds whe n both First a nd fourth ' ,mendr.tent rights
a r c inv o l v e d , as t lley a rc i n t hi s v.
unit ed St2tes Di s t r ict Court , U.S.
'l' i t l c
\'l e cont i nue t o advoca t.o th" adopti on of a stat.utor y framcwork
\...h i.ch e sta b l i s he s t ha t , e xcept for l iJl!it.cd pr oLi.rui ne ry i.nves t -
i ga t i ons, no person entit led t o t he protection o f t he Cons t i t -
uti on c an be i nv est i gat e d e xcc pt unde r a s trict c r ir.dnaI stil nd-
ard purSlla nt to to- intr usi on OIl
l a wf u l pol i tica l acti vi t y. Tho s e stnndards are no t presen t i n
Ti t l e I I . .
1 . The Ove r breadt h of Count e rintel l iqen cl?; a nd Cou' lt e r -
i. zCidUil;: f8"r 'l'i tLe "11---
u. s. Persons l, t llo;ne-:------.- - ------
Undor Sec t i on 213 o f Tit l e II, t he FBI a nd CI A may t a r get
citi z en s, associat ions of o r pe n na ncn t r e s i d e n t
al i0n s (U. S. Pe r s on s ) whe ne ve r the y a rc :
r ea s ona bl y bel ieved t o be engaged in espiona ge
or an y othe r c l a nde s t i ne i nt ellige nc e acti vity
whi ch i nvol ve s or ma y invol ve a viol a t i on o f
t he c r i mi na l l aws of t he Un i t ed Sta t e s , s abot -
a ge, any i nt e r na t i onal t e r r or i s t act i vity , or
a n y as s a s s i nation , t o be ai d i ,ng and abet ing any
pe rson in t he COllduct o f any SllC} l itclivi t .y, or
t o be cons p i r i ng an y pe r s ow en ga ged i n a ny
such ac tivi t y .
. ; .... ..".'
205 204
Unde r t hi s s tandar d', wh ich i s e ve n Lc we r i f t he Ame r ican or
pe r ma n e nt r e s i dent a l i e n ha pp e n s t o th e a gencies
may emp l o y , with t he appr o va l o f t he At torney Ge ne r a l or hi s
de s ignee und e r Ga c t ion 215 , s uc h i nt r u sive ' i n ve Ht i gativ e t e c h-
ni cJue s a s irl s occti on o f COllfi dc nt i a l t ax records, around t he
clo ck phy sici.:l sur ve i l l a nce , u s e o f i nfo nna n t s (" cov ert huma n
cov e r s , and i ns ? e c t i o n o f medi c a l , c r e d i t , em-
p l oyme nt, a nd a ho s t o f o c ho x pr iva te r e cord i n forma t i o n .
Fi r s t o f a l l , t his i s not a crimi nc l s tanda r d , o r a t l e a s t o ne
s u f f i c J.e nt t o s u stain the I nt.rus I vc nes s of t h e s e a r c h a u t h-
orl2e d in t he s e "Reaao rra bLy be l i e ved t o b e
that a ll of t he c o nduct r e f e r r e d to
i n" the s ect ion c o n s t itu t e d c r i mi n al a c t s , whi c h i s not a t al l
c o rt ai.n vd t h r e s p ac t; t o e s p i.o na qc a nd c l a ndes t i ne int e l l i s e nce
a c t ivi ty , is no t th" s t a ndard a rticu lat ed o r s ugges t e d b y t he
Sup r e me cou r t i n Tc r r y v . Oh i o , 392 U.S . 1 ( 1 96 B) , t he l e a d-
i ng c a s e i n 0 ... a r e a a f defi n i ng the pov..e r to i nv e s t i ga t e . I n
t he Cour t s t a t e d t hat " i n ) u sti fyi ng t.h e p a rticular i n -
trus i on the pol i c e o f f i c e r mus t be a b l e t o poi nt t o spe c i fi c
and a r t i c u l a b l e fac t s wh i c h, take n t ogethe r wi t h r a t i onal i n-
fo rcncos f rora those f a c t s r e e sona b ly wa r r a nt, t ha t i nt r us i on . "
I n tbe polic e w.;> r e o n l y r e qu i red t o ha ve a rea s onab l e sus -
p i c i on t ha t " c r i mi na l a c t i v i t y ma y be af oot, but t he Cour t em-
phesi z e d t ha t t h i s wa s on l y a l i mi t e d " stop ari d f r i s k " and no t
a II i ul l - b l o\\"n s ear c h . '! An on-go i ng Lnvestiqat i.on ,
a s ..-o u l.d h e a u t ho rize d he r e, i s mer- e a ki n t o a " f u ll- b lo'ill s oar c h "
r equiri n9 a hi ghe r de gr e e of 6e r t a i nty t ha t c r i mi na l co ndu c t i s
i nv o l ve d t han i n n s t o p a nd f r i s k. Ydt " r e a s o na b l y b el i e ve d ' i s
no t de fine d i n t erms o f :r e r r x and r e q u i r e s no " s pe cifi c and a r t -
Lc u Lnb l e f ac t s " t o j m.:t i rythe "be Li.ef " v
Se cond, the s tand a r d permi t s i nve sti g a t i o n o f who a r
"mga qe d in l a , ..f ll l poli t i c "l . a c t ivi t
Y
not pUIli s habl e unde r
l a.... s o f t he Un 1t e d St a tes . For c xarnpic , "cl a ndes t i n e i n tel l i g -
e n c e act1v 1ty " 1S deTineaas
" a riy i n t el lige nc e a ctiVi t y on beha l f o f a f or -
e i gn pov..e r ."h i c h i s pl nnned a nd e xe c u t e d i n a
ma nne r i ntend e d t o conce a l t he n a ture o r f act
of s u c h a c t ivi ty o r t he rol e of s uc h for e i gn
powe r , and a ny a ct i vi t y c a rri e d ou t i n s uppor t
o f s u c h a c t i v i t y . " ( ? 04 (b) ( 1 )
I n add i tion, " for e i gn powe r " i s defined t o i n c l ud e a ny for -
e i gn gove r nment or agenc y , a ny fact i o n or i n s u rge n t group ,
any foreign pol i ti c a l pa rty , o r a ny f o reign gr o up wh i c h tri e s
to inf luence the government of a f o re i gn governme nt , a nd fi n-
al l y , a ny U. S . corpor at i o n "d irected a nd c ontrol l ed by any
o f a f o r e i gn coun t r y . " ( 204 ( B) . As d ef i ne d ,
t h is st a nda rd woul d ha ve permit ted:
( a ) t he t a r g e t i ng o f uny a n t i-wa r a ct i vi s t
who t r a ve I e d abrcad a nd a t tended s c oret;
meetings wi t h a f o r e i g n govc r nr..ent , a
me mbe r of the Po rit i sh 1",1>" r Party , a l ib-
e ra l o rgan i z at io n a lso o pp osed to the
wa r and on . (For aLr o ad , c l ande s t i no
i nt nll i. qc n c e ' iw'ci v i t y i s not e ve n iaodLf Lccl
by the r equ i. r omcnt; that: the intel l igenc e
agenc y be l i e ve t ha t t he a ct i vity " i nvol ve
o r ma yti.nv c I ve a v i o lation o f l a w. " ( 2l 3
( 2
( bl t he t a r g c.t i nfj"o f: a ny r.mor tc a n o r pc rrsancnt;
r esi d 2nt al i e n i n t he Un ite d States who
u t. t cndccl sc.c ret r,l[!(;:t i ngf; o f 't he ConuaunL st;
Pa rty , U. S . l. or a ny " f r on t gl:OIlP" sin c e
t he par t y wou Ld have met t ho ot f i ci aI def-
i niti o:l of. a u . s . c o r po r a t i on " di r-c ct.ed and
c on rrolj od ' by a fOl: eign 9m-(,l:JH:\en t (t he S(\V-
i e t Uni o n) . 'rl!e "j n\l o 1ve o r may LnvoLve" a
v I o Lat i on (,1 :( li:t\! wouLd not P:: O\o(=! a problem
bc:c a u ce l h e FRI r e a s o n ahl y be l i e v c:d the meet -
i ngs v..01:e il po ssi b l c vi ol a tion o f t.ho Sndth lIct .
)
t.he ng of a mombor (I f icon
Co ::;!,d t.t o e . v. h o tra vc Lc. d to L s r a e I
and t.hr. n re.tur.uccl to lo bby Conqress OIl
the East s i t ua t i on S i J1Ce nn it g CJ1CY
c o ul d rc-asoriabLy bcl i e" ' ,,, ' t h i s wa s fin i n -
tell i " " nc e on be h alf o f a forei gn
powe r a nd t he l obby i ng a po s s i bl e v iolat i o n
o f t he lIgents Regis tration Act .
Taki ng t he "ai di.ng anti abe'.:ting " and c on s.pi r a cy s e c t.Le ns of
the into t he: r e hc h o f t he i nv e ctig a t o r y
aut ho r i z a t i on i s s.:o 0.ping . To aid and abe t or. c onnpi rc do cs
n ot r e q u i r e p or s o nc t o k nov..i.ngJ y a i. d in the speci fi e:l act.Lv-
i t i e s . Pe r s o ns cou l d bc inves t igat e d f or me r e 80 soc iati on .
I unde r t hi s s e cti. on I t he c oul d hc.:.ve t a.r<j e l:r:d Dr .
Ha r l i n Lu t.her King , Jr for "c onspi r i ng h'i th" t 'vl O uss oci et.e s
t h e FBI co ns i de r e d c omroun i.s t;e , The FBI cou Ld r canon abI y be-
l i e ve t ha t conGpir ing wi th pe rsons in Cl ntl -
de sti ne int elli s e nc e a c t i v i t i o s" i n v i o l ati on o f t he Smi t h Act.
Th i r d , the a f
c ri rnos \;i th no fo rei c n As an t. r oduc c d,
cove r i ng i nve sti -
gations o f pers ons suz pect c d b i ellgaging i ll poli t i c a l l y
mot iv et.cd c ri. ruos but Hi t l: no f o r e i gn conne c t Lo ns , i. c cor ding t o c
Sena t o r Bi r c h 9a yh , of t h e Sena te I n tel li ge n c e
0: ' ,.: ,:.
206
commi t t.c-o , "d o.ae s t. ic s ecurit y i n v t' 3 t i ga t i o o s "ar e rcor o i n t he
n a t.urc 0: "cr jr:- .i. nal Luvesti q a t i on s " and s hou ld b e s ubj c vt; t o
more c tri c t . i n\ ' cst i s nt ivc an d pzoccdure s t o p r otec t
t he r i g ht. s of ] \In(-:r l c:n n fi.
Undar r:c c:t i.nn 213 , dOM0r tjc invc s tigilti ons
mav b e c.on d u ctcrl lll l<l er. the Lowo r consi.dercd
t o p r otoc t "n ut i ona I s o c u ri t. y" f rom fo r ei 9 J1 r hroat s , 7 h c i 1: r:=,,:
r e a s on i s t l H! t unJ.5. k u 11I' orcd.C; 1I Survcil Ji:nc c
(S.J.!i 66), a cet ion 2).3 do(s flot n r va s on 2b l e
a s b r -ha L f th t, pcrson a ro ..c.:ti ns! f o r o r on o f a f o:rc i gn
p O' ,\' 8l: o r pu r s u c nt; t o t hc C1.1 )"c.:C'..: j 0:) o f a c l nn dc !;t j n e i n"..: el l i gD.l1 2e
n otvoxk o f a fOTr.:i<jn PO\,' (:r, e xcept. .in t h f.: c a s e o f cI II
cl l i9c ncc 'r h ut;, undo r t h i s s e ct i on it
o f iJ Iv:; t!.] poLico by a domc sti c r adi c eJ.
wi t h no could be si nce is
n ot. c on Li nod t .o f1 i ! ti onaI c1 ci:"('\ilsc i:1!;tnl l at. ic,ns . 'l ha t:
ra di c n L or qani z ati or; coul d b p t. a r gc t t c d i f r e a s on a bly
o f c n g ag .i.n g in " eny i on , u
DCW(' s t ic s ecur i t.y viLl, unde r t he amb i t. o f
s e ct i on 2 J 3 bc:c2usn 0 1 tho b i ll 'f . to d of i.nu
i n i t s c:l u;; r; i c ).I0.:.:..""li J1'J o r i n terl d-. o f c r irui.na L s t. a t.u t c s
'J'hur;, for o, 1I1 C"i...}: SII of cLru.si in f.o rr.1ilt i on t o t hE:
..os s CCll1J. c:! Lr. r.d t o j J,v(::i tiS$ (1 t j(Ii i ,
.in d ic tr. d Hll f ; h e T. g f o r C' s p j in the Pcn t 2g on P':lp e )z C a s o ,
I f s uc h i s Ln cJudc-d , t he flection v-ou Ld
p orrni t 5.n v c s l i g a t. i on of o f: the P': C5S who " oo n np.i red
w.i t h " o r I l id .c1 e d and i:1 un tt.:C?d
ll
P.l l sbt: rg in p r i.nri. nq t h e Po[Jc:r s .
Simi l ar probl.ems a rc p or.cd uy the hroa d d ef ini tion o f " i n t e r -
n ation a l l erro r i s t a cti vi ty i n the ( 20) . The d e f i n i t i on
vi o lent t o i llt i n i da t 6 the
c i v i l i a n po p u l " t i o n bu t ill"c> inc lud e s " v i olcri t d est n :c t i on o f
prope rt y " o r tllreat " t o d o s o i n o r de r to " i nf l uc J1CC
pol i c y o f ... . by int i r:lidalion . ' 1 Droz: d l y read , t h i s
"mul d a l lnH t he o f p "r s o n s "nq aC1 e d i n o f c i vil
dis obcd 5c :1C:C or who in civil disorde rs. tll is
terro r i s m Innst be " i n t c r nu t i oll u l
lr
i n n atnre , t he s t a nc1 a r d may
be :.;a t T" T i ed i f a ny o f t he "", c a n ,; by \: h i e h it s ob j e c U,\"e i s
a c c o,opl i s he d " Ie . g . we a po ns, f ina n c i a l ,;up port, e t c ) l r a n s c e nd
nat iollul
I n int erpr e t i ng t he t e rro',!; o f l h i 5 ,;c c t i on , \:e h av e oh...i ou s l y
g i v e n it a b r o a d r CDcU.:lCJ . thinl :. appropr i at.e i n vi e"\'l
o f t he con si. d e r ilb l e c v iclC' :1ce t hat i n tel l i s " " c c a g enci es in the
past , p a r t j.c u l n r J y i n t j.lnc fi o f c r i s i s , read a ut llo r izat ions in
jus t t hi s ,," cly . No point , f o r qx a mp l c , t o t he r BI s c ond uc t of I
ov e r o ne mi l lion u nd oi t l ic v il gu e s t ilnda r d o f
207
" rubVC1- s i VG act. i v i t.Lcs " a nd I t. s raou nt i nq o f ma ssive invC' st ig at -
'=0. p r o g r ams under a 1 9 3 9 President ial Di r e c t i v e ao b r o a dl y
a s , rho s ection i n the In Presi d ent
llOOSC\' c l t Lnst r uc t c d lhe FBI t o 1 nv c: s t 1g a l e ' ma t. Lors r e ..
J i1 t ..tJl(J t o CfriOn nge , s abot aq e , a nd v i.o Latii o ns o f t h c uo utraLi t y
;Cgu}at io)]s." ScclioJl with i t s s ubst itution o f "c l al1da s
t iJl e :in t el1 iCJ (n c e a c tL vi tie s ' fOJ: the di s c r cdi.tcd
s i l;li l a r overbr oad inve st i gnt.ion .
Th i s a lso c at abLi s h o a Idi t.y of O lU" j l1c1 qmo n t
I hat 'i' ; tl " II e mbodies il poLicy c hoi c e to il11O\'I our i n t cl -
l i gp nc (; to Lnvcs ti i qat c I I f orei gn c onnccti.o ns." by
t-Zl r g c t l ng l\m':? rl. c an.s much as h os ui JP. fon...i CJ n i.!<Jcnts, si ric c
the i n Se c t i.on 21 3 o b v i o us l y c onst i.t. ut;o iI brond
e u t l!OJ i r.C1 l" i o n to t a r g e t ci t.Lz c n s i lllCl rcsi dent, i t i s
a l so " l e a r t har hov..ever e f f i cie n t. t. h e p ol i c y , i t is c ffcct iv e .
at l hc ez!>e ll ,; e o f c i v i l libe rt i e s .
I t i s om: r e c o' ;' ,l"nda t i o ll that t h e Com.ni Lt.oe r cdraf t; t. hi n


ycar.
2. ?:h0. .. io.n.:. '<..
__
Under Se c t i o n 2 1 4 o f Ti.t l e I I , t h e FBI and CI A may l arg Rt
citi ze ns , per manent r csi d e n t a l ien s , a nd a s sooi at i on s of.
su ch p ers on s in t .hn u: l i ted for int ru sive
i:ltion, t o c o l l E' c t force i.s n i ll t e l li gene t' i n f o rlOati o n \':hen-
e ve r t he y a re " r e a s oTl tlb l y to 1.>e cmCjaged in the
same a ct. i.vit i e s set f o r th i n Se c t i on 2 J 3 d i r..cuSfi QU ubove .
The st. a n d a r d i,; i d e n t i c " l t o and , in oll r es t i m" t i o n ,
from the s altle fi nd the: same i ! ;f:;UC'$ . \'Ie
s i mpl y l"C<f e r 1:0 t ha t d isc u :;sion il nd t he .""'c recom-
menda t i.o n as to how l h e s e c t i o n " ho u l d be rc"lriJft ed .
3. Th e f Cou n.!,!,,!,in
r o r i s m, a nd 1"o r c i c;n I n t Ql l i 11"l\' 02 r.tiq u t i n: )!.i
?l" ---.-.----
Und e r b" t h Se cti o n s 2 13 and 2 1 4 o f Ti t l ,,' II , " mel'i c a n s and
pc rnwnc nt r csiucnt a l iens u. ul'oad l!lay be t .,i: r (Jl.l cd for
c oun t.e r i n t e l1 i.ge nc e , c o u n t c r Le r ror i SlO , ' a nd for e i.q n in Le1 1 iq(!:'lc e
un de r l e s s e r nOll- c ri mina l s ta:ldard !; thnn app l y
to pcr s on'; , al h orne,
. . .:\.
1,:.; ;. -';
208
209
For exampLo , undo r bo t It U . S . p er sonr: IlEIY tilrg ct-
eel i f t he y arc "rci l,SoJ:. ,!) ly br:l je v od to be cp.qi':ged in Any c L an -,
irlt u] .l i gc nc e o uts ide t hel Urli t e d e ve n
lhotHJh I1ni leu Staten. i nte l l i gcnr c iHJC?1 C:i(:5 ha v e f10 [ Cil SOIl i'!. lJl e
t.h a t th0 SC" ac t i v I t.a o s "i nv o l v e or a
ion" ( If l aw . As we: ill C,tlr a na].YLi s of SCCt iO!1
2 1 3 abov c I c Lan dc s t i. n c i u tel .1.:i.CJ I.- ':lcc act Lv i t y" c an C'. Jmos t. I I
a ny secret (I)" undi s closed con t.ac t o r with a
gO\'0 l"O:I\:' 1It..:., poli.tical p arty , pubLi c o f f i c i. a L, {1: or gi l Jl i z a t i OJl
in pol i L.i c u l. advoc e c y. I n eff e ct Lhe s e O:lt, a u t h -.
(ll:izc mn csive i Jl t o t hu o f l aw! \ll
politic;ll ilct i vit y i ll tha Firlit
merit, U. S. 1 ( 1 97 6 ) and amou n t; t o
OJI.:-:. b l c s o i zuro s u ndo r the };'o t.'l"th 'l' ..... rry
V . ohi o , 1 ( 19Gr.:) , s i nce :i.t is
right s e x t. e nd t.o Bar1in
D-:il1(lc.' r;:t:ic C)uL v , r . Supp. 11. 4 ( 1 9'/ G) r1or. C:-O:i er ,
sti:-i iZr;'-l=(l agf.li ns t t hi s c l a s s of i cans
and p:'nr.ancHt r c s i d out, a liens i.n v i. o Let.i ou o f the Equa) Protect-
io n c l aur, o of the con nt i t. u t Lon . .
) jo t h ,; c ctir,"" 2).3 iJnd a l s o " c,t f o r t.h s eparate
s\: .:t:1(1':.'.r c: s f or: un i. t e d v..h ".) may be " o f f i c i.a Ls " of
any f o r e i gn t , fJoli ti en 1. y , a s s o c.ia ri on.
Un de r sect)(1:1 2.1.3, o lfi c i.n If; rr.:'ly b.; ec.l i, f It
po.co r 0 ::: ' o: gt:ni. :-: n rLon 11 i s ovcd t o h 2 en g?fJ ccl
in c.: r"pit l.l i'i g 8 any o t r. o r c Lancl e s r.Ln o Ln e.c t i, v it y ,
Siibot ;a.ge , e ny i n terna t i ona l t crrorl fit ac-ti.vi, t y , o r a ny u.r... S<:lG -
s i n c t i on . II \1h i.lc this i s c roL a t i v cLy il i<J hnr ,StCtn<l 3r.cl , :it i s
i n9 1esfi pr o tect i on :(0 ): !itlch Uni1.:e o St at.e :;, pel SO:lS 5i ncc
t b(;y may C2 rj j ly bE:.l t (U' :CJ c t (lcl for. i111y Cl.s soc.: .1. a t.i.on
und e r t he les s0r ston d br d . Under s e c t i on 2 14 , the s epa r nt c
fClr turgct:ing o ffi c i i; ll i;. even hi- oRde r , pe r mitt ing
the t.irJn of hi5 0 1.' !Jer !J';.ljt i tioJ1 al
a c U v i ty wi t hc>lll i;!1y " vi oc nce t bat. it is \1n l " ", [ \11 if a n
i nt e l l i g e nc e as eney be lj.e vcB it "si g ni f i c ;!nt f orei gn iJl t cJ.li
g c:nc e. II \'le c Of,tc nd !. t unc.1 ar ds are equa lly allcl
v i ol a t i ve of e OfJ Gti t ut:iona l r iCjht.:!: .
c1 is t rc s r.i ng t hoU vaguC:' inv cstigntive
l Ji \ (-'! r i c D.:l 5 Inny be
c onl d ned i n S. 2 52 5 . UnCe r t he (k f i n i l:i on ;:,. l
secti on s for Urdl ed Pcr sQns , Il as soc i a t i ons " o f l'....
abro\1 c1 In?.. Y b e prc:,umcc1 to be forc .it]ners ull ti l
indic ates II l hG cont.r ar y . " ( 3 1 ) ( c ) . S.ini J.arly , pc:r;1i:mQp.t
)'e s i da;l t nlicns r eside out si de the Stil tes f or a
r.tiJY be " ; n - C S Uli\ CG to li uv\1. lust status ;1.5 a Uni t e d St r'. t e s
per s on f o r of the Il unti l lnforr.1atio n i s obt.a i.nad
I i ch ino i c a t c:s a n i n t ent on the part o f such a lien t o r e curn
'" 1 t hc un i t e d s t a t os . .. is oh t a i ne d . " (31 ) ( n ). As a
o f; these p r e sc mpt Lon s , i.n t.c l li gcIl c e itge ne i eS wou Ld
c ou l e t o t' h e s c Un i t e d S t a t e s pe r s on s f o r any
i n t e ll i g e nc e purpose , e mp l oy ,,11 i.llve s t i gntiv u t. e c hn i q uc s
. thO'olt subj oc t; t-o t h e s tandards and p roc e d ure s i n t he:
in cove r t on s , h'c b e l i.e v c
th c !;C' pr ps l.ur.p t1. ons are pa tently u n c on s t L t.ut i on nL .
urd t' e c1 St " t e s per s on s a b r o ad shou l d he s ubj e ct. t o t he, SOI.IO
invc: r.ti gal o:r: y and p r occdu r a L s a f cq ua rd s granted to JI.mcJ:icans
, no r c s i d nnt l iens ill t h i s c oun t ry. Th e re has been no
nc;, c ompl' l l .'.ng o r o t.h orwi s e , \.;hy t hi s should no t he

4.
t le _I I .
As pr c v i ous Ly no te d, a:"l ilCJf..!ncy " z o aao na b Ly "
bcl i e v... b " i:. Unit(;t! Stal es Person p.n':i?:j:c1 .i n t he act .i.v.i.t i c n
sp ec i Li c d in s oc t i on s 7.13 'mcl 21 4, i t may c or -duc t; a f.u l l s ca Lc
intru:-; i\'c i.n v o st igilli on. '7i.thout e vc r ruor o t h ,Hl a
be) i e f " t.ha t the t a r <J c t. i!; ' e:1C]ngcd in cl afl Cj0T.OU5 o r
cri rrd.nil.l ac t iv i 'f i t lel l pcr:ni ts \:hc i nv c st i yctli on t o c on-
.in de f i ni. t ely . Obv i o us l y t h:i.:' Tl't (!(;nific!,; the in trU!iivcncss
of t he 5u:::-vcj . an d c Oll s t i t ut e ::. ',,;, further dt:pal."i.:u rn frolll
pr inc i pal t hKt Un i t e d States persons s hould only bc invest-I -
go l e d un ocr a cr i mi n a l s t onoDr d .
'I'he ke y sec t i oli s t hc:t. DUS t. be e"" r.,ined " r e 2 16 ilnd 217 o f Tit l e
II . Uncl c:>r s e cti on /. 16 , b ar- c d on a "reasonabl e
bc lie f
ll
l:lay be i ni t i a1.:.C' d f or ni ne t y da ys in \..r iti llg, and
e>:t e ncJ eo f o r illl ot.her u i n "' ly <l ny s i n \Jr iti.ng. Af ler 1 80 d ays ,
the j"ay be c ontinue:cJ fo r il!l unr;pecifi ed
pe r i od i f t he Att orne y Gene r a l or hi s mnkes a wr i t t e n
fil lding unde r sect j.on 2 11 ttlat tile i s lln8 cc s nury
and r c a s o na b l u . " t h at f:ind ing r e q ui r e D t he Justice
of f i c i a l. t o c O!1s i d er t he de gr e e t o I'Ihich the i nv c s -
ti galion v i olat e s the r ight!.: o f t he t.arget , t he "irllpo r t cmc c
ll
of th" i nror m;: ,t i on to b2 c o l l '-" c t ed , o r t he l i k e l i h ood ,
iJ:UUC,l cl i ucy , i tna magnitude or any t. h r 0 (\ IHIl"l:l trom the
the i nve s t i g a t i on mny b e c on t i nu e u based s i.l':\p ly on
l n f on nrJt:i on II 'Y.'hich F.UZ; titins CJ. . " be lie fII
t hil t l he: lill' ge t is e ng dg(d in pot ential l y cri min"l OJ' d c:nsero us
co nd uct t hr e a t e ni ng t o t he n 3 t ionnl secm' i t y.

I I
210 211

As \l.'c (10 not bc-Lic.ve tlv1l a " z-e anon ab Lo b el i ef even c onsti tutf:F. IT
nuf f i ci c nt, 'JT 01.1 ndz to op e n int r usive inves tiga t ions , we object.
e v e n more t o thi s autho r jz? ti on t o c onti nuc t hem ind e f i nite l y
0:1 thi s : Li::iSY basis. 'fIle Church C01iL, d ttc c Repor t, doc urac nt cd
nUJn<2 r OU5 i n t e l l i g e n c e: i n .. whicl; cont i nuc.d for
dc cAdes (e. g. t h o GO y e a r inve sti g at i on of t h e Soej al i c t Wo r k e r
Pdrt. y) \.'i Lh out cvo r p r o .Iucin g ovi d onc o o f wronqdoi nq .: , As ,t
t h e' Ch uroh Cot rnd, '.:t.eo r ocommendcd tha t d :>ng cr- ou s or
c r i mi n iil a ct i vi t.y mus L " no on " o ccur 1: 0 s ustai n a n i n\'(s t i g a t i on.
'J'hat i" n o t t.l i o Bt:ilIldur cl OJ: t.h e (, [fec t of t.h o s ec t i ons in Ti 'de
J I whic}, purpo rt; t o l i mi t t h e d urcti. on o f i:1\"ec tigil ti ons.

).ll t" C: ) IiC!f:n ee il l\'(':':'; \ :c .. "!\e nd tho. fol l o"'::;.n::-: c hu n<:c
.
c a ur .e to belJC:VP thi1.l rl cri mc beer: , i n n oi nq , c..;r (lbout"
- ---.- -,
- - - ----_..-
5 . Rc l ' lte tl Co u nter inLc l J i q e :)L(" , Co u n t. er t.c rr- o.r i s m, ar. d r o r -
Is fi ; [:-t c:- .
r.t: r
Th e int.cat of: t h e clr ,d' t t?J:'; o f thi n Lcqi s l rrti.on to pe rmit i n-
t e l 1 i 0 c n c e a genc i c s t o r o u t i n e l y wholly innoccnt
l \mp.l:'i ccHlS and p er racnon t; rc sioC"llt a l iens t o mon i.t. o r , I
a na c ount e r f O" c j gn arJ.si.ng fr om f o rci g l)
i n the-; Un i t e d st a t e s a nd ovc-n , i n Limi t.e d ci rcumst nnce u , t o
c o l l e c L for eign i s c learly d e monstrat e d by the
Lnvo st i.qe ti.onn authori z cd by s e ct i.onc 21 8 thJ'o u gh . 2 2 2 in 't i t lt
II .
( it ) tll\(":nt and T", r,9ct
Se c t i on 21 8 a Ul holo j zcs i ll t e lligcnc o to inve stigate
u .s . pe rsons "rcit sonnb l y balicvc d to be obj e c t o f a r c c
ruiUcc n t e ffor t by the i nt e l l ige n c e s e r v i c e o f a fore ign pow-
e r by a ny per!' o n or i.n a ny i ntel: :lationa l
tC' !"l.'o r i s t ac t ivi t y . . . II Obv iotl 51y in t e l l i.ge nce s ervi c e s
ma k e " f fol't" to r ecru it u.s . But ins tead o f only au th-
or i. zinsr i nt c l l iCj C"n c c a g r!T)c ics t o \ 1? t c h f0:t"Ci.CjP. a gents unt il t hey
}lave t }\at t }le y a r e r ccl"\\ i ting par t:iC\11ar u .s. per s o ns ,
this al J o\..!; t he m t o whol] y inn0.::cnt pe r sons
to uc t.(' r n ; ne i [ the y tirc t o by
'l'hi s "i r; t he ohvio\l:' tho ugh uns t?l t p.d pur pose o f t h e
tigation . - - - - - - -
c e c t i o n 2 l R a lso au tho r ize s i n tell i g e n c e a g e n cies t o invcstig-
lIn i t e :1 St at c:s pe r sons Lo Li evcd t o be the tar -
ge t of a ny i n t e r nation a l !, t a ct ivity. o r t h" t a r g e t o f
a ny i n t ell i g e n c e c oll e c t ion or . . . Lh e t a r -
ge t o f any a sse s si nat i on at .t.empt; by a ny f o ):(dgn p e r s o n o r by
i nt:Cl'JH\ t i o nCi l t.orro r i s t s . On Lt s f a ce , t hi n j n v e s t i.qs to r y
ilULhOJ: i t y a ppears dCldgU0U inno cent pe rs ons, a nd thri
s e ction so s tate D, b u t t he t a rget ma y not be i nf o r me d o f t he
i f i s " r c a s onabl.o un certainty as t o whot he r
""cil p e r s o n ma y . be c o op o r atLnq "l it h t h e f o rei gn i,l, t e l l ser-
0): i. nt c) : n a t i o na ) tcr r o ri st. n.II t .arqot; JlW,/ it f, u,>:\ pcc; t ,
and ifno t. , may not b e i n forl'lc d (Jf t h o r i s): POSQ,C1y'Ulc, - ' liari FiT"
1C; t i. v it y n o v ove r d anq e r o u n i f i t wo u l.d j copa r di zc s o u r c e a a nd
Obv io usl yI t he l c s !_ Ln t r u si vc- Me ans to prot o ct a t:a r -
9( 't ,.' ''11 1d b e t o a u t h ori xe t.h c i" L<:>llig e :. e " aqenc y t.o HbtC!l th!"
{ or e.' gn t h r c:a t unt i l i t i s s ui, [;t.:-t l1t' i a t.o d a nd t.h 0.11 t al :: ap:'l':" o? )-icd .e
t o p r0t ecl a gains t j l: {e , g. tIle t ilr gct, a r r e s t t h e
Hut i1Cj aiJl, t hie sr.ctio n ,-J. )o,-,;. pe r s o ns t o hE:
i.nvCf:. t i t o moni t o r the l }n ':(;'; lt.
AS il p os sihLo c on sc .jucncr- o f t l rese a u t }7o, j C,t
l\1i1. cri c un c fin:., r e s .toc n t: a lie ns rr:i ght b e: t o .i lr: (-::7 I:,ig-
ul i {lrJ bo cau c e they lir e r e it s cJil .:J b l y h :: .:l i(-;v('I d to b2 o f
r e crl, i l r ' c nt o r po s ci.bl c o f ilqc nt D. \'lh i l (l t. h t.:
mo re .i.lI t: r u !:d,v(,.! u l1t.}J((rj;'; Qc1 i ll ! :e ut5.0 )1 ?-15 hill y no t
be used in i nv e s t I tha cs h av o c xt cn si v o
l eewoy to compi 10 do:' sicl :S on 1.Dw nt )idiJlg
ilnc1 rooidcnt, a l iens. Fo r c xc!r:,plc , t he ' age nc ies.; c un
( 1) c o nduct u n Limi t od i n t erv!.e li s , Lnc Ludi nq
p r e t . e x Ln r v o f o rnl s , b u s i. n c s s t . tc i cv-s f r i
a ssoci a t e s , a nd ot.hnr percons \-1ho ): H:'I\ ,Y
the s Ubject o f inv( , !' !:i gati 0n ;
(2) c h e c k c Ol: fi q e n t i a l SOU1:CCS , i ncl ncJil l'J il l
i n pla.c e "c overt h un a n sources I, o r
i nf or rt)a nt.sj
( 3 ) in p hysica l sur v e i l l a n c e f o r icJ c n-
t i f i c n t i on inclUd i n g pho tograp -
hi c s ur ve i 11anc (: ;
( 4 ) r e qu e s t i n f o r rnil t i o n f rom t h e r e c o r d s o f a llY
Fed e r a l , State, or law
eney;
( 5 ) and c O:l du c t: a " na t i o na l ?ogeTl e)' c he c kI I , whi ch
by defi n i t ion i nclude s "r1 o f l he
Fede r a l Bure au o f I Zlvc stigati on f i nge r pr i n t
and inve s t i gati ve f ile s , til e Ci,vil Se r v ice
' .- " :,::-:.'
212
s e c urLr yZ inv e sti g a t i on s i n dex, t. h e
Dc p ':l r t .J11c n't of c c rr t r aI
i n de>: . t.h o c e nt raL rI l o s o f t.h e llqnl t.ment; o f
I and \ Y' ho.:; ;) t. he r c .l.!; C\ r c n s onabLe Li k o I i
hoo d. t .hnt r c Luve n t b ioqrc phi c in:.l.... rmct.Lon viII
fO\1!Ic1 in f..uc-h :ril<..'s, t. hn ( '\:o i.:1." (1.J, f i Lcs o f
.. r - n;2-o;; l TolT;- - -_---
(G) and u'w any o t he r t cchni que not. includ e d in
sr-ct i ou 21:, .... 11.:1 u nLo ss
h i bi i hy li1\',f ,
\ 1(" c ()!1 r. ic1 e r t. h at. "Lh e cc-n t. r a I fi l e s o f a riy o t h nr Fec1':'>ral
(\ 9 /.:n c y ll t i lx, c c c u r i t.vI cinpLoyrncr.LI \-.' c). f"<l:"" e,
r.l(,(l j t: a l , r.ndo vho r d.:'ll .:l on ci.tizens Ln crc es i.n qLy ll'OrC'
of CO:7tp... . tor L(-!: chil o l ogy .i n t.or fac.o, \'; 12 Cell) L eHi Jl to
t he pot.r-ntioI hrc;lc.3th of ..
'l'hi trud.;' {' i o :-.a l (--onnt:C'rj nt-el l the
)Jl. .l.ll c j p l c ci -:: i.:-.C:d''': be 1(;:8 froi.:l p,lco: l!..:oni.ccl i lh'e s-
Ie-jig they LhC" ),;:.. ....' . 7' hese st.il tnt0l: y uu t h -
01:) a r Chc1 y fo)' any
I i ;:.ne,1 lo i f!t n. i n surv e i l l o r. c omp i l e clc)!' , s i crs on \o;ho
d5ss(:rd : fl ' o:n i t. r; pc,] -icy 01" ?ct.i,'ii.;:LGs , It, i F_: Co dC' pCl rt --
\:h i c ll ;.:hou ld b -2 r c j0.ct(:<.1 h i' l;h e: ": e that
UIC rr-Cl:U5i:i,10l,t !>t l" i.C:} ', 0.1: f r (l;';1

._- - -
(}))
Sc!c t .i on 7.20 the o f p -:"l"SCJ:l. \:ho has
" c (.J nt".{tcl"u ""'ith (lny b-;:; lieved" t o va
i n or c:ny other i nt.eJl igcncc activity."
A9 i\ i n, j !",; fUl ' ther fi \"<"cping t o invcst.iCJc-::t.c 14:1',':-
a b icli llg i C[JJl s und }J0rrnallC:' JJ t l. c sic1(:i1 t t o lor for-
cd.gn thrc2t. !i by b.?l C/. \','ilr d fr o m u. s. i n ol.-dc.:l to
l }l G lla l u r c c)1 tlle
213
. r (':-:cIIOp l c, t. h e c o tl l a c ,t i s n o t conf Lnod t o c Lend cs Li.no
J el l ev :i.dC! n c 0. some j nte.nt on t he part of t ht- t o col -
,: ith a h o stiLo f o r e i gn powe r . Ar gu a b l y , j t: permits in-
" t iGat ion of a n y o f c on c r c s s who i) l t cnds. ( l r.l b i-:c sy por>
o r p o rson ,.. .uo 11':';'5 COil tact. v:i th b J o c count ry vi
(, ,' . i llCJ any conrect; \: i th a mCi'lb:;r: of t.he Co t.ruu nLs.t : Party, U. S.1\.
aJ L e 9l:011n :: i r.; f o r Jnv c st i qert i on undor thir. sc ct i on ,
the .inv o st i qa ti.on is Limi t.e d to tl.r. u.s. pc:r. -
c]e:: t.(:l.:nj n :i_Ji(j \-l}l c i:l,l Cr: he: 0 : s h e ': c ll rl." Cn l l y h a t; h eJel ,. o r
.i1] accos s to a ny ell :.c;l c>b t't"(, of \,' h l ell to a : (or -'
p OVi e r.. l IO U ] c1 b C' the Ul?i t Cd .,Sl dt c.: !i , I , a r }} [ird-
ly l j r'l.it j ' t .l.Oll:'. II1(tj' HUC:
of it pe'::-:: {,"ln, C!r.; (! r: ,Cl eel e. o f aI . h o.lJ.lr.s , p oI >
i t i c ,ll I a ssoct a t a on s . I n l. Jl\'(:,!; t:I.'.::;t.u:m!: , the 1:.(: (:}"
i n rccruivrnent, and lin:s (.'t
t o lli c1 c n t i f y . Il f' u r t.her q u..".IJ t o " i n f o r -
l.h .i. e}} i f cli s c l o s Ld ro " fo:r::ic,;.n povcr \ :(, \) 1." "Iravtn t he: Unj.t-
eel co....-c.rs a of clI.lcl i n-
{c . g . that u U. S . th e Vici,:1C.l:1 l:.J. r po l i r:y
of tlw h dllli.n i s t. rEl t. iOld .

it-(1:-5-.- 1"' ( , r. ;':O; 1 fil Ciy he c;olJ.fo.hor.::t .)n) Hith t'. I nfor;:1-

jor u.S. i n1. c'11i,q0.I1 C0 to [(I,' US (I Ht ic-J:IS on
i JT Lr-
' .
.:.,' :: ,
215
214
( c ) Intelli<] cnce
219 ant horLzcs U.S. agen c i c::; to inv est i g a t e
vb:' dir, e; U.S. p Or i. OP5 to th er posi. t-Lve fo r ei intcl li'.;C:lcn
"not. 1+ 1iriit. c d t o ab-
ou t; r.he u n i. t e d Stat (::; " c !; s 0.n t i a l t o Un L El "sl-. an t1i n g us-
ng th f 0 ) r. i Cj n j n and t C)OI intarvi c.d.ng any o t.l .cr
p c r ocn t o \ .. f.:uc h UJl:l.tco St u.'l:t::s per uon h 3\' C v ol. untar Ll.y
eli r.cl fo z oi.qn .lll t cl 1jSlen(;B t.his i'O utho r.i.<:v. t:i on i s \:hol)y , fI
n na c c opvab l e llnd () prcccdent . .
J... s , .;t; }li: V 2 t hro uqhout.I no cjl i Z(;'Jl s h ou Ld b ':l inve st ig ate.:!
\-: r.;ur;pect ,inq hi m o f. cr i. . i.ni! l e ct i.vi t. y h'ht:n t he.: i n-
v e st t iC)71 r c l to c:r i loi nul clc t ivi t.y, lle lC: , th2::'c.:
.is not, even t i lc fox " s n. p 2-cc1ic i: l for
ati0:' 1, Lut; t.hr- I:; noed t.o ior-
e ig n };) 'oil<51y def i.ncd ,
\'n d le:: o n .it s filCP: , t.h e r.o ct .fonI t;ti1t('d that. iJJy u iri e:s
De ('onf :inc.' ,l t o "i n t"C: ' : \' ). c' ,.' l ng" ot her p e rs.ons s.corns to h e
th e dorr: not. ]"' r(?Cl'"lc.e lI p r cLpx t :: n Le r v.1.e.'\ .'s :' t<J de.
'jnta t he ini f". ().. or
1.l e j r,,fcstic.filt.) \i hic:h \ ;;)u lc1 . hrv':"
c.:"', J i"'",' y ( ' Y t: , ) On r I I:IJ
orfi",:cl :" lJar i.l1l"l r1":::. J:s , i l ,ll d i n t c l 1 :i <..: e ncf.>
il g d nt.!; (; oul c1 Ztt tl. " ;\P l. to finu C'ut about. t he for c.lt..jn i cy (".::
of. t h (! b u r;i !l c s r;. of U.S. c o r p o r n t i o n n c' .:':: -
r o .::tl , t h e f i n :t :H.:iL.! l S ti'1t of. fO.f.r.d.g n corpa r a t i v:H; nhr o,1o , o r t In
Rc >: t\ i\ l pr. (:f.c l.c nc" s of [oroi 911
We Lc ]iavc t l ln Ord er a ut horizes l:illd
o f (:o l J c c l:. i o n on a l i.:rCj c r l ::ithout JiTiLi..t i n g i nves t. i<jat 5ve:
tcc )ln i que s so OL}lcr, SllCll f o rnar Dirc c( :o r
Co l by. \, u l l ] cl 90 f IU"t!Wr. ll1 r e ccNt t r: '.,Ulnon y h e r o :: c the !lo u ,;"
J u d i c i a.::ty Co' ru cd.t t (c , r..l1gg c s t <:cl tt iJl '] survC'il-
uCJ .Ed.. lcr,; :ident ':11icns. {or"' int eJ.l iqcncc P\llP(ISCS
\\'11(11 ) 1' i n el i s ): e g a r d o f t h e i r J' ou r t h .:::n("ijl,( ;nt He \'!(lul d
nol ruqu ire they t he d efi n iti o n o f "ag ent o f a f o r e i gn
p" ....cr " un d e r S , 1 5 6 6 f o r purpo s e s o f s lll : v(,i l l ancc .
\')e ,;t ate f Oi: the rer.or. d \, e ob j ec t. t o Se c t i on 2 1 9 a s d r a f t e d
':\11'.1 to iln y t n it s itutho r i z2lt i o n e i t he r \\' i t ll l'e-
spcct t o \\' i l a l b e 01.- by means . 'l' h i s \0; 0.\\ 10 nwl:c
u l ilOC}; t : r. y o f stalcd p nrpo :.( , o [ t:h j l egisl a tion t o c O:i l r o l a nd
J" c f.. jt r i c t. d i:n gc.: l CJ tl S i nlc:lli s;cll c (: a ct ivi t ic!; .
(d) pot e n t i a l Source Inv,, !,ti 9i!.l: i o n s
Lion 2 7. 1 aut hori z e s fin i n t e l l i g e nc e to
sec; l' ll i t ec1 St ates per s on " \ ; 1. 0 is rea sonably b e l i e v e d to b e it
Ll f' i .o!"t t i il J sou rce o f Ln f o rrnat Lon or. op er at i.oa a.I r .i st il nc o. "
t. il(ll1CJ ll t he ne ct i ou appea r to r cqui r e the, COn 5E: nt o f th e
]I . i n most; c a sp- ,sI n p r ovi s o that conccnt need
pe ....
he
lJu t' a i nc:d \:hon CV8r {t migh t j oop..lrdi:..-.{: acti vLty for
t
n;;ic h o r. a ssi st nnc e i. G. sOlll) h t. " (:f t.l .r- sc
..t 58 ft t. 1 C :1S \',').11 be , ,
b eLi cvo socrocy . t o be \\'.11) \'.l.CV,T or .r ai n:IH!
i l S j e np r ocJ i z i n :! !/a c t .:i. \' i t yn . ill
' h'is cillt ho r i :t i!t"j.o n p e rru i. t .s oxt crvsi.v o inv... o f \.und t
i ny u ni \c.d f i t (),L(! s PC): :-'on5 . n i )1 i01\8 of cro POLCll-
li i' J BOUl."CC' S of .i.n f o r rtll:f t i ( l!"l or C.!iV<-:11 t ho b): (,'.:" rl tll
( I f t he f i uLd, C' [ i nq\.lil.Y aut hcrixcd i n th:fi lC9 -
b ; l id i on . n Ol' e tly,. p ro .. c fe,)'
ill t c:l l i S/(:JlCC C'.. <.: e:nci e.s t o t (Jl." <:! c
/
.: c-:nd j r.h f:i.J0.r: CII
on.:1 :1l: e:S o f. Po '\"CJry p Cl: ho n of. j u;ld c:l'
Ui ( : t. o f r:e:vc)(Jpihg p o L0at iii ) 0): iJlfc,rJI'\:
\:h i .1 Co! ( ) : ...l y th.I C(" i cJ at.i v e t cchnj.quc::; ;:1:(' t.'t.C':i,
!.. t 1 <: ?,i c , : .1 Il
C':I,: i c(.lJi s. uJ J:e c-t<}y the ;1 1 1: (\.:.: c.: o r. ..l1JCt.:i.:l:J
It l?r l' t e ;.:t .l j' : l (r v iC:! \\s " u' ;:2n of $;c.:.: c:i:.j ( )J) 0:1
T'or ( i 'Jl'J I nf o ;:mi..l'l:.io: l) l..In c1 hlC.' u.<H. h of:
i1\' id thro ng h c1 ir;cl.1:" !;).CJn of.
1Jl\'C'sl:.iqat.iCJlIfi \ :::: r.ot r:: Lh,1t
inc111 cl c: und c:c>u.Lillei1t.i i.:l
SOll l" t:i.':" a n d pUblicl y nVHi lc,ble C:PP!!r::=s t. o :l.nc:l uct (
att. f!lId i n g ItE.:c t ing s o f. c:i tiZoe-n .. ;; f\O lo ng i1t'
pu b l i c: to c:o l l cc.: t i n Le l l i geTl c c: p er s on s .
\':e bel :i(:\, e il.J1y on o f a p -:.. t c n t :'Cl1rc:e !-;}IOU ] c: CO;),
t h i fj it ut hor izat i on hh tl u l d he: f r om tl. e:
Cha r t e r .
f,cc\}!"i t.y
S0c t i on 2 22 of Tit le JI t h r e e scpnr n te i!lVcst iqnl i on&
pr..: ri rtiL u. s. i n'l:. (l l i <jE: n c e t o prot(;'ct their
l On:: ; , o r p c r s ':'IJlncl, c orr.r:.,un ic.: a ti o ns , t1nd by S\l r-
\, ci l )i\ Il.: e e, f UJJitc' (] StiltC.'S p:!rSO!l$; . \.: i t:. h a l l
I'}P "(' (

216 217
( i ) \lithi'!
t he: __oi
Se c t.Lon 222 (it) pcr rai.ts "'Jen cics lo invc !:ti'J<tl(>
U. S . per s o n c 0: 1 0 :- in t h , vicini ty lhe:.i.r insl<;lJid; ions to
they }H;, " ox c Lu dod frorn t h ..
l i1C50 n froril the im:i'I (;(l i clle v ici ni t.y of t. h at, .i n s t fi ll a t i on .I t
"l e b:<l i 0v o i t . b e; limited t.o p c r son f.bou]ti
b f! c ::, : c]uc) l2<l f ro.n on i li ri t n l J C" t i o n, (nul \ .1';:: sec n o roa s o u \.,' hy
t: b e t Lfic.d t h at lc) tc i n s l. n l J n t. j o u c a u n o no e n r
may l"t"' q\:i):c i t Jirnit(:cl .:i nv f n l :: 0 a t .;i ' )1I. TiH; l:(;'ch,:iqtl (> s
arc :i f Jli'.tt.:i.o ntll ch -,(;};s do not incJ.l,1 (; C' " t he:
f. i ."t Cf'; CJ i [:ny o t.h c r ugc-ncy'l v.hi.ch i s O\'CT-
b r o a d .
\':c eve t h e' br o.ador p'.1 r pocc of pe r s o ns to
c1c:l cn.lilJ":' whethcr they f' xc l \ iQ0 cl f r o)!\ the v .i.c i 1l5. t y
o f. (-\I I "ion j oS i ni:-: li,>r opl: j i!{ C
linl l : :";!..i ,I cr i ::; bed r.-:J corrrni 1:t.cQ OJ: ..
( })(; U, \ l {: c o no t. a c an b ; : (>:.:clud ? d f,: \)t,l tit0 vi c '
.ini.t v (I t thc' i n r;t".: d .lat j fln. 15': i L<:.: nJlo t b 0 dono , :l.I1 ':J" '..: i ry
fih:; \.I.1.cl )":':J L b0 c on-Iuot .cd t.hi s. JH1 i:lXIf;O. T'ur t.L c r , \...:- (:0" no t
):n o 'I: ,r t":Jc v .ic Ln i.t y ' .i t 11 0l c1c-
fjJ;C.I;l . I n t1l( '
pCl:".i1':ion lhat" v i c i n i t y t o l... inc)ut1cd th0
,:h o l e t an
( i i)
( b ) P Cl'J:li t s U. f, . l rJ i nv C' !=> t
iqatr' u .s . per s(ITJr; ".lh ? pCJ F r> "41 thl' C,:\C t o plly s icc:l :.. ..
o f c:ny in:t.all at.io:1 or nf Clli y p C l s o nncl of t J .a t e:nt ity ... 1/
\':c 3.c -v'<! i nv c s t i c;a l o r y iHl t h clr i r:r. t i 011 j s and.
u n...i r.f: . --_ .._- - -
Fjrst., it: itulho l: :i.::(,s ull ("'ntity to (;o nc1uct
o f o n or. \.;ithin t h e vicinity of the in-
st alIn t: .i.o n. V:e i1SS U;;\C !;\.H'h t r ud i tio nal and Jleed
IlOt lJe <;ulhori ::e:d .
Se c on d, if l h e thre: Dt is pORed in the: v icinity, t hAt
wi ll b e d et e c t e d lJy p hy s i c" l obs e r vati on , o r u nd e r section
'I' h i r c1, (I U. S . \:h o por- ;cs phy s i.c a l thl. C' i, t: cd t.hcr i s cov -
" r ed ll l'<: e r s ect: i.on 7. 13 o f l h..., c) lo, rl cr (c .'J. s;: b Ol ilC] Co) or
t h e l a'.. ::. of lhe: llni tc. 1 States. 'jlhe s e c t ion i s S.J DC:'...
fl llou r; . . .
,.-
_ i s t o the or NSA to c o ndu c t
I f 9)eJ: s o n s to pro tect. a gains t phyGica l t hreats tr)
of p C''::'' Bon r.e l i n the Un i t e n i t i s c o ntra r y to pol i c :
ioI1 f. the e J I .. f r om c:o:'lc1uc ting i ll t c r n al s ecur i.t.y , count.cr i nr ej, -
o r c. . . -
t. ne e , o r ] .:1\0; ftH1Ct i p1. S in t h e St n t (,. . J : :
i p 0:;CCl , these clSt.ncJl : S s.ho .i) a t. u r n c v o r t. ho:: u :tor::'. iJ.t.)T>n- c ' ,
hr e cl.1.
t l)i.utl )1:15 to cOI)duct 213 or
i'.'I VC:: t :i.Q3 t 1.0n o f ..Olif;.who PCH;'.. the:- lh:,: cat
(1 o r p e r soru .oi 1.T1 t hE: Uni r.e d
to 1 .... . .
t rIC: o f t he ne e d t o ros t.ri. c t . th o to for,c'iry r, inl (: 1 -
JI. l - nc ':lfi ..:" COU!1t c l -i ll t e11 i Cj c' : l c c op ors ti or- u itb:"ond (',.tld t.he
}lCJt\l(.' pl .h Li c rc- c ord t.h ut C)A thi t> : p ; iy s i C: E.l t .hroe t." pro
Oll').t
l
t o cC' :1<'!\1ct Jn2r isive i nv c: s l i(]atiu n s of:. c ivi l r.j Cj ht s i1nd :11i't5.
il ctj it i H Ln oxpi blc ,,Il l y scct ion ):;(' ( '11
in ltd :.
(i ii) ... ...
5c..c t j 0;1 2:?/. ( c ) ziu t.r .ori ae s to
c.'j1 ) or tr r or 0 1; it t i "i..CJ de- con acco con ract . o
{c.r loi n c, ' \01 111. -\ )1'.' )' t h.cy hav v i.oL a t.cd ... r:y r u l e or rl: <.: r;,) u t'l on o f
thal (l i l t- i t )' }' t: l:t id .n i n9 t.o t ll(: cc.curit.y of t.h at. r-:lt .i.t yt!; il::.: ,l:.ilJ.-
f! r : T. !: 0 :1!1e: ) , COil.:"!;'..1 r!:\ .c;:ti (.J:H"; , o r 'l'he
in v"'r; t :i c;, . LioIl S Jf.ilY b e iJlt .r us:\. \' 0. , all () f t. h0.
R'2t: f o r th i n fiC!cL).on 21 S. CCl- t.u.i nly , i t (;dn b e and
he )11n r C
rirst, be notified that thny ilre su1.>j ..- !cL to
vlhc n t he y 2.r e h i l-0.d . In no (;a s e , ho\,' e\" c l ,
!' }Io li l d .,cmp) oy ec " i n c l \ld 0 for. r,le] part icul i: :rly ""i lh
respecl to t h e e ll, nd IlS?. Forr.1cr " ",ploye(>F. shonld only be
in,'cr;ti s.:, t e:c} t.:n :::01: !:: cC" tion 213 or o r for v i o l ,: t i o n of the::
or i ,,,; Il::; l 1<H'" o f t l1e United StiAtes , a nd o n l y b y th e nH in the
United f. l<: l:cs .
i':nc1 th" i r be noti.fied
t hey rrlUY be sub:;cct t.O s uc;h i nvc :. t .i g il t j o n !i b e f o r e th0)' en ter into
the con t r il c t . lhi s mns t include 011 o f t hC' e :ilp l oy 0.e s
j- thl> c ont ra cto r invo lved i n the ,,orl: of: t he c Oll t rCl C\: . Er.> ?10y0 e s
arc not i n f o r mmd o r do no t work on conllnct shoul d on! v
be invc, s l i g a l c,o u llc1 C! r R8c t ion 21 3 , or t hC! l il \o.S o f the. Un- -
a nd o)11y by rDI i n tl)p U:l i t l 'cl Stat es.
..-
Ii! ;'
218
n .

Sect i.on 22!i o f 'j'j.t:l e 1 1 au t.h ori zc s i n t C'l l i gc n c e a q enci o s t o c o n -
duct iJlt runive cQuntcJ:tarrorj.sm, or forcian
i n t c.l l .i.<;, c 'l(;C .iuvcst Lqations of f or ei gn pernons in Uni. t. c d St. .
a c s , ant o f au cvc cp n9 Z::H1 u nconn ci b Le. t y r t.hor i,ly i r- : i c.na
Pirct , t h e La si s f o r i n... j s Th 0.
c a n i r:\ '(' st i 9 i:t e ? !ly of f l e e r or c:;-.ploy\'>c o f: a ny foaoi qn
o r za".:. ion ra.ucly hru; c"(l all t. he pc r so n ' s st at.u s . 'l' he)' ina y
:i.Sil t e ;;.ny f or c i s n pC: l' !.011 "';:1::1 l:lay ha ve: (l J)j-'
i Cln \,,- j t h CJp.y poLi. t i c aI o r p ol itj
a ssoc i o t i o innocc:nt cl nn u.("stinc; int c1 15Cj tmcc aC' ( .
ivit-.:: cr;) .if t.hr- dndi c at.c t. h nt; h n o r she 1:",ety h
s uch rc. I at .. f' o rci. qn p2r s01H.i ca u v c in-
i f t .h o ['.:J\ llC.iC:S i t ,...oul d c o n st i t. u t; " ui qn Lfi c, ., ..':
fo!:' e i g r: j nt. c-l I it t h at cc: !!;.d.ly t s 0 ;
any c1('Hl't i :] iCll in ,.,.ho t jlke:s L! t r i p ub :ro iHl o r
t ec he f' C' :" \': r j j; LC'u t. h i s o r he r f (l r ('!.i .gn e}: p eri c n""Po f': , o r \,;ho en -
in f!:)li tiC' ''lJ (1 c; tivi t y; o r c.ny f(l ;'c:) lJusi n cr;s',1l:11j, I
t'.e u c !l("': )" , or ,:110 ,,),sits ' t.h j!; c ou:lt r.y. It al,r;() .it:\'
59il.t :l. o n or F.! (W r j ,c .': n:> in i! o f C CI
In C'.f fcc::,i:ny p :;r r.oj) o f in::c'l"C' st. to th2.
('"(J"t' U'1tl lI1l:y , ':1.Tl o ffier' r O l' o f a " f o r.c i cj n 90VC').' ji -
rCCllt. (lr ... n ) I: n fo:: e i911 or i-c:si d e:nt i n
the 11:dl.:0{t s.t c''L(:s ); !D.y t o ilr:cr:tj Cj atio:) :.
i n v (ll \i ng C \2lY j vc t (' c.hni quc'"': froT;1 p.::ct(.'xt .. :.r:
t() of on.
nar c: c1 i s t r...:: s t. i ng , ;if 111':':C. t ilny of the
for col)ect: ion upplicilbJc to J':\1(..!r.icans , i n": c Gt i g \:.t i o n!:; c a n h n
c o nd u c t (.d \ \'i t"ho u t ltil nv 1 im i t a t- i o n " the c h2'.rt e-r " o n c1'.. lr i'!t -
d to
II
As \ol e in thi. s ilgencies
f ocus on fOY: P.i9n fro:;, c:.ilJJ-o;Hl. )"'jut \.. 'h le foreig n
i.nc lu:b t h o s e, h ('!; t ile f orc lgn i n t C! l lig cnce (' ficers , forei gn l C! r
r o r i s t s , ane) \,,' ho mny h a v e vul 11 2blc foreign int0.1 1ig c nce,
the crn ftc(l t o u g t1l1c i c s on
p0T!l 0n S but bro flcll y within i t s c10.iiniti ons 21 11 r c Bi de n t c.1
j.e n n , o f f i c i a l s from dcrnoCJ:atic gove rnments , a n d ma ny ]\IDc r j c a n s .
Nhile d i f f e r e n t standards mit l' IIp;>ly f o r diffe r e n t o f
lhe Un i t e d Stn t c s , the overbroad b a sis f or inve st-
i g a t i o n propo Rcd h e r e a nd lhe r e mova l of p r o c e d ur a l sa fegua r d s
on u s e of i !lvf.: s tig i!tiv0. t: cchniqll (> ri \'lho l l y j g no r e s t.h at for -
eigner!:;, fOJ:e:jg n a gen ls, il TC: protect ed under t he
Fourth llnlencr ""nt o f the Co nstit.uti on . 1'1(' point out again, as "e
d i.d in critici :-: i ng t he for .oi9n person "t andaril s in S . 1 5 6 6 tha t
t he r (iurth J\i:H.' uc1 mc nt:. refer!'; not tp rights of or
r e s ic1 e n t.r; o nly, but to l h e 'rights o f the pC'ople" t o b :c fr e e f r om
SC2I r chC: 5 u nd s e i z u rc5 . J ust as t he t e r m " p e r s o n " ,in
F1fth hmendmant h aG l c ng been h eld t o he " h r o nd eno ugh to 1n-
el u de anil every h uma n h e i n g wi thin t he jur i s d i c t i o n o f lhe
219
. \lu li e," __ 1 8 3 u .s , ? 2E , 21,/. ( 1 f. 9G) , the
f(':) .... i v !l \'111 0 a r e p z.ot e ct r-d by the: !"' c nr lh h :;V0 be,(n
nl) p e r r.o n s '.\ itilin t.hc- :i \lr i !..: cli c ti o n o f t he
t o , St.i1t C5. Ho r e Lh an f i t l y years: i:90, [or (;>:t!mr,ler l 1l(.: sup-
COUl:l', f;l'sti:l.bli};he:c1 tll2.t a n aLi.en cou ld i nv \)}.c the C':-:C] uaic n c ry
i n (\ proccr-di Uni l:C?(\ L , nq , o x, r e
fl1 v , '). ' oc1 , 2G3 u . s . l l;9 ( J.92 3 ) . - - - -- - - .- -- -.- ..- ...-- - - . - -

" 0 :- f\11) Fo u ::-th 1' .ml?)'l(ltncn t prot.c-ct Lon to f OJ:(d 9n ll at -
h (.\5 l:c c o sni :.:(; c\ by Lov-er .cou rt . r... , 0.,g. 1n
(s. . N. Y. lnO) , ,,;'f 'u 2"11 r . n ( 2nc
'; '11\ dl ,..1 . ) anCl \'.'CJ S not-ad by Supr (-ln(: Cour t in !.
tJ . ": i!1vc:J... .. u.
FBI (ln d 1.r."mu Cjrili-l0n of:f .i.Cl.pls 01 a f-;P; ' .
"')r,ec: .rc:];, lll:l c1c of the I hotc), rcom r.h o f h i. s
a rzcst. t.o t \,.j t'h j:'BJ c o n-
dpc'I.:ill g a scerch on j t- f . 0,':,; . che s t\:rr. c cl \ '11-'
OiiJ.y p):oC'l f o f l \be l ' 5 and iJ1:'"'9. ::J c-nt.ry i r-t.o thc-
o f (c od pd I
bl' O'J; ht ur. ..i.l'n ; :iJle(t i t (:O:1\").cl-
'1 0:" l.b ("l i: p!' .:<: l c :l o n t h e g rOt md th: t tI ,.: ("\, j" l ,-, "c, , o n II h 5e h 1.2 \-: , :
conv ic:t c,:l \:il r. f rui t of: a.n .i l l cCj 21 t hc re feJ}: 0
11,1V(: b('('n c::-: c l \Iuec1. Cour'..: c' :(f i. nned C'0nv i( j ,' l
f.illCl. :; lHJ that thl? senrc h hC1 c1 lJ2'cn ... l t o it \'tJJ.ic1 CCp 0 :: t.cl t-
iO:1 le ga l Oul tlJC
in tll nl i t \le t[.: clssumc:d by mi1jori t y (.rind hy t he
t.hnt c\ C' n Lho :'"i C \.'110 C"'ntcn? c1 this c O:J1"I t . r.y
and ,.,) , 0 ",ere, eng a s C'd i n e Sp i OTJi' ge - " I"e r e e'n ti,t .lell to 1n11 !:o\lrth
pro t. e c t i o n .
.. d e po r t ;, t i o:: "rresi.: 1 i l: e t he Oll C con:l nci.: e,cl in ' "b:, l m!ly
be bn s (-' d o n les z t ha n p robable caUf':.e , ?on CJ. l ien llho i. s
cd f o r p u r.p o s e s o t he r. Ceporttltj on i!] fully ny t b 0
FO\1rth l\r, t h e Ci r c u i .. .; Cc.. U): t o f l\ PPCl\J. s rec ent.
ly !:t a t ed, p l e n a r y Co ngressional po\o,'cr f'j to d c p o r. t al i ens I:cc:n no t
he i nt e r p r.c t e d GO bro"dly as t o l i mi l the Fo u r t h h r"cnd", r:nl:
of t ho s e pr.e Ge nt in t h e Un i t e d Rt n t c s . " I l l i n o i s Mi g r ant Co u n c i l
v. Pill o id, 5 " F . 2d . 1 0 62 (7th Cir . 1976 r;-llyT iio Sii'r:,,=, fOEcn;-
th" bOI:,l C'): s ea r cheR o f a u t o;r,o b i l e r; for i ll e ga l a l i ens on l e s s t!, l .
proba b l e c a u s e , see . e .g. Uni t e d Sta tc:; v . n in : t J nC' z Fu t' J:l e , 9 6 S .
Ct. 307t, (197 6 ) , Cunno t .l.ntrui ivc nOl:':
cr.i..l!\i nal s \il' v c i l l ancc o f f o r c i :.J l1 v i s i t c.r s n!l y ... i. n t. hr.; Uni t,:::
Stut e r.. Se c ti1 3 u. s . 2 GG ( 1 97 3 ) .
I,:t::.
220
In n rec ont l e t.t c,r f r om t he Of f ice o f r. ",']al Coun nr-I of t h e
IJu n t. 5cc n cpa r t.uc n t; to }lono)"nb l o EG... .'rd P . Bol andI Chni r ma n,
SeLect, Co mmi t tQc o n J Htc:l1 i g oll c n Ho u so of. RC'prc-
d at od l'lp r i l I H, t.ho \:,].',:tic e Da p.:J l "t m0nt
t. his p o si t Lo n, tha t :
the C U S C R tha t a liAn
or of u. fc)"r:; po:....o r
aro i n the: sai nc pou i. t i.on u s ot.ho r a Ii.cnu ,
Tha t is, u nI ons the Unj.ted llUD cc,n
Ecnt cd to Cj rimt them ).T:1..o'1mnit.y , axe
f uLly to it. z 1 ;,,,';8 i n i t"s
te rr Lt.ox y . . (a r.d ) \ ; i t l ";. 11
?f t 1)c: - - . --.- - ---
Cc r t. n i n l y t.ho nCilr che .t; i n ( t.le
not t0Q. t o C"nt ' t .Icd te l c1:i .p J.v:-,r:ti c ty.
nu c h , tnc i. r dr:' p.;"'. r t \;, (.: the or
l h B Fon r. i:h E. r.; LiHH.lnrc1 for :i.. s ri e rchos,
f' o r tl: i n { Ge e at: p BCJ C:: ;; .. PI aJ
r. d r,:Q F'O\l)'lh cl n c:::;ti o Ilt: a s to t.ho
io ni"t J'j ty o f UJ.'l r- etut"hor:i,xi,tion . "k ' b e Ld cv c ll\(! f'(:C'"
t io: J b e t o CO:li! /: LY vri.t.h Pou:rlh
ci pLo n i:<.J J{.1. to f.oci.ls on cJc'<tr fureiSll

t .1: , t h e r , ' n 0 Cf) I.... pel JinS' c::ccpt Il(;):igcnt
fOl: o n Ch l l : i I 1' i ()J
uncl thi fi He e Lion ',,'hen u. f, .
nrc
'f h p c v jden c.: e on t h l' r ecorC: t.hc
t o Ud " c ou n t r y i,:; p o ,,, -,1 by So.., ic,t blc (; c oun l r i c,>; . I f so , the
s t r:nuu)(1 f'.l1onl<1 be t o ICJ[lcct t he If it\';iU; ,
civi l libt'r.t :i.e!. ; COtlJ <1 h,: '" \., ' a)1. in tr \l C
fOJ: fOl"l :i gn int cl l :ig (--: n c e. Tho l e i :; JlO COlli710 11 :i nlJ r Cil f;' Ol1 d ellon
f:t rnted J.or cl ur. :1c s t i n.:: ! and of this
t i o n f J"o:'l'l v i bi t:o r s to t hi s count ry tl: nn fro:i:. vi sito::s
fr oQ C(lul;,1-_r ic.s . 'l' he of t h i.;.
c o u ntry C i1n b est h2 protc:cted h y lance of. }:n o....:n for c i9n
t e r r o d " t " "nd ",:;s oci a t",,, \,ho COlO:: t o eonnt l'y (,:h i c h infmlOo-
ti on ' /e r eceive f r om i n t e J.J i '] e nc e ga t he red <:broa d by U. S . and
oUJCi: intel li. g en c e and pol ic e fo r.c e::; ) il9 i1in,
c are fu l d raf tin u c a n p rote ct t he n Dt iona l i nteres t Dnd c i v i l
l i be r t i e s . Th e n c c c!::r-.i ty f o r this rec entl y clmnon -
s trDt.e d by the r c v e l ' , U .o" t h" t t he St a t:", Dc,p;::r t rnent ha s d i " agrc"a
\-/ it.h the ron ! o '/er who should h e a n C}: c ]\.l c.1 a hle a). i c n in u lmos t
1 0 0 pe r c ent o f t he CH':;CS cOll s i dered . Thi s the over-
b r o a d d cfini tion of f o r e i gn thr e ilt percei ved by thc FBI " h i c h
221
' an on l y b e r e gu l a t e d b y t i']h \ o r st illl d a n 1s . \.;;:: po i nt. out
S . 1566 incl uded in Title II I o f thi s b i l l providu s a
point for il. r.io r e p r e c i s e s t.andar d l o r f o roi qn pe r sons .
r i r r:t , t h e s e ction Hot n:;p) y t o a ny p erson s a s
j t \-, ): <." " , nt l)" d o c s . 1"or c x arr.pl o , t .ho d cf i n i t5 on of " for oi.qr;
nny " l o r ei CJ rI power " \'lh i e h " :=:. n y
t; o n i n t.he lip-it- cd ,.",;h j c h is l1irc c l t: c1 ane}
co:yu : o J.Je el b y uny o f i:1 C..)\ 1!l t:r: )' . 11
1\ ? 0 4 (I ..) ( 7 ) [J ;'!d (b ) ( 8 ) (D. t U . s <:ppJ.i.er: t o ti ,e
Put t y, .. a n d ot hor l :1 ::'Y b e ' d i r ec t ed
an.. " CO'l t r olle d by H. Lo r oi.qr. qO\ ' C'l"n,,;e nt " ( 0. 'Lerr.1 nn:le:f- :\n
l c,g i :; l a t"iC'm) . Ce r l il i ;11y "il uP! )) to
The f-oY"cd.(Jn pc.r uo n nhouLd not
\Jn i t .c d
Sec a n (l t h o f.". C.'c.:t. :i o n liitli t; t a l' gC' Li n') o f
r
t o [):om cou n t r \ :h:iell in l i o z t j c}e-lH)C';.li n e
li
r
: :-
nce
clc.: t i, V.' U':;' (::-; corrtr ory t o Jlht: io ll i11 of tht:' Old. i.
j.n tlli:. cou!11:ry.
'j'h::.l.'" c1 r th e' f',1.",ndLl :: c1 [ o r t i1r g ( 't L'.U ld i:c"-ll.1 ).rc.: u. I ' 1' ("'."1
f:t1E}.d.c :i r/ j l " t h ,'}":. i crni gf1 are kno :.. : il'g l:,. on
oi :. u c h f ()r c:.i.CJ j) po..:: ''':' l:S i n t"ho;.:'! .;-,ct".i \ ".itjeL, el l. i r;'
t e:r:r.- uri m;'i.: etc: ,
F O\l1"1.h, fOJ:oign \-: he,) al.-; il nr:l n o t.
vi Gi t .Ol ' !; in. t-.h'-:.:.i cOl.; n t l:Y :..llv"J. J d OJ ll)" t Jl "" u. S . P(;l"
l e g i s l a t. i o:ll , u::.: ly if they arc fJ:o:il
th u CO\Hd. .:rie :J a s i n {l c
J
.:. i v i t-i er.; i n thn
Un i t e u $ t-.... J'l"es .
;.
222
c. on Techn iques
Section 212 provi d o s for "ttorney General approva L of pro ccdu r e s
i\l ld r egu i n lioll l.: ro a ut. ho ri z o the u ue of pilrti"curar te cbn i q ue s o f
c ollec tio n a nd to insur e that. the J c a st; inlrusive t echn ique n" c (' SSiH',
to coi i o c t. r .h o j nfo rraa t.Lon sO\lCjh t in At.t o r ney .
for the use of t cCh :l iqucs in a par ticular
invcst i <J i1 t-i on (s oc t io n is a furt.hv; : saf eq u a r d a q a i.n s t,
int(:l]i abuses. But signif ic.:nnt and cha ngcf.:;
tr ust D O Ti\:.!cJC . r
1. to
Thic over all sho uld br by th0 inclunion
of: t h..e [olJc',; jng P l'ocp clul.'CJl choc ks.
(1) f or the ilpi, rovn] of
11lIcJCj. : 215 b e rcc;' lirec to incJ ('.
dc-:..cri p ti o n of tho fi c t QchniCjuE'3 cont.ornpLa t-c d,
th2 rh:::.!.. .':'lllS why lhe u. -e of 1:l!( r:e i s "nc c c s s e ry
and and c xpl enat f.on as to ;':IJy Less
int ):l' S;lV(: .. not or . \-:oi.:l rl not D.:!
'J'hc aLr.o b c' t o L: il p). QIl
f Ol" "mi n jmi.:d .nq " t h( c olJ crtion of i 1If or ri!3i... i 0:1 not.
\<,Ii tltin lhe, !;cuPC of .i Jlvest.ig.:.:t)'oJl.
(2) Tl1C p r OC( c-"h.lr c s and l"c:juJ. ilt5 \)50. of
i nv cr; t-. i. s<:t ivc Hpprov( ' d by the l\ ",.'l:(lrJJ e'y Ge:1cl ... ) )
5liould h e uni.fou" for l h e \: ho l " i ntelJ.igence communi t.y .
;:.g0nci c!5 sho uld Jlot he pe:"[!lit tt.'Q v " i: y :i.nCj d e g r e e r.
o f l atilu d " 5.n i llt rl1Cl ing llfl c.n t h e privi:.cy of U.s. pel'so""
anc1 forcigncr s sind 1il.I: cil" c \l?:. ",' i t .hin t h i r.
cou.:ltry.
( 3 ) The General rcfer rcc.1 to in section 215
rc :. pon f. i b lc for ap?rov i ng the of i n t r n s i V0
l c c h ll i 'l UN'; h '" c o n f irmed by t .h" Se ., ,, t. e and "hOll ld not
b" p enni t t e d to ,,150 nct ns nn off'icia l o f ilny i lltelligenec
Cl.9(,ll Cy . rr h e s c p r o v i r'.ions \-1 0 ul d i n s u r e the h5 g h l C"vc l
revie'" froe' outs id e U, e i.ntC'l ligencc co:t;r:t:lni ty i ll t c," d e cl
in t. he
) "Pre t e x t int cr\ i c \\'c " - ' i in ,..hi eh t he i n t e r v il..: i': U:r I
affi.liation "'ith the " ge nc :i i>.: de lib2riltely concl,a lea o r
i n Which the cl a i ms a f a l s e affi li nlio n in
order t o g a i n t h e trust of lIl1:' intervi cI{ee - 5houl d
require Attorney secti on 215.
Pretext interview:; arc a covert
c an uncover a c ons i ,fc rabYe <lnlounl of conf i chm t ia l
i n f o r rnc\ t i o n about the sub ject of an invc:::;tigC:lti.on.
223
Dc c:a u s c .i nv e st Lq a t o r s c a n roJcs d12 sigJ10Cl to inc1ll cE'
t h e .i nt e r vi ev... t o di...... u1CJ( i n f o r l!"l i:l t .ion, p ret.r- xt j
c a n c f f c c t i \c l.y be di r e ( t c d nt . spr:'iic o f a
subj o ct 'ro. l i f e , by tl s Gu:ning r oLe c '"-'h i.e h <J ai n
t he .i nt e rvicwc-o t s t rust . , .in t c r vi c wc rs c a n p:..i" ol" ' : l ly
iuto [' 1..:.\' .'1"'.:. (> Li I r- of a s ubj oct; . . I Jlf c.\ c"!l:ll i o :l
i}.-om i nt" .:.:rv::.c'::ing it s ub :icct ac c ovnt.n nu, 0 1"
cc-:. J"l casi Ly }; (. a!; a nd a r: prr s ona I (18
o bt.a i n n. record - (t t 'i. C. 1 l>. C ch rC<j\1ir:s
l\ttornc:y Gcn orz. L ::IPi)):OV':: 1] S./.:,25 (:'10 \i...:
shn \1) d r e(ji.l:ir e d. .... l I ncJ.-!C'cl , au .i ... rvic-vc.c-
mi g h t . \\'(!l l (: i vul g c! .i r.forrur.i. o n c ould n07.
f roru n. rc- c o r d - o,S. iJ l f,ln,i(\L'i,oll 1'1;(1:
tf: ('):: t. h !; ubj-7! ct: of. ;:.n'\' c:". ')J). .:I.!1(1
n at .ur'o of the j n:forl:ln.t5 on \ .. ell
t he' nee o f t hia s c ov/n: t j vu to p c:h :) ) i \' .. fOl'
h i Sh Lc-vc L r o vi.cw o f it R
F'urLher, t?"tc: nn t.uze of prot.c-xt; .i.ntervj (:\:s j:> v o
t o t he (:o l l c c l ': 0 ii o f ;:ti F- .l n f o:'" ll:-l : i l Jl1. i l
f.or (::). :11;,; ) J ,: , r...i f:.,l [;f..7::C onr. who
pri ' !;c.n t C" (i h (1':', j H!;' l..-:nc ( i J:V('r:t":!.Sllt 0 !: .
p o ss i L'Lo \ .':, ich conlc1 done by n Tr.2 ) 5
) . s
ri ncd 1y, P e.tc.xt i nt r \.:i.c,,'s t.ho
t:hr .. of
c.ippro\,.;:l l f ..hc> uld DC r("l ui.r c-:c1 to
t h e lill C of p ::":" ct ':-: ;.: l .. . or
t he: iil:c1 natur(: cjf t.h(: info'L-J:,c,d: 1on ohLc.ir;cod i.nd tl :c
l i " b i l i t i. C' s i ll)wrc-nl i ll t h o o:npluymC'nt o f thi s l (cl ln iC]ue .
7hc s c \: o u l d st:renuU1 ':'J) t J l (:
s ound p rO(; Cc1 11 r a l for the c:pproval of i n...
/.. NCh' \':.E.r an t
Our I:la j o r' t o t h e o n ' t he o f
tcch,dqu,,: s i n 'J' j t lc I I i s in t h e ttp pli. -
c ut. i on o f pr oc('(lui'e- 1 safcCju a r c!> t o p=..rt i<..:ul ,: 1 j v o tcchni (j\.wR.
At t o r ne y Ge n e ral clpr; l"ova l i s no t t h e u1t in5t
abur;c. Iln indc pc.: nd cnt che ck on r;xec\lt .i v.. be
pro vi tl c o' f o r \:h i c h , i Ji <tl: c
i n t J:usivc ,':' 5 c ]cct ron i c oSurvc..i ) l a n c e - a n ext r 0r.'lC'l y ) l1tnl!;ivc
f ( l r \ .'hich 5 .2525 t h at a j u rl.ici il J. b e
ob l l1 i nc c1. f i ca lly , \:c -
(1) " Tl1C d i rcct i Qn o f J1umnll to co] }(' ct inf or -
ma t i o n " - the l arg ctii, g of i n f rJrJl:anl s ' - "J; Qu lcl !..> C p.l"e"d
- 0.-" :"
224
und o r a wa r r a n t; s im i ] a r t o that r oqu.i.r o d {or
el e ct.ron i. c s urv ei r tanco Hi thin t h e U.s. i n the " Fo r e i g n
I nt e l l i qe nc e Sur vc l llan8e Ac t o [ 1 91 8" (5 . 1 5 66).
pas sod i)y the S"""te ;':1:1 .incorporat e d i nt o Ti t.lc, I I I o r .
s .?'!i ?' 5.
( 2 ) soarc!l0B - requ2s t z f or j n f o rrna t i on to
ret.urn s , c rrp n e o n c ilt l :1( --:c1ic C'i. l c ar t u x Loyr.io t , i o n , c,
Ln s u r ance, r.con-r.nni.cati on c s orvi ....: '3's, cr ed i t !. ...i...aLUs ,
o r o Lher f i niuJ c .i el nwt.t:C' r F. froin thr--: re-cords of any
i n t:t. .i.l ll Li o n (') 17 any ]' e d c :o : l / S l at. o r: LocaI iJ ':iCfl Cy -
be c:rt:j",l oy8cl CJ !; l y up on ju6icia l aut.h o ri z et ion.
( 3 ) h j \ldi c ia l Ln f or the o f
l'muil
The Pl: 0P0.r. pai r i. n of p roc c d u r a I a n d p e.rti cul
is t o
uri duc .i nt.rus aon upon the <': ('D=.Li tution.;..1ly r isht to
p xi v acy. for , ;jl :1C} 1 int :t:'u s iv,:, ilS \ '.'il e -
t 2.pi" I.'L ng arc ne co csary c b c:c:}:s i r: t v l J:i.:;:: :r: C0. fI.bl'GCS ,
For tI l e r ccson tbi::.t. 0. \o,[ tlT ;'))t. j J:CCjU) i .. t o i\ wi :r.'.. ''t ??,
i t S h(IU) c.1 b e (1 to sni(1,: f:. JHl J: cr; t h-:' o f o r.ho r C:":C] ll :ll. J,y
i n l; .i\,I: t.e c hni q uo s . t il e ru::- :'.l:V '; l ;,1.CI!1
t l)( n l,'lh, ,:,:' l'j):!t \1 1")1..1
l'OU1'tlJ r i lJh t [; v r(' .. 1"',.':;
S ll p :r Q; ;' +.:.' Co '."ri.:. p 0 5, 11t.cc.1 o u t in
Ni4t jo n; . l SCCln:i tY c e-: !.: ( !; . oft('n rFfJ.C' ct a 'c OI)\'cr -'
<J 0.l"I CC o f } '.l.rr;'l: ,Ind Fu u r t. h hrr.cf1d::' ;-: '?:l1t v,:,.lucr;
in Cil ;0 G of C l 'iItlC'. 'j'll o u g h i nvC[.;t j, <;' d : .l.V? I
of the C.X('(" ll t .l.\,C ) I ;:"; Y boJ in S\1 ,:, :h C i ! !"> (" B ,
so illt:l..... i s tl lC}"(: gr0nt(:r t o cuus t i t \ \ t j (,nnlly
p r o t e c t e d . . . JIif: tO:O':y (1. oC\1;,lcn i: s
t he t CI H.l en c y of
b e n i 9 n it r; rno t ivc r;--to \ ' i f:\'" ": i t h !: u:; pic io:"! "'ho
mos t f c r.v c n f:J,y e i t r,: polic.i('S. f'ollrLh
become t he: Ir:o)"o \;lI(-n the
o f b e SUfiiJcctcd of
unoJ: t.hodoxy in LIi:,i r l' 0 Jit. i cill De l j.c,[ s . ( SClL! U.S. v
(40'1 U. S . at 306) - - --
The ob jec tion t.ha t a wor r c nt i s not cons titut.i onal ly r equi r ed in
s uch ins litn c (:n i s u np c r s ll il s i ve. 'j1he
f r c C' c: o Tll o f s pc'8chI o f the p r c ;. s I 0:: a,nel of the r .i sht to
p eti.ti o :1 f o r r edr (!s s of The h i l S O( t CJI
o b s e r v e d tha t t h e c f fcc ti. ,,'c o f rc q.uircs
a s SOCi i! t i o ll a J !>r i,vacy . be ilblc associate
p r i va t c l y t o thcir p ol i t i cal b cl j c: f s i1l1d pl ans and t o
con sid0 r \..hat li)\.'ful i1.ctio:"!s to t t!kc: to t.h t:' i r i c1 PCl $ .
rel a t i ng to activitjcf; ar e
u nl e s s they conta i n evidcnc e o f c r i me .
l\" :' -;.c,: , f : .
225
l:i g ht o f e s s o ci a t.Lo n a L p ri v a c y wa s f i n r.l y c s t.a b Li z hod by
Cour t in r e pelli ng t he e f f or t o f t he Stat e of
d i scLos ure b y t h e N!'.]\,CP of i p l i r; t s .
3 S'} u. s. .. (.( nd
:'.--;-t J c c c n t l y b y the COU1 t 1.11 ). r s n e e .lS.l.01l morn,fyi:t'J l"l
d .i s c Lo sure p rovi s i o n s of t.h e g] rct i cn c;,,:u:X'li9n
t,2 4 .U . S . 1 (] 97 G). l\s Chi c. f Jllstic,' l;urge,:
" I' 'Lt d out a n h L S c o n c u rr i n q DIn , n a o n :
pO I.
and privacy d!-> t o p oJ. i t jcl"11 p rnf Cl: r.ll c e s i:n d
c o nvi ct.Lo.rc in ':t f r c c S OC)'l: ,y.
Th i s Co urt: h a s t o i t t ha t
cz. nnot: b ::: uscd t o [ O:-C(! ':t c i t. I Z f. 11 t o t1if; C) his
pr ivnt e evc-n wit h out; a r llcorl.l
r e f l (lc t :i.nCJ (:.; ! y : l :cn t ( l :r J' ct i: l i it t j',J !I .
r OT ori o it i s f':l r teo ) R':: (' i ll t .ho cluy t o :-:E'
an .i.l l-'c1ef:i.JH..; f] 'pu1.> l i c t o b r e a c h t.h t, hi storic
saf c g u ill' d s g u,:,' r up.L0E-:d by t l i e l' l r :.-"; 1:
If t hc J' i :o-:: t 1' ..mC' ndm8n t .. gOVf'.1.TIT:lel1L f:rOI'l
of: r oLat c d t o 1(\\'1 :. :,, 1 poLi ric aI
il!>f.OC.l il t i o na J a ct-ivi t y , i.t. rnus.t. \ 0
(In usc; o f .i n t.auc ivc- i i . v es; ;.::. 3 t r ' C: L I :: .. t o
qath 6:.r
'T11L: 0 o f i J:l c>:pJ. .i.C :l.t r u1..i.,,; b y the Co,-: rt0':'1
l
.. (c t: ':. 1"h0
t o c j v i J. t':'";. r'uL, (:' d by t.ho;: I.j t ,f" i
ill1Cl th o f <; l1c1 J1i(l)1 rovc;)'!:". .i! ; b.:t)iJll(I:.:"1 by
n lic nn t pub J.i.e i n ter L' z t i l l u :tplOyi. l1r:: \.' i U.ouL
t he s a e g n a r d o f j t:d i c i Zl J. r e vj C\.,. . 1t i.s llo t .
( a) o f .:i n for'm::n L s, )"c:c c' rd
---- __ . _a. _ _ - --- . ---- ---- . -
(i ) Inf or ma nts,
Th (! r e c o r d 011 t h e \1! ; e (if puid i n p olit i c 2.1
g r o up s s ho' ..:s il !d.v c v i olat.i ( '11 o f Fi l OS t: t
r i g h t s . 'J'be. \o: o r:;l i1.bll S t .'S in t he l .:.: t.t. t1n:c c:
Ocel l I l. (: u in the: cou nLc..' r j ll. t.c 1.1.-i ' ; 011 c.: e
p r o v o c a t i o n s o f t h e CO! N7 ELP;{O l.IflC1 nr i L ..
the Ch u r c h t t (-:(-: Ci l s o Cl 0 C\liil( 't l{:C? d l1nny e X2mp), c' s o f
ront:i Il C i n f o r li.<J n t a c t ivi t i c :; Hhich c u t d e c ply
pr .i vacy.
I n f o r mant s etrc i.:t most complc::.:, iv c
ClJl(l 2.b l 0. .inV0 !':ti 0 ,:t. i vc -too l !; th::' t the
e rnp 10 Y;j. The.: i n f o l"nr:: r i B: a s t h<'l C h l U: C ; l
po i n t e d o ut, a c l t.' tl ncr " f o1' in f o r mat j o :', ;
p n :. vi ck :d i:;i o f. t e u c1 i !,; t o J: l(" o o r
c.Iid i n t h i !; r c s ?l2 c l filT 1<:[;5
t ha n i nf o r:--.la t i o n o b l ' d .nc cl b y a ..-.,' tl:J:: .
227 226
1\n Lnf o rrnor who p r c r cnds to b ( : it me!i'.bc:r of it
pol i t i c nt ccnnot; s Lmpl y 9ather i n f o rl n"' l l i on. llo
or she: J:lUF.t ac t i vcLy i n t h 0 dc ci sion mu);in{'
of t h e or q ani zat i on , t {l};ing s t .a nd s on Ls suc z
s0(! }:ing to cr.. by the
pos i t.i o n s the: ol: giln.i ".i t l i o n tc:d;l::; and t he a c t i o n G in
whJ ch it
Co n s cq ur- nt f v , t he' n ut.uoriza t ion conta ined in
(c) i oc unoic cLosed p urtjcipt!.Lion i n i1 u.u .
J if; i v n-... vi. o L a c o
of th(: }'jr st, r i g h t s of of. (,ry: .:tni -
za : i,vB!: i: \ a ctiviti :2:5 .
proviro tb.Jt .in)..... be conduct r-d :: 0 l . S not . to
.... "" ttl :' l a\;ful of the r.C\ ':': io!l
or it.s i,L!.J : :( S
5.11 0Vll (1) J (' . 'l'he dirocr in of t o
f2: !'_(,-;
i\:IX_.
\lhi l c..: it:. .is true rhot the Couit: hc-:](}
i:tTl j ndLvi du.iL no i n t1<, ,: )p ;F:,:' n t r ot:ri'h r isonI...
t o b e f) f) o,u
Ho f f ;: v . u,i.t" ' (l :S!) O. !:.:)93 tho Cour t
t !1(", of
r ur i.(I;;tl J.l y l:':'S l\ :\ l 'C'U v..
i u l a r o lo f: l,, "','ei l) of pr:l.\ .:1'i.:,I,.":
p o 1 i t i ciJl or nth.: :!r ciclivit5. C's. '1' ; 10
. Co u r l }itl S illtjJl.atcd , hU'.: .::vcr , t:h ':lt hel'c b a l i
\,' OU1c.1 shi ft cJnd Ci \ .", : .T.T?':"tt \:oll.lc.1 b.2: rcqu'.rt.:c1. lIs,
J u r; t 3Cl: Hh i t( p u t it j II hi s o pi nl(")!) in llnjtC'd
v. " h i t " , u.s.. ( J.9 "11) , u" h,',-i tu i)j"t i;-c:--- '--
of il "'v.'ir cu :informer" tdl.'Cjctc:d u t a n
" 0 l U- pro hl e m, in t f' r r.:s (If t.he? prjneiplc i n
!S!"l!._Y."__l!!.'i l '.' 0 389 U.f>. :l97 (1 % .1) , is "hat
1. 01-S ('If r' ):J (':}'.(' t-i tnt i 0 J1(11 1 y
' j tlfjt-i l i c:b .l c ' - -\\'hat the rouj,"l:h l,:.1p:1Gr 1'.':"nt
\d 11 pJ70tCCt in c;b :;..!J1CC of (1 \ .. ar:Cil nl". 11 Sili ca
0: i o rn ) p:,,:iVi:C".'i' cOJi sti
j u t; l i f i il b l c , the: rO\ H:.:h c -:) nvC:.' r q e


( i i )
The of privcte records is form of
in t J'l lSiv c search ,:hi eh ';r,s hot h First and Fourth
CJucsli cln i . III Bur:,:,o\,' s v _ SUf,('rior COtlrt.
1 3 Cell . :3d 2JH , P I .. 't hc'
Court. r(ccnl )y pc,.int e:d Oi!t in inVil1 idating a
SCil l'ch o f c o pie:s of: pcrson,,1
c h e c k : ; i n t he c ustody o[ a honk t ha t;
'T o r a l l p r a c t i c a l p urpos o c , t h e d isc Lo s ur e by
o r o f t h e i r
f i n anciaL r e c o r d s t o it bu n}: not t:Jit:irc ly
wi l l f u l s inc e i t i s t o
i n t.he e conomi c 1 i f t ' of c o n.... . f, "C.l. t.? ty
wi t ho u L rnai nt acni u q a a c co u nt .
c our s e o f such inqr: th 2 c1 et.... os i.!.:. or
o f rli s p; rGonu), opin jo:l s ,
h a b i t :s , il SROC" i i:t i o ns . I nd Qc d t ll C ()f
ro oo rd s a virtue. J. ("'lI l 'r e n t
q r rr phy , Th e c'l e v c l o
t
';'i\ci1t of p hoto c-c-py i 119 raachi nor,
c 10ct " 0r:ic (Jthcr
i n s t r pJ. 11ont n h a v e. occol c r :... the' d!' .i.J j l y of
t o into a rous Hil}(':1 a pr-r son
n o r mi l ] Ly to from 11 9
(.I.l1'-l i nqu.l t i\'\,, ": r.d.nds , Co ns c q ucnt'll,
j tH"i i c:\ o l of. t h e. ' oJ'
Fo u r t h t. o:,:j O: 1i"4 ) Ul C'" tcc:t.ior. 0;'
incli v j cl u :.\ l privacy }: c..:p with t he
p.: .'r:tlfi e rect t e o b y t .he r:(' 11<'\',' ck!V.i CCG. II
s ea r chos of h a v e
bc-co .v; rouu .i.uc i n r c-cc-nt yoars ,
t .h o ':t r :r.i \:cll o f n e\ .'
0: t ... .l C1 :Ji. J 01:
CC. ::'i.'ll t er i zec1 .t n fC1l :i";ilLi.on (e . g:. , t.he i nCU,f.\ l : y l!..
"('l cct r (lnic
t Lnv o st .i.Sid' 1. -..;'/ C t .u r :l.n,::)(.:, :.i
t o pl:iv,"lt":-> rc c o rd t; . the:
s \lch n : Sc c r c c l of 19"/(1 hLt D iaci15tatec.i
hy r C'(j l\ i r i J1 9 p r iv c:tt c' l:e c:QJ: u.3 to b e
f o r l o nCj \::r p .!ri ods o f In i:t
rnvoltl tio n j n i n f o r m.::! t i on h a g f a r ppe: -.
th e 'x p c c:t a t i c.n s p po?l c h av e a be-li t th" r r i vi' c y of
thei r ppr s o n a l r e c o r d s .
Re c o r d s sear che s u r c a n allcl p er. mi s,Sible
crimi n ;, l in\ cst i g a t iv(> Ncvc.. :r lhp](\f:S,
t h e y C iln o n I>r i v a c y
u na. th c r f d or. c raise t he f:i:l1:'C First. i-i.J1 d Fo'.ntli ]\wcmcl-
lrIent i s s u e s t h a t . a ri s e i n t he c c,;zc o f info ):;:'311 -::
s ear c h u r; . Al tho ug h t h e C01.1 1 t h a G ht'::). d U ICl t
a ,,' a l:rim t p r o c:C' du r c i s not c ons ti t ut J ona l ly H CJ u i red
f o r b a nk r e c or d s s eREch e s , Un i t e d Statr s v . Mi l ler ,
96 ' S:ct. 1619 ( 1 9 7 6), stat ut ory-Cj u:[cii:jr;(; 'e i s CIUa?: l'!
ne e de d in t h is ar e a.
Government i. nves ti g a t o r s !;h::ltl l d not IJ" abl e t o
obt a i n a c c ess t o r ec; ord!=, \..i t ho u t ) cC] u ] p roc(:s U .- i . l?.
un Cl d nlini strc\ t i v c SU!T!\l':>ns , s ubpoenn o r s CiJ. rch
i ssu0d upon a s howi ng t o o f
pro c \, ""l:: s s . 'rho np,ed fen- . i. n int 0 1 1 j tJ(' IH':C
i nv c s t i g a t .i o n n make s a \-tar rant the tno st
228 229
p quzrr nq p r i.vacy r act LceI o f s af.e d i the ot
f o r ma n t t han o t h orc Arnon'J t h e n o arc d o mo s t i c
conf i d cnt i e I r c cordcr obj o c ri onn to ) c<]i s L et.J o n
pol itical rc\'ol ut icJnori cs , those with
cur r ently b ofo r o COilg l 'C';'" (JIR 21") which wo uLrl requiro:.:
s t r o n g f eel i n g s of solidnri ty, il n d
d is.cLos urc il.CCOSS to recroc.s vould t.hus be ) ;\ 0 "'.:. .
forciqn spy ri.nq s . \n:c r c us a me mber o f i\ 9illl'J
o f ban): robhor s {,li s h t hc: i n duc ed to infor-
raar. io n i rl cxchanqe for 1:'0nr:y 0 1:' Lc-ni uncy , a
( i i i )
rc-voLutLon ery or sr .Y huvr- it price no
q ovcrnr.ient . c ould P ilY.
Hi1il cove-r-s tho r;y!->tei'1at: .ic: recorcti nq of ,:11
p e rs.on s , b u s . ' i llld o r q z ..r.Lzc tLonr. \,,'5 t' h '.... it
( 7 ) 1 t is rr uc t. htrt, C'. ;t': cqui r c:'le11t \,' o ll .l d pl a ce (' t
p erson c o r r o s.p o n d c . Such i Hfo :c a=it.i o ll ("("':.11 Of : ' P!1 n :.",re ..: )
burl :: \i cJ:i. t i c iI: t h e p nt h o f .i nvc-ctt gAt Ci J.' f.j
ui \'jn i t i c i'.n t 5nfo rm.;. ti on as Hell as
Lnt.o nt 0\1 r o s o r r iny t el t}H..:SC' t cc hni quco s uc h it s.af r(I
infCJ J:Til:1t :i on a p crsont s politi c..:;:J., ..; t j (Jn 2 1
i s \-1 h ' n i!ltru sj vc- tocbniq uc-s r. u cli .:J!; ':t T.'c?
aud ... cos wh i ch .i.s h y t.ho
Cc rt ai n ty , it l lOt: p .':O\' L l1 t o b 2
F'i }: r: t
i n:.\1t(.. iu the: of c)r.ct-roni.c r;l1l"\' c:.i.llc:: nc:e.
'r h i !i Lnvcs r i.qu t i vo t.c-c-lm i. quc- qui t .o .1. ;,',: to
( 3 ) Col'. it. r; arc t h e l :l : .ISt" l Ci1}:" p xo o f of t h o rc
usc of rJ("'n t o r c-r-or.d il11
i s no t o icv o th:Jt c o vrts c a nnot;
both , l numho r I:lnc1 lei-: .::h e<J hy
f:ie..-rc-cy v.h erc ni 'CC' s s ::n :y j lJ i nl j ::cnc(: c r.s c s. r ant
l i S'.:" of fo;." f'orei
upp ] .i c at . i. ons c .:Ju} ,l be h(.:=t r d h:,' !- .. c our t
c o un t ori )ig. nce or. pur r",:)!;c!'; \:.i.tll j:'.
p n J \d d c. ' ll for :iu 'J' jt.lc 1 1:1" .' thb
U.S. \olO\.1] (1 )C' Qni :=- 2 i: S, ).J(,(. . 'l' hc
PC: l.re':!l in
ci v.i I n ui .t s r c.c uLt i nr, f r o.n t he' '- !/l H : ::\ ,'C' o f l ni" }: i r ..

i f r;SE: ( ) f \ \' ': :, -,,,bj: ' :-.:lcu to p r i o r
.'l:i. ..:!!J _ _rr:,.i
j u(l i " l ed s c r u t.Ln y .
..; :.
j G n o t u b:.-) :i f: V:"' (: ;.: .. ' 1,11 j l.H:J,;:- C':-dl 1'".Ot.
( :,) 'J' hn ' : C:-Hl i :( I'.It: n t. \'.'ou 1.,: n o r j (("): u_cli.::c
apJ:'J.... a f;i,:i...t lit... .11 .'1 n .1 iil':cl clc) t (' 1::,' n:- "']. '2\: : , ,;' 1 t
.. --
o f eon <! of t h!.:r.;e
Ce r t n :ty , t h e i :,(: of h.) ) ncy i. s ilC
'J. "1"I ..::: above - the o f jn.frJl j ,i tln t f; , ]: (' (:0)'<1.:--::
ope)1 l o (j u c s Lion as t. }w t of fl )uclse.
ilnd lOdi) COV(.'l:r.; - arn
tcchn i quf.!G and th ' en' a )C!;",:'r.,b l aucc t o
t c c h n jC] uc s the 'usc of \:hi ch r e q uire' z ::ti o:) in
I n f ;\YI, the fra..,c"..or}; [or th e o f
o f a v.'ar. r i l n t. . shou ld !..Ie l (::f.t tu t:1"J
i ll\' <..: st g c. mc:rally !-; ounc but I:lIu ; t h e i n.p rovp.d
!;olc cli s crnt i O:1 o f ex ecuti. v(:. sho u j rJ be
l\f; il'X)\'e . 2.ppl ic(lt j on o f t o
by lit h' . COil :::) u sio)) i s in
p:l: l ic \1J il r r.hc"Jlf.l L e )-(... Prc1:r::t
tlle o[ si gnjf.ic;.,nt publi c uu tsi c1c
D ) ' ( ' (J l1i r e: l..t:t.O:".ll .:')' C: c :: er.-\ l llI HI r- 1 F('ct j (1: 1 /. ] 5.
of d i scrcr i on :
4
'\
'fi l (' i ng ( Jf i nfon:I(:nts and usc u f !;ciJrch(, s ,!nd
rn uil c ov e r s Sh-:, i1'l d b e tel j udic):.l ..y a !; it check
( 1 ) 'i' he value il.ll d o f uS Cl l'l illvc; tiqc.'
on cJ .i 'j, "he lH'e o f i n r Ol mi.ltl',. !; ill
tiv e t ool ll ot nn nrgu:Jen t subjcctj.ng til e
ri rs::-. acti\'j t y j !.i po):ti c n) ilrl y tlirc:i'i'l'(:n'in<j t o c i v i 1
te ch ni q ue to jndi ci aJ !;c:rutiBy. QIle c on (If a ny
1i h(J." LiCG and he. p l"o h i h i1f,,1.
nllmbcn: of i T1 v es \; :i.gati v c p:':"i1cticcn i ll polic e
stilt es - c .CJ . t o r t u r e , are,'1. .. - "..hic:h \.. 'onI d he
valuahle to ill Vl!stigi\tors in tile tl .S. Suell i l
i s clcLl rJy no o f tho uct ivity. the
viline o f inf o n nf.u t s in c ocllt erintelligc-n:-:: t..: countcr -
t crr.ori s::-. i l:v("'s'lig;.:. tions !;uhj cct to ,1;)1- ('8
Q. Wileon clalMc that:
Ce r t n i l) gro Ui)S arn vu)rlcrablc to Lcing
p e ne t r a t e d by , or being deceive d by a n in-
.: d Ij:)';:"
230
D. P rovi.n i. o nr; f or r 0 1: C"i qIl E l ccLron i c Survoi, l l ancc , u ncon s on tcd
11 1- - - - - - ---
'l'i tle )11 e xt end s the provi si on s o f S .15(, G t ,o f ozoLq n r -Lcct.r-oni c
.... "'i l ]ancc uncons ont.ud p hysi.cal z.nd mai I op oninq by
p.ro vi d i nq it \:D. r r an t rcqui reinC:lit f or t.htJ .cri n d uct; of
act i vitt o s f;il.lil ar. to tll ;l t mz. nd at c.d f or o lc-ct rondo s.urv cir.Lr-nc e
wit.hi n tho u. s.
di.t.l not vi qor ou sLy the p a ssage of 'S .l SG6 b2c aue i t \U'tS
a n i... up on c urro nt ] a\:. \'?c wo n I d !',ot o bj c:c: to t:ht.J
Lo.ji.cnL c:-:tnnsiolJ of :itf': p:-ovis:i.cJ;\ :; to e J c ct r-onic.: su:':" vei l
;1 11
l ",n-:- ;o jJl ;0 f nr c\!:lo t h c :; c provi c Lons of 'J"'l i t lo- III
upon CUL.lC:1.t c :-:tt;.s io)1 must . b e bas,c:-i up a n t he
p;: :(:!,ti ,;':--'1: ion U. S. p r: THOUf' iJ.lload ar c il l:.iLled to tho !: 6.ii H:
c onrt i tc t l' l"Ol C::: t j O!i r, af.forcca them ilt" hon-o.
nc.L tlt0 propose d xt c nsio n of 1.0 the of
phyai caI sea l c }v::. i: i1:.l ):w i l ope-ni11 9. {\l provi of
Ti t l e J 1) p i"' ; tl Jcl tll 0 SE
t. hc-y l: 0L YL'i tL f. r o !!. l o tectionu
rcsi c. :!:.t ry curr cnt I I"::\,' . 'l' h c: aut.hori z;..ti(In::: UICf: C
ac t ivit'.c s .. .l ! J i.T t;! cl C: i:r of l 'C1 ur th
,
OLD:' of: T3.t1c III \-.. fol Io",,;:, .;:')'()i".\ ,t Ile
on t ll ttt CJ \, (:r t. h (: c o f [; .1:"(,(; 1, r.'.G cnd(:d.
I t. is to tho!.:.(! of t h e t 1: 1.0 \ ,'h .i.c h ( '>:pancl ui.)(1:1
thnl: I ' i l l.
1 .
Ne s lat'.ion t rH. of [orcig:1 elec:t l onic 0 ))c1
t he r i g ht!; o f
i'lb r ora rl s!l oulc1 l. c c() y,n i ..: n d illJd p :: o tcction f o r '
tl n tl c::-:p:ln c! c:c: b y a JlO\': L' \,(-=r, l egi r:l il tio!1 \-;r. ich
r ct r e cl t G from t. 1,1\; \.- o nld b e \ :or!:e thit.:l cCo llgr c s,s:lon;11
i. n :Je. : t..i.un.
"-
ProviBion for f urcigJl al ld sj grl itJ.z i n t e J.l j.g c n c e muu t
t h a t J'I r:1:lrici:Il!.: a broad ore n ot cU!Jjr:ct to any rcc1uc.:t.i .on in
eon';l: itutioni'J. p n.ltceti oJl. C, 'h i " p rineipl(, bilS be'en upheld inACI,lI
l i U ,g . , L.i,(, n . Bnrlin !lemocr " tie Cl ub v . Hu:r.sf C'ld , F.Sup p.
14 t, (19 '/.6) ). I\ Pi' ) i(' ,]-t ocl eetrc;iiIc;- "u'l:vei l "l.-;;i'Ceas 'ti :}alt with i ll
'!'itJe IIJI it: t lwt 5c c t i o n 321 er,lbody at l e i.:s t the same
st and;: r d s , procodllr e s 8Jlc1 restrictions r cgirrding tl,O t argcti.l)g. o f
u .s. p Cl'fiOn S i.l 5 th0 5C forth in section 311 for t: il r gc t i ny U.S .
the U.S . ScCtiOll 3 2 1 a s wr i _tten t hc
provi. s ion s of ,,<-etion 31 l t o the de t r i me n t o f the e i v i l l i u':> r t i c s
of U. S. il b road:
231
Stl e t i o n 321 authorizes t h e t iJrg"ting of a u.s . p e r son
( l )
wh o Lc a n 0::ti c o r o r eJOploj' eC u f it Iorei qn p ower
rosi.d i ng i:broad under a no n-vc rimi nul t andnr d fo r
o f obt.a i.ni nq . a n y infor", ,,tion f i t.tii.nq the> broil'l c.1efi ni.ti eon
o f I : foreign .int c l J ig cn8c II 'j'h5.i
i !:; a c Le a r t.hr e at to the c i vil of it whoI. c
o f U. s . of tb 2 l;1,=,\ jor i t.:y c crt ai n Ly I n\-.'
ilbidi ll S. 'l'hifi p rovi n. i on )1[: "':' no paTi1l1t..: l in 5l.. :ctjun :nlj
r c :; i cl c n c e a br o a d doo s not, t IJI}) ... . f;(lo ct i (J!1
!;hou ld s t.ri c k o n f rotu ']' .i.tl c I I I .
f.:e ct ion pro vidz--:; for t.::r.yE.:t.j : IS o f f n9 j t . f) c.;:-.
( 7 )
:i ilh::-o aL: vno u , S , fo:' : purpn ::,.:: . o f
C'bt a i n i n c! fo:,(c:i <jil i :l l .;:-J l i g e rl c e .l.:1f o n":\ (ll :.ion ' il<]i.d n ;1
i l;;
t!l a o f 3) ). .
t o c o n s t i t.u t.Lono L p1: otect .5(11
! rCVjl ( .){ ctx oni c f.: )}' : of. o!-.t;duiut..!
whst; l :iS T C l. y bE:' 'J'he
be s i. ri c x o n . .
[; (' f.:l:1an l'l.O(- t.lI .:..! f o ::
(:;)
c' ) :'.c.: :"l c,n :Lc !.;'l1.Y l:i) C(; Yt. .if y t! \;t 1C' : : : l H'.- l:lt:..i"e.'
Cf;jl i)(l t" t:.L:: 3 1 1
(1(1-:: ;'. 'J.j Ji r: h ':Js H:J )(.":! :icl:,l
( 1,)
c"l{"o (: ;; n('t
;:JI-.l i l . f ( : l (',(: -:' T (;.;I.' C
e:tJi("'C f.,(. ( t icn
::11 L5 ') :'I' )'
th0 i s J0 9 i c("l l J y f t"lj-P0l. e_
'rh i f; ]jBt n o t 'J'h 0. il7l.pOl: t: i1n t . p:)5.nL \.'G; ,,; i t.ll to J:lt:d: c.:
t.rl: h e r.e h ut t.he b r o i' :'<) -
il)n' .o .:.,1 il l C e n t i t l c c1 to l.-t.j on:. l
U,r.; i -i:'rf(.
2, .. .. ..
Nu f01: ciJl b y
I ' i t 5.(l \ls prop"..::0d i n on 34J . 'ri H: c o u r l :.;
nC'.vC"' r r. (.'{' ()':3
n
i zc d o.l n a t i o n aJ. f : e CUl J. c::cr.' pt i Oll f( I:!.: a phy !;j Cd1.
c r. lJni t. .' rl S t a.t c5 \ 1 . Eh r ] l chmi.ln, 376 }',S npp . (D, lL e. 1 9701 ) .
c::,:c 0? t i o n bc-ell
for ".':i ret- il l)?.i f ig ,\ ;h i c h ' hilS ):"' 0 C'::: IJt t o
\'l o l a Lc t h e .. h I f r o u) t. h \.' ilS cl':.. ' f: i qr:f'!.. !
t o i..: Cjai n :'i t i t \..'it.!' un l: 0 il Bo n ,a l.;. ' 0 sCCi.rc}-lc"s'
o f hou s e s , p a p ers , nnd n t ci t .i z(:: nz .
'fh.i Cl u '.:' hc.lri ::Hti o T) ,: o u l d 5 tri}: c a t ti l C' hC'i1r t" t.1: c Fourth Alnt' :ld'
T:'.ent. , goi nCJ f a r b eyond 1i l\. . SC" c L50 n 3" 1 \'.'o u l (l :
(1 ) i1\ltho r i z (! !;( arch c r: !: i nc0 i t. dC:i., i:r t!; frCJ;'"t:
the t r a d i t i o n z.l o f p r o b :... b J (' caU GC 01 .(1 _c r i :h3 ;
' : .< {I: ;: '
I'
244 245
cr.v cri: Ii.n.... n oinI () L" supj-ortI di.r oct. i rltJjr c.{"'t.' . ,
1. 0 n ii)' (I f t h e ion llj" os:-

'i:; r 1 i j on
( t d ( 9 ) (c ) of. '1:;, :.,J.t: IV,
1 h o CL' ;,""1;::: ' -,ti t': :.';: 1 j,\;)j.i", ;_Lt 5 u.":.- u!"ly
"
i 1
c: t \,'.it ! I,': i: ;. n .:"'i 1 (j .. ::;i }: l'l" .. 0 t(J -:11
(;(1\ '(' )' 1.: 11(' .1 ::)::...
'i I1(. ' ...(\:) ,. (.l; <. ,,,: . P' .; ,' ; i. C', " ,1, '1
nut, [ lt- I }. C< .: t ( " t . ; , : '.: : :' j j i n.:(: .i n :;0: ) ( , )
( I; ) :. 1, l ;v,v... c.c.:
, ( ',
},.y (") ),[ t :: 1 ," ', " rcs ri.i,ct , ::
r u i' J n. : j 1:vi . (l'
/..
c c- - - -.. -_.- '. ,
\';.i.i.:]' " j,...l.
,: 'L: ';::,
3. J ,i 5 '
t v t..:: i".'.::.' t hr c. .11j \ -r . ) " ( l " f, ':.": .
(;:) Cc,',.- ,'
n 0I: d(d5n:\1'.;:OU'::1 r)':"; .. ' d i. 'h;- pr.: :l '
11 l 5 (; ; l -in ;o;' ,';t).,.,:) ((.) U, :' U.(, 0 1
.:;: ..;<:'
('} \1;:" .:.<.", l ) :: f y e ;'): : I }:": ,' )" ! , i.!l;A .. " ,
J.:.:: " l r.i:, ':';1:. o j,'.,: d:.-i':;"; r; \;;,0.1 I',--\..: .
Covc-; : J.:,' ['3 .7\1,.: l' .i lJ'l l t : : : i:n n;:: ... ''';H:
bi!!l i!.' ncC:/io.. :c1. !I j'
1' ]..;, of. (\)
c, 1.!J) ...-... t (l C') t : h i.. :::O,/ t :h..<..'.
the e ll, fo."': d j . n t. hi r: e}l l i..C:J
for t h o hor i o f j t !> ) , i ': t1(: .
r:
Th e us c o f aCi 1<1 -: ' mic!:i f(J j- ils::d.,stan... c; i s
i n 13 /. (l: ) (/.). 'Ph ?' r ....C] uir.c.tcnt. th tl t cq.' i">r op r i i' l c II
o i l j c i i11!j " a t be not: ific,:(l i !: no:':' it
Tc' r:t r .i c ;.: i o :1. 'r hc=: '/, !' p r o'i) yi.:l t n " c ou l d j:1
h e' unj\'0r ::: i t' i"
iti "C il :.Jl \,' hich by
t L():. (, \': llfJ CI I(.F I,.: , (l ) : 1 ilC"' ,!(:0. : rl j c <It lbe i n s :. ; It.:tj{)o.
f.:rn (.' I J',' I.' )" , i1 : I J' or- t.bl..: I il C": u l or boc]y C:l:l be'
fOJ' O:)CTclLion;I' il ssi !"> t i1;h "':C' if h r.? i!--: n o t a V. fl . p >l' son or
Hot c u rre nt.ly sp0n:""v.':('(1 ;!lI
r
l I) y t lJc in.:: .l i t:uti c.:J.
of media or gani za tions an d r el i gi ous institutions
f r om the genera l provisions of secti on 132 are open
excr' IY for of H6z i otancc, aru
Firs t lInc n,ir-,ent i ns t i t ut i ons . one form of operational
i s unrestricted for .a l 1 Firs t k ncnd-
The dange rs are obvious and a
cnt
shoul d be c loGed.
(c) Cont r a c t i ng
S ct i on 139 authorizes s e c r e t cont r act i ng wit h academic
The Harvar d Uni ve r s ity Report o n relati onships
t he Harva rd community and U. S. intelligence ag encies
. x l a i ns why such cont r a c t s mus t he publicly acknowledged,
than merel y dis c los ed t o appropriate o f ficials. The
publ i cat i on of rese<:l rch s uppor t ed but not a c!;no\'1 lcdge d t o have
been don e unde r the a us pice s of an intelligence agency is
sub j e",t t o abu s e for If the f ruit l< of
. th e r e s ear ch a r e cla s si f i e d , t he proj e ct is not ac ade mic.
Stu dent s <:I nd fa CUl t y may be unwitt i ngly involved i n work for
pur poses they do no t s up por t . Finally a nd mos t distres s ing,
contr ac ting opens t he door to i nt r us i ve i nve s t i gilti ons of
meml>er s of t he a ca demi c community, many of whom a re unawar e of
their co riuect.Lon wi t h t he i nt ell i gence communi t y .
lie pr e sume t ha t the aut hor i zation to contrac t wi th "any pr ivate
company or insti tution i n t he U. S . " without di s c l os i ng the
age ncy con ne c t i on ex c l udes a l l othe r First Amen u!\lent org,miza-
tions . If t he i nt ent of the sta tute is otherwise , t he same
objections apply. All contract s with First Amendment insti-
t utions s houl d be pub l icly a ck nowledged and the r e s e arch
ava i l able t o t he pub l i c under t he Fr eedom of Infor mati on Act.
(d) Re cruitment
The exp r e s s ed a uthoriza t i on f or t he pai d undi s c l os e d us e of
r ep r esent a t i ve s of any and a l l First Amendme nt institut ions
swa l l ows a l l of the l i mi t e d re s trict i ons descr ibed above .
It establ i shes a r e l a t i ons hip be t ween t he age ncy and t he member
of t he i ns t itution whi ch i s no di f f erent f r om cover or ope r a -
tiona l ass i s t anc e . I ns t i t ut i o na l t i e s a re us e d to probe the
vi ews of o ther membe r s to dete r mine l i ke l y r e cr ui t s . Li ke l y
pros pects are s ub ject e d t o pot ent i a l s our ce invest i gations.
The recr ui ter is e f f e c tively asking ot he r member s of the i ns t i -
tut i on to enga ge in i ntelli gence a ct iVi t ies. The recruiter,
for e xampl e , a faculty membe r at a uni ve r s i t y , i s using t he
authority conf er r e d by the i ns titut i on on beh a lf of t he ag en cy .
If t he se peop l e a r e recrui ting abroad, as 'membe r s of t he press,
academic co mmun i t y , t he Pe ac e Cor ps or a r eligi ous or gani zat i on ,
they ar e engaged in mpionag e o r , cover t opera t i ons . I f t hi s
is not pr ohibi t e d , t he Sovi e t Uni on would be justified
prevent i ng Amer i c an j ournalists f r om communi c at i ng wi th
lssidents.
246
(e)
Secti o n 1 32 au t .h o ri i"Hl Y a nd .0 1 1 v o Lu n t. ery
c - o u t e c t. n b c t. \ ,' e r..:: n J' i r !..>l J.:- .ll:::n :l.:1ic ' l t .l. rl !.:t. i t . ut i O T: S a n d t.h e i r f,, ::;: jnb'2r s
j. s a not uc r a ut hori.z a cion r-or.d crs t.ho
i n s e c t ion J 37. illc: LfC'c l ui11 . 'f li 0 f;Q li a \' 2 t h e
.i.f..j c..f." ...: upon t. t l'.: and. iil l.:C" C,' :t:i t.y
o f an . . pai d r cl ut ion ah .ip . OJJC
o f z vo l vntory r:
o f a ):;:ldi (J ;on i.:. JleJ the FB I ,
of. CJ. (:) '.r;:ni:i .JtioJl V:<::.S c O';,)Y.O!:' )
:( 1 C( , f l Cl'd v f i.1nd o n c l :ns e, .r,:": c"t ,
an d t he ll s et."i for o p orar.i or. a!
i n c l l,:3ing t h
r
..: \ .i.'i...l5 uc. o 0 ' . .
s 1 1 t :L
3
.l : 11 ';' j LY .\
e,f to t. I i r- i.itt i..) i l "j]:.) V';'J1UT1L: ':'r::..i.y
Clo:is i s t.(.':,J. tr.(."!; l'f .:i.l . ' >1 o..; ::.: .. t i.1P..:"'! :.
o f. in j D!"i\': t l:.i Li-J .: . .
in n o L c: 110 {' o w!._l c:.3.:
Vol\ '11 .. reLa t.i.oush i p s h-::- ti q h l l:/ .. )Jed c.1
rel .:: , t-. h i. pc . c,':, t:l!i.! l li t .f Jy '. Lo.(:
f ro :;: l l:i co vort .'.C.: ] ,:l1:.i. n JI (;! .1::.;;; wit I; .;'j)':.t
j nr.t], III on.:;,
247
pre>t "e c!:... Civi.!...

525 a s draft ed , c onta i ns on ly t he rudiment s of an enf or c e -
2 s cheme to pr ot e c t civil r i ght s and civi l l i ber t i e s . Pr i mari l y,
l i e s on repor ting and oversight mechnni sms . Although we
e
r
ve
o f t he s e r equi r ement s (s ee par t I I of Lhi s memorandum) ,
sn f c,:, uar d s ar e mor e os s ent.i.aL, The charter must est abIi s h
ot helut e prohi bi t i ons un cer t a i n int e l l i gence a c tiviti es and
tb" O pe na lti c s an" civi l .r cmedi e s for t he i r vi.o Lat i on ,
set rd er to effe c t uate t his enfor c ement scheme , the c ha r r.or mus t
rporCl te bot h a mechanism for tri gge r i ng a special pros ecut or
judicial pr oce dures to 6ea l wi t h t he enforc emen t problems
an by secrecy. .
pr e ",
1. !!.'!' !,ee d ti. '?!!.2.
Wi t hout absol ut e proh ibitions , enf orcement o f the cha rter may
ell be i mpo ssibl e . Exc epti onsto the r ule provide i nte ll igenc e
Wgcnt s a good faith de fense . Moreover, because the di s c losure of
: ecr ets may be nece sser y to pr ove Lhat a good f a"i t h defcnse
exi s t s , pros ec ut or s wi l l he s i tate t o proceed i n c r i mi na l cases (e.g .
the Helms case) . The "state s e cret s pr i vi l ege may bar t he
enforcement o f civil l iabi l i t y (e . g . t he NSA ca s e ) .
2. The Need f or a Spe c i a l Pr os e cutor
A tempor a r y spec i a l pr os e cutor i s ne cessar y to i nsure that
intelli genc e agent s who vi ol a t e "t he l aw wi l l be brought t o j us tice .
Recent hi s t or y demon strates that t hi s r e s pons i bi l i t y c annot be
left to the Attorney bec ause of the innerent conf li c t o f
interes t hi s dut ies t o enforce t he "l aw and mai ntain t he
of the FBI. A spec ial pro s e cut or is even more nec e s s ary
under the s cheme . of .the cha r ter s ince t he Attorney Genera l i s designat
the pri nc ipl e o f f i c e r t o approve pr ocedur e s , i nve s t i gat i ons , an d
prevent ive a c t ivi ties whic h may a f fect t he r i ght s of Amer icans .
Thi s s itua t i on i nt ens i f i e s the conf lict of interest .
3. New Civi l Remedies Mus t Be Cr e a t ed
i
he
must make i t eas ier f or c iti zens to obtain r e dress
or of the i r constitutional r ights . . Bec aus e da mages
t o measur e in t hi s are a , r emedies must incl ude
i qul da t e d damages . Ci tizens s houl d not ha ve to es tabl i s h t he
of po tentia l damages t o ha ve standi ng t o sue i n f ede ral
aO
Urt
. For c ivi l remedies to serve as a deterrent, intel ligence
not be inununi zed from personal " whi.le. at
e same t+me t he gover nment should also llabl e
II
249
248
4. N0H Pr oc edur e s to Handle SecreSt
Sec r e cy must not be a bar t o e i t he r the pr os ecution of i nt e ll i gence
ag e nt s or gover nmen t a l liabili ty fer co ns t itut i onal t orts ,
v i ] l pe rmi t i nt e llig c J1CC operate out
s ido t.he La w o f t he c ha r t e r I s s t r.i ct u r e s ,
strict is t.he principa l s oLut i.on, ll ov,le vcr, in dO"ll b t-
f ul c ases , a must be c1 ev cl oj>l2(l for. t he c o u r; .s t o
\-,-h ct.h or le gitim.:.t:e st a te s ecrets a rr- rc ) Hit. hout; rc
t he ir di s closure. The cha r t e r must a lso e s t.nb Li s h tha t ' :hen the:
q o v e r s t; e p rLvi. Leq o nrnarrt asserts the t a s ecrets in a civi l Gct .ior!
i n \-Ih ich t he r e is an y rea sonable blts i s f or l i ltbil i t y , t he r e f us a l
t o di s c l ose sha ll be deemed an admi s sion of cul pabili ty .
Part II
COVERT :ACTION'ANDESPIOI:AGE ACTIVITIES ABROAD
Intr c ducc;on and Over view
. me;no r andurn ccmnerr t s upon the ."National I nt e llige nc e Reorgani-
" nd F.c t of S.25 25 it the conduct
ove rt 1n the b111, and
o and r e l a t e d suppor t c landest ine activities, dubbed
:spllec tio n , " abr oa d. Pr ovi s ions r ec;arding t hese a ctivi ties are
C?mar i l Y cont a i ne d i n Ti t l e s I . I V an d VI of t he proposed charter
Our on thes3 se=tions in large
)"p,.at thos e whi ch ':e made in our memorsndum of November 23, 1977
se Sena tor Hl' ,, ::11 e s t on , c haLrraan of the s ubcorrrd t .t.ee on of
comnitt e e , whi.I.e S.2525 was s till in the d: "fti ng s tages.
lIeclIusc mos t o f the prob l ';':'lS we noted . t he n r emaan and because we
onsi de r the curre nt ver Sl en of t he b1 11 open ' t o c on structive
we a r e rei ter a t i ng our co nce r n over these sect ions of
the propus e d ch a r t e r .
The of S.2525 a r e an over President Carter's
Execut i ve Or de r 12 036 of J an ua ry 24, 19/8 , .which currently governs
for ei gn i ntel l i gence a ctivity . The draf t's ove rsight provisions
are ge ne raJ,l y colll!llendabl e end i t s c omma nd end cont r ol prodec ures
are str icter t.ha n t hose e labo r a ted i n the Execut ive orde r ,
Npverthcl e s s , the provi s i on s of Ti t l e I require subs t ant i a l
if t.he nev cha rter i s ' t o pr o t e c t ou r cons ti t utiona l s yst am fro:n
severe abus e s s imi l r t o t hose it ha s suf f e r e d i n t he pus t as a
resul t of our f or e i gn clande sti ne int e l ligence a ct ivities. In
its pr es ent t o rm, 5.2525 f a ils to e ffect t he f undaraerrtaL reforms
neces s a r y . to ins ur e t hat t he abuses of the pa s t are not re?eat ed.
In some crucial Tit lc I fa ils even to provide the minimal
refor I:l s pr oposed by t he previ ou s Se na te Select on
Inte l l i gence , cha i r ed by Chur c h, a nd the Pike
Indeed , in the area of "spec ial a c tivities," Titl e I ret reats
from prot e cti on s a fforded by cu r r ent l aw as in the
Hughes - Ryan Ame ndment. .
S.2525 woul d aut hor i ze a ,lide r a nge"of fare i 'ill"' i ntell i gcnc
activities. wo uld not "spec ial activitie s abr oad by
limit i ng the i ntel l i qe nc e agencies t.o inlelli.ge;lce
Coord i nati.on a nd anal ys is . i t would no t prohi::, i t e spiona",e in
peacet i me, t hcrc bj' \:hat the c hurch ccranu ttee ter:ncd a
cover t
. .
ASS"-'llin9" a de cis Lon t o aut horLae covert intervention abroad , .. hich
we strong l y o?pose , S.2525 would fail even t o :
(1. ) c:; t ilbli s heS a stllndarc f or president ial approva l, ',;hieh
i nsure s t hat any " spocLaI ac t Lv Lcy " .. :i11 e:-:ce?t io=:al
and s ho rt - l i vc d an d be:;un only i.n rcspcr.s.e to t!le ::lost
grave throats to securi ty;
250 251
(2 ) e s t a b l i s h c lea r and taea n i. nqfuI st ari d ar d s and
t o g o v e r n t.h c cou c'u ct . o f c ol.Lc ct ion .
.
( 3 ) pla c e clear pro hi b i Lions on a ct Lvi t i.c s whi ch co nst i. t ute
g r oss vio l ntions o f norm.::; of int er n.::.ti on'::'l
or r e q ui r e t he a !}d
..rrs i o n of fr- c c in.f t itiHi o: 1S
a t. roc... c1 ; .. ....
( t,) p ro hi bi t covert l i. to? and p a r ami 1i ta z y Ln t. c-r
a n d ",: o ulc i Il St:0Ci U .is h i n La w for t h e fi r s t tim'2
[0 1- t he presi der. t; to o rdo r c ov er t p .'\ ;. c.!!i i l j ..
op ora t icns , ci v iLi e n o r
Un ) o s s a t Lo est. CIW00Y t.h e s t andsrd s , probi-
b .-j. t-i o n s a bovo , provi s ion s of ',d.t.h to{:
of " s pe c i a l and
!;l..: !: v c raore t o c o n zt i t.n t i or .el . a b us o s t.h a n t o e l imi na t e:
t.bo ra ,
S.252S Should Cov 0r l Acti on Abroac
o p p ose s e c t i o n 111( a ) I s a ut.h ori. z ati o. i of c o n t n u r-d " s pe ci a l
a c.:ti v i t i c s I I and the r os.u).ti ng r .eirrc cnan c e o f wha t h e Ch u :r c h
COJruni ttac d0 scr ibed 2S a u r e of
? 9C': n t s I 0 1 n C'.t\:( r }:s o f: a g e gt s , i n iJ. v a riety o f cover t;
iIC:'-.i v i ty . II C(JVC l: t e cti o n h ':: G prove n t.o CC1;. t 1)' t o
f o r D retU}:Jl. Di r c c t o r
Co l by ha s ;. t"a t , d c o vort a ct i o ("oG) c1 be' ;.'t. t. hi s
t i u (:; \;:itJ",ou't: h i1vir' 9 lnc:jo r. o n t h e! cu r rcr. t r;pclll:5.t. y of t.l.c
U:1it. (!c.1 ,st illCS ., 11 'l'h.1. s ...io n t h 2.t . c o vcr t; a cti on is not; i rl't:.c s r 21
to the: p r ot e ct io n of o u r n c. "'..: i 0 : :
I
:; s ocuri t.y mU':jt b e p Jc1c::(! c"1lOll tj r.ic:
t h e p ubli c r eco r d of c=:. b USC5 and c1 i:: n g cL: s :poso rl b y s uc h ac t; v i t i c.s ,
a o t i on Ch :.T,ge:- r o u !:..1. y i llf Lucnc o s ti c "
wit:l1i n t hi s counl :r y "
- - 'l' he Ch ur c h Co:;-c.li t t cc c o ricLudcd t h et; c o v e r t . a c t. i o n p) : CJ je c t s stO(l:' :
" in" bas i c ten s i o n - i f ne t inc.)!:r:)t!.t..ilJi l i t y " " \-!5 t b t h e o f
0\1:'- syst cm. 'j lhe of c r ; \ iJl \' c> l\ c f.\c r:t
n ni v e r sL ti. r-s , mi s a i o n e rics , t he P ): QSS C!J lCl un i o rrs o e i':'..o n: jt r a t e cl
how a c overt i19E.! :lcy raust; j n evi t. ab Ly unde rrni ne
i ns t i t:ut i.ons i n t he U. S. T11c !)ctWO:':l
t .he c onduct; o f " s p e cia L ac-!:i \, i t ics " an d the c onqr c- s sio ue.L powc r
t o If!. 2.kc va r , t.h e r cqui r e me n t. t:)i::!.t th e b e op.::nly publ i F,hc:1/
the pr o t ect i o n p r i o r c ens o r s h i p unc1 t h e o f f i c i 2.1
a ct s a l l t he b:1Si c c o n t r bd i c t i o n b e t ween a c ove r t
c apabi li ty a nd tIl e o r de r .
- -'r h o Ch ur c h ttee 1 th o:: t Cl:C u t!:=c ' l liO:"1
0:1 th0 o f r.:.: c cuti\c to t o cover t oy(!:: i.:. t i o ;,!:. i: l
o r de r t o ilvoi d congres s iona l. rubl i c
e r t a c tion pro joc ts' t e nd to create secret a nd
which l imi t ou r poli ti cal opti ons abroad, the Church
com; ;'i t tee coric Luded , by "creating t ies t o groups and causes that
c a n no t r enounc e
t ver t a ctr on. Suc h a l so lnhlbJ.t J.nf ol":iled
CObl ic deba t e ove r p UllCy
pu ,
a!!cct ahrOitd a nd
osr; the pe rccpt i on o f t he Un i t e d St a t e s wi thin t he world
CO 0uni ty. Spe ci f i c il l l y :

C ve r t act i on un de r mi ne s the same democratic f r e e doms and
tuLi oll ;; a b road a s i t t h ree c e n s at home. " Sp e c ia l activities "
t h e IS e xp r e s sed COJ;u:\i tmcnt t o . human rights
broa d . Th e c hu rch COml'l1t t c e fo urid that the CIA's covere action
i nc l ude d a gen ts i n l oc a l media, p ol i t ica l
uni on s , f o rc: s, the mi litary, and
l eg'islatuH' s . . Th e P:y. c CO,,",'1l 1t t.o e found t hat ap?:-oxlr.,ate ly . 29%
of Cov L> rt a ct I on proJ cct s a pproved at the coordInation
leve l we r c p r opa qa nde a nd op er at Lon s r a no ': lte r 32%
invol ve d e lec t i on s uppor t. , 'l' hus, over hal f o f t h e ppe rations
wer e b a s e d on t a ki ng a dva nt a ge o{ e lect ions or an
pres s .
--Cove rt action r e qui r e s t he United St ates to anno unce i n Law _
r proposed in Ti t le I - tha t i t s t ands in suspi cious antagonism
tli tn the res t; o f t he \w r l d and mai nt-atn s tJ:e ri g ht t o intervene
cover t l y a br oa d , even i n v i.olat ion o f internati ona l or
treat ies. Th e f o und t ha t the exposure of
certa i n cove r t op or et i.ons " ha ve r esul t e d i n dar.,<:ging thi s
nat i on' s a b ilit y to e xer c i s e mora l- an d "e t h i c al.l e ader s h i p
throughout th e wo r l d."
No proper defen s e o f "spe cial a c t ivi t ies" has yet b e e n made on the
public r ecord . No a c t ivi ty o f the l a s t fi f t e e n yea r s ,thus f a r
expos e d has bor ne even a r e mot e ' relat ions h i p t o t h e de f e ns e or
securi t y of the Un i t e d St ates . The Ch ur c h "gave serious
con sidera t ion t o p r op os i ng a t o t a l b a n on a ll of covert
ac tion" and b acked away only f or the po ssibi lity of a "gr ave,
unf orseen t h r e a t . " We b e l ieve o f 'a cover t a cti o n
inf r a-struc tur e r equ ires f a r g rea t e r jus t i f i c a t i o n t ha n p reparation
for the unfors e e n : it s ho ul d b e c l e ar t h2.t the mere fact t h a t its
ac tivi t i c s a r e s e c r e t do e s n ot emp ower tile i n t e l l i ge n c e coran un Lty
to ha nd l e the un for s e e n . 'l'he da nq ors p osed by s uch a st r uc t ure
are rea l a nd hav e been demon s trat ed. Therefore, we oppose S.2525's
unpre,cecJ e n l e d statutor y a u t ho r i zilt i on . o f " s p e c i al a c t ivit ie!t" in
absell c e o f any e v i d e nc e t h a t s uch a c t ivities a re
Vltal t o the s ecu r i t y o f the na t i o n .
Pr o J:i b i t Es-=> i on,:<:E' i n Pe a c e t i m,;,
,"' ' . '.
('Ppo se s ec tic," 11 1( a) ' s aut;hor i zation' of c l a ndcstir:e c ollection
any ceclarilt ion of No
.. t o s c']scr.; t i ':l
c tha n a ne g l l g l b l e v" l uo or p:: ovl d E':J lnforr.lat l o:l o f s lgn1.fl -
252
253
c a tl Ce ot he r i nt e lli qence f or "s oc c i a l acti t i v i c s . " \
The v allie o f SllCh aCl i v i t l 'c s be
ma n y o f t ile abu s e'! ; t}l=cat s t o the
a bove in our of "spec ial a cti vit i es:"
a ct ivi t i cs rcqu i.rc: '...:. :"c or (, O-..
i n : !.- a - s t r uc t c r c whi c h " s ? c c i a l c ct i vit i e s " rcqui re and 2.b8Ut
wh i c h t h e C hur c h Co. nrui t t o o (' ;,:p :-cs!i ed g rav2 . r o s o rvn t :\. 0 11S .
e c l:i v i t i c s u r.d c rrn i no t i.c f r c l:c1o::- ,s ar.d i JlS t 'it u-
. ti o n s a brou d by i nfJucnci r.q t h c of lac:::l
me d ia , par t ips , Jlni oIls, po li c e the
l c g i s l a t i \ c bod i e s .
--St a t ut o r y a ut.ho r a z.et i o n of o spi o uac o c1 i rni n i s h c::::; t t l'.2 r.ro ro I and
et hical of the Uni ted St a t e s i n t})c wo r Ld c omr.un.i t .
--Un t .j rac.ly c xpos uro o f e s pi o n aqc o pe rat i o ns abroad c a n T,e g a t i v12 1y
a ffec t t he c o nduc t o f o ur f o r e i. c r. p oli cy bot h hy c a using
c r i s e s a nd gr a dua l e r os i on of cre di b ility . .
Althougl l oppos e all " s p e c i a l and i n
p e a c e t i me , vo r cc.oo nizo t ha t; the l CH5.s l a t. i."\rc c o u rsc ult i ma t e l y
ta }::. en v..il l li ke l y a ut ho ri zc the s e act ivi t i c s , Co nsc q uc-nt Ly, \': Q
outl i ne b e Low t h e mini ma ] p r o c c:a uTes z.nd
p r ohi L i t i. on s ;: e G 2 f : ;'\\ os s en t.. i a I t o f . t bc c ons t i. Lu t i ori a L
SY S l E:.:T1 f r o::-::; the c on s oqucnc e s o f ec t i vi t i.o u ,
Th e Ch a r t e r S ho u ld Defi n o a n \'7hi ch Cl(' C':"]v
11 f i I I ,":. s-"}: :;i:c,
On l y i n Lo t. he Gravest to U.
Se cti o n 1 31 e s t a b l i z h c fi" p r o c c dur e s f or a p p rovn I a rid r ovicv of
" s p aci a l activi ties . " We opp os e t he s e p r ocedu r e s b e c a u s e they
a utho rize c o v er t a c t ion . At "t he ve r y .l eCist , hO\-J('ve r , the s e
require t i g]; t c nj.ng. One SU0s tion mus t
direct t he r e dr a f t i ng : ar e "spc< c i"l a c tivit.ies " to ' r ema i n a
routi ne t oo l of )'-"1e r i c an f oze i qn po licy or e re - t.hey to be. ec:o,ploypc
on l y i ri r a re, i sol a t e d b rief in d ura tio:l and
i n n ature ? Unle s s t. h e Lat t e r is as s un.od , t he n S . 25 25 \oJil l me r e l y
l eg i t i n izc a c t ivitia s po s e a c ();ltinu al t h r e a t to
c onsti t.u t a c n a L s ystem \ l hi I.e i n po s i n g no l!l?ani nsfu l s af cq ua rd s
.aga inst abus e .
Section 131,(dl effectiv e l y r e qui r c s t hrce Prc s i de nt i a l f indi ngs
before th e of a I l s pec i 21 ac tjvi ty . " TIle nuS
be c e e mec1 " es s e nt i.a I t o the nz, ti ona L dcf cn se or cond uct of t e
fo r e i g n po l.i cy o f t he Uni t e d St 2.t l2s. " 'l'he r c si dcrit; i:last c clcrr.. ne
t ha t t he ant ici pat e d bene fits t Ile r s }: s o f D:le,
Le s t Ly , t net; Lo s s s on s i ti ve e I tc r n.:.tiv c s v.ou d ri o t 1.i l.c l.y acbic\"0
the e nc s .
Th is for be
. . . l o t he o [ t he for eign po l icy o f Ut\it c d.
Sla t e s " i s a 0ztab ]is hc s rc.u tl;:C
01 o f American policy. The "foreign 'po l i cy of the Uni ted St at e s"
7
0
often directed at the of goals
ar c l i mi t ed in scope and to nati onal security.
t he anticipat e d bene f i t s outweigh t he r is%s of foe s
l' t, l i;:lit c onduct, 0: act i vi r.ic s !,i:-iC"-:
lI"-es
u
;n,-, ol Y such a cal cu lat ion s ho ul d ah:ays be raade in det errai.ni nq
P1bl
i c
po li cy ; henef its s houl d a lways outwei gh cos t s , ev en in
mos t cold-bl ooded , amoral process. The finding
le s S s ensi tive te chniques would not likely achi eve the desi red
endS i s an i mpc;'rt a nt , r e s t ri;: tion. ' we f ear th,;- t i n
pra c ti ce, contlngencles may too easlly eventualltles.
The f our t h fi lId i ng n;quir e d by scction 131( d) , that "the cIrcum-
sta nce s r equi r e the us e of e xtraordinary r.\eans , " we inte: rpret as
horta t o r y and adding no new restrictions to the c onduct
of spec ial a ctivities."
than pzov.i de a dd itional safeguards with re spect to the
conduc t of " s pe c i a l a ctiviti e s," the provisions in s ection 131
.rel:.
r ea t
fr o"-l Lhe r e s t rict i ons placcd on s uch ac t i vi t i e s by the
Hughe s- Ryan Amendnent to the Foreign Ass istance Ac t of 1963.
Etanda r ds and procedur es set forth , i n S, 252 5 s houl.d not be ir.!plc. -
Jr.ente d as a replaccr.:ent f o r t he rcpor ting requirements current ly
in e ff e ct,.
The e l abor at e rel'0rUng requirenents spelled out in s e ct i on 131 of
5,2525 ef f e c t i ve l y ac,:1 up to l i t t l e mor e than the Hughe s - Rya n
that the President re?or t, "i n a fashion,
a de s cr i pti on and scope ,of -s uc h operation . " The quality of
execut ive r epor t i ng wil l ultimatelydepcnd upon t he "v i gi l a nce of
Congre ss. i mpo r t ant , the Hughes -Ryan requires that
t he Pre s i de nt rep?rt to ei ght comqr e s si oneL coiam i. ttecs - t he
for e i gn r e l a t i ons committees,the armed s ervices and t he
appropriat i on:> commi t t e e s ' o f both houses a s "ell a s t o t he t ,,'o
int e lligence co".-"ittee s t o ' ;llich S, 2S25 r eq ui r e s r epor t.Lnq . This
addi tiona l s crut iny c an only be benef ici a l.' I f S . 2525 i s t o
super cede t he Hughes-P.yan Amendment, i t mus t embody t hes e s t r ict
reporting requirements.
The Hughe s - Rya n stanc 3rd requires t ha t covert acti. on ope rati ons
"impo rta nt to'the na tional secur ity of t.he Uni t e d States."
Alt hou gh " i mpor t a nt " i s less restri.c tive t han css e ntial," t hi s
Bta':ldard a t l e a s t t i e s t he cond\,;ct of , cove r t a c t i on op e rat i ons to
natl ona l 5e cur i t y r a t her than mcre pol icy i nt e r e s ts.
5ect ion. 1 31 is i nac eq ua t e to govern the of "special
ac t ivit i e s . " 'l'he rcco:n.'Ienc<,. t ioils of the Church COil"J:ti t t e c s houl d ,
a s a 'guide in redraft ing it. The Corzn.ittpe that
rCGuir e cert ifica t ion thut a hs oc c ial
ac t i vit y"i s r c q ui:::: e o " by "cxtrcor di nar y ci t o de a I t h
.-grave:: t h r eat s " to t ho .s c curi ty , I t .. t,?vc
the to p rovide CCt1g.r-cSsiO il.J. 1
t he rea s ons j c s t i f y i :l g a cc ci si on to
c r , s ove t a c i t ou At the vc.:r}' Lo zs t , t ho t.a ndar d ,
r l.ch c: -: p l i c i t l y t h,:;:.. . covert; .z.c c Lor. n r c.j,-'c ts ....i ) :
arc, ; ::"1(1 p;.:r t Lc uL:r, he i1 C01) t c. .t! i :: 5 . 2525 .
255
254
','
Se ction 1 31 requi r es a n i r'r.l edi a t e , pr.i or no t.ifica t i on to t he h,o
intelligenc e of Congres s \-l i t h an er.lCrgency e>:cc?ti o'n.
We see J10 re ason the c a n no t b e k e p t
ful ly a nd currently i n the same manner a s
b .ra nch the? Ch ur ch
requiring Pr c sicJ 8n t i a l' Lha t t he a ct i vi ty ;:'. .. l}:Q
s tanda z"ds a D weI]. QS a r e port o f the r eaSOl l $ E!ioul d })c
fo110I':" 0.
5 . 2525 Shoul d Es t nbli eh Cl e ar and Stan derQs
Pr o ceduros t o t h-:-
Aeei - - -- - - -- --- .--- - ---.- - .-----------_
Se c t ion 131 s ets for t h st andards and pr oce dures for the ap?r oval
o f c er t a i n c La ridos t I ne co llect i on e c t Lvi t i.os . Ot her cl a nde s t i llC:
c o Ll.c c t Lon a cti vit i.os , howeve r , r cma i.n un r egu12t e d . Be:cause th.,
dcterni n2-tion a s t o whi.c h t yp e s o f c011ecti on a c t ivi t 5c5 rnerit;
speci21 s cr u t i ny i s l e f t Lo the Pr eside n t, S.252 5 fails t o establist
clcar o f r e s pon sibil ity.
Secti on 1 31(b) (1) J:<:>Cluir e s Ka tiona:t Se c urLt.y c ounci r r evi e w of
co llect ion a ctivi t ios " and scc t i on 13 1( c) set s
some but no t not ?- 11 o f t he criteri a fo c revi e;l. I n
s e c t.Lo n 131(b ) (1) rcqui rs-s Presi d::mt ial a pprovaI for e,:c epti om:1Jy
c o l l ect i on CoLl ect.Lon Cl cti vit i c s no t

"sensiti v e" a rc left unreg ula te d.
Criteria b y \.. hich ' lo i.denti fy activit. ics wli ich rc:q uirc NSC rovi o:..,
and/or l'residu ll t.lc:l l ap?::- o\".;::. J. ere lc:i t to the Pzcn.i dc r.f to c ctc-rnir.e.
These crite ria a re subj ect to changa s ucc e e di ng admini s tra -
tions . Moreove r , a Pres ident can e ffec t ively and
by defi ni ng cer t a in 2c ti vi tic s a s not sens i t i ve e nough
to require rcvi oi.. t, Thus, S. 2525 doo s not provi de f or
a c co untabj. Lf t y in the condu c t of c landestine collect i on activi tics .
The b ureaucrati c dcniabi lity Which ha s p lagued inte ll igence
collect ion in the past remai ns pos sibl e.
S . 2525 Sho ul d Pr ohibi t Acti vit ies l'ihich !'.re ." I ncorw ilt i b l e !'lit h
luueric:-tn Pri nciples '9
Title I ostensibly prohibits'p a r t i c ular f'o r ms of "spccLa L
Section 135 list5 the fOllo;-:i ng [0 1'/1'. '; of pr'ohIb.i. ted ac ti v iti e s :
-(1) The s up por t of international terrorist a c t i vi t ies ;
(2) the I:IaSS destruct i qll of prop!! r ty;
(3) the c reation of food or Io."at e r shor t ages or f loods;
(1,) the creation of e pidemics o f d isc a s es;
(5) the us c o f chemi c a l , bi ologi cal, or other
in v iol ation of tre ati es or agree -
men t s to Io."h i c h t he Un ited is a party ;
(6) the v i o le nt ove r thr ov o f t r.e democratic goverllDe nt
o f a ny c ountry;
( 7) the t or t urc ' o f indi vidu2ls ; or
(8 ) the suppo r t of a ny a c t i on , wh i ch vi o lates human rights,
conduc t e d by t he po l ice , f oreign i nt e l l i ge nc e or interna l
sec ur i t y fo r ce s of any for e i gn c o unt r y . "
secLion prohi b i t s po l i tical a s s 2s s i na t i on .
l i 5t c d nead t o b e other
prohibi t i ons ne ed t o be i nclUde ? in order t o el i mina te covert
war-maki ng or t o i ns ur e U. S. adhere nce to huma n r i gh t s
standards. The l i s t e d prohibi tions need to be e xtended a nd
clarifi e d 2S
__Beet ion 135(a) ( 2) the I l mns s d2 s t r uc t i on" of
wi thout defi:l ing "mais." a s sur edl y , the a d ject ive c r e at e s
a loopho l e which nega t e s t he pr-oh i b i t ion , Th e Ai r E'o r c il , for
do scri be d i ts bombing in Vietna::\ as s e lect ive
and sur gi c a l . The proh ibi tion s houl d ban t hc destr ucti on o f
pro'>E) l:ty.
' - - Sc c tion 1 35 (a ) (2) proh i bi t s t he cr e ation o f f ood o r water
s hor t a ges . I t s ho ul d p r oh ibit t he ca tegory of wE: 2ther
mod i f i ca t i On (e. g. t he c r ea t i on d f fl ood s) and shoul d a l s o
b e ext e r!d.? d to cover the c r ea t i on of cme r gy ahor t.a qe s or
d i:3 r upt i oa s .
--Secti on 1 35 (2. ) ( 6) prohi b i t s t he vi.oLe nt; cver chrow o f a "dorao-
cra ti c " 'l"h e c3cfi ni tlonoI -th c woz d " democr ?.t i c "
i s the f i r Bt obv i o us probl em; onc e a gn i n the &dj e c t i vc
r i s ks nega t i n g the proh i bition. The pr ohibit ion shoul d be
eYotende d t o cover t he non- v i o l e nt as we l l a s v iolent over throw
of any i n peace t i nC-=-an a ct which would violat e
thc-U:N. Char ter and accepted law. .
--The P::oh ibi t Lon on s upport o f any a c t i on vi o lat e s huraan
rights (sec t i o:) 135 (a ) ( 8)) s hou l d b e e xt e nde d to
ongoing suppor t for <l :1Y. po l i c e , f or e i gn i nt eJ. l i ge nc e or i nte r nal
security for ces whi ch v i o l a te r i ght s as a mat t e r o f policy .
--Section 13 t. pr ohibi ts ass ass i nati ons of f 0r e i gn o f f i c i als. The
la\-l appl ies on l y t o o ffici a ls . U:1de r t h e 12ws o f war - r ules
ado?ted b y thQ Uni ted for
is pr ohi b i. t ed . Pol i t i c al murde r shou Id r e cei. v e r;o-gr e a t e r
protection nectius e i t i s done co vertly in Furthcr,
the la'" wou Ld r equ ire t hat t ho mur de r be eo rrcnat t e d f or a po l i -
ti.::al mot Lv cr thi s na r r owi. n g of a prohibition is unnecess ar y .
Moreover, scve ral proh ibitions shoul d be tiPcie d to insur e t ha t
COvert proj0c ts are no t unde r ta ke n in of basi c
F'=i nci ?l c s .. For e x arnpLee
--Br 5,!)ory or of f or c isn o f f i c i a l s s ho ul d .. ..
We C2n na t }Joth f o ster use their
256
indc pondcncc l o our TI l e bri bery s canda ls at the
beginning o f this A'eiuinistr ati on an d those involving the Sout h
C IA !\JlG the Co nq ro s s t hat such a c t i v i ties a r o
!i('('J1 by the VCJ s t maj o ri t y of A:!l.eri can c i t i zen s ,
--Pr o \'o c il ti O:l o f viol e nce , dcmonn t ret Lo n s , str i kes or b:,.y c o t t!';
sh ould be pro hi bi t.od . 'I'bc Un i t e d. s ho ul d no t be part y
t o p r ovoki ng violenc e i n othe r s oc i e t i e s . '
l'ina1 1y, the s e pr ohil,i lions must bn abs olute in ti...e of p eaco ,
Se cti o n 136( n ) ( 3) pz"cJ vi das n Pr eside lltiz l o f Llall Y o f tl10
pro h i b i t i o n s i n s ect. i on 1:-< 5 undr-r ext raordinar y ..
1'his pr ovi.s io n sh oul d b", st ri ckon f r orn the bi l l.
Should Paranil iti, r y_o r t ies
A raozt; vi,tel se t of prohi bit.i ons conc e r ns t he pLa oed upon
a na t 11C c:.ployrnent of
' Sec t.i o n 133(a) rct rca ts f r om bo th t he Chur ch Co mmi t t.e o and the
Pi ke r(".::o:,trr,e:o di1tions b y author: zing the assLenncnt of:
a civi1i"n U.S. as D conilibt ?nt a br03d f or up t o 90 days '
Presi dential ap proval end inde f initel y upo n congre5s i oa 31
approva l . .
The House r c c oJr:=lc' jl c -:c1 that "i:). l p2!."f.l !:lil it c:J r v
s hc l ) b e o roh i b Lt od in t ii:',C of
be }::7;'ac lcc. ia the s erae fashi on
as ra.iLit. a r y pers onnel unde r t.ho PO\-.'cr s f.:hic h r cqu Lr o s
Conq ress Lorie L e.p pr o vc L wi.t.hi n s ixty d eys ) . 1'he Chur ch Cc ncll i t t c,e
a ls o tha t the e xe cut ive branch be prohibited from
conduc t i ng allY co ver t mi l i t ary as s i stance without
e xpl ici t prio r c on sent; of t he i ntel l i ge nc e over si qh t; c ommi t.ce e (s)
of .
We urgc t ha t t he House be a dopted. The statut e
s hould fl it t 1y prohibi t thc cove rt empLoyment; df: p eraraiLi. t.ar y
a ctivi ties and military in pe acetime. The
Church fo und t hat of f i ve pa r arn i1itary activi ties s tu di e d
o nly one a c hi ave d i t s obj e- ct iv o r.nc1 thi.t t in no instC'.:lc c 'i:a!:;
compl.et c secrecy successfull y p ro sor..-e d, The CO;:ir.l i ttC? c ' s con-
c Lu s i on w a s "the c v.idon c o p o i n ts f a i lur e o f p e r a rni. L i t.er y
a ct i vi ty as a t cchni'quc o f c ove r t a ct-ion." I para-
mi litary activj,tias have a il po t en t i a l f o r c scaJ.ating into
major mili ry corn i t m n t s Current S c rc t az. .- y of SLate Cy r us t.a nr e , e
Vance i rrfo r rr. c d t he Chur ch Co ncni t t cc t hat " per ami I Lt ary op e r a t i ons
are pe rhaps uni que in tha t it i s r;'ore diff i cult t o Hithdraw fro:3
t hero, OJ:Cc sta rt e d, thal l cove rt; opc r at io ris ,. "
sec ti ou 13 3 is \'''holl y i nad"'i uc :e. As de f l'o:;, the, a ut hori catLon
f o r t he: us.o of u.s . ':.: !": o :: (; c v i Li ans , " i t doos net i n
any way the pnid Cbe g:l or
of Da t c r ial, Ili l l g and 2s5is lanc c for
".5 wr i t.tc n , this socrion (100r : c !.- till:! US(\ o f
pararai Li t ary o pcrati o r.s a s L. l:,c , ;n!. 0 :' ci the
pliJCCC on cxcc uti vc di sc rc t i cn bj' thc t\ c t. .
257
If the r e is but one lesson to be f r om o ur r ecent exper i -
nces i n I ndo c hi na a nd Angola, i t is tha t no U. S. mi l i t a r y
s h o ul d be made .... ithout public d i s cus sion an d ccr:-:nit.".',ent
bY co ngr e s s . Covort 'civi lian parami l i tary int e r ve ntion shoul d
be and l.li l .i: ta l:j arid i n t e r v c oti ons
be gov'c r Ile d by t he provis i ons of the Har Power s. Act.
' b.ccountabi1i ty
If covert ope rat i on t o be c ont i nued , s t ri c t 5t a nda r ds ,
and pro}: b itiol)S must be by provi sions
i n
te 1 J
j gcnc c t.y and Cj:l2 c ut i\'C ac countabi Li.t y t o c ori q res s
and the puhl ic. Coruai tt oos o t he r than t he i nt e lli ge nc e c orami t t ee s
of Congr e s s , i nell vidua l c o nqre ssrncn.and t he ge nera l pubLi c must al l
be t o scrut ini zc i nt e llige nc e Dc l ivit i es.
cong;e f,s i0:11 ovor siqht; must be b ro..dened. Neces s ary r ev isions in
include:
,
(1) The acce s s o f l egi s lator s t o informat i on r (' l Dting to the
conc uc t of nat i ona l i nt e 11 i gc nce act ivities s houl d not .
be i e s tricted. Ce r t a i nl y , procedures de sighe d t o sa f e -
gllar u t he socrc-cy o f sh o ul d be
but shoul d not incl ude de:lying a c c e s s
t o In t he r aCeJlt deba t e t he CI A buds c t ,
some conqr e s smon c omp Leinc d th.:.. t ev en t he c l as s i fied
r Cp0l" t .!1 vhi c h the y e x erci ncd we r e excer p t.ed S.25 25
shoul d provide for c omp Lct.e acce s s : o r a l l
(2) All CI A a ct iviti es shoul d be subj ect t o GhO a udit
the pr ov 1so i n 123(e} that t he DNI cen e xce pt
cer t a i n funds expcp. ded f or a parti cul a r national intel l i -
ge nc e a c t ivi t y.
(3) Al l of Congress s ho ul d be empowe r ed t o or de r
a n aueii t of a ny or a l l CI A a cti vities. The provi sion
(section 123( b)} req ui r i ng i ntel l i gen c e clearanc e
of audit rcsu1ts be fore re lea s e to
s hould be s tricke r..
( 4) I rldi ':i d;': '.:. l o f t he intel li g c :'1 cc ccnvr.un Ity faced
with or ill ega l order s of an y o t he r evice nce
of ir,- .?r o? r ie: t y sl io uLd be f ree t o r e por t s uc h i n f o :-itl.:: t ion
to any not mere l y to a
1ige nce ov ers i90t a s provide d f o r in sec ti on
lS1 ( j} ( 3) (;,,) .
The publ i c ' s r i s ht to s houl d not be negl e c ted. S. 252 5 can
be t o a between t Ile need f o r publ i c
. '..,: '\
..- " It ' ,:
258
and searecy interests . Some c ha nges are :
(1) The tet al figure the intel l igence budget shoul d be
made public. The rninimal threat to the national
so cri..i ty by t he !:elc:(':.::.:- of t .h i s:
far outweighed by the need t o give the publ ic sense
o f hO;J nlany t ax dollars ar e being spent on
activities. florcover, the COJl s ti t ut i o n probably
such dizclosure.
( 2) S.2525 shouLd the Lni t Lat.don of ci vil suits
a q ai n st; p e rson s uacl assificd o r ir:lproperly
cl uz s i f i c d
The nbove recommendation z Inus t be i nc or por ate d i nt o S.2525 in or der
to insuro executive aCCOlllltabi J.ity for the c ot)dt!c t o f nat i ona l
inLel Jigcnce activitie s to both the Congr c s z the public .
Conclus ion
\1e the authorization of "special and
coll c c:ti.on a ct i vit.i os bccause of the c!ar,')'ers ':hich the c o nduct;
of such t i v L L s poses to t he s t. ti onaj I f c an- ac t. o con Li u l
de st ine op&rat ioll S abroad (1 .::& t o be aut.hor Laocl tl lC f.t.ar.c1urc s ,
arId limi ted ilbove - a Et ?ndar d
for "speci al ac t i v i t i e z " w!,ic), as e xceptional,
strict and expl icit and procedures for t h0
ti on of clandestine coll e ction acti vi tics, prohibit i.on s on activi ti e "
arc contrary to t raditiona l 1.-:leri can princ iples , prohibitio:.s
on and ac t iviti,es - the saf eguar d;
ne ce s s ar y to prot e ct the democrati c decision-I oaki ng proce ss. The
cur r e nt provisions of S.2525 dealing I:ith co vert abr oad
s er ve' mor c to legitinize cons t i t ut i ona l a buses to elininate
then.
259
TABLE OF CONTENTS TO lICLU
ON 5.2525
Pi\G::"
trl.c1uc t i on and ovorvf.ew 1
I nr t One- --The Righ t s of 1I1neri cans an d Resident Aliens 6
pa I nve s t i ga t i ons of u .S . Pe rsons
A Da nge r ous Poli cy Choice 7
Count c ioillt e l l i ge nc e and Counter-
terr0r isn I nve s t i ga t i ons (521 3) 9
For. e i gn Intelligence I nve s t i gat i ons (S214) 13
Investigation of u . S. Pe r s ons Abroad S521 3- 214) 13
Duration of (5216 - 217) 15
Other I nve s tiga tions ( 5521 8- 222) 16
. Investigation of Fore ign Targets (21&) 16
Cont ac t Investiga tions ' (52 20) , 18
I nve s t i g2t i on l or Collection of Foreign .
Intell igence Inforr.lation (5 21 9) 19
of Pot.en tial Source s (221) 20
Inve st i ga t i on for Prote c t i on Security (522 2) 20
..ion of Pers ons in t.he _Vicini ty
of I ns t a lla t i ons (5222 (a 21
I nve zti ga t i on t o Pr otec t the PhyR: c ul
Sa fety of (222(h) 21
Investigat ion of Employees and Contract or s (5222( c 22
I nve s t i ga t i ons of N0n-U.S. Pe rsons Withi" tho United Stfttcs 23
Ut i l i za t i on of I nt r us i ve I nve s t i ga t i ve Techni que s (5S212 and 21 5 ) 27
Proc edur e s Which Govern the Use of I nt r us i ve Technigues
(55212 and 215) 27
J udi c i a l Wa r r ant s for ' t he Use of Intrus i ve Techni ques 28
Us e of Informants 30
Record Se arches 31
Hail Cove rs 33
Ut i li za t i on o f Very Intrusive Investigative Tec hni qu e s (Title III) 35
Fore i gn Electronic and Si gnal s I ntelligen ce (SS311 and 321) 35
Unc once nte d Physical Se arches (53 41) 36
Ma il Opening (S351 : 37
Mai nt ena nce Di s s emi na tion of I nf or ma t i on (S5231- 232) 38
Pr Ohibi t i ons Necessary for the Protection of Ri gn t s of Americans 41
Prohi bi t Pol i t ical Survei llanc e ( 5241) 41
PrOhibi t I nf i l t r a t i on o f Fi rst Amendment Or ganizations
(S5244 and 421(e) 42
ProhibitPreventive Action (5243) 43
Domestic Activit ies by the CIA 46
Ut ilization of First Amendmen t I nstitutions 47
Re s t r i c t i ons on the Us e of First Ame ndment I nst itutions 47
Us e of Media Organi zations (51 32) 47
Use o f Religious Organi zati ons (513 2) 48
Us e of Academic I nst i tut i ons (51 32) _ , 48 0
pse of Ot he r First Amendment I ns t i t ut i ons 48
260
OF TO IICW
(continu9d)

PI,(:.
of
Cover
"9
4S
Cont r acti ng wi t h Fi n ;t. 1' .mendment Institutions
"9
Rocrujt mc n t;
Voluntary Cont act s
Hechani.f;o:.IS f or S:lt 2'j uii,) cJinC) Civi1 Rights and ci vi l
Need for hbsoJ utc Prohibitlons
for D Sp aci a l
Nand for t:cw Civil Re medies
Nccd for l: e", to n,tlldle Sccl'ecy
Part T, io - -C o v 0rt Acti on a nd El'Jpionage 1' .bro.<d
Ln t roduc r.Lon and ovorvf.cv
Prohi bit Cover t Action
Prohi b i t Esp i ona ge in P':'l1 ,--: ctim<:> Ill ))
li t Minin-.u'n, Co vert Ac tio" Only in HC:;pof . s e
to U.S. Security
l1ean iJl g ful St. a rida r ds to covor n Cl a nc!c z t i n.:.-
,
Pro h i bitAl l lIc \.i\ i t i e s l':hich Al'O " ln c omp a U. bl e \-lith
, Am(,ri ciln Principle,," I SS1 3l, - 135)
59
Prohibi t Par a military and !-lercen;,r:; 1,c t i v i t i e 3 ( S133 )
61
Ac c o unt abil i ty
62
Co n cl usion
63
. '
to the Gnwest
57
ColJ.e ction ( l 3l )
59
50
50
51
51.
52
5,
52
53

51,
55
5(,
261
r-:

CenterforNational
SecurityStudies
't\oia
hyL..AL'I.
Report

ro#
C}>
Comparisonof
Proposalsfor
Reformingthe
Intelligence
Agencies
AUGUST 1978
262
263
REPORT
TEXT PREPARED BY THE FOLLOWING STAFF MEMBERS OF THE CENTER
fOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES:
COMPARISON OF
Jerry J. Be r man
Mark T. Drooks
PROPOSALS FOR
Morton H. Halper in
Barbara A. Pollack
REFORMING THE
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES
AUGUST 1978
Copyright (c) 1978 by t he
Center for National Security Studi es
CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
. .. J fr<
264
265
COMPARISON OF PROPOSALS
FOR
III.
for
The
Intelli ge nc e Pur pos e s
Us e o f Ind e pe nd e nt Ameri c a n I ns t i tut i o ns
15
REFORMING THE A. Aut horIZa tion 15
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES 1 . Should t he use of i ndepe ndent Ame r i -
c an i nstitut ions by t he i n t el l igence
communi t y be a ut hor i zed?
B. Re str ict i on s 15
TABLE OF
- - --
CONTENTS
1 .
2.
How
How
s hould
s houl d
t he
t he
use
use
o f
of
c l e r g y be regu lated ?
j ournal i s t s be re-
gu l a ted?
3 . How sho u l d t he us e of governme nt grante es
I NTRODUCTI ON
I. Covert Operat ions Conduc ted Abroad
A. Author ization
1 . Should the United States conduc t
ope r ations ?
cover t
1
3
3
4.
5 .
be regu l a t e d ?
How s houl d t he us e of r epr e s e nt a t i ve s o f
academi c inst i tutions be r e gu l a t ed ?
Shou ld t he d i strib u t i on o f i nf or ma t i on
wi t hin t he Uni ted Sta tes be s uppo r t ed
c over t l y by t he i nt e l l i g e nce c ommun ity?
B. Implementation of Covert Oper ati ons
1. Who should be al l owed to conduc t
operations?
covert
3
IV. Preventive Ac t i o n Designed to Fr us t rat e Hos t i l e
Foreign Inte lli ge nce and Te rror ist Ac t ivi ties
Both Abr oa d a nd in the United States 1 8
2 . What act ivi ties should be prohibited in
A. .
18
C.
the c onduct of covert ope r a tions ?
Stand a rds
1. I n what circumstances should covert ope r a -
t i on s be conducted?
6
B. 1 8
2 . What should be the standards o f prior appr o - a ut hor i zed , i n
3.
val f or c overt operations?
Should there be a limi tat i on on t he du r a t i on C.
i t be per mi s s ibl e?
19
D.
of covert
Procedur e s
o perations?
9
1. What pr o c e d ur e s shoul d be f o l l owe d prior to D. 19
ini tiation of covert operations?
II. Covert Co l l ection of
A. Authorization
Intelligence Abroad
11
11
B.
1. Does c over t collection dif fer from intelli-
gence col lection general ly?
2. Should t he r e be special author izat ion for
covert c o llection?
Standards
12
V. Foreign I n t el l i ge nc e , Cou nt e r i n t e lligence , and
Counterterr ori s m I nve s tig a t i ons Bot h Abr o a d
and in the Uni t ed St a t e s
A. Investlgatlon o f u.s. persons wi thin t he U. S .
conduc t e d f or t he pur pos e of learni ng a bout the
20
1. What standards should
o f cover t collection?
trigger identific ati on a c t i v iti e s of f or e i gn gove r nments and a ctivities
a br o a d (f ore i gn i n t e l lige nc e 20
C.
2. What s tandards of review should
for covert c o l l e c t i on ?
Procedures
be r e q u i r e d
13
1. I n wha t c i rcums tanc e s shou l d a U. S . pe r s on
be t argete d for a for e i gn i n t e l l i ge nc e i n-
vest igati on ?
1 . What shou ld be the procedures for approval 2 . Sho ul d t he r e be l i mi t a t i ons on t he tec h-
D.
of cover t
Restrictions
col l ect i on?
14
n i que s empl oye d in s uch
1. What rest rictions should g ove r n
collection?
covert
266 267
E. Investigations of U.S. persons within the
United States conducted for the purpose
of learning about the activi ties of inter-
national terrorist groups (counterterrorism) 33
1. In what circumstances should a U.S. per-
son be targeted for a counterterrorism
investigation within the United States?
2. What restrictions should be applied to
such investigations(e.g. limitation of
techniques, restriction of duration, etc.)?
F. Investigations of non-U.S. persons within the
United States conducted for the purpose of
learning about the activities of in tern a -
tional terrorist groups (counterterrorism) 36
1. In wha t circumstances should a non-U.S.
person be targeted for a counterterrorism
inves tigation within the United States?
2. What restrictions should be applied to
such investigations (e.g. limitation of
techniques, restriction of duration, et c. )?
G. Investigation of U.S. citizens abroad for for-
eign intelligence, counterintelligence or
counterterrorism purposes 36
1. In what circumstances should a U.S. per-
s on be targeted for a fore ign intelligence,
counterintelligence or counterterrorism
investigations abroad?
2. What restrictions should apply to such in-
ves tigations of U.S. persons abroad?
VI. Other Intelligence Investigations of U.S. Per-
sons 39
of investigation of t argets of
foreign i n t e l l i ge nc e services or terrorist
or g a n i za t i o n s 39
1. Should the targeting of potential targets
of foreign intelligence services or terro r-
ist organizations be authorized?
2. I f so, under what c ircums t a n c e s should
such investigations be permi t ted?
B. Procedures for i nvestigation of t arge t s o f for-
eign intell igence services or terror ist or g a n i -
zations 40
1. What special procedures should be estab-
lished for such i nve s t i g a t i on s ?
2. Should the object of such investigation be
notified?
3. What procedures should be established to
govern these i nv e s t i ga t i ons ?
4. Should these investigations be restricted
in duration?
5. What other restrictions should be appl ied
to such investigations?
Investigation of non-U.S. persons within the
B.
united States conducted for the purpose of
learning about the activities of foreign govern-
ments and activities abroad (foreign intel ligence
27
informationl
1. In what circumstances should a non-U.S. per-
son be targeted for a foreign intel l igence
investigation within the Un i ted States?
2. Should there be limi ts on the techniques em-
ployed in such investigations?
3. What procedures should be established to
govern these investigations?
4. Should these investigations be restricted in
dur a t i on ?
5. What other restrictions should be applied
to such investigations?
c.
I nve s t i g a t i on of U. S . persons within the United
States conducted to uncover plans of foreign
intelligence services to gather information
about the United States or its allies or to
conduct covert operations in the United States
30
(counterintelligence)
1. In what circumstances should a U.S. person
be targeted for a counterintelligence in-
vestigation wi thin the Uni ted States?
2 . Should there be limi tations on the te c h -
niques employed in such investigations?
3. What other restrictions should govern such
investigations?
D. Investigations of non-U.S. persons within the
United States conducted to uncover plans of
foreign intelligence services to gather in -
f orma t i on about the United States or i t s allies
or to conduct covert operations in the United
States (counterintelligence)
32
1. In what circumstances should a non-U.S.
person be targeted for a
investigation within the UnitedStates?
2. What restrictions should be a pplied to such
i nve s t i g a t i on s (e.g. limitat i on of techni-
ques, restrict ion of duration, etc.)?
:,::"
268 269
C. Restrictions on investigation of targets of
foreign intelligence s ervices or te rrorist
organizations 40
I. Restri ctions on investiqation of poten-
tial sources of assistanc e
1. Shou ld the nature of the information
45
1. Should there be limitations on the tech- sought be restricted?
2.
3.
niques employed in such investigati ons?
What should be the purpose of such in-
vestigations?
Should there be limits on the durat ion
2.
3.
Should the techniques empJ oyed be re-
stricte d?
Should the durat ion of such inves tiga-
t ions be res tr icted?
of such investigations? 4. Which entities of the intelligence commu-
4. Which entity of the intel ligence commu- nity shou ld be authorized to carry out
D.
nity should carry out these investigations?
Authorization of investigation of persons in J .
these invest igat ions?
Authorization of investigation of persons
contact with suspected intelligence agents 41 in possession of foreign intelligence in-
1. Should persons who come in contact with formation 46
3uspected intelligence agents be targeted? 1. Should U.S. persons in possession of
2. In what circumstances should such investi- foreign intel ligence information be
gations be authorized? subject to investigat ion?
E. Procedures for investigation of persons in 2. In what c irc umstanc es should such in-
contact with suspected intelligence agents 42 ves tigat ions be authorized?
1. What speci al procedures should be estab- K. Procedures for investigation of persons in
lished for
tions?
initiation of such invest ig a - possession of
tion
foreign intelligence informa-
47
F. '
2. Should the target of such an invest iga-
tion be notified of his/her situation?
Restrict ions on investigation of persons in
contact with suspected intelligence agen t s
1. Should there be limitations on the tech-
43
L.
1. What special procedures should be estab-
lished for such inves tigations?
Restrictions on investigation of persons in
possession of foreign intel ligence informa-
tion 47
2.
niques employed in such investigations?
Should the duration of such investigations
be restricted?
1.
2.
Should the duration of such investiga-
tions be restricted?
Should there be limitations on the tech-
3. What should be the purpose o f suc h an in- niques employed in such investigations?
vestigation? 3. Which entity of the intelligence commu-
4. Which entity of the intelligence commu-
nity should carry out these investiga-
tions?
M.
nity should perform these investigations?
Authorizat ion o f investigations for the pro-
tection of securi ty 47
G. Authorization of investigation of potential 1. Should persons in the vicinity of in-
sources of assistance 44 stallations be subje ct to investigations?
1. Should the unconsented investigation of 2. What special procedures should be es tab-
potential sources of assistance be autho- l ishe d fo r such investigations?
rized? 3. Should there be limitations on the tech-
2. If so, under what circumstances should niques employed in such investigations?
such investigations be authorized? 4. Should the investigation of persons sus-
H. Procedures for investigation of potential pected of posing a threat to, installa-
sources of assistance 44 tions or personne l be author ized?
1. What special procedures should be es- 5 . What special proc e d ures should be estab-
tablished for such inves tigations? lished for such investigations?
6. Should there be limitations on the tech-
niques employed in such investigations?,-. ,
7. Should t he duration of such ,r ' ,
tions be restricted?
8. Should employees o f intelligence a gencies
and persons in simi la r situations be sub-
ject to investigation?
__ 8a'028 0 79 18
270 271
9 .
What special procedures should be established 4. Which entities of the intelligence commu-
for such inves tigations? nity should employ this technique?
10.
Should there be limitations on the tech-
niques employed in such i nv e s t i ga t ions ? Mai nt e na nc e and Dissemination of Information Ob-
VIII.
11.
Should the duration of such investiga- t ained in Intelli ge nc e Investigations. 63
tions be restricted?
A. Maintenance 63
12.
Which agencies of the intelligence commu- 1. Should the period of time for which informa-
nity should be permitted to conduct inves- tion may be retained be p rescribed?
tigations relating to the protection of B. Di s s e mi n a t i on 63
security?
1. To whom, within a given agency, should pri-
vate information which i d e n t i f i e s a U.S. per-
VII. The Use of Very I n t rus i v e Techniques
son be disseminated?
52
A. Electronic Surveillance within the United States 2. To which agencies and departments and in what
52
1. Should e lectronic surveillance within the circumstances should private foreign intelli-
United States be authorized? gence informat ion which identifies a U. S . per-
2. Under what procedures should electronic son be di ssemi n ate d?
surveillance within the U.S. be employed? 3. To which agencies and in what circumstances
3. Agains t whom and in what circumstances should private counterintelligence and counter-
should elect ronic surveillance within the terrorism i n f orma t i on which identifies a U.S.
United States be employed? person be disseminated?
4 . What efforts should be made to reduce the 4 . In what c i r c ums t a nc e s should private foreign
gathering of information about i nd i v i d u a l s intelligence information which i d e n t i f i e s a U.S .
not targeted for investigation? person be disseminated to a foreign government?
5. Which entities of the intelligence commu- 5. In what circumstances should private counter-
nity should be authorized to engage in intel ligence or counterterrorism information
electronic surveillance within the U.S.? which identifies a U.S. person be disseminated
B. Foreign e lectronic surveillance to a for e i gn government?
56
1. Should f or e i g n electronic surveillance be 6. Should information relating to criminal acti-
authorized?
vity be disseminated to law enforcement autho-
2. Under what procedures should foreign elec- rities?
tronic surveillance be employed? 7. Should the dissemination of "misinformation"
3. In what circumstances should foreign elec- about a U.S. person be authorized?
tronic surveil lance be employed?
4. What efforts to reduce t he gathering of in-
formation about individuals not targeted for
investigation should be made?
5. Which entities of the intelligence community
Append ix A 67
should be authorized to conduct these surveil -
lances? Appendix B
71
C. Physical searches and unauthorized entries
58
1. Should physical searches for foreign intelli -
gence, c o un t e r i n t e l l i g e nc e , and counterterror -
ism purposes be authorized?
2. What procedures should apply to the use of
this t e c hn i q ue ?
3. What standard should apply to the use of this
technique?
4. Should multiple searches be permitted?
~ :.:.:
5. Which entities of the intel l igence community
should be author ized to conduct these searches?
D. Mail Opening
60
1. Should the opening of a U.S. persons mail
be authorized and, if so, in what circum-
stances?
2. Under what procedures should this technique
be conducted?
3. Should multiple searches be permitted?
272
273
INTRODUCTION
The r e is now broad a gr e eme nt that leg islat ion
shoul d be enacted t o a uthor ize a nd res tr i c t t he activ i -
t ies of int ell i gence agenc i es, bu t t here i s s ubs t a nt i a l
and impor tant d isag r e ement about wha t t he s e condi t i ons
shou l d be. Severa l dif f eren t c omprehens i v e s e t s o f re-
c omme ndati ons have been put f or wa r d . Th is r e port c om-
pares fi ve of t hese repor t s a s t he y relate t o e i g h t
major i s s ue s affe cting f oreig n i n t e l l i ge nc e a c t iviti e s . *
The f ive of f i cial docume n t s a r e :
Executive Or d e r 12036 on U.S. I n t e l l ige nc e
Ac tivi ties (The Ca r ter Order), i s s ue d by
President Carter on J anuary 26 , 1978.
Th i s orde r c ur r e ntly gove r ns t he a c t i vit i e s
of the i nte l l ige nce c ommunity ;
S.2525 , The Na t iona l I ntel l igenc e Reorga-
nizat io n a nd Ac t o f 197 8 , cha rte r
l e g isla t ion f or t he f or e i g n i ntelligenc e
re l a t e d a c t i v i t i e s o f t he i n t e l l i ge nc e co-
mmun ity. The b i l l wa s introduced by t he
Senate Se l e c t Committ e e on I n t e l l igence
on February 18 , 1978 and i s cur ren t l y t he
subjec t o f he a r i ngs b e f or e that c ommi t t ee.
I f a nd when e na c t e d, i t will s upe rse d e
Executive g u i deli ne s t he n in e ffec t ;
Recomme ndat i ons o f t he Final Rep or t of the
House Select Commi ttee on Intel l igence, 94th
Congress , 2nd Sess ion, (The Pike Commi t te e
Re po r t ) ;
Re c ommendat i ons o f t he Fi na l Re por t of t he
Senate Se lect Commi tte e t o St udy Gove r n-
menta l Operations wi th Respect t o I n tel l i -
ge nc e Ac t ivi ties, 94 t h Congr ess , 2nd Sessi on
(The Chur c h Commi t t e e Repo rt);
*Some of t he guidel ines a lso dea l wi th dome s t i c i n t e l l i -
gence gathering where the targets are Amer ican c i t i ze ns
not believed t o be agen ts of forei g n powers . The i s s ue s
involved in these act i viti e s a r e no t d i s c usse d in this
r e port . See: Tes timony o f J e r r y J . Berman, J oh n H.F.
Shattuck a nd Mor ton H. Halperin on behal f of t he American
Civil Li be r t i e s Un ion on FBI Charter Legis lat ion before
the Committee on the Judiclary, Unite d States Senate,
Apr i l 25, 1978.
1
H.R.6051, The Federal Intelligence Activities
Control Ac t of 1977, a bill designed to pre-
vent abuses of power by the intelligence
community and introduced with the support
of a number of c ivil l i be r t i e s groups in-
cluding the American Ci v i l Liberties Uni on . *
The ma jor sets o f activi ties compared in th is re-
port are:
I . Covert ope r a t i o ns conducted abroad;
(p.3)
II . Cov ert collection of intelligence abroad;
(p.ll)
III. The use of independent American insti-
tutions for i nte l l i ge nc e purposes;
(p. 15)
I V. Prevent ive a c t i on designed to frustrate
hos tile foreign intelligence and terror-
ist act ivi ties both abroad and in the
U.S. ; (p.18)
V. Foreign intelligence, counterintel li -
gence, and counterterrorism investi -
gat ions of Americans both abroad and
in t he U.S.; (p.20)
VI . Other intelligence inv e st igation of U.S.
persons; (p.39)
VII. The use o f v ery intrusive techniques of
investigat.Lonr (p.54)
VI I I . Maint enance a nd dissemination of i n f o r -
mation obtained in intelligence inves-
tigations. (p.65)
Each section ident ifies the major policy questions
a nd describes the r e c omme nd a t i ons contained in each do-
c ume n t .
*Unde r line d words are used to refer to these reports here-
i na f t e r . Executive Or d e r 11905 (The Ford Order) and t he
recomme nd a t i ons included i n the Report t o the PresJdent
by t he Commission on CIA Activit ies Wi thi n (The
Commission Report) are also discus sed, though
less e xten slve ly. See the Appendix for more information
On t he s e documents.
2
274 275
I . COVERT OPERATIONS CONDUCTED ABROAD
Covert opera t i ons are act i v itie s c onducted abr oad
which a r e des i gne d t o f ur ther U. S . pol i c i e s and a r e
carr ied on i n a ma n ne r whic h is des igne d to conc e a l
t he r ole o f t he u . S . g overnment . The t actics empl oye d
and t he sec recy i n whi c h t he s e mi s s i ons are c a r r i e d out
a re, a c c o rding t o t he Chu r c h Commi t t e e , " i n b asi c t e n -
s ion " wi t h t he d ema nd s o f a democratic s y s t em a nd r a i s e
i mpor t a n t civi l liber t ies i ssue s. Al l of t he docume nt s
d e a l wi t h c ov er t ope rati ons.
A. AUTHORIZATION
1 . Shou l d the Uni t e d States c onduc t c ove r t oper a-
t i ons ?
The Car t e r Or d e r a uthori zes t he c onduc t o f c ove r t
oper a t ion s . 1/ 5 2525 wou l d a ut hor ize c over t ope r a t i ons
s ub ject t o proced ur a l r e qui rements , Pr e s i d e ntia l f i nd-
ings a nd with specifi ed limi t a t i o ns a nd pr oh ibi t i ons . 2
The Church Commi t t e e , a f t e r " s e r i ous cons i d e r a- --
t ion o f t he opt ion o f propos ing a t o t a l ban on a l l f or ms
of c ov e r t a c t ivity , " rec ommend e d au t hori z ing c ove r t
ope r a t i ons onl y in "ex t raor d i na r y c ircums t a nc e s i nvol v-
i ng grave t h rea t s t o Uni t e d St a t e s nati ona l s ecuri t y . " 3/
The Pi ke Commit t e e Re port r ecommende d proh i b i t ion o f --
s peci f i c t y pes of c over t oper ation s a nd author i zation
of a l l other s . 4/ HR6 051 wou l d prohi b it a l l c ov e r t
ope r a t i ons in pe a cetime '-2/
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF COVERT OPERATIONS
1. Who shou l d b e al l owed t o conduc t cov e r t ope r a-
t ions ?
The Ca r t e r Order aut hori zes the CI A to cond uct
c ove r t ope r a t ions ; a ny o t he r i nte l l i g e nc e a ge nc y may
c onduc t an operat i on i f t ha t agenc y appear s mor e l i ke l y
1
Ca r t er Or d e r , 1- 302-303.
2
5 2525
3
Chur c h Commi t t ee Repor t , Book I , p. 446 , s e e a l s o Chur c h
Commi ttee Report , Boo k I , p. 44 8, Recomme nd a t ron-#3 5 .
4
Pike Commi t t e e Report, p . 2 .
5
HR6051 303(e)
3
tha n the CIA to a c h ieve the obj ective of the operation . 6/
52525 would authorize the CIA and, in wartime, the
Forces , to conduct covert operations.-2! 52525 would
permitany other intelligence agency to "provide support"
for a covert operation. 8/ The term "provide support" is
not defined. --
The Church Committee Report recommended authori -
zatio n of only the CIA to conduct covert operations. 9/
The Pike Committee Report d id not specify which intelli -
gence agencies should or should not conduct covert opera-
tions . HR6051 would prohibit covert operations in peace-
time and does not specify who may conduct such ope rations
dur ing war.lO/
2. What activities should be prohibited in the
c overt operations?
The Carter Or de r prohib its only assassination. Il/
52525 absolutely would prohibit the following: --
1) assassination of foreign o fficials,12!
2) " the c rea tion of epidemics,13!
6
Ca r t e r Order,
7
5 2525 131( j ).
8
Id.
9--
Chur c h Commi t t e e Repo rt, Book I , p .448, Recommenda tion ' 35.
10
HR6051 (e) (1 ) .
11 .
Cart er Order 2-305.
12
5 25 25 !il 34 (5 ) .
13
.:.- :.....'.:
Id . .l 35 (a ) (4).
"
277
276
3)
use of chemical, biological, or other weapons
in v iolation of treaties or o ther inte r nat i ona l
agreements to which the Uni ted States is a
party;14/
4)
the to r ture of individua ls;15/ and
5 ) t he s upport o f a ny a c t i on , wh ich vi o lates
h uman r i g hts , c ond uc ted by the po l ice, f oreign
i ntel l igence , or inte r n a l s ecurity f orces of
any for ei gn c ount r y . "16/
5 2525 would prohibit the following but would provide
f or a Pres idential waiver of this r estri ction i n times
o f war or when t he Pres ide n t d e t e r mi n e s that there is
a "grave and imme d iate thr eat to the nat iona l security"
and t hat s uch a ct i on i s "vital " and i s t he only wa y t o
a c compl ish the objec tive : 17/
1 ) "the suppor t o f internat ional terr or ist a c t i -
v itie s ;lB/
2 ) t he mass destruc ti on o f prope r ty ; 19/
3 ) the c r e a t i on o f f ood or wa ter s hor t a ge s or
floods;20/ and
4) the v i olen t overthrow o f t h e d e moc r a t i c gove r n-
men t o f any c ount r y ."21/
The Church Committee Re por t r e commended p r o h i b i tion of:
14-
rd . 13 135 (a) (5 ) .
15
r d . !i135 (a ) ( 7 ) .
1 6
r d. !i13 5(a) ( B).
17
Id. !i136.
I B
I d . 135 (a) (1 )
1'laiver a t 13 136.
1 9
Id . 135 (a ) (2).
Waiver a t 136 .
20
I d . 135 (a ) ( 3 ) .
at 1 36 .
21
Id. 13135(a) (6).
Waiver at 13136.
5
"polit i c a l as s ass i nat ions ;
1)
2) e fforts to s ubvert democrat i c governments; and
3 ) s uppor t f or pol ice or o t h e r internal security
f o r c e s which e ngage in t he sys tematic vi olation
of h uma n r ights." 22/
The pi ke Commit tee Report r e c omme nd e d prohibition of
"d i r e ct and indirec t atte mpts to a s sas s i na t e i ndivi-
dual and a ll paramili tary act ivi t ies ..except in t ime
of war." 23 /
C. STANDARDS
1 . I n wha t circumst a nc e s s ho u l d covert operat ions
be conduc ted?
Th e Car t er Order author i zes covert operations
whe ne ver the Pres ident appr oves s uch a ctivity.24/ 52525
woul d r equire , prior t o initiation of a covert-operation,
Pr e s i de nt i a l findi ng s t hat:
1) "such activity i s essential to the national
de fens e or t h e conduct of f o rei gn poli cy of
the Un i ted States;
2 ) the a nt icipated benefi ts of such activity
j u s t i f y the f ore s e e a b l e risks and likely con-
sequences of i t s di s c l o s u r e to a foreign
power;
3) overt or less sensitive a l t e r nati v e s would not
be l ikely to ach ieve th e in tende d ob jectives;
and
4) the c ircumstances requi re the use o f extraor-
d i na r y means . "25/
22
Chu r c h Committ e e Repor t , Book I, p . 44B , Recommendation #36.
23
Pi ke Commi tt e e Repor t, p. 2. ,. ' ;'
24
Cart e r Or de r !iI- BOB.
25
5 2525 !l131 (d).
6
279
278
The Church Committee Repor t r e c omme nd e d limitat i on
of the conduc t o f cover t ope rat ions to "extraordi nary
ci rcums t a n c es when no o ther me ans wi ll suffice" and the n ,
only when nec essary "to deal wi t h gr a v e threats to Amer i -
can security."26/ The Pike Committe e Report recommende d
authorizat ion of covert operat ions on l y when t he Presi -
dent cer t ifies t ha t s uc h a c t i on "i s r e qu i r e d t o p r o t e c t
the nat ional secur i ty of t he Un i t e d St ates."27/ HR6051
would a u t horize covert ope rations only a f t e r a "congres-
s ional dec laration o f war."28/
2. What should be the sta nd a r d s of prior a pproval
for c ov ert operations?
The Car ter Order doe s not p rescr ibe s t a nd a r d s for
pr i or r eview o f c ov ert opera ti ons . Unde r S252 5, t he N5C
would have t o c ons i der t he f ol l owi ng factors p r ior to
ini t i ation of c over t opera t i ons:
1) "the justif icat ion for such proposed act ivi ty;
2) th e n ature, scope,
c osts , foreseea ble
o f di sclosure, and
o f the termi nat ion
probable durat ion, es t imate d
risks, li kely c onse q uences
actions n eces sary in t he e vent
of such a ct ivity;
3) the
and
relationship between the proposed
any pre vio usly a p prov e d activi ty;
activity
4) the l ikelihood that the object ives o f suc h
activity would be achiev ed by overt o r less
sensitive al ternat ives; a nd
5) the leg al
.ss/
implicat ions o f the proposed activi ty."
26
Church Commi t tee Report, Bo o k I, p. 44 6; s e e a lso Ch urch
Commi t t e e Repo r t , Book I, p. 44 8, Recommendat ion #35 .
27
Pike Commit tee Report, p. 2.
28
HR6051 303 (e ) .
29
525 25 1 31 (c ) .
7
prior t o ini t iation of covert operations, 5 2525 also
r equire the Presidential findings l iste d above.30
The Ch ur c h Committee Report r ecommended inclusion of
t he s ame f actor s for considerat ion by the NSC as 52525
a s as "a c a r e f u l and systematic analysis of the
po l i t i c a l premises u nd e rlying the recommended acti ons."31/
Rev i ew by the N5C, a s r e c omme nd e d by t he Pike Committee ,
encompass the same factors as those listed above
5 25 25 would require for s uch revi e w. 32/ HR6051
require a "congressi ona l declaration o f war" prior
t o initi a t i on of cover t ope r a t i ons .33/
3. Should there be a limitation on the duration
of cov ert operatio ns?
The Car ter Order d oes no t set a time limit on cover t
ope rat i on s . 52525 would not l imi t t he duration o f cover t
ope rat i ons and wou l d e s t a blis h annual r e v i e w of such ac-
tiv i t i e s on the a s s ump t ion that they may continue for
peri ods l ong e r than one year. 34 /
The Church Commit tee Report did not specify a
cut - off per iod for covert operations. The Pi ke Com-
mit t e e Repor t mandated t ha t no covert operation continue
f or mor e t h a n one year pas t the "date of affi rmative
recomme nd ati on o f i t s i n i t iat i o n . "35/
30
5ee no t e 25 & accompanyi ng t ext supra .
31
Chur c h Commi t t e e Report, Bo ok I , p . 448 , Recommendat ion #3 7 .
32
Pike Commi ttee Repo r t , p. 5 .
33
HR6051
34
52525 131If) .
35
Pi ke Commi tte e Re po rt, p. 3.
8
......: 0"
-r (( ::. :
281
280
D. PROCEDURES
1 . What pr oc e du res shoul d be f ol lowed prior t o
i n i t i a t i on o f c ove r t o pe r a t ions ?
The Ca r ter Order es tab l i s he s a c ommi t tee o f t he
NSC whi c h mus t c ons i d e r a l l pro pos a l s f o r c ove r t ope ra-
tions and s ubmi t a po l i c y r ecommenda ti on t o t he Pre si-
dent on a l l covert oper a tion s . 36/ The Pres i d e n t mus t
appr ove al l c ove r t operat i ons pr i o r t o t he i r i niti a-
t i on und e r t he Car ter Order . 37/ S2525 wou l d r equire
revi ew of eac h c ov e r t ope r a t ion by t he NSC a nd Pres i -
dent i a l appr ov al prior t o ini tia tio n o f t he a ctivi ty. 38/
Pr i o r noti fica t ion to t he c o ngr e s s i ona l c ommi t t e e s on--
i n t e l l i ge nc e wou ld be r e q ui r e d by S252 5 unless t he Pr e s i -
dent determi ned t h a t s uch no t i fica t i on would r e s u l t i n
harmf u l d e l a y . 39/
The Chur c h Commi t tee Re po r t r e c ommended pr ior
r e view by a c ommitte e of t he NSC and fi na l approv a l
by t he Pr e s i d e n t . 40/ The Ch ur c h Commi t t e e Re por t a l s o
c a l led f or s pecifIed a nd deta ile d budge t r e quests f o r
c ove r t ope r a t i o ns a n t ici pated a t t he t ime o f the annua l
i n t e l l i gence budget The Pi ke Commi t t e e
Re por t r ecomme nd e d e s tabl ishmen t o f a NSC commi ttee
36
Car ter Order 1- 302 .
37
Car t e r Or der 1- 808.
38
S2 52 5 1 31 (a ) , ( d )
39
S2525 !h3l(g ).
40
Churc h Commi t tee Repq r t , Boo k I, pp. 448-449 , Recommenda t i on 137.
41
ld. at p. 449, Re commenda tion #3 8.
9
whose members would review all covert operations and
submit their proposal to the President.42/ The Pike
commit te e Report required notification to the House
selec t Committee on Intelligence accompanied by a Presi -
de n t i a l certification of t he necessity of the operation
a nd r e c omme nd a t i on s f r om members of the NSC committee.43/
HR6051 would prohibi t covert operations in peacetime --
and d oe s not establish procedures for their authoriza-
tion during war.44/
42
Pike Committee Repo rt , p. 5.
43
l d . a t p , 2.
44--
HR6051 303(e) .
10
' ,::
282
283
II. COVERT COLLECTION OF INTELLIGENCE ABROAD
Cover t or "sen s i tive" col l ectio n a cti v i t ies are cla n-
dest ine ef f orts by t h e U. s . t o for eign i n t elli ge n c e
for ma t i o n . The expo s u r e o f such an op e ration , e i t he r
becau s e o f t he s our c e o f t h e i n forma ti on s ought , t he
sub j ect o f t he inf o r mation, t he manne r of c ollec t ion
or othe r f a ctors , c a n o f t e n h a v e a sig ni fi c a n t e ffect
on Amer i c a n i n tere sts . Th e U- 2 , KC- 135 a nd Gl oma r Ex -
plorer are intell i genc e c ol l e c t ion operat i ons who se use
wou l d b e c ov e r e d by t h ese r u l e s a l ong wi t h the u s e o f
s pi e s in some c i r cums t ance s . Th e secr ecy r e quire d by
t h e s e opera tion s i n sulate s t h e m f r om the s or t of pub l ic
deb a t e norma l l y as s oci a ted wi t h democ rat i c d e cisi on-
ma k ing; mor e ov e r , in forme d publ i c deb a te on broad er
issues i s h indered by the sec recy in which the fr u its
of s e n s i t i v e c o l lec t i o n a c t i v i tie s a r e h e ld.
A. AUTHORIZATION
1. Do e s c ov ert col l e c t i on diffe r from i ntelli-
gence col l ecti on gene r ally ?
The Ca r t e r Orde r d i stinqu i she s bet ween clande s-
tine i n t elligence i n ge neral and "sensit ive f orei gn
i ntellige nc e c o l l e ction operat ions " a nd est a b l i shes
r u l e s f or the latte r . 1/ S2 52 5 would es t abl ish sepa-
r a t e pr o c edur e s for c l a ndestine col l ection act i v i t ies
who s e "impor tanc e or sen s i t i v i t y " mandat es a ddi tional
safegua r d s or review. 2/
Th e Church Commi t t e e Re p ort d i d no t c a l l f o r
s peci a l r u l e s for c ertain colle ction a c t i v i t i e s . 3/
The Pike Commi ttee Re p or t r e c omme nd e d a r e quire me n t
o f s peci a l r e vi e w o f " ha z ardous c olle c t i on a c t ivit i e s "
al though i t did not i ndic a t e t he pre c i se scope o f t h i s
term.-..!/
1
Ca r t e r Or d e r 1- 303 .
2
S25 25 1 31 .
3
Chu r c h Commi tte e Repo r t , Book I, p. 4 36- 442 .
4
Pike Commi t t e e Repor t, p . 5.
11
aR6051 would distinguish between human and technical
i n t e l l i g e nc e col lection and would prohibithuman collec-
tion (espionage) in peacetime. 5/
in_
2. Should there be special authorization for covert
collection?
The Carter Order requires special authorization
by t he Special Coordination Committee of t h e NSC prior
t o i nitiation of a ll sensitive c o l l e c t i on operations . 6/
S2525 would mandate review and approva l of sens itive --
c o llec t i on by the NSC prior to initiation of such acti-
v i t y . 7/
'The Church Committee Report did not specify
a need for special authorization of covert collection.
The Pike Committee Repor t r e c omme nd e d that review of such
act ivi t i e s by a Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the
NSC be required. 8/ HRG051 would prohibit covert human
--
B. STANDARDS
1. What s t a nd a r d s should trigger i d e n t i f i c a t i on
of covert col lection?
The Carter Order requires the President to estab-
lish the standards which would t r i gge r the special au-
t hor i z a t i on procedures for sensitive c o l l e c t i on . 1 0/
5
HR605 1 8 30 3.
6
Ca r t e r Order 1- 303.
7
S2525 131(a).
8
Pike Committee Repor t, p. 5.
9
HR6051 303.
10
. ''';: ....

Carter Order 1-30 3.
12
285
284
S2525 also would require Presidential determination of
such s tandards t o identi fy t hos e c landestine c o l lect ion
acti viti es whose " i mpor t a nc e or sens i tivi ty r equi r e s
review by t he NSC." l l /
The Ch urch Committee Repor t, t he Pi ke Commi ttee
Report, a nd HR6D51 did not address t hi s issue.
2 . What standards of r ev i ew should be r e quired
for c over t col lection?
Onl y S25 25 wou l d mand a t e spe cif i c s tandar ds f or
review of cover t col lect ion. They a re:
1 ) " jus ti f icat i on f o r s u c h proposed a c t ivi ty ;
2) t he na t u re , s cope , probabl e durat ion , e s t imate d
c os t , f ores e e a b l e r isks , l i ke l y c ons e que nc e s
of di s c l o sure , a nd actions nec essary in t he
even t of t he t e r mi na t i on o f t he a ctivi ty;
3 ) t he rel a t i o ns h i p betwe e n the proposed acti v i t y
and any pre viously approve d activity;
4 ) t he likel i ho od tha t the obj ectives of s uch
activ ity would be ach i e ved by over t or l e s s
sensitive alterna tives; and
5 ) t he l e gal impl i c ations of t he propo s e d a c t i -
vity."!y
C. PROCEDURES
1. What s hou ld be the procedu res f or ap proval of
cover t col l e c t ion ?
The Car ter Or d e r requ ires the DCI t o r eport pro-
posal s f or cove r t c o l l ecti o n to the Cha i r ma n of a Com-
mi t te e of the NSC and mand ates the Committe e t o revi ew
a nd approve all such p roposal s .13/ S2525 would re q uire
s imil ar review by t he NSC as wella s pr ior noti f i c a-
tion t o t he President. S2 525 a lso wou l d e stab lish a
procedur e f or Pres i dent ial a pproval o f activities
11
S2525 !l131 (b) (1)
1 2
S25 25 13 1 (c)
13
Carte r Or d e r !l1-3D3
13
"whose e xceptiona l importance or sen si t i v i ty" r equires
this addi tional safeguard.14/
RESTRICTIONS
p.
1. What restr ictions sho ul d govern c overt collec-
tion?
S2525 would establish limitations f or c ove r t col-
lection but these wou l d a pp l y on l y to t hose acti vities
whos e "exceptional importance or sensitiv ity" wou ld
ma nd a t e President ial approval. The Pres i d e n t wo u l d
have to establ i sh s t a nd a r ds for ident ification o f t hose
a c tivities which fit this categ or y.15/ S2 525 would r e-
qu i r e that, wi t h respect t o thi s category of c olle c t i o n,
the President determine that:
1) "the information to be obtained by such project
must be essential to the national defense or
the conduct of the foreign po li c y of the
United States;
2) the importance of the information must justify
the f or e s eeab l e risks of the like l y c o ns e que nc e s
of disclosure to a f oreign power; and
3) ov e r t or l e s s s e ns i t i ve alternative s wou l d not
be l i kely to accomplish the i nte nd ed ob jectives . "
!Y
15
Id
14
S2525 lh31 (b) (1)
; ~ ...
I:: ~
16
Ld , at ~ 3 ( e)
1 4
286
287
III. USE OF INDEPENDENT AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS
FOR I NTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
The CIA has , i n the p a st, us e d r e pr e sent a t i v e s
of Amer i can i ns t i t ut i on s - c l ergy , aca demics , j our na l i s t s _
f o r oper ati on a l ass i s t a n c e i n espio n a ge a nd c ov e r t ac-
t i v i t i e s . The us e o f t hese individua l s r a i s e s i ssue s
wi t h r e s pe c t to t h e c oo p t i ng o f i nd e pe nd e n t i n sti t u -
tio n s t o t he det r i me n t o f both t h e i n s t i t u t i on a nd
soci ety at l arge.
A. AUTHORIZATI ON
1. Shou l d t he us e o f i ndependent Ame r i c a n ins t itu-
tIOnS by the community be authori z ed ?
The Carter Or de r does not r egu l a t e t he use o f
i ndepe ndent i n s t i t u t i o n s by the i nte1 1i g ence community
a t a l l , l e a v i ng t hi s matte r to agen c y regu l a t ion s .
S2525 wo u l d not restr i c t t he vol untary us e of r epr esent a -
t i ve s of i n s t itut i o ns . Th e b i l l wo u l d partial l y pro -
h ibi t the pa id us e of s uch pe o ple . 1/ The Chur c h Com-
mi t t e e Re po r t pe rmi t t e d vol unt ary r e l a t ion s h ips . Th e
Chu r c h Commi t t e e Re p ort r e c omme nd e d p rohibiti o n o f c o n-
t r a c t u a l rel ati o n s hips wi t h t he p ress , c lergy a nd gove r n -
me n t g rant ees (exc ha ng e s t ude n t s ) . Paid r e l a t ion s h i p s
wi t h represe ntat i v e s o f Ame r i can a cademi c i n s t i t ut i ons
woul d be a utho ri z e d . 2/ The Pik e Committe e Re po r t re-
c ommended pr oh i b i t ion-of p a i d r e l a t ion shi ps . 3/ HR6051
wou ld p r oh i b i t c l a nd e s t ine col l e c t i on a nd c ov ert opera -
t ions i n peacetime a nd wo u l d t hus render thi s i s s ue moot . -!/
B. RESTRI CTIONS
The Ca r t e r Or de r con t a i n s no restrictio ns. S2525
wou l d a u t h o r i z e l i mi t e d us e o f certai n pe r sons under
1
S:t 525
2
Chur c h Commi t t ee Report , Boo k I, p . 45 5- 45 6 , Re commendat i o n s
#42-48.
3
Pi ke Commi t t e e Re p or t, p. 6, P( l).
4
HR6051 303.
15
rticular circumst ances for certain purposes. The
Re po r t proposed reg ulation of the us e
of
1. How should t he use of c l e r g y b e r egul a t ed?
S2525 wo u l d prohibit the p aid use of a nyone engaged
in a ful l-time religiou s vocation for o perat ion a l ass is-
Howe ver, s uc h per s o n s could be c o n t r a c t ed
to aid in the recruitment of s o ur ces of i n f o r ma t i o n
or
2. How should the use of jou r n a l i s t s be regu l a t e d ?
S2525 would prohibit t he p a i d use of a c c r e d i t e d
journalists, edi tors and po l i c yma k e r s o f U. S . pub l i c a-
ti ons for operational ass ist a nc e .-2I Howe ver , their
pa id assistance i n rec r u itment effo rts wo u l d b e author i -
zed. 8/ The use of freelance journal i sts wou l d not be
regulated by S2 5 25.-2/ Th e Chur c h Committe e Report recom-
mended extension of t h i s protectio n to all journalists who
co ntribute material s regularly.10/
3. How should the u se of government grantees be
regulated?
Grantees could not be paid for ooerati o n al as s istance
unde r S2525.11/ Howe v e r , t hey c ou l d be contra cted for
as sistance in-recruitment efforts.12/
5
S2525 132(a) (1) .
6
Id.
7-
at 132(f).
Id. at 132(a ) (3 ) .
8
See
9-
note 6 supra.
Se e
I -O-
note 7 supra.
Se e
11-
Church Committee Report, Book I, p. 456,
. .:
#46.
S2525
12
132(a) (2) .
__Id. at 132( fl .
1 6
288
289
4. How shou l d the us e o f repr e s e n tat i ve s of a ca-
d e mi c i nsti t ut i on s be reg ulate d ?
S252 5 wou l d aut ho r i z e the us e of a cade mi c s t ravel -
ing 3broad for ope ration a l a ssistance ; a s eni or o f f i c i a l
at such per son 's i ns t i t ut ion would have t o b e n o ti fi e d
of a paid relationship.13/ The us e o f aca d emics to
a s s i s t i n r ecru i t ment e f f orts (at home as well a s a -
br oad) wo u l d not be r es t ricted by the bill . 14/
The Ch urch Committ ee Re port r ecommend e d us e of
academics be permitte d and require d t hat officials of
the ins ti t u t i on be noti f i e d in a l l c ases . It suggeste d
that universities adop t thei r own regulati ons . 15 /
5. Sho u l d the dis tri b ut ion of i n formation wi t h i n t he
U.S . be supported c ov e r t l y by the intelligenc e
communit y?
Th e Carter Order does not prohi bit thi s activ ity.
S2525 wou l d p r oh i b i t covert distr ibution wi t h i n the U. S.161
a nd a b roa d whe r e such di s t r ibut i o n is "l ikely" to re- -
suI t i n "subs t a nt i al redistri bution wi t h i n the U. S.17/
The Church Commit te e Report recomme nde d prohibi t io n-of
bo t h direct a nd indi r ect di s t r i b uti on within the U. S . l SI
The Pik e Committee Repor t al s o r ecommended prohibition-of
such activ ities .1 9/ HR6051 wou ld also prohibit unack now-
ledged s uppor t for publ i c a t ion s .201
1 3
Id . a t 13 2(b) ( 2) .
14-
r d . a t 1 32 (f) .
1 5-
Church Committ e e Rep or t , Boo k I, p . 456 , Recomme n da t ion #42.
16
S2525 132 (a) (4).
17
I d . at 132 (a ) (5) .
l S-
Church Committee Repo r t , Book I, p . 456 , Recomme nda ti o n #45 .
1 9
Pike Commit te e Repor t , p. 6, P(2).
20
HR6051 !l303.
17
I V. PREVENTIVE ACTION DESIGNED TO FRUSTRATE
HOSTILE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND TERRORIST ACTI VI TI ES
BOTH
ABROAD AND IN STATES
Operations designed to frustrate the intelligence
operations of f or e i g n powe rs or the acti v i t ies o f inter-
national terror ists have also been a par t of the intelli-
gence mission . These activities ma y be c onducte d ei ther
abroad or in the United States and may be directed
ag ainst Ame r icans . Ta c t i c s can incl ud e b ut are not
limited to the d i ssemi na t i on of mi s i nfor mati on , atte mpt s
to provoke viol ence a nd v a r i ous f orms o f off i cial harass -
ment. Only S2525 deal s specifica lly wi th t h i s issue.
A. AUTHORIZATI ON
1. Should activities des igned to fr ustrate and
prevent anticipated foreign intelligence and
terrorist activities be authori zed?
The Carter Ord er does not p r oh i b i t a nd t h e r e fore
implicitly a u thor i ze s wi t hout r e g u l a t i on s uc h activ itie s .
S2525 would authori z e coun t e rterrorism and c ount e r in-
t e lligence acti v i ties. 1/ The Church Committee Report
r e commended prohib ition-of COI NTELPRO-type acti vi t i e s . 21
RR60S1 would proh ibit preventiv e action e x c e p t whe n such
action might be authori zed in t r ad i t i ona l l aw e n forc e -
ment related s ituations - e.g. arrest for a t tempted
crimes, intervie ws of suspects.-l/
B. STANDARDS
1. If such activity i s to be authori ze d , in what
c ircumstances s hou l d itbe permiss ible?
S25 25 wou ld not establish a sta ndard for initiation
of counterintelligence and coun terter rorism a c t ivities
but would direct the President to esta blis h s t a nd a r ds.-!/
1
.- ,,"
S2525 !l141.
2
Church Committee Re po r t , Book II, p . 317, Recommendati ons #40- 41 .
3
RR6051 l02; See also HR6051 112-113.
4
S2525 141(c) (2) .
IS
290
291
I t wo ul d require tha t cons ti t ut iona l cons iderat ions be
one bu t not the onl y f a ctor i n the deci s ion . 5
C. PROCEDURES
1 . Wha t proced ures s hou l d be e s tabl i s he d t o gove r n
the s e activi t i e s ?
S252 5 wou l d d i r e c t that t he Pr e s i d en t e s t a bl ish
procedures t o govern the i n i tiat ion o f a ctions t o pr e-
ve n t or c ou n t e r t errorism a nd espionage . I t wou l d d irect
t ha t t he mos t sen s i t ive a c t i viti es be a pproved by t he
Pr e s i d e nt bu t woul d l e av e t he determination a s to whi c h
a c t i v i t ies r equi r e t hi s s pecia l treatment to t he Pr e s i -

D. RESTRICTIONS
1. What restrictions on duratio n of these activit ie s
s houl d be e stab lishe d?
5 2525 would not limit the duration of c o un t er in -
t e l ligenc e a nd counter t e rroris m acti v i ties . -ll
2. Should c e r t ain a cti vi t ies b e proh i b i t ed?
S25 25 exp l i c i t l y wou l d not pr oh ibi t any a c t i on s
und e r t aken f or c oun t e r i ntell i ge nc e or c ount e r terrorist
pur pos e s ; COI NTELPRO- t ype a ctiv i t ies woul d no t be pr o -
hi b i t e d . S2525 does prohibi t a nonymo us d i ssemi na t i on o f
i nfor mation for t he pur pos e o f d i s c r e d i t i ng s omeo ne be-
c a u s e o f h is e xercise o f c on s t i t u t i ona l ri ght s . Howev e r ,
24 3 a ut ho r i ze s v i o l a t ions o f l aw othe r t han a c t s of v io-

5
I d . a t h41 (c ) ( 4 ) .
6-
Id.
7-
See S2 525 1 41 (c ) ( 5) whi ch manda tes annua l r evi e w i nd i c a t i ng
that l o ng- t e r m act i v i t i e s a re co n t e mp l a t e d .
8
The pro hi b itions o n s pe c i a l a cti vi t ies (S2525 ! 1 35 ) do not
app l y to count e r i n t e l l i gence a nd countert err ori sm
by S2525 14 1). 242 pr oh i b i t s d i s s emi na t i on ; 243 a ut hor l ze s
pa r t i c i pa t i on in i l l e g a l a c t ivities.
19
V. FOREI GN I NTELLI GENCE, COUNTERI NTELLI GENCE
AND COUNTERTERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS BOTH
ABROAD AND IN THE UNITED STATES
The foreign intel lig e nce gathering a c t iviti es of t he
uni t e d States inte lli gence agenci e s a r e designed to col -
lec t information for three primar y purpose s : (1) to l e arn
about the a c t iviti e s of foreign gove r nments a nd a ctiv i -
t i e s abroad , " f ore i gn int elligence i nforma tion" ; ( 2) t o
unc ove r the p l a ns o f fore ign i ntel ligenc e s ervi c e s t o
gather informat i on about t he United Stat e s or i ts a l l i e s
or to conduct c ov ert operations in the Unit ed States ,
"coun t e r i nt e l l i ge nce" ; a nd (3 ) t o lea rn a bout the acti -
vities of i n ternationa l t e r r o r i s t groups , " c oun t e r t e r r or -
ism. "
Such i n f o r ma t i on i s gathered no t on l y by targeting
foreigners but also by targeting Ameri c a n c i t i ze ns and
permanent resident aliens ( "U.S. pe rsons " ) bo th in the
un ited States and abroad. A v a r i e t y of t e c hni q ue s , some
extremely i nt r u s i v e , is used to gather thi s i n f ormation.
A. INVESTIGATI ON OF U.S . PERSONS WITHI N THE U.S . CON-
DUCTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF LEARNING ABOUT THE ACTI-
VITIES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND ACTIVITIES ABROAD
(FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION)
1. In what circums tances should a U. S . e e rson be
t a r ge t e d for a for eign intellige nc e l nve s t i ga-
tion?
The Carte r Orde r def ines " f or e i gn i n t e l lige nc e "
broadly as " i nforma t i on r e l ating to the c a pabiliti e s ,
i ntentions and act i v itie s of foreign powe r s , o r ga n i za-
t ions or persons." I I The Carter Order a u t hor i ze s i n-
vestigations for the col lec tion of s u ch i n f or mat i on
about U.S. pe rsons but limits collec t ion t o the f ol l ow-
i ng types of non-publicly a vailable. informat i on:
(a) "information about a person who i s reasonably
belie ved to be act ing on behalf of a foreign
power ."
:,:,:::
1
Carter Order 4- 205.
20
r
292
(b) " Inf or ma t i on c oncerni ng corpor at i on s or othe r
c ommerci al organi zations o r activ ities that
c onstitutes for eign intelligence ."
(c ) "In forma tion c ons t ituting f o rei gn intel l i ge nc e...
g a t he red ... fr om coopera t ing sour ces i n t he
Uni t e d Sta t es . "
(d ) " I nf or ma t i o n a cquired by over hea d r e c onna i s-
s a nc e no t di rec ted at s peci f i c United Stat e s
per s on s."
(e ) " I n f or ma t i on c ol lected , r e c eived , d i s s emi n a t e d
or stored by the FBI and ne c e s s a ry to ful fill
its l awf u l i nvestigat i ve r e s po ns ibi l i t i es."-21
These limitations c an reasonably be inte rpreted to en-
c ompass mor e t ha n crimi na l a c ts.
5 2 525 would author i ze for e i gn i n t ell i ge nc e i nve s t i -
gati ons of U. S . person s wi t h in the U. S . whe neve r a
des i gnated o f fic i a l o f the inte l ligence age nc y invo l ve d
ma ke s a det e rmi na t ion that the information wou l d be
" s i gn i f ican t f oreign intelligence" and t hat t he pe r s on
targeted
(1) "i s rea s o nab l y believed t o b e e nga ged i n e s -
p i onage or a ny o t her cla nd e s t ine i n t e l l i gence
activ i t y wh i c h invo lves or may i nvolve a vio -
l a t i on o f the criminal laws o f the Uni t e d
State s , sabotage , any internationa l t error i s t
activi t y , or any assa s i nati o n , to be aiding
and a be t t ing a ny person in t he conduct of a ny
suc h a ctivi t y , or to be consp iring wi t h a ny
person e nga ge d i n any such activi t y ."_3_1
5 252 5 would defi ne "foreign i n t e l l igence" mor e broa d l y
than the Ca r t e r Or d e r a nd inc l ude wi t h i n t he scope o f
tha t term "infor mat i on per t a i n i ng t o the capabil ities ,
i nte n t ions , or a c t i v i t i e s o f a ny f or e i gn s t ate , g ove r n -
ment, orga n i zation , ass o ciati on, or i nd i v i d ua l a nd a l s o
pertaining t o t he defe nse , natio na l secur i t y , f oreign
pol i c y or r elate d pol icies of the Uni t ed St a t e s , i n-
c l uding i n forma t ion on the f or e i gn aspects o f narcot i c s
prod uct ion a nd t raffi c k ing ."-i.!
2
Id . a t 2- 208 .
3-
5 2525 214 (1 ) .
4
Id . a t 1 04(13 ) .
21
293
Thi s s t andard tie s i nvestigations wi thin the Un i -
d states to e vidence o f c r imina l conduct. Howeve r ,
t ~ e standard on l y r equi r e s that the "reasonably be l i e ved"
t tivity "ma y i nvolve" a v iola t i on o f cr i mi na l statute s .
~ ~ i s change is a s i g n i f i c a nt retreat fr om the trad i t ional
standard (Terry v. Ohio) . As discus sed below, rim
inal
~ h e nexus to crime i s we a ke ne d e ven further for investi -
ations abr oad.
g The Church Commi t tee Report expl i c i t ly r e c omme nded
tha t the s t a nd a rd f or i ni t iat i o n o f a " f u l l pr e ve n t i ve
intelligence investigati on" shou ld be t ied to Te r r y v .
Ohio. 51 It rec ommended t ha t such a n i nvestigation should
proceed upon "r e a s ona b l e suspicion " t ha t t he t arget "wi l l
soon engage i n. . hostile fore i gn i nte l l igence a ctiv i t y . " 61
"Hostile f oreign i n t e l l i ge nc e a c t i vity " i s def ined to i n=-
elude some non-criminal a ctivities .-ll Howeve r, the re port
sta ted that "cer t a i n activiti es e nga ge d in by t he cons c i ou s
ag ents of foreign powers , s uc h a s f orms o f i nd us t r i al, t e ch -
no l ogical, or e c onomic e spi onage , a re no t now prohibited
by fede r a l statutes. Itwou l d be prefe r ab l e to amend the
espionage laws to c over such activity ... As a matter of
principle, intelligence agencies s hou l d not investigate
activities o f Americans wh i c h are no t federal cri minal
statutes."(sic) 81 The Committee restricted investi g a t i on s
to t he acts o f conscious age nts of a f oreign power . 91
The Church Committee Re porta lso r e c omme nd e d that t he FBI
be permi t t e d to c onduc t a less i n t rus i ve i nve stig ation--
a "preliminary prevent i ve intell igence i nv e stigation"--
whe r e "it has a spe cif ic a llegation or spe cific or s ub-
stantiated information that the American .. wi ll s oon e n-
gage in ... ho stile f oreign intel ligence activ ity ."l OI
:.
Church Committee Report, Boo k II, p -. 318 .
6
~ at Book II, p. 32 0, Recommendati on #4 4 .
7
Id. at Book II, p. 34 0 , De f i n i t i o n (H) .
....; ";
8 :;:.'.'.:
~ at Book II , p. 34 0 , ftn. 74 .
See notes 7 and 8 & a ccompanying t ext supra .
10
Church Committee Report , Book II , p . 32 0 , Re comme ndat ion #44.
22
294
295
HR605 1 would authorize on l y t he i nvestiga t i o n o f
"spe cific acts which vio late Fe d e r a l c r imi na l statut e s . " 11,
Pr ov i s i on is a lso made f or a l imite d pre liminar y i n vesti=-
g a t i on "upon r ece i pt of a s pe c i f i c al lega t ion t hat a
pers on ha s commi tte d , is c ommitting , or i s abou t t o
c ommi t a s pe cifi c a c t whi c h v i olates a Federal c r imi nal
sta t ute." 12/ Absent a v iolat i o n o f c r i mina l s t atutes ,
HR5 05 1 wo uld prohib i t t he cover t c ol l ect i on o f for eign
i nte l l igence i n forma t i on i n peacet i me. 13/
2. Sho ul d t here be l i mi tati ons on t he t echni ques
emp l oye d i n such
Al l o f the recomme nded g uide line s exce pt HR6051
e nvisage f u ll sca l e i nve s t i ga t i on s proce edi ng from t he
a bove s t a nda r d s i n c l ud i ng b ut not l i mited to t he fol l ow-
i ng t e c h ni q ue s :
Overt Te c hn iques (inclUd i ng prete xt inter v iews )
Name c hec k s / Na t i o na l Agenc y checks14/
Phy s i cal s ur ve i l l a nc e
Ca nvas of exi sting cove r t huma n s ources
Exa minatio n of phone and c redi t r e c ords
Ta rge ting of c ove r t human sour ces
Ma i l c over
Exami na t i o n o f t a x records
Exami na t i on o f med i c a l r e c ords, pr i vate institu-
t i ons ' r e c o r d s , " s ocia l hi s tory " record s , f e de r a l ,
sta t e and local agenc y r ecords .
11
HR6051 112(a) .
1 2
.I.!L. at 111 13 ( a)
13
I d. a t 3 03 .
14-
For def initions o f the s e t e r ms , see , r espe c t ive l y , Chur c h
Commi t t e e Repor t , Boo k I I, p . 34 0 , Definition (I ) a nd 5 25 25
2 04 ( 10 ) . No te t he di f fere nc e be t we e n the t e r ms ; a "nat i o na l
a ge nc y check " i s mo r e e xt e ns i ve t han a "name che c k . "
23
The church Committee Report recommended limi t at ion of
"preliminary preventive intelligenc e investigati ons "
to overt techniques, name checks, phys ical surveillance ,
anvassing of exi s t i ng human sourc e s a nd examinat ion
phone and c redit records.
HR605 1 would establish a h igher s t a ndard - - that of
probable cause of a criminal act- -for the examination
of private records and the use of mail c overs .15/
The use of informants would be prohibi ted (by HR6051)
with respect to groups engaged i n Firs t Amendme n t Acti -
vity.16/
of t he guidel ines would e s t ab l i s h different
standards from those discussed above for the emp l oy -
ment of very in tru sive techniques--electron ic sur vei l-
lance, physical searches and mail ope ning. The s e tec h -
niques require a warrant when empl oyed for traditional
law enforcement purposes and will be d iscuss ed below in
section VII, "Very Intrusive Techniques."
3. What procedures should be e s tabl i shed to govern
these investigations?
The Carter Order authori zes investigations to
be undertaken "by procedures e s t a bl ishe d by the head
of the agency concerned a nd a ppr ove d by the Attorney
General."17/ 52525 would authorize investigations upon
the written approva l o f a designated agency of ficial;
annual review by t he At t or ne y General of i nves t igat ions
which last more than IBO d a ys would also be required.lB/
52525 would require the approval of the Attorney General
for the employment of the following techniques:
1. examination of tax records
2. physical surveillance
3. direction of covert human sources
4. mail covers
5. examination of private records

HR6051 203(b) and 206(a ) .
16 ": J
ra. at 202.
17-
Carter Order 2-201(a).
rs
5 2525 216 .
24
297 296
6 . See secti o n VI I on t h e us e o f "ve ry i nt r usive
technique s . "19/
The Churc h Commi t t e e Re por t r ecomme nded
wr i tten a pproval of t he At torney General for t he
emp loyment o f a ny tech n i que Nh i c h wou l d not be per -
mi s s i ble a s pa r t o f a pr eliminary prev e n t i v e int e l l i gence
inves tigation . 20/ (See page 24 for a lis t o f thes e
techn iques . ) HR605 1 wo uld require t h e wri t t e n appr ov a l
(including per t i nen t i nformat i on ) o f the director o f
the inve s t igat i ng agency a fter t hirt y days . Th e approv a l
of the Atto rney General would b e req ui re d i n any investi-
g ation touchi ng on t he e xerci s e o f t he tar get ' s F irst
Amendment ri gh t s .21/
4. Should these investigati ons be r e s tric t e d in
duration?
The Carter Order does not l imit the period of time
for whi c h an i nvestig a t i on ma y c onti nue. 5 252 5 would
pe rmi t investigat ions for 90 d ays , r ene wa b l e in wr i t i n g
for another 90 days. An investi gation c ould be ext e nd e d
indefinitely be yond 180 d a ys upon a wr i t ten fi nding
by an agency off i cial that suc h an exte nsi on wa s "ne c-
essary and rea s onable."22/ The standard f or extens ion
of an i nves t i ga t i o n would be no higher t han the origi-
nal s t a nd a r d .
Th e Church Committee Re po rt recommended that a
preliminary pre ventiv e intell igence investigation be
limi ted to 30 days from the recei pt of the information.
An e xtensi o n no t to e xc e e d 60 days could be obtained
i f the At t or ney General or his designee det e r mi ne d that
the informa tion obt ained wa rrant e d f urth e r investigation . 23
A full prevent i ve intelli gence inves t igation could l a st --
no longe r than on e y ear wi t hout a finding of compell i ng
circumstances b y t he Attorney Gene ral or h i s des i g nee.24/
The Chur c h Commi ttee Re po r t r ecommend e d t h a t the targe tIng
o f i nforma nts be limi ted t o 90 d ays with a 60 d a y ex-
t ension upon a f inding b y the Att orne y General of "pro -
b a ble caus e ." 25/
19 --
Id. at 21 5 .
20--
Church Commit tee Report , Book II, P? 327-32 9, Recomme nda t i on
#51- 58.
21
HR6051 11 4(a) - (b).
22
52525
23
Church Committee Report, Bo ok I I , p . 320 , Recomme nd ation #44 .
24
Id.
25--
I d . at Book II, p p. 328-329, Recommendation #5 6
25
HR6051 wou l d limit preliminary i nqu i r i e s to 60
aYs. However, the director o f the FBI could authori ze,
writ ing, a thirty d a y exte nsion if the fact s obtained
7 the original inquiry we r e deemed to j usti f y i t .
n
an authorizat ion wou ld hav e to set f orth the parti-
ul
a r
acts on which the author i zation was base d.26/
full-scale criminal i nve s t i g a t i o n would have to be term-
inated after 6 months unless an ex tensio n was authorized
in writing by the At t or ney General upon a f inding of
probable cause.27/
5. What other restrictions should be appl ied to
such investigations?
Both the Carter Order and 5 2525 require tha t the
least intrusive me a ns of inve s t i g a t i on should be employ-
ed.28/ The Church Committee Report and HR6051 c on tain
simIlar restrictions.29/
The Carter Order prohibits all intelligence agencies
from requesting or otherwise e n c ou r ag i ng "directly or
indirectly, any person, organi zat ion , or gov e r nme n t
agency t o undertak e activities forbi dden by t his Order
or by applicable l aw."30/ Simil ar l y 52525 woul d mandate
that "no entity of commun ity .. s ha l l
kno wingly pa y , cause, re quest , or otherwise e n c ou ra g e ,
directly or indirectly, any indi vidual, organ i zation ,
or f or e i g n government to engage in any act i vity i n whi c h
such entity of the intelligence community i s p rohibi t -
ed from engaging. "31/
HR6051 wouldprohibit "al l f or ms o f p olitical sur-
veillance by intelligence age nc i e s "32! ' a nd "al l forms
of selective investigat i on or prosecution by t he i n t e l l i -
gence agencies."11/
26
HR605 1 !ill 3 (b) .
27
I d . at 1l4(d ).
28-
Carter Order 2-201(a) and 52 525 !i21 5 ( "necessary and
r e a s o na ble" req uirement).
29
Se e , Church Committe e Report
b
Book II , p . 32 8,
Recomme nda t i o n #55(2) and HR6051 E:204 ( b) (3) .
30
Carter Order 2-307. "_: ./ : "
31
5252 5 137 (a)
32
HR6051 2 (b) (1). See also HR6051 lilOl
33
".!E.. at 2(b) ( 3 ). See also, Id. at, h 0 3 .
26
299
298
HR6051 al s o wou l d proh i b i t intellig ence agencies from
coope r ating with any f ederal , state , loc a l or private
agenc y to per form i nv e stigations or t e chniques prohibit-
ed by t he act . 34/
B. I NVESTIGATION OF NON- U.S. PERSONS WITHI N THE U.S .
CONDUCTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF LEARNING ABOUT THE
ACTI VI TI ES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND ACTI VI TI ES
ABROAD (FOREIGN INTELLI GENCE I NFORMATION)
1. I n wha t circumstances should a non-U . S . pe r s o n
be targeted for a forelgn i n t e l llge nc e lnvestl -
ga t ion wi t h i n the United State s ?
The Carter Order provide s n o protection for non-
U.S . perso ns. 525 25 woul d a l low such inve stigations
if:
"(1) such pe rson i s an office r or employee of
any for e ign powe r o r organization;
( 2) the circumstanc es o f s uch person's presence
in the Un i t ed St a tes make i t r e a s on abl y
likely t ha t such per son ma y engage in es -
pionage or a ny ot he r c l a ndes t i ne intelligence
act i vity;
(3 ) i n f orma t i o n c once r n ing such person i s deter -
mi ned by the h e a d of t he colle c t i ng ent i t y
of the intel l igence c ommunity to be signi-
fic ant foreign intelligence; or
(4) the c o llection of information concerning
s uch person wou l d be permi tted under thi s
par t if s uch person we r e a United States
person , b u t a ny l i mitat i on u nder thi s part
on d ur at ion o r techn i ques of collection
that would be appli c a ble to c ollection
c oncerning a United Sta t e s person s hall
not appl y t o col lection unde r this section . " 35/
34
I d . at !!l 04 .
35-
52525 22 5.
27
standard of investigation for foreign per s ons wi th -
' n the United States would not be tied to a cr iminal
foreign persons wit h in the united States would
be subject to investigation under S2525 for their e mp l oy -
ment status under (1) abov e a nd the information s ought
need not be "significant foreign intelligence."
The Church Committee Report recommended application
of the same standard of i nvestigat ion to fore igners
within the United States as that whic h applied to Ameri-
cans. The Report recommended that a " pr e l i mi nary preven-
tive intelligence imvestigation" follow " a specific
al legation or specific or substantiated information that
the American or foreigner wi l l soon e n ga g e in ... hostile
foreign intel ligence activity."36/ A " fu l l preventive
intelligence investigation," could be c ondu c t e d upon
" ' r e a s on a b l e suspicion' that a n Ame r i c a n or foreigner
will soon engage in.. hostile foreign intelligence a c-
tivity."37/ HR6051 would prohibit covert collection
of foreign intell igence information in peacetime whether
the target was a U.S. person or a foreigner.38/ HR6051
would require reasonable suspicion of "specific act
whi ch violates a Federal criminal statute" for initia-
tion of a full investigation of a for eigner wi thi n the
United States.39/
2. Should there be limits on the tec hniques em-
pl oyed in such investigations?
The Carter Order implicitly places no limitations
on the techniques for such investigations . 52 52 5 would
limit only techniques used in the invest igat ion of U.S.
persons and "any limitation... on duration or techniques
of collection that would be applicable to collection
concerning a United States person shall not appl y to
collection" of i n f o r mat i on concerning foreign persons
wi t hin the United States .40/ The Church Committee Report
r ecommended that certain t echniques be empl oyed pur-
suant to each stage of investigation; t h i s distinction
between preliminar y and ful l investigati ve techniq ues
applies to i nvestigations of foreigners as we l l a s U.S.
persons.!!!
36
Church Committee Report, Book II , p. 320, Recommendation #44.
37
38I d. .r- ..: ,,:.:","
HR605l 9303.
39
!.t!. at 1l 2(bl.
40
5252 5 22 5 (4l .
41
Church Committ e e Report, Book II , p. 32 0 , Recommendation #44.
28

300
301
HR60 51 wou l d proh i b i t collection o f f or e i g n inte l l igence
5. Wha t other r e s t r ictions should be app l i e d to
informa tion in
such
The res tricti o ns d i s c us s e d i n Se c t ion A. ( 5) a bove
pplY to i nv e stigati o ns o f non-U. S . pe rson s as well as
3 . Wha t proced ur e s shou l d be e stab li s he d to govern
investig a t i ons of U. S . persons .
t hese i nve s t i ga t ions ?
The Carter Order d oes not estab l ish proc ed ur e s for
s uch i nve s tigation s . 8 2525 wou l d no t req ui r e that the
INVESTIGATION OF U.S. PERSONS WITHIN THE U.S. CONDUCTED
c.
p r oc e d ura l s a f e g ua rds r e q u i r e d i n t he i nve stiga t ion of
TO UNCOVER PLANS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES TO
I
U. S . per sons be a ppl i e d to t he i nvestigat ion o f for e i gn
GATHER I NFORMATI ON ABOUT THE UNITED STATES OR ITS
pe r s ons wi t h i n t he U. S . If t n e s t a nd ard was met, S2 52 5
ALLIES OR TO CONDUCT COVERT OPERATIONS IN THE UNITED
wo u l d manda t e no f ur t her r e q u i reme nts . 4 3/
STATES (COUNTERINTELLIGENCE)
Th e Church Commi t te e Re por t rec ommended d iffe re n t
pro c edure s f or e a c h c over t ' e c hn i que a uthori zed on l y f or
use i n "ful l prevent ive i n t ellige n c e i nve s t i ga t i ons."
These proced ur e s a pply on l y to i nve stig a t i on of Ame r i -
1.
cans unl e s s t he t e c h nique is one whic h i f use d for l a w
e n f or c e me n t p urpos e s wou l d r e qui r e a j Ud i c ial warr a n t
(f or t he p rocedure s wh ich gove r n t h e use of t he s e t e ch-
n iques , s ee Sec t ion VI I on "ve ry intrusiv e tec hn iques " )
The Ca r t e r Ord e r defi ne s "count erinte ll i gence" as
HR6 051 wou l d requi r e t he s a me p roce d ur e s i n the i nves t i -
"inf ormat i on ga t he r e d and act ivities conducted t o p r o -
gat i on of for e i gn pe r s ons a s itwould f or the i nve s t i-
tect a ga i ns t espionage and o t her cla ndestine inte lli-
gat i on of U. S . pe rsons . !!/
gence acti vitie s , sabotage, inte rnational t e r r o r i s t
acti vities or a ssassi nat i ons conduc ted f or or on behalf
of f oreign powe r s , org a n i z a t ions o r person s , but not
inoluding pe r s onne l , phy s i c a l , docume n t, or communi c ations
4. Shou l d these i nv e stigat ions be r e s t r i c ted in
security pr o gr ams . "48/ The Carte r Order a u thori ze s
duration?
investigations for t he c ol l ecti o n o f suc h information
ab out U.S. pers ons but l i mi t s col lecti on_ to the fol l owi ng
Th e Carter Order do e s no t l i mi t t h e period o f
types of nonpubl icl y availa b l e inf ormat ion:
t i me f or whi c h a n i nv e s t i ga t i on ma y contin ue . The dur a -
t i on limi t a t i on s which S25 25 woul d a ppl y t o i nves t i ga-
(a) "informa tion a bout a person who is reas onably
tions o f U. S . persons wo u l d not a pply to i nv e stiga t i ons
be l i e v e d t o be a cting on beha lf o f a f oreign
of non- U.S . pe r s on s . 45/ The Chu rch Commi ttee Repor t
powe r , e n gagi ng i n i nte r na t ional terro rist
r ecommend e d that the-rimi tations on t he d ura t i on o f i n -
activities or na r c o t i c s p roduction or t r a f -
ves t i gations of U. S . pe r s ons a pply to inve s t i ga t i ons
f i c k i ng , or e ndangering t he s afety o f a per-
o f n on-U. S. persons as we l l.46/ Si milarly, HR6051
son protected by the Un i t ed Sta tes Secr e t
wou l d l imi t the d uration of t he i nve stigat ion s o f non-
Service or t h e Departme nt of State ; "
U.S . pe r sons to the s ame time peri od s d iscussed a b ove
whi c h a p p l y to i nv estigat ions o f U. S . pe r sons.4 7/
(b) "informat i on con cern i ng cor por ations or o t her
42 commercial organ i z a t ions or act. Ivi t ies t ha t
HR6051 S303. c ons t i t u t e s cou nt erint e l lige nc e ; "
4 3
Se e g e ner a l l y S2 525 S 22 5 .
(c) " i n format i on arising o ut o f a lawful counter-
44 i ntel l i ge n c e i nve s t i ga t i o n ; "
>:....
HR605 1 Sl12 .
4 5 4ij
S2525 8 225 ( 4) . Carter Orde r 8 4-20 2 .
4 6
30
Church Commit t e e Re po r t , Book II , p . 320 , Re c ommenda t ion #44 .
4 7
HR6051 Sl14.
29
302
303
(d ) " information c onstituting . . .counterintelli ge n c e
gathered ... from cooperating Source s i n the Unite d
States;"
(e) " information collected, received, disseminated
or store d by the FBI and necessary to fulfill i t s
lawf u l i nvestigative responsibilities; or "
(f) "i n f or ma t i o n concerning persons or a ctiv iti e s t ha t
pose a c l e a r threat to any facil ity or personne l
of an agenc y wi th i n the Intelligence Community.
Such information may be retained only by the age nc y
threatened and, if a ppr opr i a t e , by the Unite d
States Secret Serv ice and the FBI."!2./
S2525 would a uthori ze counterintelligence investigations o f
U.S. persons wi th i n th e United States if such person:
" (I)
is reasonably believed to be engaged in e spionage
or any other clandestine intelligence activity
which involves or may involve a violation of
the criminal laws of the United States, sabotage,
any international terrorist act ivity, or any
assassination, to be aidinq and abettinq any per-
son in the conduct of any such activ ity , or to
be wi t h any person e n ga ged in a ny s uc h
activity."50/
Thi s standard would tie such investigations loosely to a
criminal standard in the same ma nne r as the s t a nd a r d for
investigations o f U.S . pe r s o ns for f oreign i n t e l l i ge nc e
information.
The Church Committee Report recommended that the FBI be
permitted to conduct a preliminary preventi ve investiga t i on
"whe r e it " h a s specific allegation or specific or substa n t i a t ed
i nf o rma t i o n t;la t the American .. wi l l soon engage in .. . hos ti Le
fore ign inte lligence activi t y . "51 / The Report recommende d
that a full investigation initiate d upon " ' r e ason-
able suspicion ' that an American .. . will soo n engage i n...
hostile foreign i ntell igence acti vity ."52/
49
Id. at 82-208.
50-
S2525 8213 (1).
51
Church Committee Report, Book II, p. 320, Rec omme ndati on #44.
52
ld.
31
h term "hostile forei gn i nt e l l i ge nc e act i vity " includes
or conspiracies, by Ame r i c a n s or foreigners, who are T e
ts,
"a
C
. f .
ffi c e r, employe e , or agents of a powe r ,
o whO, pursua nt to the d i rect ion of a foreign powe r ,
in clande stine i nte l ligenc e act ivi t y . "5 3/ Whe n t he
. vestigation t argets a U.S. person for c oun t e r i nt e l lige nc e
t he a bove standard applies. HR605 1 wou l d requi r e
ihat, "Counte rinte l l ige nce i nv e s t i g a t i ons insi de the United
stat es .. focus on obtaining e vide nce of vio l a t i ons of t he
r iminal laws of the United States for p ur pos e s of pros ecu-
deportation, or e xpu l s i on from t h e United St a t e s ."54/
2. Should there be limitations on the t e c hniques em-
ployed in such investigations?
The Ca rter Order applies the same l i mi t a t i ons on tec h-
niques employed i n counterintelligence i nv estigations of
U.S. persons wi t h i n the Unite d St a tes a s itappl i e s to foreign
intelligence inve s t i ga t i ons of U.S . pe r s ons wi t h i n the United
State s. (See Sect ion A. S25 25 wou ld apply the same
limitations to investigat ions as itwould
to f or e i gn intelligence i nve s t i g a t i ons . (See Se c t i o n A. (2 )
above)
The Church Committee Re por t a nd HR605 1 al s o apply the
same limitations as listed a bove i n Section A. (2) .
3. What oth e r rest r ictions shou l d gove r n such investi-
gations?
See the restrictions on f oreign intellig e nce invest ig a-
tions of U.s . pe r s on s listed under Section A. ( 3 ), ( 4 ) , and
(5 ) above f or r estric tions wh i c h limi t the c onduct of counter-
inte lligence inv e stigati ons of U. S . person s wi t h i n the United
States.
D.
INVESTIGATI ONS OF NON- U.S. PERSONS WI THI N THE UNI TED .:
STATES CONDUCTED TO UNCOVER PLANS. OF FOREIGN I NTELLI GENCE
SERVICES TO GATHER INFORMATION ABOUT THE UNITED STATES OR
ITS ALLI ES OR TO CONDUCT COVERT OPERATI ONS IN THE UNITED'
STATES (COUNTERINTELLI GENCE)
rr-
ld. at Book I I , p. 340 , Def inition (H) .
54
HR6051 8 30 4 (a)
32
305
304
1 . I n what c irc ums t a n c e s s hould a non-U .S . person b e
t a rgeted f or a counte rintelligenc e invest igation
within the Un ite d St ates?
The Ca r ter Order do es no t e xpl i ci tly a ddress t he iss ue
of counterintelligence investigations o f non -U .S. p erso n s
within the Uni t ed States a nd t h e restrictions on investiga-
t ions a pp l y onl y to i nve s t i ga t i o n s o f U. S . pe r s ons . S2525
wou ld a pply t he s ame standard t o t ri gger a counte rintel l i -
gence i nvestigation o f a non-U. S . person as it a ppl i e s to
forei gn i ntel l igen ce investigat ions of s uc h p ersons. (Se e
Sect ion B. (l )supr a ) .
Th e Church Committe e Report r e c ommended applicat i on
of the s ame sta ndard o f i nvestiga t i o n o f for e igners t a r ge t e d
in a c ount er int ellig ence i nves t i ga t i on a s t hat wh i c h it r e -
c ommended f or U.S. persons targeted i n a f o r e i qn inte l li -
gence inv e stigat i o n . (Se e Sect ion A. (l)supra). HR60 51 wou l d
req ui re the s ame standard of i nves tig at ion of non - U. S . pe r s ons
as t ha t app l ied t o U.S. p erso ns in t he conduct o f coun t e r -
i ntel l igence inv estigations. (See Se ction C. (1) supr a) .
2. be a pplied to such i nve s t i -
o f techni ques,
Al l o f the guide line s mandat e the same res tricti ons f or
applicat ion to c ounteri nte l l igen c e i nv e stiga t i o n s of no n -
U.S. persons a s f o r f oreign intelligence investigations o f
s uc h persons . (Se e Sec t i o n B. ( 2 ) , (3 ) , ( 4), and ( 5) s upra ) .
E. I NVEST I GATI ONS OF U.S . PERSONS WITHIN THE UNI TED STATES
CONDUCTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF LEARNING ABOUT THE ACTIVI-
TIES OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS (COUNTERTERRORISM)
1. In what circums tances s hou ld a U. S . person b e t a r ge t -
e d for a c ounterte rror i sm i nv e stig a t ion wi t hin t he
United States?
Th e Carter Orde r de f i ne s " internat ional terrorist a c t i-
v i t y " as "any acti vity or a c t ivi ties which :
(a) involve s k i lling , c aus ing s e r i o u s bodi l y ha r m, k id-
n a pp i ng , or violent des truct ion of p roperty , or
a n a t tempt or c red ible t hreat to c ommi t s uc h act s ;
a nd
33
appea rs in te nded t o e nd anger a protectee of t he
(b)
Secre t Serv ice or t h e De p art ment o f Stat e or t o
f ur t he r pol i t i ca l , soci al o r eco nomic goa l s b y
int imi dating o r c o e r c i ng a c i v ilia n popu l a t i on
or a ny s e gment t h e reof, i nf l ue ncing t he p o l i cy
o f a g ov ernme n t o r i n ter nat i o na l o rgan i za t i on
by intimi d ation o r coe r cion , o r ob t aining wide-
s pread p ub l i c i t y f or a group o r i t s c a use ; a nd
t r a ns c e nds na t iona l b oundar ies in terms of t he
(c)
means b y whic h i t is accompl is he d , th e civi l i a n
populat ion , gov ernme nt , or international orga n i -
zat ion ita ppea r s intended t o coe r c e or i n t imi-
d a te , o r t h e l ocale i n wh i c h i ts perpet rators
o per a t e or s eek asyl um. " 55/
The Car t e r Or der a u thor i ze s inv est i gat ion s f or t he c o l l ecti o n
of suc h i nformat i o n a b ou t U. S . person s but l i mits c o l l ecti o n
t o t he f o l l owi ng t y pe s of non-pub l i cly av aila ble i n forma t ion :
" i n f or ma t i on about a person who is r e a s onably be-
(a)
l ieve d to be acti ng on b e h alf of a f orei g n power ,
eng a g i n g i n i n ternational ter r oris t act i v i t i e s or
na r coti c s p roducti o n or t r affick i ng , or end a nger i ng
t h e safety o f a p erson protec t e d by t he Uni ted
St a tes Se c ret Serv i c e or t h e Departme n t of St a t e:"
"info rma tion c o l l ecte d , r ecei ved , di s s e minated or
(b)
stor e d b y the FBI a nd n e ces s a r y t o f ulf i l l i ts
lawf u l inv e stigativ e r espons i b i l i t ies ; o r "
"infor mation concer ning pe rsons or acti vities that
(c)
pose a c l e a r t hr e a t to a ny f acili t y or personnel
o f an a gency wi t h in t h e Intellige nc e Commun i t y .
Suc h i n forma t ion may be r etai ne d only b y t he a ge nc y
threate ned a nd , if a pprop r i a te, by t h e Un i t e d
State s Secre t Ser v i c e and t he FBI . " 56 /
52 525 would a uth o r i ze c ou ntert e r rori s m i nv e s t i gations o f U. S .
within t he Uni t e d Stat e s p ur s ua nt t o t h e same s tand a r d
wou l d requ i re f or t h e t a rgeting o f s u ch p ersons f o r c ount e r -
i nve s t i ga t i on s wi t h i n t he un i t e d States . (See
Section C. (1) above) .:
The Churc h Commi t t e e Re p o r t r e c omme nde d t ha t t he FBI b e
per mitted to cond uc t a pr e l i minar y prev enti v e i nte l lige n c e i n-
ves t igation "where ithas a speci fic a l lega t i on or spec i fic
... ., I;J:: "'
SS
Carter Order 94- 209.
S6
!. a t 82-208.
34
306
or s ubstanti a t e d i n format i on t ha t the Ame ri c a n.. wi l l
e ngage in ter r ori s t acti v i t y ."'i2/ The Report al so
t ha t a f u l l i nvestigation could be i ni t i a t e d upon
NVESTIGATIONS


f
soo n
rec OllUne

suspi cion ' that an Ame r i c a n.. wi l l s oon e nga ge i n terror i s t e
act ivi t y . " S8/ Th e Chur c h Commi t t e e Re po r t de f i ned " t e r r or i
act ivi t i es" a s " a c t s or conspiracies whi c h: (a ) a r e violent St
or d a nge rous to huma n life ; and (b) v i o late f ede r a l or St at
cri mina l s tatutes concerning ass assination , murde r , arson e
bombi ng, hi j a c king , or ki d na p ping ; a nd (c) a ppe ar i n t e nded' t
or are l i kely t o h a ve t he effect o f : 0 ,
(1 ) Substa ntially disrupting federal , state or loca l
government; or
( 2 ) Subst antially disrupting interstate or f or e i gn
commerce between t he Un it e d States a nd another
c oun t r y ; or
( 3 ) Di r e ctly interfering wi t h t he e xercise by Amer i -
cans , of Constitut i ona l rights protected by the
Civil Ri gh t s Act of 1968 or by f or e i g ner s , of
their righ ts under the l aws or treaties o f the
Unit:ed
HR60S1 wou l d a l low a pr e liminar y i nves t i ga t i o n o f a U. S .
pe r son wi t h i n t he Un i t e d St ates only " (u ) pon rece i pt of a
s pec i fic al legat ion that a pe r s on h a s committed , i s c ommi tt -
i ng , or i s about to commita s pe c i f i c a ct wh i ch violates a
Federal crimina l s tatute . " 60 / Furthe r i nvestigati on would be
limited to investi gat i on or"specific act s whi ch violate Fe d-
eral c riminal statutes . "g;
2 . What restrictions should be a p pl i e d to s uc h inves-
tigations limitation of techniques, restric-
tion of duratlon, etc.)?
Allo f t he g ui d e l i ne s mandate the same restri c t i ons fo r
a ppl ica tion to counter terrorism i nvestigations of U.S. pers ons
as f or f orei gn i ntel l igenc e investigations of s uc h per s ons.
(See Sec t ion A. ( 2 ) , (3) , ( 4 ) , and (S) supra) .
':> 1
Chur ch Committee Report, Book I I, p . 320 , Re comme nda t i on #44.
58
Id.
S9-
I d . a t Book I I , p . 341 , Def ini tion (N).
60
HR6051 8113(a)
61
HR60S1 S112( a )
307
OF NON-U.S. PERSONS WITHIN THE UNITED
CONDUCTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF LEARNI NG ABOUT THE
OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS (COUNTER-

1. In what circums tanc e s should a non-U.S. person be
targete d for a c ounter t err orlsm i nve s t i ga t i on with-
In the Un it ed States?
Al l of the gu i d e l i ne s wou ld requi re the same s tandard
r i nvestiga tion o f non- U.S. pers ons f or counterte rrorism
fOrpo s e s as t he y would requ i r e f or investigat ions o f such per-
for foreign i nte l l i gen c e purposes. (See Section B. (1)

2. be a l i e d t o s uch i nve s t i -
o f t e c hn i ues, r e s t rict ion
Al l of the gu i deli ne s mandate t he s ame res trictions for
appli c ation to count erter ror ism inves t i gati ons o f no n- U. S .
persons as for for e i gn i nte l l i ge nc e inves t igations o f such
persons. (See Secti o n B. (2 ) , ( 3 ) , ( 4 ) , a nd (S) s upra).
G. INVESTIGATION OF U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD FOR FOREI GN INTELLI-
GENCE, COUNTERI NTELLI GENCE OR COUNTERTERRORISM PURPOSES
1.
The Carter Or d e r a u t hori zes i nvestiga t i ons f or the c ol-
lecti on of suc h i n f o rma t i on abou t U. S . pe r s o ns but limi t s .>
7olle ction to the following t ype s of ava i lable
1nformation:
(a)
"infor mation a bou t a person who i s r eas onabl y be-
l ieve d t o be a cting on be half o f a fOJ;. e i g;n , powe r ,
e nga gi ng i n inter natio na l t e r r o ris t or
narcoti c s pr oduc t i on or t raf fi c king , or enda nger-
ing t he s afe t y of a pe r s on prot ected by t he Un i -
ted Sta tes Se c r e t Servi c e or the De pa rtmen t o f
State; "
36
35
308
(b) " i n f or ma t ion c onsti tuting f oreign i n te l lige nc e
o r count er intel l igence g a thered abr o ad or f r om
e l e c t r o n i c s urvei l lan ce c onducted in comp l i a nc e
wi t h Sec t i o n 2- 202. "
(c) " inf or ma t i on a c qu i red by ov e r he a d r e connai s s a nce
no t directe d at s pecific Uni ted States per s ons ; "
(d ) "infor mation c once r n i ng Unite d State s pe r s ons
abroad t h a t i s obt a i ned in r esponse t o r e que s t s
f rom th e Departme nt o f Sta te f or s uppor t o f its
c onsular r e sponsi b i litie s relat ing t o t he wel-
fare o f those persons ." 62/
S2525 would authori z e such investiga t ions o f U. S. persons
a b r o ad wheneve r a des ignated o ffici al of the intel li ge nc e
agenc y i nvol ved ma ke s a d eterminat i on that the infor ma t i on
would b e " s i gn i f i c a n t fore ign inte l l igence " and tha t t he
person targete d:
(1) "is reasonabl y be l ieved to be enga ge d in any cland e s-
tine i ntel l i gence act i vity ou t s i de the Unite d Sta t e s ;"
(2 ) "re side s outside the Uni t ed States a nd i s act i ng in an
official c a pacity for a f oreign powe r and t h e inf or ma-
t ion s ou gh t c once rns such person 's officia l dut i e s or
activities;" or
( 3) "is a fugit iv e from Unite d States jus ti ce abroad ,
r easonably be l ieve d t o have r elations h i ps with f orei gn
governments or organizations wh i c h wou l d c on s t i t u t e
si gnificant f oreign i ntelligenc e ." 63 /
The standard for such inv estigat ions under S2 52 5 wou l d r e-
treat e v e n f urther fr om a criminal stand ard than that re-
q u i red for investigations of U.S. persons conducte d wi thin
the United States.
The Church Commi ttee Report rec omme nded tha t suc h in-
v e s t i ga t i ons could not be e mployed f or colle ction of i n for-
ma t i o n c oncerning Amer i c a ns a b r o a d e x cep t :
"(a) I nfor mation conc e rning Ame r i c a ns whi c h it is pe r -
mi t t e d t o c ol l ect wi t h i n the United State s ;
(b) At t h e r eques t of the Just i c e De pa rtme nt a s par t
o f cr i minal inv e sti g ations or a n investigat i on
o f a n Ame r ican f or suspecte d t e r r o rist , or hos -
t i l e for eig n i n tel lig e n c e a ctiv i t ies or s e c urity
l e a k or security ri s k i nve s t i g a t ions wh i c h t he
____________ FBI h a s opened pu r s uant to (t hese recommenda t i ons )
62
Carter Order 82-2 08.
63
S252 5 82 14
37
309
and wh ich is conducted cons ist e n t ly with the s e
r e c omme nd ati ons ."64/
60 would allow counterinte lligence investigations of U.S.
llR 51 a b ro ad subject to "the prohibitions contained in sons
(b ) and (e) o f sect ion 203 o f th e Nat iona l Se-
g l'tY Ac t o f 1947 ( 50 U.S. C. 403) ." 65/
cur ---
2. .- Wllr.ll
tions o f U.S . pe r s on s d U L UQU-
The Ca rter Order does not limi t t h e techniques which
be employ e d in suc h i nvest i ga t i ons . However,it requires
preside nti al authorization o f the t echnique as we l l as an
Attorne y Gene r a l findi ng o f " p robabl e c ause to bel ieve tha t
the united St a t es person i s an agent of a f oreign powe r" for
utilizat i on o f t e c h niq ue s which requ ire a wa rra nt if under-
taken f or traditiona l law enforceme n t purposes. 66/ Very
intrus i v e t e c h n i q ue s may be used without a f inding o f c rimi-
nal activi t y . S2525 wou l d requi r e t he same l i mi t a t i o ns on
p r o ce d u r e s and durat i on f o r i nves t igations o f
U.S. per s ons a broad as f or such i nv e s t i g a t i ons conducted wi th-
in the Un it e d States. (See Section A. ( 2 ), (3), (4), a nd ( 5 )
supra) .
The Ch urch Commi t t e e Re port als o r e c omme nde d that such
investi gations be conducted cons istent wi th t he r ecomme nda -
tions wh ich would gov ern invest i gations o f U. S . persons wi th-
in the Un i ted States. (See Se ction A. (2), ( 3), (4), and ( 5)
supra) .
64
Committ e e Repor t, Book I I , p. 306- 307, Recommend a t i o n #9.
Church
65
HR6051 8 304(a) (2) .
66
Carter Order 82- 20l(b ).
38
310
VI. OTHER I NTELLI GENCE I NVESTI GATI ONS OF U. S . PERSONS
In a d d i t i on to fore ign intelligence , c ount eri n t e l l i g
e
and c oun t e r t e r r or i s m inves tiga tions i n i t i a t e d unde r t he s t ance
d a r d s and procedures described in the pre vious sec tion ,
of the blueprints for i n t e l l i ge nce a c t i v i t ies a u t ho r i ze ot he
i nvestigati ons based on non-crimi n a l s t a nd a r d s f or purpo s es r
suc h a s t argets of f ?rei gn i n t e l l igence
a ctivi ty , poss 1b l e recru1ts for U. S . 1ntel11ge n c e , or t hose
who po s e a threat to intel ligence agenc y s ecurity . I n some
case s, spec ial procedure s a nd r e s t r i c t i ons are est a b l i s he d t o
g ov e r n t he s e i nvestigat ions ; in other c ases, no s peci a l pr e -
c a ut i ons are t a ken.
A. AUTHORIZATI ON OF INVESTIGATION OF TARGETS OF FOREI GN IN-
TELLIGENCE SERVICES OR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
1 . Should the targeting of potential targets o f foreign
intelligence ser v i c e s or terrorist organi z ations be
authorized?
The Carter Order author i zes such i nvest igat ions. 1/
S25 25 wou l d author i ze such i nvestigations . 2/ Th e Church
Committee Re por t -lland HR6051-i1 wou l d
2 . If s o , under wh a t c i rcumstances should suc h i nve sti-
gations be permitted?
The Cart er Orde r author i zes i nve s t i ga t i ons "for t he pur-
pos e of protecti ng fore ign intelli gence a n d c ounter inte l l i -
gence sourc e s and me t hods . "5 I S2 52 5 wou l d a uth or i ze t he i n-
ve s t i ga t i on of a ny person " r e a sonably bel ieved " to be the ob -
jec t o f a recruitment ef f o r t by an intellige nc e ser v i c e o f i -
a f oreiqn power or t h e t arget of a n i n tern a t i on a l t e r r orist organ
zation . The bill al s 9 woul d permi t i nves t i ga t i ons o f persons en-
g a g ed in a n act i vity or po s s e s s i n g i nformation wh i c h i s
"r e a s o na b l y believ e d " to be a target . The i nv e s t i ga t i on o f
a ny per son " r e asonably bel ieved " to be t h e t ar g e t o f a n a ssa s-
s i nation a t t e mp t also wou l d be
1
Carter Order 82- 206(c).
2
52525 8218(a).
3 dati on
Se e Church Commi tte e Re po rt , Book I I, pp . 320- 323 , Recomm
e n
1144.
4
HR6051 881 1 2- 11 3 .
5
Carter Or d er 8 2-206 (c).
6
311
PFOCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATION OF TARGETS OF FOREIGN IN-
TELLIGENCE OR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
II'

1. What s pecial p r oc e dur e s s hou l d be e sta b l i s he d for
such i nve stiga t ions ?
nor S252 5 est a b l i s h s pecia l
Ne i th e r the Carter Or d e r
edure s for s uch cases . 7/
proc --
2. the s ubject o f such i nvestigat ion be no t i-

S2525 wou l d requi r e no t ice unle s s "( 1 ) i nf ormi ng the
person would j e opar d i ze i ntelli genc e s ou rces and met hod s ; or
(2) there is r easona ble un c ert aint y a s t o whe t h e r suc h per-
may be c o ope r a t ing wi t h t h e for e i gn i n t e l l i ge n c e s e r -
vice or internat iona l t e rro ris t s . "
c.
TELLIGtNCE SERV1CES OR TERRORIST
1. Shou l d t h e r e be l i mi t a tions on t he t e c h n i que s e m-
prayed in s uc h i nves t i g a t 1ons? -----
The Ca rter Or der aut ho ri ze s phys i c a l s urvei l lance. 9
82525 would l i mi t i nv e s t igations to t e c hn i que s whi ch would not
Attorne y Gener al a pp r ov a l . See p . 24- 25, suprjf or a
0
Ilst of the techn ique s wh ich require such approval .1 See
also, p. 23. --
7
Carter Order 8 2- 20 6 (c ) a nd S2525 8218(a ) .
952525 821 8(b).
Orde r 92-206.
52 525 8215 l i mi t s t he t echn iques a ut h ori ze d therei n ( t ho s e
would r equire At t or n e y Ge ne r a l approv al) t o i nv est i g at i on s
:Ln 1t:Lat ed "under this s ubpa r t , " t hose i n itiate d under t h e
Standards e s t a b l i shed i n 821 3/8214; i nvest igat i on o f po t e nt i a l
targets i s author i ze d by a d iff e r ent s ub part , S2 52 5 8218 .
40
S2525 8 21 8( a) .
39
312
313
2. What should be the purpose of such inves t igati ons?
2. In what circ umsta n c es
a uthor l.zed?
should su c h i nvesti a t ions be
S2 525 would di rect that . investigations be de s igned t o
"pr o tect against" such terrorist or intelligence activi t y or
ass assination.II! Criminal prosecution need not nec essari ly be
the goal. -
3. Should there be limits on the duration of s uch inves _
t igations?
The Carter Order do e s not limit duration .12/ S2525 wou l d
permit these investigations to continue for up to 180 days.13/
4. Which entity of the intelligence communi ty should
carry out these investlgations?
S2525 would authori ze any entity of the intellige n c e
community to carry them out .!!/
D. AUTHORIZATION OF INVESTIGATION OF PERSONS IN CONTACT WITH
SUSPECTED INTELLI GENCE AGENCIES
1. Should persons who come in contact with suspected in-
telligence agents be targeted?
The Carter Order15/ and S2525 16 / author i ze suc h i nve s-
tigations. The ChurchlCommittee Report recommended prohi -
bition of them e x cept for a narrow exce p t i o n concerning Amer i -
cans abroad.17/ HR6051 wou l d prohibit them. 18 /
11
S2 525 8 21 8 (a) ( 2) .
12
Carter Order 82- 206(c) .
13
S2525 8 21 8(al .
14
Id.
15-
Cart er Orde r 82-208 ( d l .
1 6
S2525 8220.
17
For t he rul e , s e e Church Commi t t e e Re por t , Book I I , pp. 321-
3
25;
f or t he e xcep t i on , s e e id. a t Book I I , p . 307 , Recomme nda t l
On
#11 (c )
18
HR6051 881 12- 11 3 .
41
The Ca rte r Order aut hor i zes t h e inve s t i gation o f a ny
er c omi ng in c on t a c t wi t h pr esent and forme r emp loyees
s on
P contra ctors or anyone wh o comes in c on tact wi th the sub-
nd of a l awful counte r inte lli gence or forei gn i nt e l l i ge n ce
Investiga t ion . 19/ S2525 would a u thor ize t h e i nvestigati on of
person who h a s c o nt a c t wi t h any pe r s on "reaso nab l y be-
lieved" to b e engage d in "es p i o nage o r any o ther cla ndestine
intelligenc e activ ity." 20/
The Church Comml. t t e e Repor t sta t e d t h a t t he FBI s houl d
not i nv e s t i gate t h e a l l e gation t hat a U.S. Senator attended a
cocktail party a t a f or e i gn e mbas s y where a f orei gn int e l l i -
gen ce agent wa s p r e s e n t . " 21/ Re c omme ndat i on 11 , howeve r, p r o -
vided that " ( t lhe CIA may employ covert tec h n i que s abro ad
against American s . (tlo the ext e nt ne cessary t o i den t i f y per-
sons kn own or s u s pe c ted to be Amer ica n s who come i n c ont a c t
with foreigner s, t he CIA i s investigating."22/
E. PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATION OF PERSONS IN CONTACT WITH
SUSPECTED INTELLIGENCE AGENTS
1. What special p rocedu res s hould be est a b l i s hed for the
initiation o f s uch l.nvestigations ?
Neither t he Carter Or de r no r S25 2 5 estab l ishes s pecia l
procedures .23/
19
Carter Order 92- 208(dl .
20
82525 8220.
21
Church Committee Repor t , Boo k II, p. 322.
22
ld. at Book II , p . 307 , Re c ommendat ion #l l (c l . See also ,
Book II, p. 32 3, Recommendat ion #47 f o r l i mitation on FBI
i n conduct of bac kgro und i nvesti g at i ons o f f e de ral emp l oyees
or contractor s : "The aut ho r i t y to conduct s uch inve s t igat i on s
s hoUld not, howe ver , be us e d as the basis f or condu c t i n g
2lnvestigations of oth e r persons . "
_ Carter Order S2-2 08 and S2525 8220.
42
314
2. Should the tar e t o f such an investi ati on b e not i_
f1ed of h1s her s1tuat10n?
Nei t h e r the Carter Or d e r nor S2 525 prov ides for not ifi _
cation.
F. RESTRICTIONS ON INVESTIGATION OF PERSONS IN CONTACT WITH
SUSPECTED INTELLIGENCE AGENTS --
1. Should there be limitations on the technique s e m-
ployed?
Th e Carter Or d e r does not limit permissible techn i -
ques . 2 4/ S2525 wou l d permit all techniques which do not r e-
Ge n e r a l approval. ' Se e p. 24, s up r r ' for a
list of the techniques which require such approva .25/ See
also p. 23, supra.
2. Should the duration of such an investigation be re-
stricted?
The Carter Or d e r does no t restr ict durat ion . 26/ S252 5
would allow up to 9 0 days.27/ --
3. What should be the purpose of such an i nv e s t i g a-
tion?
The Carter Or d e r limits the scope of such investiga-
tions to "information needed solely to id en t i fy" the sub-
j e c t of the inv estigation . 28 / S2525 wou ld provide that the
i nv estigation ma y onl y exte nd to i dentifying the person and
finding out if such p e r s on ha s , has had , or wi l l have a c c e s s
to information the disclo sure of which would be harmful to
the
:.!4
See general ly , Carter Or de r 8 2-201- 208
25
S2525 8220.
26
See Carter Or de r 8 2-208 .
27-
S2525 8 22 0 .
28
Carter Or de r 8 2- 2 08 (d ) .
29
S252 5 8 220 .
43
315
4. Which e nt i t y of t he inte ll i g e nc e communi ty s hou l d
carry out t hese i nve s t i g atio n s ?
Both the Car t e r Or d e r and S2 52 5 a u thori ze any entity of
;ntellig e nc e communi ty to eng a ge i n t he s e act i viti e s . 30/
tl1e --
AUTHORI ZATI ON OF I NVESTI GATION OF POTENTIAL SOURCES OF
G

1. Should the inv e stigation of potenti a l
source s of a s sist a n c e be a u t hori zed?
The Carter Or d e r 3l / a nd S2525 a uthor i ze s uc h invest iga-
tion
s. 32/
The Church Commi tte e Report recommended that s uc h
activi tres be authori zed .33/ HR6 05 1 woul d no t authorize such
investigations.34/
2. If so, under wh a t circ umstanc e s should such inve s t i -
gations be author i zed?
The Carter Ord e r 35 / and S2 5 25 requ i re that a " rea sonab l e
beLi.ef " standar d be met:"36/ Th e Ch ur c h Commit t e e Re p or t r e -
conunended that t h e r e should be a " bon a f i d e expec t ation " tha t
the subject mi ght b e of assist ance . 37/
H. PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATION OF POTENTIAL SOURCES OF
ASSISTANCE
30
Carter Order 82- 208( d ); S2525 8 220 . .s->:
31
Carter Order 82- 208 (e).
32
52525 8221
33 .
Church Committee Report, Book II, p. 30 3 , Re commenda t i on
t B (b ) - ( c )
34 .
-;-.... r,:'. : "
3SHR6051 88112-113.
36Carter Order 82-208(e) .
3752525 8221.
Church Committee Repo rt , Book II, p. 303.
44
316
1. What specia l proc e dures shoul d be e s tabl i s hed f or
such investigations?
None of the guideli ne s establish s pecial proce d ur e s to
gove r n these i nve s t i g a t i o ns .
I . RESTRI CTI ONS ON I NVESTI GATI ON OF POTENTI AL SOURCES OF
ASSISTANCE
1. Shoul d t he nature of t he infor ma t ion s ought be r e-
stric ted?
In a l l c a ses, the informati on sough t wou l d b e l i mi t ed t o
that whi c h i s necess ary to determine the s ubj ect ' s s ui t a bi lity
f or empl oyment or hi s / her credibil ity a s a source o f i nf orma-

2 . Should the t echnique s employed be restricte d ?
Th e Carter Or d e r does not r e stri c t techniques . 39/ S2525
would au t hor i ze al l t ech n iques wh i c h d o not r equi re Attorney
Gener a l a pprova l .iQ/ See p . 24 , s uPfia , f or a l i st of t echni -
q ues which r equir e s uch a ppr ova l . Chur ch Commi t te e
Re port recommend e d a uthor iza tion only o f name chec ks a nd i n-
terv iews wi t h pe rson s who know the subject . 41 /
3 . Should the duration of such an i nve s t iga t ion be r e-
stricted?
Th e Carter Or de r does no t l i mi t the duration of such in-
S25 25 wou l d 90 d a ys.43/
38
See notes 35 , 36 , a nd 37 & accompanying text supra. .
39
Carter Order !l2 -208.
40
S2525 8221.
41
Ch urch Commi ttee Report , Book II, p. 303, Recommenda t i on
#8 (b) - (c) a nd f t n s . 23 -2 4 .
4 2
Ca rte r Order 2- 208
4 3
S2525 8 221.
45
317
d i d not d irec t l y d isc us s the du -
e chur ch Commi ttee Re por t
Howe ve r , t he Repor t i mplie d
TO o f s uch inv e stigations .
t i on be s hor t , r e flect ing the limi t-
the investigations s hould
;d goal o f s uch a cti viti es . 44/
4. Which e n t iti tes of t he i n t e l ligenc e c ommuni ty s hould
be a ut hor i z e d t o c a rry ou t the s e i nvesti gat i ons ?
The Carter Order and 5 2525 author i ze any e nt i t y o f the
inte ll i ge nc e commun i t y t o i nve stigat e pot e nt i a l s o ur c es o f
The Chu r c h Commi t tee Re por t r e c omme nd e d t hat
the CI A conduct thes e wi t h r espe c t t o poss ibl e
sources f or the CI A onl y a nd the FBI , wi t h r e pe c t t o poten-
tial employe e s o f tha t
AUTHORIZATION OF INVESTIGATION OF PERSONS IN POSSESSION
J.
OF FOREIGN I NTELLI GENCE I NFORMATI ON
1. Sh ould U. S . per s on s in possession o f in tell i-
gence be s ubj ect t o
On ly S2525 e xpl i ci t l y wou l d aut ho r ize s uc h i nve s t i g a-
tions o f U. S . pe r s ons . 47 /
2 . In what ci rcums tances should s uch i nvestigat ions
be a uthor i zed?
Th e informat ion wou l d hav e t o con s t i tute " s i gn i f i c a n t "
forei gn
44
Chu r ch Commi t t e e Re po r t , Book I I , p . 30 3 ,
Se e gene rally,
#8 . .
Recommendat ion
45
S2525 8221.
Se e Carter Order 92- 208 ;
46-
Commit t e e Repo r t , Book I I , p . 303 , Re commendat i on
Se e Church
323- 324 , Recomme ndat ion #47 . c ' <,/:
W a nd pp.
47
5252 5 !l 219 .
48
g. a t 8219 (1 ) .
46
318
K. PROCEDURES FOR INVESTIGATION OF PERSONS IN POSSESSION OF
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
1. Wh a t speci a l procedures should be establ ished?
A p rope r l y de sign a t e d a gency o f f icial would have t o
determine t h a t the a bove sta nd a r d wa s met ( i . e . c i rcums t a nc e s
exi st ).49/
L. RESTRI CTIONS ON I NVESTIGATION OF PERSONS IN POSSESS I ON OF
FOREI GN INTELLI GENCE I NFORMATION
1. Should t h e duration of such i nve s t i ga t i ons be r e-
stricted?
S2 52 5 woul d not l i mit the d urati on.50/
2. Should there be limitations on the techni ques em-
ployed in suc h i nv e s t i g a t ion?
S252 5 wou l d l i mit i nv e s t i ga t i on s to inte r views (i nclu-
d ing prete x t i n tervi ews ) o f pers on s t o whom the informa t i on
s ough t mi ght h a v e been di s c l o s e d . 51
3. Which of t he i ntel l igence c ommuni t y s ho u l d per -
form t hese l nvesti ga t ions ?
S252 5 wou ld a uthorize any ent ity t o c onduct them.52/
M. AUTHORIZATION OF INVESTIGATI ONS FOR THE PROTECTI ON OF
SECURITY
49
Id.
50-
See gene r ally , S252 5 821 9.
51
S2 525 921 9(3) .
52
I d . at 821 9 .
47
319
1. Sh ould p e r s ons in the v i c i n i ty of instal lations be
s ub j e c t t o inv est i g a t ion ?
The Car ter Orde r d oe s not e xp l i c i t l y a u t hori ze s u c h in-
estigations . S25 25 would permi t t hem. 5 3/ Th e Church Co;runi t -
recommended authorization of inve s t i g a t i ons whi le on t he
premises. 54/ HR6051 wou l d not authori ze these act ivities.
2. What special procedures s h ou l d be e s t a b l i s hed f or
such lnvestlgations?
No special procedure s a re established b y any of the r egu-
latory schemes.
3. Should there be limitations on the techniques employ-
ed in such investigations ?
S2525 would authorize physical surveillance, national
agency checks and requests for records from federal, state,
and l o c a l law enf orcement agencies.55/ Th e Church Commit-
tee Report r ecommended' o n l y authorIZation o f physic a l sur-
veillance while the subject i s on the ground s .56/
4. Sh ou ld the inve stigation o f persons s uspected o f
posing a t h r e a t to installations or pe r s onne l be
a u thorl ze d ?
The Carter Or d e r authorize s the i nves t iga tion o f " pe r -
sons or activ ities that pose a clear threat to any facility or
per sonne1 ."57/ S2525 wou l d a u thor ize the collection of i n-
formation concern ing a ny person "who is reasonabl y belie v e d
to be engaging in any activity wh ic h poses a clear threat t o
the physi cal safet y of any i n stal l a t i on or of any personne l ."
58/ This standard would be l ess stri c t tha n th e general stan-
dard di scussed in the prev ious sect i o n (see p .20 , supra);
:>3
52525 9222(a) .
54
Chur c h Committee Repor t , Book II , p . 30 2, Re c ommend a t i o n
#7(a)
55 ."
. .
8 252 5 9 222(a).
56
note 54 s upra .
Car t e r Order 92- 208 (k ) .
58
52525 !l2 22 (b ) .
48
321 320
i nves tiga t ions a re i n t ende d t o det e r mi ne whethe r t hat gen-
eral s tandar d has b e e n met. The Ch urch Committ e e Re por t d i d
not r e c omme nd aut hor i za t i on of i nvestiga tions o f t hi s nat ur e
outsid e of those wh i c h woul d b e c ove r e d unde r t he gene r a l
c o unt eri n t elli gence / c ounterte rrori sm s t a ndard . See p . 20
s upra . HRG05 1 would maintain t he c rimina l standa r d in t hi s .
a rea by no t addressi ng s uch i nve s t i gations dir e ctly.
5 . should be e stablished f or
Nei t he r the Carter Order nor 5 2525 establishes s pe c i a l
pr oc e d ur a l safe guard s for these investigations .
G. Should t he r e be limitations o n the techniques em-
p loyed in such investigations?
The Carter Order does no t limi t techniques .59/ 5 25 25
would a utho r i ze phy s ical sur ve i l lanc e on or near the insta l -
lat i on, n a t i o nal a ge ncy chec ks, interviews , and requests f or
r ecord s f r om f e deral, state, and local law enforcement a ge n-
c i e s . GO/
7. Should the duration of such investigations be res-
tricted?
Neither the Carter Order nor 52525 limits the d u r a t i on
o f these i nve s t i ga t i ons.
8. emIrl,?
sons
tion?
The Ca rter Orde r author i zes the i nvest i ga t i on of pr e -
sen t a nd f ormer emp l oye e s , present and f o r me r cont r actors and
a pp l i c ants for employme nt or a contr act in o r de r to "pr o t ect
f oreign intel lige n c e o r c ount eri ntelligence s ources o r me-
t hods from una ut hor i ze d di sclos ure . " Gl/ 5 2525 wou l d permi t
i nvestigations o f employe es, c ontrac t o r s and t he employee s o f
contrac t or s for s e c ur i ty r e a sons . G2/
59
Ca r t e r Order 92 - 208 (k) .
60
52525 9222(b) (1)- ( 4) .
61
Car ter Order 82-208(c ).
62
5 2525 11222( c).
49
he Rockefeller Commission Report recommended that investi-
T tio
ns
of persons presently or formerly affiliated with the
be authorized only if the Director o f the CI A finds that
"the investigation is necessa r y to protect intellige nce source s
r methods the disclosure of whi c h might endanger the national
0ecurity."63/ The Church Committee Re po r t recommended prov i-
for investigations of employees , contractors and their
employees, and applicants for such positions .64/
9. What special procedures should be est abli she d for
such investigations?
NO special procedures are established by any of the regu-
latory formats.
10. Should there be limitations on the techniques em-
ployed in such investigations ?
The Carter Order does not restrict techniques . 5 25 25
would permit all techni9ues which would not require At t orney
General approval (see above p. 24 , for a li st of techniques
which do) plus certain techniques Wh1Ch normally would r e-
qu ire Attorney General approval but in this case would be per-
mitted upon the written permission of the head of the inves-
tigating
11. Should the duration of such investigations be res-
tr1cted?
The Carter Order does not restrict duration. 52525
would permit 180 days after which the head of the agency could
authorize continuation of the inv estigation.66/ The Church
Committee Report did not discuss d u r a t i on of-Such inve stiga-
tions.
63
Rockef eller Commis sion Report , Recommenda tion (18)b .
64
Church
#8 (a)
Committee Report, Book II , p.
. ",',
65
52525 8222(c) .
66

::Hi
322
1 2 . Wh i c h a enci es of t he inte lli e n c e communit s hou l d
be to conduct relating to
protection of securitl ? __
The Ca rter Or de r and S2525 per mit a ny e ntity of t he i n-
tell igence c ommuni t y t o c ond uct t hes e investigations . 67/
The Chur ch Commi t t ee Repor t expl ici t ly a uthor i zed the-CI A
and the FBI to t a ke such a c t i o ns .68/
67
Ca rter Or der S2525
68
Chur c h COmmi ttee Repor t, Book I I, p. 303 , Re c ommendat ion
#8 (a) and pp . 323 -324 , Re comme ndations #4 7-49.
51
323
VII. THE USE OF VERY INTRUSIVE TECHNIQUES
"Very intrusive techniques " refers to three t ypes of
i nvestigati ve activi t ies - electronic sur veillance both
wi t h i n the U.s . and abroad , ?pening and
eS. These techniques have a wa r-
rant whe n emp l oye d for law e n f or ceme nt purpos es.
A. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE WITHIN THE U.S.
surveillance wit hi n the U.S. refers gen-
erally to the targe ting of the domestic and in-
ternational communications of U.S. persons located in the
U.S., the intentional acquisition of the wire communications
of any person in the U.S. where the acquisition occurs within
the U.S., the intentional acquisition of totally domestic
radio communication or any other monitoring of communica-
tions within the U.S. in wh ic h a party to the communication
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
1. Should e lec tro nic surveillance within the U.S. be
authori zed?
The Carter Order and S2525 authori ze t hi s technique.-!j
The Rockefeller Commis sion Report also aut ho ri z ed this tech-
nique. 2/ The Church Committee Re por t rec ommended author i za-
tion or-such surveillance. 3/ HR6051 wou ld prohibit the use '
)f this technique.-/ --
2. Under what procedures should electronic surveillance
within the U.s. be employed?
The Carter Order does not r equire that a judicial wa r -
rant be obtained before electronic surv eillance is i ni t i a t e d .
1
2c a r t e r Order 82 - 20 2 ; S2525 8311 (1 8 U. S . C.
Rockefeller Commissi on Report , pp . 16 8-169 .
3 .
Church Committee Report, Book II, p. 327, Recommendation #51.
4
nR6051 201
52
325 324
Pr e s i dent ial app rov a l of the us e o f suc h techniques is r e -
2) the faci lities or the place a t wh i ch the e l e c t r o n i c
quired. The d ete r mi nat i on that t he sta ndar d h a s be e n me t i s
sur veillance i s dire cted ar e be i ng us e d , or are a -
lef t t o the At torney Ge ne r a l . 5/
5 25 2 5 woul d p r ovide s u rvei l lance wi th in
t he U. S . c ould on l y be empl oye d pursuant t o a judic ial wa r -
rant 6/ i ssued by a speci al court t he members of wh ich woul d
be chos en by the Ch ief Justice from among nominee s of the
Ch i e f J udge s of the c i r c u i t courts . 7 / The Pre side n t wou l d
h a ve t o aut hor i z e the At t or ne y Ge n e ral to a pp rove app l i ca-
tions for s uc h wa r r a nt s . 8/
The Chur c h Commi t t e e Report recomme nd e d a wa r r a nt p ro-
c e dur e for electronic survei l l ance wi t h i n t h e U.S . ; no s pe-
c i a l c ourt wa s recommended . 9/ Th e Rocke fel l e r Commi ss i on
Re por t recommende d ei t he r a -Warr a n t procedu r e or a requ i r e -
men t of wr i t t e n approva l o f the At t o r ney Ge n e r a l . l O/
3. Aga i ns t whom and in what circumstances shoul d ele c-
surveillance within the U.S. be employe d ?
The Carter Order does not r e s t r i c t the use of thi s t e c h-
nique against foreigners at all. Electronic surveillanc e may
be employed against U.S. persons whenever there is "prob a b le
cause" t o believe that such pe rson is an "agent o f a f o r e i gn
power."l l / "Forei gn power " is not define d ; "agent of a f or -
e ign power " is not defi ne d . The Carter Or d e r does no t est a b-
li sh a c r i minal s t a nda r d for the us e of electronic sur v e i l -
lance wi thi n the U. S .
The standard for e lectron i c sur veillance wh i c h 5 2525
woul d establish wa s taken from the Foreign Intelligence Su:: -
veillance Act(S1566) as itwas whe n 5 2525 wa s introduc e d a nd
wi l l presumab l y be amended to r e f l e c t the ter ms of t he Act
whe n passed by the Congr ess . As p a s sed by t he Senate 51566
would authorize electr onic surveil lance o nly wh e n :
1) "the target of the electronic surv eillance i s a
__---- powe r or a n agent of a f o reign powe r ; a nd
5
Carter Order 9 2- 201 (b).
6
52525 8 311 (1 8 U.S . C. 8 2522 ) .
7
I d . at 8 311 (18 U. S . C. 82 52 3).
8-
Id. at 9 311 (18 U. S .C . 8 25 2 2 ) .
9-
Church Commi t t e e Re po rt , Boo k II , pp . 327- 328, Re c ommend a -
tions #51-52.
1 0
Roc ke f elle r Commi s s i on Re por t , p. 1 68 .
11
Cart e r Or de r 9 2- 2 01 (b ) .
. 53
bout to be used, by a foreign powe r or a n age n t o f
a foreign power;
3) the purpose of the s u r v e i l lance is to ob t a i n f orei gn
intelligence information; and
4) that such information cannot reasonably be obtaine d
by normal investigative techniques ."12/
The bill also wou l d requir e a number o f procedur al safeguards.
The Church Committee Re po r t recommended a requ ire-
ment that all American citi zens and resident alie ns be tar-
geted pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Cr ime Contr ol and
safe Streets Ac t of 1968 - s pe cific crimi na l a ctiv i t y mu s t be
suspected.13/ A limi ted e xc e p t i on is ma de f or for e igne rs,
for whom a warrant may i s s ue i f :
"(a) There is probable cause that the target is an
o ffice r , employe e , or conscious a gent of a for-
eign power.
(b) The At t orney Ge ne ral has c ertified that the s ur-
v e i l l ance is l i ke l y t o reveal i n f or mati on nec-
essary to the p r o t e c t i o n of the na t i on against
actual or po t e n t i a l attack or other ho s t i l e acts
o f force o f a forei gn power ; t o obta i n for e i gn
int elligence informati on de eme d es s e nt i a l t o
the security of the U.S. ; or to p rotect national
s e c ur i t y information against host ile f or e ign in-
telligence activ i ty."14/
The Churc h Committe e Report recommende d limitation o f
elect ronic sur vei l lance of foreigners wi t hin the U. S . to s i t -
uations in wh i c h t he i n f o rmat ion s ought wa s neces s ary to
the s e c ur i t y of the nation . Th e implication i s t ha t t he Com-
mit tee did not intend this to be common pract i c e ; rather , the
non -criminal standard for f ore igne rs wa s to be a n a r row ex-
ception t o the criminal standard . The Roc k e f e l l e r Commission
Report recommended that the minimum thres hhold for approval
of el e c t r on i c surv e i llance should be a f inding that the nati on-
12
51566 92 (1 8 U. S .C . 8 2524) .
13
Church Commi tte e Re port , Boo k I I, p . 32 7- 328 , Recomme n dation
#52. ., .. ,,-.-,'
14
at Recommendation #52(a)- (b) .
54
327
326
a l secur ity was involved a nd t he "c i rcums tanc es i n c l ude d a
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
significant con ne c t i on with a f or e i gn power. "15/
s
4. Wha t e f f o rts shou l d be made t o r e d uc e t he
of i n f or mati on a bout i nd i vidua l s not t a r ge t e d f or
i nv e s t i g ation?
The Cart e r Orde r do e s no t requ i re t hat a ny att e n t i on be
paid t o mi n i mi zat i on . 5 2525 wou l d d ire c t t hat minimi z a t i on
proc edures be deve l o pe d a nd tha t t he c ou r t review t he s e pro-
c edure s to make s u r e t h e y a r e r e a s onab le. 16/ The Chu r c h Com-
mi t tee Repor t also d i r e c t s t hat a t t ent i onlbe pa i d to mi nimi -
zat ion.17/
5 .
The Cart er Order a utho r i z e s any e nt i t y , e xcept t he CI A,
to us e t h i s t ech n ique .18/ 5 25 25 wou l d a u thor ize the FBI , CIA,
a nd NSA.19/ The Report rec omme nd e d
t h a t on lY-t he FBI a nd NSA be per mi tted to use t h i s t e c h-
n i que . 20/
15
Rockefel l e r Commiss ion Re port , p . 1 68 .
16
5 25 25 9 311 (18 U. S . C. !j2521 (b) (8 ) , 2524 (a ) (5), end
252 5 (b ) ( 2 ) (A .
17
Chur c h Committ e e Report , Book I I , p . 327 , Recommenda t i on
#52 (c). Title III of the Omni b us Crime Co ntro l a n d Safe
Str eets Ac t o f 1 968 a lso req ui r e s mini mi zation .
18
Carter Or de r 8 2- 202.
1 9 '
See 5 252 5 88 506( a ) a nd 215(6) f o r FBI ' s a u thority t o
e ngage i n e lec t r oni c sur ve i lla n c e wi t h i n t he Uni ted State s .
See 52525 !413 (c) ( 2) f o r l i mi t e d a u t hori z ation f or t he CIA.
The NSA was es tablished f or , among other purpose s, monit J r i ng
c ommun i cati on s . S2525 !602(2 ) a nd 611(b).
2C'
For autho ri z a t i o n for FBI use, see Chur c h Commi t t ee Repor t ,
Book I I, p. 327 , Recommendation #52 a nd Book I I , p . 120 ; Re -
co'rrne nda t. Lon 1144. For author izat i o n f o r tlSA, see Bo ol: :rI,
n , 1nq r a+: i o r. ..,.
5 5
As d efined i n 5 25 25 t he ter m " f or e i g n e lect roni c
or signals inte lligence activ i t ies " me a n s :
"the acquisition of i n f or mat i on by t h e i nt erceptio n o f
wire communicat i ons , nonpubl ic r adio c ommun i c a t i ons ,
or oral communications without the k nowledge o f a l l
parties , or t h e installation or us e o f a d evi ce f o r
monitor ing to acquire information wi thou t t h e know-
ledge of the pers ons or a ctivit i es mon itore d , b u t d oe s
not include 'ele ctro n ic s urvei llance wi th in the Uni-
ted States ' a s defined in Chapt e r 120 o f Title 18 ,
U.S. Code . " 21 /
1. Should foreign e l e c t ronic surveillance be authori zed
All of the proposed sche mes to govern the intellige nce
community except HR6051 wou ld author i ze this technique .22/
2. Under wh a t p r o c edur es shou l d f ore i g n e l e c t r on i c s ur-
veillance be employ e d ?
The Carter Order e stablishes t h e s a me p roc e dur e s for
this technique as itdoe s for electr onic sur veillanc e wi t h i n
the U.S. - i . e . there is no warrant requ i remen t.23/ 52 52 5
would require a wa r r a n t and the s a me p r o ce dur e s wou l d app l y
to thi s technique as apply to ele ctronic s ur vei l l a n c e wi t h i n
the U.S . 2 4/ The Church Committee Repor t a l s o r ecommende d
that a wa r r a n t be required for such s ur v e i l l a nc e.25/
3. In what circumstanc es s hou l d f ore ign e l e c t r on i c
surveillance be emp l oye d ?
22 S2525 !l321 (18 U.S . C. 82 5 31 (bl) .
Carter Orde r 8 2- 202 ; S2525 8 321 (1 8 U. S.C. 825 33 ) ;
Chu r c h Commi t t e e Repor t , Boo k II, p . 327 , Recommendation t'
23
.'
Ca r t e r Order 8 2- 201 (b).
24
52525 8321 (18 U.S.C. 8 2534 ). See a l s o , i d . 8 311 (1 8 U.S .C
82524) .
25 .
Church Committe e Re po rt, Book II, p . 327 , Recommen da t i o n
#51.
56
328
The Car t e r Or de r app l ies the s a me s t a nd a r d a b r o a d as it
does for oth e r e lect r onic sur veillanc e . 26/ 5 2525 wo u l d broa d_
e n t h e sta nd a r d i t wou l d e stab l i s h for e lect ronic s ur v e i ll a nc e
wi t h i n the u . s . by adding t o it . The bi l l would p r ov i de tha t
a ny U. S . pe r s on wh o is a n "ag e nt o f a f o r e i gn power " or
whose activities outside the u .s. wo u l d , if e ng a ged in wi thi n
the U. S . , meet the def inition of " a ge n t of a f o r e ign powe r "
coul d be t argeted.27/ In a dd i tion , another category r el a t ed
t o criminal condu c t would be added- - - "a fugit i ve from U.S.
justice abroad , information about who s e r e l a t i onshi p s wi t h
foreign governments wou l d cons titute f o r e i g n intelligenc e
information . " 28/ In ad di t ion , a U. S . pers on could be t a r ge t ed
a b r oa d if e n g ag e d i n non- cri mi nal activi ti e s if "the U. S .
person t a r ge t ed i s a n offi c er or employee of a forei gn power
res i d i ng abroad , information about who s e off icial duties or
c ommunications may consti tute fore ign int elligence i n f or ma-
t ion." 29/ The Churc h Committ e e Report r ecommended appl ica-
tion or-the same standard a b r oa d as itdid wi t h i n the U. S . 30/
4 . What efforts to reduce the gathering of informa tion
about individuals targeted for investigation shou ld
be made?
The Carter Order does not provide for minimizati on.
5 25 25 would direct that procedures be deve l oped, as d i d t he
Church Committee Report.ll/
26
Carter Or de r 8 8 2- 2 01 - 20 2.
27
5 252 5 8321 (1 8 U.S .C . 8 2 5 34 (b) (3) (A)- (B) )
28
Id. at 8 321 u. a U.S.C. S2 5 34 (b ) (3 ) ( D)).
2 9-
I d . at 8 321 (lB U. S . C. 8 25 34 (b ) ( 3 ) (C)).
30-
Church Committe e Re po rt, Book II , p . 32 7 , Re c omme n da t i on
11 51.
31
Se e 5252 5 8321 (18 U.S. C. 88 25 32, 25 34(a) (5 ) , and 25 34 (b ) (4 ))
see also Chur c h Committe e Repor t , Book II, p. 32 7 , Re c omme nda -
tion 115 2 (Omn i bus Cr i me Cont r o l a nd Safe St r e ets Ac t o f 1 968
r ef erred t o t here i n pr ovides t he n e c e s s a r y mi n i mi za t ion
proc edur e s ) .
57
329
5. Which entities of the intelli gence community should
be a u t hor i ze d to conduct these surveillance s ?
The Carter Order authori z e s any e nt i ty.32/ 5 2525 and
the Church Commi ttee Report wou ld autho r i ze the CIA and NSA
to empl oy this
PHYSICAL SEARCHES AND UNAUTHORIZED ENTRIES
c.
1. Should physical searches for forei gn intelligence,
counterintelligence and counterterrorism purposes be
authorized?
The Carter Order authori zes searches f or intell igence
purposes both withi n the U.S. and abroad.34/ S2525 would
authorize searches wi thin the u.S. and abroao.35/ Tne Church
Committee Report also recommended authorizat ion of phy-
sic al searches.36/ HR6051 only would authori ze physical
searches pursuant to Title lB , that is, under a criminal
warrant procedure.l2!
2. What procedures should apply to the use of this
technique?
The Carter Or d e r does not require a warrant; the same
procedures whi ch appl y for electronic survei l lance apply to
physical s earche s - i.e., the President must a pp r ov e the use
of the t echnique and the At t o r ne y General must authori ze the
search and find that the target is an agent of a foreign

32
Carter Order 82- 202.
33
Authorization f or employment of this.techni que derives from
t he general scope of the e n t i t ies ' aut ho r i ty.
34
Carter Order 82- 204.
35
S2525 8341. .r " .::
36 - '
Chur c h Conitte e Report, Book II, p. 32B, Recommendation 11 54.
37
Thi s authorization is implicit by th e omi ssion of a prohibi-
tion wit hin the p rovisi ons o f the HR6051.
3B
. . Carter Orde r 82 - 201 (b ) and 2- 204.
58
330
331
S252 5 wo uld r e quir e a wa rrant for s earches abroad as we l l a s
52525 would authorize them abroad.471 Th e Church Commi tte e
wi thi n the U. S . 3 91 The Chu rch Committee Repor t r ecomme nde d
and HR6051 did not authorize multiple
re q u ir ing a wa rran t .40
5. Which entities of the i ntelligence community should
3. Wha t standard should apply to t h e us e o f this t e c h-
be authorized to conduct these searches?
n iq ue?
The Carter Or de r author i zes the FBI a t h ome and any
The Carter Order applies the same non- criminal sta n-
e nt i t y abroad.491 S25 25 would not explici tly l i mi t authori-
dard ituses to a u thor i ze electronic sur veillance . 41 1
za tion to conduct physical searches t o a particular entity .
S2 525 wou l d appl y t he same standard for s earches wIth i n t he
The Church Committee Re por t authorized onl y the FBI t o conduc t
U.s. a s it woul d a pply to electronic surveillance wi th i n
suc h searches within the U.S. and the CIA abroad.5 01
t h e U.S . (See p. 54, s up r a ) 42 1 Searches conducted abroad
wou l d be governed by the same standard wh i c h would c over
f or eign electronic s urve i l l a n c e (see p . 58, supra ) ill
The Ch ur c h Committee Repor t recommended application o f the
D. MAIL OPENI NG
same standard i t sugge s t e d for e lec tron i c surveillance bot h
wi t h i n the U.S . and abroad - a c r i mi n a l standard with a
narrow e xc e p t ion f o r forei gners . 441 HR6051 wou l d r equire
a crimi nal search warrant in all-cases.4 51
1. Should the opening of a U.S. pers on's mail be author-
ized and, if 50, in what circumstances?
4. Sho u ld multiple searches be permitted?
The Carter Order authorizes mail opening in U.S. postal
channels under e x i s t i ng statutes and abroad unde r the same
The Carter Or d e r authori zes mult iple searches .461
standard itapplies to electronic surveillan c e.511 S2525
would leav e curre nt law enforcement procedure s to govern the
openi ng of mail within U.S. postal channels 521 and would
authorize the opening of a U.S. person' s ma ir-outside the U.S.
postal c ha nne l s p ur s ua n t to the same standard adopted for e lec-
tronic surveillance within the U.S. (See p. 54, supra)5 31
With respect t o mail passing b etween two persons, one
o f whom i s an American, the Church Committe e Re po r t r ecommend-
3:1 ed restriction of mail ope n i ng to cases in whi c h there is prob-
S2 5 25 !l 341(a).
40
47
Ch ur c h Commi tte e Repor t, Book I I, p . 328 , Recomme nd a ti o n #54.
See S2525 !l3 41 ; note the plural "sea r c hes " .
. 41
48-
Ca rter Order 82-2 01 (b ) .
Church Committee Report, Book II , p. 328 , Re c ommenda t i on #5 4
42
uses the singular form o f the noun . Exist ing s earch a n d
S2 52 5 9 34l.
seizure law, in effect under JR 6051, requires a war ra nt for
43
each search.
.: a t !l 341 (b) (2 ) .
49
44
Cart er Order !l2-204.
Churc h Commit t e e Repo rt, Boo k I I , p . 328 , Rec ommend a t i on #54.
50
45
Church Committee Report, Book II, p. 299, p. 306- 307.
This r e q u i r e ment i s i mpl i ci t s inc e HR6051 do es not
51
e xemp t phys i c a l s ea r c hes from exi s tinq l aw.
See Carter Or de r 8!l2- 20 1 (b ) and 2-205. .._d ,) ,..
46 52-
Th e p l ur a l " sear c hes " i s use d t h rough o ut t he a ppl icabl e
S2525 8351(a) (1) .
sec t ion : see Cart e r Order 82 -2 04 . 53
Id. at !l351.
59
60
333 332
4. Which entities o f the int e l l i g e nc e c ommun i t y s hould able c ause t o believe that the p iece o f mail c o ntai ns evi-
emp l oy t his t echn i q ue ? de nce o f a crime . 54 / Conc e r ni ng mai l correspondence i n which
both pa r t i e s ar e for e i g ners , t he Re po r t establ ishe d t he s ame
s t a ndar d a s i t e s t a b li s hed f or e l e c t roni c s urv e i l l a nc e of
f or eigners . (See p . 58 , s upr a ) 55/ The Rocke f e l l e r Commis s i on
Re port r ecommended " t ha t t he CI A is no t to e nga ge . . . i n d ome s -
t i c mail openings e xcept with s t a t ut o ry a uthority in time o f
war. " 56/ HR605 1 would not a ut hor i ze mail openi ng.
2. Under wha t procedur es s hou l d thi s tec hnique be c on-
ducted?
The Carter Order applies the s ame procedures t o t he mail
of a U.S. pers on a br o ad wh i c h i t e stabl i s he s for e lect r on ic
surveillance - no wa r r a nt requi rement. 57/ 5 2525 wou l d re-
quire that a judicial warrant be ob t a i ne d in a ll cases.58/
The Church Committee Re po r t al so required a wa r rant for--
mail opening.59/
3. Should multiple searches be permitted?
The Ca rter Order permits mu l t i p l e searches, a s wou l d
5 2525 . 60/ The Churc h Committe e Repor t was unclear on t his
question .61/
54
Chu rch Commi t t e e Report, Boo k II, p. 328 , Re commenda t i on #53
a nd p. 315, Re commendat ion #37(a) .
55
I d . at p . 328, Re comme nda t i on #53 and p p . 315- 31 6 , Recomme nda-
t i on #37( b ) . See a l s o p . 327-328 , Re commendati on #52.
56
Ro cke f e l l e r Commission Re po r t, RecoMme nd a t i on (1 3 ) a .
57
Se e Car t e r Or der SS2-2 01 (b ) a nd 2- 205 .
58-
5 2525 8351.
59
Chu rch Commi t tee Re p or t , Boo k II , p. 327 , Recommenda t i o n #51.
60
Car t e r Or de r uses the t e r m "ope n mail ; " see Ca r t e r Or der
2- 20 5 5 2525 uses the t erm " openi ng ofmai l; " s e e 5 25 25 8351.
61 -
5e e Church Commi t t e e Repor t, Book II , p. 32 8 , Re comme nd a t i on
i53 and pp . 315- 31 6 , Recommenda t ion #37.
61
The Ca r ter Order a ut ho r i ze s any enti ty.62/ 5 2525 would
uthor i ze t he FBI and , i n s ome case s , t he cond uct mail
apenings. The Ch ur c h Commi t t e e Re port wou l d a u thori ze only
FBI to, us e t h i s techni que at home . 63 /
62
Carter Order 82- 205.
63
See 52525 at Ti t le V a nd (c) (2) and Church Commit tee
Report, Book II, pp. 298-299.
6 2

334
VI II. MAINTENANCE AND DISSEMI NATION OF INFORMATI ON
OBTAI NED I N INTELLI GENCE INVESTI GATIONS
Informat ion gathered in intelligence investigations
is subject to misuse. Because of the sensitive natur e of
the information, its maintenance and dissemination should
be c on t r o l led . Rel ease of information could be damaging
to the subject; selective dissemination c ould be used, f o r
exampl e, to d i s c r e d i t political opponents of the Admini s -
tration. Howe ver, important information must be made avai l-
able to policy-makers.
A. MAI NTENANCE
1. Should the period of time for which informati on may
be r etained be prescr ibed?
The Carter Order does not limit the period of r e t e n-
tion, nor would S2525. 1/ The Church Committe e Report requir-
e d that information be-Sealed or p urg e d upon completio n o f the
investigation in wh i c h itwas obtained. 2/ Improperl y obt ain-
ed information would b e "sealed or purged as soon as prac t ic-
able."---l/
B. DISSEMINATION
1. To whom, within a given agency , should private i n-
formation which identifies a u.S. person be d issem-
lnated?
The Carter Order does not govern such
S2525 would restrict such dissemination to persons who re-
quir e the information f or the discharge of authori ze d gove rn-
mental
1
Car ter Order 82-310; S2525 S231.
2
Ch urch Committ e e Repo r t , Book II, p. 330, Rec omme nd a t ion #65.
3
Id. at Recommendat ion #66.
4-
See ge nera l ly Ca r ter Or de r 82- 310.
5
S2525 S232 (b).
63
335
ChUrch Commit t ee Report did not cover intra-agency d i s-
file . 6/
selllinat r.o n _
2. To wh i c h agenci e s and d e pa r t me n t s and i n wha t c i r -
cumstances s hould priva t e f oreign intel ligence i n-
formation whi c h i d e nti f i e s a u.S. pe r s on be dis s e-
minated?
The Carter Order does no t restrict interagency d i ssem-
ination within the intelligence communi ty.-l! S252 5 would
authorize dissemi nation of s uc h informa t ion whe n the r ecip-
ient has lawful access to foreign i n telli ge nce inf or ma t i on
and the ident ity of the u .S . person i s essent ial t o a n
asses slllent of the The Churc h Committ e e Re-
port did not authori ze s uch d issemination outsid e the De-
partment of Justice other than to the Department of State
and the Natio nal Security
3. To which agencies and in what circumstances should
counterintel ligence and counterterrorism
lnformation which identi fi es a u. S . pe r s on be dis-
semlnated?
The Carter Or der does not restrict int e ragency di s-
semi nation of such inf o rmatio n . l O/ S2525 wou l d a u thorize
dissemination to a ny agency h av Ing lawful coun terintel li-
gence or counterterrorism respon s i b i l i t i e s a nd having a d irect
interest in the i n f o r ma t ion . 11/ The Church Commi t t e e Report
recommended autho rizat io n of coun t e r t e r r or i sm
information to any l aw e nforcement agency ha v i ng j ur i sdi c t i o n
over the criminal activity to wh i ch the i n f or ma t i on rel a t e s .12/
6
See generally , Church Committee Repo r t , Book II , p p . 33 0- 331 .
7
See note 4 supra.
8
52525 8232(c).
9
Church Committee Re po r t , Book II , p . 33 1, Rec omme nd a t i on #67 (b ) ( 2) .
10
note 4 supra. .: .".
1/2525 8 232 (d ) (1). 'c" -r r
Church Commit te e Repo rt, Book II , pp. 330- 331, Rec ommendation
#67(a)(1).
64
336
4 . I n wha t circumstances should pr ivate forei gn i n-
telligenc e i n f o r ma t i o n which identifies a U. S .
person be d i s s e mi na t e d to a forei gn government ?
The Carter Order authori zes d i s s e mi na t i o n of for e i gn
intelligence information to "entities of c o ope r a t i ng f ore i gn
governments" without restrictions .13/ 5 2525 would not a utho_
ri ze such diss emination .14/ The Churc h Committee Repor t re c -
ommended allowance of dissemination of such information to
foreign governments i f relevant to an activity permit ted by
the recommendations.!2/
5. In what circumstances should private counterintelli_
gence or a U. S .
person be disseminated to a foreign government?
The Carter Order does not restrict such disseminat ion;
information may be given to "cooperating foreign gove rn-
ments."16/ S2525 would permit dissemination if the informa-
tion i nd i c a t e s that the U.S. person concerned could be e n-
gaged in international terrorist activities or in clandes-
tine activities of direct interest to that
foreign government if such dis s emination is clearly in the
interest of the U.S.17/ The Church Committee Report recom-
mended authorization-of dissemination of counterterror ism infor-
mation to foreign law enforcement agencies having juris d i c-
tion over the criminal activity to which the information re-
lates and to foreign intel ligence agencies if relevant to
an authorized activity.18/
13
Carter Order S2-3l0(c ) .
14
S2525 limits s uch dissemination to counterterrorism a nd
counterintelligence information; see S2525 S 232(d) ( 2) .
15 --
Church Committee Report, Book II, p. 330-331, Recommendat ion
#67( b) (3) - (4).
16
Ca r t e r Order S2- 3l 0 (c ) .
1 7
S2525 8 232 (d ) ( 2 ) .
18
Church Committee Report, Book II, p. 330-331, Rec ommend a t i on
#67(a) (1) , ( 4).
65
337
6. Should i nforma t ion re l ati ng to criminal activi t
be disseminated t o l aw e n for c eme n t a ut h or i t ies ?
All of the guidelines d iscussed provide f or such
dissemination.19/
7. Should the di s s e mination of "mis i n format ion" a bou t
a U.S. per son be autho ri zed ?
The Carter Or d e r d o e s no t r e s t r i c t s uch d i s s emi nation
for purposes c ons i stent wi t h a legitimate int el l igence a c t i -
vity .20/ S2525 wou l d aut. ho r Lze t he di s s emi na t i on of "mi s -
information" under c a rr aan c i r c ums t a nces .2l/ The Chur c h Com-
mitte e Repor t did not r ecommend a uthor i z ation o f such d i s -
selllination.
19
Se e Carter Order 8 2-310 (a) , 5 25 25 8 232 (d), Chur ch Committee
Report, Book I I , pp . 330- 33 1, Re c omme nd a t i on 467 .
20
The issue is not dire c t l y a d dressed . Th e o nl y po s s i b l e
saf eguard appe ars in Ca rter Order, 8 2- 102.
21 .
52525 8 242 .
66
-r ..- ) / :
338
APPENDI X A: DETAILED INFORMATI ON ABOUT THE DOCUMENTS
CARTER ORDER
The Carter Order, Executive Order 12036,-l/ is curre ntly
in force "in order to provide for the organization and c ontrol
of United States foreign intelligence activities." 2/ Unde r
the definitions set forth in the Carter Order, in-
telligence means information r elating to the capabi11t i e s ,
intentions and activities of for eign powe r s , organi zati ons or
persons, but not including c ounterintelligence except for
information on international terror i st activities ." 3/ Not -
withstanding the exclusion of counterintelligence from the
scope of the definition o f "foreign intelligence," the Ca r-
t er Order exp l i c i tly includes "counterintelligence" wit hi n
its provisions. -!/
CHURCH COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
On January 27 , 1975, the United States Senate, through
Senate Res olution 21, established a Select Committee under
the chairmanship o f Senator Church "to conduct an investi -
gation and study of g ove r nmen t a l operations with r espect
to intelligence a ctivities and o f the e x t e nt, if any, t o
wh ic h illegal, improper, or unethical act ivities were en-
ga g e d in by any agency of the Federal Government." The Church
Committee, pursuant to the mandate o f S.Res. 21, focused its
inquiry on three broad questions:
1. Whether i ntelligenc e act i vities have functi oned i n
accordance with the Constitution and the law of the
U.S. ; 2. Whether the structure, programs, past his-
tory, and present policies of the American intelli-
g ence sys t em hav e served the na t i ona l interests i n
a manner consistent with declared national pol i -
cies and purposes; a nd 3. Whe t he r the processe s
through which the intelligence agencies ha ve be e n
directed and controlled have be e n adequate t o assure
1
Carter Executive Order 12036, r eprinted in Vol .43, No . 18
Federal Re g i ster pp. 3674-3692 (Ja n . 26, 1978 ).
2
Id. at p. 36 74.
3-
Id. !l4- 205.
4
see, id. at 1- 304 .
67
339
con formi ty with po l icy and the
Church Committee' s Fi na l Repor t, S.Re p.No. 94- 755 , was
in six vo Lume s on April 1 4 , 1976. Mos t o f t he
recomme ndati on s are conta i ne d i n Book II , I n -
COll igence Ac t ivi t i e s a nd t he of Americans. Re-
c oncer n ing CI A a c t 1v i t i e s ab road a r e i n Book
c Foreign a nd Mi litary I ntel ligence. Book I II c ontai ns t he
Detai led St a f f Re por t s on I nte l l i ge n c e Ac t i-
1t1e S and t he Right s o f Amer i c a ns .

-
FORD ORDER
On Februa r y 19, 1976 , Pre sident Ford issued Executive
order 11905 to govern "Un ited State s Fore i gn I n telli g ence
Activities. The Fo r d Or der wa s designe d "to i mprove t he
quali ty o f int ell ige nce needed f or na t i ona l s e c uri t y , t o
clari f y the authori t y a nd respons i bili t ies of t he int e l ligenc e
departments a nd a genci es, a nd t o e sta blis h effe c t i ve ove r -
sight to assur e c ompliance wi t h l aw in the management a nd
direction of intellige nc e a ge nci es a nd d e par tme n t s o f t he na-
tiona l governme nt ." 7/ The Ca rter Orde r , mentione d above ,
superseded the Fo rdOrder.
HR6051
HR6051 wa s introduc e d i n t he Hou s e o f Repr e s e ntatives
on April 5 , 1977 . HR6051 , the Fe de r a l I n tellige nce Activi-
ties Contr o l Ac t o f 1 977 , wa s e stabl i shed as a b i l l "( t )0
preve nt abuses of power by the int ell igence a genc i e s o f t he
Federal Governme nt, t o limit th e jurisd iction of the Fed-
eral Bureau o f I nve s t igat i on and the Central Int ellige nce
Agency, to reg ula te di sse minatio n of informati on by intelli-
gence agencies , t o ame nd the Freed om of I nfor ma t i on Ac t t o
promote gr e ater public a cce ss to t he opera tion o f i nte l li-
agenc i e s , to p unish d ecept ion o f Cong r ess o r t he pub -
11c by officials of the intel l i gence a ge ncie s , to e s t abl i sh
proce dures for assuring c ompl iance wi th the f or egoing mea-
and for o ther purposes . " 8/ HR6051 ,wa s r e f er r e d
J01nt ly to the Commi t t e e s on the Judic i a r y, Ba nki ng , Finance
and Ur ba n Affai r s, Armed Se r v i ces, and Government Operations .
5------
6Church Committe e Report , S. Rep. No. 94-7 55, Book I" .-pp. 3-4'
Execu tive Or der 11905, reprin te d i n Vol. 41, 34
7 ederal Re g i s t e r pp. 7 70 3-77 38 (Feb. 18 , 197 6 ).
!!!. at /H.
8
IIR60S1 at p. 1.
68
340
PI KE COMMI TTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
The Hou se Select Commi tte e on Int e l l i g e nce was e sta -
b lis he d pursuant t o Ho use Re s o l ut i on 591 (9 4th Congr ess ,
2nd Se s sion) . It wa s d i r e cte d to c onduc t a n i nquiry i nto
the organi zation , operati on , a nd oversight o f t he i ntell i -
genc e community . The Pike Committee Recommendations were
pub lished on Fe br ua r y 11 , 197 6 as House Re por t No. 94-833
94t h Cong . , 2nd Sess. (Wash . GPO '
ROCKEFELLER COMMI SSION REPORT
Th e Roc ke fe l ler Commissi on Report stemmed from Exe -
cutive Or d e r 11828 . In that or der , Pres i d e n t Ford e sta b l i s h-
e d the Commi ssio n and set f orth tasks to be compl eted by t he
Commi s s i on ; primarily, t he Commi s sion , under the chai rma n-
shi p of Vice-President Rockefeller , wa s to " (d) e t e r mi ne
whe t he r e x i s ting safeguards are adequate to pr e ve n t a ny acti-
v i t i e s whi c h v i o l a t e the pr ov i s i ons of 50 U.S . C. 40 3 . "1 0/
Th e Commission , establishe d in J anuary 1975 , met in c l os e d
s e s s i ons and issued a .report of the ir fi ndi ngs in J une
1975 .11/
S2525
Introduc ed on February 6, 1978 , S2525 , if and whe n
enacted , wi l l supersed e the Car t er Or d e r and pr ov i d e t he
"s t a tut ory basis for t he nat i ona l intelligence act i viti e s of
the Un i t e d States . " 12/ Ti t l e I o f S2525 defi ne s "na t i o na l
intell i gence ac t ivi t y " a s "any s pe c i a l activity i n suppor t
o f na t ional f orei gn pol i c y objectives, or , a ny f orei gn i n-
telligenc e act i v ity t he primary purpose of whi ch i s to pro-
duce nat i onal i nte l l i genc e . " 13 /
S25 25 is d i vided into s e ve n tit les . Ti tles I V, V and
VI e stablish the s t a t u t ory basis for the key agenci e s o f t he
i n t e l l i ge n c e c ommunity . Title I V gov erns the CI A, es t a bl i s he s
i t s functi ons , aut hority , a ppr opriati on s and s e t s all othe r
b ur e a uc r a t i c guidelines. Ti t l e V de fines the a ut hor i t y of
the FBI to engage in v a r i ous act .i v i t i e s and Ti t le VI e s t ab -
l i s he s the Nat i ona l Se curit y Agency and def i ne s its aut hor i t y .
9
Pi ke Commi t t e e Te xt , pub li s he d in t he Vi l l age Vo i c e,
" Spe c i a l Su ppleme n t " (3 6pa ge s) (1 976 ) .
10
341
Titl e s I , I I a nd II I a re t he hea rt of S2 525 . Ti t l e I
fines t he s c ope o f al lowable a c t ivi t i es in whi c h the i n -
delligence c ommuni t y may engage . Ti t l e I I, e ntitl e d " In-
telligence Ac t ivi t i e s a nd Co ns t itutional Rights," dea l s wi t h
tee constitutiona l r i ghts o f persons aff e cted by i ntelli -
tn nce activ itie s . Ti t le I I I dea ls wi t h the employme nt o f very
t e chniques .
In
70
Executiv e Or der 11 828 2 (b) .
11
Repor t to t he Pre sident by t he Commi ssion on CI A Ac t ivi ties
wi t h i n the United St a t e s (the Roc ke f e l ler Commission-June 1975)
12
S2 525 at p. 1 .
13
S2525 104 ( 23 ) .
0;
-- , -"


342
APPENDIX B: S. 2525 AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
ON CIA OPERATIONS WITHIN THE U.S.
The Na t i o na l Se c ur i t y Act o f 1947 ( 50 U.S .C. 403 )
barred the CIA from exercising "any police, subpeona,
enforcement powers, or internal s ecurity functions wi thin
the United States." Because of exc e s s i ve secrecy surr ound_
ing the CIA and its covert mission, and the c onsequent
lack of public accountability, Congress determined that
the agency's focus should be exclusiv ely outward. Title
IV of S. 252 5 (Section 432 (b) ) scates that the agency
"shall have no police, subpeona or law enforcement powe rs ,
nor perform any internal security or criminal investig a -
tion functions except to the ext ent e x pr e s s l y authori zed
by this Act." The exceptions ar e numerous.
First, the CIA is permitted to conduct foreign in telli_
gence i nve s t i g a t i ons in the United States directed aga i ns t
foreign persons, a category which includes r esident al i e ns
and some citizens. The CIA may also conduct counterintelli-
gence and counterterrorism activities with in the Unite d
States as are "inte grally related " to its activities a br oad.
These activities may include investigations and prevent ive
actions directed against United States persons a s we l l a s
for eigners.
Second, the CI A is br oa d l y authorized to conduct i n-
vestigations in the Un i t ed States to determine ob j e c t s of
recruitment, possible targets, foreign contacts, and "po-
tential sources", activities now barred by law. See Weis -
mann V. CIA, 565 F. 2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Third, the CIA is authorized to conduct investiga-
tions to protect it s installations and personnel in the
United States from "physical threats" and to engage in ac-
tiviti es to "counter" espionage or "prevent" terrori s m in
this country.
The domestic jurisdiction flowing from all of the s e
authorizations is subject to expansion . Because juri s d ic-
tional disputes are to be settled independent of the c ha r ter ' s
provisions (see 141 (3) and 113 (k) ), CIA authori ty
may be further expanded.
71
343
ACLU REPORTS

-
cxmroILI NG 'lliE FBI
ACID 'IES'I'IMOOY
on
CHAR'IER IElJI SLATI OO
be fore
'lliE SEJIA'IE JUDICIARY CCTofIITIEE
April25, 1978
Jerry J. Berman
Morton H. Hal per:ln
30m H. F. Shattuck
600 Pennsyl vania Averue , S. E.
Wasl1iJl>;ton,D.C. 20003
(202)
AMERICAN CIVIL UBIRnl1UNION
22 Slreel New York, N.Y. 10016 (2121725-1222
.. f.:. :t .
344
Ml'. chairman am Member s of t he Cc!:rn1t t ee :
\'Ie welcome the oppor-t urn.ty t o t est ify here t cday on t he urgent
need t o devel op a statut or y charter t o gover n the Federal Bureau of
Invest i gation am t o state our vrews on cri tical i s sues which must
be r esol ved . Concurr i ng i n your vi ew t hat this is a mat t er of para-
Il' ount l egislat i ve priorit y , we conrnerrl you for i nitiating these de-
l i ber at i ons am look to working with t his Commit t ee and the
Congress i n a cor.certed ef f or t t o enact a statutory charter i nto l aw.
'This l er;i sl ation i s l ong overdue . POI' t,'o "ears both the Congress
am the previous ar.d pr esent Admini st r ation Mve r epeatedly said that
the FBI char -t er- i s ur gent , yet we are only now get t ing t o busi-
ness.V In t hi R r egard , "Ie are par-t I cuIar'Iv pl eased t hat you pr cdded
t he Justice Departrr:ent t o ccrre I'orward in ,Tilly with some ki rd of proposal
f or an investihator v charter. l'Ie al so share your vlew that t hi s is the
first pr i ority and t hat the Admini stration's recent ca l l for a campre-
henslve FBI ard even Federa.l "Law enforcement " chart er must not become
2/
a r eason to furt her delay t he r esol uti on of basic i s sues . -
1le ernpt a s ize the necesst t v f or t he Comni ttee t o f ccus i t s pr incipal
':lOr k on defini ng t he criminal i nvestir,;atory ,Juri sdict i on of t he Pur eau .
l'Jhile we agree wi t h the Just ice Department t hat a comprehens i ve FBI
char t.er srould be developed t o pl ace all of the Eureau ' s invest igator y,
police t r ai ni ng: , suppor t ard l ia.ison functions urder- l aw, we believe
t her e are reasons f or the Comnitt ee to make t he establ i srrnent
345
of st at ut or y stamards and pr ocedures f or FBI investigations the
first order of business.
!'!hUe other j ur isdi ctional issues ar e of vital concern to the
AcIJ}, as for example, t he Eureau' s r ol e in maintaining and di s semi na t i ng
cr 1l11
i nal
history dat a ) l we vi ew the i nvestigat or y charter as a matter
of consider abl e urgency lliii see no valid reason t o delay its considera-
tion and enactment perding t he r esol ution of t hese other issues. loJhen
a roor e crmprehens i ve chart er i s wor-ked out over time , the investigative
4/
statut e can easily be included as one or more of i t s titles . -
'!he Need f or an I nvest iftator y Chart er
The massive an:i disturbing pUbl i c record of investigat ive abuse
by t he FBI J.s t he primary impetus for cffirter l egi sl at i on. I'.'hlle we
can hope t hat t hese programratic abuses are i n t he past , we must bear
in rnirrl that the central concl usion of each of the many congress ional
inquiries is not t hat invest igat i ve abuses wer e comnit t ed but toot
t hey occurred l argel y because t he FBI 's invest.igative po wer-s are un-
defined, unchecked, ar.d unr-egul.at ed by statut cr v star.dards am
proCedur es. 2!
As tee f r amers of t he Fourth Jlrner.dment urrl er st ocd, the unchecked
PO':!er of the Executive br anch t o i nvest i gat e roses a furdamental
t hr eat to const i tut i onal liberty. As the &tpr eme'Court sa i d in the

"[T) t.ose charged. l-:1th [t he) tnvest t gat t ve and prosecutor1aI ,,:.:
346 347
duty should not be the sol e of to ut i l i ze
const i t ut i onal l y sensiti ve means i n pursuing t hese
t asks . The hist or i cal ,judfl]1lent , which t he Fo.u-cn
A'11emment accept s , i s t hat executive
discr et ion rray yiel d t oo r -:C1ully to pressures t o
obtain incriminat.:. ,g evi dence am overlcok po- 6/
t ent i al ':'Jvasi ons of pr i vacy and pr otected speech. -
S:lgni ficantly, t he Court , in poi nt i ng out the i nherent danger of'
en unchecked "execut ive discreti on" t o i nvest i gat e, i nvi t ed the
Congress t o est abl ish st atutory st andard s ar.d proc edures for sensit i ve
teChniques .I! The es senti al validi ty of t hi s hi stori cal
judgment ar.d t he burde n of congr essi onal r es ponsi hi lit y ext end to the
whole of t he i nvestigat or y process .
Since t he incept i on of t he modern Feder al Bureau of Invest i gat i on
i n the Congress , by enact ing. a ITul tit ude of criminal stat ut es ,
has greatly expanded t he cr iminal i nvest i gat ory aut hor i t y of the FBI.V
At t he sarr.e t ime, i t has permi tted the Executive Branch t o exer ci se
a cl a:lIr.ed "i nher ent IXlwer " t o overlay t hi s author i t y wi t h a f ormidabl e
10/
i nt elli gence j uri sdi ction.- Yet t he Congr-eas has declined t o def' Lne
how t he FEI is sunr oscd t o exer ci se t hi s aut t or i t y except in t he most
rudimentary f ashi on. The Attor ney Gener al is s:lIr.pl y aut hor ized t o
direct t he FBI "t o det ect . . .. .cr imes against t he Uni ted Stat es . ,,11/
i n the United St at es Code does the Congr es s set out st andard s
12/ ' .
and proc edur es ':;0 gut de t he Eureau i n detecting cr ime :- the basis
f or init i at ing invest i gat i ons ; tr:e st andard t hat must be met t o con-
duct Int.rusdve i nvestigat i ons ; or guldel.Ines t o control the use of
l 3/
tigative rr.eans . As f or the Bureau' s "domestic security"
in
ves
14/
t he Code i s simol y si l ent . -
i on
fllsS ' -
This def er ence to t he Executive has been
destructive of ci vil liber ties and damaging t o l aw enforcement. I t
resulted in
__broadscale int el l igence survei l lance of l awful pol i t ical
act ivi t y in vi ol at i on of the First ftmendrnent right to
privacy of pol itical associ at i on;
--rout ine invest i gat i on of ci t i zens wit hout probabl e
cause or r easonabl e suspici on of cr ime in bot h
dorre stic security arrl cr iminal cases i n viol ation of
the Fourth Jlmer.dJnent ;
--ext ensive use of paid and directed informants lilt hout
adequat e guidelines or procedur es for ir.deperrlent
revi ew cont r ary to t he spiri t and purpose of t he
Four t h Jlmernment ;
--inspect i on of cOJ'1Sidential r ecords lilt bout subpoena
in violat i on of t he Fourt h Jlmer.dment ; arrl
--use of investigative techni ques t o "chill speech" i n
viol at i on of t he First Amendment .l2!
Tni s l i st does not even incl ude cl earl y illegal 'act i vi ties such as
Use of intrusi ve surveillance techni ques (e .g . , break-ins , wiret aps ,
J1la11-
openin
g) wit hout judicial warrant or COINI'ELPRO act.tonsto -i "
. c.-_o
349
348
16
/ "di srupt ard neutralize" political prour s .
Fost of the publi c r ecord ava:larle r el at es to ir. -
abuse cOMmit t ed by t he PBI i n i t s conduct of
domest ic sec urit" orerations , there are reports t hat "bl ack- l"E1 [,;
,10bs , " "sui ci de tans" and ott-e r- abuses have also occurred i n FliT
or["ani zed cri me
The darrare to Lav enforcement is obvious . I n pur-sufrrt the
dissenter and the merely suspect , and i n overreachinr the laN, the
Bureau pas souandered valuahle nUhl i c r esour ces whtch should have
been devoted to se rious destro"ecl public trust in its OM1
institution, and exposed agents to civil and crimi nal liahil it".
1"e cannot and should not r eI " pr-Imarf l v on the court s to
resolve these basic issues . I n criminal cases, t he onl" means the
courts have to control the rnvest inatorv funct ion is the exclusionary
rule . Eut rncr-easmr-Iv th; ruf.o i s locked on .I"i t h di sf avor bv
19
/ hoth judr:es and ler:al scholars . It is obviouslv ineffective i n
providin[" standards or reF-edies for i nvestir:at l vP ahuses i n a
orit:,I of cases "Ih:lch are never prosecuted , arvt in all intellir;encp
Lnvest irtat.tons vmere pr-osecut ton is not the aim. 20/ AlttoU["h \'le
believe it is rcoutr-ed by the Foui-t h Amerxlrcent , t he excl usfonarv
rule i s Inadeouate as a F-echaniMl f or estahlishin[" r:eneral
invest,ir,ative the prirrar:r obj ectdve here, s ince l'evie.! is
00 a a number of r ecent decisions, the
supreme Court ha s strongl,v suggested tha t it i s t he Congress
21/
t hat must l egislate starrlards ar:d procedures f or invest i gat i ons.-
Rel iance on Execu t i ve cont r ol of invest i gat ions is the very
core of t he problem whi ch l egi slat i on must redres s . Despi te t he
premi se of t he Just i ce Depart rr.ent to devel op guidelines for all
i nves tigations t wo years ago, the exist i ng gui de l ines remain
22/
incomplet e . Domest i c Security Gui de lines pave bee n prernulgated
2<'/
but ther-e are no s1mil ar guidel ines f or cr imi nal investigations . -
!(or eover , althoue;h mor-e strict t ha n previous t nterrat sec urity
procedures , t he current Comest i c Securi ty Gui delines authorize
ongoine; intelligence i nvest igations of Lawf'ul, politica l act ivity
ar.d can be r ead t o permit many of the same kinds of investigations
24/
that t he Congress has so r ecently cr :l.ticized . -
import.ant , the Guidelines derive their authority frem
t he Executive ' s claim of an "inherent power" to conduct intelligence
231
invest igat i ons . In the past , t hi s claim has permi t t ed the
exact scope of the investigator y power to remain nebulous. I n t he
absence of public debate , Execut i ve guidelines have been am may
2Y
al . a ys be i nt er pret ed broadly. Even st r i ct e;uidelines may be
alt er ed by a str oke of the Executi ve pen . The Pur-eau has already
27/
r er,r esent ed that serne of t he p;uidelines are teo restrictive. -
The JI.dmin1st. r-at i.on r.as f our.d that cr:lrninal investill;l:-tive guidelines
.- ..- '( ' ;"-
351
350
28/
ar e "not possible" t o devel op. - t}ui delines , as the Jl_clr.1i nistratlon
has so aptly put it , are onlv "s trop-gap" measures . ,,29/ They do
not r esol ve basi c issue s.
Cnly an investigat ive chart er can provide a f irm f oundat i on
for c i vil l:l ber t i es . Guidelines am. t he electi on of a new
Jldmlnist r a t i on make no lasting f'urdament al changes . '!'he pr:!.l'lary
r eason for t he decline in t he number of Investtr-at t ons , ac cording
to the Bureau , i s t hat "t he pol:l t i cal/sccial climate changed . ..30/
Tcday the FBI i.:; only invegt i[!:at:L,\,; i ndi vi dua l s and or ganizati ons
' -1110 have ccnmf.t t ed cr iminal acts. 31/ Isrt the soci al cLfrnat e wi ll
certainly change , Civil l:lbert ies shouId not rest on mere circum-
st ance . '1J1e Cart er Admini st ration has l eft the door open for a
r ea ssertion of br oad tnher-ent power s in t hf., domest i c security
area . It has never admi tted error or of fer ed t o set .tLe any of the
W
many c i vil sui t s cha llenging past abusive sur-....eillance practices.
-\1i t hout statut ory redress , invites r erJet i t i on of past
abus e . Executive di scret i on perpetuates t he dange r of over zeal ous
efforts to "detect " cr ime .
Toda;T "Ie I-rill f ocus our t esti"llOny on t he case f or t he five
basic r eforms a st atut or y chart er must in, t i t ut e :
First , t he chart er must abol:l sh t he domest i c
:lnt ellir;ence j urisdict ion of t he PBI.
Secord , t he charter must only autbor-I ze i ntrusive
inves ti r;ations pur-suant to a criminal stardard,
excludinG conspiracy as a bas i s f or i nvestigation
I'T)-,en First Amendment ac tivity may be :l_nvoJ.-.red. The
of such invest igations shoul d be the
gathering of evidence for' arrest and prosecution.
Tjdrd , t ile char-t er must est ablJ. sh stri ct statut ory
procedures gover-nfng -;.nvesti gati ons wruch may
D1tr ude on First activity in order
to insure that they are pronerly authorized and
conducted so as t o minimize the jntrusion.
Fourt h , t he chart er must est ablish a j udicial
war-rant procedure gover-rring t be FBI 'sdirecti on
of i nf ormant s or under-cover- agent s to i nfil t r at e
associ at i ons in aut hcr i zed cr iminal Dwest:J.eations .
Fifth, the charter must prohibitthe PEl from
engagi ng in "preventive acti on" or COI NTELPRO-
type
These pr oposal s are embod'led in the mcde'l l er:i sl at i on , !l
raj-{ t o Contr ol t he f RI , 33/ and in H.R . 6051,,4/ nowbefore the House .
fIltheugh t hey ar e cont r over si a l, we hope t hat over the course of
t hese t earings the Cormrt t.t.ee and the Congress vIill becane convinced
t hat theirenactment is both I"ise public policy and necessary f or
tr.e prct.ect I on of furdamentaL constitut i onal liber t i es .
Cese Jlgainst Domestic Security I nvestigations
Domest i c securi t y i nve sttgations are int el l i gence invest i Gations
umer t aken by the Feder al fureau of I nve gt i gation primarily t o
pr f'vent act s of polit1.ca1 vi olence r at her than t o effect criminal
prosecut i on . Alt hough t he FBI never r-ecogni zed such a distinction
in tte past , domest i c securit y inve stigati_ons are today defined as
dist inct rron cOUl1terintel lif;ence investir-:ations because Violent
352
acts t hey are i ntended t o ant ici pat e ard prevent are rot urrler-
351
t aken for or on behalf of a forei en power- , flost of the
intelligence jn vest igati ons conduct ed by t he FBI , from invest ip",ation
of "subver si ve :act l vi t i es" to invest i e;at l ons of r adi cal s and
321
ext r emist s , i n f act fall in this category, Today domestic
securi t y invest i gat i ons are authorized t o wlti ci pat e and pr event
t he viol ent over-throw of t he gover rment , ci vil d:!..sorder s, and
37/
dcmestic ter ror i sm. -
The val ue of dcmestic intellir,ence does not outweagh t he
risk t o ci vil libp.Fcies. Over t he course of our hi st ory, \'Ie have
always recogni zed t he t ensi on between maintaining an open , ;-i::<" '"
democrat i c societ y am protecti ne that soci et y fran vi ol ent dis-
ruptl on , Repeat edly we have est ablished "domestic securi t y
measures " in r esponse t o percei ved threat s to our social order .
In every case , from t he Alien and E'e::l. i t ion Act s t hrough the "Palmer
Paids" in t he 1920 ' s ard t he loyalty an::i securi t y program 1.'1 t he
1950 ' s , to t he r ecent r evetat i ons of massi ve covert FBI sur vei llance
ard disruption of l awful politi cal act i vi t y over the l ast f our
decades , t hese meaour-es have pr oved far more damaginG t o our
soci et y than prot ect i ve of i t .
Yet t oday Vie are cons t der-trr- the continuat i on of a dcmest t c
int ellir:enc e jurisdi ct i on f or the FBI.. 'Ihe neu t hrea t t o \'rhiCh
1,;e are r espond! ne; i s polit ical ter r-or-Lsm. 38/ Persist ently we
353
r el
v
on these der.onstrabl v danr:erous l':easures hecause of (lUI'
stubbor n adherence to t\10 basic assumntions : (1 ) that it is
pos si bl e "t o drai: the fine line betwe en l ep" i t :1JlJat e conduct and
i nvestip:ation of advocacv I'lnd association" and
thereby miniMi ze t he threat t o civi l liberties; arrl ( 2) that
dompst i c se curi t y oper ati ons can suhst antially nrevent or reduce
pol i t i cal viol ence . These assumpt i ons t he asser tion
"on bal ance" t he benefit s outl:ei r:h the r-t sl-s , 'The only problem
t hen i s to desf.gn pr oper r;uldelines and pf f ect i ve over sir:llt . 3/
These assumpt i ons are thoroup;hly debun}{ed hv the evidence .
By def i ni t i on domest i c investir:at ions reauire
surveillance of 1211ful pol itical act i vi t y. Part icularly i n
of soci al t IL'TlO:'l , t hose charr-ed \'.' ith a preventive intellir;ence
Missi on have been umrilli nr; or unable t o di st inr:u1sh between
40
vi f,orous citizen di ssent r eal sec urity t hreat s. / At
least i n part because of thi s dcmest i c intellir,ence
oper-at ions have f ailed t o accOIT(Dlish their p:oal. there
1s sir.ni f icant evidence t hat t hese ef fort s are count er pr oduct i ve
in political viol ence oft en have the opposite effect .
these fact s of life, sound nubl i c poli cy , based on the need
t o pr otect fundament al const i t ut i onal r j.r:ht s as I:ell as society
f'r om se r i ous Vi olence , mist r e,j ect this frui tles s and danr:er ous
course .
:: ':..
355
354
Reaching this conclus ion in no vav implies that we do not
consider terror ism to be a serious pot ent ial threat t o the f abr i c
of our soc i ety and t o our i nsti t ut i ons . Rather i t is
based on a larf,e body of empiri ca l evidence on t he publ I c r ecord
cont r-ar-y to t radit ior.al dcgma , indicates ti"at prevent i ve
t o the ext ent that it t s corrluct.ed wit hin "t ol er abl e
int r us i ve means" may well he more ef f ect i ve . The evidence indicat es
t hat "more of the same" is not is ca lled for i n meeting this
ser i ous potential t hr eat. 'The Corrmi ttee shoul d use t he oppor t unit y
af forded by calmer times t o make d i f f erent and wise public policy.
1. Dra\!in,g the Li ne is Imposs ible
It is not di f f i cul t t o f athom why t he Church Corrmittee f our.d
i ts ef f or t "to draw t he f ine l ine bet ween l egi t imat e con::l uct ar.d
i llegi t1mate invest ieation of advocacy and associat t on" f or
prevent ive intellie er.ce invest i&itions "t he most difficu l t .
41/
t o dr aft . "- i s it hard t o urder-stard \"11:1 t he J ust ice
Department ' s ef for t t o do the same i s interpret ed by some FBI
42
cf f k ial s t o aut hori ze cont inutrr; invest 1c;ation of "subver s i ves . "---..-'
I t is s impl y not possi ble to make t he necessar-y di st inct i ons
in t he fremewor k of a Gorr.es t i c i ntelligence authori t y.
I f their object i ve i s t o permit t l:e FBI to prevent a cr ime
befor-e i t occ urs , int elli.r'ence i nvestir;ations, by defini t i on ,
must be initiat ed 'Nit hout r-cas onabLe sus pic f.on trat, a criminal
]-1,.:J.s been, is beinr;, or is about t o be corrmitted . 43/ FBI
agent s i nevi t abl y focus I nvestIgat Ive attention on persons
who vi gorously dissent goverrment policy or social
r.oncti t i ons , or \100 advccate the need for r ad ical , or
r evolut i onary crange , even t hough t nese act i vities are cons t.r t u-
tionally pr otected . Di ssenters are vis i bl e ar.d r easonab l e targets
of i nt elli gence inves tigations whi ch are suppos ed to prevent
polit i ca lly mot t vat ed viol ence . r.lor eover , if t he m vest tgat Ive
purpose i s to piece t Of,et her a "Neb of intelligence " whic h
intelli gence agent s claim to require to dist ingui sh the r eal
tnreat .s of potential violence from "legitimate cor:duct," inves-
t igator s have t o gat her ir.formation about a ll of t he pl ans ,
acUvitl es , beliefs , a ssociations ard member shi ps of sus pect
. 44/
ir.dividuals ar.d f.'I'oups . - 'This danger i s particularly acut e
when the principal i nvest i gat i ve t echnique is the pl anted
inforrr.er who canno t be with t he dec i s i on to deci de wi"at
i s r el evant or activit y which may s i gnal ps s s i bl e
45/
violence.- 'fr.e r est;.l t i s the ver y evil which t he
gui del ine s ar:d charter s are int er.ded to prevent : ongoing inves-
t i gat i ons of l awf ul polit ical activi t y in vi ol at ion of f r ee speech
ar.d assoc iat i onal privacy pr ot ect ed by the First pmen::lment,46/
searcr.es sei zures in vi ol at i on ,of t he Fourt h
Jlmerrlment ; 47/ and a concomi t ant on all political
act i Vi t y when ci t i zens are subj ect ed t o a f ear of invest i gat i on ,
,r.,,';:.:
356
exposure, ani reprisal if they p-np'ar,e in unpopular- political


Because t he cpec Lt'.lcs of the .rust i co Department Gu"ldelines
and the Church Conmittee RecorrmerdatLons are not at i s sue at
t nts t i:ne , we s:lmply point out t.hat; have analyzed themin
ter ms of their potenttal, overbreCldt:1an::l concluded that the:! can
be interpreted to permrtmany of t he k trrt s of investigations
4G/
which occurred i.'1 tne 'IPe l ate Senator- Philip furt
expr-essed our succ inctly i n his dis sent f rom tr.e Church

"The Col'lYlittee vas concerned about
such ext ons t vo investic;ations bef or e there i s a
' r e?sonable basis of suspicion ' the subj ect
enr age in terrorism. 'llie Report offers exampl.es
of hO':1 t his !"'ecO!'l11em ption woulrl work, and in-
di cat es our desire t o Insul.at .e I a-rfu.L Polit ical
activity from of tsrror-tsm. But
t.heae ver:.J exampl es Elustrat e hO\'I .tnextr-Ic ab l .e
the two rna:! be at the outset of ar. ir>ol.1 iry into
an illlef,aUon or tnrornat Ion. The
task of out \.rhether a dj,s sident .l ':, con-
templat:!ng vt ol ence or i s onl y Invo.lved i n
vi[';orous pi'otest i r,Eevi t ahly r equi r es InvestI-
cat jon of his protest I!'!the
pr oces s , t",e FBI could 1'0110\'1 the
of the HashiP.[;ton peace ra11y for three months
on t he 0:' an allegaEh'1"l that th"lYnig11t
er{" ,ar;e i n vi olence ,"L .
\''1111e some m'J.:! ar'r,ue that thts Ls 8. strained rcadil1F- of
t.l-,8 Guidelines ard Cburch Carl"littee r-eccrrmerdat t ons , t umul t uous
t:!llles proo uce such. i nterpretat i ons . President Rooseve l t ' s secr et
1939 Executive Directive only tnst ruct ed t he [0"' 1 to
357
vio l at i ons of sabotage , espionare, treason , am violat i ons of
t r.e neut r alit y I aws . '.:':1i s i)irect i ve CeCaIT'2 the princinal ba s l
for that foll o\'reU. 51/
Prevent i ve I ntell i r;ence is Ineffective' aOO Count erproductive:
2.
The inevitable costs of t hese i ntelligence ac t i vi t i es re-
qu:lre t he Congr-ess to carefully assess t hei r value befo r e aut bor-I zlnc;
ttem. Based on the pubHc record, the BureauI s "offerof proof"
t o suppor t U s missi on , arrl the General Accountt ng Office ' s
intensive audit of FBI ;)omestic I rrte'l l Igence , arxi i ts f'o.L l.civ-up
st udy appropriatel y t itled"FBI Comestic Intell:tt",,;ence Operat ions:
An Iir.cer t a in Future , ,..2/t here i s literally no evidence to SUpDC. 't
the value of domest i c intelligence in antic i patir.g or or-evont Ina
acts of colitical violence.
--f,ccording to the Church Cormdttee, "between 1960
arrl 1974, t he FBI conduct ed over 500 ,0 00 separate
invest i gat i ons of per sons am ["roups umer t te
' subversi ve ' cate[SOry, predicated on the cossi bl i t y
that t hey :nif,ht be likely to overthrow the gover n-
ment of the Un1t:ed States. Yet not a stngl e
iOOivi dual or TouP has been pros ecut ro since 1957
urrier- Laws whi ch prohi bi t planning 0g_advocat ing
act i on t o overthrow the goverrment ,"2
- - Accordi ng to t he GAO auditof some17 , 523 FBI
' domestic int ellir.:ence invest igations of irxl ividual s
in 1974, oruy 1 . 3%r esul t Ed i n prosecution am
convicti on, ard in only "about 2%" of the cases
vas advance knowl.edge actiVity -r- legal
or illegal -- obt ai ned . - '
--I n r evtevdng 11)1 orp;ani zat i on files , the GAO
found onl y 119 instances '.'lhere ac t i vi t i es were
anticipated by the FBI. Qlly 127. of these
359
358
could ;oooaelva9l y i nvolve vi olence . . Ther e
i s no r ecord of l'ihether the FBI prevented
any of thispotential violence. '!'he FBI
cont ends t hese st at i st i cs m1g.'1t be unfair
because t hey concentrate on 1r.dividual s ",:,.r,;:.. <:!"
rat her t han groups . I n r esponse , GAO states
that i t s "samp.le of or ganizat i ons and control
files were sufficient to determine that
gener ally the FBI di d not report advance
knowledge of pl anned violence. " I n rrost of
the 14 instances wher e suc h advance know.ledge
\'J3.S obt ained , i t r elated t o "such acti vities
as speeches , demonst r ations or --
all essent ially non- violent .
t o supply mor e support ive inf ormat i on
to the Church Ccnm1t tee , t he FBI pr oduced a
memor andug6J!1which 3 cases of prevention
detail ed.-
--'.rhe gener al f Wing of t he GAOestablishes
t hat the 'ant i ci pat i on or prevention of violence
by the FBI just does not happen . "Investigations
of sabot age , cer t a i n bombings , and r i ot violations,
of f ore1e-n of ficial s , although
as part of the domesti c intelligence
operations, us ually involved criminal acts
ccmnitted bef ore the investiSations wer e initiated . ,571
- -One of the main reasons advanced for expanded
. ,-collection of mrormati on about urban unrest
and anti-war protestwas to hel p respons i bl e
officials cope ldt h poss i bl e violence. However,
as t he Church Commi t t ee r epor t s , a 'former
'.'hlte House offic i al ldthmaj or- dut ies in tnis
area urxier J ohnson Arnnini stration has
concluded in r etrospect t ba t ' i n none of t hese
situations....would advance i ntel ligence about
di s si dent groups [have] been of much help, ' and
that what was needed was intellieence'
about geography of major cities, am that the
attempt to 'predict ,vas rDt a
successful
The Eureau' s f ailure occurred during a per i od when i t
oper-at ed covertly "wit h no holds barred.,,591 None of the major
outbr eaks of political violence \'!hi ch are cited t o support the
need f o!' a preventive intelligence juri sdi ct i on were anticipated
or prevented: t he civil disorders of the 1960' s , t he campus
di sord er s of the 1970 ' s , t he Capitol Bcw.bing, the political
assa ssinati ons and attempts , t he viol ent act i vi t i es of t Ile
601
Under grourxi or the SLA.-
So l ong as "prevent ion" remains the goa l of domestic security
i nves t i r;at l ons , new rest rictions ar.d procedures will furt her
insur e f ailur e . The often heard criti cism t.hat these r estrictions ,
necessar y to prot ect ci vil liberties , \'Iill "t i e the hands I! of the
611
FB:': ' s i ntelli gence agents is not unfourxied.- The follow-ur
!i.er;or t of the Gener al Accounting Office Repor t , FBI Domest i c
Int elligence Oper ations : An Uncer t ain FUt ur e , r eal i sti cally
desc r i bes t he dilemma :
''Despi t e t he impr ovement s in t he direct i on and control
of' domestic 1ntelIir;ence, trere are stlII 1ewvis ible
r esul ts..... Reali stically this may be the best that
can be exoected, particul arly in viewof the greater
invest i t i ve r es trict i ons now pl aced on t he PBI and
i n vi ew of its pact r ecord l':hen t her e wer e ewer 62
r estrict i ons an:! l ess contr ol. " (emphasis supplied )-I
' 'breover, t here is cons i derable evidence that pr event i ve
int ell i gence measures are in fact, counterpr oductive. I nst ead of
serving t o detect and pr event viol er.ce , they have the oppos i t e
effect of crime more difficult arxi violence more
likely.
.: ., li:) i,-
./
361
360
By f ocus ing on t he di ssent ers and pr ot est ers :in order t o
f erret out potent i al vi ol ence , agenci es play int o
tre hands of t error i st s . As t he aim of the t err or i st is t o both
intimidate and cr ea te sympathy f or his or her cause by
people that r epress ion mcU<es viol ence neces sary, overreact i on bv
author ity is a key element in t he strategy. If police inve sti8at e
Innocent per sons or those svmpat bet t c t o t htO "cause" of the
terrorist, t he poli ce confirm or appear t o confirm t re trut h about
r epres sion. By vi ol atinr: cons:li i t ut ional r ip' )ltf1 , intelligence
agencies help to pr omot e the succes s of t error i st
63/
tact icfo.-
By engaging i n over br oad surveillance , intel l igence ar,enci es
creat e paranoia and dist rust of the police makes detect i cn
of t error i sts rror e di f f i cul t . To c i t e j ust tvo exampl es , t he
r-eason \.1hy t he FBI has had p;reat difficul t y in over t aking the
SLA and Heather Undergrourd i 3rt!'.at a sir,ni ficant segment of t he
public has been u!ll' .'1ll inr: to establish t heir whereabouts t o t he
pol i ce and some peopl e have helped t hese stay under r,r ound .
I."1t elli gence investi,:.at i ons have made them "e nemf.es: of t he police
and t hey \'T0nV-Y but underst andably i dent i f y wi th other "enemies"
of the police. VIithout publ.t c t rus t in police au tbor-Lty, ",hi ch is
urdermined by surveillance or fear of surveillance , PRI criminal
invest ir..at or s are hj .mcred in l egi t i 'nat e ef f or t s to enfor ce t re
l aw.
6V
flinally, by t ak ing "pr-everrt I ve actions" or us i ng i llez..al means ,
''In i nt elligence agency becomes t he mirror image of the terrori st s it
i s bUP!X>Sed to t h.,'8I't. \'lhen a police agency becomes a kim of' t er r orist
orf,ani,:;at i on usfng intimi dation and vi olence to achieve publ i c ends ,
t l".at is a f ar wor se t hreat t Hm Black Sept ember or PALN, 0 1' ,<;LII,
of f::.clal t er r or is t he ul t imat e ev il in moder n t imes , 65/ and tI lE' FBI ,
as the public r ecord Sho:'IS, used t actics in its int cll:1[;ence missi on
\'!hich lie associate \.'i t h police stat es ; from t !:e canpilation of emergency
detent i on t o
n * * * * i? * * X J:
A tot al change in empha sfs is r equired . Inst ead of fo cus i ng on
litical di s sent . t he FBI shoul d zero in on i llegal conduct . '!'he
appr'opriat e alternative i s cr-tminal cord ueted urder-
st rict standards and pr ocedures . Eot !'1 t he Mministr ation ar:d
66/
C
1
ement.s of t he Congr-ess are aopar- ent l y coming to t he same conclus i on. -
\-1hen we f irst t est ified in f avor of pr ohi bi t inb dcrr.estic i n-
67
t plligencc invest i li;at i ons t wo years ago , only t he Pi ke Corrmittee ard /
a manber - of public organt zat Ions , 68/ the Uni t ed Aut omobile
ar.d Corrmon Cause , advocat ed a s imilar flat ban . 69/ fut h the
. ' "ro/
Jus t :i.ce Cepart ment under f ormer Att or ney General Levi- am t he Senat e
Sel ect Oll Act i viti es (the Church ccmmittee)7l/
r pcorrmerxk d tna t tr.e Congres s aut hor-Ize l imi t ed
363 362
Invcst tgat I ons becau se 0:' tl1Q recess tty to "ant l cfpate ard prevent "
poEtica l vi ol ence bef or e itoccur's .
72/
Re'cently , however , a number of House member-a , 1....- includin8 t he
chairman of the FBI Overs ight Comnittee of the Jud iciary Comnitt ee ,
the consti t ut ed Senate I ntell 1(';ence Commit tee , and t he Just i ce
9'partment have t aken t he r ositi on t pa t investigative standards
urxler st r i ct shou l d be used i n domest i c security
cases . Chairman ron Ech-mrds of the FBI Oversight Comni t t ee has
introduced which would acccootLsh this result
Tre Chai r man of t he I ntell i gence Corrm:Lttee, Senator Bir ch Bavh,
also a member of thi" Corrrnit tee, announced on Pebruary ') of thi s year
that the CGr.Jmittee decl i ned t o i ncl ude domest i c
securi t y investtgo.tions in t he f oreir"..n i nt elligel'ce cbar-t er , 3. 2525,
"because they shoul d be treated as I aw enforcement r ather than in-
7/
j
tellie:ence functions. "-I the Attorney General has adopted a
similar vie" r, which he descr i bed i n r ecent t est imony before t he
Ho use .Judi ciary Corrmittee :
"IE.st veal' we began effor t s t o drai't l el2: i sl at i on
dealin', I:rith tr.e ctcrnest i c security investivations of
the PEl . It Quicl<ly became apoarent ! hm-iever ! that is
is unsn'.md! both lefCo.llyFro nr act1call y ! t o i sol at e
this particular. sUb.lect frcm other areas of FBI crimi nal
r espons i bi l ity. There is no r eal differ ence
[,?t ,;een investigat::'ons of criminal enterpr ises bent on
violence for political rrotrves ani cr1r.Jir.a1 enterprises
bent on vj.olence to extend the influence of or r.:anized
cr-ime f or eco nomic sain. n.lrd0r , assault , and
extortion are Heapons p.:lUally adapted to ca lling
attention to a pol1Ucal cause or er.dorsinr, a loan-
or l,q,atevcr the motIvat.Ion
the come int0 nlav in
at tempting to identify thE: per-sons or organfcat.ronc
behi rxl these act s , det errl'b i nc; \..110 provides the
l eadership 1:'.00 bringing a halt to such crtmes , 'Ihe
onl Ydistinction :'s t In t creat eI' sa f er;u9I'df' for the
pr ot ect i on of First be
rrovided in the investl,,,:ation of crimes ur.de ken "
for political r easons. emphasIs supplied -
The FBI's curr ent policy in t he dcoesttc security area is i tself
a 8r8'Wnent f or the of abolishing the
do:'\cst1c security jurisdict10n. The Bureau 'laS transferred all
domestic security t nvestigat Ions t o i ts CrlJ11inal Di vi s i on .: Despite
the ar8'Jabl y broad jur:sdict:ion 13X'3.!1ted by t!Y: Ju stice Department
';uidelines, the Eur eRu, in :;.:s o\'m "quality over Quantity" approach,
h::w limi t ed i t sel f to investigating c:1ly "irrlividuals ard organizat ions
involved in crimes aga inst the U. 3. "..rnch invol ve act s of vi ol enc e. ,,76/
I nstead of \:astillg t lme ard r esources am i nfri ngi l'.g rights by trying
t o pr event violence bef or e it occurs , t he Eureau seems to be t ryi!1: to
vi ol ence by detectinGan::l prosecuting :hose v:ho commit crimes
of violence in order to deter such ::l ets.
Prohl bi t i ng Other Domel'tic Security I nvest if;atlons
I n order t o cl ose the Bureau' s domestic int elligence
j ll!'l :.vl1ct i on, t he charter must pr e-empt al l execut i ve order s and
limi t t he FBI to the conduct, of cr-trunal. I nvesttzat tons . The charter
must al so carefully define the F31I S i nvest.1iatory r es!"'ons i bili t y in
the areas of ci vildLsorder-s and bac kgr-ound in':est:i.e..at ions. These
fu nct i ons must no l onf,er const i t ut e a fo r ,inves-
3.64
365
tigations. 77
Civil disorder information r,athering InuSt be stri ct l y l imi t ed .
'The Attorney General must aut hor i ze collection only if there i s a
clear an:l immediate t hreat of viol ence lilcel y to r equire the
out of f ederal t roops . Cnl.Y tempor ary (30 days ) collect i on should
be permit ted am the PI3I sbould be l 1r.li t ed t c t he use of overt t ec h-
niques unl ess a full cr:lminal i nvestigat i on in autlx>rized . The &!reau' s
autlx>rlty t o gather inforrratior,781 about pl anned derronstr-at .Ions sbou l d
be similarl y r est r i ct ed .
The scope of t r.e fureau 's aut hority t o corxluct bac kgr-ound ard
securi t y invest i gat i ons should be r eassesned mld expl i ci t l y def ined .
1"0 bac kgrourd invest igation should be con::!uct ed wit hout the subj ect ' s
consent . Cnl y i nformat i on relevant t o the l egi t imat e purpose of the
investigation slx>uld be collected or maintained; dissemination shoul d
be t 1ght l y controlled . Eecause of the inher ent tension betwee n the
FBI's counterintelll.eence and backgr ound Investigat.Ive fu nct i ons ,
the Omrnittee should seriously consider t he t r ansf er of most of this
791
author ity t o the Ci vi l SeFvi ce Commiss ion .
A Stardard. f or FBI Cr imina l I nvest i p:.at i ons
'The Congr-ess must define carefully t he FBI ' s criminal investiga-
t ory authority. The chart er shoul d mardate that the primary purpose
of a criminal law enror-cemont investi:l:ation i s to "det ect " .. ... crimes
against the United States," identif:r1r.g the perpetrator s arxl gathering
to establish the basi s for arr est and pr osecut ion.
coJ1i7'ess can thus insure t ea t the 1''81 \'Ii ll not conduct "int d l igence "
i nvestigat i ons .
Of part icular importanc e , t he Conc;ress must establ ish an investi-
gat orY st and ard l'Ihich the FBI must meet be f ore it can conduct a
covert , intrus i ve cr-tmt nal investigati on . He believe t he FBI rray
not conduct an int rusi ve i nvest i gat i on unl ess i t has a r easonabl e
suspici on , based on spec ifi c and articulabl e f act s and r a tional
1Ilf er el1Ccs frcm such f ac t s , that the subj ect of an investigat ion ,
whet her a person or a group , has corrmi t t ect, i s ccmni t t i ng, or is
about t o ccrrrnit a speci fic act which violates a f eder al criminal
statute ,
80!
Supreme Court in Terry v . Ohi o- held t l1at a reasonable
suspicion stardard mist be met, t o justif y a search pursuant to an
nves tigation . Spec ificall y , t he Court stat ed t hat :
"in j ust i fyi ng the parti cul ar i ntrusion t he police
of f icer must be abl e t o point t o specif ic and
art1culahl e facts ,,'hich, t aken together with
rational inference s frCl g t hos e f act s r easonabl y
varr-ant that l ntrusi on .-l!
'111is hol di rJP.: doe s not r esol ve the issue of what k1n:i of "reasonabl e
just ifi es a fu ll cr iminal inveRt igat i on . But t he I.'
"specific Vi olati on of 18.1'1" basis for invest i.{"-p.-t ion i s a IOp'cal
ext ens i on of the Terry deci si on t o th':? "part i cul ar int rusion" we are
C(l!1sidcr inp; here. 1.'1 Terry t he police wer e only r ecuired t o have a
- - ... .., .. :.:. ;.: ;: .
J.... _ 0 79 24
367
366
r-eascrn hl.e susnt cIcn t r nt .'1ct::tvity rrflYbe afoot , ,,82/ hl<L
t he Cour t ernpha s l zed t hat t his was only a l i mi t ed "st op ard :'ri .,1\ "
and not a "full--bl o\'ll l search.,,831 An on- going criminal
... I.)
whi ch i nvol ves covert , i ntr usive neehnfque s such as cont.Inuous
surveillance , inspecUon of pr-Ivat e r ecords , and use of pai d am
di r ect ed informant s i s mor-e a 'dn t o a "full- blown search" r eq1l1ri ne;a
h:1gtler degree of cer taint y that criJni nal conduct; i s involved than t o
a "stop am 541 In such I nvest.I gatIons, wher-e t.he FBI does 1'Ot
have prohable cause to or does not use techniques which r e-

quire a search Iarrar.t , .....<. we believe the Const ttutton r-equn -es the
Eu."' 8au t o :neet t.be st andard we have proposed.
Fe do not pronase a "pr-obab'l e cause" stardard , both the
A': t or :1ey General ard PBI Director have indi cated mi ght be wor-kabfe ,86/
because we are at t empting t o articulat e a standard of i nvestigat i on
t hat is r.ot premised on "conspiracy 'I st at ut es . I n our vi ew, r-easonabl e
suspici on of a specific act in violat ion of I aw i s a tighter tnvest r -
c;atory stardard than probable cause of conspiracy, ard the onl y stardar '
t hat can prot ect consti t utiorul r ight s adequat ol.y.
I n t he past, t he FBI cor.duct e 1 mas si ve of
Iawf ul polit i ca l ac.t ivity premi sed on t he vi ol at i on of conspir acy
stat ut es such as the 5'mit h Act osU.S.C. 2385) ani Voorhis Act
(18 U.S.C. 2386) I' !fli ch on t'Jei r face ! .uni'3hlmlful speech am
871 Her-econmerd the repeal of these statutes by this
5
Q
ch3I't er l ('j-i sl a t i on. .:..:I I'owever , pven i f t hev art" r-epeal.ed , the
use of consoir acy statutes (lR u.s,c. i n conjunct t on
.,ttJ1 stat ut es prohi bi t ill[': substant ive corxtuct !I S !3. pr-ed t ca t > f (lr
l.nvest i r:at i on ner petuates the pr-onlen . 'The neport
() ccanpanyinC the> recentlv enacted 8.143'1 r-er-eals thf' ,"mitlo
roses t he i ssue :
':'he r C(1.c mor e aD]')r onr i atp.l " l eaves 1U'P.3 t o
the consprr-scv r rovision (sect j on 1( 02) ,
,.-hich '-; ill mal-e i t an orrense t o consrdr'e to
vi ol atp. ei ther .,ection 1101 or 1102
Qr
I n case l aw, t he court s E:':T1rhasize t Ile i nhereJ"t n:'Ul{"er i n pr o-
secuUnr: !"lersons e!'l:aged i n First Jlmer.dment act Ivt t " urrt er- consp t r'acv
001
statutes.-- Com;t ituUonallv pr otected conduct; coul d be puni shed.
Consr.i rac'i statutes, on tl,eir' f'ace , pr ohibit associ at i ons estahH shed
for iller:al purposes, I\n overt act, \'I' ic'1nay be Lavf'ul , i"
sufficj ent t o pr ove t he crime . nterrntivel:' , i f the a ssoctat Io n
for t'1e pumas", that oul d be i llel'"al can he r.hOlm. then an j llep;al
act t>' r one associa t e mav be to all other
IberRof
t hat associ ati or. . 0
11
1"'rohlern in the first JlJ"!erment area i., tmt vtr:orous
dissf'nt hv political as socl llt1.onc; of t en inv01ves aclvocacy of act s
' 'Oul d l:n i llef!:al i f cO!'1!0 t t ed (e.r.. , ovept!"a'ow of thE:'
"'.overnnent 0" rli sru'1t i on of a r:overr:I'lf'ntal fu ncti on). over-t acts
\'II11ch mirht suffice t o pr ove consptr-acv i n '" c,. irliJ"al case such as
-." ';';,'
368 369
Rnd r ai r,i nr ar e t r.c or political
nc tivl tv . ConsoouontI v , court s h<tvp r f'(1u ire{1 A. sho"'i nr of
:m",cifi c i nt ent i n t l;e prosecut ton of' T'i .rst AJ1'!C'r;c'nent r elat Pd
cases , Fur-t her", !:'pcause thO' nct r ve s foY' oor tici".'1t i on rna" bave
or H l er:al asrect -i, cnur t " have r efu sed t o at t r-t but.e
tl"'f' llle[':al r-ct.s of ope 'If'>''ociRt e to ot.hp!", s t r-e rr-our-. (J 2/
A::,!"' l t'.;e court s I obser-vat tons concerrn Tl} nrose cut tnp;
consrur-ac tes t o ir.vpst i r ati nr: such conspfr-ac tes l.11us-
tr-at es t he :;'1or t ccmi ngs of cuch a hFlSi '3 "or' 1rwes l :i["ation.
"ea' 1inr: consotr-acv stat ut es l1t er al lv. advoca c: of 111pf':Fll ac t s hv
in j ust ifies i nves t 1Rat1on . 'ureover , cc,rmi s-
s lon of "'!loll:,' l efCFll overt act :" .. I nter-t vdned "rtth t he>
r ol.f.t i cal. process , coul d a l so .1ust1fy .' nvest 1F,ation . ,'I qt ':-lm ard
of pr obahlp cause of such act avt t v if: eas f I v rnet , Even if ther e
is no s pec f f'I c i ntf'nt t o violat e t l"R Lav by one or a ll of t he
assoc i at es , consr cr acv ost?tutes r-er-ut i ntru":'. ve I nvest tr-at t on of
Fir st act i v rtv . I nvest .tr sr t or v t o r roceed
under t he :ce statut es r-errl er-s R ' r:r iJ"li nal "t 8!')' lcm:l' an U luGor v
i nvC' st ::: at j.vc a....u se".
nr osecutor i al r equirement of snnc i f i c i nt ent J1'!U<;t be
T)ilI'A.l l cled i n t ,le starrtard for f nv est. !.. "',ilt :ton . Fer-sons or rrroups
should not Iv> t 8rr-:et ed f or i nv2'";tirClt1on unles ther e i s r ea sonabl e
susrdc f.on t hat t he "uhst ant l ve cr-Ime (r at her t hAn consr d.racv) i s
ato
ut
to be Por exampl e , i f t he PDI obtains of
a SPl;.'CH ic threat of 1.llepa l bv an association t or;et hf'r
,,,ith soeci fic, am articul able f a cts i m icating t rot a member ha s
pur chased ""apon::; . t he "'Ell woul d have r-ea sonabl,e susp.lcLon tha t a
criminal act \'11S abou t t o be corrmi tted. "1at her t han "any' over t
act. onl\T an over t act which '.oul d const1t ut e an el ement of t he sub-
stantive cr:1ne "'oul d .l ust.Lf' v r-easonab'I e suspicion of specifi c ,1nt ent
tJ3/
or imninence of i lle(T,al corduct , - t 'le sane r-equfr-ement I"hich tile
courts US" t o narr- ow t he over-br-eadt h of conspiracy prosecutions .
st arxtard vould pr ot ect Pi r st am Pourth . Arnen:lmetIt
r 1r ht f' ,it)"Dut urdermt ntne the prJ! I S l aw enfor cement ef f or t s .
'Ole FBI "'oul d not be r eouired t o "si t on i ts hams" unt il a
suhst pntive cr ime occurred . The cr-Irunal, st andard al Lows a full
!.rwst J.r at ion l, efo r e t he Law has been vt ol at. ed , ' u r e tmror-tant , i t
shoul d not bar t he Pureau frem corrtuct inz preUmi nary i nqui r i es
ustm les s int rus ive t echnf cues , A chart er , pr oviding f or a pr e-
l im:!n3I"T cr 1l'li l'.rtl i nouirv , 1''QUl d 3.110,", the PRJ: to check i t s own
r ecords , comuct int erviews, cont act establ i shed sources of
and use ot her such means t o f i r.ct out whet her t he basis
1i 4
/ f or " full investi,O' ,:;t i on iC l st s . Ilithout l'lef't i ng a r ea sonahl e
susn tcIon standar d . t he FBI cou.ld chec k out spec I f'I c thr- eat .s,
credi bl e all er ati ons , i ncident s ard t ho E l<:e : '1n other ham , if
the aller at ::'on is unf'ourded , or in t he c ase of a full i nves t ir, at i on ,
i f t he, SUbst ant i ve cr-Ime does not occur , t "'e inve stir;at i oT).:.:fUst
370 371
t errunatc .
l"..:lther than ! rJrder t he "ur-eau , t he starrtard vould na ke tl1e
RBI 1'10 1'1" out its enror cement r-csoonsf t-j ,
lities . Consr i r ncy nr edl cat ed l ean t o over br oml
Invest Ir-at .Ions are f1 !.' ast e of r-esour-c- e on virtually t'ruJtl ess
,1t tl'1nt s to nrevent cr-ime .
I;n the a s sumnt t on tr.1.t nr evcnt t on mav be mor e eff ective if
cr ir.1i m l s are ard prosecuted , t l-Je narr-o-er cr1l'11na.1
starrtaro "'oul d caus e the "'PI to f ocus f t o r esources on ':' ol vi m
scr :\ous cr ime , In poi nt of fact , the starxtard ,'.'1" propose 1'3' a
stat ut or-y embcdImont of the versus ouant t t v' appr oach tbat
ha s caused the :.eD! to make an 1nter Ml deci sf on t o f ocus r nvest.trn-
tions on oer-sons or or rtan t zat i ons \'hrJ bave canni t t ed serious or
vi olent cr-imes fo r political or ccoronic mot i ve .
" creaver . stnce riost suchcr-tnina). consntr-acI es ccme to tty>
at t eot:lon of the a l-Ja.s r.een ccmmlt ted, Most
i nve stip"8.tive act i vit" ("r:J t 111n st r-t ct er- r-ocedur-es ) t l' 1t now [; 0 on
woul d be peI'l'1h ;f,ible urd"!r t ho r oasonat .Ie susntci en starriard .
T!1e "prtJnJlry" rur-rose i s t o invest i r;at e am to [T.1. t
hf>
r evidenc e
of cr-Jmo , t he FBI still r rC"le nt cr-ime befor e i t occurs .
PRI could ; prevent D cr-ime" r easonably belk'/cd t o be about to occur ,
us inr; t r-ad at tonal mean s such as a"T-C' '''t., "'Qrninr ootent i al victlms ,
an.1 t he I H:e . 'The st at ute- as l at er ::,U["[;est , must nrohi bit
cnIHI'FlJ'P0 act.fvtt.tes .
'The narrow standard \"e ororose in r-equr r-ed wh" n Firr-t
[1ctivi t i es may be investJ['"at ed . ".:111" same standard i r.; orobab tv not
const itutionall y r-eouir-ed in ot her cr-Imtna .l invest igat i ons . Ho,'ever,
Fourth JI:ner.dment considerations r emai n a cr-Imtnal st an:lard is t her e-
f or e r enul r ed .
'l'!"e !'luhl1c policy Lssues h" orrtantzed crime "Int el lir.encI" ,
invest i p.nt i om are not unlike t ho'lp. r a i sed hy t he deba te over danestic
i ssues . Ef f or t s to t !ll'art orv-ant zod cr-Ime have been 18r r;el y
j nef f ect l ve , Arecent GAO r eport concludes mil lion tax
dell ars have been Na st ed by or rtarrlzed crime st r i ke forces i n t he l ast
decade. 5/ fo s in t he donest sc secur .tty area , a rajor- prohl em bas
"9(,/
been the inability t o def ine "orr;anlzed cr-Ime,
Jllthough di f fer ences t ",t ' ,'C' cn these t l"o areas of t nvest tsa t I ve
concern extst , jmnor tant constrtut t omf "'00 pract tcal, s imilarjtles
CRn also be noted , These si milar i ties RI'pue f or a tlf.",ht cr:lminal
stanjard cr ime investl f",at iom , per haps t he same
stan:J<lI'd ":hi ch gover ns First Jlt"endment r r:l ated ilct i vi t ic' s . ' .Ie l ook
to the ,Tust i ce Depar-tnent am the FBI to exnlain a uni f om
stamard uoul d not he pr act.t ca bl e ,
r, ;"
373
372
Spec1;u Procedures for FBI Crlnl.n.'11 Tnvcstirii tions
As Impor-tant as i t i s to se t starrtards f or in1.tlatlnr; F"lI
cr-Immal InvestIrtatIons, the charter MUst aLso establish pr-ocedur-es to
i nsure t!la t investi r:ations are corrlucted so as t o mtrumt ze i nterference
wit'! constItutt onal, rights. Particultrly str i ct or-ocedures are neceSS81'1r
in cases "'hich involve tnvc"t1.r:atlons of rer-scns or /TOUpS enr;Ewed in
First Ar.1endmcnt ac t tvtt t es . the "'!:'J ' ns r eason to believe frat
a cr-Ime l1aS been com-ut .ted , nr ocedures ar-e needed to r r-event over br oad
survef.Ll.arce of l al1U1 Fi r st 1'rJ('nir",Ent act i vi t " , ,)'lich coul d "chill
soeecb' am intrude on the of nolitical assoct at.Ion. lis
J ust i ce POl:el l stat ed t r.e case for a vif, i lance this investi-
r:ative area:
' ''T'he or-tee of public dissent mist ro t be a
dread of sutrl ectton t o an unc!Y'cked survetLl .ance
oower- . lbrMUst t !"E' rear- of urrurtbor-Ized official
df'ter citizen di ssert. and
discussion of Government action in nrivate conversat i on .
For private cilssent , no l ess t Im open TXlblic ,Us-
course, i s essent ial to our free fJociet y. Q71
The t''f'e of procedural sa r eruar-t s reClUl.r R:1. i s i llustr ated one
examnle f'rxm t Ile r-ecent past: The r!3I 's five am '\ ':al f vear- cont i nuous
tnvest .tgat .ion of t he I nrvt .l.tute for Policy ,St udi es , R 'IrellJmolm l ef t -
l i beral r esearch orr-anr zation in "lashL'l"tan, I).C. '!.'he Inst itut e "las
t he; v1ct1m of hat h unregul.ated, urr-iarr-anted t arr,et i np: am over-br oad
surveillance of pol i t i cal act i vit ies fromother
legitimate cr1n1. '1r'll " 1-:Instit ute ' s case indicat(>s tt:e
need t o mandate procedur-ea t o r er:ulat e ",vpr:! stage of the i nvest i,o:at i vE'
preces s . Pased on discovery In a ci vil suf.t , wo know t rat :
')he ini ti!1t ro. th> I PS i nvc'ltlr;atlon in l ii68 "t o
determine "'hether ('If Inst itut e and
its "ersonnel were in 0f Title 18, United
St ates Code (USC), Sections ;:18380, r el atIrr: t o
r ebellion and insurrect io n , sedit ious
ant advocacy of the overthrowof t'1e Government." In
ot her word s i t an investir'ntiw in1tintP.d on t he
of cr imi nal statut es but any evidence.
The investiration continued a fu llyear bef or e a
"confidenti al source" advised that r,iU'CUSRasldtl of
Inst i t ut e had made allof t.ho "l.!"r anr;ement s for a
Pan- African Conf er ence i n ftlr-iers withmoney
provtded by IPS. Pecause t he "tone ard cijrect i on of
the Conference vzas t he resultof s1...n:nificant sovt et,
influence' accorctinR to the conf i dent i al source, the
lrwesti{::ati on continued on the bants of pos s fbIe
vjol ation of 18 U. S.C. 2383-'35.
The deart h of evidence in t hi s case a lso inn l cates
t he license perr'itted by t ty, cons'-'i r "lcy st :m:lard .
By this t1me i n t he I nvf'stigat i on more
than a prcl1minar:r one, since t he 1"''11 had infilt r ated
the Institute "lith informants . FUrt her , because
P.icha.rd Barnet t of I PS publicly stated that he had
visi t ed llaro i , t he PD1 det(>rminE.'(\ tiYl t he rnir',ht be
in viol ati on of 50, U. S.C,
?o SlS8 Dert3.i nir.r; t o f ailure t o r pr:i st er as an
esoi onar:e ap;ent of a fore:lJ:7l pover-. the ':'it le
18 or Title SO Invest1.r'r'ltions l':ere ever by t he
Justice to determln(') the evidence
amounted to a reasonable susoicion of a crime to
"!urrant t he i nvestirratl on.
'The .Iust Lce Depar-tment did enter tt:P. ricture in
AUfUst of 1971 , \'1hen Ass istant Att or ney Gener al !'lober t
request ed t he r SI t o resol ve t he ''FBI fnvestt -
rati on" 1'Thl ch had "determined' that I PS had ool..lr,ht
copies of the Panel's' in 1"7f'l. F.l even
af ter t he "determinat i on, " in ot her vords , t he
FBI was Instructed to invest1/2;at e I PS f or pos s i bl e
Vi ol ation of ':'i tle 18, U.S. C. Sections 792-
n
8
r el ating t o
'The Justice Dcoar-tnent a.ril F"3J afnoi.als made- .'. ,
".- . < :, ' :'-
374 375
no eff or t t o "n1nimizp.' t hl' invest i :""ation or rnkf' any
de ternination that intrusive t echni oues "'ould have
t;een <;uf fic i e'1t to out thA a ller.:at i ons of'ill e"''11
act i vt t v. ASSl.JJ'11i m aI':":Uemo t hat a criminal s t ardard
had r-et , the only named t arr:;ets of
verc '1Rskin UIl r:.t er s Conference ) ar.d Ric hard
i'arnet t (vi si t i ng Panoi ) tbe Pentagon
farArs ) of t he In stitut e . Yet t he FGT collected
Inf'ormat ton through !ntrusive surveillar.ce of all I PS
personnel and as sociatez ar.d al l IrS oolitica1
meetings. Extensive fill'!s ver-e maintatned.
In 1971 , the FBI of the whereabouts
of the Ireather Uraer/lTOunr] resulted i'1a new avenue
f or investigati on of IPS. Cmt.ho basf s that one member
of the Urrlerf.!"Oum v" obtained money fran
Art!1ur Haskow of I PS, prior t o becorn:l.np: a fUr:itive
am that another- fur,itive allo,,:edl.v '"vi s i t ed
offi ces," t he !"DI continued its t ot al cover age of
I Pf, 'Ira its poUt i cal activi ties on t he rrClUJ'rls
t hat per sons a ssoc Iat ed I PS may have vi ol ated
Ti t l e 13 , U.S .C. Sect ion 1071 t o Concealing
a PerR)J1 from Arrest . i\!oeff ort''':is made to pr even t :, ',
this ler-itw.ate criJrli:'.al investl f"ation from
in over br oad surveillance of I PS' ?ir st flJ1lerrlment
act i vity .
In 1971 , apparent I v because an I PS s taff associ ate
sponsor ed a conferenc e wonted views (in the
Eureau's opinion) "ident ified with Arab p.uerrillas '
aml ater r eoues t ed r'arcus Faskin of IPS t o fi nance R
t r i p cf 'hi s t o t he IUdrUe fast t o study t he politi cal
situat io n , t he FBI det ermmed t hat I PS J11ip:ht be
in violat i on of Title 18, Secti ons
1541-
1
15r elatir.;; t o violatiom of Passpor t am Visa
Pa t t er s . TI1e investigation continued.
Cebleen and 197
J
no otl-)er "evicte nce" of
H ler.al act i vi t" ' ca.'1e t o "'!:.r attention hut t he
investi?,at j on Nas not tlomi nat ed untilP2r ruar:.' 28,
1974 , aft er a c i vil l 8,\-Osul t Ivas filed t-y IPS chilrrinr:
surveillance.
Other than AssLstnrrt At t or np.,! Gener a.l 'ardinn I S
r eouest in 1971 and an "':'1 ;readaunrt0rs review in Ar.':'il ,
1')7'3 (11 rrx:mtr:s cef or e the t enmna t i on of t he
tion and a1Jllost five Yf!ar s a fter i t s ccrrrnencernent ) , t here
i s no evidence of F!3J sUl'l 'rv islon of t he I PS tnvest t r-at aori .
over- t he cour-se of t'10 i nvp",tif.' at i 0n, t he Bureau
pai d or di rected over ')0 informants t o f"ather i nforr>.a-
tjon on I PS, obta Ined confi dential dccuments , per-sonal,
mail (fran trash covers ), member-shfp list s, research
documents, pl ans of !!1eE'tin.":s, deta iled reports of ",hat
-ent on at meettrrtc , and built a r-a s s t ve f ile on the
or p:ar.iza t i on .
I n "'f>bruary , 197
L
I, upon di scont i nui nr; t he
irwe"tir,ati0n , the FBI concluded after "careful ana lysis"
t rat t her e 'va s insuffic ient evidence t o support
n!,osecution of IPS leaders or member-s un::ler existinr:
Federal s t atutes . '!he u.s. llt t or ney l s offi ce I';as
never i nvol ved.
Tre J usti ce Depart ment am t he FBI continue to
defem the corduct of t his investigation as Legal,
arrl pro!'r. 2!Y'
The chart er must include requirements f or procedural saf'eguards
insure: (1) accountability for the authorization and conjuct
of investir;at i ons ; (2) t r.at no investigation i n vrlthout,
statut or y basi:;; 0 ) that criminal t nvest .tgat.tons do not bec o-ie a
pretext f or open- erdecl intelUgence i nves ti[':at i ons; (11 ) t hat the
least i ntrusi ve t ecbntoue necessary 1:: 0 oi .tatn evi dence is employed,
(5) t 'lat tnvesttrat iona are not over-broad ; ard ( 6 ) t hat pr i vacy i s
not vi ol at ed by unnecessary maint enance am dfsseminat t on of infornation.
";-ecial provrsfons to achieve these ems are l ai d out in A t o
Control t il" PelI. 'I'hey incl ude (1) r equirement s f or "/I'itten au1:: hori-
z'Iti<:m ar.d certificat i ons ' (2) time liJ111ts f or invest:1["ations;
(3) Just i ce Department r evi ew, author i zation, ar.ct supervision of
inve stigations: special author i zation and .Just ice
mardated procedure s to t he use of -i ntrus i ve !:,.eql'miQues ;
r - t .. -i:
376
377
and ( 5) t l-at n:l.n !r1i z"t i on nr ocexi ures be
'Jl:':'!'e pr ovtatons Cll"f! not df't allecl r(''""l.ll r.>. t i on::; , d tl ch t he ,lustlc,.
Dopart m",nt nr.d t he !llreau seEm t o f ear.
Rather g:!mpl " rnaniate
t h.at t he J ust i ce l)p.p.1r t!"!cnt establish r r ocedur es acc orxtirs- t o
s t at ut or y crit er i a .
Tl I" ,\' se t aDDr ooriate l imit!' on Cl.dninl str at ! ve
discr C?t:ion.
f,ll of t hese procedures sroul d '1n'Jl.v in cri minal cases
i nv01v1n,.,; Pirst flmerxt" cnt ac t f vt t v, Put::Ja!l;li' nrot cct ar.:ai nst Pourt:1
f.r.:em"lE' nt nri vacy violat ions and shoul d apply t o all crir;1inal
mvcst i r.:atiol1f; .
f or Intr uJive Technioues
;..::;---
Special procedur-es to m.1..niJllize r.'B! i nterference 11.th First
r i r,ht s must be r einror cec by a '.arr-ant reouirenent for
cr:tmi nal invest i gative techniques which may int rude on r i ght s of
flOUtical pri vacy . For t he same reason t hat a varr-ant is reoutr-ed
t o corxluct a ' Tiret ap , it shoul d be used t o guide and restrict t he
use of Inronmrrt s ard searches of pri vat e r-ecords , The tarrret of
each of t hese t echniques is speech , albei t in differ ent fonns , ani
the onl y I'Jay t o insure that t he purpose ant corduct of the search are
Umit ed to the seizure of cr imir.al evi dence i s t o r-eoui r-e prior
judi cial appr oval . Nowher e is the need f or j udicial supervi sion
!Veat er than in case s i nvolv1n.. ": dcrnest ic secur i ty, vJtY.'re Pirst am.
Fourth JlmerxlPtent r ight s are simultaneously j eopardized. As the
Supr err.e Court pofnt ed out i n reit h '
National securi t y cases ... . often r efl ect a converwenc e
of Pirst and Fcur-th Amerdment va lues not or esent in
cases of ' ordi nary ' cr ime . Thouf,h t he invest igative
duty of t he execut ive be stronr-er in such cases,
so al so is ther e great er J eopardy t o const i t utionally
pr ot ect ed speech . .. .. Hi.st orv a t urd ant l v document s t he
t en::l ency of i:.overnnent - bovever- benevolent and
benign i t s mot i ves - t o vi ew \'.1.t h suspf cI on t rose 1110
most ferventl y di sput e i ts pol i cies . Fourt h ftmen::lment
pr'ot ect i ons become t he more nece s sary Noon the t arr; et s
of official survei llance m y be those suspect ed of
Q9
/ unort rc doxy in t heir beliefs .
Tl:e First Amerdment , of course, guarantees freedan of speech ,
of the press , of as sembl y and of t he r ir,ht to pet i t i on for redr ess
of gri evances . 'Ire Supr-eme Court has often observed that the
378
379
effective oxerc tse of these r-equ n-es assoc lat lona'l nr-rvacv.
Sit I zens must l1e ab le t o meet am assocfat privately to discuss
politica l beliefs arxl plans arx' to cons l dor- ':'hat l awf ul ac tIons t o
t o promote their i deas. r ol at i nf, t o these
activi t i es are r r otect,f'ct unless they cont atn evi dence of cr-Ine ,
'The r i V"t of nS30ciatiom l :Jrivacy ' ''''is f irr.Jl y estnbf I shcd by tl'
:cupr ene CO'lI't :L, r er'Cllir>.r: t h" ef f ort of t he St at e of A.lnh8TJ\'1. to c:,m,-<e]
disclosure the "':':\CP of nEnhershiD lists. nAJ',-CF v. ....rn,
357 U.S. 449 ( LQ')8) , It 81')'} E'r'Jnhasized most r ec ent l y
h:,' the Court in i tsdecision cer-t a i n intrusive discl osur?
provi s ions of the Federa I Election C?.Jn!Caii'Jl ,ICt . v. Vnl ,,: ,),
42
1
1 1 (F'76). !\s Cldef J us ti ce "uri<p.r poi::ted out :.n his
COn0Ul'Tinr; cotnt on
[ S'[ocr-ecy am pr i v<lcy a s to polit icnl preferences arrl
are a free societv..... This
Court has to i t t oot J::overn"le'1t?l !'O"ler cannot; be
used to f'orce a clti zen t o disclos f' private
affili at i ons , even " tthout a r-ecor d r ef'l cctinp; an'!
syst.ermt f c " 2ras P.:1cnt or r et :cl.1at :l.on . . . . ."'or one i t is
f ar t oo 1l'1t e i n t ne d,!y t o an ill-d efine(!.
' public Inter-est.' t o l!!' p.Qch t.he .. s:U'er;uards
':)l'lI'anteed by t,;e T.' ;.T'c:t . 100/
1f the first pr-events t r -e goverlT.!ent frm ccr.' .pcllinr
discl osill"e of :! r.f omation r el '1tecl to Lavf u'I political and other
aseocf.atI onal acttvttv, :'.t must also require restra ints to be :!.r.mos ed
o n .t he usc of intrusiv" i.:lves t:i<;at i ve to J:rathpr 'Ouch inf orma-
tton . In f'act , i t i ::' f or t his r-ea -ion tl1at t l,.) rest.ratnt of a "IDTant
procedure ha s been Imposed upon r,overnment 1r1ret appi.rJr; . Surely t !Jf'
First Jlmerrlment j s no l e ss violat ed if t '1e FBI obtains a copy of t he
membership or contribut or list s of t he Sociali st lklr kers Part y throunn
t he use of paid informers or the search of the Party's bank records
th'JIl if the Party ' s member ship ani contr ibut or informat i on is obta i ned
tl1I'Ough a lmetap or a s a result of the campai gn r ef orm law. I ndeed ,
the First Jlmen:iment violation is CO!T1IXlUmed when it results froman
intrus i ve search which also r a i ses Fourt h Ameo:lment quest i ons . ':'his
i s why we believe that a warrant requirement shoul d be impos ed on
the use of informers arrl r ec ord searches in crimiml invest 1e;at i ons .
1. I nformers
The FBI record on the us e of pa i d informers in political p:rou!1s
shovs a rras s tve violation of First Amerrlment right s . Altlx>ugh the
vor-st abuses in the l a st three decades occ urred in t he urrlercover
provocations of the COINl'ELPRO ani C01"PJFIL prop.;rams, the Church
Corrrni t t ee document ed many exampl es of r outine informer act i vities
"!hich cut deepl y; int o a ssoc iat i onal privacy . The COI1J111t t ee ' s
Fi nal Report points out that during the 1964-76 period:
'The FEI expanded its use of informers for gathering
int elli gence about dcmestic politi cal groups , sanet:imes
upon the urgi.np;of the Attorney General. N:> s ignificant
l:lm1ts ...rere placed upon the kin:l. of political or
personal informat i on collected by informers, r ecorded
in FBI files , am o1'ten disseminated outside the Eureau.101/
'me s e vast informer operations typified by the f ollowing:
--by 1972 ,' 7, 402 "ghet t o tnr ormant s" (e . r;. , "t he .. , ,,:,:!: ';
380
381
proprietor of a candy store or barber shop") had been
put in place as FBI "listening post s' to provide
information abcut I'rac ial ac t i vi t i es [ arrt] ident i f y
ext r-emf st s pass ing t hrough or locating in t he ['",het t o
area;102/
- - i n 1964 t he FBI had inf i l t r at ed t he Part
USAat a rati o of one 1 agent f or ever y 5.7
- in1070 FBI Direc t or Hoover lifted rest ricti ons against
r ecruitinp; H3to 21 year oJd i nformers , an:! field
offi cers wer e urged t o take advantage of thi s
"tremerrlous opportunity" to expand coverage of "New
Lef t col l ec t i ves, communes an:! st affs of underf,rourrl
news papers;"104/
- - bet ween 1966 and 1976 t he Chic ago FBI office paid mor e
t han $2. 5 mD.lion t o -S ,145 informant s ard invest i gated
or opened files on 27, 900 organtzat tons am irrlividlals; "105/
- - the General Accounting Office reports t hat 48%of all
domestic securi ty inve sti gat i ons are i nit iat ed on t he
ba sis of information provided by an F81 informer - a
percentage almost three t1mes higher than the next
most ccmronly used source f or opening an investirat i on; 106/
-asr ecent l y as Piscal Year 1976 tJ1e PEl budget
al l ocated $7, 401 , 000 f or i ts intel ligence informant
pr ograms - - mor e t han t wi ce t he sum f or organi zed
crime infor'r..jrs . 107/
These stat i stics reveal t he magnf t ude of t he informer i ss ue
am i ts impact on associati oT' .al privacy. But t he i s sue i s even
l arger t han the st atistics i rrl icate . Informers are at once the JOOst
complex, comprehensi ve and unpredictable investigat ive t ool s t hat the
B>.lT'eau empl oys. Fnile the informer is , as t he Church Corrr:Jittee
pointed out, a "vacuum cLeaner-' f or informat i on , the information is
often di storted or inaccurat e am in thi s r espect is far l ess r eli abl e
than infonration obt ained by a wiretap. Furthermore , an iriformer
preterrls to be a member of a oolitical proup cannot simply gatber:
i of orwati on. or she must participate ac tively in the dec i si on
fTl3ldJ"!C' of the organization, takinf': stands on issues am seekinr; to
erJi--ance credi bili t y by influencing t he positions t he or ganizat i on
t akes ani t he act ions i t engages in. Inevitably, as Alan Der-showrt z
11'15 p.ointed out in his penetratirlg account of a Defense League
mJrder case in "Ihich his clt errt t urned out t o be an informer, the
i rSormer corrupts the or ganizati on :
Violence inevitably stems from a police syst fJ1 tlat
recruits (am educates) secret informers am
provocat eurs I"ithin a r adi cal movement. '!he
recruited agent , almost by definition, is an
unst able , psychot ic, or psychopathic irrlividual .
His t emnt at i on t o improve his st at us by
in or encouraging violence i s almost irresistable .
'This is what touches off the f atal cratnreaction.
Violence feeds on violence am the question of
is informer, who is terrorist, beccmes confused
beyond comj):(' ehensi on even by the irrlividual
involved
I n our View, the case for informer warr-ants is oven/helming.
If.1ile i t i s true that t he SUpreme Court has hel d that an irrlividual
has no irrleperrlent Fourth Jlmen:lment r ight t o be free fran varr-arrt I ess
inf ormer surveillance , Hoffa v . United Stat es, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) ,
the Court has never directly addr essed the questi on of ,'!'at restrictions
na:r be const i t ut i onall y required when informers are used t o corrluct
surveillance of private political or otter associational activities.
rrr.e Court has intir.1ated, J:owever , t ra t here the bal ance woul d shift
aryl a warrant ,":auld be required . As Just i ce l'lhi t e put itin his
1,:.::"- "
382
opinion in united Statesv . 1','h1t e, 401 u.s. 745, 752 (1971) , uphol dt ng
t he l egal i t y of a "wil'ed infoI'lller" targeted at an indivi dual, "our
problem , in t erms of the nrinc1r>le announced in fr.atz v . States ,
389, u.s. 397 (1967), is what expectati ons of pr ivacy are const i t u-
tionally ' j ust ifiabl e' - what expectations t he Fourth Arnen:J.ment will
protect i n t he absence of a warr-ant . " Since an expec t ation of
a es ocIat t onal pr ivacy i s constit ut i onall y j WJt ifiabl e , t he First and
Four-t h Amendment s conver ge t o r equire a warrant for t he use of informers
in cr1minal tnvest agat t ons of E1'OUps.
To sum up, Congres s should enact a warrant procedure simil ar to
Title III of t he Qnni bus Criminal Control ani .':;af e s tr-eet s Act f or
t he use of pale and direct ed un::lercover agent s by t he FBI t o
investigate criminal acts by member s of a group. 1091 No wart-ants
sboul d be i s sued aut:QriZL'1[; t he infiltration of polit i cal or gantza-
tions not suspec t ed of engagil1[!: i n specLf'I c cr iminal corduct. , This
new procedur e is necessary t o pr otect First as as Fourt h
Jl merdment r ight s , and is urgently r equired to insure t hat political
freedan \'lill not again be t r-ampl ed upon by FBI domestic securi t y
activi t i e s .
2. P.ecorQ.s Searches
Anot her f orm of int rusive search which r a i ses bot h First am
Fourt h Jlmen:J.ment questions i s t he warrant less inspecti on of pr ivate
records . Most peopl e believe in t he pri vacy of t heir per sonal tax
r-ecords , bank r ecords , emplovrnent recorda ard ot her r ecorded "t hird
383
part y information" about bow t hey lead their lives. Thl.s cxpec
of pr i vacy has oft en proved to he unjustified, alt hough in cons
t ional t erms i t \'lOuld certainly appear to be j ustifiable. fls t
Californi a Sui'reme Court r ecent l y pointed out in Inval tdat Inr; a
\..-arr antles s search of copies of cancelled personal checks in th
cust ody of a bank'
: For all pr act i cal purpo ses , the disclosure by
indivi dual s or business f :\rr1s of their financi al
r ecords to a bank i s not entirely \'Tillful since
it is impossibl e to participate in the econcmic .
lif e of cont empor-ary society \Tithout maintain:1r.g a
bank account. In tbe course of such deal.Ings the
deposit or reveals many aspects of 'lis per-sonal,
aff airs , opinions , habits, as soc dat .Ions , I m eed
t he totali t y of bank records provides a virtual
current bi ography. The of photo-
cop:Ji.ng rrachf nes , elect ronic conput.er-s am other
sophi st i cat ed instrument s have ac ce lerated the
abili t y of government t o intrude int o areas whi ch a .
person normally choose s t o exclude from pr ying eyes
and inqui s itive minds . Consequently , the j udi cial
interpretat i ons of t he r each of the Fourth Amendment
const i t utional protect ion of imividual privacy must
keep pace with t he perils created by these new
devi ces . "1l01 - .
I nformal i nvest i r,ative searches of private r ecords have
become i ncr easingl y routine in r ecent year-s , \'lith t he arrival
of new ccmputerdzed storage systems and mctrods of facilitati.nl;
acc es s to ard exchange of ccmputerized information (e . g ., the
ban}: industry's fledgl i ng "e lectronic rums transfer" svstem) ,
gover rrnent investic..at i oris have burned increasinp-,ly to privat e
records . At t he same time , levslation such as t he Bank Secr-ec
of 1970 has f acili t o.t ed record searcJ.:l i i1g:.by requirinE: private!
384
to be retained for longer periods of time. In short, a revolution
in information t ec hnology has far outstrifPE;d t he expec t ations peoPle
have about the privac y of theirpersonal records .
. There are many recent examples of informal access to bank
r ecords . Congres si onal invest ic;ations and ACLULawsutt.s have
uncovered the foll owing.
--A Cal i f orni a supporter of radi cal causes di scovered
that his checld..ngaccount statement had been reviewed
by FBI agent s when an int er nal hank mano was mistakenly
sent to him read: "This memo 1s to autbor-Ize
you t o r ead checks to "the FBI bef or e seming the
st at ement t o t he custaner . "1111
--As part of a se r i es of FI31 danestic securi t y
investic;ations, the bank accounts of Jane Forria,
Dr . Benjamin Spock, Floyd !'bKiss i ck am ot her anti-
war amcivil r ic;hts activi st s were inspec t ed
Without process;1l21
--A memo to FBI fiel d offices fran Direct or Hoover in
1968 stat ed : "there i s a need t o compile ina s ingle
investigative r eporta clear-c ut picture of t he
ent ire Left rlov6:lent \Jh1ch \<'111 i dent i fy i t .
sources of funds "1131
-- The FBI inspected am copi ed the creeks of ci vil
rights ac tivists in Philadelphia amDetroit to
make a record of theirprofessional activiti es,
includinsl:, in one case ,' a l awyer-client rel at i on-
ship.
Records searches are an important am permi ss f bI e criminal
invest:1F;ative technioue. Nevertheless, they can intrude
subst antiall y on associational privacy am therefor e raise t he
same First amFourth Amendment issues that arise in the case of
infonner searches . Al t hough t he Supreme Court has hel d t hat a warrant
385
procedure is not constit utionally r equired f or bank r ecords searches ,
St at es v . rtl l ler , 96 s.Ct . 1619 (1976) , guidance is
;::.0---
cl earl y needed in this area .
\'Ie propose several principl es as a point of departure . Fi r st ,
a person' s privacy interest in bank, tax, credrt and employment
record s should be r ecogni zed by statute . second , a person' s
st anJ ing t o asser t his or her pr i vacy r i r.,ht s overrecords in the
J1';lJ'rls of third part i es shoul d be conferred by st at ut e , on t he same
basis as if the records ver-e in hi s or her personal possess ion.
Third, government i nvestigat or s should not be able t o obt ain access
to the r ecords wi toout I egal process -- i. e., an administrative
sunmons , SUbpoena or search warrant; Lssued on a shOldng appropriate
to the method of proces s . Fourth, i n all inst ances except the
issuance of a search ' 'J31'I'ant, t he r ecord subject should be F;iven
pr ior notice of t he proposed i ns pection and a r easonable t:l.me to
ass ert 'lis or her rights before disclosure. These proposals are
set f or t h in more detail in Ti t l e II of H.R. 6051, and t hey paral l el
var i ous other peming r ecord pr i vacy bills .
Ther e i s a my3tique about t he use of r ecord searches in l aw
enfor cement. The trail of paper and computer tape is said to be
di f f er ent from the trailof physical evidence ..-. so mien so
that the "old-f ashioned" rul es do not appl y . T1'x:mgh there has
been mich t alk about the need f or breed search power-s to f ight
or ganized cr ime and l'lhite collar cr-ine , the r estri ct i on-.-of,j ,nvest i g,ative
386
meth::ds within recognized constitutional boundaries vould not preVent
vigorous lawenforcement efforts against these types of criminal
violati ons. WOOre the would be the greatest is the
abuses have been t he greatest in the use of secret , unrestrict ed
governmental access to private r ecords for the collection of POlit i Cal
intell1r,ence; access to the toll r ecords of news paper
r eporters t o pinpoint t he sources of POlit ically embarras sing "inSidE>
stori es ;" ac cess t o t he bank records ofant i war and civil r i ght s
groups to identify theircontributors ; access to the records of
political opponent s in elect i on campaip,ns or out spoken cri t i cs of
goverrrnent policies, or 1n1eed anyone at all, for t he i nt elligence
p,atherers have l ong had a completely f'ree hand . FJ.1m1nation of these
abuses 111 the purpose of the procedure weare propostng,
Statutory Prohibitions Required
The statutory chart er should inc l ude t wo flat prohibi t i ons :
1. The FBI shoul d not be permitted to i nvestigat e
any per son or groun solely on the basi s of First
Pmendment ac tiviti es. 115/
2. 'TheCP.arter must ban preventive action and CLI!1I'F.LPRO-
116/
type activiti es.
To enforce these prohibit ions the char-ter- should establish
cr1m1nal penalties f or t heirintentional viol ation and a civil
cause of action for vict:lr.1s.
387
rsif'ht of the FBI

We chart er s should establish effective over-stght mechanfsms ,
'.rit h1J'1 the Just i ce Department , the Attorney oenerar shoul d be r equired
t o i nsure Depar-t ment and Bur-eau compliance "l1th the lawant to comuct
a periodic revi ew of agency investi gat i ve act i vi t i es .
117
/ The
Attorney General must have ful l and complete access t o fureau files . I I B/
Hi thin the Congress , the Judi c iary Ca:rn1ttees should also have
access to all fllesmlun::ler appropriate privacy safeguards and
shOul d be r equired t o conduct pr i or review of all procedures de signed
to implmcnt the legislation. 'Ihe Attorney General shoul d be r-eoutr-ed
to repor-t FBI violations of chart er pr ovisions which viol at e const i-
t ut ional r i ght s t o t he committees .
Public overs i ght i s also necessary and requires the statute to
mardate that all invest1gatory guidelines and r egulat i ons be publi shed
in accordance "l1th the Administrative Pr actices Act.120/
'Thank you f or the oppor-tunrtv to apoear bef ore thi s ccmnitt ee .
-r" 1,: '-;'"
388
389
Acm STATEI'lENI' ON FBI CHARI'E..'1If/HSLATI W
ri r;hts of cit izens mO that they have done so primarilY because
FOOINarES : chec!{S am balances deRiJ;:nedby the framers of the Constituti oi1
1. E.g. Test:1mony of f ormer Attorney General Edward H. Levi and
Deputy As si st ant Att orney General rvarv on "'?dnpooa
v

Feb . 11 , 1976 , in "FBI Oversi p;ht" , Hearings Bef ore t he
Subcommit tee on Civil aro Constit ut i onal Right s of t he
Cormdttee on the Judi ciary House of Representatives (94t h
Cong . 2n::l Sess. Serial l'b . 2 Part 3) (Hereinafter cited as
House Judiciary FBI Over s ight Hear-Inns ) pp . 253-262; Test imorw
of Attorney General Griffin Bellhef ore the SUbcommittee on
Government Information and Ind i vidual B:1p;htsof the House
Government Oper ations Carmit t ee , June 11 > 1 977 ; and Reccmnematlons
in the ''Final Report of the Select ccnmtt.tee to Study Governnent
Oper at i ons \'li t h Res pect t o Intelligence Activit i es", Book II ,
Uni t ed States serate , (94th Cong o 2d . Session Repor t 94- 755)
(Goverrrnent Pr int ing Of f i ce : Apr il26 , 1976) (Hereinafter ci t ed
as Church Cormdt t ee Final Reoort Book I I ) pp. 289-341 .
2. This i s a recent positi on of t he Ju stice Department and t he
Feder al Bur-aau of Invest i gati on . Testimony of Attorney General
Gr iff in Bellbef ore t he Senate Judi ciary Comnitt ee , April 20,
1978. See al so Pr epared Statement of At t orney Gener al Griffir.
Bel l Bef ore t he SUbcoMmit t ee on Ci vi l and Constitut i onal
Cornm1t tee on the J udici ary U.S. House of Represent at i ves
February 28, 1978.
3. See TestimOl'l,.V of Aryeh Nei er , Executive Director, .Amer i can
Ci vilLiberti es Uni on on S. 2008 , t he Criminal
Informat i on and Pr otect i on of Pr i vacy Act of 1975 on July 16,
1975, in "bear-Ings on t he Criminal Just i ce Information and
Prot ection of Pr i vacy Acts of 1975 bef ore t he Subcorrrn1t t ee on
Const i t ut i onal Right s of t he Committ ee on the Judi c i ary
United States Senate" ( 94th Cong. 1st Sess, July 15 and 16,
1975 ) (56-8 33 U.S. GovtPr i nting Of fice 1'Iashington : 1975) .
4. As for exampl e S. 1566, the For ef gn Elect r oni c Surveillance
Act of 1977 i s proposed as an eventual part of Ti t l e I II of
t he onnt bus S. 2525, t he Nat i onal Intelligence Reorganizat i on"
and Ref orm Act of 1978 , introduced on February 9 , 1978, 95t h
Congo 2d Sess.
5. See. e.g, Church Committee Final ReportFlook II , Note . 1 surra
at page 289: "The Committee ' s f'urxl.amental concl usi on i s t hat
intelligence activities have urdermined the constitutional
t o assure accountability have not been applied . " See also
compt rol l er :}eneral of the Uni t ed St at es , "Repor t to t he Fouse
ccmM1
t t ce
on t he Judi c iary PoEI Domestic Intellir,ence 0per at ions . ...
'TheirPurpose and sc ope I s sues That :leed to rye Resolved"
(General Accounting Office: Feb . 24, 1976 ) p.26 (Hereinafter
ci ted as GAOFBI Audi t ).
Uni t ed St ates v . United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297,
fi.
317 (1972).
ra. at 769.
7
The Divisi on of I nvest i gat i on was fir:3t deslgnated as the
8.
Federal Bureau of Investigation by the of I'arch 22, 1935.
ch, 39 , t itle II , 49 Stat. 77 . and ha s teen so designated in
st at ut es since t r3t date.
For t he developnent of t ll Bur 0au' s i nvest i"q;at i ve jurisdiction,
Q.
see chapt er on "Criminal ,Turi sdi ct i ort ., 1.'1 Ungar , sanford J. ,
FBI : An Uncensored Look Pehim tIle '.ralls pp , 678. 3 (At l ant i c-
Litt le BrOlin 19761 .
see Generally "'The Development of FBI Domestic Intelligence
10.
Invest i gations " , in Supplementary Detailed Staff Repor't s on
I ntelli gence Activit i es and the Rights of .l\rnericans Pinal
Report Book III of t he Select Comni ttee t o Study novea-mental
Operations with respect to Intell1p;ence Activities United States
Senate ( 94th Cong , 2d ses s. Report !'Jo. 94-755 April 23, 19711)
pp. 3'13- 558.
11. 28 U.S. C. 533.
12. Former- Attorney General F.dward H. Levi interpreted the "detect"
claus e of 28 U.S. C. 533 to mean trot the fureau mist. f ollOl'1 a
cr:lmi nal staniard of "investigatinr, persons or vnen
there Ls a reason to believe that a federal crime has been or
is likely to be comn1tted so that the violators can be prosecuted
or the crime prevented." See Attorney General Edward H. Levi,
Mdress to the J\merican Ear Associ ation, August 13 , 1975. Isrt of
course , t hat was not t he int erpr et at i on of f ormer officials of
t he Department of Justi ce nor necessarily the interpretation
of future Attorneys General .
13. Sect i on 3052 of Title 18 defines the power-sof Bureau agents
SUch as carry1ng f irearr.JS, serv1l1[': warr-arrts , ard subpoenas ,
but only sets a stan:iard f or arrest: ",>lith or with3'ut
f or any offense against the Uni ted States corrmitted in their
390
presence, or f or any f elony coc;nizable urder t he l aws of the
Uni ted States if they have reasonable grourds to believe that
the person to be arrested has corrrn1tted or iscomnitt:1I'l8
such f el ony . ,;
14. Former Attorney General Edward H. Levi f'ourrl authority f or
"non-cr-tminal.' intelligence investigati ons in cl au se 3 of 28
U.S. C. 533 \'Ih1ch aut hor i zes t he &Ireau to "conduct suc h other
inve stigations regarding of fici al mat ters urder- the control of
the Department of Justice am the Department of State as may
be directed by the Attorney General. " See Attorney General
Edward H. Levi , Addres s t o t he American Bar Associat i on , August
13 , 1975. fut tReFii'Otory.cf t hIs language , orIgfrliil1y in the
Bureau' s appropriations bill, 1rrl i cates t hat only forei gn
intelligence or counterintelligence invest igations could have
been interned am not danest i c security investigations . 'lliat
i s why the FBI relied so heavily on President Roosevelt's
Executive Direct i ve of Sept ember 1939. See Devel otJTJent of FBI
IXxnestic Intelligence Invest igations , Not e 10 supra , pp. 395:ll 07.
I t should be not ed however , t hat t he FBI has over itshist ory
used the "penumbr a" interpret ation of certain pol i t i cal
conspiracy st at ut es l ike the Smit h Act , 18 U. S.C. 2385 a.rrl
the Voor his Act ; 18 U.S .C. 2384 t o deri ve an intelligence
authority fran what were interned as crirn1nal statutes urrl er
\'Ih1ch persons were to be prosecuted. See Developnent of FBI
Domest i c Int elligence Invest 1P;ations , Not e 10 supra , pp . 448-
454. Bit particularly , see 'Bri ef on FBI Authority For !Xlmestic
Intelligence Invest ip,at i ons " in GAO FBI Audit, 5 supra,
Appernix IV, pp . 199- 200. Both the GAOand the present
Attorney General , Gr iffin Eellbef ore the Subccmn1t t ee on
Goverrment I nformat i on am W i vidual Ri ght s of t he House
Goverrment Operat i ons Cam1i ttee, J une 6, lll77 .
15. See Generally Ch:.lrch r.crrett"E'?io:l :" 00)' U ! .
Note see 81so Halperm, 1-10rton A. am ferman, .Terry
J . eds . , The Abuses of the Intell ,ence enci es (Center f or
Nat i onal Securi t y St udi es : 1975 : and Halperin, Berman,
Borosage, and i'1arw1ck , 'The Stat e: The Cr:1mes of t he
U.S. Agencies ,(Penguin 1976)
16. See sources cited at Id , and also the Report s:
"COINrELPRO: The FBI ' 5Covert Act i on Programs Against American
Ci tizens" ; "1
1
arrant l es s FBI El ectroni c Surveillance" , ''' -/arr ant -
l ess Surrepti tious Ent ries : FBI ' Black f'ap; ' Break- in a.rrl
Installations ", ard ''Danesti c CIAard FBI l'ail
Opening" in Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on
Ac t ivi ti es ard the Right s of Americans Final Report Boo!': III of
the Select Comnittee t o Study Goverrmental Oper ati ons with
r espect to Int elligence Activities United St at es Senat e (94th ;
391
Cong . 2d se ss, Report Jlo. 94- 755 Apr il 23, 1976).
"F.B.I. Cr:lme Inquiries Reportedly Tainted; l!eN York Times
17
C'c tober 6, 1977, , .11-1; "llel'! By U.S. Into F. B.I.
Activit i es, New York T:1.rr.es, rx::tober 8, 1977 , p , 11- 24. See
Villano, Anthon,y, Brici: Agent: Inside the IVafia f or the FBI

Accord ing t o t he Church Committ ee. t he cost of FBI domest i c
18.
int elligence i s $80 million annually . Church Ccmn1ttee Final
Report Book II , Not e 1 , supr a , p . 18. 'fue General Accountinp.;
Of fice audit sbows that most of this money va s spent on useless,
overbroad investigations. See GAO FBI I\udit , 1J0te 5! supra,
The GAO r eaches the same conclusion in i t s f ollow-up r eport .
Rel)Ort of t he Comptroller Gener a l of t he Unit ed States ,
"FBI Da:lestic Intelligence Operations: AnUncertain Future"
(November' 9, 1977) (hereinafter ci t ed as Follow-uP GAO
FBI Audit ) . 'Ibi s is disc ussed infra . In t he Organized Crime
area, t he GAO stat es that strike forces have wast ed
million in t he l ast decade . Report to t he Congress by t he
Compt roller General of t he United Stat es , "War on
Crime: Faltering Federal Strike Forces Not GettineJ ob Done, "
(r-Brch 17, 1977) (her einafter ci t ed as GAO Organized Crime
Study).
See e. g. Amsterdam, Anthon,vG., "Perspectives On The Fourth
19.
Amerdment, "58 Minn. L. Rev. 3
u8
(1974).
See e'. g , Terry V. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1968) .
20.
Id, see a lso United States v. United States District Court ,
21.
U.S. 297 (1972)' Laird v. Tatum, 408u.s. 1, 15 (1968):
"[SJuch a r ole C't o confine t he military t o their l egi t imat e
sphere of act i vi t y and to pr otect appellant s ' allegedly in-
fringed const i t utional r irhts" ) appr opriate for t he Congress
act1ng t hrough its ccmmt.t.ees arn the "power of t he purse ' .... . "
22. Jus tice Department Guidelines f or Domest i c securi ty I nvest iga-
tions, 10 , 197!l' l1h1te House Per sonnel and
Background Invest 1.[;at i ons _ Reporting on CivilDisorders and
Demonst .rat dons Involving a Federal I nterest : and Use of
Informants in Domestic security, Organized Cr:lme, and other
Cr :lm1nal Invest i gat i ons (Jaruary 5, 1977).
23. Despite a two year promise to develon guidelines in all
inve st i gat i ve areas , t hi s committ ee knows from the test:lmonv
of the Department on April20, 1978 t bat the task ..haB, not been
accompli shed. A little les s than one year ago, the'iJepartment
Task Force, established during the Ford klm1nistration but
393 392
which oper ates also in the Carter Administrat i on ' s J ustice
Department stated that "or1ginall:r" we "had intended.....
that we would draft all the p;uidelines to cover not only
domestic securi ty but al so the whole range of investtf,ati ve
activities that the FBI is engaged i n. 'Ih:it ''lasn' t possible ,
so we adopt ed guidelines a s went a l ong . " Test:1Plony of J ust i ce
Department 'Task Force Of f i cial s on FBI Cmrter Pr oposals An::l.
'JlJe At t orney General ' s Domest i c securi t y Guidelines , before the
Subcommit t ee on Ci vi l and Constitutional R1f;ht s of t he J udiciary
Comnit t ee of t he House of Representat i ves , (June 6, 1977)
(hereinaft er Justice Department and FBI 1977 Test im:my)
(quote from draft hearing t ranscr i pt ) .
24. t he probl em here i s that p;ui de lines bowever str i ct
mieht change , t he Just ice Department Gui delines are not very
st r i ct . Alt hough t hese gui deline s are not bef or e us t oday , a
couple of observations. The Church Comnittee pointed out that
i ntelligence offici als insi de t he FBI interpr et the Guidelines to
author ize continui ng invest igat i ons of "subversi ves ." Church
Camdt t ee Final Report Pook II , Not e 1 , suP1' p . 318. The
Commi ttee al so interpr eted t hemas OP t he ir ace overbroad .
As did the GAO, in concl ud1np; that "the l anr:uage i n the
draft r:ui delines would not caus e any subs t antial chanp:e i n t he
numher and of domest i c i nt elli Gence
initi ated. " GAO FBI Audi t , Note 5 supra , p . 150. The GAO
i nterpretation vas of earlier draft s of t he Dcmestic securftv
Guidel ines . Put i n t he f inally prcrnu}f;at ed ('Ui delines of
!w ch 10 , 1976 , t he standards of' i nvestigation art iculated vere
not ITUch tir-.,hter . statinp: that the ourpose of investi-
was to ascertain "tnf'ornat.ton on the activiti es of
individual s, or imivi duals actinp: in concert >Thich involve
' or W1ll:.invblve the use of r or ceoc vi ol ende . and . the violat I on
of federal Law," the "involve or will involve" standard is
dilut ed by fo l l owing sect i ons "mich author ize the FBI to
i ni t i 1'l te pr el imi nary i.nvest 1l';at i ons on the hasis of mere
"allegat i ons " and full investigations ifpersons or r.;roups "may
be " engaged in act i viti es t hat i nvolve or "lill i nvol ve
vi olence. The Attorney General, Edward Levt , admitted t hat a
mor e"fl exi bl e " st andard ','as r ecurr-ed t o expl a in t he choi ce of
"mav be" over "are involved" or ''1-Ttll be involved." See
Testimony ci t ed at Note 1 supr a . Fe believe t he Gui delines
r ecodi f y inF..xecutive Order t he premise t he PRI has all'1aYS
to i nvest i gat e possibl e violati ons of the Smit h Act,
18 U.S. C. 2385. First the per son or proup does not have t o
be ellfa!:.ed i n violence hut simpl" "invol ved" or 'It SOMe
t ime "Involved" in activities are vi ol ent . Their intent
may be LegaL and others illegal but no matter. secom, the .
threat of vi ol ence may be i n the dist ant fu t ure . Full investl.'!'a-
t i ons are based on a "may be" standard rat her than t he more
defini t e "1'1111 invol ve" standard cones at the preamhle
of the Guide lines . Efforts to make the test more definite
by talking about the :'ureau ,!eif".,hir.r: the m:l,";nitude of t he
harm and likelihood of itsoccurence do not because
t here i s no expl anat i on of bov to the balance. "'or
example, ifthe harmwoul d be large, "over-thr-ow of t he
goverrment ," t he FBI coul d amue that the liJeelihood of its
occure nce coul d be r emote . Thi s i s a stan:lard t hat l eaves
us right where we were bef ore the Guidelines. Although the
number of Bureau investigat i ons is SUbstantially, the
major- r ea son , as Eureau official s adMit, is t hat t he "s ocial/
political climate charsted" and because the PRI isoperating
on even more strict p.:uidelines f or "oual.Lt v over ouant i tv'
focus tnvest tgatIons on persons or r.;roups "n th a l one
history ofvi ol ence or "Iho are reasonably believed t o J1avp
c=n1tt ed crimes of violence . see ,Tustice Departmen t and
FBI 1977 TestimonY, 1I0te 23, supra .
25. Ift her e i s no statutory basis f or the !XJMestic secur-ttv
.Tur i sdicti on of t he ""'!1I , as pointed out in Note 14. supra,
then t he Gui delines can onlv be author1 zed urder claim of
inher ent power t o conduct national se curity
activi ti es .
2f.. See Committee on Peder al Legislation of t he Aseociation
of the Bar of the Ci t y of NeH Yorv, "Ie r;i sl at i ve Control
of t he FBI" p , 10 (May 1 , l Q77) (her einafter cited as
Ne,.; York Par Report).
27 . '",re do ... . . have some concern about t he l imi t at i on on the use
of pr evf ous'lv est ablished t nrormant s . . . . .1"e hoped to deal
\'li t h infonrlant s in P.7' eater dept h and detail an:i p:ive f ar
greater considerati on than we "'ere able to devote at t he
t ime the danestic securi t y guidelines wer e adopted and for
t hat r eason sane of the rules are st ated inrather shorthan::1
fashi on am l'1i llhave t o be thoug.ht out agatn ," Just i ce
Department and FBI I Q77 Tes t imon,v, Not e 23, supr a (quotes
f ran transcript ). - -
2fl. Thid.
29. Ibi d.
3
n


3l. Ibid.
-r d I ," ' ';'
394
32. The present Justi ce Department is argulnr.: proper
corrluct in the f o11owirr, exemplary cases : Palperin v .
(D. D. C. 1187- 73) (reasonableness of wiretap , tnminttv of -'
President or Government official s from l iabili t v) ; Ba lkin v.
Helms . Civil Action No . 75- 1773 (D. J1 .C. ) ( l ep;alit y nf l'larrantless
NSA el ect ronic surveillanc e arrl Lack of hann t o First Amen:Jment
right s arislnp.: out of CIA Operation CfI.Ao.. c;): L:lJront v . U.S . ,
Civil 77- c- I 029 (E. D.N. Y. ) (no l i abilit y f or i llegal nail
openlnr.:) ; Soc i aU st l'br kers Party v . Jl ttorney Gener'aI , 73 Ci v.
Action 3160 (S. D. N. Y. ) (legali t y of 40 year survei llance ).
33. Commit t ee for Publi c Justice, The Civi l Li berti es
Uni on, arrl The Center f or National Securi tv Studies, A laI"
to Cont r ol t he FBI , Feb . 15 , 1977. . --
34. 6051, 95th 1st Ses s . Apr i l 5, 1977. See also H.R.
4173, 95t h Cong o 1st Sess . March 1 , l Q77 . ( In H.R. 6051 ,
domest i c security investigati ons are prohi bited arrl crimi nal
investigat i ons r egulated in Titles I and II . I n H.R. 4173 ,
see Ti tles II ard I II , including the varr-ant r-ecuir-enent for
the use of informant s.)
35. The Church Committee made no distinction between counter-
int el l i gence arrl domest i c securi t y investiP-ations i n rnakirr.
i ts r ecommerrl ati ons . See Recommerrlat i on 44 , Cnlrch Committ ee
!Iot e 1 , supra , p . &It s. 1566, t he Foreign
Int el ligence Survei l l anc e Act of 1977 does r ecogni ze a di s-
t inction arrl incl udes l ower stan:lards f or counterint elli p;ence
arrl counterterrorism investigations involving wir-et.apotng than
present l y exi st for domesti c securi t y are
governed by The Streets Act urrl er a Probable Cause of
Crime Starrlard. The line is difficult to draw, but the issue
is rr.ooted for us by the sure passage of S. 1566 ard its l10use
counterpart II. R. 7308 , unless we permi t l ower standards in
domest i c securi ty investigati ons.
36. See Development of FBIDomest i c Intelligence I nvestigations,
10, supra , notes the histor i cal blurrine of invest1p.:ations
pr emised OriCOunt er acti J1ll: carmunist influenc e COMINFJL ard
later investigat i ons of civil r 1ght s ,rroups, ant i- war act i vi st s ,
c i vil disorders, arrl the rest. Fe cont end that most of these
invest1?,ations were premised on "anti-camnmisrr." ard the belief
tmt vi olence arrl dtsorder- were corrrnunist inspired. Remove
the ant i-communi st bi as arrl t hese are investi gati ons
of "homegrown t ana t oes " as t he FBI r ef erred t o t he :"1OCi al i st
I']orkers Part y. B..it caution that to matrrtafn t he "f orei gn
connecti on" premise or pr-esumptdon , bovever developed, would
blur the dist inct i on in t he future . The Congress :':illhave to
deal 171t h the bourrlary line between count er i ntelli r:ence Rl'rl
395
domest i c securi t y or cr iminal investteations. I f t he bourrlaries
are not dravm in f avor of hjvher stardards a"Y.l a presumption
t hat a f or eign pover i s not i nvolved , domestic sec urity
[!Uidelines or statut es t hese investi !'=ati om, will
not pr ot ect citizens s ince "ror etrnconnect.t on" i s so easy to
fird ard may be invol ved i n most cace s ,
See Domest ic Securi t y Guidelines of March 10 , 1976, c i t ed at
37
Note 22, supra.
Stat ement of Cl arence Kelley, Director , F:lI, hefore the
38.
Civil and Constitutional Subcommittee of the Hous e
Judi ciary Coornittee, February 11 , 1976, j n Judi ciary FRI
l)versf rr iit Hearings"Not e 1, supra, pp , 262- 6 . See general ly ,
N:.J.t i or.al Advisory Commit t ee on Criminal ,Tustice St arrlards and
Goal s, Reportof t he Task Force on Di sorders arrl Terrori sm
( LEAA 1976). Rejecting the f ocus on "subversi ves" in t he ,Tustice
Department Gui delines, the crur-ch Ccrrmi ttee r ecomnen::led a
more narr-ow f ocus on t error if>'l . see Recommerrlation 44 Di scussion,
Church Committee Final Report Book II, 320- 323. How
more narro, ! thi s coUld turn out t o be is debatable.
A most exemplary stat ement of this balanc i ng tecbnt oue i n t he
39
domestic security area is the reasoning of the Supreme Court
in the Keith case . United States v . United 2,t ates Di st r i ct
407 u.s . 297 (1972).
40.
'The Y.e i t h case , ci t ed in Hote 39, also conta ins the
t hat domestic securit y "stard ar ds" are overrun as a
matter of historical f act :in our hi st ory . See ouot e at p , 25
infra from 407 U. S. 297 at 314.
41. Chllrch Corrrnittee Final Report Book :r.T, Note 1, suer-a at n , '321.
11 2. See di scus si on , tbt e 24, sunra ,
1l'3 . Recent amendments have changed the National 1.Iiretap
Stanlard f or targeti ng per sons engaged i n i nt ernati onal t error i sm
fromprobabl e cause to a r ea sonable suspicion tecause of t he
need f or greater fl exibili ty to prevent the nann from occurring.
See Reportto Accompany 1566 from senate Ccrrmi ttee on
(Repcr t No. 95- 701 , 95t h Conr;. 2d. Sess. 11arch I
4telligen
ce
1 , 1978) , p. 26 . '
1; 4.
For t he expressi on of this vi ew, see Response of f ormer FBI
Director Cl ar enc e i'l . Kelley to the GAOFBI Audit arrl critique
of the Guidelines in GAOFBI Audit, Note 5, supra, Apperyji;<
V, p . 213: ''Limi t i ng domestic int ellir,en::e invest 1i!ations.:.: t 6
396 397
preventinr.; f orce am violence could r est r i ct the gather1ng of
intelligence information useful for anticipat1ng threats to
national security of a ITOre subtle nature. This is the case
because, in our such a Hmi t at i on would protect f'rcrn
governnental inquiry t hose plott:1n{1: t o urdermtne our institut i ons
durine: theirprel1minary stages of organization am preparati on
an::i thus inhi bi t the devel opnent of an intelligence collage
upon uhi ch t o base meaningful analysis lUX! predi ct i ons as t o
fu ture t hrea t s to t he stabili ty of our soci et y ." (Emphasi s
Supplied)
45. 'llie basis, we believe, for the "vacuumcleaner" metaphor for
what informant s do with r espect t o pr i vat e i nformation - -
i t up di stinct ions be:1n{1: made. See "The Use of In-
f ormants in FBI Intelligence I nvestigations " in Supplementary
Detailed Staff Report s on Intelligence Activities am the
RiWlt s of Americans Final Beport Book III of t he Se l ect
Corrmittee to Study Governnental Operations w1th Respect to
Act i vi ties. Uni t ed St ates Senat e (011 t h Congo
2d. Sess . ) (1976) pp. 225- 271.
46. A line of ca ses develop these propositions , e . g , , NAACP v ,
Alabama, 357 U.S. 1149 Bates v. Little Rock;35l
516 (1960)' Buckl eyv . Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
See discussi on infra on use of tnrormants with:mt judi cial
f or their exposi tion.
47. United States v. Vnited States District Court, 407 V.S. 315,
313- 14 (l972):i1 'Historical1y t he struggle for fr-eedcmof
speech am press in Ehr' .,lam bound up with the iS5'Ue of the
scope of the search am seizure potrer' v. Search I'Tarrant ,
307 V.'S. 717.....(1961). "
48. NAACP v . fu t t on , 371 u.s. 415 (1963) ; but see Lairo v . Tatum,
408 lJ. S. 1 (1972) st ating t mt there' i s no st an::i:1IJr; to cha llenge
the exi stence of an intelligence sys tem merely because it
exists. "Allegations of a SUbjective 'chill' are not an
adequ at e substitute f or a cl a1mof specif i c present obj ect i ve
harm or a t hreat of speci fic future harm. .. .. " Id . at 14.
Not e however, t hat the Court not ed that t he al.Lezat.Ions were of
surveillance by overt techniques. "We are not cited to an,v
clandestine intrusion by a military ar:ent." at 9. Recent
cases have di stinguished Laird on this when speci f i c
intelligence activities are al. Leged , E.g. , cases ci t ed at Note
32, 3:1pra.
49. See discus si on in Note 24, supra.
50' S?urch Corrmittee Final ?eport ?ook E , Note 1, supra at 359-60.
51. See r,enera11y of FBI Donesti c Intelligence In vestigations ,
Not e 10, supra, par-t.tc.uar-I y lJ 05-07.
51'. f ollow n nAO FBI Audi t , Not e 18
53. Church Cor.m1ttee Final Beport !:ook n, 1, suora, p, 19.
5
11
. GAO FBI Audit , Not e 5, supra, pp ,
55. p, 144.
56. Church Carrm1t t ee Final Report Pock II, Note 1, sunra, p, 18, 1'11 101.
57. n;,o FBI ' J\.udi t , Fot e 5,s ur-ra , pp , 3-5.
51l . Church ColTJTl1t t ee Fi nal Rer.ort Eooy. II, tbte 1, sunr a , p, 19.
Test:lr.ony of Joseph Califano. - -
59. "This is a r-cugh, tough, dirt:, business, and danzer ous , I t va s
dangero us at t r.e t irr.es . Ib ho.Ids barred. .'This i s a r ou["11,
t our,h bus ines s , " as T'!i lli am C. Sullivan t he l ate and f ormer Assist ant
t o t he Director put i t . The FPJ:'s Covert Action
Prortrama Ap;ainst Amer i can Ct tizens" i n Supplemental Peoort.a , Note
16 supr a , p. 7.
60. See examples ci t ed bv Clarence t1. Kal I ey i n hi s test:!lr.orw cited
at l'ote 38 supra.
61. See Repor t on Di sorders ?-oo Terrorism, Note 38 suPra, Pl' . 145-148:
"I"an,v of t he appr oaches to ler i sl at i ve rerulation now under di scuss i on
voul.d seriously coneromtse t!1e ability of police to cope with the
probl ems of cr 1r.11nal di sorders and terrorist ac t i vities." Id, at
62. FOllOl';Up nAO FBI Audit , Hot e 18 sunra, p , 6.
1)3. llacker-, Frederick J., n.n. , crusader s Cr 1r:1nals! Crazies : Terror
and Ter r or i SMin Cur Time Ctbrton 197 ) . b
(,4. Ib id . 137- 78. "Between seven arrl tve'lve peonl.e successfu lly evaded
lit erall:' thousands of FBI and ot'"1er secur-Ltv f orces =bllized for
t he specifi c purpose of discoverinjT then, '!'he SLA rrember-s did not
even fe el compelled t o keep a Low prof1le. '1J1P.y popped up per icdicall y
In or in San Franci sco ." Id , at 158. "r i ve hundred
runt v- one days passed bet ween Pattv ' s totally i nvoluntary !':idnanpil1l!
by the and Tania ' s t otally invol untary capture by the FEL"
at 169. 0' .: ,,:;: '
65. p, 4: "Even in derrocratic sor.ieties , counterterror1st
actiVities cr.n, c:r use of plectrui c surveill ance, cl nndest i ne
_ 38- 028 0 _ 79 _ 26
398
infiltroti on , i llegal searches , am siP':ilaractions , compound
the violat ion of t he val ues t hat t hey i.'1tended (or pretend )
to protect . or by counterterrorist
campaagns often adopt the tactics they pr-esurnanl y abhor nad
for the sake of ef f i ciency , becme as terroristic as the
activities against which t!'ey O' ::' -,ee Packer P"enera11y
on this point. See also, Rosenbaum, .Icn H. and sederberg, Pet er
C., eds . Vigilante Politics : On:'ler 1'dthout Iaw, Defining the
problem, they use the term "of ficiiil vigilant:!.sm. " I d . at Hi .
66. As Hacker states , "Lip servic e is r eadilygi ven to t he novel. t v
of the phenomenon of modern terrorism, but nobody dares touch
the traditional enrcr cecent r outines.....These days every-
body is willinl; off i ciall y to acknowledge t he necessity f or
novel measures inmeeting moral challenges ; but when itcanes
t o brass tacks , the bras s want to depend on t he old met bods
that have fail ed ... .. " Ibid . at 246.
67 . P.ecOl'TTlemations of t he House Corrmittee on Intelli[!;ence ,
Feb. 11 , 1976, House Report 94-833 (r-eccrrmerdfng abolition of
the Internal Securi t y Branch of the FBI) .
68. t'ost recently, the C'.onm1ttee on Federal Legislat ion of the
Association of the Bar of the City of York. :' ee tlew
York Bar Rerort, llote 26, sunra.
69. See Letter to Senat e Intelli r:ence Corrrni teee on ?DI Charter
Ilecornnendat i ons , "'1arch 11 , 176 (on fUe at Cent er for
National Securit y St udies) .
70. See Test imony of Attorney General Levi ci t ed at lJot e 1 ,
supra.
71. Recomnerrlation 44, Church Comnittee Fi nal Reportfuok II,
Not e 1 , supra, p ,321.
72. For exampl e, H. R. 6051 has 2C) co- sponsors, a 10'-1 number only
because the billalso bans allcovert ooerations abroad and
espionage by the United except in time of I-Iar .
73. 95th 1st Sess . Dec . IS, 1977 .
74. i'lev;s Felease Senate Select Ccr..m1ttee on I:1te lligence, Statement
of Ser.ator Birch Bayh, cna irman Senate Select Cor.mittee on
on the Introduction of t he '<attonal I nt elli gence
Reor ganization ard Reform Act of 1978 , Feb. Q, 1978. p, 7.
75. Statement of Griffin B. Bell , Attorney General Pefore the
399
Subcommittee on Civil and Const i tutional Committee of
the Judiciary U. S. House of RepresentaUves , Feb. 28, 1978,
76. Justice Departm:nt and FBI 1977 Test:lmony, Note 23,
77.
For authori t y to assi st Pr esi dent in assess ing need f or t roops
i n ci vil disorders as basis f or FBI i ntelli gence gathering,
see Devel opment of FBI Domest i c
Note 10, supra , pp. 489-518. For hi st or y of backgrOUTrl
as bas is f or authority t o coll ect int elligence
by FBI, see I d. at pp. 431-35.
78. 'This is a st rict er version of t he J ustice Department Guidelines
on T'!pport1il;. r.:!.vU ni RmV'pl"S ? ryl Jnvolvil1l" a
"pQerol Int er-est., . 22, supra . And al so
str i cter t han Reconmemation 45-6, churchCCii1n1tt ee Final
Report Ecok II , p.323.
79. Consent is nowa requirement urrler Just i ce Depart ment Gui delines
on \oIhiteHouse Personnel Securi t y and Backgrourd Investip' fltion,s,
Note 22, supra . &It the dis semination rules need t o be t 1J;ht ened .
See Recomnerrlation 47, Church Cor.mi ttee Final Report flook II , PP.
323-4 . Trans f er t o t he Civn Service ismandat ed by t o
Control the FBI and r ecomnerrled f or consi derati on by the
York City Bar Association Report. , 2(" suora, p . 35.
Act ually more generally a t ransr er- t o "another' ageney;"
80. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
81. Id. at 21.
82. Id. at 30.
83. Id. at 19.
84. In Terry, t he Court made much of t he danger t he of ficer s f aced
in the situation but also that this was an area of conduct
"necessarily swift ac tion predi cat ed upon t he on- t he-
observations of t he offi cer on t he beat -- which hist or i cal l y
has not been , am as a pr act i cal matter could not be , subj ected
to the warr-ant procedure',' Id, at 20. 'The Court stressed
that "we do not retreat fran our that the police must ,
\-nenever pr acti cabl e , obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures t hrough t he warrant procedure. " Id ,1-!hile
weare not requiring a warrant here, the Court ' s reasoning is
stronp;ly suggesti ve t hat a higher st andard i s r eouired in
circumstances wher e a ;.. arr-ant might be r equired .... : ,,:'-", "
/.
400
401
85. 'The Church Comnitteer' ecorrmerded warrants based on probabl e
cause for mail opening am surreptitious Pecomnemations
53 arrl Church Cor.rn1ttee Fi n'll Report Book II, Note 1,
supra , p. 328. No statute is necescary to reouire this in the
domestic security area, since these surveill ances
wer e r:enerally r ecognized as "clearly i llegal. " Legi sl at i on
i s necessary to define f oreign int elligence or counterint elli r.:ence
war r ant standards since the Pr esi dent bas asserted inherent
power to conduct warrantless surveillance for these purposes.
Executive Order 1203/'i, J anuary 26, 1978. \Ie also reccnnend
warr-ants f or use of umercover agents am intrusive record
searches. See discussion infra; Hiretapping in the danestic
SE' curity area should be prohibited as a "general search"
Violative of the Fourth Amendment .
86 .
Testimony of Att orney General Griffin Pellbefore the
SUb''Comnittee on Government Infonnation am Individual Ri["J1t s
or t he ('o()verr.T'"pnt r r'p,.. " t 1.nn" CC'T'T'_1.t tf'P , ,Tll'1e ( , 1'177 :
r--" ::f-: :!ron
v
0 " 'pj-'rt"T' T)' p('ctor of tr(' "'T'I on PPI
?:;t ioI1ro T s1nt
i
on ' j-":t'ore th' :"-mt r> ,TurUc.i. ar" C0rT".1tt ee ,
}'.nr E 13,
87.
See text acc anpan.vi m !.... Jot e 53,
88.
See Section of H. R. introduced hy DJn Fdvards of
Calif ornia, r epealing cer t ain la;,/s to el imi nat e color of
authority: 'Chapt er 102 (relat inf, to r i ot s ) of Titl e 18,
Sections 2384 (relati ng to sedi t i ous conspiracy) , 2385
to advocating the over-throw of gover nment ) , 2386 (rel ating
t o r egi s t r at i on of cer t ain or ganizations ) , 2387 (relat il1[l; to
peacet1J'le interference with l oyalty, morale or
of mil itary f orces), and 2391 to temporary extension
of l'1art ime penalty f or i nt er f er er.ce wit h l oyalt y. Moral , or
di SCi pline of military f orces ) of such '?!.tle 18 are all
repealed.
89.
Report of the Corrmittee On the Judici ary,United St ates senate
to Accompany S. 37: Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977
(Pept , No . 95-6 05 Part 1) (95th Congress 1st Sess.) pp.... .'l 8')- r; .
9().
0cales v . U!1ited States , 367 U. S. 203 (1961) ; Yates v. United
States, 35/1 U. s. 298 (1957).
91. United States v . F. 2d. 165 (Lst Cir. 1969) .
92. Id .
See also Scales v. United 367 203 (1961) .
Brandenburg v . Ohi o , 395 u.s. (1969), in which the Court
93
held t hat politi cal groups are within their legal right s to
advocate any course of ac t i on including t he "use of for ce of
laN violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting
nrpr- oducdng 1rnninent l awless act i on and is likely t o inci te
or pr oduce such act i on . " Id . at 41J7 .
This is es sent i all y along t he l ines of t he preliI!1inary inquiry 9
4
in the Justice Department D:>mest i c securi t y Invest i gat i on
Guidelines , March 10, 1976.
95. Report t o t he Congress by the Ccmptroller Gener al of t he
United States, "Tar on Organized Crime: Faltering - Federal
St rike Forces Not Get tins t he J ob D:>ne (GAO March 17, 1977) .
96.
Id , at i : "'There i s no agreement on what organized crime is
and consequentl y, on pr ecisel y or what the Goverrment
is fiehting. " One dangerous conseauence of t his shoul d be
noted. In several st ate inquiri es into operati ons of stat e
and l ocal police "Organized Crime Intelli gence Unit s " furrled
1r:l.th LEAA furrls, the major f1rrling is that organized crime
f or economic gain has bee n ignored whil e t he pol i ce cord uct ed
intelljg ence i nvestif/;ations , somet imes on mass i ve scale , of'
orr;anized "polit i cal act i vity" suspect ed t o be 1l1egal or
subver si ve . E. f';. > Repor t on t he Operat ions of the Intelligence
Di vi si on From Chief of Police , Dist rict of Columbi a To Mayor
Halter E. Hashington , Narch 7 , 1975; Improper Pol i ce Intel U r,ence
Activities, AReport By the Ex t ended 1/arch 1978 Cook County
Gram J ury, October- 10, 1975; P.epor t to t he senat e of l"arylam
By the Senate Investigat ing Corrrni ttee Es tablished Pur suant To
Senate Resolution 1 and 151 of the 1975 Maryland General
Assembly, December 31, 1975; Staff Report 'lb House
Civil Rights Ccmnittee I''embers ReGarding Inquiry into House
Bills am Dealinr, with Police Int elligence
Oper ations , September, 1976; State Police Survei l l ance ,
Report of the II. Y. St at e Assembly E'pec1al Task For ce on State
Police Non Cr1m1nal Files, Septerr:ber, 1977.
97. United St at es v . United States Distr i ct Court> 407 U. S. 297,
314 (1972).
98. Response By Def'erdant Clarence To Interrogatory
No. of Plaintiff's Secord set of Int errogatori es 'Ib Feder al
Bureau of I nvesti eat i on , January 23, 1978. Inst i t ute f or
Policy St udies v. f'Jit chell, (Civ . Act i on 74-316) (D.D.C).
99. 407 U.S. at 306.
"'
100. U.S. at 20.
402
i
101.
Intellie:ence Activities amthe T\i,r;hts of Americans, Final
, i
Report of the Select to Stu1y Governmental Operatio
with Respect to I ntellir, ence Activi ties , United Stntes Senate
nS
2d. Sess . , I'll: . II, p . 68 ['Churc h Report "] . '
102. Id., p.75.
103.
l"'arwi ck, "Tne Governnent I nformer," First Pr inciples, March 1977
p , 3. ,
104 . Church Repor t , p , 78 .
105. Washington Pos t, Apr i l 9, 1978, D. A3.
106.
1976 GAO FBI Audit , Not e 5, supra, p. 105 .
107.
i>nr! tho
p. -
lOB.
et
CUr 01'111 Client,
.r"' t r\ f' f '-'r.';,,())"'t s fin
()f (''''\;rr.'' ('('1'TJttpe '''''0;+, :' 00): -Tl:
. - - - '
a l., ' 'The JDL Murder Case; Informer Fas
"'SIvilLi bertieG Review, lIpr il!1"'ay , lC)7G , p. 59.
109.
WrrovTs v . Suoerior Court , 13 Cal. 3d. 238 , 243-44 , 529 P. 2d.
590, 593- 96 (1974).
110.
lfcari n County I rrl eperrlent J ournal , /Ipril20 , 1972, p . l.
111.
Hearings of t he Suhccmnittee on Pi nancial Inst i t utions .
Ccmnittee on Banking, Housing am Urban l\ffairs, United
St at es Senate, 92<1 Conr: . , 2(1. Sess , (1972) , at 136-37.
112.
Church Renort, BJr. VI , at 657- 75.
113 .
Crnr ch Report, Vol. 6, at 669- 75.
114.
Jabara v . Kelley , C. A. No . 39065 (F.. D. !'Uch) ; Kenyatta v .
Kellev , C. A. No . 71- 2595 m . D. Pa .) .
115. Such a provi so has been added t o S. 1566, t he Fbreif,n Intel l i gence
Surve illance Act of 1977. See Report To Accompany S. 1566 fran
Committee On (Renort No . 95-701 , 95th
2d . Ses s . 11Rrch 14, 1978) rp.
116. Attorney General Edward Levi , struck from the
Department Guidelines all reference t o "prevent i ve act ion
bec ause of congressional criticisr.! , he did not rule out
403
autr.ori zing such activitie s on a ca se by case bas ta, In
testimony before this Ccr.rn1ttee. FBI Director William
haS stated that i n sane ca ses t he FBI J1U.Ist t ake preventive
act i on mea sures. (Aorll20, 1978 I t i s cr i t i cal
t o 1Jlsure t hat this does not include incit ing di1lsensi on ,
f alse or 1r.forr.ation to rtiscredit
persons or groups , or any of t he ot her "prevent i ve" measures
engaged in by t he FBI i n its COTh'TELP:'1O operati ons .
AccordinL': to the GAO, the Justice Department has deac tivated
117
t he hirJ1 level ccmm1ttee that reviewed domestic security
1Jlvest i eat i ons . Such a ccmnittee rust be nan::lat ed by the
Chart er . Follow-up GAO PBI Audit, Not e 13, SUDra, p. G:
.,r':!'] he Just ice Department" s Investigat i ons Revie\'; (jnit , which
s respon::; ible f or providing policy gui danc e on t he FBI'e
darestic int elligence operations , i s currentl y \'T1t oout s taff
a."'rl its future urdecided,"
Untilr ec ently t he FBI never al.Ioved t he Justice Department or
UB.
even the At torney General to have access to i t s r.ase informat i on ,
even though the FBI is urder t he supervisi on of the Just i ce
nepartrr.ent. Astatute J1U.Ist rmn:iate thi::; access. f'f'e "Deve.lopnent
of FBI Domestic Intelligence Investigations . "}Jote 10, supra ,
f or a running ac count of t hi s refu,,-a1 or f a ilur e t o di sc l ose .
119. Corwess must rrardate t hat i t be kept "fully ard currently"
informed about FBI act i viti es . An investigation continues
into the failure of the FBI to turn over all files relating
to break- ins after 1966 . r!ash1.ngt on Post , April22. 1973 .
The GAO never been given complet e acc e::; s t o PDI f i l e s ,
an::! has had to work\11th sunmar-tes , Part of the current in-
vestifa tion , includes possiblemi sl eading information supplied
t o the flAO f or i ts audit.
- ?O.
Today the Domest tc secur1t" Guidelines are nuhlished. On the
ether hard t he Foreign Cmmter:tnt el1i gence Guidelines are
secr-et Am \oithhelrl urder- the Pref'dan of Information Act
Lxemptlons . Secr et directives have been the cause of much
OVerrp.achinr; . ;:t andards shoul d be T'Ublic and subject to
cri tic ismand possi bl e r evi s i on by the ,Tust i ce DepartMent .
1,::: \
404
FOREIGNINTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
-
Ik- LJ IJ

HEARINGS
DBFORE THE
SUBCOl\lMITTEE ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES,
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
OF THE
ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
H.R. 7308
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
JUNE 22, 28, AND 29, 1978
Serial No. 48

Printedt or the use ofth e Commit tee onthe Judiciary
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
12-2170
WASHINOTON : 1978
405
od Mr. Halperin I note have been with us before; I don't know
\outMr. Berman.
a Welcometot he committee,gent lemen.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN SHATTUCK, DIRECTOR, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION; MORTON HALPERIN, DIRECTOR, CENTER
01" NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES; JERRY BERMAN, LEGISLA-
TIVE COUNSEL, WASHINGTON OFFICE, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION
Mr.KASTENMEI ER. You may proceed as you wish.
There is a joint statement we have received from Messers.
Berman and Shattuck anda separatestatementofMr. Halperin.If
yoU wish, you may proceed from those and in anyevent they will
bereceivedandmadea partoftherecord.
[Theprepared statement of Mr. Berman, Mr. Shattuck, and Mr.
Halperin follows:] .
PREPAREDSTATEMENT OF JERRY J . BERMAN, LEGISLATIVE CoUNSEL, AND JOHN H.
F.SHATI'UCK, WASHINGTONOFFICE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
Mr. Chairman,wewelcome the opport unity to testify before this Subcommitteeon
legislation to prohibit t he longsta nding and much abused executive branch practice
of conducting warrantless electronic surveillances for foreign intelligence purposes.
H.R. 7308, the HouseversionofS. 1566, which passed t heSenateon April 24th by
a vote of 95- 1, involves mat ters of vital concern to t he American Civil Liberties
Union, a nationwide nonpart isan organizati on devoted to protecting individual
rightsand libertiesguaranteed bytheConstitution.
Thislegislation was introduced t hreeyears ago(S.3197) in direct response to the
revelations ofmassive abuse ofFourt h Amendment rightsof individuals committed
by U.S. intelligence agencies in the name of nat ional security. With the exclusive
andunchecked power to employ taps and bugs for foreign intelligence purposes, the
FBI and CIA, and later the Nat ional Security Agency, frequently and often indis-
criminately targeted individuals and groups, as the Church Committee pointed out ,
"engaged in no criminal activi ty and who posed no genuine threat to the national
security." Often ignoring their own internal procedures or expanding them atwill,
intelligence agencies, at the direct ion of administrat ions of both parties, targeted
n.ewsmen, businessmen, members of Congress, presen t and former employees, civil
rights leaders, and numerous groups engaged in lawful polit ical acti vity. Private
andoften int imate fruits of those surveillances were disseminated widely and in
manycasesused for political and otherimroperpurposes.
We restate the findings of the Church Committee Final Report to right the
balance of discussion before this Committee and to emphasize what must be the
concern ofthe Congress:Doesthis.leW-slation afford incr eased protection
t'tt F0!lrthAmendment rights of"t he people'?Testimonybefore thisCommittee
at 'national securi ty" ta kes precedence and that judicial warrants and other
outlined in t he legislat ion unduly interfere with the prerogat ives ofthe
co branch ignores this record of abuse. Moreover it ignores the central
of the Church Committee that unchecked executive discretion led to
Xd Inthe past and threatensits recurrencein thefuture. ::.
1666 dren
Ing
this paramount concern today, it is our considered opinion that S.
inal ly amended by the Senate, and H.R. 7308, as amended by the House
law.Igence constit ute a modest advancementover present practice and
the national secur ity wiretaparea.Thi s by no means constitutesan endorse-
allWi .legislation,since the basic policy of the ACLU is general opposition
!"ClrarJ
e
PPIng as fundamentall y incompatible with the Fourth Amendment. In this
bini the views of Congressman Robert Drinan 80 eloquently stated by
eC?urse ofthesedeliberations. .
the moreih
thlS
does.representdifferent testimony from thatgiven by theACI;-U In
an ten timee we have appeared before House and Senate committees
tlonBgaing versions of H.R. 7308. Each t ime we have measured the legisla-
aPPearan
nst
eXISting FourthAmendmentlaw and found it deficient.In each ofthose
lIameof we stated t hat we will work to defeat any which I? the
re orm would have the effect of expanding or ratifying current Wireta p
406
abuses. At the same ti me we have repeatedly urged the Congress to 'revamp the
legislation so t hat it would in fact impose new restrictions on cur rent pract ice
In recent monthssome of those restrictions have at last been incorporated in
legislat ion so that it minimally improve s on curr ent Jaw. We refe r of course to t he
cri minal sta ndard amendment for U.S. persons, t he impr oved mi nimizat ion prOCe-
dures, and th e improved struct uringoft he Special Court funct ions.While wear c by
no means satisfied wit h the bill-it is fartoo per missive in many of its provisions_
we are even less sanguine about current law and it is in t his contextthatwe mUst
view t he bill.
Before t urning to the deta ils of H.R. 7308, it is important to place this bill in
perspect ive by viewing its provisionsagainst t he background oft hesevere er osion of
tradit ional Fourth Amendment values by recent Supreme Court decisions and ex.
ecutive branch policies.
ELECfRONIC SURVEILLANCE ANDTHE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The ACLU opposes electronicsurveillanceas an investigative tech nique it
is themost intrusive and inher entl y unreasonable form of search and seizure.Even
when taps and bugs are used agai nst a person suspected of engaging in cr iminal
activity, it offends t he Fourt h Amendment because t hey necessarily result in a
"generalsearch" ofall pr ivateconversat ions, incriminat ingor not ,whi ch occur over
t he period of the surveillance. The surveillance technology itself severely impedes
any kind of effective control, such as a convent ional search warrant which aut ho-
rizes theseizureoftangible evidence,"particularly describes" the thi ng to be seized,
and gives not ice to th esubject ofth esearchexcept under narrowly defined "exigent
circumstances." Cf.Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S.323,329- 30(1966).
The techn ology of electronic surve illance ma kes the search and seizure of tele-
phone conversations infini tely more int rusive t han t he physical searc h ofa homeor
a person, even when a tap is conducted pur suant to a courtorder.Sta tist ics rel eased
by t he Administrative Office oft he U.S.Courts,for exa mple,show t hat theaverage
court-o rdered federal wiretap in 1976 involved t he interception of 1,038 separate
conversat ions between 58 persons over a period of t hree weeks. These st ati stics
demon strate dramatically thateven in the case of a cri minal investigation, a wire-
tap search inevitably has a dragnet effect which strains the Fourt h Amendment to
the breaking point. Bugs, of course, are almost illimitable since t hey pick up
everything in a room.
Electronic surveillance, t herefore, is t he pri me example of Justice Brandeis' fore-
boding in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) t hat "discovery and
invent ion have made it possible for the govern ment , by means far more effective
than stretching upon the rac k, to obtain disclosure in cour t ofwhat is whisper ed in
the closet ." Even where circumscribed wit hin th e confines of a cr iminal investiga-
tion, wiretapping representsan intenseandextensive inva sion of private speech and
th ought with almost no parallel. Wiretap an d ot her electronic surveillance devices
intrude so deeply and so grossly that they discour age people from speaking freely,
and,as JusticeBrennan has warned, ifsuch devices proliferatewidely, we may find
ourselves in a society where the only sure way to guard one's privacy "is to keep
one's mouth shut on all occasions." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,456(1963).
CURRENT LAW GOVERNING NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE
If the technology of electronic surveillance severely strains the fourth amend-
ment, the cur rent practice of nat ional securit y surveillance shatters it . Here t he! tJ
are virtually no restrictions under currentlaw, in contrastto the statutory restpC-
tions imposed in cr iminal investigat ive taps by Title III of the Omnibus CrUDe
ControlandSafe StreetsAct (18U.S.C.2510-20). . _
Today, as in the past, national security wiretapping, bugging, and even teleVllHon
surveillance are conducted by the Executive under a claim of "inherentpower." In
January of t his year, Presiden t carter issued Execut ive Order 12036 to govern
"UnitedStates Intelligence Activities." Under the Order, thePresidentmay .auth
or

izeforeign intelligence electronic surveillance and t he AttorneyGeneral may

rize a particularsurveillance, if he has "probable cause" to believe thata peraoi
an "agentof a foreign power." The Orderdoes not require t he AttorneyGener a
obtain a judicial warrant. It does not require him to find probable cause or reason'
able suspicion ofcrime. It does not define "agentofa foreign power." .
While the exercise of inherent power to conduct warrantless national
electronicsurveillance hasled to widespreadabuse as we have alreadydetailed, 5
Supreme Court has not held it unconstitutional. In United States v. United Sta ee
District Court, 407U.S.297(1972), commonly known as theKeith case, the
Courtheldwarrantless"domesticsecurity"surveillance unconstitutionalbut offer
407
no opinion on whether national secur ity surveillances involving "agents of a foreign
JlOwer " would require a warrant .Si nce Keit h, twocircuit courts ofappe al have held
that t he President may tap foreign powers or their agents with out a warrant and
that this practice docs not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Brown,
484F. 2d 418(5th Cir . 1973); United St ates v. Butenko, 494F. 2d 593(3rd Cir. 1974)
(en bane)cert, denied, 419 U.S. 881(1974).On t he othe r ha nd,t he CourtofAppeals
for th e Dist rict of Columbia in a domestic security case with some foreign connec-
tions int imated that a warran t is req uired in all nat ional security cases. The judges
held that "a warra nt must be obta ined before a wiretap is inst alled on a domestic
organizat ion that is neit her th e agent of nor acti ng in collaboration with a foreign
power,even if the surveillance is insta lled under pr esidential direct ive in the na me
offoreign intelligence gat hering for prot ect ion of th e national security." Zweibon v.
Mitchell, 516 F. 2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). Going
furth er , th e court opinion indicated t hat "an analysis of t he policies implic ated by
foreign securi ty surveillance indi cated t hat absent exigent curcums ta nces, all war-
rantless elect ronic surveillance is unreasonabl e and therefore unconstitu tional."
The significant point , however, is t hateven if the Supreme Courtwere to affi rm
the reasoning in Zwei bon in some fut ure case,and require a warrant for all foreign
intelligence cases not involving foreign agents (by no means cert ain), it is highly
unlike ly to go beyond th e warrantrequirements it spelled out in Keith. There, the
Court, in striking down warrantless domest ic security surveilla nce, indi cated that
Congress could draft a constitutionally acceptable statute for t hese cases with no
foreign connect ions thatspeci fied a warrant procedure different from the probable
cause requirementin criminal cases .
"Different standards may be compat ible with t he fourth amendment if they are
reasonable bot h in relat ion to t he legit imate need of Gover nment for intelligence
information and t he protected rights of our cit izens. For the warrant application
may vary according to the government interes t to be enforced and t he nat ure of
citizen rights deservi ng protect ion . It may be that Congress, for example,
would judge t hat th e appli cation and affidavit showing probable cause need not
follow t he exact requirements of sect ion 2518 (of titl e 18) but should all ege other
circumstances more appropriate to domestic securi ty cases; that the request for
prior court authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any number of a
speciallydesignated court" ;and thatth e time and reporti ng requirementsneed
not be sostrict,as those in Section 2518." 407U.S. 297,323(1972). .
Most likely, if theCourtis prepared to have lower standardsfor domesti csecurity
cases,it probably woul d settle for lower standards in cases involving foreign intelli-
genceconcerns,andthelowest standard ofall in cases involving foreign powers and
their agents. In any event, it :appe ars unlikely that the court would require a
criminal standard, since, as we have learn ed from t he recent Stanford Daily case,
46, L.W. 4546 (May 31, 1978), searches of "mere evidence" directed at persons not
even suspected of cri me have already been sanct ioned by the Court. Moreover, in
foreign securitycases, not even ajudicialwarrantmaybe requir ed. This maybe the
ultimate pr ecedent set by the Court if it hears an appeal in United S tates v.
Humphrey (Crirn, no. 78-A, E.D. Va.),the Vietnamese Spy case.
In this context, H.R.7308, as amended, must be considered an improvementover
law. practice, regardless 'of its many imperfections from the point of
ViewoftraditionalFourthAmendmentvalues. . .
H.R. 7808: A. MODEST IMPROVEMENT OVER CURRENT LAW
First , H.R. 7308 requires an across-the-board warrant for all nat ional security
surveillances in t he United States in which a United States be a party
to the conversat ions. Whil e we oppose t he amendment by the House Intelligence
Committee which excluded certain communicat ions exclusively among foreign
POWers from the warrant requirement, we support t he Committee's determination
to subject all United States communications to a statutory procedure. We als o
its rejection of certain amendments designed to remove embassy and other
oreign power tapsfrom thewarrantrequirement .
The warrant requirement even for embassies resolves the uncertainty of present
!aw as to whether a warrantis required by the Const it ut ion and improves the law
in t wosignificant respects.For once an d for all it puts to resttheexecutive's power
:h conduct foreign intelligence surveillance under a claim of "inherent power" in
e United States and provides a check on unregulated executive discretion. More-
OV
er
, it provides the means to check abuses docume nted by the Church Committee.
U
nrestricted foreign power taps have a long record of abuse. The executi ve
: aknch has targeted embassies both to gather political intelligence on cit izens and
eep track of Americans who contact foreign officials for political purposes. For
401
400
;.
\.
:;
I
85. '!he Church COlT1ll1ttee r-ecomnerded varrarrt s based on probable
cause for ooilopen:!.ngam surreptitious entr-y, Fecorrmerrlations
53 ard 54. Chlrch Corm1ttee Fin.- '1l Report Book II, Note 1,
supra, p. 328. No statute is necescary to reouire this in the
domestic security area, s ince these surveillances
were [':enerallyrecognized as "clearly illegal. " Legislation
is nec es sary to define f orei gn intell1;ence or counterintellie ence
warrarrt stamards since the Pr esident has asse rted inherent
power to corrluct \;arrantless surveillance for these purposes.
Executive Order 1203n, J anuary 26, 1978. lie also recOfT.lerrl
warrant s f or use of urrlercover agents and intrus i ve record
searches . See disc ussion infra; Hiretapping in the danestic
secur-Lty area should be prohibited as a "general. search"
violative of the Fourth Amen::lment .
86. Testimony of Attorney General Griffin Pellbefore the
Sub-ccrmrttee on Government Information am Individual Rif".hts
or roOverr.r:pnt rr ,.pY'nt1.or>f1 CCl"T'ltt,pp, ,TIl"e (, 1'177:
r- of' .'f>rrt" r of th: "'T'I 011 "'PI
T sl-nt<on t"ro)"p tl'''' ,TurUc<.ar
v
COrP'.ittee,
!:nril13,
87. See text accanpanying 1.. 1ote 53, supra.
88. See Section 4 of R.n. 10400 introduced hy Don Fdvarda of
California, repealing certain I mls to eliminate color of
autoority: Chapter 102 (relat1.n{'; to riot s) of Title 18,
Sections 2384 (relating t o seditious conspiracy), 2385
to advocating the overthro\'lof government), 2386 (relating
to regis t rati on of certain organizations ), 2387 (relating to
peacetnme interference Vlith loyalty , rrorale or - cl:!. sc:! nlJ_" e
of military f orces), am 2391 (l'elat ir.p; to temporary extension
of Nartl.me penalty f or interferer.ce Vlith loyalty, Moral , or
discipline of military forces ) of such 71tle18 are all
repealed.
89. Report of the Comnittee On the Judiciary,United States Senate
to Accompany S. 1437: Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977
(Pept . 110 . 95-605 Part 1) (95th Congress 1st Sess.)
90. $cales v. United States,
States, 35
11
U. s. 298 (1957).
U. S. 203 (1961); Yates v. United
91. Dnited States v. 416 F. 2d. 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
92. Id. See also Scales v. United f-tates, 367 U.R. 203
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 u.s. 444 (1969), in which the Court
hel d that political groups are \11thin t heir legal r ights to
advocat e any course of ac tion including tre "use of force of
law viol at i on except wher e such advocacy is direct ed t o inci ting
orpr oducing tmminent l aNless act i on and is likely to incite
or produce such action . " Id , at 41l 7.
93.
94. This is esse ntially along the lines of the prel:l.r!11nary inquiry
in t he Department Domesti c Securit y Invest i gat i on
Guidelines, March 10, 1976.
95. Report t o t he Congress by the C<:Jlll)troller General of the
United States, War on Organized Crime : Falt ering - Feder al
St rike Forces Not Gett ing t he Job Done (nAO March 17 , 1977).
96. Id , at i : "There is no agreement on what organized crime is
ard consequently , on pr eci sely whan or what the Goverrrnent
i s f ight ing.t : One danger ous conseauence of t his shoul d be
noted . In several state inquiries tnto oper ations of state
and local police "Organized Cr ime Int elligence Uni t s" furrled
111th LEAA furrls , t he maj or f W i ng i s t hat organized cr ime
f or econanic gain has been ip,nored \oo'l111e the police corrlucted
intelli gence i nvestigat i ons , sometimes on mas sive scal e , of
orp;an1zed "political activi t y" suspect ed t o be illegal or
subversive . E. f':., Repor t on t he Oper at i ons of the I ntelli r;encc
Division FromChi ef of Pol ice , Di st r i ct of COlumbi a To Mayor
Halt er E. Hashington , 7 , 1975; Improper Police Int ell1.f:ence
Activities , A Report By the Exterrled 1' arch 1978 Cook Count y
Gram J ury, October- 10 , 1975; Repor t t o t he Senat e of l4aryl and
By the Senate Investigating CaTmittee Established Pursuant To
Senate Resol uti on 1 am 151 of the 1975 General
Assembly , December 31 , 1975; Report 'lb House
Civil Rights Ccmn1ttee Regarding Inquiry into House
Bills 4923, 6408, and 6409 with Poli ce Intelligence
Oper at i ons , SeptE!T1ber, 1976; State Police Surveillance ,
Report of the II. Y. State Assembly E'pec1al Task Force on State
Police ron Cr1m1nal Fi l es , Sept err.ber , 1977.
97. United Stat es v . United Stat es Dist rict Court , 407 U. R. 297,
314 C1972i .
98. Response By Deferrlant Clarence M. Kelley 'Ib I nterrogatory
No . 4 of Plaint iff ' s Secorrl Set of In terrogatories 'Ib Feder al
Bureau of Invest1ePt ton , J anuary 23, 1978. Insti t ut e for
Policy St udi es v . r1i t chell , (Civ. Act i on 74-316) (D.n.c).
99. 407 U.S . at 306.
.. d
100. 424 U.S. at 20.
402
101. I ntell1tl;ence Activities and the RiI",hts of limericans, Final
of the select Co:-mittee to Study Goverrnental Operat ions
wi t h Respect to Intellir, ence Activi ties , Unit ed St at es Senate,
9
1
lt h Cong., 2d . Sess., BJ:. II, p .68 [ "Church Repor t"].
102. Id . , p. 75.
103.
"The Governnent Informer, " First Princi pl es , fo1arch 1977,
p . 3.
104.
Church Report , p. 78 .
105.
Was hington Post, Apr i l 9, 1978, D. A3.
106.
1976 GAO FBI Audit, Not e 5, suora. p. 105.
107. ,t""t .qf' f '-'P.r.o ]',tf' -on
;,rr! Pir-lltf' ()f ('1,\ ;1'c,", !0"Tj t.t.pe '.... r0:* , : '0 0 ): "'"':1 ,
It , - .
lOB.
et al., ''The JDLMJrder Case: The Inf ormer ,-Jas
Our OIm Client ,"-cIvilLibertieGReview, April/May, 1g76, p.59.
109.
v . Suoerior Court , 13 Cal. 3d. 238, 243- 44. 529 P. 2d.
590, 593-9b (1974).
110.
rfarin County Independent Journal, ftpr i l 20, 1972, p. l .
111.
Hearings of t he Subcoornittee on Fi nanc ial Instit ut i ons ,
Carrnlttee on Banking, Eousinp; and Urban Affairs, United
States Senate , 92d COng. , Sess. (1972) , at 136- 37.
112. Church Repor t , BJr. VI, at 657- 75.
113. Cru r-ch Report , Vol. 6, at 669-75.
114. Jabara v . Kelle;t, C. A. No. 39065 (F..D. Kenyatta v.
YEl ley, C. A. No . 71- 2595 (E.n. Pa.).
115. Such a provi so has been added t o S. 1566, t he Foreign I nt elligence
Surveillance Act of 1977. See Repor t 'Ib Accompany S. 1566 from
Corrmittee On No. 95- 701, 95t h Cong,
2d. Sess. 14, 1978) rr . _ - , 0.
116. I-mile At t orney Gener al Edward Levi struck from t he .rust i ce
Department Guidelines allreference to "preventive action"
because of congressional cr i tic iSJ:l , he did not rul e out
403
autroriz:1ng such activit i es on a case by case bas i s . In
testimony before this Cor.ra1ttee, FR! D:trect or Nill1ar:J vlebst er
has stated t oot i n some cases the FBI must t ake oreventi ve
action measures . (Aprl1 20 , 1978 1't:st :lroony). I t is critical
to insure toot this does not include incit'1np: dil'l sension,
disseminatine; fal se or anonymous 1r.forr.lO.t l on t o eUscredi t
persons or groups, or any of t he other "!'r event i ve" measures
engaged in by t he FBI i n its COTh'TELP!<O oper at i ons .
117 . AccordirJr; t o t he GAO, the J ust i ce Department bas deact i vated
the high level commi ttee that reviewed domestic securi t.y
tnveettgatnons , Such a comnitt ee mist be Mamat ed by the
Chart er . Follow-up GAO FBI Audi t , Not e 13, supra, p .l):
" r':l:' ] he Justice !:Jepartment ' s Investigations Revie'-T Unit,"Ihich
is r espons i ble f or pr ovi di ng policy gui dance on the FBI 's
dane stic inte111eence operations, is currently ,-l1thout staff
ani i tsfu ture un::lec1ded . "
118. Untilr ecently t he FBI never al.Loved the Justice Department or
even the Attorney General to have acces s t o i t s case informat i on,
even t hough t he FBI i s un::ler the supervi si on of t he Justtee
Depar-trrent , A st at ut e must rrardate t his access . f"ee "Deve'Iojment
of FBI Danestic Int elligence Invest Igat fons , In,
f or a running account of thi s or f ailure to di scl ose .
119. Coneress must rnarrlat e t oot itbe kept "fully and current l y"
informed about FBI activities. An i nvest1eation cont inues
into t he f ailure of t he Fm to turn over all f iles relating
t o br eak- ins after 1966. v!ashington Pos t , April 22, 1978.
'!he GAOhas never been gi ven complete access t o FBI f iles,
am bas had to work ,l1th sumnarles. Part of the current m-
vest1gati on,includes pos si ble misleading information sup!)l i ed
to t he GAO f or i t s audi t .
J.20. Today the Cbmestic Secur-rtv Gui delines are pUhlished. On the
ether hand t he Foreign Counteri nt ellir;ence Gui del i nes are
secr-et Am Idthhelrt urder- the Pr eedan of In f ormation Act
Exempt i ons. Secr et direct i ves have been t he cause of much
overreach1.ng. .':taooards should be nublic am subject to
criti cism and poss ible r evi s i on by .Tustice Departnent .
I -
404
FOREIGNINTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT
I
- I
: i
i:
HEARINGS
l,)

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMUITTEE ONCOURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES,
AND THE ADMINISTRATIONOF JUSTICE
OF THE
ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
H.R. 7308
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEI LLANCE ACT
JUNE 22, 28, AND 29, 1978
Serial No. 48

Printedtor theuse of theCommttteeontheJudiciary
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
12-2170 WASHINGTON: 1978
405
and Mr. Halperin I note have been with us before; I don't know
about Mr.Berman.
Welcome tothecommittee, gentl emen.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN SHATrUCK, DIRECTOR, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION; MORTON HALPERIN, DIRECTOR, CENTER
OF NATIONAL SECURITY STUDI ES; J ERRY BERMAN, LEGISLA
TIVE COUNSEL, WASHINGTON OFFICE, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION
Mr. KASTENMEIER. You may proceed as you wish.
There is a joint statement we have received from Messers.
Berman and Shattuck anda separatestatement ofMr.Halperin.If
you wish, you may proceed from those and in any event they will
berecei vedan dmade a partofthe record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Berman, Mr . Shattuck, and Mr.
Halperin follows:] -,
PREPAREDSTATEMENT OF JERRY J. BERMAN, LEGISLATIVE CoUNSEL, AND JOHN H.
F. SHATTUCK, WASHINGTON OFFICE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
Mr.Chai rman,wewelcome theopportunityto tes tify before thisSubcommitteeon
legislat ion to prohibit t he longstanding and much abused executive branch practice
ofconducti ng warrantless electronic surveillances for foreign intelligence purposes.
H.R.7308. the House version ofS. 1566,which passed t heSenateon April 24t h by
a vote of 95- 1, involves ma tters of vital concern to the Ame rican Civil Liberties
Union, a nat ionwide nonpartisan organization devoted to protecting individual
rightsan dlibertiesguaranteed by theConstitution. _
This legislat ion was int roduced three years ago(S. 3197)in direct response to the
revelations of massive abuse of Fourth Amendment rights of individuals committed
by U.S. intelligence agencies in the name of national security. Wit h the exclus ive
and unchecked power to employ tapsand bugs for foreign intelligence purposes, the
FBI and CIA, and later t he Nat ional Security Agency, frequently and often indis-
criminately targeted individuals and groups, as the Church Commit tee pointed out,
"engaged in no cr iminal activity and who posed no genuine threat to the national
security." Often ignor ing t heir own internal procedures or expanding them at will,
intelligence agencies, at th e direction of administrat ions of both parties, targeted
newsmen, businessmen, members of Congress, present and former employees, civil
rights leaders, and numerous gr oups engaged in la wful political activity. Private
and often int ima te fr uits of thos e surveillances wer e disseminated widely and in
manycases used for polit icaland other imroper purposes.
We restate t he findings of t he Church Commit tee Final Report to right the
balance of discussion before t his Committee an d to emphasize what must be the
paramount concernofthe Congress :Does t his afford increasedprotection
fortheFourthAmendment righ ts of"the people'?Test imony before thisCommittee
that "nat ional security" takes pr ecedence and that j udicial warrants and other
procedures outlined in the legislation unduly interfere wit h the pre rogatives of the
executive branch ignores t his record of abuse. Moreover it ignores the central
of the Chu rch Commi ttee that unchecked executive di1!Cretion led to
a use In thepastand threatensIts recurrenceInthe future. -, .
ISAddressing this paramount concern today, it is our consi der ed opinion that S.
66 as final ly amended by the Senate , and H.R. 7308, as amended by t he House
r telligence Committee consti tute a modestadvancement over present pra ct ice and
awin the national security wiretap area. This by no means constitutesan endorse-
of the legislation, since the basic policy of the ACLU is general opposition to
wiretappingas fundamentallyincompatible witht he FourthAmendment. In this
h,:gard we share the views of Congressman Robert Drinan so eloquentl y stated by
un over the course oft hesedeliber ations.
thHowever,thisdoes represent differenttes timony from thatgiven by theACLU in
e !fiorc than ten ti mes we ha ve appeared before House and Senate committees
earlier vers ions of H.R. 7308. Each ti me we have measured t he legisla-
tion against exist ingFourth Ame ndment law andfound it deficient. In each oft hose
appeara nces, we stated that we. will work to defeat any legislat ion which in the
nlUI1e of reform would have the effect of expanding or ratifying current wiretap
407 406
abuses. At the same t ime we have repeated ly urged the Congress to 'revam
legislation so that it would In fact impose new restrictions on current
In recent mont hs some of t hose rest rict ions have at last been incorporated in
legislation so that it minimall y improves on current Jaw. We refer of COurse to the
criminal standard amendment for U.S. persons, the improved minimization proce
dures, and the improved structu ring of t he Special Court functions. While we are bf>.
no means satisfied with t he bill - it is far too permissive in many of its provisions Y
we ure even less sanguine about current law and it is in thi s context th at We
view t he bil l. s
Before t urn ing to the details of H.R. 7308, it is important to place this bill i
perspectivc by viewing its provisions against t he background of the severe erosion
tradit ional Fourth Amendment values by recent Supreme Court decisions and ex
ecutive branch policies. -
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The ACLU opposes elect ronic surveillance as an investi gative tech nique becau3;! it
is t he most intrusive and inherently unreasonable form of search and seizure . Even
when taps and bugs are used against a person suspected of engaging in crimi nal
activity, it offends th e Fourth Amendment because th ey necessar ily res ult in a
"general search" of all priva te conversa tion s, incr iminating or not , which OCCur Over
the period of t he surveillance. The surveillance technology itself impedes
any kind of effective control, such as a conve ntional search warrant which autho-
rizes the seizure of tangible evidence, "particularly descr ibes" the thing to be seized
and gives noti ce to the subject of the search exce pt under nar rowly defined "exigeni
cir cumstances," Cf. Osborn v , United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329-3 0 (1966).
The technology of elect ronic surveillance makes the search and seizure of tele-
phone conversa tions infinitel y more int rusive t han t he physical search of a home or
a pers on, even when a tap is conduct ed pursuant to a court order. Sta t isti cs released
by t he Administrative Office of t he U.S. Courts, for exa mple, show t hat th e average
court-ordered federal wiretap in 1976 involved t he int erc ept ion of 1,038 separate
conversations between 58 persons over a period of th ree weeks . These statistics
demonstrate dramatically t hat even in the case of a criminal investigation, a wire-
tap sea rch inevitably has a dragnet effect which stra ins t he Fourth Amendment to
the breaking point . Bugs, of course, are a lmost ill imita ble since they pick up
everything in a room.
El ectronic surveillance. therefore, is the pr ime exa mple of J ust ice Brandeis' fore-
boding in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) that "discovery and
invent ion have made it possible for the government, by means far more effective
than stretchin g upon t he rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in
the closet ." Even where circumscribed wit hin th e confines of a cri minal investiga-
tion, wire ta pping represe nts an inten se and extensive invasion of pr ivate speech and
thought with almost no parallel. Wiretap and other electronic surveillance devices
intrude so deeply and so gr ossly t hat t hey discourage people from speaking freely,
and, as Justice Brennan has warned, if such devices proliferate widely, we may find
ourselves in a societ y where the only sure way to guard one 's privacy "is to keep
one's mouth shut on all occasions." Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 456 (1963).
CURRENT LAW GOVERNING NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE
If the technology of electronic surveillance severely strains th e fourth amend-
ment, t he cur rent pr acti ce of national security surveillance shat te rs it. Here there
are virtually no res trictions under current law, in contrast to the statutory restpC-
tiona imposed in criminal invest igat ive taps by Title III of t he Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act (18 U.S.C. 2510-20). . .
Today, as in the past, national security wiretapping, bugging, and even tel eVISion
surveillance are conducted by the Executive under a claim of "inherent power." In
January of this year, President carter issued Executive Order 12036 to govern
"United States Intelligence Activities. " Under the Order, the President may author-
ize foreign intelligence electronic surveillance and t he Attorney General may authc:
rize a particular surveillance, if he has "probable cause" to believe that a person IS
an "agent of a fore ign power. " The Order does not require the Attorney General to
obtain a judicial warrant. It does not require him to find pr obable cause or reason-
able suspicion of crime. It does not define "agent of a foreign power." .
Whil e the exercise of inherent p?wer to conduct warrantless nat ional secUrity
electronic surveillance has led to WIdespread abuse as we have already detailed, the
Supreme Court has not held it unconstitutional. In United States v. United St ates
District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), commonly known as the Keith case, the Sup reme
Court held warrantless "domestic security" surveillance unconstitutional but offered
opinion on whether na tional security surveillances involvi ng "agents of a foreign
would require a warrant. Since Kei th, two circ uit courts of appeal have held
"-at the President may tap foreign powers or their agents wit hout a warrant and
t his practi ce does not violate the Fourth Amen dment. United States v, Brown.
F. 2d 418 (5t h Cir. 1973); United St ates v, Butcnko, 494 F. 2d 593 (3rd Cir . 1974)
(en banc) cert. den ied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974). On t he ot her hand, the Court of Appeals
for the Distr ict of Columbia in a domest ic security case wit h some foreign connec-
tions int imated that a warran t is required in all nat ional secur ity cases. The j udges
held that "a warrant must be obta ined before a wire ta p is installed on a domestic
organizat ion that is neith er t he agent of nor acting in collabor ation with a foreign
wer even if the surveillance is insta lled under presidential di rective in t he name
int elligence gather ing for protection of th e national secu rity." Zweibon v.
Mitchell. 516 F. 2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). Going
furt her, the court opi nion indicated t hat "an analysis of the policies implicated by
foreign security surveillance indicated th at absent exigent curcurnstances, all war-
rantless elect ronic surveill ance is unreasonable and therefore unconstitut ional."
The signi ficant point , however , is th at even if the Supreme Cour t were to affirm
the reasoning in Zweibon in some fut ure case, and require a warrant for all foreign
intelligence cases not involving forei gn agents (by no means cer t ai n), it is highly
unlikely to go beyond the warrant requirements it spelled out in Keith . There, the
Court , in st riking down warrantless domestic security surveillance, indicated that
could draft a constit uti onally accepta ble statute for these cases wit h no
foreign connect ions t hat specified a warrant proced ure different from th e probable
cause requirement in criminal cases .
"Different standards may be compat ible with the fourth amendment if they are
reasonable both in relation to the legit imate need of Government for intelligence
informatio n and the protected ri ghts of our cit izens. For th e warrant application
Play vary accor ding to the govern ment inte res t to be enforced an d the natu re of
citizen rights deservi ng protecti on o. It may be t hat Congress, for exa mple, 0
would judge that the app lication and affidavit showing probable cause need not
follow the exact requirements of sect ion 2518 (of ti tl e 18) but should all ege other
circumsta nces mor e appropriate to domest ic security cases; that the request for
prior court authorizat ion could, in sensitive cases, be made to any nu mber of a
speciall y designated court an d that the time and report ing requirements need 0 0 ;
not be so strict , as those in Section 2518." 407 U.S. 297, 323 (1972). .
Most likely, if t he Court is prepared to have lower standards for domestic securit>,
cases, it probably would settle for lower standards in cases involving foreign intelli-
gence concern s, and th e lowest sta ndard of all in cases involving foreign powers and
their agents. In any even t, it: appears unlikely t hat the court would require a
criminal standard, since, as we have learn ed from t he recent St anford Daily case,
46, L.W. 4546 (May 31, 1978), searches of "mere evidence" directed at persons not
even sus pected of crime have already been sa ncti oned by the Court. Moreover, in
foreign security cases, not even a judicial warran t may be required. This may be the
ult imate precedent set by the Court if it hears an appeal in United States v.
Humphrey (Crim, no. 78-A, E.D. Va.), the Vietnamese Spy case .
In this context, H.R. 7308, as amended, must be considered an improvement over
p: esent law. rractice, regardless 'of its many imperfections from the point of
VIew of tradit iona Fourth Amendment values . .
HA 7308: A MODEST IMPROVEMENT OVER CURRENT LAW
Firs t , H.R. 7308 requires an across-the-board warrant for all national security
surveillan ces in th e United Sta tes in which a United States person -may be a party
to the conversat ions. While vie oppose the amendment by the House Intelligence
Committee which excluded certain communications exclusively among foreign
POwers from the warrant requiremen t , we support t he Commit tee 's determination
to subject all United States communicati ons to a statutory proce dur e. We also
its rejecti on of certain amendments designed to remove embassy an d ot her
orei gn power taps from the warran t requirement.
the warrant requirement even for embassies resolves the uncertainty of present
la . w as to whether a warrant is required by the Const itution and improves th e law
In t wo significant respects. For once and for all it puts to rest the executive's power
to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance under a clai m of "inherent power" in
t
h
e United States and pr ovides a check on unregulated executive discreti on. More-
Over, it provides the means to check abuses documented by t he Church Committee.
Unr est ri cted forei gn power taps have a long record of abuse. The executive
bra nch has targeted embassies both to gather politi cal intelligence on citize ns and
to keep track of Americans who contact foreign officials for political purposes. For
409
408
example, in 1968, Lyndon J ohnson ordered the FBI to gather information On
ti ons hips bet ween prom inent Repub licans and the South Vietnamese. The J.'B[ el
a
.
so by way of a ta p on the South Vietnamese embassy. Similarly, between 1964 did
1966, the FBI t ra nsmitted extensive summaries of contacts between Senators and
gressmen, and other politi cal figure s and foreign governments gathered from
sy tap logs to t he White House for polit ical intell igence purposes. After the 1!l<lS-
election, the Nixon Administration conti nue d th is practice . GS
While th e warrant for foreign powers is not a cr iminal standard, H.R '
requi res. officials to certi fy und er oath to a j udge. th at th e pur Po; 30
8
the tap IS to gather rel evan t and necessary foreign mtelhgence mfor mat ion an/ of
political intelligence. Moreover, the Special Court must impose an d can
"minimiza tion procedu res" designed to pr event disseminati on of irrelevant info/
ew
t ion gathered about Ameri cans from these surveillances. rna
Certai nly the quest ion of whether the tap is for legitimate purposes presenl1
"case or controversy" which t he courts may entertain. As for subst itu t ing Con : a
sional over sight for judicial review, it must be pointed out th at over sight can
revie w th ese taps after t he fact , when the damage may al ready be done. Futhe)'
more , Congressional committees may not ha ve th e ncessary impart iality and
t!on fr? m polit ical that lead to political of activi:
t ies, Finall y, th e jud icial warrant does not render oversight meaningless since the
Intelligence and Judiciary Committees may also execise revi ew over these
Second, H.R. 7308 improves on present law by requir ing the government to meet
criminal standa rd before it can target U.S. persons for fore ign intelligence purposes
In essence, t he legislation imposes the standard (and per haps even a highe r stand:
ard) recommended by the Supreme Court for domest ic security cases in foreign
security cases. While it is not the standard we have recomme nded, since we concur
with the Church Committee recommendation th at no Americans should be wire
tapped without a showing of probable cause of crime (the standard in H.R. 5632
Representat ive Kaste nme ier 's bill ), the bill comes close to meet ing this sta ndard
beca use of recent amendments supported by the Admi nist ration.
In effect, there are four criminal standards in the bill. As set forth in section
101(bX2), each defines an "agent of a foreign power " for purposes of surveillance.
One standard rel ates to "clandestine intelligence gatherin/?: act iviti es" or espionage;
another covers "other clandestine intelligence activitie s ': a third, "sabotage or
terrorism"; and a fourth ancompasses "cons pirac ies" in t he above specified conduct.
Each standard requires t he government to establish probable cause of activity
engaged in by a person knowingly on behal f of a foreign power. In every instance
except for clandest ine intelligence gathering activities, there must also be probable
cause of a crime.
While "clandestine intelligence gathering act ivities" only require reasonable sus-
picion of cr imi nal conduct (e.g. "involve or may involve a violation of law"). the
Report makes clear th at the act ivities do not encompass lawful political activi ty, but
only traditional spycraft. Moreover, the provision replaces the non-er iminal stand-
ard heretofore in the bill which required no evidence of criminal act ivity. .
As for "ot her clandestine inte lligence activities," recent amendments make It
clear that probable cause of such act ivit ies cannot be established by suspected
technical violations of th e For eign Agents Registration Act, since t he must
rgu
be "purs uan t to t he di rection of an intelligence service or network." This !S d
ably stricter than a traditional probable cause of crime standard premise . on
violations of this vague criminal statute. Similarly, the terrorism standard require:
probable cause of a criminal activity. Although the legislation does not definett\
vague term "clandestine intelligence activities," a proviso in the bill state:' wful
person may be ta rgeted as an agent of a foreign power who is engaged In a
First Amendment activity. he
Furthermore, the government must establish to the j udge that th e purPDSC of;iI1
tap is to gather foreign intelligence information and that less intrusive m
ean
d
r a
not suffice to gather the information. While the judge may only review un tethe
"clearly erroneous" standard. he or she may at least probe to some exten
legitimacy and necessity of the surveillance. ie
ve
Contrary to the view of some witnesses before this Committee, we do not .beJ-cial
this constitutes judicial inte rference in national security matters
expertise. Judges must of necessity involve themselves in "national secun tr in
ters in reviewing wiretaps in espionage prosecutions, in making dis<;overy ru
cases involving national security concerns, in reviewing classified documents s the
under the Freedom of Information Act, and ill ot her instances. to
judges here are being asked to do what judges traditionally do: apply a stan tion to
determine whether a search warrant should issue based on su fficient informa
II competent decision . (Are t he witnesses in this regard pr epared to argue
oversight committees have more exper tise or competency to
lb
at
wheth er standards are being app lied and followed?) ,
judg\d H.R. 730B improves on present law by requiring minimi zat ion of the
rete nt ion, and disseminat ion of informati on gathered from nat ional
SOCIu ity electronic surveillances.
surveillance is to be authorized, procedures to minimize its scope are
itieal importance. We have already stated our view that such min imization is
of impossible to accomplish, at least with respect to acqu isition' of information
aJn1 electronic surveilla nces. However, it is clearly impossible without strict Iegisla-
m
standards. As this Committee knows , t he Supre me Court has recently demon-
tl
ve
ted th e inadequacy of t he mini mization requi rements imposed by Titl e III, by
that even where the govern ment ma kes no effort to minimize the surveil-
boee lin objective test can be applied after the fact to j udge whether the conversa-
:ions 'might have been acquired under a reasonable effort. Scott v. United States, -
U.s - (1978). .
Here agai n, H.R. 7308 modestly improves on the unsatisfactory state of current
aW Under the House bill, th e Attorney General is required to develop minirniza-
procedures for considerat ion by t he judge in t he application procedure. We view
this as establishing in law a requirement that mi nimization be consider ed before
rather than after the fact and a Congressional statement that th e Scott decision is
notpublic policy.
Equal1y important, particularly in the nat ional security surveillance area, the law
requires t he development and implementation of mi nimization procedures for the
dissemi nat ion and retention of information. Where "positive intelligence" is being
lOught (e.g, embassy taps), innocent persons are bound to be overheard. It is critical
that those conversa t ions not be retained or disseminated so as to identify those
perBOns unl ess it is absolutely necessary to understand the information meeting the
defmition of foreign intelligence informat ion.
In this regard the House bill makes it possible for the judge to confront the
problem. Except in very limited foreign power surveillances, cr it ical information
such as the location of the surveillance, th e type of communications or activities
being subjected to surveillanc e, th e nature of t he surveillance; including whether
multiple devices are being used, must be disclosed to the judge. This permits closer
scruti ny of minimization procedures proposed by the government and makes
It possible for reasonable procedures to be developed an d implemented .
Finally, the bill puts teeth into this requirement, by making it ill egal for govern-
ment officials inte nt ional1y to ignore minimization procedures, a prohibition that is
essential where dissemination of information is involved. The political abuses of
foreign electronic surveillances mus t not be allowed to happen again.
Fourt h, H.R. 7308 improves the structuring of the Special Court functions over
h t e Senate version of th e bill .
On first impression, we were highly dubious of th e Special Court t hat would be
by this legislation. At this juncture, we st ill have ser ious reservations
';1t how it will function wit h all of the trappings of secrecy, security, and central-
that wil1 surround its workings. However, we do not believe that it is a "star
wliUl1ber" or necessa rily a "rubber stamp" of th e executive. Moreover, there are
;:'e functi ons the court can perform to protect civil liberties which any district
ruling on these mat ters could not. Let us be specific.
if rat, as we all know under the Title III experience, wiretap warrants are rarely
oni"er deni ed. Wh.ile there may be some truth to the argument that the
Y. presents valid warrants to , the court out of a concern for beIng ' demed an
.P&hcat ion, it is also tr ue that many judges bend over backwards to support law
With national security concerns involved, judicial deference to the
will likely be greater unless some special process is developed. The
tIlo lahl is such a process, since it will make a number of judges familiar
W:. WIth these mat ters so that they may not act as a rubber stamp.
Un ile the Court will be aware of its "national security" obligations, the bill also
OnPo6e.s more civil liberties responsibilities than does Title III. The Special Court is
that abuse of power is a reason for its existence; that standards must be
1:t led. careful ly to avoid inst rusion on privacy and lawful political activity; and
lle '!llnlmlzat ion pr ocedures are one of its critical functions. Then, over its shou l-

r
IIts the Congressional oversight committees. In other words , the Special Court
1'hcut bot h ways-as it should.
YIe e concern that the Special Court would be a rubber stamp owed primarily to
that the Senate bill gave the responsibility for naming the judges to the
Usbce of the United States and only from judges in Washington, D.C. In
410 411
response to th is concern , the House bill expands t he number of judges, includi
ar ound the country, and involves the chief j udges of the circuits in
nominating process.
We believe t hat a Special Court is required to effect ively develop and adminis
the bill's minimiwt io!l procedures, If judges are involved in the
tion process, there Wi ll be no way to develop rational minimizati on procedures C
different types of surveillances, using different kinds of technology. More
there will be no way to implement and enforce rational rules regarding the
nation of informatio n. One judge may contradict another or be unable t o set aSi/
wha t another judge has set in motion. If the govern ment is permitted to "fo
ru
e
shop" at the outset of implement ing t his bill absent a special court, the
intent and procedures of t he legislat ion could be upset.
Fi na lly, a word about the ex parte nat ure of the hearings on warrant appli cations
We, of cours e, would prefer an adversary hearing on each application before
. surveillance is ordered. We have not prevailed on this point, but emphasize that this
makes it incumbent on t he Congressional oversight commit tees to do their job in
judging the work of the Special Court . If the government seeks to use the fruits of a
' surveillance in any proceeding, the House bill per mits the Court to conduct an
adversary hearing to determine whether t he applicat ion did in fact meet the stand.
ards in the legislat ion.
A MAJOR DRAWBACK IN THE LEGISLATION
In our testimony today, we have st ressed areas where the bill improves on present
law-areas where t here has been give and ta ke betwee n national secur ity and civil
liberties concerns . In one area, however, there has been no give and take.
As Congressmen Drinan has pointed out along wit h us on numerous occasions
this legislat ion declares open surve illa nce war fare on all foreign officials and for:
eign visitors in this country . First, H.R. 7308 goes beyond the Senate bill by
permitting electro nic surve illance of any officer, employee, or member of a foreign
power. Simply because of their sta t us, the governme nt is permit ted to invade the
privacy of these persons, regardless of t heir count ry, or t heir .obedience to the laws
of the United Sta tes. This would include, for example, all employees of Air France,
the Prime Ministe r of England, or a member of any foreign polit ical party on an
official visit,
Second, the bill permi ts counterintelligence taps and bugs to be targeted under a
non-criminal standard against foreign visitors, incl uding students, professors, and
many relatives and friends of U.S. citizens.
We point out tha t the Fourt h Amendment refers not to the rights of cit izens or
residents, but to t he "right of the people" to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Just as t he ter m "person" in the Fi fth Amendmen t has long been held to
be "broad enough to include any and every huma n being wit hin the j urisdiction of
the rep ublic," Wong v, United Sl ates, 183 U.S. 228, 242 (1896), the "people" who are
protected by the Fourth Amendmen t have been held to include all persons within
the territorial jurisdict ion of the United States. More than fifty years ago, for
example, the Supreme Court established th at an alien could invoke the exclusionary
rule in a deportation proceeding. United States ex rei. Bilokumsky v, Tod, 263 U.S.
149 (1923).
The extension of full Fourth Amend ment protection to foreign nationals has been
recognized by lower courts, e.g, In re Weinstein, 271 F. 5 (S.D. N.Y. 1920), aff'd 271 Fi
673 (2nd Cir . 1920) (Learned Hand, J .) an d was noted by the Supreme Court in Abe
v. United States, 362 U.S. 21; (1960). Abel involved a joint invest igat ion by the FBI
and Immigration officials of a suspected Russian spy. A search was made of the
suspect's hotel room at t he time of his administrative arrest preliminary to
tion, wit h FBI conducting a subsequent search on its own. These searches turned
not only proof of Abel's alienage and illegal entry into t he United States, but .
o
espionage (coded messages and microfilms), and the government brought an esp;:"
nage prosecution and obtained a conviction. Abel appealed on the ground that t e
eviden ce on which he was convicted was the fruit of an illegal search, and
should have been excluded. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction by findll1
that the search had been incidental to a valid deportation arrest and was therefo
r
d
legal itself. But the important point is that it was assumed by the majori ty (an
stressed by the dissenters) that aliens-even those who had entered this count1-
illegally and who were engaged in espionage-were entitled to full Fourth Amen
ment protection. ri
Although a deportation IUTCSt like the one conducted in Abel may be based 0
less than proba ble cause. an alien who is investigated for purposes ot her .tha;r;
deportation is fully protected by the Fourth Amendment. As the Seventh Circ
UI
t of Appeals recently stated, plenary Congressional powers to deport ali ens
(:ou
r
not
be inter preted S{) broadly as to limit the Fourth Amendment rigths of those
"ClIn nt in t he United States." Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilloid, &4 F. 2d 1062 (7th
By the same token, the border searches of automobiles for illegal aliens
Cir
iess
than probable cause, see e.g. United States v, Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074
0f97
6
) can not be taken to permit sweeping and int rusive non-criminal surveillance
(f foreign visitors anywhere in the United States. See Alameida-Sanchez v. United
Stes 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
th e argument that foreign power embassies and employees-as distin-
ishcd from a larger class of foreign visitors-can be subjected to broad surveil-
fa:tce is in constitutional support an d to international law. There is
('tOe basis III Supreme Court case law for a distinction between types of foreigners
IIwfully in the United States. Moreover the federal courts have long recognized the
dot imposed by internat ional law to "protect the residence of an ambassador or
urisler against invasion as well as any other act tend ing to disturb the peace and
dJgnity of the mission or the members of the mission." Frend v. United States, 100
F 2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 640 (1939). This obligation is more
than a general principle of int ernat ional law. The Vienna Convention on Diploma tic
Relations, signed by the President and ratified by the Senate in 1974 expressly
provides in Ar t icle 22 that: " (1) The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The
ents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of t he
of the mission. . . . (3) The pre mises of the mission, their furnishings and
other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune
from search, requisition, attachment or execution."
The Consti tut ion expressly directs the President to carry out the laws and treaty
obligations of the United States. Neither the Const itution nor the Vienna Confer-
eDce Treaty will support the broad surveillance of foreigners which H.R. 7308 would
the government , in arguing that foreigners are not protected by the Consti-
tution (a most interest ing posit ion taken by the Office of Legal Counsel of the
Justice DeRartment), has limited that conclusion to foreigners having "di plomatic
immunity. But H.R. 7308 applies to all foreign officials, employees, and members,
Dotall of whom have such immunitr'
Even if compelling governmenta interests permit the government to make dis-
tinctions or establish different standards for foreign visitors, the government has
not made a showing which supports the foreign visitor standard in the bill. The
evidence presented by t he Administration to support a lower standard for foreign
visitors is that Soviet bloc visitors present a serious danger to national security
because of the likelihood t hat they will engage in clandestine intelligence act ivities.
Yet the standard in the bill is not drawn 80 t hat only bloc countries and persons
who may act on t heir behalf are subjected to a lower sta ndard. Instead, the govern-
ment may target any visitor who "may" enga ge in undefined "clandest ine intelli-
gence act ivities" on behalf of any country which engages in "clandestine inteili-
gence activities contrary to the interests of the United States." That is not a
defmition which calls to mind only the Soviet Bloc, which the FBI worries about,
b
ut literally any country in the world. . '
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ACL our only objection to this legislation. As we have said, the Of COurse this is not
U is opposed to all wiretapping. This bill authorizes wiretapping and other
,Iectronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. We objecttothe departure
rOm strict probable cause standard. We object to the non-criminel''standard and
coverage applied to foreigners. We object to the non-adversary proceeding
el. Which warrants are considered and approved. We are troubled by the fact that
surveillance abroad is not covered, even though the government promises
thIScritical issue will be addressed in other lerslation.
or to st ate a cliche, we find ourselves between 'a rock and a hard place." For all
faults this legislation is better than current law, for with every decision in t his
bird
t he
Supreme Court further erodes traditional Fourth Amendment values. This
kUldsoes put to rest the doctrine of inherent power and will curtail some of the
lind thf abuses committed in the past, and which could be committed in the future
I e! e r ule of changeable executive orders.
IS recommendation that this bill go to the floor. It has been reviewed
CO .ustlvely by three Committees of the 95th Congress. and has developed from
Ce weaker proposals that have been considered by earlier Congresses.
It. It should not be weakened, for in that case we will work actively to defeat
ut III the wake of Watergate, and the revelat ions of massive intelligence agency
412 413
abuses, we cannot believe th at this Committee, or t he Hou. . , turn the effort to
reform the intelligence community into a vote of approv.i
j uut hor ization of
these da ngerous act ivities.
This bill was int roduced as part of an effort to reform t h. . .' .' llcies. Whether 0
not it passes, an d in what form, is a significan t test of whe tl .. 1he Congress has th r
re solve to bri ng our intelligence agencies under t he rule of l.ow an d t heir
in li ne with constitutional principles. '
We trust the resolve is there.
S TATEMENT OF MORTON H . HALPERIN, D IRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL Sl;
CURITY STUDIES, JOINTLY SPONSORED BY THE ACLU FOUNDATION AND THE
FOR PEACE
Mr. Chairman, I appreci ate the opportunity to testify before this Committee
Having testified with considerable vigor before t his Comm ittee and a number or
others over the past several years about t he inadequacy of earlier versions of this
bill and t he need to defeat t he bill if it was not substanti ally amended, I have no
hesitation in saying to this Commi t tee that th e bill which now is before you is a
substantial improvement over current law . I urge you not to take any steps which
will prevent the bill from being enacted t his year. In my judgment, the bill has been
amended as far as it is reasonable to expec t.
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATION
The need to legi slate in t his area to check on abus ed discretion by the Executive
Branch is clearer today than when this legisl ation was first int roduced. The acti on
of the Carter Administration in t he Humphrey-Truong case and t he find ing of a
District Court j udge that at leas t r.art of that surveillance was illegal and unconst].
tutional, suggests the dangers of leaving activities in t his area to the unchecked
power of the Executive Branch. Moreover, t he Exec utive Order issued by President
Carter authorizes t he Attorney General to conduct such surveillance whenever he
finds the individual is an "agen t of a fore ign power." The Executive Order does not
defi ne that phrase nor is it in any way linked to criminal conduct. This is a far less
specific standard t han contained in this legislation. Whatever one may think about
the constitutionality of such warrantless surveill ances, the fact remains that they
are being conducted and will be conducted under that standard un less this legisla-
tion is passed. .
My own view is that all elect roni c surve illance violates t he Fourth Amendment in
that it is inherently a gen eral search. Nonetheless , until Congress is prepared to
abolish electronic su rveilla nce, efforts to regulate t he activities of the Executi ve
Branch and to require a warrant seem to me to be imperative.
The maj or controversy, as this Committee is aware, over the previous versions of
this bill, has to do with whether American citizens could be th e subject of surveil -
lance if they are not suspected of cr iminal activity. This bill does provide that
American citizens can only be subjecte d to elect ronic surveill ance if the government
believes their conduct is, or will be in some way, ill ega l. In most cases, it provides
for probable cause of cr iminal activity. Thus, the government can conduct electroni c
surveillance of United States persons suspected of terror, sabatoge or, as it is called
in the bill, "other clandestine intelligence activities," only if there is probable cause
that their actions violate the criminal laws.
It is only in the case of what is called clandestine intelligence gathering tha t
there is some deviation from t his .standard. I would, of course, prefer to have a
provision requiring probable cause of criminal activity. However, the bill nit
drafted requires probable cause t hat the person is engaged in clandestine I'
gence gathering. This is defined very clearly in the Committee report as
classic kinds of espionage activit y. In addition, a j udge must find that the
involves, or will invo lve, a violation of the criminal law. It is very difficult for me ed
believe that a judge who found probable cause to believe that a person was engag
in "clandestine intelligence activities" would not also find that the person
engaged activity which consti t uted a violation of t he criminal law. Thus, I thl:t
thedeviation from a probable cause standard for United States persons IS extraor I
narily narrow. f
Moreover, in my view, the standards in this bill would prevent most, if not all, 0
the abuses that have come to light .
THE CASE FOR WARRANTS
I want now to address myself to the proposal put forward by the minority on
House Intelligence Committee that warrants should either not be required at all
limited to United States persons.
We don' t know if th e Supreme Court WOUld . req uire warrants for wiretaps of
united persons who are agents of a . foreign power or of foreign powers or
foreign VISitors. The c.ourt left that 1Il Kerth case and it has declined
several opportumtIes since to review the Issue. Several C-ourts of Appeal have
endorsed surveJI.lances where t.he purpose was "solely to gather foreign
. telligence and the pluralit y of t he Zweibon court has suggested that such war-
Bu.rveill ances are
In my ': lew, the approprIate question ask to determine whether the constitu-
tion reqUires wa rrants III some cases IS one that the Supreme Court has
tra ditionally as.ked about proJ?Osed to. the warrant requirement and
which t he C(;>urt applied. That question IS whether an exception to the
warrant reqUlrement IS necessary to carry out the purpose of the surveillance. The
su preJ.ll e Cour t has consistently hel d even !n non-criminal such as thrAe
involvmg OSHA inspections, a warrant IS required unless there IS a showing that
requiri ng the threaten the purposes of survei llance. Despite tbe
claims of t he minority m the House Intelligence Committee Report, no such Sho-K-
ing has been made nor do I t hink it can be made.
Requir ing warrants under t he scheme of HR7308 is said to jeopordize the "speed
and security" which is necessary to effectively conduct national security and elec-
tronic surveill ances and lead to t he possibility of "delay and disclosure." The prcce-
dure set out in the bill will, of course, do neither. The bill permits warrantless
surveillances in emergency situations when there is not time to get a warrant
a federal j udge. Moreover, such judges will be sitting constantly in the District ai
Columbia an d it is extremely unlikely that a judge could be reached and found :A>
make a decision in time to meet the requi rements of the emergency provision. As
far as disclosure is concerned, the re cord of the judiciary in keeping secreta is
extr emely good as compared to that of both the executive and the legislative brazca,
The ot her possible risk of delay would occur if a District Court judge denied a
surveillance requiring a resort to the appeal procedures. However, this arguzceat
cont radicts the suggestion that the courts will simply rubber stamp exec..m..e
branch requests . In my view, neither is likely. The bill provides that the courts Q':l
not have discretion to deny a warrant if all the conditions are met. In the case uian
embassy surveil lance, for example, the government will simply have to show fOT :be
judge's sat isfaction that the target is a foreign embassy. The judge will also ha..e !J:)
determine t hat the procedural requirements of the surveillance have been folic....ed
and that the appropriate minimization procedures are in effect. There appears to be
ext remely little likelihood of any delay in such situations.
The one case where t here may be difficulty involves situations in which t.he
govern ment needs to prove to a court's sa tisfaction that an individual is an Q[
a foreign power under the defi nitions of t he bill whether the person be a
visitor or a United States person. In such cases it is appropriate, in my view,
there be a scr ut iny by the judiciary branch. The purpose of the Fourth Ameni:-..e!:t
is precisely to ensure that persons would not be subject to unreasonable
and seizures . The warrant requirement would ensure that a neutral magistrate a.!Xl
not t hose agents charged with tracking down enemies of the state would
Whet her a surveill ance was j ustified. One must recall that the Attorney IS
responsible to t he President to conduct counterintelligence investigations and t.:.et,
hence. he cannot perform the function of the neutral magistrate.
We. are also told that it is inappropriate for the courts to intervene in
because the constitution provides that foreign policy questions
to the political branches of the government. However, the courts
conSistently held that the only foreign policy questions which are left to the p:',:..--;;;-
cal branches are those which concern the conduct of our relations with
COunt ries. They have been quick to point out that where the action of the gc..... ..=-
which may be labeled foreign policy or national defense, impinges .-=- /->0
constit utionally protected rights the courts have an obligation and a duty to :::::=-
vene to ensure t hat those rights are adequately protected. _
d I have thought that the Abel case (Abel v. U.S., 362 U.S. 217 (1960))
with the ability and the obligation of the court to intervene.
rights are at stake and also to establish without question that
to the United States have such Fourth Amendment rights. The
unanimous in the case of a Soviet KGB agent, illegally in the L ::::.:-.r.d
ill With false papers, in holding that Abel was protected by the Fourth A=?"
whn: h Th e court also had no difficulty finding that it had the right to <:e<""..Qe
er the search which was conducted was constitutionally valid. "
star UChamh IS made of the notion that this bill will lead to the creation of "secret: Z#'
C bel' proceedings. However, all search warrants are issued on an ex
.
415
414
,., is in a secret proceeding. ;, no answer to say that in criminal cases such
.rrunts may be subject 1<) " later adversary process. The possibility of such
v-rsary processoccurrin g,arises out ofthe exclusionaryrulewhich is clearlynot
t he courts have presented it, a requirement that flows direclty from t he ex
.rch warrant. That is to say, no court has held that the exclusiona ry rul e is
[uired in order to provide for an adversary tes ting ofan ex par te sea rch warrant.
Iher, the rule has arisen out of t he belief that it is the only way to get police
.cers toobeyt he Fourt h Amendment.
I'hose advocating no warrants, or those limited to certain cases, have suggested
;! the Attorney General will t ake more care when he alone can decide. I doubt
.; much that it works that way.The Attorney General is an extremelybusy man
! when pressed by his staffor other agencies for an electr onicsurveillanceorder
h' likely not to review the evidence as carefully as he might and simply to sigy;
uuthorizat ion when there appears to be a plausible case.When t he full story of
Truong-Humphrey surveillance is told, I believe it will reveal such a pattern.
. n, on the other hand , the Att orney Gener al needs to go to court and needs to
an affidavit, I believe t hat the care that he and ot hers ta ke will be much
tor.Moreover, the fact that a warrant is issuedwill not eliminate t he possibility
.,ter court review of the propr iety of the action . The courts often do review
'h warrants on the basis of a much fuller record in an adversary proceeding
was present before the j udge who issuedthe warra nt.
' 'llly,on th is issue,let mesay a word about t he question ofabuses.The Church
;",ittee Report shows clearly t hat taps on foreign embassies have given rise to
-sive abuses. When Presidents J ohnson and Nixon asked for information about
it i-war views and activit ies ofsenators and congresspersons,t he FBI prepared
-mary of contacts bet ween American legislators and foreign officials t hrough
-ntal overhears on embassy wiretaps.The first such list was sixty-seven pages
.nd covered t he period from J uly I, 1965 t hr ough March 17, 1966. The second
ary was prepared two months later and additional materials were sent bi-
\.to the White House under t he J ohnson and then Nixon Administr ation (see
"1 Committee Report ,Vol.3,pp.313-314.)
also know of one case in which a foreign embassy was ta pped specifically for
rrpose of learn ing about t he political and ot her activities of an Ameri can
' . The Johnson Administ ration conducted surveillance of Anna Chenault, a
'lent Republican leader,by install ing ta ps on the South Vietnamese Embassy
',0 t he 1968 election. The purpose was to discover whether or not Mrs. Chen-
as conveying certain advice t o t he Viet name se government. Whatever one
of the propriety of what Mrs. Chenault was engaged in, t he incidents shows
mhassy taps can be used for th e pur pose ofconductingsurveillan ce of Ameri-
i7.ens.
need, t herefore, is to provide judicial supervision of such surveillance to
, t hat t hey do not violate the const it ut ional rights of United Sta tes persons.
"')rt unately, it is not the case th at there have been . no abuses in th e last
,Iyears.The District Court judge in the Humphrey-Truong case that McClory
,so extensively found that a substantial partofthesurveillances were illegal
nconst itut ional because they were conducted after the major purpose of the
.llance had become cri minal. Even to reach the judgement that much of the
iIlance was legal, t he court was required to retreat from the standards set by
urts ofAppeal cases which hadsuggested thatthe purpose ofthesurveillance
he "solely" for foreign intelligence purposes .J udge Bryan substituted a "pre-
""nt" stan dard.Moreover, in myjudgement, th e criteria laid out in the Carter
.itive Order permi tting the surveillance of United States persons with no
nee of criminal activity, simply when the At torney General finds that they
be agents of a foreign power without any definit ion of t hat phrase, is in itself
'mse oft he rights ofan Americancitizen.
'C' House Intelligence Committee has elimi nated t he warrant requirements fo,r
very special class of surveillances in which there is no probability that Amen-
will beoverheardor communicated. I regret that this is done and hope that1Il
Conference Commit tee this deviati on from the bill as proposed and passed by
Senate, will be rejected. Nonetheless, I would urge the House to move forward
.enactmentofthislegislat ion.
r. Chairman, I recognize that the bill raises serious constitutional, legal and
. ical quest ions and thatit would be quite natural for this Committ.eeto wantto
crta ke the most searchingexaminationofits provisions.In othercircumstances.
auld be urging you to do so. However, in view of the scrutiny.that the bill has
cived in previous sessions from this Committee and the attention that has been
on to it in painstaking detail by two committees of the Senate and one of the
is in a secret proceeding. It is no answer to say that in criminal cases I
:rrants may be subject to !" later adversary process, The p<!ssibility of I
.cI
versarY
process occurnng,ar ises outof theexclusionaryrule which is clearly
IS thecourtshave it, a requirement thatflows direclty from theex p
_arCh w!i"ant . That IS.to say, no court has held that the exclusionary rul
required m orderto provide for an adversarytestingofan ex partesearchwarr,
8Bther, the r ule has arisen out of the belief that it is the only way to get po
fficers to obey theFourthAmendment.
oThose advoca t ing no warrants, or those limited to certain cases have sugges
that the At torn ey General will take more care when he alone decide. I do
verymuch that it thatway. TheAttor.ney General is an.ext remely busyn
and when pressed by hisstaffor otheragenciesfor anelectronic surveillanceore
he is likely not t o review the evidence as carefully as he might and simply to S:
the aut horizat ion when thereappearsto be a plausiblecase. When the full story
the Tr uong-Humphrey su rveillance is told, I believe it will reveal such a patte:
When, on th e ot herhand, the Attorney General needs to go to court and needs
institute an affi davit, I believe thatthecare that he andothers take will be mu
greater.Moreover ,t he fact thata warrantis issuedwill noteliminatethepossibili
of later court review of the propriety of the action. The courts oft en do revie
!e8J"Ch warrants on the basis of a much full er record in an adversary proceedh
then was present before thejudge who iss ued thewarrant.
Final ly, on thisiss ue, letme saya word aboutthequestionof abuses.TheChurc
Committee Reportshows clearl y thattaps on foreign embassies have given rise 1
extensive abuses. When Presi dentsJohnson and Nixon asked for information aboi
the ant i-war views a nd activities of senatorsandcongresspersons, the FBI prepare
a summary of contacts between American legislators and foreign officials throug
accidental overhearson embassy wiretaps. The firs t such list wassixty-seven page
longand covered theperiod fr om July 1, 1965 through March 17, 1966. The secor
.summary was prepared two months lat er and additional materials were sent bi
weekly to theWhiteHouse under t he Johnson and then Nixon Administration (se
Church CommitteeReport,Vol. 3, pp. 313-314.)
We als o know of one case in which a foreign embassy was tapped specificallyfo
the purpose of learning about the poli t ical and other activities of an America.
citizen. The J ohnson Administration cond ucted surveillance of Anna Chenault, I
promi nent Republican leader, by inst alli ng taps on theSouth VietnameseEmbass;
prior to t he 1968 elect ion. The purpose was to dis cover whether ornot Mrs. Chell
aul t was conveying certain advice to the Vietnamese government. Whatever OD'
thi nks of t he prop ri ety of what Mrs. Chenault was engaged ill, the incidentsshow:
thatembassy tapscan be used for the purposeof conducting surveillanceof Ameri
can citizens.
The need, therefore, .is t o provide judicial supervision of such surveillance tA
ensure t hat they do not violate the const itutional rights of United States persons
Unfortunat ely, it is not the cas e that there have been no abuses in the las
several years .The DistrictCourtjudgein the Humphrey-Truong case thatMcCl.>r:
quotes so exte nsively found that a substantial partof thesurveillances were illega
and unconstitut ional because they were conducted aft er-the major purpose of th.
surveillance had become criminal. Eve n to reach the j udgement that much of th
Surveilla nce was legal, the court was required to retreatfrom the sta ndards set
the Courtsof caseswhich had suggestedthatthepurpose ofthesurveillano
: ust be "solely' for foreign intelligence purposes. Judge Bryan substituted a "pre
EOminant " standard. Moreover, in my judgement, thecriterialaidoutin theCartel
Or der permitting the surveill ance of United States persons .with nl
eVldence of cri mi nal activity, simply when t he General finds.t h.at .the,
may be agents of a foreign power WIthout any definition of that phrase, IS In itsel:
anabuse oft he rights ofanAmericancitizen.
The House Intelligence Committee has eliminated the warrant requirements fo.
One very special class of surveillances in which there is no probability thatAmen
will be overheard or communicated. I regretthatthisis done and hopethatir
e Conference Committee this deviati on from the bill as proposed and passed b,
Senate, will be rejected. Nonetheless, I would urge t he House to move forwarc
With enactmentofthislegi slation.
-_
Mr . Chairman, I recognize that the bil! rai ses ser ious constitutional, legal am
Polit ical questions and that it would be quite natural for this Committee to wantte
undert ake themostsearchingexaminat ion of it s provisions. In othercircumstances
I Would be urging you to do so. in view of th e scrut iny t hat t he bil ! has
received in previous sessions from this "tto_.' __ ..
given to it in.puinstaki ll<f ---
........-
416
srATEMj,:lrrOF JERRY J . BERl'1llN'"
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
!t<:.l, 11.

BEFORE
TIlE CRIHI NAL JUSTICE SUBCXU1ITfEE OF TIlE
m USE CCl't1ITlliE ON JUDI CIARY
8'
May 18 , 1977
TI 1C Arreri. can Ci vil Lf bcr t Les Union .,/cl cC(lCS thi s oppor t uni ty t o
t cs t i.fy on JUt. 2335, the "Speci al Pr ose cut or Act of 1977. " le gi slati on
al Ollij t ho l ines of H.R. 2835 i s Long over due . Clearl y, we have l e31.11Cd
in r e-cent years t hat inveGti 8:lt i on and pr osecut.i.on of offi ci al s Indo-
pendent; of t he Justice Department i s essential t o in sure j ust i ce in
cert.:Ln ct.r cunstrmces . H.R. 2835 this end est ablishes a
"lTi l;Ger " f or a t empor ary spcc Lal prosecut or when t he ci .rcims t ances
Will.T iJIlt. He t herefore endorse the thrust of t he l egi sl at i on.
lkxecver , ' ole do not believe t hat H.R. 2835 goes f ar enough t o
provide a special pr osecutor machani.sm i n one cri t i cal area . Any
l egi sl at i on desi gned t o insure t hat high government of f i cial s who
disobey t he l aw ar e invest igated and pr osecut ed in a f air and impar t i al
n<rrnler nu st enccrnpass a number of intel l i gence agency official s not
now covered tmder H.R. 2835' s special prosecutor juri sdi ct ion and
nus t inpose rror e st rict l imits on the di.scr eti on of t he Att orney
General t o control the ci rcums t ances tmder which a speci al prosecut or
* Jerry J . Berman i s a l egi sl at i ve as sociate at the Amer i can Civil
Li berti es Uni .on Washingt on Offi ce and also Dir ector of the Proj ect
on D::xiesti c Surveillance at t he Cent er f or Nat i.onal. Securi ty St udi.es ,
MI:. Berman i s co- author of The Lawl ess St at e (pengui n 1976) and
has writt en on th e i ssue ofSPecial Prosecutor. His r errarks t oday
are on behalf of t he Ameri can Civil Li ber ti es Union.
417
is triggere d. We bel i eve t he l eg i s l a ti on s houl d be amended to
provide more f ully f or a s pe cial prosecu t or i n the event of
abus e of power by U. S . i nt e l l i gen ce agencies .
We hav e par ti cul a r amendmen t s t o offe r , but befor e we
do, we think it i s impor t anr t o s e t - for t h why t he Ameri can
Civil Liber ti e s Uni on b e l i eve s tha t i n t e l l i gen ce a gen cy
abuses mus t be subj e ct t o inve s t i ga ti on by a s pe ci al prose cut or
and the part i cu lar r e as on s why we b e l i eve H. R. 2835 i s i n -
adequat e to a c compl i sh t h i s en d .
The po s i tion of the Ame r i can Ci v il Li ber t i e s Union ha s
been t o supor t a tempor ar y s pe ci a l p ros e cut or in limi t e d
cases wher e i t is abunda n t l y cl e ar that the Departmen t of
J ustice and t he At t oTl1ey Gen era l c an not conduct a pr os e cutor i a l
i nvestigat i on i n an i mpar t i a l manner or wi t h out givi ng the
appearance of par tia l i t y. In r e cen t year s , the Amer i can Ci v il
Libertie s Union h as i den t i f i e d t wo s uc h a r e as and c a l led for
special pros e cut ors. In 19 73 t he ACLU endor s e d the creati on
of a Tempor a r y Spe c i al Pr osecutor Fo rce to inves t i ga t e and
prosecut e h i gh gove Tl1men t off i ci a l s impl ica t e d in "Wa t e r ga t e"
and relat ed ma t t er s . In 1975 in t he mids t of t he " reve l a t i ons "
concerning abuses by i nt elligence agen cy offi ci a l s , the ACLU
endorsed ini tiat i ves t o"cr e at e . . . a Spe cial Pr osecut or' s Of f i ce
with respect t o the int elli gen ce community . " Bec aus e such an
office has un fortunat ely no t yet been e s tab l i s he d , the ACLU
Vigorously supp ort s congressiona l ena c tme nt of H.R . 6051
.:
419
418
recent l y i nt r oduce d by Representat ive Herman Badi l l o of
New York and others . Ti t l e VI I of t hi s Bill , t he " Intel l i -
gence Agency Cont r ol Act of 1977 , " cr eat es a 5- year t emporar y
spe cial pr os ecut or appoint ed to i nve s t i ga t e an d pr osecute
vi olat i ons of fe de r a l l aw by U. S. i nt e l l i gen ce agen cies .
We be l i eve our r eas ons f or t aking thi s pos i t i on are compelli ng
and under s core the nee d f or amendi ng H. R. 2835 .
As t he publi c r e cor d demonstrates, lVat ergate was onl y the
" t i p of t he i ceberg" and a mer e ext en sion of a pat t ern of
officia l l awles znes s t hat has devel oped wi t hi n our i nt e l ligence
agenc i es ove r de cad es un t il it has be come a mat t er of bureau-
cr atic rout i ne. Wa t er ga t e , a s we s ho uld r e cal l , i nvolved
the Houston Pl an , the "Na t i ona l Security" wiret ap progr am, and
t he IRS " enemi e s " progr am, al l of whi ch invo l ved activi t ies
of U.S . int el l i gence agencies. Becaus e they were "rel a t ed
mat ters" , t hey wer e turned ove r t o t he Speci a l Wa t ergate Pr o-
1
secut ion Force .
After Wat erga t e , came the deluge of r evel at i ons im-
pl i cat i ng U.S . intel l i gence ag enci es i n mass i ve i l lega l
activity : the FBI COI NTELPRO operations; CI A and FBI mai l
ope ni ng programs, Oper a t i on Shamr ock an d Mi nar e t , the NSA' s
cabl e i nt er cept programs ; t he CIA CHAOS ope rat ion ; t he FBI ' s
war rant l e s s wi r e t appi ng program agai ns t domestic groups;
the CIA drug tes t ing pr ogram conduct ed wi t h unwi t t i ng
subj ect s; the I RS Spec i a l Services Staf f ; perj ur y a llega tions
ainst former CI A Dir ec t or Ri chard Helms ; and t he FBI "bl a ck-
ag 2
" or bur gl ar y program . Thes e were offici al cons piraci e s
g
ba 3
i n vi ola t i on of United Sta t es l aws :
Section 241 of Titl e 18 of the Uni t ed St at es Code
(l 8 U. S. C. 241) makes a crime any cons pi r acy " to injure ,
oppres s , thr eat en , or i nt i midat e any citizen in the fr ee
ex erci s e or enjoyment of any ri ght or privi l e ge secured
t o him by t he Cons t itution or l aws of t he Uni t e d St ates ,
or be caus e of his havi ng so exerci s ed t he same . . .. "
Section 242 of Ti t l e 18 of the Uni ted States Code
( 18 U.S.C. 242 ) pr ovides f or the puni shment of anyone
who , und er color of l aw, "wi Ll f uLl.y s ubj ect s any inhabi tant
of an y St a t e, Territor y or Di st r ict t o the depr i va t i on of
any r i ght s , pr ivi l eges , or i mmunit i es secured or protected
by the Cons t i tut i on or laws of t he Uni t ed St at es . .. "
Fr om 1956 t o 1971 , t he FBI conduct ed at l eas t fi ve covert
ac ti on progr ams (COI NTELPROs ) aga i ns t a var iet y of domes t i c
organ i za ti ons , some of whi ch were involved on l y in pea ce -
ful pr ot es t . Among t hese l att er or gani zations wer e the
Sout hern Chri stian Lead ershi p Conference , many black st udent
groups , and var i ous ant i - war gr oups . The Senate Sel e ct
Commi t t ee on Int e lligence Act ivi t ies f ound t hat t he actions
taken by the FBI in connecti on wi th such pr ograms "int er-
f ered wi t h t he Fir s t Amendmen t r i ghts of citizens . They
were explicit l y i n t ende d t o de t er citi zen s f r om joining
gr oups , ' neut r alize ' t hos e who were al r eady membe rs, and
pr even t or i nhibi t t he exp r es s i on of i deas . " Actions
t aken by the FBI i n cl uded tact ics des i gned t o break up
marr i age s , t erminat e f unding or empl oyment , encourage gang
warfar e among vi ol ent r i val gr oups , dis r upt Doli tical
ca mpa i gns , and de t er the expres s i on of i deas whi ch t he FBI
con s i der ed danger ous . Mor e t han 2000 propos a ls f or a ction
were approve d and carr i ed out .
From 1963 unt i l hi s death in 1968, t he l at e Dr . ~ r t n Luther
Kin g, J r ., was the t ar ge t of an FBI operat i on des i gned t o
neut r a l i ze him as an e f fe c t i ve Negr o l ead er . Hi s phone s
were t apped and his ho t el r ooms and office s wer e bugged.
He was a ls o pl a ced under phys ical an d photogr aphic s ur -
veill ance . Ef f orts wer e made by the FBI t o di s cr e di t him
wi t h Execut i ve Branch offici als , l ead er s of Cong r es s ,
r e l i gi ous l eade rs, uni vers i t i es an d the pres s . Shortly
bef or e he was t o r ece i ve the Nobel Pea ce Pr i ze , the FBI
an onymously mai l e d t o hi m a t ape and an uns i gned l e t t er
whi ch as s oci a t es of King sai d he interpreted a s an e f f or t
:r ';'
420
421
to indu ce h i m to commit s u i c i de .
I n 19 69 , the Inter n al Reve n ue Se rvice e stab l i s h e d a
Speci a l Serv i ce s St af f to t arget groups an d indi v i dua l s
for t ax e xami n ations b e caus e o f t he i r po l iti cal and
i de o l o gi ca l b e l i efs an d act i v it i e s. I RS r eque s t e d the
FBI to pr ov i de i n forma t ion of organ i z a ti on s of " pr e -
domi n an t l y di s s ide n t or e x t r emi s t n ature" an d pe opl e
i de n t i f i e d wi t h t h em, an d t h e FBI did so . Th e Staf f
mai n t a i n e d i nt e l l i ge n c e fi l e s on more than 11 ,000
i n divi du a l s an d gr oups until i t wa s abo lish e d in 1973
by the n ew I RS Commissi one r wh en h e di s c ove r e d its
functions we re not tax rel at e d.
I n v i ol a t i on o f its chart er prohibiting it fr om e x e r -
ci sing i nt e r nal s e c u r i t y f unctions , the CI A dev el oped
a pr o gr am- Ope r at ion explor e the ex t en t of
for eign i n f l uen c e on do me s t ic di s siden t s . CI A a gen t s ,
wh i l e i n t h e Unit e d St a tes , prov i de d s ubs t an t i a l in-
f orma t i on a b ou t lawf u l dome sti c a ctivi t i e s o f dis s i dent
Ame r ican gr oups . The CI A in connect i on with thi s program
acc umul at e d more than 13 ,000 fi les, including 7,200 on
Ame r i can c i tiz ens an d a n inde x o f more than 300 , 000
name s . Ostens ibly t o prot ect CI A personnel and i n s t a l -
lations, the CI A al s o infiltrate d Wa s h ingt on b ased p e a c e
groups and Black activi st groups and collect ed ge n eral
information about radical gr oups across the country :
In 1966, the CI A a n d FBI ent e r ed int o an informal a gr e e -
ment regarding CIA' s c l ande stine act ivity in the United
St a t es .
The Army carri ed on a nat i onwi de i nt e l l i genc e surve illance
program, creat i n g f i les on s ome 100, 0 00 Amer i c an s and a
l arge number of domestic or gani z a t ion s, e n c ompa s s ing
v i r t ua l ly ever y gr ou p s eeking p e a c e ful change in the
Uni ted St a tes , i n c l ud ing the Ur b an League, the Nat i on a l
Organi z ation of Women , the NAACP , and t h e Ant i - De f ama t i on
League of B' n a i Br ith. Al t h ou gh Ar my co l l ection pl ans,
wh i ch were circulate d t o the Jus t ice Depar t ment , did not
men t i on techniques of collection , t h e i n f orma tion des cribed
cou l d hav e been co l lect ed only b y cov ert s urvei l l an c e .
The Justice Dep a r t me t nev er objected .
Section 1 70 2 of Ti tle 18 of Code ( 18 U.S.C . 1 702) pro-
hibits the taking of mai l wi t h "design t o obst r uct the
corres p on de n ce , or t o p r y i n t o the b us ine s s or s e cr e t s o f
another . . . " Both the CI A and the FBI condu c t ed mai l open -
i n g pr ogr ams over per i o ds of many y e ar s wh i ch were dire cted
a t mail sent or r ece i ved b y U. S . citi z ens on wa t ch l i s t s
de si gn e d t o moni tor i nte rnation a l mai l . Th e Rock e f e l l e r
commi s s i on conc luded t hat t he CI A mai l openi ng pr ograms
were "un l awf ul. " Th e FBI termi nated it s p r ogr am i n 1966 but
cont i n ue d i t s us e o f t he CI A p rogram and submit ted t h e
name s of dome s t i c di s siden t s to the CI A f or i t s wa t ch l i s t .
More t h an 300, 000 f i rst c l a s s l e t t e r s we re opene d , i nc luding
t he mail o f t he Federa t i on o f American Scient ists ,
John St e i nbeck, Se nators Kenne dy and Chur ch and numerous
Ame rican p e a c e gr oups such as the Amer i can Fri e n ds Service
coni t t e e and Women Strike f or Peace.
St a t e and l oc al l aws p r ohib i t burp, lary and Section 2236 o f
Titl e 18 ( 18 U.S .C . 2236) prohi b i t s searches wi thout
j udi ci al war r an t excep t i n c e r t a in very l i mi t e d cases .
Over a pcr i o d o f y ears , t he FBI a n d CI A c on du c t cd h undre ds
of br e ak- i n s or " b l a ck - b a g j ob s , " wi thout j u di c i al war rant ,
many of wh i ch we r e agains t American c i t i ze n s . I n s ome c a s es
were to install microphones , i n o ther c a s e s to
s t e a l s uch items , a s member shi p li sts .
Secti on 25 11 of Ti tle 18 ( U. S . C. 25 11) pr ohi bi ts ,
ge ne r a l ly, e lectronic survei l lance without j udi c i a l wa rrant .
Ove r many years , t h e National Security Agency int e r c ep t ed
mi l l ion s o f private messages tran s mitte d b y e lec t ron ic means
to or f rom the Un i t e d St a t e s . Under one pr op,r am, NSA obtaine d
es s e n t i a l l y a l l c abl e s to or f r om t h is count r y . Fr om t h e
early 1960 ' s t o 1973, NSA comp ile d a l i s t of i ndi v i du a l s
and or gan i z a t i on s , i n c l ud ing 1200 American ci t izens and
dome s t i c groups, whose c ommun i c a t i ons were intercepted ,
t r a ns c r i b e d an d fr e que nt l y disseminat ed t o other agen cies
for " i n t e l l i gen ce pu rposes . " " Th e Amer i cans on t h i s l i s t ,
many o f wh om were ac t i ve i n t he an t i -war and c i vi l ri gh t s
mov eme n t s , were p laced there by t h e FBI , CI A, Secret Se r v i c e ,
Def en s e De p a r t men t an d NSA i tself wi thou t prior judicial
wa r rant .. . . " The FBI carried out in t hi s count ry over a
pe r iod o f many years wa rrant les s e lectron i c surve i l lance of
nume r ous i ndi v i du a l s and domes t ic p,roups .
Se c t i on 1905 of Ti t le 18 ( IR U. S . C. 1905 ) makes it a cr i me
f or a government of f ici al to pe rmit any i n c ome t ax r e t urn
to b e s e e n by any person e xcep t as prov i de d by l aw. Until
1968 t h e FBI obtained tax r et urns f r om t h e I RS s u r r e p t i t i ous l y
wi t h out f i l i n g app lications with t h e I RS Di s c losure Bran ch
a s requ i r e d by regulat ions . After 1968, apparen t ly , t h e
FBI f ol l owe d t he required appl i cat ion proce dures b u t t h e CI A
Con t i nued t o r e c e i v e t ax re tur n inf ormation wi t h ou t
r eque s t s . Even a f t e r f or ma l reques t s were r e qu i r e d , the
I RS . wh ich is require d to r e lease t a x i n f ormat i on onl y when
ne c e ss ary , a ccepted t he Jus t i c e De partment ' s un docume n t e d
ass ert i on s t ha t t he requ es ted t ax i nforma t i on was ::,n e c e s s a r y ."
: ;.
423
422
Mos t FBI r e que s t s for t ax i n f ormat i on were "f or t ar p,e t s of
various COINTELPRO opera t i ons .
This is not mean t t o cons ti t ut e an exhaus t ive l i s t of the
poss i bl e violations of c r i mi na l law by f e de r al i n t e l l i genc e
ag enc ies . Various CIA of f i c i a l s may have vi ol at ed pr ovi s ions
of t he f edera l cr i mi nal code in view of the find i ngs of the
Chur ch Commi t t e e that Uni ted St a t e s of f ici a l s i n s t i ga t ed , aided ,
abetted or a cqui e s ced i n pl ot s to assassinate at l e a s t f i ve
f or e i gn l eader s . TI1e CIA an d i t s off icial s may a lso have
vi ol at e d s tat ut es proh ibi t i ng the des t r uc t i on of pub li c recor ds
( 18 U.S . C.S207 1) when t he y des t roye d fi l e s on drug tes t i ng
pr ogr ams , and Ri cha r d He lms , t he f or mer Di r e ct or of the CIA,
may have c ommi t t ed perjur y be f or e Cong r e s s i onal committ e e s
(18 U. S .ClOOl ) in t esti f yi ng abo ut t he CI A role i n Chi l e and
Water ga t e .
Unl i ke Wa t e r ga t e , however , none of the pr ose cutor i al i n-
ve s t igat i ons of t he s e activiti e s has been turned ove r t o a
spe ci a l pros e cu t or . Al l have been i nves t iga t e d by t he J us t i ce
Depa r tmen t . And f r o ~ this myr i ad of pr ogr ams i nvol vi ng i l l ega l
a ct i vi t y on the part of numbers of governmen t of f icial s , on l y
one indic tment has be en s oup,h t , a ri sing out of a New Yor k FBI
ag en t 's par t i ci pat ion i n il l e gal survei l l ance in the New York
4
are a in 1972 .
Clear l y t he se pr ogr ams s hou l d not have be en investi ga t e d
by t he J us tic e Department . This is no t meant to i mpune t he
i n t egr i t y of At torneys ' Gene r a l Richa r ds on , Levi , or Bel l , or
"
the i nve s t i ga t i ve s taf f of l awyer s a t the Jus ti ce Depar t ment .
per hapS none of the offi cial s invo lved in thes e many i lle ga l
act i vi t i e s shoul d have been pr os ecuted, e ither bec a us e of
l ack of suf fi ci ent evi de nce , s tat u tes of l i mi t at i on , good
f ai t h defens e s , or any number of r ea s ons . The poin t her e is
t ha t none of t he s e inve s tigat ions should ha ve be en condu c t e d
by the Jus t i ce Depar t ment b ecause of confli cts of i n t eres t t hat
made it i mpo ss i ble for the Dep artment t o c ond uc t a f ul l and
t hor ough i nve s t iga ti on 1'7i t hout t he ap pearanc e of "par t iali ty .
Ther e ar e at leas t f our grounds on whI ch a prosecu tor
shoul d di s qua l i f y hi m or her se l f t o avoid con f l i c t of int er e st
or the appe ar ance of bi a s . Three were manife st when the J us t i ce
Depa r t ment llil de r t ook to investiga t e inte l ligence agency abus es :
(1) no pr os e cut or should i nvestigate his s uperi ors ; ( 2) no pr o-
secut or s hould i nve st i gat e i f he may i n any way be impli cat ed
i n t he cr i me s under i nve s ti gation; ( 3) n o pros e cutor s ho uld
i nvesti gate per s ons wi th whom he has had a cl os e pers ona l or
wor ki ng r e l a t i ons hi p; an d (4) no pr os e cut or s houl d c arry out
an investi ga t i on whi ch c ou l d give the ap pe arance of p ar t i a li t y ,
conf l i ct or i mpr opr i e t y , As r equ i r ed by t he American Bar
As soci a t i on ' s St an dards Rel at i n g t o the Pros e cut i on Funct ion
and Defens e Funct i on, a pros ecut or s houl d " avoi d the ap pe ar ance
5
or r ea li t y of a conf lict wi th r e spe ct t o hi s off i cial du ties. "
I n its i nve s t igati on of int ell i gen ce ' agen cy ab us e s , t he
Depar t men t of J us t i ce had t o inve s ti gate itsel f and t op of f i c i al s
had t o l ook into po s s i bl e ill egal a c t i vi t y by per s on s .wi t h whom
~ ~
425 424
they had a clos e persona l an d worki ng relat i ons hip . For exampl e ,
the record shows that i n a great many cas es , offi cial s insi de
t he J us t i ce Depar t ment either ini t i a t ed , carr i ed out, or par ti-
cipated in pos s ib l e cr i mi nal conduct . The FBI was impl i cat ed
in COI NTELPRO, mai l openings, burgl ary, i llegal wi r e t apping ,
and the NSA i n tercept program. The FBI cont ribut ed an d r ecei ved
i nfor mat i on from t he CI A's CHAOS operation and ai ded the I RS
Spe ci a l Servi ce s pr oj ect . The re is evidence that offi ci a l s
hi gh in the Depar t ment' s chain of command had knowledge of at
l eas t some as pect s of COI NTELPRO , the Ki ng wiretap , and ot her
programs . Even though t he Attor ney General may have been di li-
gent, the conflict i ng loya lties wi t hi n the Depar t men t and be t ween
the Department and the FBI made i t di f f icult to believe that
inve stigations were t r u ~ or t hat Justice Depar t ment i nvol ve -
ment in t he a ct ivi t ies did not mi l i t a t e aga i nst prosecution.
The Jus tice Dep ar t ment l earned of COINTELPRO in 1971 but di d
not i nvesti gate the pr ogr am until 1974 . Even t hen t he Depar t ment
r elied on "surmnaries " pr epar ed by the FBI whi ch , as it turne d out ,
di d not disclos e t he true natur e or ex tent of illegal ac t i vi t i es .
Defen ding t he FBI in the Socialis t Wor ke r s Party lawsuit, t he
Department for a long time mai nt ai ned that t he FBI commi tted no
burglari es against the par t y , onl y t o be confront ed wi t h evi dence
that ithad . The Jus t i ce Dep artment s tated as part of i ts
rationale f or not prosecu t i ng off icials invol ved in mail - openi ng
the f a ct t hat t he Depar t ment ha d fai led to estab l ish adequa t e
6
guide lines on mai l s urvei l lance .
Si gn{f i cantly , t he J us t i ce Depar t ment had to invest i ga t e
its el f when it l ooked into progr ams conduct ed by othe r agencies.
The Dep ar t ment ' s I nt er di vi s i onal Int elli gence Uni t (I IlI U)
coll ect ed i nt el l i gence fr om t he Army and FBI 's ques t i onabl e
surveill ance act i vi ti es . The Bur e au was t he eh ief bene fici ary
of the CIA mai l-openi ng pr ogr.am and had knowl edge of its oner a -
tion . The FBI s upplied "wa t ch l i s t s " to t.lre NSA [or the cabl e-
int er cept pr ogram of tha t agen cy . The I RS col l ec t ed much o[
itS i nf or ma t i on on di s s i den t s fr om t he FBI and t he FBI us ed
in f or mat i on de veloped by the I RS fo r i t s i ntel l i genc e and
count erint el l i g.:mce oper at i ons . The J us t i ce Depa r t men t and
th e CI A a lso had a 21 year Agreeme nt under which the Depar t ment
del eg at ed to the CI A i t s s t a t ut or y dut y t o i nves t i ga t e and
det ermine whether or not to pr os ecu t e cr i mes on beh a l f of t he
Uni t ed Stat es when CI A personne l were i mpl i ca t e d i n il l egal
ac tivit y .
The J us t i ce Depar tment gave an appear an ce of par t i al i t y
by de fepding i nt elli gence agency offi ci als in a number of
civil s uits arising ou t of the mai l-opening , wiretappi ng ,
cabl e-intercept , and COI NTEL programs. In one example the
Depar t ment was de f en ding the CIA age nt s invol ved i n the mai l -
opening ,pr ogr am i n civil litigation before ithad compl et ed
i t s cr i minal inve st i gation of these s ame age nts. The Department
concluded t hat be cause of a " good- f aith" dc f ens e convi ct ions
7
were unl ikely and decided aga inst prose cution .
Even Att orneys General otherwise above reproach cO)..l ld not
.... 1,:":-'.
426 427
avoi d the ap pear ance of pa rt i al ity . At torney General Lev i ,
pub l i ca l l y commit ted t o r es toring morale i n t he Depar t ment of
J us t i ce , gave the appear ance of partiality ever y t i me t he
Depar t ment de cided no t t o prosecut e . The conf l i c ting deman ds
on t he At t or ney Gener al ha ve a lso s ur fa ced i n t he new Admini str a _
ti on . Gr i f f i n Bel l has been und er obvious pr es s ur e not t o
pr os ecute FBI agent s in the . i nteres t s of Depar t men t mor a l e .
Si n ce hi s aut hor i zat i on of t he indi ctmen t of an FBI s upe r vi s or
f or i l l egal wi r et appi ng and mai l - openi ng, he ha s been a t t a cked
by the FBI f or havi ng al l owed t he Bureau 's mor ale t o be l ower ed
and a ccus ed of "a vende t t a " be caus e the Dep ar t ment did not also
8
indict the CIA of fici a ls who engaged i n mai l -openi ng . He has
ye t t o r each a de ci s i on on t he perj ur y char ges agai ns t f ormer
CIA Di r ect or Richard Helms but i s under pr es s ur e not t o pr os e -
cut e from of fi cials who ar gue t hat the pr os e cuti on wi l l have to
9
di s cl os e "n at i ona l s ecur i t y" s ecrets.
Con f l ict , potenti al conf l i c t , and ap pear ance of par t i a l i t y
co ul d have been avoi ded if a s pe ci al pros ecut or had been
a ppoi nt e d t o inves t i gat e and pr osecut e viol a tions of l aw
comnutted by t he i nt e ll i gence communi t y . But no "tri gge r i ng"
mechani s m e xi s ted and t he di s cr e t i on t o es t abl i s h a special
pros ecut or of f i ce r emai ne d wi t h t he At t or ney General . The issue
i s whe t her Congr ess wi l l ena ct l egis l a t ion t ha t wi l l r equire a
spec i a l pros e cut or if i nt el l i gence agenci es en gage in fur t her
i l l ega l ac t i vi t ies .
ANALYSI S OF H.R . 2835
H. R. 2835 a t tempt s t o i ns ur e t he es tahlishment of a
speci. al pros e cut or in the event of ano t her "Wa t er ga t e . " It
r ecogni zes t ha t t he of f i ce of Att orney Gen er al is a " pol i t i ca l "
cnti t y-- - and not i ndependent of t he Pr es i dent , an d t ake s s teps
to insur e tha t a pr osecutor doe s not s t and i n t he pos i t i on of
pr os ecuting hi s s uper i or s . Antici pating another Wat er ga t e t ype
s i t va t i on , Sec t i on 591 r equi r e s the At t or ney Gener al to r eque st
a 3-Judr,e Spe ci al Cour t t o a ppoint a s pe cial pros ecu tor when
he or she has s ubs tan t i at ed "s peci f i c Lnforma t Lon" t ha t the
Pre s ident , Vi ce - Pr es i dent; members of t he Cabi ne t , of f i c i al s
jus t bcl ow Cab i ne t r ank , top Hhite Hous e empl oye es , or the
Presiden t' s campaign manager are involved i n vi ol a t i ons of
f eder al l aw. I t i s a 1.Jatcrga te Ref orm Bi ll.
However , H. R. 2835 does not adeq ua t e ly pr ovi de a mechani sm
t o trigger a s peci al prosecutor t o i nves t i ga t e i nt e l ligence
ae enc y abus es . Hhi l e i t r ec ogn i ze s t ha t a pr os ecutor shoul d
hot pros ecu t e hi s s uper i or s , i t doe s no t address t he confli ct
inherent in the int el ligence af-ency s i t uat i on of al l owing t he
Department of Justi ce t he di scret i on t o prosecut e i t s e lf , cl os e
wor king associate s, or per s ons un der ci r cums t ances tha t gi ve the
appearan ce of pa r t i al i t y . Und er th i s l egisl a tion , t he Depar t men t
of Justice would r e t ai n t he dis cre t i on t o any r epe t i t i on
cf mos t of the illegal pr ogr ams conduc t ed by the int el l i gence
t. :";,.-
428 429
agenc ies. Fr om our point of view, t h i s begs t he ques t i on and
shoul d be r ec tifi ed .
Li mita t i onA On Speci al Pr os ecut or Appoi n t men t Under n.R . 2835
As an int e lligen ce abuse r eform meas ure , s e c t i on 591 in-
c l udes on l y the At t or ney Gen era l , the Director of t he FBI , and
the Di r ec t or of Ccn t raL Int elli gence Hi t hin the se l ec t group of
top of f ici al s whose illega l activiti es r equire t he At torne y Gene r al
t o " tri gge r " a spe ci a l pros ecut or. Thi s i s f ar from resp ons i ve
t o t he probl ems pr es en t ed by i llega l i nt el l i genc e a ct i vity .
First, t he prob l em of the At t or ne y Gener al . Under n . R. 2835 ,
i f t he At t orney Gen eral ini ti ates an il legal int elli.gence agency
pr ogr am (or a Ha t er ga t e - type bur glar y f or t ha t ma t t er ) , he may
be s ubjec t to s pe cial prosecut or inve s tiga tion. Howeve r , the
At t or ney Gener al is a l l owed t o conduct t he prel i mi nary i nq uir y
to es tab l i sh whe ther " speci f ic Lnf or mat Lon " of crri.mc i s subs t an t -
i at ed. In ot her wor ds , t he At t or ney Gene raL i.nves t Lga t es hi ms e l f.
If he concl udes t hat the charge s are un substantiated , he r ep or t s
the r es ul t s of hi s i nves ti ga t i on t o a 3-Judge Court , but is per-
mi tted to do so in "s ummary" f'or m. The Cour t mus t accep t t he
deci sion of t he At t or ney Gene rc. l an d can not appoLn t a s pe ci al
prosecut or over the At t orney General 's obj e ct ion. Al l i t can do
i s release the " s unnna r y" to t he public .
If his t or y is an y gui de thi s i s whol l y i nadequate . I magi ne
the "summary" tha t Attorney General Mitchell woul d have t urne d
over r egardi ng the "Li ddy Plan" or t he "na t i onal s e curity"
. etap progr am. Does the re lease of a s ummar v by t he 3-Judge
.
court advance us beyond whe re we ar e t cd e.y or for t ha t ma t t er
we were during the Wat ergate ye ar s? Attorney General
and then Deput y At t or ney General Richar d Kl ei ndi ens t
offered such "summar i es" to t he Congre s s . Even t ua l l y Congr ess
had to investigat e the char ges on i t s own and force t he app oi n t -
ment of a speci al pr os ecutor .
Under Section 595 (e) of thi s Act, t he Cong ress i s al l owed
a political r ecours e:
"A majori t y of maj or i t y party member s or a maj ori t y of all
non-major i t y member s of a judi ci ar y commi t t ee of ei t he r
House of t he Congres s may r eq ues t i n wr i t i ng that t he
At t or ney Gener a l app ly f or t he ap pointment of a speci al
pros ecutor und er t h i s chapt er . "
If the Attorney Gen eral does not ac t , he has to e xp lain why in,
writ i ng and the Congress c an rel e as e his expl anat i on . We< unde r-
stand the purpose of this provision . but how does it di f f er fr om
what the Congress did during Hat erge.te or can do t oday? In 'f ac t
the Congress may be abl e t o obt ain mor e jnforma t ion under i t s
present subpoen a power . If t his l e gis l a t ion i s goi n g t o work a t
all, the Attorney General should not be allowe d t o inves tigate
himsel f or control d e npp oi.n nmen t of a speci al pr os ecut or when
he is implicated in i llega l activi t y. Whe re the Attorne y General
is concerned, the appoi.ntment of a s peci al pr os e cutor shoul d be
"automatic. "
Second, the probl em of the Director of the FBI and the
of Central Intell i gence. By ad di ng the s e offici. al s to
... .... :,:}:
38-0 28 0 _ 79 _ 28
431
430
t he l i s t of pe r s ons r equi r ing t he At t or ney Cen er a l t o " t r i gger "
a special pros ecu tor , t h l e" i sl a t i or. ee ges bu t does not u a c k n o v ..
s ol ve t he pr obl em of i nt e l l i gence agen cy abuse. A s pec ial pr o-
secut or wi l l se l dom be t r i gge r e d , not be ca us e t he s e direct or s
wi 11 al ways be ab ove r epr oa ch , but Lccaus e they have a t al en t
for co ns t r uc t i ng "pl a us ab l e denial" [ or t hei r i nvol vemen t i n
dub i ous ac t i v i t i es . In on l y r ar e i ns t ances hAS Rnv
conduct ed i n t o the a c t i vi ties of t he i n t el l i gence aeencies
naile d down pre ci s ely whe ther or not "or der s" wer c given a t t he
top . 1105 t i n t e11i gence agency inves t i ga t i ons have to proc eed
from t he bottom- up t o uneove r pos s i bl e direc t or i nvol vemen t .
As a cons equ ence t h i s l e&i sla t i on woul d l eave mos t int e l l i gence
agency i nves t i ga t i ons r i p,h t where t hey are today, i n t he J us t i ce
Departmen t, whi ch a s we have shown , of t en i nve s ti ga tes i t s el f in
t hes e ma t t e r s .
Thi rd , t he probl em of i n t el l i gence aeency of fic i al s be l ow
the r ank of Di r ec t or . Under t hi s l egi s l a t i on, the s ta t us qu o
i s maint a ined. I t i s a l mos t whol ly to t he Attor ney Gener al
whe t he r the kinds of "pr ogr ammat ic" 'abus e s' commi .t t cdt by agenc y
offi ci als are inves t i ga t e d by a s peci a l pr osecutor . For exampl e ,
i f the Di r e ct or of the FBI i s i nv ol ved , t he Attor ney Gene r al
could but does not ha ve to "expand t he prosecutor ial j ur i s di c t i on
of a s pec i al pr os ecu t or" and r e f er " r el a t ed ma tt e r s " to him
und e r sect ion 592 (f) and 593 ( c). Of cou r s e , the s ol ut i on i s
t o r equi r e t he At t or ney Gener al t o r e f er r e lat e d mat t ers .
Withou t such a requi remen t , the only wa y to mand ate a
C
i al pros ecut or f or t he int e l l i gence agencies und er t hi s Bi l l
spe
is cont ai ned in s ec t i on 592 ( 2). The At t or ney Gener a l is requi r ed
in any cr i mi nal inves t i ga t i on to r eques t t he ap pointment of a
speci al pr os e cut or i f the inves t i ga ti on or pr osecution
may s o dir e ctl y an d s ubs t anti al ly a ff ec t t he p, ol i ti ca l or
pers ona l i nt er es t s of t he Pres iden t or the At torney Gen e r a l
or the of t he Pr esiden t ' s pol i t i cal as t o
make i t inappr opri a t e i n t he i nteres t of t he admini s t r ati on
of j us t ice f or t he Depar t men t of Jus t i ce to conduc t s uch
investi ga t i on .
Al though t he s e ct i on a t tempt s to r e s t ri c t t he di scr etion of
the At t orney Gener a l , and mi ght ap pl y t o i n t e l l i gence agency
abus es although i ntended to cover a Iva tergate a f f air , it i s s o
stri ct a stan dar d as to be almos t meaning les s . The s t anda r d
suggests t ha t "impea chment " i s immi nent . Moreover, we can f i nd
no mechani sm f or enfor ci ng the ob l i ga t ion i n thes e circums t ance s .
If i mpea chmen t i s not i mmi nent or i f r ela t ed matt er s a re
not r eferred or t here i s no direct evi dence of i nvolve -
ment, the J us t i ce Dep artmen t may r etain j ur i s di c t i on over t he
investi ga tion and pros e cut i on of i nt e l l i gence agen cy official s
bel ow the r ank o[ Di r e c tor . Unde r H. R. 2835 as dra fted , t he
Jus t i ce Departmen t could con t i nu e to inves t i ga te i t self . It
would have pr os e cut or i al j ur i s dict i on over t op Depar t ment
offi cials and t op FBI offi ci als who mi gh t have par t i ci pa t ed i n
intell i ge nce ag ency abuses for the Depa r t men t, or al t er na t e l y ,
who are pe rsons wi t h whom the pros e cu t or s ha ve had a close wor k-
ing relations hip. I f H. R. 2835 was s t atut or y l aw i n 1974 , the
or ..' ,'-:.,'
433 432
Depar tme nt cou ld have invest iga ted COI NTELPRO, t he " bl a ck - ba g"
bur gl a r y pr ogr am, and the ma i l - opening pr ogr am without appoin t _
i ng a speci2l pr os e cut or .
We do not be l i eve section 528 provi de s an answer to t hi s
problem. Under it , t he Congre s s de f er s to t he At t orney Gener al
to pr omul ga t e r ul e s r e s pec t i ng pr os ecut or i a l di s qua l i f ica t i on
f or t he Dep a r t ment. \Vh i l e the Depar t ment s houl d do s o, the
Congr e s s shoul d est ablish s tatut ory gui dclines i n cl ear - cut
ca s c s . We believe t he Congr e s s has the informat ion an d t he
capa c i t y t o r c sol ve the int e l l i gence agency pr obl em now, and
shoul d not defer t o the Departmcnt on a !!lat ter whi ch it ha s t o
dat e be en un abl e t o r e s ol ve vo lunt a ri ly t o any one' s s at isf ac t i on .
To r ect i f y t he s i t ua t i on , we r ecommend t he amendmen t of
s e c tion 591 t o i nc lude 'Ni t hi n t he c a t egor y of per sons whose
cr i nli na l a ct i vity r eq ui r e s t he appoi n tme nt of a sp ec ial pr o-
secutor " any f eder a l of fi cia l s upe r vi s i ng a c landest i ne i n-
t e l l i gcnce c r co unt er int e l l igence ac t i vity of gov er nment . "
Sec t i on 593 ( 3) car ve s out t he \Vh i te Hou s e per s onne l for par t i-
cul ar at t ent i on . He bcl i eve ther e i s compe l ling rea son to
r ec ogn i z e t ha t the offi c i a ls of U.S . i nt elligenc e ag enc ies
a l s o mer i t s pe ci a l at ten t i on in the int er e st of r estoring and
i nsur i ng i nve s t i ga t ion and pros e cution of offi cial mi s cond uc t .
Pr obl ems With t he At t or ney Gen eral "Tr i gge r "
The power of the At t or ney Gene r al to invoke the s pe ci a l
pr os e cut or mechan i sm i s a l most tot a l . If .he r e c ommen ds against
z:
app ointmen t af ter conduc ting a prelimi nar y inves t i gation
the
substantiat e that a vi olat ion of law may have oc cur r ed , h is
to
her de c i sion i s fina l . The cour t mus t a ccept hi s " summa r y"
or
conclus i on s and the Congr e s s can on l y a s k him t o s how caus e
" hY a pros e cut or s hou l d not be app oint e d . \'le thi nk that wi t h-
out i mpai r i ng his di scret ion , certai n changes shoul d be made t o
i nsure that the At t orney Gener a l ' s i nve s t i ga tion s ar e co nduc ted
in a re s pon s i bl e manne r .
Fi r s t , we have alrea dy mentione d our concern t ha t the
At tor ney Gener a l. ha s f ina l s ay over an inves t igation where he
may be i mpl i ca t e d i n ill ega l c onduc t . He r e corrm.end " automa tic"
appoi ntment of a s pecial pros ecutor t o i nve s t i ga t e the a l l ega -
tions. If the s peci a l pr osecutor finds t he charges without
merit aft er conduct i ng a " pr e l i mi nar y i nve s t i ga t i on" [ or s i xt y
days, he s houl d , at t he request of the Attorne y Genera l , make
the findi ngs pub lie .
Se cond , we do not believe the At t or ney Gener a l should be
abl e t o " s ummar i ze " an y i nves t igat i on to a Spe c i al Court , The
Specia l Court should have ac ce s s to t he total i nve s t i ga t ive
file. Thi s i ns ur e s a che ck on the Department o f J us t i c e. If
the Cour t disa grees wi t h t he Attorney General ' s de c i s i on not
to pros ecu t e , i t may at l east r eleas e more than a summar y t o
the pub li c. Of cour s e, t hi s pre s ume s a r e s pon s ibl e Cour t, and
we recogni z e t he pr ob l em. We s ee no o ther way, howe ver , to
have meaningful over s i ght over the At t or ney Gener a l in matter s
-r .... r , ~ :
435
434
where conf l i ct may be i nvolved . I t i s important t ha t an
i nve s t i ga t i on by t he Attorney General i s " t hor ough."
Ot her Pr obl ems
We have a [ew other qu estions about the Bi l l a s dr a f t ed.
For ex ampl e , at what point docs a s pe ci al pr os ccut or m'mounce
publ i ca l1y his " j ur LsdLcr Lc.n" ? This i s not sp ecified in
section 593 . lJe thi nk it should he at the po int t he pros ecut or
t o scck en indictmen t . Sec r ecy i s essential to pr ot ec t
the Lnuoc cn t per non during an Lnve s t Lga t Lon . But t he j ur i a -
di c t i on must be announc ed a t some point to avoi d a star chamber
pr oceed:'ng .
Under sect ion 593 (b), i t s tates t ha t t he Cour t shal l
"def ine .. . ( t he ) special pros ccut or ' s pr os ecut or i al j ur i s di c t i on ."
Can the Cour t de f ine i t beyond t he a l legat ions of i l l ega l con-
duc t present ed to i t by t he Attor ney Gener al ?
Then, un der s ect i on 594 (d) , it i s not clea r f r om the
dr af t i ng that t he Depa r tmen t of J us t i ce mus t supply the kinds
of i nf or mat i on lis t ed tha t the specia l pr os ecutor may r eques t .
Of cours e , t he Depar t ment should .
SUMMARY AND RECO}lliENDATI ONS
We appl aud t he e f f or ts of t he Congr es s to transla t e t he
l e s s ons of Ha ter :;ate i nt o Lav , He are hopeful t ha t the Con[',r es s
wi l l shar e our per cep t i on t ha t int elli gence agency abuses were
of Wa tergat e and f ar more dan ger ous , because con-
llll
ed in secre t and beyond accountabi l i t y of any kind. A
t
dll
C
eci
al
pros ec utor mechanism for t he i n t el l igence agenc i es i s
sp
ncccs s ar y, bot h to i nsur e t hat j us tice i s done in t he fut ur e ,
all to act as a det err en t to i l l egal i n t e l ligence agency
d
activi t y . We can pas s l aws t o cont r ol thc agenci e s but unl esf.
agency offi ci al s und er s t and t ha t next time they wi l l be pr o-
secut ed [or vi ol at i ng t he l aws , t hos e l aws wi l l be wor t hles s
and our democ r acy i mper i l ed . A s pe ci a l pros ecut or i s s uch a
me ssage , an d H. R. 2835 shoul d be amen ded as f ol l ows :
(1) Section 591 shoul d be amen ded t o i ncl ude " any feder al
of f i ci al su per vi sing a c land es t i ne i n t e l l i gence or coun t er -
int e l l i gence act i vit y of gover nment " ;
( 2) Sec t ion 592 be amend ed to prov i de tha t i f
" sp eci f i c inf ormation" invol ves pos s ible v i ol at i on of l aw
i nvolving " abus e" of the of f i ce of At tor ney Genera l, a
s pe ci al pr osecut or shoul d be appoi n t ed to conduc t the pr e -
l i mi nar y i nves t i ga t i on an d make t he de termi na t i on if f ur t her
i nve s t i ga t i on or pros e cut i on i s war r an ted ;
(3) Section 592 (b)( 2) shoul d be amen ded t o pr ovi de t hat
notifi cat i on shal l con t a i n t he i nf or ma tion r ecei ved and the
r esul t s of any pr el i mi nary i nves t i ga tion ;
(4) Sect ion 592 (f) shoul d be amende d t o s tate t ha t "The
At t or ney General shal l a sk a sp e ci a l pr os ecutor t o accept
ref er r al of a mat t er that rel a t es t o a ma tter withi n t hat
sp eci a l pr os ecutor's pr os ecu t or i al j ur i s di c t i on. "

437
436
FOOTNOTES
...1./
Wat ergat e Sp ecial Pros ecution Fo rce , (Oc t ob e r ,
197
5)
...1:./
See Repc;>rt to the Pr e sident Qy the Commi-,,-ssi on on
IITtnIn the Final
Repor t o f t l1'C""seTe'CtCommi t t e e t o St udy Govcrnmen 6 i1- -
2..r a tionsW I th Respe ct t "D".lnreITi gc nc e
Unite d St a tCS-Sena t c ,-g4tn Cong . , 2nd .
...1./
Much of th i s J.egal ana ly sis is excerpted from a Re port
by the Cotnmi t.t e e on Ci v i l Ri ght s of t h c Associati on o f
the Bar of the City of York , J n t ell iAen c e AgC'n.9:
Ah... The !iced i!Tempo!",,y SJ?CiCTiil uPro sC' cutor .
1197l)) . """"TTh e was dr a t ed in s lIb f: t antiaIj)art
by J erry J. ne rman a t the Cent e r f or National Securi t y
Studie s and Ray Ca Lamaro, now Deputy Assist ant Attorney
Gen eral for Le gi s lat ion in the Department of Jus ti c e .
....!!../
J us t i c e Depa r t men t Pr e s s Re l e a s e , Apri l 7, 1977 .
....2/
New York City Bar Repor t , c it. p . 2.
...2. /
Report o f the Department of J ustice Concerning
Investieation !!nd Prosecutor ial pecisions Witl! !, e spect
to Cen tral Int eITigen.ce Agency Hai l Activit ies
in t h e Un i t e d Stntes (January ). .
..2/
I b id .
..:E./
Gos hko, Joh n , M., High FBI Official Cl a i ms ' Ven de t t a '
on Burglar ies, Washington Post , Apri l 13 , 19 77 (A... 2) .
-!!../
New Yor k Ti me s , Feb ruary 15 , 19 77, p . 15 .
I

"
STATEMENT OF MELVIN L.
LEGAL DIRECTOR
CIVIL LIBERTIES mUON
ON
S . '1 , AS
. A BILL TO CODI FY, REVISE, AND REFORM
THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
MARCH, 1975
-r" 0,::;;:'
OF COUNSEL:
Mary Ellen Gale
438 I 439
HIGHLI GHTS OF lI CLU' s PROPOSED CIIlINGES I N S. l li S lI MENDED TlI BLE OF
- - A BI LL TO CODI FY Tlffi FEDERAL CRI MINAL LAW
INT RODUCTI ON . .. . ... .... . .. . . .....Page 1
1. OFFENSES I NVOLVI NG NATI ONllL SECURI TY 2
1. Off e ns e s Involving Na tiona l s e curi ty
A. The Official Se c r e t s Ac t .. 2
A. The Offi cial Se c r e t s Ac t , 11 21- 1 125 : Su bs t i t ut e
ACLU propo sed e s p i o nage s t a t ut e s e t o ut at P. 18
1. Espionage , . . 6
Requi r e t hat, whe rever the word " war " is empl oy e d,
o f s ta tement . Dr o p 1122- 1125 in t he i r e nti re t v .
2 . Disclosing natio na l de f e ns e informa tion l O
3 . nat i ona l defens e inf orma t ion 12
i t b e d efined t o me a n a wa r de c lared by Co ngress
4 . Di sclos i ng c l a ssifi ed i nfo rmation 13
un de r Ar t . I, Se c . 8 o f the Con s t i t ut i o n .
5 . Un l awf ul ly obt a i n ing c l a s s i f i e d
i nfoonation .. , . . . . . 17
B. Other Of f e n ses Against t he Na t i on
6 . Defini tions 17
7 . ACLU Propos e d Statut e o n Es p i onag e 18
1. Th e Smi th Act , 1103 . Drop itentirely .
8 . Ot her sections o f S .1 20
2 . Sa bo tage, 1111-1112 . Dr op 1112, na rr ow ll i l .
B. Ot h e r Offe n ses Aga i ns t the Na t ion . 22
3. Impairing Military Effe ctive ness by False
Sta t e me nt, 1 11 4 . Dr op itent i rel y .
1 ; Tre a s on .. . 22
2 . I nci t ing ov erthrow o r de s t ruct ion of t h e
g overnment . . 24
2. Of fens e s Aga i ns t Public Order
3 . Sabotage . . . 26
4 . I mpairing mi l i tary e f f e c t i ve ne s s by
A. Inc iting or leading a Riot , 18 3l-l8 34 . Drop
fal se sta t ement 28
s ub s e c t i on s (c) (3) (4). a nd ( 5) from 183l.
II. OFFENSES AGAI NST PUBLIC ORDER 29
B. Di s o r d e r l y Conduct , 1861 . At t he v ery l e a s t , d rop
s ub s e c t i on s ( 2 ) , ( 3) , ( 5), ( 6) and ( 7). Recons i de r
A. Riot i ng 29
s ub s e c t i o ns (1 ) and (4 ) .
1. Inc i t i ng o r lea d i ng a r i ot . 32
C. Drugs , 18 13 . Decr i mi nali z e us e of po s s e s sion o f
2 . Di s o r de r l y oonduc t . 34
rnar i j uana ,
B. Dr ug s ; 36
drop p i ng 1842 in i t s ent ire t y .
D. Obs c e nity , 184 2 . De c r i minalize pornography by
C. Obs c e n i t y : . 38
3 . Of f e ns e s Ag a i ns t Gov e r nme n t Proce sses
III. OFFENSES AGAINST GOVERNMENT PROCESSES . . 4 1
A. Criminal c on t empt , 133l .
Maxi mum pena l t y should b e 5 d a y s i mpr isonment a nd a
A. Obstructing a Gove r nme n t F unctio n 42
$5 0 0 fi ne .
B. Demons t r a t i ng to I n f l ue n ce a Jud i c i a l
Pro c eeding . , 4 3
B. Refusing t o testi f y , 133 3 .
Al l i mmun i t y s ta t ute s s ho ul d b e a b o l i s he d .
\ C. Crimina l Contcmpt . 43
4 . Wi r e t a p p ing a nd Electroni c S urvei l l a nc e
. 31 0l - 3 109 . Abo l i s h a l l e lectr o nic eavesd rop ping a nd
D. Re fus ing t o Te s t ify ;r ,;,45'
wir etap pi ng.
IV. DEFENSES. . . .. . . : . . . . 47
A.
En tra pme nt 47
B. Pub l i c Dut y . . . . 4 9
V.
WIRETAPPI NG AND ELECTRONI C SURVEI LLANCE 51
VI.
SENTENCI NG, PROBATI ON, AND PAROLE 58
440
Int r od uc tion
The ACLU i s a na t i o nwi de , noo-, urt i s a n o r gani za t i o n
o f 275 , 000 memb e r s d ed i ca t e d t o t h e preser va t ion a nd
promot i on of i nd i vi d ual r ight s a nd lib ertie s g ua r a n teed
b y t he Const i t ut ion of the Unite d s t a t e s . one of t he
ACLU' s p rimary mi s s i ons i s t o e nc o urage l egi sla t i ve
a dva n c eme nt of c i v i l l i b ertie s and to oppose l eg i s l a t i ve
encr oa c hme nt on the m.
Th e ACLU s uppo r t s r e v i s ion and reform of t he f ede r a l
I
c r i mi nal l a ws . Th e over- all g oa l o f mak i ng t he fede ral
c rimina l l a w mor e r a t i o nal a nd mor e pre dicta b l e is a
s a l utary one . Clear, c oher e n t , a nd uniform l a ws s e rve
the p ublic by mak i ng itplain wha t cond uct is lawful a nd
wha t is f o r b i dde n. They g i ve f a i r not i c e t o cit i z e ns
a nd l a w enfo rceme nt o ffic ia l s a like , thereby . res t r i c t i ng
the pos s i bili t i e s of arbi trary p un ishme n t . Howe v e r,
obtain ing c l e ar and c ohe rent l a ws a t the e xpens e of t he
r i ghts a n d l i b e r t i e s of o ur people wo uld b e a ste p back -
ward.
I n t he pages tha t f ollow, we e xp res s our s t r o ng
" ' f ' " 1 d d ../ opp os 1t 10 n to s ome s peC1 1C prov1s10ns of S. , a s a men e .
In pa r t i c ul ar, we foc us on the b ill' s nationa l sec urity
prov i s ions whi c h we bel ieve are espec i a l l y dang e r ous
FirstAme ndme nt f r e e doms . I n some cases , s uch a s
-I Al l r efe rence to S. l i n t he s uc c e e d i n g pages a r e t o
S . l , a s ame nded, t h e ve rs i on o f t he b i l l now b e f o r e the
Se na t e J ud i c i ary Commi t t e e .
- 1-
441
. r t s o f t h e natio na l s e c ur ity sec t ion a nd a l l o f
the ob s ceni t y s e ctions, we ur g e that pr ov i s i ons b e
e l i mi nate d a l t og e t he r . I n others , we s ugge s t
rev i sions or expres s concer ns whi ch s houl d gui d e t h os e
who may draft r e vi s ed s ect ions.
Re form of t he federal cri mi nal l a ws is a n
importan t unde rtak i ng . I t mustb e done with de ep
conc ern Eo r the c ivil r ights a nd lib ert i e s o f t h e
indi vidua l citize ns.
I. Off ens e s I nvol ving Na t i ona l s e curi t y
A. Th e " Official Secrets" Act
Five s e c t ions of S .l, woul d r e v e r s e 200 yea r s o f
democra tic de cis i on- making unde r t h e Consti t ut i o n by
pre ferring g ove r nme nt sec recy to the fr e e doms g ua r a n te e d
by t h e Fi rstAmen dme n t . Se ctio n s 1121- 25 of S . l wo u l d
del i ver into t he hands of the Ex e cut i ve comp l e t e and
fina l c ontrol of inf o rma t ion "re lat ing t o t h e nat i ona l
defense." The free flow o f f ac ts a nd op in ions o n which
self-government ultimately d e p e nds wo ul d b e da mme d a t
its s ource. Our true na t i o nal s e curity, which s p r i ng s
from "un i nhibi ted, r ob ust, a nd wi de - op e n '" deba t e on
publ i c i s s ues and p ub l i c o f f i c ial s, New York Ti me s Co .
v. Sull ivan; 376 U. S . 254 , 270 (1 964), would be de s t r ox c,d .
-r" 1( .' ;'
When Congres s f i r s t de ba ted t he Espiona ge Ac t o f
1917, t wo Sena t o r s marked o ff for f ut ure gene ra t ions
the para meters o f de ba t e ov e r the protect ion of nat ional
secur i t y ,
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442
443
Se na t o r Ne lson : " ( I'1hi l e ] t here are some cxpr os si onc
p e r ha p s in the bi l l t ha t m"y "ee lll u
l i ttl e t o o drastic , yet I ho ld t ha t,
when the sa fety o f t he co un t r y is a t
s take t he r ight s of the ind i v i d uu l
must b e s ubroga ted t o t h e g r e a t r i g ht
o f ma i n t aining t he i n t e g rity and
we l f u r e o f t he Na t i on . "
Se na t o r Cununins : "The Se na t o r f rom Mi nne s o t a seems t o
t hink thi s i s nece s s a r y for t he
sa f e t y o f the u n i t e d Sta tes. I do
not; no r do I t h i nk we hav e a Na t i o n
worth s avi ng i f t his is ne c e s sary.
If t he powe r t hat i s he r o ;' o ugh t to
be g i ve n to t he Exe c ut Lvr " ()up l e d
with t hese o f f e ns e s t ha t for t h e
firs t time de s c r i b e d i n ; :.i c a n l i f e ,
a r e ne c ess ary, I doub t the
Na t i on c o uld be pr e serve d . "
54 Cong o Re c ord 34 88 (1 97 1) .
We s ubmi t t hat Sena tor Cummi n s had the be s t o f t hat
e xcha nge and tha t - - so l ong as we r ema in a fre e, out -
s pok en, and demo crat i c s o c i e t y - - h e wi l l a l ways ha v e
t h e b e s t of i t .
Our oppo s i t ion t o t h e i nf ormat i on con t r o l prov i s i ons
of S .lb egins wi t h t he s p irit which p erme a t e s t he m
Exe c ut i ve d i s t r us t of t he Ame r i c a n peop l e a nd t he
Ameri c an p r e s s . Nee d l e s s t o s a y , it i s ironic t hat
l e g i s l a t i on o f thi s k ind shoul d b e prop os e d s o soon a f t er
t h e f a l l of t he Ni x on r e g i me . Tha t a dminis t rat i on's
obs e s s i on wi t h s ecrecy , i t s dis t rust o f t he Amer i c an
p e op l e , and its animus t owards t he p res s s ho ul d s urely
ta ug h t u!:: t h e l e sson o f t h e need for more no t less
op e n ne s s i n g ov e r nme n t , a nd mo r e not l e s s t r us t o f the
peopl e a nd the p res s . But Se c t i o ns 1 121- 1125 o f S. l ,
as .amended , a re wr itt en as i f 'wa t e r ga t e a nd i t s f al lout
n eve r ha ppened . A mome n t ' s t hought mus t l e a d t o the
obvio us c onc l usion t ha t the s e p rov is i o ns mus t b e
thoug ht ob j e c t iona bl e i n p rinc i p l e anu p r u c t ice,
and we urg e t he Cong r e s s to r e j e c t the m and t h us
refus e to e l e vat e o ff i cia l s e c recy t o t he s tat us o f
la w.
s e c on d l y , we bel i e ve tha t the ove r - a l l t h r us t
o f the se s t atut e s is profound l y un cons t ituti ona l .
Th ey s tri ke a t t he hea r t of f ree speec h and due p r o-
cess of l a w. Th e y s we e p wi thi n t hei r p r oh i b itio ns
t h e col l ection , communication, o r p ub l i ca t i on of i n-
f ormat i on r e l a t i ng t o t he na tio nal de fens e r ega r d l e s s
o f i ts o rigin . Th e y s e t no s tandard where by the
cons c i e nt i o us c i t i z e n , p ublic offic ia l , o r ne ws r e-
porter may det e rmine whe t h e r t he i nformati on he
po s s e s s es, ga t h ers , o r sha r e s with o t he r s i s cons t i t u-
tionally p rote cte d or the sub ject o f cri mi na l s a nc-
t i o ns . They us e t e rms so broad a nd va g ue as . t o force
men and wome n of good will to guess a t the me a n i ng of
the l a w - - a nd act a t t h eir peri l. The y e nc o ur a ge
off i c ial a b us e by i nv i t i ng sel ecti v e pros e cution a nd
' a d j ud i c a t i on on p oliti ca l o r pe r s onal grounds . Co up l e d
wi th t he capi t a l puni s hment p rovis i ons . of 5 . 1 , passed
e arl i e r t h i s yea r , t h ey might even p r ov ide a mandatory
death pena l t y f or indi v i d uals wh o sough t only t o inform
t he i r fe l l ow c i t i z en s o n the g r e a t pub lic
time.
Th r oughout this chapter, the commi s s i o n of a crimi na l
a c t i s mad e d e pend e n t upon i t s ' b eing c ommit t e d in "ti me
- 4-
444
o f war," or the puni slunent is enhanced if the crime is
committe d i n " t i me o f war . " Sahotage a s a Cl a s s A
f e l o ny c an be commi tte d o nl y "in t i me of ,wa r " ( l l Ol ) :
one c an i mpa i r mi l i t a r y effectivene ss by fals e sta t e -
ments on l y "in t i me of wa r " ( 11 1 2 ) : wh e ther o r not
espi o na ge i s conuni tted "i n t i me of war , 1I determines
. whethe r t he c r i me i s a Cl a s s A o r B f e lony ( 1121 ) .
Whene ver an offense t urns on whether the United
St a t e s i s at war, 5. 1 sho ul d r e q uire t ha t the wa r is .
one de c l a r e d by Cong ress und e r Art . I , Se c . 8 o f the
Constit ut i o n .
Al l of t h e o ffe ns e s wh i c h, r e q uire o ur be i ng a t war
a re not onl y trad itiona l ly t ho ugh t to b e ser ious i n de e d ,
but some of them i ne v i tabl y i mp l i ca t e q ue s t ions of
f r e e dom o f spe e ch. And i f t he FirstAmen dment is t o b e
so ser i ous l y i mpa ire d unde r any of t h e s e provisions,
' t hos e drastic res t r i c t i o ns up on f undamenta l f reedoms
shou ld be permi t ted; i f at a l l , on l y a f t er a de l i b e r a t e
a nd explici t declara t ion o f war by Co ng r e ss, a s r e q ui r e d
by Article I , Sec. 8 o f the Con sti t ut i o n . The nation
sho uld be insured that i mposit ion o f t h e severe penalti e s
provide d in these sections , t oge t he r wi t h t heir intrusions
i n t o t he Fi rs t Amendment, not b e left t o t h e sol e
determination o f the Ex ecutive Branch o f g overnme nt.
I t would be a s ubstant ia l ret rogress ive s t e p to
p r ov i d e tha t any "wa r," whet her or no t it is de c l a r e d by
Congre ss, may t r i g ger prosecut ions and a ffec t sentences
under various s ections of Chapter 11 . Jud i c i a l and
. -5-
445
s chol a rly opinion i z d e e p l y d i v ide d on t he que stion
of the legali ty o f t h e Vietna m li a r and s imila r
que z t i o ns were a p propr i a t ely r a i s e d by the e nga g e me n t
o f o ur troop s i n the Domini c a n Republ ic in 1965 . Th e
f ormulati on of "de clared ' wa r " rnakos explicit wha t i s
r e q u i r e d prio r t o the appl i ca t ion o f t he s e pena l sanc-
tions, partic ularly sinc e man y o f t he m curtai l f unda-
menta l f r e e doms normally protected by the Fi rs t Ame nd-
ment.
1. Se ctio n 11 21. Es pionage .
The Amer ican Civ ilLi b e r t i e s Uni on recognize s
tha t gen ui ne esp i onage i s a s e r i o us o f fens e aga i ns t
the na t ion , r equiring cri mi na l s anc tions a nd pun ishment .
Be c a us e i t is s ubject t o serious abuse in t i me s o f
nat i onal crisis , i t mus t b e c l o s e l y and c a r eful ly J e f i ne d .
2 Gorin v . un ite d St a t e s , 312 U. S . 19 ( 194 1 ) . Instead,
Se c t ion 11 21 b r o adly c r imi nal i zes the knowi ng c ol lect i o n
or c ommuni c a t i o n o f "natio na l defens e i nf o rma t i o n, " wi th
the "knowledge that itmay b e us e d, to t he p rej ud ice of
the sa fety o r i ntere st o f t h e uni t ed States , or t o the
a dvant age of a f o reign power
By e l imina t ing speci fi c inte nt 'as a n e l e ment of the
cri me o f espionage , 5. 1 inv ite s who lesa l e abus e of the
Firs t Amendme nt b y a l lowi ng pros e cution a nd o r ~ ~
of indivi duals whose purpos e i n s pe ak i ng o f so- c a l led
"na t ional de f ense i nfo rma t i o n" i s t o inform the Americ an
people of gove r nme nt a l a ctiv i tie s which t h e p ub l i c ha s a
right t o know, a nd wh i ch they sho uld know; in o rder t o
-6-
446
pa s s j udg1nc nt o n t ho s e a c t i v i t i e s . Without i n t ent t o
inj ur e , the c o nd uc t i ntcnde d t o be p rohi b i t e d by a va l i d
e spi onagc sta tut e c a n no t us e f ul l y be r e g ula t e d f o r t he
r esul t is t o seri o us l y inva d e r i gh t s prote cted by t h e
First Amendme nt .
I n a ddi t i on , the terms us e d i n Se c . 11 21 t o d efi ne
t h e cri me are fraught wi t h confusion . Wha t is "national
d e f e nSe! info rma t ion" ? Or, more to t he point, under
1 128 (g ) , wha t i s " nat i onal de f e ns e i n f o rma t i o n" ?
Th e Sup r eme Cour t held .i.n Gorin . s up r a , 312 U. S. at 31- 32,
tha t und e r a s tat ut e l isting spe c i f i c pla c e s and t h i ng s .
t h i s wa s a q ue s t i o n for the j ury t o de t e rmine . Sound
p ublic pol i c y and c onstitutional l a w a l i k e d emand a
c a r e f ul ly con f ined l e gal d e f i n i t i o n to g i ve a dvance
warn i ng o f wha t cond uc t is p r ohib i ted and t o g ui d e j ur y
delib era t ions . Und e r t he p r e sent t e rmi nolog y a ne wspap e r
r epo r t t hat bad wea t h e r ha d d e l a y e d a n Ai r For c e airpla ne
t e s t , t ha t a p r omi nent g ene ral wa s hospi t a l i z ed f or mi nor
s urge ry , t ha t t he Nor t h Vi e t namese ha d deploy e d t roops i n
So ut h Vi e tnam, or t hat U. S . troops we r e using d e f e ctiv e
r i fles , wo ul d a llb e p roper SUb j e cts f or i nvocat i o n of
t he e s p i o na g e p r ov isio ns . Ye t t h e first t wo a r e probably
t riv i a l , t he l a s t t wo a r e no t only p roper b ut ne c e s s ary
to informed pub lic d ebate, a nd a l l f o u r a r e p r o t ected by
even t he na r r owes t r ea d ing of the F i r s t Amendmen t .
Gran t e d t ha t Congress c annot e nvi s i o n e v ery p r ospec -
tiv e viola t i on, c r i mi na l s ta t ut e s wh i c h touc h o n Fi rst
Amendmen t f r e e d oms mus t none t he less b e wr i t ten to f o r b i d
-7-
447
only the narrow cla s s o f c o nduct which genuine l y
e ndange r s t he pUb l i c welfa r e . v . But t o n , 37 1
U.S. 4 15 , 4 33, 4 38 (196 3). The l ate Mr. J ust ice
Harlan, a s t r ict cons t r uc t ioni s t of t he Di l l of .Ri g h t s ,
put it lik e t hi s:
But whe n a S t a t e s eeks to
subj e ct t o c r imi nal s anc t i o ns con-
duct whic h, e x cep t f or a demonstr ated
pa r amount s t ate i ntere st. wo ul d b e
withi n the r a nge o f fre e dom o f ex-
pre ssion as as s ur e d by the Fo ur t e e n t h
Ame ndment , it c a n no t do s o by means
of a g e neral a nd a l l - i nc l us i v e .
prohibi tion. Itmus t br ing the
a ctivity s oug h t to b e proscrib e d wi th-
i n the ambi t o f a s tat ute o r c laus e
. "narrowl y d r awn to def i ne a nd pun ish
specific c onduct a s constitut i ng a
clear and p r e s ent dang e r .t o a s ubs t an-
t ial interes t o f the S t ate." .
Garne r v . Loui s i a na . 36 8 U.S . 157 , 202
( 1961 ) (conc urri ng op inion ) (citati on
omitted).
There a re s i mi lar prob l e ms wi t h the o t h e r stat ut ory
ph r a s e s . One r e a s on why inf o rmat i on a bo ut the g eneral' s
gallstones or t h e Army' s misfir ing M-16's (no s ecre t , o f
course, to the e nemy ) might b e brought wi thi n t he s tatut e 's
sanctions l i e s i n the provis i on t hat the o n ly r equire d
' p r oo f i s "knowl e dg e " t hat t he info rmati on "may b e us e d
to t he advantage o f a for eign p owe r . " But any
. information wi t h some r elations hip, no ma t t e r how tang en-
tial, t o the nat ional d efe ns e, b e t o the adva n ta g e
.o f some for e i g n "government, f act i on, pa r t y o r
force, or pers ons purport ing t o act a s s uc h , II o r "any
international organi z at ion" (the definition of "foreign
power" as g i ve n in Section III of S . l l . Th e Internat i onal
Red Cros s may .b e int ere sted t o learn of o u r medi cal
-8-
448
t e c hnology -- u nd muy us c i t to help t h e wo unde d e ne my.
A Germa n pol i tical pnr t y muy usc stat i stic s a b o ut
dis affe c t e d or dr ug - a b using soldi e r s t o b uck up a d emand
for r emova 1 of U. S . troop s f r Ge rman s o i l . The s e are
among th e "dang e rs" of free Ii: -c h , The ' Cons t i t ut i o n
never g uarante e d t ha t free sp. .e c n would prot ect us from
the ridi cule or hostil ity of forei gn nations, or from
the us e of our idea s bey ond o ur s hore s. Its authors
c l a i med only t ha t i f we we r e not wi l l ing to run t hese
r isks , we would not b e fre e - - and t h e opinion of othe r s
I
would no longer mat te r .
Mor e over, there s e ems little r eas on fo r sta t i ng the
propos ed s tanda r d of ha rm in the injury to
the unite d States or a dva ntage to a foreign .powe r. "[Ijf
a communication does not wo r k an injury to the United
States, itwo uld seem to follow logically that no gov ern-
me nt intere s t can be a sserted to overcome t he first.
a men dme nt's g ua r ant ee of fre edom of . Nimme r ,
"National Security Secre t s v . Free Speech: The I ssues
Left Undecided in the El ls berg Case," 26 Stan. L. Re v.
311 , 330 and n. 92 (1974). See unite d State s v. Heine,
151 F. 2d 813 (2d Ci r . 1945) , c e r t . denied, 328 U. S . 833
(194 6), wher e Judge Lea r ned Ha nd r efus ed to apply a
s imila r c l ause of a precursor s ta tut e to information
wh i c h ha d nev e r been c las s i f ied .
There i s no g r e a t e r c ertai nt y i n t h e r e quirement of
k nowle dge t ha t t h e i nforma tion ga t he red o r d isse mina t e d
.-9-
449
may be uscd "to t h e pr e j udi co of the s:
o r i n t e r e s t
of the Un ited S t a t e s . " Are we mor e or " sa f e " if
the public knows or do es no t know o f o ur defcnse ne eds?
Is it i n the "int erest" of the Uni t ed S t u t e s t o s upp r e s s
the f a c t s about our c onduct of t h e wa r in So ut h ea s t
Asia or to sprea d them on the publ ic rec ord for de bu te ?
The meaning of the First Amendme n t i s t hat t he gove r nme nt
shall not ha v e the power to limit p ublic knowle dge, save
in narrow circumstance s wher e national sur v i val is in
clear a nd pre sent dang er. Wh i t ney v. Ca l i f o rni a ,
274 U.S . 357 , 37 6-77 (1927) (Bra nd eis , J . , c onc ur ring) ;
! .
cf. Bra nde nburg v . Ohio , 395 u.S . 44 (1969 ) . As a f or me r
secretary of State ob ser v ed i n 1 822 :
No na tion . e v e r ye t found a ny
inco nv eni e nce from t oo clos e an
inspection i nto t h e cond uc t o f i t s
offi c ers; but ma ny ha v e b een bro ught
to ruin a nd r e d uced to sla very, by
suf f ering g r adua l i mpos i t i on a nd abus e s ,
whi ch we r e i mp e rcep t i b l e, only because
the means of p ubl icity had no t be e n
s e c ured . 1 E. LiVing s ton , CRI MINAL
JURI SPRUDENCE 15 (1 873 e d . ) , q uoted
i n Ni mmer , s up ra , 26 Sta n. L. Re v . a t
333.
2. Se c t ion 1122 . Dis clos i ng Nat i ona l Defens e
Info rmat io n.
Se ction 1122 makes criminal the 'knowing c ommun ica -
tion of "national defense i nfo nna t i on
l1
t o a pers on "he
knows . is not authori z ed to receiv e i t ." Section
-r
define s "authorized" a s mean i ng a utho r i t y to ha ve a c c ess
to, recei v e, pos sess, or control li as a r esult of the
Provi s ions of a s t a t ut e or exe cut ive order, or a
-10-
451
450
t.hc round cr The s tat ut e t h us
r e '.lul " t i o n or r
d e l i v ers t o Con .
;s a nd t he Admini strtlti o n t he exc l us i v e
power to d o t erru' .. who s ha LI , a nd who sha l l not, Lc a r n ,
s peak, or wr i t e a bout a va s t arra y of politic ally as
well as milita rily s e ns i t i ve i nformat i on . To s t a t e t his
prop osi tio n is to refut e it. The Const i tution permit s
no s uch l a w.
Mor e over , by f aili ng t o r e q uire a s p e c i f i c i n t ent to
d o a n unlawf ul a c t , the sta t ut e "ma y b e a t rap for
inno c e n t a cts , " papa c h r i stou v . City o f J a ck s onville ,
4 05 U. S . 156 , 16 4 (1 972 ) . I t is s o " l a ck i ng in a s c ertain-
I
abl e sta nda r ds of guilt, that it fail[ s) to g i v e a
p e r s on o f ord i nary intellige nce .f a i r no t i c e that h i s
c on t e mp late d c onduc t i s for bidden . " Pa l me r v . Ci t y of
,
Euc l i d , 4 0 2 U.S. 544 , 545 (1971 ) . No s tanda rd o f conduct
wha tsoever i s s pec i f i e d . Gov ernmen t officials a r e g i ve n
a fre e h a nd t o e n f o r c e t h eir own i d e a s o f wha t t he l a w
should b e , and e n forc eme nt wi l l de p end on who i s, o r is
not, a nnoye d by t h e disclosure. But crimi na l statut e s
t h i s va g ue a re p lain ly unconstitutional. Coate s v. City
o f Cinc inna t i , ' 4 0 2 U. S . 611 ( 197 1) . I n a d d i t i o n , 1122
i s ov erbr oa d in a c ons tit utiona l l y f a tal s e ns e , for i t
s weeps wi t h i n i t s p r oh i b i t i o n c ond uct wh i c h i s no t on l y
innocent, but s a nc t i o ne d by the Firs t Ame ndme n t . See ,
Keyi s hian v . Boa rd o f Regents , 385 U. S . 589 (196 7 ) ;
Bag ge t t v . Bul l i t t , 377 U. S . 36 0 (1964) . An ov erbroa d
s t a t ut e may b e i nval id ev e n t ho ugh i t g e nera l ly pro t e c t s
v ita l na tio na l inte r e s t s whi c h c an on a pprop riate
occasions o utwe i g h F irs t .r>.me ndme nt r i gh t s . United Sta tes
v. Robel, 3lJ9 U. S. 250 (1 96 7 ) . .f.i.:. Go r i n v . un ited
s t clt .CS , S llpr(l , 3 12 u. s , a t 2 8 , na r r owi nq a n c a p i o naqc
stotllte to a ppLy only wh e n s cient e r i s e st a bLi.s h od,
3. Se c t i on 1 123 . Misha nd l ing Nat iona l De f e ns e
In f o n "otion .
Se ction 1123 ha s s i mila r def ici enci e s of va g ue ne s s
and overbrea dth. Had t hi s p r ov i sion b e e n l a w a t the
time o f the r e vela tion o f the Pen t a gon Pa pe r s , e very
p ers on throllgh who s e ha nds t h ey pa ssed c oul d ha v e b een
charge d with this offe n s e . Ev e n memb e r s o f Con gre s s
a nd t heir staffs might ha v e been prosecut e d. Se e
Gr ovel v . u n ite d St o t e s , 4 08 U. S . 6 06 (1 972) . Reporters ,
editors, pllbli shers , secr e t arie s , and probably e ven
printe r s cOllld have been s we pt wi t h i n the sta t llte's
rea ch. Ind e ed, the g ove rnment attempted to us e the
similar, although p e r ha ps not q uite s o vol umi nous,
provisions o f 18 U. S .C . 793(e) in pro sec ut i ng Dani el
Ellsb erg a nd Anth ony Rus s o .
Th i s provisi o n al so pos e s a un ique c ons t i t llt iona l
diffic ul ty, by ma k i ng ita f el ony for one i n una lltho r i z e d
posse ssion or c ontrol of II na t i o na l defens e inf o rma tion"
knowingly to fail "to deliv er itp r omp t l y to a federal
public ser va nt who i s ent itled to r ece i ve i t . " Th e
Fifth Ame ndme n t fo r b ids t he e n f o r c eme nt of statllt e s whi ch
infringe the pri vil ege a ga i ns t s e Lf-eLncr imi.nat i.on', <,:.:irh e
Supreme Court has repeatedly s t r uc k down e f f o r t s to
short-cir cui t, the investiga tive process (a nd the
Const i tution) by c t i minaliz i ng the fa i l ur e to reg i s t e r
-12-
- 11 -
452 453
ononoL f a s a p rob a bl. c cr iminal. v. Unit0d
Sta t e s , 390 U. S . 85 ( 196.8) ( f u i l ur e t o r eg i s ter a
f i r ea r m) ; Alber tson v . S . A. C. B. , 382 U.S . 70 (1965)
(failur e to r e gis t e r a s a Commun ist Pa rty member ) ;
La ury v. Uni t ed St a t e s , 3'95 U.S . 6 (1 969 ) ( f a i l ur e t o
comply with th e Mari j uana Tax Act). I,e ary, supr a ,
395 U.S. a t 28 , holding that the Fi fth Amendme nt
e s t a bli s hes a " r i ght not t o . be cri minall y liuble f o r
o ne ' s pre v i o us f ailure to ob ey a sta tute wh i c h requi r ed
an inc r i mi na t ory act . "
4. Se c t i on 11 24 . Di sclos i ng Cl a s s i f i e d I n f o rmu t ion .
Sect i o n 1124 wo u l d mak e i t a c r i me for a
pers on" t o " communica t e c l assifi ed ' i n f orma t i on
to " unaut ho r i ze d" pe r s o ns , r e gardle s s of h i s
i nt e nt a nd r ega rdle s s o f the probabl e o r even pos s ibl e
effect o f h i s a ctio ns . Mere d i s c l osur e , with no
of p ur p os e or ca pacity t o da ma ge t h e g e n ui ne nat i o na l
de f e n s e i nt e r e s t s o f t he na t i on , wo ul d b e a f e l o ny
p un i s ha bl e by a $100,000 f i ne a nd s e ven yea rs i n pr i s on .
Yet i t has b e e n e s t i mat e d b y a s e c urity cons ulta n t
wi t h mor e t han 4 5 years of mili t ary a nd c ivil i a n experienc e
i n t h e fiel d of na tional de fense i n f orma t i on , t hu t ov e r
99 1/ 2 p e r c e nt o f c l a s s i f i ed doc ume nts c ont a i n i nforma -
t i on in the pub l i c domai n o r do no t wa r r a n t p r o tec tion
for othe r r ea sons . Sub c omm. on Cr imi na l Laws a nd
Procedur es o f the Senate Comm. on the J udici ary, 92nd
Co ng., 2nd Sess., He arings on Reform of t h e Federa l
Criminu l Laws , Pt . II I, Subpa r t D, a t 3045 (Comm. Print '
1972 ) (Te s t imony o f G. Fl o renc e ) . I t may b e
s ugge sted tha t the problems Mr. Fl or e nc e spoke of have
been overcome by the ne w Exec utive
NO . 11 , 652' o [ Ma rch 8 , 1 972 , os t e nsibly r eformi ng the
' c l u::;s i fica t ion proc e s s . But Mr. Flor enc e t e s t i f i e d
t ha t he h ad trie d
subcommit tee last
be f o r e a
__ a nd f ailed - - to obtain fr om the De partme nt of
some o f ' the c lassi f ied doc u-
De f e ns e eurl ier in 1974
m which " ere de s i g nated a s p ub i ic r ecords by t h e
e nts
presiding j udge d uring th e Russ o- El lsberg trial. Th e
rea s on for de niu l of h i s r eq ue s t ? The Penta gon pap e r s
__ wh ich ha v e b een wide ly q uot e d in news pa p e r s , d is-
cus sed a t the t ria I, r e corde d i n the trial t ra ns c r i p t s ,
and spok en, r ead, a nd a rgued ab o ut by mi l l ions of
Amer i c uns (and for e igners) - - a re sti l l
But t h i s i s no t a l l . Enu e trnent of t h i s statut e
would i r r e pa r a b l y da ma g e -- i f not v i r t ua l l y de s t r oy
the fre e dom o f t h e p r e s s upon wh ich a n i n f o rmed p ub l i c
a nd democ r a t i c s elf- gover nment its elf r ely. ' I f t he
pr e s s i s not to b ec ome mere l y a wi ther e d a rm o f gove r nment
i ns t ea d o f 't he adve r s ary f orce the constitutio n i n t e nde d ,
itmust ha ve sour c e s oth er than o f fic i a l pre s s r elea s e s
f or the informat i o n it pUbl i she s .
In a s t udy pre pared by the Fo r e i gn Divis io n
of the congressiona l Re s earch Serv i c e for the Senate
Relations Committe e , t he point i s brought home .
on Refor m o f t h e Feder a l Crimi na l 1," 1' 8,
supra , at 3063 - 94 . Th e study found "wide ag r e e ment t ha t
t he g reat b ulk of de f e n s e mater i a l i s us ua l l y over
prote cte d __ t oo highly c lass i f i e d f or too l ong a t i me . "
- 14 -
:.:.::' "'
-13-
454
455
~ at 3077 . An d, it c o n t inued , high government o ffi c i a l n
-- s uc h an fo rme r Secre tur i cs o f Defens e Melvin R. Lai r d
and Clu r k H. Cl i f f or d - - f requent l y "dec l a s sify " na t iona l
defense i n f o rma tio n whe n it ser ve s t h e i r purpos e s, re-
ve aling itt o Congre ssi onul c ommi t t e es to justif y budget
r eque sts o r to ne ws r eporte r s to t e st o ut p ubl i c opi nion
o n a wi de va r i e t y of s ub j e c ts. ~ a t 3080- 81 . Th ere i s
a "hi gh incide nc e of l e a k s o f c l a ssi f ied information
wh i ch a ppea r to b e upproved by s ome one i n a uthori t y
." J.3.,.. at 3081.
~ o wonder, t h e n , t ha t c on s c i e n t i o us r e por ters tur n '
to of ficia ls with di f f e r ent opinions a nd diff ere nt f acts
at the i r c omma nd t o tes t o ut i n t hei r t ur n t he Admi n i s-
tra t i on' s ver s i on of the t r uth . Ve t eran r ep or ters and
' e d i t o r s of the New Yor k Time s a nd Washington Po s t f i led
aff ida v i t s i n t he Pent a gon Pa p e r s ca s e , ~ New York
Times Co . v. un i ted s tate s , 4 03 U. S . 713 ( 1971 ) , t o t h e
effe c t that of fi cia l and unof fic i a l leak s we r e b ot h a
nec e s s ary sour c e o f i n f o rma t i on f or a respon s i b l e pre ss.
Wi t ho ut the us e of c l a s s i f i ed mate r i a l , a ccor d i ng t o
Times Wash ington Bur e a u Ch i e f Max F r a nkel, " [t] he r e
c o uld be no a deq uate dip l omat ic, mi l i t ary, a nd pol i t i ca l
repor t ing of t he k ind o ur p eop l e t a k e for g r ante d . "
Ex cerp t s from Affidav i t r epri n t e d i n Hea r i ngs on Re f o rm
of t h e Fe de r a l Cri mi na l La ws , supra, at 3079.
As the Supre me Court de c l a r e d i n another conte x t , the
people o f th e Uni te d State s :
ma y not be rega rded a s c los e d- c i r c u i t
r ecipie nts of only that wh i c h t h e
- 15-
St a t e choos e s t o commun i ca t e . Th e y
ma y not b e c o n fine d to the e xpression
o f t hos e sent imen ts t ha t arc o ffi -
c i a l l y approved . Tim, e r v . De s '
Ho ine s Inde pe nde n t COTTUn un ity School
Di s t r i ct, 393 U.S. 503 , 511 (1 96 9) .
And s ec J us t ice Do ug las ' c oncurr i ng opini on in New Yor k
Ti me s Co . v . unite d State s , 403 U.S . 71 3 , 723-24 (1 971 ) ;
Th e domi na nt p urpos e of t he First
Ame ndme nt wa s to p roh ibitt h e wi de-
s p read p r a c t i c e o f governme n t a l
s upp r e s s i on o f emba r r a s s i ng i n f o rma -
tio n. I t is common kno wle dge that
t h e F i r s t Ame ndment was a dop t ed
a ga inst t he wide s p r e a d us e of t he
c ommon l a w o f s e di t i o us l ibel to
p uni s h t h e d iss e minu t i on of ma t e r ia l
that is emba rrass i ng to the p owe rs-
I
; that-b e. Se c re c y in gov e rnme n t is
fundamenta lly a nt i - democ r a t i c , per-
p etua t i ng b ur ea uc ratic e rrors . Open
, deba te a nd di scu ssion o f pUbli c
i ssue s a re v i ta l t o o ur na t i ona l
h e al th.
Th e s t a t ut e as written i nvites a b us e . Eve ry
"pe rson" who"
handles cla s sifi ed i nforma t ion
would s p eak i n pe r i l of v i o l a t ing its t e c hni c a l commands ,
and be s ub j e ct to pros e cution f or politically e mba r r a s s i ng
the g ov ernme nt. Offici al s could b e p unished for e xpressing
political vi ews di stas te ful to the government , if a single
clas s ified f act could be fo und within their s ta temen ts.
Gr ant ing t hat the gover nme nt ha s the r ight t o pr o t e c t
limited ca t egor ies of information f r om una ut h or i zed dis-
Closure by i ts employees , i t n eed not make such trans -
gressions c rimi na l . Dismi s sal of t hos e who r elea s e';?:"
informati on wi th c ul pa b l e intent o r f or p e rsona l gain
s hould b e a s uffi c ient s a nc t i on .
The allowa n c e of a defe ns e that the informat ion
communi cated "wa s not lawfully SUbjec t t o c l a s s ifi ca t ion "
i s, of course , , de s i r a b l e i f t h e o f f e n ~ i s to exi s t a t ~ l l
Dut i nvoca t i on o f t ha t ' de f e ns e r equi res t he de f e nda nt
- 16-
457 456
f i r s t to have exhuus t e d h i s r e me d i e s b e f or e the clu s s i fi-
cOllting cncy in r e s pe c t of f o r e i g n po we r s.
c ation r e v i e w a g ency to b e es tabl ished under Sec . 1124 .
The diffi c ulty . wi t h t ha t c on d i t i o n is , howe ver, that no
prov ision i s ma de r equiring the agency to act p r omptly .
Th e Fi r s t Ame ndment r eq ui r e s t ha t Sect i o ns 11 2 2- ,
Conseq ue n t l y , t he agenc y c ould sit on mat eri a l f o r we ek s
o r eve n months, d ur i ng wh i ch t i me the mat eria l s rel e vancy
be remove d ent i r e l y . Th e r e a re no equi va lents in pre s e n t.
law, a nd adoption of the provis ions p ropos e d i n wil l
seriously i mpa i r Fi rs t Ame ndme n t right s wi thout providi ng
would hav e passed by.
5. Sec t i o n 11 25 . Unl awfully Obta i ning Cl a ssified
Information .
any compe nsat ing b enefi t s t o t he na t i on ' s sec ur i t y or
Thi s s e c t i on mak e s i t a c r ime for a n age nt of a
welfare. Th e only pur p os e t hat woul d b e s erve d by t h e s e
foreign power to obtain or c o l lect "c l a ssifi e d information . "
provisions would b e to ha v e s e n t Dani e l Ellsbe r g a nd Vi c t o r
Insofar a s the section also precludes the defe ns e that
to pr i son . Th os e who t h i nk t hat t hos e men s ho ul d
the i nformation wa s improperly c lassifie d , a nd since it
have b e en i mpri soned s houl d vo t e up 1122-1125 . Thos e who
does not r equire proof of c ulpabl e i n t ent , i t wou ld be
belie v e that El l s berg a nd Mar c he t t i ha ve ser ve d t he h i g he s t
' s ub j e c t to due proce s s and fre e s p e e c h ob j e c t i o ns s imi l a r
interes t s of the Fi r s t Ame ndme n t b y s uppl ying i n f o rmatio n
t o those outl ine d a b ove.
of the g r e a t es t i mportance to all citi z e ns , will v ote down
thos e s e c t i ons .
Through 1125. '
Obj e c t i on s to the definitions of "a ut ho r i z e d" ,
6 . Sect i on 1 128 . Defini t ions for Se ction 11 21
7. ACLU Proposed Es p i ona ge Stat ut e
Section 11 21. Espiona g e .
"classified informationII and "national defense Lnf' o rmat. Lon"
(a) Offens e -- A p e r s on i s g uilt y of a n o ffen s e if,
hav e b e e n noted above . We strongly urge that if the
latter ph ras e is retained, i t b e closely r estricted to'
with int e nt that cla ssifi e d nat iona l defe ns e i nformation be
Used by a foreign powe r t o inj ure t he nat i on a l d e f e n s e , he
military or defe n s e mat eri a l wh i c h the gove r nment has a
or she knowi ng l y :
l e g it i mate i n t e res t in k eepi ng s e cre t from t he outside
(1) . communicates such c l a s sif ied na t iona l
wor l d a s we l l as from t he Amer i c a n peop l e --
t e ch n ica l deta i ls of mi l i tary weaponry , tactic a l deta i l s
defe ns e i n for ma tion di r ect l y to a
o f mi l i t a r y operations , the cond uct or p r o d uc t o f s p e cifi c
or a gent; or
(2) ob t a ins such cla s sified na tio na l d ef e ns e
information i n order to c ommunica t e dire ctly to
fore ign covert i nt e lligence ga t hering operations, and
- 17-
-18-
r.
I
458
f oreign powc r o r o r
( 3) r e s t ri c t e d area with int ent
t o obt ain s uch c l a s s i f i ed defe nse
i nfo rma t ion i n o r der t o commun i ca t e i t
d i r c ctly to a f o r e i gn p owe r or agent .
(b) . Gr a d ing An offense descr ibed i n this s e c t i o n
is :
(1) a c l a s s A felon y in t ime of decl a red wa r ;
( 2 ) a A misdeme a no r a t a l l othe r time s :
Se c t i o n 1122 . De f i n i t ions f o r Se c t ions 1121
( a) "nat i ona l de fens e i n format i on" me a n s :
(1 ) t e c hni c al de t ails o f tactical mi l i t a r y
o pe r a tions i n time of declared war ;
( 2) t e chni c al de t a i l s of we a ponr y ;
( 3) defensiv e mil i ta ry cont ingenc y p la ns
i n r e s pe c t o f f oreign powe rs ;
. p r o v i de d t hat s uc h i nformation wo ui d , i f obta i ne d by
a for e i gn powe r, b e us e d by t ha t p ower to inj ure
s i gnif i ca n tly t he nat i ona l de f e ns e of t he Uni t ed
St a t e s , a nd t hat at the t i me o f the o f f e ns e the
i nfor mati o n ha d no t pre v i ous l y b een p Ub l i s he d .
(b) "Agent" mea ns one in the emp loy o r s e r v i c e of a
f ore i gn power who i s act i ng o n i ns t r ucti on s o f t ha t
power.
( c ) " c l a s s ifi ed" means prope r l y c lassi fied p urs uant
to a va l i d s ta tute , exe c ut i v e o r de r , or r egula t i o n ,
a nd no t de c l a s s i f i ed p ri or t o t he t i me of t he alle ged
' o f f e n s e . I t i s a d efe nse to .a p ros ecut i on unde r thi s
459
sec t i o n t ha t t he informa tion WOo S not cltl 5s i f i c u. in
c on f o r mi t y wi t h the r eq u i r cme nt s of t h e stat u te,
. e xec ut i v e orde r , or r eg u l ation , o r thn t t he Ln f ormar-
t ion was not r e a s ona b l y s ub j e c t t o 'class i fi ca t i o n
under t h e sta t ut e , e xe c ut i v e o rder , o r r egul a t i o n .
"pre v i o usly b e e n p ub l i s he d" mea ns made p ub l ic
( d)
I t i s not a r eq ui r eme nt o f t h i s sec t i on
in a ny f orm.
that publ ication was o f f i cia l l y made o r by
an o f f i cer o f the gove r nme nt wi th a uthor i t y t o do so.
o the r Se c t.i on s o f S . 1 lfu i ch Co u l d Be Used To Ce ns o r
. 8 .
the pr e s s a nd Withh old I n f o rma t i o n from t he pub 11c
Aside the prov i sions inc l ud ed in the s o-ca l led
two' o t h e r s e c t i ons o f t he
"national s e curity " cha pter of S.l
pr opos ed Crimina l Code could be us e d t o s ti f l e the
-20-
-19-
ACfLU
5
---.
STATE7-1ill1I'
of
JOHN H. F. SHATIUCK, HASHING'IONOFFICE DIRFC'roR
and .
DAVID E. LANDAU, STAFF ASSOCIATE
N1EIUCAN CIVIL LIBERl'IES UNION
on
H.R. 6869 ("CRTI'IDTAL CODE REFORJl1 scs OF 1911")
before
THE SUBC(JlloUTrEE ON CRll'flINAL JUSTICE
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMl'U!rrEE
March 21:, 1918
461
swcu(,cI S l anr;uuc;e pruhiUto; a jury f rom "I nt cnt . . . t o
obst r uct t he abilit y of t he United St at e:;. .. to. . n [".age in "131'
or def enoo activi t i c:;" from suc h cir ClLllst ances . Noth:l nr: would prevent
prosecut i on under the ceneral cr i minal attCl r,pt , conspi r acy, and solic-
i tation sections of H. !\. 6869 for speech encourae;ill;3 such a dem:ms tmtion.
Since int ent t o irrpair military ef f ect i ver.css could be
examPle, f romacti ve opposition t o the devel opment of
editorial s against; the ABN, news stori es cxpos :!ng cos t
:lr:ferred, for
cos tly weapons ,
over - r uns and
nechani cal f ailure, or s irrply a cit i zen 's public or private remarks
the situating of nuclear stoclq."lil es in his hOJretowncould aea
i nst
provide the basis for sabot ac;e prosecution on the theor y t hat t hey
"darrar;e" the obj ect s of t heirdisapproval. 'Thi s sec tion should there-
for e be narrowed to apply only t o physical
Another prob lem wi t h Section 1111 is t hat -no spe ci al
is required that the property was suitable for use in the national
defense and was in the control of t he Unit ed States . 'Ib f allwithin
t he Secti on, a person only has t o be svare of but disregar d the risk
t hat i t i s such proper t y . 'Tte Senat e h'Or sencd this aspec t of Section
1111 by insert.. the words "in f act" t o qualify United St ates control
or 'Thus, no knowl.edge l,Quld be required that the propert y
is under the control of or being used for t he United St at es . At t he
very l east , t her efore, t his section sroul.d be amended t o require desig-
nation of such propert y or faci l ity (f or cxwnple, specific military
hardware ) and t he culpab1li t y l evel sbouId be r aised t o "knowing."
".- "< :. : .: .
2.
AnPiliring_
As currently draf t ed, Sect i on 1112 would make i t a f el ony level
of fense to damage certain propert y with "reckles s disregard" of
pOssi ble national defense consequences. '!his i s over broad and sus-
cept i bl e to Widely dif ferent int erpret ations. Dar1{;crous conduct which
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION__
22 East 40th Street New York. N.Y. 10016 (212) 7251222
462
f all s I nt o t hi s 1lI'Ca i s al r eady prosc r-Ibed ClSC\'II1cr C in t n:
" "rxl
should ei t her be trea t ed as a mi sderteanor - under t he Dest.ruc t. von of
covcr nr ent Property sect ton (Sec . 1703) , or. i f truJy i n vol vine t he
nat i om l se curi ty, as sabot age (Soc . l1ll ) . The Senat e narrowed the
scope of t ho section by l imitir.e i t s applicat i on to war, nat i onal
emer gency or ma jor weapon s sys t ems i n peaccti rr.e . It shoul d be del eted
ent i rel y, bowever-, because i t is unnec essary and suscept i bl e t o broad
abuse .
3. Espi onar:e
Through cros s- r ef erenci nr;, Sect i on 1121 would carry for wa rd the
l anguage of exi st inr, espionaf,e statut es , t hereby l osing a si[,Difi cant
oppor-t unl. t y t o reform tr.e arcralc and ambiguous pri visi ons of exist i ng 1 20\'; ,
I f Congress is t o COdifY t he Gener al espionage l aws, i t shoul d at
l east rrake cl ear in .t he Legf.s.Lat .Ive his t or y that pr oof of specH i c
int ent to injure the nat i onal defense i s an essenti al .el err.ent of t he
defense . The indictrr.ent of Cani el El Lsberj; in 1973 derronst r at es t he
overbreadt h, and adverse impact on t he Fi r st Arr.endrr.ent of
18 U. S. C. 793. Pr i or to t he El l sber g pr osecut i on for dis cl osi ng the
Pent agon Paper s , t he gener al espi onage I aws had been i nterpret ed by t he
courts to r equire proof of an intent to inj ure t he nat i onal def ense .
See Gor i n v. United St at es , 312 U.S. 19 (1941) . El lsberg 's indi ctrr.ent
was constitutionally defi ci ent in t hat i t f ailed to r ef l ect t hi s
cruci al e'lerrent , This deficienCy shoul d be cur ed in codi f ying exi st-
ing law.
Unfortunat el y, t he Senat e Repor t resol ves the ambi gui t y in
section 793 i n favor of t he dange ro us interpr etat i on which t he govern-
ment pres sed on the Court i n t he Pent agon Paper s pr osecut i on . The
report states that:
463
Unlike subsect ions 793(a ) ard (b) , subsections ( n.)
t hrough ( f) do r.ot r equir e an i ntent, t o t n.lur e or
<:>;i ve an a n
iifti cnnce o{ the i nfor mat i on . are pr-Lnc.ipal .Iv
frcphylact i c ailr.ed at conduct
whi ch mi ght expose rraterial t o f or eip1 eyes rather
t han agaf.nst; act i ve espionage on behalf of for ei,Gner s
(Senat e Repor t , p, 215) (emphasi s added) .
This broad r eading of Sect i on 793 would permi t and even encourage the
prosecut ion of Government empl oyees wrD disclose and newspape rs which
plbli sh class i fied i nformation ,' I t i s an invitation f or t he government
to enforce broad off 1.cial secrecy t hrough t he criminal Jaws and should
be reJected.
4. 14il itary Rec ruitrre nt or In duction
Section 1115 prohibits "incit[ i l1P; ] other s " t o i nvade military
service i n t ime of war- with an intent t o "hinder " or "int erfer e l11t h"
recrult rrerrt or i nducU on. The Section al so prohibi ts t he i ntent i onal
creation of "a phys i cal i nt erference or obst acle " t o recruitment .
This "Incf .terrent " offense i s dangerously broad. The tenn
":incites" is def ined i n Secti on III t o mean "to urge ot her per sons
to engage i mn1nent l y i n conduct i n cfr-cumst.ances under which t her e
is a substantial Lf keLi.ro cd of irrminently caus 'ing such conduct . "
Since the tenn "war" is def ined t o i ncl ude "hos t ili t i es " i nvol vi ng
United St at es forces which t ake plac e in t he absence of a dec l ared
war (the Senat e del eted t hi s definition but did not subs t i t ut e a new
one). the circumst ances in which an inciterr.ent to obst r uct induct i on
COuld be prosecuted are nearly l imit l ess . Couns el l ine draf t r esistance ,
or sign:ing a "Call t o Resi s t'; based on oppos i t i on t o an war,
or Picketing an i nduct i on cent er could all fal l wit hin Sect i on 1115 as
it now stands. Safeguards ac;ainst such whol esa l e pr osecut i on of speech
actiVities should be adopted by l i mit ing t he sect i on to acts of physical
interference I'li th i nduct i on durirll; t irre s of declared war.
464
5. :rnc1U n[: or Insutorvunat.Ion 01 '
se ction l UGmakes it a crdrre to ai d or abet in "inci t [lnl; )"
any numbep of t he armed for ces to eneage i n mut iny, i nsubordinat i on,
r-efusa l. of duty or desertion. Given the t road definition of "in cites"
quot ed above , and the inclusi on of "ir.duces" withi n t he defint i on of
"abet s " (Sect Ion lll) , t hi s offense is al so dangerously bro ad , flny
civi lian speech or which i s cr i t i cal of United St ates
act i vi t i es and i s i ntended or can be expect ed to be heard or t o come
to t he at t ent i on of mili t ary per sonnel v:oul d arguably f all wit hin t he
prohi bition. The section woul d t hus have a severe chilling effec t on
contact s bet ween sol di er s am ci vili ans and woul.d cut off unof fi ci al
ci vi l i an act i vi t ies on such sensitive subject s as r ace
r el at i ons and counsci entlous obJect ion . At t he ver y l east its
applicability shcul d be limited t o t drres of declared war-,
"G. Offenses Involvi ng Goverr.ment I':roccs ses
1. t o Infl uence a Judicial
Section 1328 pro hi bi t s pickets , parades , di splay of si sns or
ot her derronstrat ions on t he grounds or wit hin 200 f eet of a cour-t house.
(The Senat e bill was amended t o l imit t he dist ance t o 100 feet . )
Alt r.ough the ACLU generally endorses such st at utes as neces sary t o
prut ect due process right s , we bel i eve that t he stat ut e srDul d be
wri t t en so as rDt t o appl y t ocemonstrators who do not disrupt or intim-
idate t re cour-ts , and whose int ent is t o expr ess opinions of t he
j udicial process which are protected by t he First Ar.endment. As
dr afted, Section 1328 has 00 such limit ation and i s a rorm of str i ct
liabili t y.
The courtrDuse shoul d not be t r eat ed di ffer ently from otr.er
publ i c buildings open to t he publ i c. Ademonstration shcul d
I
/kl.l./
/JtJ(t....
JlN lINIII,YSI S OF 'fill;' CONf;',1'] 'fU'l'lONIILl 'rY
01-' 'l'Il E CJII' S PRE- l' UBLI CIlTI OlI
--- H1N I El'/ llEQUIR;;I'IEi,!'fS
/.I
The CI lI and the ticpar t.mcn t; of J us t i ce hold t he view
th at t he s ecre cy agr ee men t s whi ch CI JI employeen arc r equired
to s ign a t the be ginni ng o f t heir empLoy rac n t; i mpose a l i f e-
long r equi r eme nt t o submit t o CI II for pr e- pub l i cat i on r evi ew a l l
writ i ngs re lat i ng gene r a lly t o i nt el l i gence ma tter s and t hat the s e
agreements a rc j udi c ial l y enf or ceable. For the r e as ons s et for th
in this memor a ndum, the lIme r i can Ci vil Liberti es Uni on di nagre e s .
The CI A has empl oyed s eve r a l ve rsi ons of thi s a greement
since the Age nc y ' s i ncept i on i n 1947. The curre nt ve r s i on of
the a gr eement, whi c h was adopt e d i n 1974, i s r eprese nt ative of
previous agreements and at t he s ame t i me t he mos t ex pl i c i t of
any of the ve r s i ons . I ts cen t r a l pr ovision pr ovi de s :
3. I he r eby agree tha t I wi l l never di VUl ge ,
pUbli sh or r eve a l by writi ng , wor d , conduc t or
other wi s e any c l assifi ed information , i nc l Udi ng
CI A cover ar r an gements , to an y unaut hor i zed pe r -
son wi t hout pri or cons ent of t he Director o f
Central Intelligence or his r epresentat i ve . I
further ag ree that any materi a l whi ch is r e lated
t o intell i gence or i nt e l l igenc e s ou r ce s and met hods
an d pr epa r e d for pub licat ion by me wi l l be s ub-
mitted t o the Central I ntel ligence Agen cy pr i or
t o disc us sing with or s howi ng to any publ i s he r s ,
editors or l ite r ary ag ent s for the pur pos e of
de t er mi ni ng whether said mater a l c ont ai ns any
c l a s s i f ied i nfor mat i on as defined in Execut i ve
Orde r 11652. I agree that the Centra l I nt e llige nce
Agency has the aut hor i t y to make t he f i nal de t er- .
mi na tion as to whe t he r i nformat i on i s c La s s Lf i ed v : ,; "
and thus should be deleted f r om t he materi a l
submi t ted.
466
Th e Go vernment s uccess f u l ly r elie d on a similar s ecrecy
agre e me n t t o obt a i n an inj uncti on wh i c h r e qu i r e d f o r me r CIA
e mp l oy e e Vic tor Mar c he t t i to s ubmit the man us c ript at a book
a bou t t he CI A f o r pre-pub licat ion r evi e w. Un i t e d Stat e s v.
Ha r c he,tti , 466 F.2d 1 30 9 ( 4th Ci r.) , c e r t . de n i e d , 409 U.S. 106 3
(1 97 3) . The Gov ernment a lso s ue d f o r me r CI A e mpl oye e Frank Sne pp
a s a r esu l t of h i s publica tion o f a boo k whi ch was not s ubmi t t e d
f or r e v i e w. The Gover nment c h ar ge s him with a breac h of c on t r a c t
and f i d ucia r y duty and s e e ks t o r e c ove r a l l t he r evenues he ha s
de r i ve d a nd wil l d e r i ve f rom his book. The Governme n t wa s
s uc ces s f u l i n t he di str ict court , a nd t he c a s e ha s be en submi t t e d
to the United State s Cour t o f Appeals for t he Fourth Circuit.
Unite d State s v . Sn c pp, Civ. No. 78- 92-A (E .D. Va . , Aug . 2 , 19 78) ,
appe a l argued , No . 78-1651 (4th Ci r ., Nov . 15 , 1978 ).
Cont rar y t o the ho l ding in the Ma r c he t t i c a s e , t he Amer ican
Civil Liber ties Uni on do e s not beli e ve t ha t t he CI A' s secr ecy
a g reeme nts are j Ud i c i a l ly e nforce abl e a gre e me n t s be c a u s e t he y
i mpose an u nwarra n ted a nd i mpe r mi ssib l e burden on t he Fi r s t
Amend ment r i ght s o f CIA e mp l oyees and a l l c i tizens who wi s h t o
r ead t he publ i c wr i t i n gs o f CIA e mployees . The reason s i n
s uppor t of o ur v i ew a r e s e t for t h below.
I. THE CI A'S OF PRIOR RESTRAINT I MPLI CATES I}WORTANT
FIRST VALUES.
Thi s count r y ho lds "a profo un d nat i ona l c ommitmen t t o
t he principle that de b ate o n p ubli c issues s hould be uninhib i t e d ,
robust, a nd wi d e - op en New Yo r k Times v. Su l livan, U.S.
25 4 ,270 (1964 ) . Books and articles about the CI A are at t he
467
t o f t he Fir s t protect ion:
t>E'af
Whatever dif f e r c':)ces may e xist about i n t e r -
pre t a t i ons o f t he Fi r s t I\mendl'lent, t here i s p ractical l y
un i ve r s a l a g r e e me nt t h a t a ma j o r purpose o f t h at Amend-
ment wa s t o p rot e c t t he free d iscussion o f gove rnmenta l
af f a i r s . Th i s o f c o urse i nc l udes d iscuss i o ns of .. . t he
ma nner in wh i c h gove r nment i s ope r a t e d or s ho u l d be
ope r a t e d , a nd a l l s uc h matte r s r elat i ng to po litica l
pro c e s s e s .
*/
'lIS v , Al a ba ma , 3 84 U. S . 214 , 21 8-19 (1 966) . -

Thi s p rot ection e x t e nds not o n l y t o t hos e who wish t o
speak a nd pub l i s h, b ut a l s o to t ho s e who wi s h t o r e cei v e infor -
conce rn i ng ma t ters of pub lic i nteres t . Vi r g i nia Pha r ma c y
' Vi r g i n ia Ci t i z e n s Con s umer Counc i l , 425 U. S . 748 , 756
(19 '( " [Tlhe protect ion a f f o r d e d -i s t o t h e c ommuni c a t i on , t o
76)
**/
its source, a nd t o its r ecip ients both . ")-
Tlfirs t Nat i onal Bank of Boston v. Be l l o tti, 55 L. Ed . 2d 707 , 717- 18
Buck l e y v . Va l eo, 424 U.S. 1 , 14 (19 76 ) ; Mi lls v . Al a b a ma ,
384 U.S. 214, 2 18- 19 (1 966 ) ; Gar ri s on v . Lou i si ana , 379 U.S . 6 4 ,
74-75 (19 64 ) ( " s pe e c h conc e r n i nq pu b li c af f a dr s is mor e tha n s e l f -
expres s i on ; i t is the e ssenc e o f s e l f-government ) ; Tho r nh i l l v.
Alab al'\a, 310 U. S . 88 , 101- 10 2 (1 940 ) ( " Fre e domof di scuss10n , i f it
would fulfil l i ts h i s t o r i c f unc t i o n in t his nat ion , mu s t e mbra ce
all issues, about wh i c h i n f ormation i s neede d o r a pp r opriat e t o
enable t he member s o f s o c iety t o c ope wi t h t he e x ige nci e s o f t he i r
period".)
tt/Kleindei nst v . Ma nd e l , 408 U. S . 75 3 , 762- 7 6 5 (1 972) ; St a n l e y v .
394 U. S . 55 7 (1969) ; La mont v . po s t mas ter Ge ne ral , 381 U. S .
19( 5 ) ; Mar t i n v . Ci t y o f Stru t he r s , 31 9 U. S . 141 , 143 (194 3 ) :
Thoma s v. Col lins , 32 2 U. S. 516 , 5 34 ( 19 45) ; Th o r nh i ll v. Alaba ma ,
supr a, 31 0 U.S . at 1 02 .

468
I n o r d e r t o f ul fil l t he conuni tl'1e nt t o open de ba t e a nd t o
the f r e e f low of i n f o r ma t i on o n matters of p ubli c i n t e r e s t ,
t he Fi r s t Amendment ge n eral ly prohibit s pr i o r r e s t r a i n t s on s peech
a nd p ublicati on. Nca r v . Mi nn e sota , 283 U.S. 69 7 , 71 3 (1 931 ).
The Supr e me Court ha s r e peate d l y h e l d t hat t he Firs t Amendmen t
"a f f o rd[ s} s pe cial prote cti on agai n s t or de r s tha t p r oh ibit "t he
p ublicati on o r broa d c ast o f pa r t i c ul ar i n f o r ma t i on or comme n t a r y . "
*/
Nebra ska Pr ess Ass ' n v . Stua r t , 4 27 U.S . 539, 5 56 (1 976).- Con s e -
que n t l y " pri or res t r a i nt s on speec h and p ubli c a t i on are the most
seriou s a nd t he l eas t t ole r abl e inf r inge ment on Fi rst Amendment
ri gh t s." l d . a t 559. Acco rdi ng l y , any s y s t em of pri o r r e stra i nt
on e xpressi on be a r s a he a v y pr e s ump t i o n a gains t its cons t i tut i ona l
validi t y . Ba ntam Books, I nc . v . Sul liva n , 37 2 U.S . 58 , 70 (1 963 ) ,
a nd t h e Gover nment c arr i e s a he a vy b u r de n" i n s howing a jus t i f i c a t i on
*/carroTl v . P"re sident and Commi s s i oners o f Pr i n c e s s Anne , 393
6 . 5 . 17 5, 1 81 (1 96 B) ( "Prior r estra1nt up on s pe ech s uppresses t he
p reci s e freedom wh i c h t he Firs t Amendme n t s o ught t o pr o t e c t aga inst
abri d gement . " ) ; Curti s PUb l i s hi ng Co . v . But t s , 388 U. S. 1 30 , 149
(19 67) ( " [I'lle ha v e r e j e c t e d a ll manne r of p ri or r estrai n t on
p ublicat i on . . .. " ) ; Gr os j e a n v. Ame r ican Pr e s s Co.. 29 7 U. S . 233,
24 9 ( 1937 ) (The Fir s t Amendme nt wa s mean t t o precl ude t he s t a t e s
"fr o m adopti ng a ny f o r m o f prev i ou s r e s t r a i nt upo n pr i n t e d publica-
t i o ns " ) ; Patt e r s on v . Co l or a do, 205 U. S . 454 , 462 (1907 ) ( " t he main
purpos e of [ t he F1rst Amendmen t ] is "to pre vent a l l s uc h p r evi ous
res t raints upon p ubli c a t i on s a s had been pr act i c e d by o t he r
governments. (e mpha s i s i n o rigi na l).
469
for t he i mposition of a ny r estr aint. Orga n izat ion f or a Detter
40 2 U.S. 415, 419 (1 971).
Ev e n where i n f o r mat i on r e l at e s t o t he na t iona l sec ur i t y
and t he dela y i n pub lic a t ion i s b ri ef, t h e burden of j u s t i f i c a t i o n
Nebr a s ka Pres s ' As s ' " v . Stuar t ,
on the Gove r nme nt r e ma i ns heavy.
42 7 U. S . at 55 9 . In New York Time s Co . v . Un i t e d St ate s,
403 U.S. 71 3 ( 1971) , t he Co urt r efus e d to e n j o i n even t e mporarily
publ icat ion o f t he Pent a gon Papers , not wi t h s t a ndin 9. t he Gove r n-
ment' s " c l a i m t h at pub l i catio n wo ul d c a us e gra v e dama ge t o t he
national s e c ur ity . Whi l e f our of the conc u r r i ng Jus t i c es we r e
convi nced t h at "reve lat ion of t he s e docume nts wi l l d o sub s t a nt i a l
damage to publi c intere s t s " [ 403 U. S . a t 731 (\'Ihite, J . c o ncurri ng ) } ,
none c ould s ay "th at d i sclo s u r e o f any o f the m wi l l sur e l y r e sul t
in di rect , i mme d i a t e , a nd i r r e para b l e dama ge t o our or
its p e ople . " 403 U. S . at 730 (Ste wart , J . concurr i ng ) .
There i s no r e a son t o revers e t he pre sump t i on a gai n s t pr i or
I n
restraints wi t h res pect t o wr i t i ng s by f o r mer CI A o f f i c i a l s .
most instances, f o r mer CIA o ffi ci a l s wr i t i ng a memo i r o r oth e r
work c o nc e r n i n g the CIA will no t b e pub l i shing i n f or mation wh i ch
1s as sens i t ive as the informat i on c o nta ined in the Pe n t a g on
Papers was alle ged to be. This s t a t e me n t is bas e d o n expe r i e nc e
with memo i r s writ t e n by f orme r governme nt o f f i c i als who he l d
PoSitions in the na t iona l s e c u r i t y are a a nd h a d a c c ess to sensiti ve
inf ormation. A sys tematic lis t i n g o f e v e r y memoi r publ ished
between the e nd o f Wo r l d War I I and 1973 revea ls t ha t over 100
".- ....
470
s u ch bo oks have been wri t t c n, Ha lperi n, Bureaucr atic and
Fore i gn Policy , pp . 317- 321 (Br o ok i ngs I nstitution ; 1974) .
I'lh i l e wo d o not kn o w o f any s ys tema t i c c omp i l a t i on o f me mo i r s
since 1973, i t i s a ppa r ant tha t ma n y more s uc h bo ok s ha ve been
wr i t t e n si nc e t hen ; t he Wat e r gate me mo i r s l e a p to mi nd . So f a r
a s we know, no more t han a f e w o f t he s e s c o r e s o f books wr i t. t.en
by men a nd wome n wi th a c c ess to sens itive i n f o r ma t ion were
r e v i ewe d by t he Gov e r nme nt. Fu rthe r more , t he Gove r nme n t ha s
n e ve r demon stra ted t ha t t he s e b ooks ha ve c aus e d d a ma ge to t h e
nati on a l s ecur ity . Eve n i f s ome d a ma ge through i nadverta n t d i s-
clo sure c ould be d e monst rated, that d a ma ge woul d be out.we Lqhed
by the i mmens e cont r ibution which the s c o r e s of c o nsci enti ou s
me moi r wr i t ers have made to publi c debate a nd u nde rstand i ng o f
our, go vernment po l i cies . The r e is no r e as o n to beli e ve t h a t
former CIA emp l oyees a r e less c o nsci enti ou s . than other gover nme n t
o ffi c ials in nationa l sec u r i ty po s i t i o ns. Mor e ov e r , a syste m o f
prior r e s t r a i n t will not stop t he who i s determi ned to
tell secre ts. Leak s t o t he press a nd publicati on abroad a r e
t oo r eadil y avai lable alte rnativ es. Accordingl y, there i s no
reas on t o r e vers e t he p resumpt ion a gainst prior res traint s with
respect to wr i t i n gs by CI A e mp l oye es.
II. THE CI A' S SYSTEM OF PRIOR RESTRAINT LACKS STATUTORY
AUTHORIZATION.'
Even ifwe assume tha t writings by a CI A o f f i cia l c onta i n
as harmf u l as t he i nforma t ion whi c h was invo lved i n
New Yor k Ti mes, t hat c ase provides t he proper s tandards by which
t o judge t he r estraint which t he Go ve r nment now ho l d ove r
471
*/
Th e re, f i ve of the si x conc ur r i ng Ju s t i c e s
forme r CIA
Dougl a s , St m,art , \'Ih i te and Ma rsha l l bas e d the ir
Dlilc k,
' s i ons i n vary i ng de g r e e s on t he ab s e nc e o f any Co ng r e s siona l
deC].'
hOr i z a t i o n for t he pr i o r r e s t r a i n t whi c h t he govcr nme n t s ought.
t aU
, ' lar ly, the absence of a ny a u t ho ri z ation f o r t he
,
rcs t ra int >lhich the government c lai ms ove r CI A .e mpl oyees
.
renders i t s position une nfo rc eable by th e court s.
Mr. Justice White , wi t h whom Mr . J ustice St ewa r t j oi ned ,
"At l e a s t in t he absence of l e g i s l a t i on by Cong r e ss,
"rotc:,
based on its o>ln i n ve s t i ga t i o ns a nd f i nd i n gs , I am q u i t e una b l e
to a gree tha t t he inhere n t powe r s of the Exe c u t ive a nd t h e c ourts
reach s o f a r . as to a u t ho r i z e r eme d i e s having s uch s wee p i ng
potential f or inh ibi ti ng ' p Ubli c a t i on by t he p r e s s . " 403 U.S. a t
732. Aft er c a nv assi ng t he v a r i ou s s t a t utes whi c h cr i mina l i ze
the communicati ng a nd publ ishing of s e n si t i ve na t i ona l security
informa tion , he c onclud e d :
It i s t hu s c l e a r tha t Co ngr e s s has a ddress e d
i tse lf to t he probl e ms ' o f pro t ecti ng t he s e c uri t y
of t he country a nd t he nationa l d e f e ns e f r om
unaut hor i z e d di s clos ur e o f pote nt i a l l y d a magi ng
informa t i on . [Ci t a t i o ns omi tted ] . It has not,
fa c t t hat f o r mer CIA of f icials signe d d oc uments wh i c h
purport t o limi t t h e i r Fi r st Amendment r i g ht s doe s no t d i s-
tinguish t he i r s i t ua t i o n fr om t he pr i o r r e s t r aint i n vo l ve d
in New Yor k Ti me s , as we demo ns t r a t e i n Poin t IV o f t h i s
memorandum.
:,: ;:..'
473 472
howe ve r , a ut ho rized t h e inj un c t i ve r e me dy a gainst
threa t e ne d discl osu r e . I t be e n
s ati s f i ed t o rely on c ri minal sanc ti o ns and thei r
d ete r r e n t ef fec t o n t he r e s po n s i b l e a s we l l a s
t h e i rre s po ns i b l e p res s .
40 3 U. S . a t 7 40 .
Mr . Jus ti c e !la r s hall s t a t e d the poi nt mor e
Li ke J u sti c e s White a nd Stewart, he f o und t ha t Cong r e s s had "o n
sever a l occa sions g i ve n ext e nsive conside r ation t o the pr oblem
of p rotecti ng t he mi litary and s t r a t egi c s e c r e t s of the Un i t e d
St a t es" and had e na c t e d "st a t u tes mak i ng it a cri me t o r ece i ve,
di s clo s e , communi c a t e , wi t h hol d , and pub l ish c ert a i n do c ume n ts,
photo gr a phs, ins tr ument s, appliancqs , a nd i nformatio n . " 403 U. S .
at 74 3. Furthermo r e , he a l so f o un d t ha t i n a ddition to e nac t ing
v a r i o us c r i mina l s tat u tes ,
it i s clear tha t Congr e ss ha s spec i f ical ly
rej e cte d pa ssing l egi sl a tion tha t wo ul d .
have cle arly gi ven the Preside n t t he
power he s eeks here a nd made the curre nt
activi t y o f the ne ws p apers un l a wf u l . Whe n
Con gre s s s pe c i f i c al l y d e c l ine s to make
conduct unlawful it is not for thi s Co urt
to redecid e t hos e i s s ues - - to overrule
Congres s.
403 U.S. a t 745- 46. In reaching this conclus i on, he r elied he a vi l y
on the fact that in 1917, Congress rejected a proposal to author ize
the President to exerci se pri or restraint over the publicati on
*/
national defens e i nformation. 403 U.S. at 746 . - Ac co r d i ng l y ,
: /T he propos ed l egi slation provided:
During any nat ional emergency r eSUlting f rom
a war t o which the United States is a pa rty, or from
thr eat of such a wa r , the President may , by procla-
mat i o n , decl a r e the exis tence of such emerge nc y a nd ,
by proclama t ion , p rohi b i t the pUbli s h i ng o r
COmMuni c a t i ng of , o r the at t e mpting to publ ish or
c ommun icate any information relating to the nati o nal
defe ns e wh i c h , i n hi s judgment, is of such charac ter
CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
" I t wo ul d , howe ver, b e u t t e r l y inconsi s ten t wit h
wrot c:
concc pt o f scpa r atio n of power s f or thi s Court t o u s c i ts
c r of c ont e mpt to p rev e n t b e havi o r t h a t Congr e s s h a s
,

ccifically to p roh ibit." 403 U.S. at 7 42.
W .
Furthermo r e , a s Mr. Justice Douglas point ed out [4 03
U.S . at 72 2 ) , whe n Congre s s amended the e s p i o na ge statu tes in
by addin g 18 U.S.C. 793(e) , i t inclUded i n s e ction l (b)
195
0
of the amendi ng a c t the provi so t ha t : "Nothi ng i n this Ac t s ha l l
FROH PREVIOUS PAGE
that it i s o r mi gh t be useful to the e ne my . Whoever
viol a t e s a ny s uc h pr oh ibi t ion s ha l l be pu ni s he d by
a fine o f not mo r e t h an $10 ,000 o r by i mp r i s onme n t
for not mo r e tha n 10 ye a r s , 9r bot h : Provide d ,
that nothing in thi s s ecti on . s hall be c onstrue d
to l i mi t or r est r i c t a n y disc u s sion , c omme n t , or
cri ticism o f the acts or pol ici e s o f t he Gove r nment
or its r e pr e s e n t a t i ve s or the pub l i c ati on o f t he
same .
55 Co ngo Rec . 1763 (1917) . The prov i sion wa s defe a t e d , i n p a r t
bec a us e of FirstAmendment ob j e ctions . 403 U.S . at 72 2 (o p i nion
of Mr . Jus tice Doug l a s ) ; Edgar and Sc hmi d t , The Es p iona ge Statute s
and publ ica tion of Defense Information, 73 Co l . L. Rev. 92 9, 959- 60
(1973) .
.: .. :0::- "
474
be cons trued t o requi r e , Or es t a blish mi litary or
civi l i an ce ns or s hi p or i n a ny way t o l i mit or infr i nge upon
freedom o f t he press or o f speech as guara nt eed by t he Cons ti_
t ut i on o f the United States a nd no r egul ati on s ha l l be pr omul gat ed
he r e und e r havi ng tha t e ff ec t . "
64 Stat. 987 (19 50) . Thi s r eCor d
of i nacti on l e ad I1r . Justice Douglas , with whom Mr. Justi ce Bl ack
joined , to s tate i n much the same fashi on as Jus tice s ' White ,
St ewa rt, and Ma rsha l l tha t " t her e i s, mor eover , no s tat ut e
barring t he publication by t he press of the ma teri al which the
Times and the Post s eck to us e . ... Congre s s has been f ai t hf ul to
t he command of the Fi r s t Amen dment in t hi s
a rea.II
403 U.S . at
720, 722.
Furthe rmore, Congress ha s en act ed s ta t u tes whi ch a ut hor i ze
court proceedings t o e n j oi n the publication of narrow: y de f i ned
cat eg or i e s of information . The At omi c Energy Ac t , 42 U. S. C.
S 2280 , a uthori zes t he At t or ney Gene ral t o seek inj unctions
against the discl osure of atomi c energy i nformati on.
Congr es s,
howeve r, has never granted this authority t o the executive branch
*j
with r e s pe c t t o informa tion r el a t i ng to the CI A.- It is true
*/Indeed, 19 74, when Mr. Will i am E. Col by , then Direc t or of
Central I ntel l i ge nce reques ted l e gisl ati on whi c h would author i ze
injunc t ions aga i nst di s c losure , he acknowledged that " the r e i s
no existing s t a t ut or y a uthori t y for injunctive relief . " Howev er,
de s pi t e the fact that s uch legislation was s ubmitted as r e ce nt l y
as 1975 by President 'Fird, Congr e s s has not act ed.
475
L con gr e s s ha s charged the Director of Cen t r a l Inl ., llige nce

, h t hc r e s pOlu;ibil ity f or "pr.ot e ct i ng i nt e ll i ge nce sour.ce s 'a nd

t hodS f rom una u t ho r i zed discl osure . " 50 U. S . C. 403 (d ) ( 3).
", at statute docs no t, howcvor , "authorize the remedy
,9.1i ns t thr e a t e ned discl osure . " 403 U.S. a t 740 (opi ni on of
lit. J us t i ce , \'1hite ) . To pr ovLdc s uch a ut hori zation , t he r e mus t
"a speci fic l aw aut hor i zing civi l proceedings i n fh is fi e l d . "
U. S. at 730 (opi ni on of Mr. Just i ce Stewa r t ) . I f s uc h a l aw
_r
e
passed , "the cou rts woul d likewi s e have the du t y to decide
con s t i t ut i onal i t y of s uch a l aw a s wel l a s its appl icabi l i t y
to th e facts proved . "
There is no di s pu t e tha t t he CIA pos s ess es inf or mati on wh i ch
protecti on. Howe ver -- a t l e ast in the abs e nce of a
congres sional decision to t he contrary - - our l e ga l s ystem
proscribes the pUblication of information, if at all, through
criminal sanctions ra ther than thr ough prior r estraints . "[A]
free s oc iet y prefer s t o punish the f ew who abus e rights o f s pee ch
after they break the l aw than t o thrott le them and all ot he r s
beforehand. " Southe ast Pr omo t i ons , v. Conrad, 420 U.S . 546,
559 (1975) (empha s i s i n original ) . The Cour t of Appe a l s for the
District of Col umbi a Circui t has recently su mmarized t he rea s ons
.Ior this preference:,
,An admini s trat i ve censorshi p s cheme pr ovi de s
less prot e c t i on f or expression than a sys t em of s ubse-
que nt punishment because i t permits sanctions to be
impos ed for failure to obtain t he censor 's ap prova l ,
regard l es s of the na ture of t he e xpre s s ion . Expr e s s i on
may be punished in a censorship scheme upon pr oof of
one fact -- the f a i l ur e to ob tai n prior approval. A
would- be spea ker t hus cannot i gnore t he censor , f or
later he wi l l be una b l e to de f e nd hi s exp r e s s i on on
the ground tha t itpo sed no dange r and theref ore t he
censor c ou l d no t have suppres sed it cons i ste nt wi th
-r .... :,:::." \
477
476
t he Fi rst Ame ndment. Se e Poul o s v , He w Ilznnps hi rc,
U. S . 395 , (1 95 3-) -.- In c ont rn st , under a system
o f " sub s equen t pun i s hruon t , the s t a t c mu st shovr i n each
c a s e t ha t t he pert i c ul a r e xp r e s si on whi c h t he at at;c
s eek s to p uni sh d i d i n f act pose a n i mme d iat e t h r e a t
t.o a n i nt.er est whi c h t he s tate has il r i gh t t o p rot o ct .
Se c Landma rk Communi c il t i o n Inc . v. Vi rginia , 435 U.S .
829 , 843- 44 (1 97 8) . * I'lhe r e t.h e r e:;triction i s by
cri mi na l l aw, of c o ur so , th e burdc J) i s on t he s t a t e
to pr o ve that t he s peec h d i d in f a c t pos e a g reat
danger.
In Re Ade le Ha lki n , No. 77-131 3 , Slip 01' _ u t 12- 12 n ..1 5 (D.C .
Cir., Feb. 1 9, 1 979).
Congre s s has e nac ted a c r i mi n al s tatut e whi c h pose s a
subs t a nti al d e t erre n t t o a ny for me r CIA e mploye e c ommuni c a t i n9
info r ma t ion which he l e a r ne d in the c our s e of h i s e mpl oyme nt .
18 U.S.C. 7 93( d) provi d e s:
Whoe ve r , l a wfu l l y ha vi ng pos s e ssi on of , a cce s s to ,
c ont rol over , o r be i ng ent rus t e d wi th a ny do cume n t ,
writ i ng, code book , s i gnal book , ske tch, pho t o graph ,
pho t o gr a p hi c ne ga t i ve, b l ue print , p l a n , map , n ode l ,
instrument, a p p l iance, o r note r e l a t i ng t o t he
n ati ona l de f ense , or i n forma t i o n rel ating t o t he
n a t iona l d efense whi c h i n f o r ma t lon t he po s s e s s or
h a s r e a s o n t o be11eve cou l d be us e d t o t he 1nJ u r y
of the Uni t e d Sta t e s o r t o t he adva n t a ge o f a ny f o r e ian
w1llfully communi c a t e s , de 11 vers , t r a n s m1t s
or c aus e s to be deli vered, o r tra ns-
mi t ted o r atte mp t s t o d eli ver, tra n smit
or c a u s e t o be c o mmun icate d, de l i ve red o r t ransmi t t e d
the s a me t o any pe r son not e n t i t l e d t o r e c e i ve i t , or
willfUll y retains t he s ame a nd f ails to de l i ve r 1t
on d emand to the o f fice r o r e mp l oye e of t he United
States e nti tled to re c ei ve i t --
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 o r im-
p ri s o ned no IT.o re' t ha n ten years, o r both. (emphasis
ad ded).
Similarly , Congress h a s a lso enacted a statute whi c h pos e s
a s ubs t a n t i a l deterren t to anyone who might pUb lish i n f o r ma t i on' from
a f o rme r CIA emp l oy e e . 1 8 U.S.C. S 793(e) provides:
tlhoGv e r 01., a cce ss
t o , o r c o nt r ol o ver ilny do cumclIt , c ode book ,
s i g na l book , s kct ch , photograph , phot ographic nc qat i.v c ,
bl ll c pr i nt , pl an, map , model , ins t rument , appJ.iunce , or
no t e r e l a t i ng Lo the na t i o nal defe nse , or i n for mo t i on
r elu t i ng t o the na t ional dcf cnuc, whi ch infOi.'iiiatTOrlthe
po s s e s s o r has reason to bell eve c ou ld be us e d to the
i nJur y o f Un1tcd States or to the advantuge ot
f orci qn na t i on, w1l lfu l ly communi cat.es , del ivers, trans -
mi !.::> or c aus e s to be commun i ca t.c-d , de l i ve red , or trans -
mi t te d o r attempts to communi cate, deli ver, transmit
o r cause t o be c ommuni c Cl t e d, de l i vered , or tran smitt ed
t h e s ame t o an per s on not e nt i t led t o rece ive i t , o r
w1ll fully reta1ns the same a nd fa1 ls to de11ve r 1t to
t h e officer or emp loye e o f the Uni t ed States entitled
t o r e c e i v e i t --
Sha l l be f ined not more than $10 ,000 or i mpri s oned
no t more than t e n year s , or both. (e mpha s i s added ) .
ThUS, t he CI A cannot c o nt e nd t h a t its interests i n the s ecur i t y
of its ge nu i ne l y sensitive inf or ma t i o n have b een neglected by
t he Co ng r e ss.
Nonethel ess , the CI A insi s ts that i t must have the right
of p r e - p ub l i c a t i o n review because only t he ' Agne c y i s i n a position
t o kn ow wha t i s trul y sensitive. The CI A is unwi l l i ng to r e l y
on t he det e rrenc e o f t he c r i mi na l c ode a nd t he j ud gment of its
forme r emp loyees, even t hough t he y a re t r a i ne d and experienced
*/
i n d i s t ingui s hi ng s e n siti ve from non-sens i t ive i n f ormat i o n.- The
*/The Fo urth Ci rcui t Court o f Appea ls has a c c e p t e d thi s v iew.
"One ma y speculate that ordinary crimina l sanct ions might suf fi c e
t o pr e ve n t u nauthor i z e d di s closur e o f s uc h i n format ion , b ut t he
r i s k of harm f rom disclosure is s o g reat a nd maintenance o f t he
confi de n t i a l i t y o f the i n f o r ma t i on s o necessary t hat gr eate r a nd
more pos i t ive a ssuranc e i s wa rranted. " Uni ted States v. Marchet t i,
' 466 F . 2d 13 09, 1 317 ( 4t h Ci r . ) , c ert . d e n i e d , 40 9 U. S. 1 063 (19 72).
However , i t shoul d be no t e d t h a t t h 1s s tatement was ma de i n t he
c on t e x t of a cas e where a for mer CI A emp l oyee had i n t he p a s t di s -
clos e d c l a s s i f i e d informa tion a nd c l a i me d t he right t o di s c l os e
Such i n f o r ma t ion i n t he f u t ur e . I d . a t 13i 3.
. _ 0'

478
CIA ' s view, however , ha s been decis ively rej e cted by Chief J ud ge
J . Ske l ly Wright o f the Uni t e d States Cour.t o f Appeal s for t he
District o f Co l umbia in a dissent which wa s u l t i ma t ely v i nd i cated
by the Court of Appe al s e n bane a nd the Su pr. e me Court :
It i s sai d that i t i s be t ter t o r ely on t he
j ud gme n t o f our gove rnmen t o f f i c ials t ha n upon the
j ud gme n t of p r i vate c itizens s uc h as the p ub l ishers
o f the Pos t . Aga in , that mis s e s
poi nt . The Amendment i s d irected a gainst one
e vi l: sup pre s s i on of the speech o f priva t e c iti zens
by government o f f i c i a l s . I t e mbodi es a he al thy di s -
trus t of gov ernmen t al c e n sorship. Mor e i mpo r t a n t l y ,
it e mbod ies a fund amental trus t o f individua l Amer i c a ns .
Any fr ee s y stem o f gove rnme nt involves ri sks. But
we in the United States have c ho s e n t o r e ly in the
e nd upon the judgment a nd t r ue pa t r i o t ism of a l l
the people, not on ly of the of fi c i al s .
Uni ted States v . Washingt on Po st, 446 F .2d 1322, 1 326 (D. C. Ci r .
"/
1971). - We c onc ur i n t ha t view.
*/In tha t case, a pane l o f t he Co u r t o f Appea l s gra nt ed a
tempo r ary in junc t i on pending a ppeal of t he di s t r ict c o urt 's
deni a l o f a n i n j un c t i on agai nst p ubl icat i on o f t he Pentagon
Pape rs. The fol l owi ng day, t he c o ur t en ba ne a f f i r me d the
dis tric t cour t 's d e c i s i on , 44 6 F.2d l 327,-and one week lat e r
the Supreme Cour t a f firmed t he jUdgment o f t he Court of Appeals .
New York Times Co . v . United St a t e s , s upra , 403 U. S. 71 4 .
!:
479
II I . Til E CIA ' s SYSTEM OF PRIOn RESTRIIIWf I S AN UNI:EIISONII13LP.
DURDEN ON PLAINTIFFS ' t' IHST IIMEllDm': N'f RI GHTS .
Even i f the CI II ' s sys tem o f prior. r e s tra i n t was l e g i s l at i vely
auth o r i z e d , i t woul d s t i l l impos e a n u n r e a s ona b l e bu rde n o n the
Fi r s t IIme ndme nt ri gh t s of f orme r e mp l oy e e s a nd t he publ i c. Fi r s t ,
it p l a c e s t he powe r of c e ns o r s hi p i n t he ha nd s o f t ho s e who ma y
be c r it i c i z e d and emba r rass e d by the publicat ion. li s ' t he Unit e d
s t a t e s Court of Appe a l s f or t he Di strict o f Columb i a Ci r c ui t
has r e c e n t l y obs erve d , "[ g) ov e r nme n t o f f i c i a l s who wo uld not
stoop t o mi s r e p r e s en t a t i on may r ef lect a n i n he r e n t tendency to
resi st di scl os u r e ... " Ray v. Turne r, No . 7 7- 14 01 , Sli p 01'. a t
17 (D. C. Cir . , Aug. 24, 1 97 8) . This "na t ur a l inclina t i o n " [ i d. )
is ine v i t a b l y the mos t pronounc ed a nd pernicious when the r e v i e wi ng
off ici al s' age nc y i s u nd er attack. I nd e e d, e ven t he Attorney
Gen e r al has be e n quot e d as saying that t he r e a r e "ways t o ma ke
the [CI II) c o nt r a c t more reasonable" a nd that he wo uld c on s i de r
propos als tha t s ome ou t sid e a ge nc y wo uld d o t he r e vi ewi ng . The
New Yor k Time s, p. A- 9 31, 1978) .
Seco nd , t he sta nd ards by wh i c h the CI A' s r e view a re c onducte d
are unr e a s ona bl y vague . As s umi ng t ha t t he Agency onl y de l e t e s
clas s ifi e d i n f o rmati on , t h a t t e r m i s too i mpr e c i s e to pr ovi de
an e xc e p tabl e ya r ds t i c k in a n a r e a invo l v i ng t he Fi rs t Amendment.
Under Exe c ut i ve Or d e r 12065 , "Nat i ona l Secur i ty I n f o r ma t i on " ,
the l owe s t l e ve l o f c l ass i f i c a t i o n i s defi ned as "inf ormati on,
the una uthori z ed di s c l o s u r e o f whi ch' r e aso na b l y c ou l d be expe c t e d
to c a use i de n t i fi a ble da ma ge t o t he nat i o nai s e c u r i t y . " Se c t i on
1-104 , E.O . 12 065 . 4 3 Fe d . Reg . 28 950 (July 3 . 19 78 ) . The
,.' ..
480
Supreme Court h a s r epealedly he l d l ha t where governmen t r e g ul a t i o ns
affect First Amendment a ctivi t y , " [p J r eci sion of r e gu lati on
mustb e the touchsto ne in a n area 50 c lose l y t ouchi n g ou r
mos t precious freedoms ." NAACP v. Bu tlon , 37 1 U. S . 41 9 , 43 B
(1 96 3), a nd a ny l i c e ns i n g aut ho r i ty must be g uided by "na rro" ,
obj ective a n d d efin ite sta ndards . " ShuttleSlwrth v. Birmi ngham,
3 94 U. S . 1 47 , 151 (1 969 ) . Shelton v. Tucker, 36 4 U. S . 4 79, 4 BB
( 1960 ).
Th e Execut i ve Orde r d e finiti on o f cl a ssi f i e d i n f o r ma t i on ,
while suitable f o r o t he r purpos es , fa ils to proved the r e q u i s i t e
precisio n f o r the system o f pri o r restra i n t wh ich the secrecy
a g reement i mp o s e s . There may be many items o f i n f o r mati on t he
"discl osu r e o f wh ich reaso n a b l y could be expect ed t o c a us e
i de nti fi a ble d a mage t o t h e n ati on a l securi ty , " and yet t h e i r
d isclosure wo uld not i n fac t have any de letor i us effect . Pro-
c eedi ng u nder this vague and i mpr e c i s e standa rd, t h e CI A cen s or s
are "set a drif t on a boundl q s s sea. " J o s e ph Burs tyn , Inc. v.
Wi l s o n , 343 U.S. 495 , 504 ( 1952). Th i s s tan d ard i s t h e r e f ore
. infect ed wi th the v i ce o f vaguenes s - - i t f ai ls to pu t t h e a u t hor
on noti c e of p recise ly what i n f o rma t i o n i s pro s cribed, a nd it fai l s t o
establ ish clear g ui d e l ines for .t h e c e nso r wh ich will preven t
arb i trary and d iscrimi nator y de let i ons . Smi t h v. Go guen , 414
U. S . 566 , 57 2- 73 (1974); Gr a y ne d v. Ci t y o f Ro c k f o r d , 40 B U.S .
1 04, 1 0B-0 9 ( 1972 ) .
Third, the CIA's sys tem o f p r i o r r e s t rai n t i s unr e a sonab l e
because it i s under-inclusive. "Under-incl u si on o ccurs whe n a
state b enef its o r burd ens persons i n a manner that f ur t hers a
legitimate public purpose bu t d o e s not confe r t h i s same benefit
481
or pl a c e this s ame b u r d e n on o th. \.'110 arc s i rmL ar l y t u a t ed , "
No t e , De vel o pme nt s in t he IJOW - J:' : \:;\ 1 Protecti on, 82 Il a r v , L. Rev .
10 6 5 , 1 0B4 (1 96 9 ) . Dep ilrtment v. rlo sel 't., 40B
U: 5 . 92 ( 1972 ) ; Rinaldi v. Ye aqo r , 384 U.S. 30 5 (196 6 ) . The
gove r nme n t emp loyes t ens of lhou s a nd s of pers ons in t he Departmen t
o f De f e n s e , the mi l itar y s ervi c es, the State De partmen t , the \-Ihi te
1I0u s e s taf f , and o the r a gencies who ilrc similarly situated to
CI A emp l oy e e s in that they ha v e a c c e s s to hi ghly sens itive
inf or ma t i o n - - ind e e d even infor ma t i on gathered by t he CIA . I!mlever ,
only CI A e mp loye e s a re s ubjec ted t o a system of prio r r estraint
ov e r their wr iting s . Thi s di scri mi natio n bet"een CI A employees
and all other government e mploye e s wi th access t o cla ssi fi e d
i n f or ma t i o n doe s not survive the scr ut iny whi ch t he First Amendment
de ma n d s . When s u ch a dis tinction abr idges :a fund a me ntal ri ght
s uch a s the First Amendmen t , it i s s ub jec t t o s trict and exact ing
s cru t i ny . Elrod v. Bur ns , 42 7 U. S . at 362 ; Buckl e y v . Val eo,
sup r a , 424 U.S. at 362; NAACP v. Alabama, s upra , 357 U.S . a t 460- 61 .
The i n f i r mi t y of the disparate t r e a t me n t of CI A employees
i s d e mons t rate d by the Co ur t ' s anal ysis in Ca rring t on v . Rash,
380 U.S. 89 (1965). The s t a t e of Texas p r oh i b i t e d members of
the Armed Forces who moved to Texas in th e course of thei r mili tary
duty from vot ing i n state e lect ions. One of the j ustifications
offere d f o r thi s prohibiti on was that t h e s t a t e had "a valid
i n t e r e s t i n pro tecting t h e f ran c h i s e from infi ltration by transients,
and i t can reas o n abl y as sume
the const i tutional exclusion
short period o f t i me . " Id.
that. th o s e s ervi c e men who fal l within
wi l l be within t he Sta t e for only a
at 93. The Court re jected this
,. :t.
482
rationa le and f o und the prohibition t o be an invidious di o-
criminati on, in pa r t , b ecaus e i t wa s un der- inc l usive : "S t ude n t s
at colleges and un iversiti e s i ll Texas , pat.i e nt s i n ho spita l s and
o t he r i n s i tutions wi thi n t he st et o , a nd c i v i lian emp loyee s
of t he Uni t e d St ates Gover nme n t may be a s transi ent as mi litary
pe r sonne l . " I d. a t 95 . The CIA ' s system of prior r e stra i nt i s
a lso an i nvi d i ou s discr imination aga ins t i t s emp loyees who are
s i milar si tuat ed wi th t e n s of t ho us a nds o f government emp loye e s
whose Fi r st Amendme n t r ight s are not s imi lar ly bur d ened .
Fo urth, t he CI A sys tem of pri o r r e s t r a i n t i s i r rat i o na l
becaus e i t a pplie s t o wr i t i ngs but no t t o spee c h whi c h can ha ve
jus t as ser ious - - and per haps mor e seri ous - - c ons e q uenc e s a s
wr i t ings . The gove r nme n t holds the pos i t i o n t ha t the CI A's pre-
publi c ati on r e q u i r e me n t is nece s s a r y i n o r de r t o a ssur e i t s sourc es
o f i nforma t i o n that i n f o r mation provi ded t o the Agency wi l l not
be di s c l o sed without a uthorizat i o n. Howe ve r , t he gove r nment al s o
conce des that the re i s no requ iremen t for CIA e mp loye e s to obtain
pr i o r approval for t he i r and that t he Age ncy depend s
on i ts e mployees' jud gme n t a nd d i scre t i o n t o a vo i d speaking
a b o ut mat ter s whi ch wo u l d be da ma g ing to t he na t i ona l securi t y .
I n i t s b rief i n t h e Co ur t o f App e a l s i n t he case, the
Uni ted Stat e s stated:
Of c ouise, CIA employees mu s t be a bl e t o di s -
, t i ng ui sh between c las s i f i e d a nd unc lassified
i n f o rmatio n in t he c onduc t of t he i r r outine
official a nd p ersonal a cti v i ties . Howe v er,
the obvio us necessi t y t o ent r u s t CIA e m-
ployees o r e x- emp l o ye e s wi t h t he d iscretion
to make judgments i n t he s e areas , un de r t he
supervi sion o f supe rior o ff icer s a nd o f t e n
circumscribed by written direct i v es, doe s
not p r e s e n t t he same r i s ks as t he unre vi e wed
publication of a wr i t t e n work by a f o rme r
employee .
483
Bd e f of Appe l.l e e , lIni t.e d States v . Sllepp , No . 7 8-16 51 ( 4t h
c i r . ) .
The i r r a t iona l i t y of thi s sys t e m i s mani fes t . A f o r me r
CIl, o ffi c i a l i s f ree t o make a t elevi sion program i n wh ich he
may speak at l e ng t h about t he CIA , b ut i f he wr i t e s a book abou t
the s ame t op i c , he must s ubmi t i t f or CIA c e ns or s hi p -.' The
irra t i ona l i t y is unde r s c o r e d by t he f act t ha t t he t e l evi s i on
prog r am he i s f r e e to make is l i ke l y to r e a c h a wide r a udi e nc e
than t he bo ok he i s obl iged to s ubmit. Th u s , i f a ny
CIA s our c e i s d e t erre d by t he Age n c y' s i na b i l i t y to e xer cise
compl e t e c ontro l ov e r d i scl os u r e o f inf o r ma t ion by i t s e x-
empl oy e e s , t he s o urce wi l l b e fa r mor e d e t e r r e d by t he grea ter
di s s emi na t i o n whi ch i s pos sibl e through a program than
a b ook . Such a n irra tiona l means o f achi eving the CI A' s s tated
pur pos e c a nnot survi v e s t r i c t a nd e xac ting scr ut i ny u nde r the
First Amendme n t .
Fi fth, there is that in re v i e wi ng book s , the
Agency de lete s i nfor mation whi c h d o e s no t r e q ui r e delet i o n. The
for me r Gen eral Counsel o f t he CI A who wa s i n vo lved i n t he r eview
of Th e CI A And The Cult Of I nte l li gence by Vi ctor Ma rchet t i and
John Marks d e scri b e d t hat pr o c ess in an a rti c le rec oun t i ng t he
Marchetti litigation:
There was car e ful c onsideration o f whi c h
i tems, a l thoug h classi fied , we r e so widely
k nown tha t no s e r i ous harm wo ul d r e sul t from
publi c a t i on . [Dire ctor o f Ce n t ral I n telli gencel
Co lby made the de c i s i on we shou ld pro c e e d
to l ist a l l cl a s sifi e d ite ms c o ns i s t ent wi t h
t he langua ge of t he injunct i o n , wi t h the v i e w
t ha t a t a later d ate , pos s ibly a t t r i a l , CIA
wo uld wi t hd r aw on t he s of t er i t ems .
-r :' :;./::
II r
484
Warner, The Marchetti Ca s e: New Cos e Law, Studie s in I ntell igence,
p . G.
The scop e of this gamesmanshi p wa s massive. Aft er its
f irst review o f the manuscript , the CIA demanded t hat 339 it ems
be del eted. After a round o f ne got iat ing with Ma r chetti ,
the Agency wi thdrew i t s ob jec tions to 114 " s of t " items . at
7. "La ter a fter a thor ough revi ew of t he r ema ini ng
a nd more care f ul study by the four deputies and the l awye r s as
t o what t hey would face as wi tne sses i n the a ctua l tri a l , CIA
wi t hdrew a nother 57 i t ems , l eavi ng I G8 deletions on whi ch CI A
s t ood fa s t". However , at t r i a l , t he di strict jUdge upheld
t he CI A on onl y 26 of th e I G8 which we re i n di s pu t e . I d.
*/ --
at 8. - I t thus appe ars t ha t rat he r than maki ng pri nci pl e d
de c i s i ons a s t o wha t can ' be pu bl i s hed , t he CI A wi t hhol ds i t ems
t hat no l onge r mer i t c l assi f icat ion so t ha t it can ama s s bar-
ga i ni ng chips for us e i n litigati on .
Si xt h , t he avai l ability of j udicia l r evi ew of CI A
dema nded dele t i ons do e s not ameli orate t he inj ur y to Fi r s t
Amendment r i ghts. The go vernmen t c ontends tha t pre- publ ication
revi ew by t he CI A is r ea s onable becau s e t he aut hor can seek
judicial revi ew o f an y de let i ons whi ch he f ee l s ar e unwar r a nt ed .
Court o f Appea ls f or t he Fourt h Circuit reve rsed t hi s
,deci sion on t he gr ound tha t t he di s trict j duge had ap plied an
imp roper standa r d of r evi ew. Alfred A. Knoe f , Inc . v . Co l by ,
509 F.2d 1362, 1368- 69 (4t h Ci r.) c ert. den1ed , 421 U. S. 992
(1 975). However , i n l ight of recen t opi ni ons cons t r ui ng t he
r equirement o f de novo j udici a l r evi ew unde r t he FOI A, i t now
appe ars t ha t the-di stri ct j udge i n Knopf ap pl ied t he correct
standard of review. See Ray v. Tur ne r , s upr a .
485
'1'h
i 5
cont ent i on is wi t.hout; mer i t , for j udi c La L pr ior res traints \
arc jus t a s r epugnant t o the First Amendment a s administrative
r i o r restr a i n t s . Car r ol l v. PrC' s i dc nt and Commi s s i one r s of \
P
\
prince " s linne, 393 U. S. 175; In IIde ) c HaIkin , s upra ,
:----
No. 75- 1773. As Mr . J us tice Drennan wrote in the New York Time s
uni t e d Sta tes , 403 U. S. a t 7 7.5-2G.
The e r r or that has pe rvade d the s e ca s e s'
f rom t he out set was the granting of an y i njunct ive
r e l i e f wha tsoever , i nter i m or othcrwLs e , The en -
t.i r e thrust of the Government ' s c l a i m t.hroughout
t he se ca se s ha s be en t.hat. pUbl ica t ion of t.he
material s ought to be e njoined II c o ul d , 1I or "might,"
or "may" prej udice the nat iona l intere st i n variou s
ways. But the First Amendment tolera t e s absol utel y
no prior judicial restraints o f the press predi cated
upon s urmi se or conj e c t ur e t hat untoward conseq uence s
may result .
Si mil a r l y , Hr. J us t i ce Black wrote tha t "every moment's continuance
of the inj unc t i ons against these newspapers amounts to a f lagrant,
i nde f e ns i bl e and cont i nui ng vi olation of t he First Jlmen dment. ,.
403 U. S. at 715. IIccor di ngl y , j udici a l r e stra i nt of publ i cat ion
i s pe r mi s s i bl e only where pu blication "wi l l surely result i n
di r ec t , i mmedi at e , and irr epa r abl e damage ot our Nation or its
*/
peopl e . " 403 U. S. at 730 (opinion of Mr. J us t i ce stewa r t ) . -
'IJ udge W11kev 1n hi s dissent in In Re Adele Halkin has summarized
t he s t r i c t sta ndard whi ch i n his view 1S appl icable t o judi cial
re s t r a i n t s on t he pub l ication of i nf or mat i on other t han
obtained in dis covery:
Thre e f e at ur e s of t hi s s tric t standar d have been
s tr e s sed : (1) insist ence on an ex ceedingly hi gh probabili -
!l - - bor de r i ng on cer t a inty - - tha t t he harm pred1cted w111
materialize un less t he r e is a prior r e s t r a i n t ; (2) i nsi s t enc e
t hat the ha rm predict ed be s e r i ous and i rreparable and that
t he compe t i ng 1nt e r e s t s at stake be s ubst ant l a l , a t least
approach ing in d1gn1ty t he F1rst Amendment 1n teres ts sought
t o be cur t a i l ed ; and ( 3) i ns i s t e nce that the cour t s make
f or mal an d s pe c i fic factual f i nd i ngs and art i c ulate t he s e
f indings in some detai l.
Slip Op. a t 10- 11 (empha s i s in ori ginal )
Om1tted )
486
norcovc r , the del ay and cost involved in obtaining judi ci al
r evi ew o f CI II de l eti ons ropr c-scnt anot he r gr.o s s infr ingemen t of
First IImendment rights. t' p.hr a "k a Pr e "s IIs"oci. ation v . Stua rt,
427 U. S. at 559; Ca r r oll v . Pr e s i de nt and Commi " s ioners of Prince " s
Anne, s upr a , 393 U. S. a t 18 2; ,'Iood v. Georgia , 370 U. S. 375, 391- 92
(1962); nddges v. Cali f or ni a , 314 U. S. 252, 268-69 (1 941) . In thi s
regard t he }(nopf litiga tion i s i ns t r uc t i ve . Pursuant. to t he cour t ' s
ordcr in Uni t ed State s v . Ma r che t ti, I1r : Marc hetti s ubmitted hi s
manus cript t o t he CIA on August 27 , 1973. The ensuing process of
CI A negoti ation , final IIgency action , district court
litigaiton, ap pella t e i s s uance of a fina l order l a s t ed
un ti l October 22, 197 5. Indeed, thi s pr otract ed proce ss became
s o burde ns ome t o the authors an d publi she r s that they pub li s hed
thei r book with the 168 deletions in mid- 1974 , after t he distri ct
cour t proce edings, but be for e t he deci sion by the .Court of Appeal s.
Ma r che t t i and Ma rks , The CI A And The Cul t Of Intelli gen ce, xxvi (1974) .
IV. CIA EMPLOYEES DO NOT WAIVE THEI R FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
BY ACCEPTING EMPLOYMENT InTIl THE CI A AND SIGNING TilE
AGENCY 'S SECRECY AGREEMENTS.
The government cont e nd s t hat by accept ing employment with
the CIA and by signing the Agency's s ecrecy documents, indivi duals
vo l untar ily a gree to the diminut i on of the i r
First Amendmen t r i ght s . Indeed, t he Fourt h Ci r cui t Court of Appea l s
accepted this cont ention i n Marchetti and Knopf. Thi s posi ti on,
however, is in direct conf lict with ma ny decisions of the Supreme.
Court.
487
In KP.yi shi an v . lid. of TIcqcn t." of New Yor k , u . g . 589 ,
t he cour t stat ed that "colls t i t uti ona l doctrine . . . ha s
605 (1%7),
pub lic employment... may be
rej ec t ed [ t he ] pr emise . . . t hat
of co ns t i t ut i onal right " which
condi t i oncd upon t he surrender
similar. ly,
coul d not be abr idged by di r ect govC' rnmcnt ac t i on . "
in B r od v. Durns , 427 U. S. 347, 398 n. ll (197 6), t he Cour t noted
t hat " l tl hi s Cour t ' s dec i s i ons have prohibited co nd itions on
publ ic be ne fits , i n t he fo r m of j obs or ot he r wi s e , dampen
tt. e e xercise gener a l l y of Fi rst Amendment r i ght s , however s l i ght
to for sake those r ights . " In
t he i nducement t o t he i nd i vidual
its
(1972) , t he cour t s umma r ized
p2r r v v - Si nderman , 408 U. S. 59 3
years which stand for the
deci s i ons ove r t he pas t t we nt y f i ve
pr opo s i t i on t ha t :
(Gove r nment l may not de ny a bene fit to a pe rson
on a ba s i s t hat i nf r i nge s his cons t i t ut i ona l l y
protect ed i.ntere stS - - espe ci a l ly , hi s i nt e r e s t
i n freedom of s pe e ch ....[Ml os t of t e n, we have
ap plied the pri nc ipa l to de ni als o f pub lic
employment .
Speci f i c a l l y , i n
408 U.S. a t 597 an d ca s e s ci t ed t he rein .
"Nor
405 U. S. 67 6, 680 (1972 ) , t he c our t s t a t e d :
Ri cha rdson,
on an oa t h t hat one has not engaged, '
may empl oyme nt be condi t i oned
or will not e ngage in protec t ed s peech ac tivit ies s uch a s . .
cr i t i c i zi ng institutions of gove r nme nt .. "
The .government , neverthe l ess, argue s that by accepting empl oy-
waive any obj e c tion to t he
ment wi t h t he CIA, for mer employees
t hey could ha ve ob jected
provi s i ons of the secr ecy agreement whi ch
The Supreme cour t
to a t t he begi nni ng o f t he i r empl oyment.
squar el y rej ec t ed s uc h waiver concepts in El r od v . Bur ns , supr a ,
-:- '- I;?;;
427 U.S. at 359 n.13:
488
The di f fi c u lty wit h t hi s argument i s t ha t
i t c omp l e t e l y s wa Ll ows t he rule . Si nce
the quaLi ficat ion may not be const Lt.ut i onaLl.y
i mpo s ed absen t an nppropria \e j us t i f i c a t i on,
t o accept the wai ver argument i s to s a y t ha t
t he government may do what i t way not do . A
f i nding of wa i ver in t his c a Ke , t herefore ,
wo ul d b e c ontra ry to our v i ew that a partisa n
j ob q uali fi c at i on a br i dge s the Fi rst Amemdme nt.
Se e Spe i ser v. Randa l l , 357 U. S. 51 3 , 52 6 (1 958 ) .
Simil arly , in Pi cke ring v . Bd . of Fduc a t i on , U. S. 56 3
(196 8) , \<here the Court hel d t ha t a t e a c her i s f r e e to c ritici ze
hi s board o f educ a t ion , t he Cour t r e ject ed the con t e nt i on t ha t
"' the t e a c he r by vi rtue of h is pu bl i c emp l oyment ha s a d uty of
l oyal t y to s up po r t h is' s upe r i o rs . . . ! " Id . at 568 . Ind e e d , the
Co ur t o f Appeals ha s r e c ently r e j e c t e d t he sugge s t i on t ha t Fi r s t
Amendment r igh ts c a n be wai ved a nd s tat e d t ha t :
Ev en where i nd i v i d ua l s h ave e ntered i nt o
expres s a gre emen t s not t o di sc los e Ce r t a i n
info r mati on, e i ther by c o ns e nt ag r eement ,
Cro s by v. Br a d s t r e e t , Co . , 31 2 F.2d 483 (2d
C1 r .) c e rt. den1ed , 373 U.S . 91 1 (19 6 3 ) ; or
by a n emp l o ymenr-con t r a c t a nd secr e c y o ath,
Uni te d Stat es v. Mar chetti , 466 F .2d 1309
(4th C1r.), cert d e nie d, 409 U.S. 106 3
(19 7 2), the court s have held th a t judi ci a l
orders enfor c ing s uch agreeme n t s are pri or
res traints impl i c ating First Ame n dme n t
ri ghts.
In Re Adele Halkin , supr a , Sl i p 01' . a t 25.
This i s no t to s a y t h at CIA emp l oyees may no t be subj ecte d
: .
to any r egulation of the i r speec h . Howeve r , as we h a ve demon-
strated above , t he r e q ui r e me nt of pre-pUb l i cation review of a ll
writings i s an unre asonabl e r e stri ct ion o n t h eir First Amendment
rights. Furthermore, t hi s ext reme b u r de n on a fundame nta l
const itutional right canno t be enforced where i t has been
e stabl ished by a n executive branc h a gency which lack s expl icit
authori z ation f rom ei ther t he Congress or the President t o
489
i mpo s e suc h a burden . Gr e e ne v . Mc Elroy , 360 U.S. (1 959);
lIilmp t on v . Sun U. S . 88 (1 976 ) [p r e si d c nti a I
o r Con gr e s s i o na l aut horizati on r cquired for agency restriction
o f right s of al i e ns ) ; Ken t v. Dul l e s , 357 U.S . 116 (1958 ).
I n t he Court c onsi dered a mi l i t a r y secur i t y
cl e a r a nc e program e stabl ished by the Depilrtment of Defens e unde r
whi c h the De p artme n t c oul d d i smi s s emp loye es without .provi ding
t he m with an opportunity to confront and refute the evidence
a ga i n s t t hem. The Co ur t held t ha t befor e itwould approve the
de ni a l o f such a funda me nt a l r i g ht , itmu st be cle a r t h at either
t he Pre s i dent o r the Congress expr essly and specif ically
authori ze d t he d e ni al :
... i t mus t be made c l e ar t h a t t he Pr eside nt o r
Congr e s s within their r e s pect i ve c on stituti on al
p o\<e r s , speci fical ly ha s d e c i de d t hat t he imposed
procedu r e s are ne c e s s ary and \<arran ted and has
a uthor i zed their us c.. . . Such de ci s i ons c a nno t
b e a ssumed by a cqui e sce nc e o r no n-action.... The y
must b e ma de explicit l y not on l y to a ssure that
indiv i d ual s are no t deprived of c he r i s he d ri ghts
unde r prec edure s not a c tua l ly a uthorized.. ..
b ut a lso becaus e e xpl i c i t act i on , especia l ly in
a r e a s o f do ubtful c on s t i t ut i onal i t y , r equi res
c are ful and purposeful c ons ide rati on by t hose
r e s pons ible f o r e na c t ing a nd i mple me nt i ng our
l aws. Wi thout exp licit a c t ion by l a\<rna ke r s ,
d e c i s i ons o f gr eat consti tuti onal i mpo r t and
effec t woul d b e rel e gate d by de f a ult t o a dmi n i -
strat ors who , under our s ys t e m of gove rnment , a re
not endowed with a utho r ity to dec i de them.
Gre e ne v . Mc El roy, supra , 36 0 U. S . a t 507 (citat ion s omi t t ed).
The Fi r s t Amendment ri ght t o p ub l i s h wi t ho ut p rior r estr aint
is a t least as funda mental a c onst itut i ona l v a lue as t he ri ght to
proc e dur a l due process wh ich was ' a t s take i n Gr e ene. Even
as s umi n g tha t t he Preside nt or Congr e s s c Quld impos e a s ystem of
prio r r estraint on CIA e mplo ye es t h rough c ont rac na i s no
490
evide nc e what s oeve r that e i t he r il uthor i t y hilS don e so .
There is no execut i ve order cstnb l is}ling S llC], a system.
I nd e e d , Pre si dent Carter recen t ly c o nsi de red a nd r ej e cte d a
pr opos a l t ha t he aut ho rize the us e o f sec r e cy agr e e ment s. I n
the fa l l o f 19 77 , the White Dou s e mad e avnila ble f or p ubli c
c omme n t a draft e xec ut i ve o r d e r o n na t i ona l secu rity i n f o r.ma t i on .
Be arings Before Th e Se n a t e Subcommi t tee On Adminis trative
Practic e and Procedure Of Th e Committ e e On The JUdi ci ary, Free dom
of I n f o lTIa t i on Ac t , 95 t h Congo 1s t Se s s . , 1010. 458-46 7 (19 7 7) ;
1 4 Weekly Compi l ation of Pr e sidential Documents, No . 26,
p. 11 94 (June 29 , 1 9 78) . One o f the provisions o f the dra ft
orde r a uthor ized a l l agency heads t o r e qui r e the s igni ng of
sec r e cy agreements as a precondition to access to c l a s s i fi e d
*/ .
i n f o rmat i on .- Tha t prov i s i on wa s sharply criticized by Me mber s
o f Congre ss and ci t i z e n gro up s . Cong o Rec. HI09 85
(dai ly e d., Oct . 1 3, 1 97 7) (re ma r ks o f Con gr e s s ma n Pr e yer ) ;
Hearings, s upra a t 469- 72 . When t h e Pre s i den t i s s ue d his new
Exec utive Order o n nat i ona l i nformat i on , No. 120 65 ,
43 Fed . Reg. 2894 9 (JUl y 3, 1 97 8) , t he secti on autho ri z ing
s ecr e cy agreements had been dele ted . Thus , t he " legislative
:1 The draf t exec ut ive o r d e r provided:
Secre cy agre e ments . - -Heads o f agencies may
requi r e the si gni ng of a s e c recy agreeme n t a s
a pr e c o ndi t ion o f acc e s s to c l a s s i f i e d i n f o r ma-
t ion . The Se c u r i ty Informa tion Of f i ce sha l l ,
in c o ordi n at i on wi t h appropriate a genci es,
deve lop a uni form secrecy agreemen t whi c h the
head s o f agencies may adopt. Se c r e c y a g r e e-
ments c ur r ent l y in f o rce need no t be r e e xe c ut e d .
Hearings, supra, at 465.
491
lli s t or y " of tl li s executive o rde r dClnODs l r il t c s t ll il t t) , e PJ:cnidont
hilB r e cently c onsi dnr e d a nd re j ect e d the t ype o f bu rden on t he
Fi r s t nmemdment r ights of government e mpl o ye e s whi c h the Cln
mai nt ai ns .
Similar l y , t he r e i s no statu te a ut ho r i z i ng t he Cln' s system
o f pri or re straint. The government c o n t e nd s t hilt t he provision
in t he National Securi ty nc t o f 19 47, wh i c h c harge s the Director
o f Central Int ellige nc e wit h the respons ibi l i ty for "p rote ct i ng
int e l l i ge nc e sourccs and met hods f r om u naut hori ze d d i s c l o s ure, "
50 U. S . C. S 403 (d ) ( 3 ) , is a Co ng r e s s i ona l autho riza tion for t he
use of s ecrec y agreements . Thi s c on t e n t i o n , howe ver , i s un founde d
beca u s e s e c t ion 40 3 (d ) ( 3 ) co n t a i ns no suffici e ntly explicit
de l e ga t i on o f a uthori ty to s up po r t the Gov ernment 's c l a i ms (1 )
tha t t he CI A can r e qui r e i t s f ormer emp loye es to submit thei r
writ i ng s for p r i o r r e v i ew a nd ( 2) that r efusal to s ubmi t t o such
a r e g i me subjects forme r e mploye e s t o inj unctive r es t rai nts a nd
civil li a b i li t y .
I n Gr e ene v. McElroy, s upr a , 36 0 u . S . a t 502-504 , t he Govern-
men t r el i ed on s i.mil a r e nabl ing stat utes and o t he r pr o vi s i on s
authori z i ng non- d i s c l os ur e o f i n f o rmati on , bu t t he Cour t f ound
that t he s e a uthori t i e s we r e not suffi ci ently expl i c i t t o autho r i ze
the cha l l e nge d p rocedure s . "Al t ho ugh t hese s tatutes ma k e it
apparent that Congre s s r eco gni z e s t he e x ist e nc e o f mi l i t a r y
secr e t s , t he y ha r d l y consti t u t e an a ut ho r i z a t i on t o c r e a t e a n
elabor ate cle ara nce program wh i c h embod i e s p r ocedures traditi onal l y
beli e ved to be i n a d e q ua t e t o p r otec t affect ed pe rsons . " I d . a t 504.
Similar ly, Congre ss in s ecti on 403( d) ( 3 ) r e c o gni ze d t he
nee d to p rot e c t i n t e l l igence sou rces and me t hods
disclos ure itd i d not a ut ho rize a n e l a bo r a t e admini strati v e
492
syc tern of prior r c s t r a i nt; over former emp loyees . Inde e d ,
the f or me r Di rector of Central Inte l l igence, wi l l i a m Col by,
c onclud e d t ha t " t he r e i s no statutory authority t o i mple me n t
thi s resp onsib ility [ i n sec t ion 40 3 (d ) (3) l ." Letter to Roy L.
Ash, J a n. 14, 1974 . Mor e over, a s we ha ve demons tra ted ,
in the Pe n t ilgo n Pa pe r " ca s e , where cl a s s i f i e d i n f o rma t i on wns
involved, f i ve Jus t i c e s joined i n vacnting t he i n j un ,?ti ons wh i c h
h ad be en i s sued on the g rou nd the r e wa s no " e xpr e s s and a p propr i a t e l y
l i mi t e d c ong r e s s i onal n uthor i zation f or p r ior r e s t r a int s in ci rcum-
stances such a s the s e . " New York Ti mes Co. v. Unite d Stut es, 403
U. S . 713, 7 31 (1971 ) (o p i ni on of Mr. Jus t i c e Whi te ).
CONCLUSI ON
For t he reasons s tated a bove , we bel ieve t hat t he CI A
sec r e cy agreeme nt s a rc unen f orc e a b l e bec a use t he y vi o l a te the
First Amendment r i ght s o f f o r mer emp l oy ees a nd the p ub lic. We
bel ieve t hat o ur po sition wi l l Ul t i ma t e l y be vi ndicated in the
c ou r t s , no t wi ths t a nd i ng t he Marche t t i de c i s ion . Ot h e r l i t i ga t i on
invo lvi ng the se issues is currently underwa y . Un i t e d States v.
supra; McGehee, et al . v. Tu r ne r, et a l., Ci v . No . 78- 2407
(D.D. C. ) . We r e c ommen d t ha t the Committe e r e f r a i n f rom a ny
l e g i s lativ e a c t i on whi l e thes e cases are pe nding . I n al l events,
.we a re opposed to the l e g i s lati ve i mp osit i o n o f a ny s ystem o f pri o r
restra i n t. We doubt that t he c o n stitu t i ona l infir mi t ies of the
CIA's cur r e nt system can be c ur e d through a l e g i s l a t e d s ys t e m.
Moreover, any such sys tem wou ld i t s e l f be subject to attack on
Firs t Amendment gr o unds .
493
we u r ge t he Commi t t e e t o consider t he Jmmo nso contribution
"hi c h f o rme r government o f f i ci nl s --unh i nder e d by any restraint
ot he r t hn n thei r own c o ns ci enc e s- - h nve made to public debate and
unde r s t a nd i ng of government pol i cies . We c hallenge anyo ne who
propo s e s prior r e straint s to de mons t rate that the scores of s uch
bOo ks have caused a n amo unt o f d a ma ge t o t h is c ountr y which
jus t i f i e s a r etre at f r om o ur fund a me n t a l a nd c he r i Rhed fr e e dom o f
spe e ch and p ub l i cat i on . We do not believe the c a s e can be made .
Fina l l y , we ur ge t he Committe e t o r e me mbe r the words of John
Mi l t on ' s grea t spe e ch in 16 4 4 at tacki ng t he sys tem of l i c e n si ng
whi c h t h e Pa r lia me nt ha d enacted : "I f i t come s to p r o hi b i ti ng ,
there is not aught more l i ke l y t o b e proh i bite d t han t r u t h
its el f. " Mi l t on 's Pros e Wr iting s, 3 8 (Eve r yma n
Ed. 1 92 7 ) .
Re s p ectfu l l y submitted ,
D. C.
J a nua r y 24, 1979
Mark H. Lynch
St af f Attorney
Ame r ican Ci vil Liberti e s Uni on
r -< Ii: ;;:'
495
494
THE USE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN LITIGATION'"
/kL.tJ .

1-"2..
HEARINGS
BEFonE Til E
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECRECY AND'DISCLOSUHE
OF THE
SELECT C01!ltlr rTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
MARCH 1, 2, 6, 1978

Printed tor the use ot the Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1978
. You. willfind itvery difficult.
:teknowledge that that may he..a problem. 'Vo
iic ncc with that. We asked the Agency-they
sur e how it came about, but in a definit ion of
'. in another contextt hatwas ra ised, and my un-
afi is we rcceiveSLn sing}e sRacp, deflni1 J
alld tCe!llqques. . -, ' L
peaks to mvbuslC concern about your statutory
theAgency"is goinrr to, I t hink-Iexpect thati t
be overprotectIve,broaderthan in almost every
-cd be in order to have'the broadest umbrella to
rnately theirresponsibility,thatis, obtaining and
to It is II. herculean t ask.
beli eve it is manageable on a. case-by-casebasis if
forth between requirements of t he law and tho
,and you wouldnot find the exact same situation
t is hard for me to generalize. Wo found every
uniquesit uation in itself. '
As you are aware, the damage assessments that
have, looked at, and I believe t hat some of them
W73, andI understandyouleftin1973
cs,sir.
\.t least some ofthe cases we looked at, andthere
I 50cases where there was a. determinationby the
age assessment th at t here was damage, and the
.ant,andvaryingdegreesof significance but none-
and there was'a general consensus that itwould
ile prosecutingifwe could prosecute.
d that, for a number of reasons-itvaried-that
ot or should notgo forward, and obviously what
ringsis how do we comeup wi th a statutory help,
st rat ive changes that would put us in a position
cute thewrongdoers and send a signal to the rest
.hat if,in fact, they do reveal certain information
.e have the desire t o prosecute, which exists now,
without further jeopardizing internal security
,only reason I mention thatis thatI t hought you
oSenator Huddleston, that in most of the cases
to prosecute, very near 10, you were able to sue-
. or didI misunderstand 1 ' ., ,: .c:'
said I could remember two cases where we de-
" thatwe could not prosecute. I do not remember
such. A great deal of our involvement, when we
ty aspects, was eit her when somet hing of ours be-
mother criminal case or a defendant in narcotics
cuti on, claimedthat we were behind them andthe
g the negative sometimes was troublesome.
with theU.S. attorneys involved in each case, we
out a.satisfactory answer and not interfere with
. ' ' " " ' 1 . '
I
/
I
496
.Senator Gentlemen; thank you very much. rr eall y appre_
ciate your t ime. .
Our next witness is Morton H. Halperin, who is the di rector of
th e Center for National Security Studies whose activities are spon_
sored by the ACLU Foundation Fund for Peace.
. Mr. Halperi n,welcome,andthankyou for takingthetimeto come
beforethis committee.
STATE1riENT OF MORTONH. HALPERIN, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
Mr. HALPERIN. Thankyou,Mr. Chairman.I am pleased to behere.
r have a prepared statement, and I would like to ask that that be
entered into the record. .
Senator BITlEx. Without objection, your ent ire statement will be
entered into the record.
[The preparedstatement ofMortonHalperinfollows:]
P REP ARED STATEMENT OF MonTON H. IIALPEIlIN,' DIRECTOR, FOR NATIOX.l.L
SECURITY STUDIES
Chai rma n, I am honored and pri vileged to appear before th is committee
t oday to present some views on t he ver y difficult and complex ma t ters with
which t his subcommitt ee is gra ppli ng. I am speaki ug on hehalf of t he Center
for Na tion al Security Studi es and the Amer ican Civil Liberti es Union.
Itmight be most useful if I simply make some comments on the issue con-
tained in t he draftst udy di stributed by the committee and th en re spond to any
questio ns that you mi ght have.
The first a nd per ha ps most Impor tant point that I would make Is t ha t I
believe that the issues involved In criminal cases are substant ially diff'ereut
f rom t hos e which are rai sed when natioual security issues develop In civi l
li t ig-ati on. I would urge, therefore, that th e committee consi der these two
Issues separately. I n criminal cases, the government has au obllzatl on not to
re ly upon clai ms of national security to interfere with t he du e pr ocess rights
of a defendant that It chooses to bring Int o cour t. In civil liti gation the gov-
ernment may he the plaintiff, the defendant, or simply a third party seeking
to prot ect information th at ot hers wi sh to obtain and make publi c.
Let me turn first to th e question of criminal cases. Th ere are two g-eneral
approaches that could be used to Reek to avoid the pr oblem of forcing the
government to choose between rele asing sensitive national security mrorma-
tion and dropping a pr osecution.
q" One key to t he mutt er Is to draft narrow statutes which do not require
gO\'ernment to prove anything about th e qua li ty of parti cular infor mat ion nnd
whi ch excludes defenses which r equire th e use of classified informat ion. }'or
cf' exa mple. and the sufficiency of th e offer of proo f. At t he end of such hearin::
the court should be required to issue an opinion dealing both with t he legal
theory and th e suffi ciency of the offer of proof.
The legislation should provide that such n ruling must be in wr iti ng and
should be subject t o an automatic right of appeal by either party prior to the
trial , both to the court of appeals and by petition to the Supreme Cour t.
Ifth e district court upholds the legal theory and the sufficiency of t he offer
of proof and the government either appeals, or turns tbe documents over to
th e defendant s. Itshould be required t o give the documents to th e court. Th",
court would then examine the documents ee parte in camera , to determine If
they are discoverable In whole or in part under Brady, Jenck; or the f ederal
rules. The court would he permitted to examine the documents Rought on nn
ee parte in camera, basis, but Itwould not be permitted to receive on an es-
parte basis affidnvit or argument in support of th e irrelevance of the doeu-
'Morton H. Hnlperln Is the di rector of th.. C..nt ..r for National Secllrlt:v
activitIes nre sponsored by tbe ACLU Foundntlon a nd tbe Fund tor Peace.
497
I"rr..r of proof. 'fhe court should be authorIzed at Its dl scretl on
.. _. I tor the def endant, and, Itnecessary, the defendant himself
.' " the advcrsary i n camera proceediug based on a pr otecti ve
. .
.
.rt n{ll'r examining the documents, finds that tb ey are dl Rcover
,. 1" notify the governm('nt and give it then an opportunity t o
'. We slate' s secrets pr ivilege, or simply to drop the prosecution.
," .. tillli that the state's secrets privilege has been properly [nvokerl.
s
,., .. Ihc gO\'ernment tbe choice of either dropping tbe case, wulvlu
,.::';l'and relcasing the documents, or appealing the ruling of the court
_ 1 " '*-' ' ,1 11(' "<lei that ill Illy view such procedures are unlikely ever to be in.\
." lhe power to prosecute officials of Intelligence agencies Is tnken
,.' _I : " ,: . ; thc Department of Justice and given t o a special prosecutor. As
.'.;.. :;;;:t attorney gcneral and his predecessors have reminded us on anum-
: ..... they are responsible for th e morale of FBI agent s and
.' " : r Inh.lllgence agen cies. Indeed, t beir abillt.y to perform certain f nnc-
, e ' to them by Congress and by the president depend on the morale
"';'. of the FBI. For that reason. there is alwnvs a conftict of
. .. :I I><' l ween the duty t o enforce the criminal laws and the uutr to have
. functioning Intelligence agency. A special pros ecutor's office
' ,'."1 I.... cn'nted whos e sole f nnction would be to monitor the activities of the
"':. r',.ne<! and to prosecnte violations of the st atutes enact ed
;,".. A model for such legislation is contained in R.n. G05!. Title VII.
. 1 ;; me turn briefly to the question of civil litigation. Here I think th e prol
." :. uot as complicated and much less needs to be done by way of legisla-
, III order to avoid any remaining uncertainty about t he matter, Coucress
"." wish to speclli cally authoriz e in camera ndversary proc('eel1ngs when the
..... , rll Invol,es the stat e' s secrets privilege, If th e court feels that such
lllcllt
proceedings are necessary to determine whether or not the prtvi leze
VI' properlY Invol,ed. The legislation should require, where the go,ernmcnt
" Il,,' \,lninti ff and seeks tbe aid of the court In enforcing its position. that
;:OI'ernmellt sbould be r equired, as it was in the Pentagon Papers ci vil
,r.,1 1111<1 In t he Marchetti case, t o turn over all relevant infor mati ou to the
.:. (oo l;Olallts under an appropriate protecti ve order preventing tbe public re -
1, ' '' ' of the information.
f hcre Is one area where I think more extensive legislation might be appro-
I believe that in situ atl ous where there are allegations of violations of
",,,"sHtnti onal rights, and where those allegations have a clear and firm rae-
Illal basls, the consequences of tnvold ng t he state's secrets privilege should hi!
then the nor mal cousequences which flow from the tnvoktnc of a n
rr hlentiary privilege in a criminal case. Where the government finds itneces-
..,ry to Invoicethe state's secret s privilege to prevent a citizen f rom litlgntill ;:
,", ssihl e violations of his or her constitutional rights. then I bell eve that n :e
of invoking the privilege should be that the violation of th e
ronst lt ut ionu1 right should be assumed to be proven f or the purpose of t1:('
llticatt on. I n such cases, whatever is done in general to amend t he Tor t Clai Jl:s
Act. the gO\'ernment should assume from any Individuals who have heen sup'\
III their personal capacity, the responsibility for paying any damages which
Inny arise out of the litigation.
This solution to the problem seems to me to deal In an appropriate way
the various concerns involved. On the one band, the $ould not ],e
reqnlred to reveal information which It has satisfied the conrt"is prot ected
the state's secrets privilege. On the other hand. the government should not
able to use the privilege to prevent a citizen from being compensntrd fo\'
jl Ol at ions of consti tutional r ight s or to prevent th e courts from granti ng in-
tllncti ve or declaratory verdicts. No barm will be done to the prlvllege or to
he purpose of the privilrge ifthe government. in appropriate cases. Is re-
to compensate individuals when it declines to contest their fa ctual
alegations where those are not based on mere suspicion.
Let me emphasize, Mr. Cha irman, tbnt these are only very
Uloul:ht s and remarks stimulated hy the ver y useful paper prepared ", t1,,'
staff. I would be glad to answer any questions that you might Ilan-,
I)' colleagues and I at the Center for National Security Studies and tll<'
498
Ameri can Clvll Lib er t ies Union look forward to working with yOll nnd
staff of the comuilttee in developing nil appropriate response to these dilllCUlt
issues. ,
. Mr. HALPEnrN. If I may, in the interests of t ime, summari ze it
briefly, and t hen I would like to make a few comments on some of
the testi mony that the committee has alr eady received.
Senator BIDEN. I would appreciate t hat. .
Mr. IL\I,PEnrN. I should say that I am speaking on behalf of the
American Civil Libert ies Union as well as the Center f or National
Security Studies. .
. I thi nk it is useful that the committee has separat ed the issue of
how to deal with criminal cases from the issue of states secrets in-
for mation and civil cases. I would urge you not t o completely lose
sight of the problems tha t I think do exist in civi l litigation and I
t hink the committee ought to consider whether something should be
done about thatas well.
. The two majorpoints thatI would make about criminal cases are
really the points that Mr. Lacovar a has made in more detail and
eloquence.Basicallythey arethesolution of theproblem,in myview,
rests largely in t he narrowing of the criminal stat utes involved so
thatthey donot require proof about the nature of t he informat ion.
The example I used in my statement has to dowith violations by
officials of intelligence agencies on the rest rict ions puton those agen-
cies. I think that such a statute could be drawn t hat would not reo
quire the release of any information.
Si milarly, asI understandthe perjurystatute,the releaseof classi-
fiedinformation beyond thatnecessary t oprove that t heperjury was
commit ted isirrelevant, either to theproof of the caseor to anypart
ofthe defense. I have never been able t ounderst and the assert ionof
t he Government that the prosecution of Mr . Helms would have
f orced the revelation of substant ial amounts of national security in-
formation, since the all eged perjury was already made public.
The second way to proceed--
SenatorRIDEN.It was made public; was itconfirmedI
Mr. HALPERIN. The Senate I nt elli gence Committ ee issued l\. de
tailed report, including quoting fro m cables.Mr. Hel ms himself,the
second ti me he testified under oath, admi tted that, in fact , he had
been involved in giving aid to Mr. Allende's opponents, one of
issues on which the alleged perjuryhadtakenplace.So thatI think
that the factual information necessary was public. In addit ion, he
testified underoath thatthe CIAdidnotsend photographersto anti-
war demonstrations to take pictures. The Rockefell er CommiSSIon
report stated the CIAhadsent agentsto such demonstratorsto t ake
pictures. so the only issue there was whether Mr . Helms knew that
at the t ime of the t esti mony.
It is hard for me to believe that information about this knowl-
edge of photographing American citizens in demonstrations in the
United States related to the national security and had to be kept
secret.
The second major point I would make about criminal cases is I
would say that there are procedures in existence which can be used
i
They were followed in the Elleberp case-which, I should say,
was on the other side, working as a consultant for the defense.
499
1 should say, Mr. Chairman, in the interests of full disclosure, I
",liS the person who originally the Pentagon papers. I am
fl sure I wantto'defend thatdecision, butI thought I would put
th
ot
llt
on the record. . . '
'fhe other major procedure-
Senator BIDEN. I think-Ihate to disappoint you, but I think
that is fairly well known. I appreciate your disclosure. .
Mr.HALPElliN. The other point I would make, another one which
Lacovara made in deta il, I think there are existi ng procedures
which will avoid this uncertainty in the middle of the trial that
.uddenly material would be released. I think it would be;useful for
Congress to codify these proceedingsin a. way that he suggests and
1 . . . ., .
I think oursuggestIOnsare essenbally compatible.There IS a Iittle
more detail in my statement, but I think essentially we are saying
the same thing.
Asto civil litigation,thereare two suggestions thatI would make,
One, that the Congress codify the procedures that have developed
having to do with the ability of the govermnentto examineex parte
incamera affidavitsin thecaseswhere thestatesecrets privilegemal
beinvolved. . ./-t
Theotherislegislationwhich I thinkshouldbe considered in con-
nection with revi sions of the tort claims net which the Judiciarv\
Committee is now considering. The amendment would provide tllllt \
inthe case of an alleged constitutional violation where the Govern-
ment asserts the secrets privilege that the Government, then, be-
comes liable ratherthan the individuals for the damages. 'Vith cer-
tainli mitat ions,the burdenwould be on the Governmentto disprove
the allegat ions if it denies information under the state secrets
privilege. . .' III
Let me,ifI may, make a few comments on whathas gone before.
I wasgladto welcomeMr. Colby intotheranksof civil libertarians.
Tthink hi sstatementdoessuggest an awareness of some of the ques-
tions that would arise in attempting, for example, to subpena the
pressin cases involvingthe proposed espionage litigation.
Let me say thatit seemsuseful to think of the espionage laws in
three areas. One, is attempts to publish leaks of information to the
press. There I would endorse very strongly what Mr. Colby said.
Namely, it is my understanding that the intent of Congress in en-
II cting the general espionage laws was that they were not intended
topunish leaks of informationto the press. They were intended only
to be used in situations where the individual made an.attempt to
aid a foreign power or hada clear reason to believe acti ons
would directly aid a forei gn power. .
. I. think that it is extremely important, in light of the Ellsberg
Sndlcfment , and in the light of the committee reportthat accompaniE's
1437. Congressshouldnot inadvertently,as itappearsto bedoing,
tnakea fundamental change in those espionagelaws which, in effect,
their use in situations of leaks where there is not intent to
InJure the United States.' .. . .
ti That was not the intent of the Congress in enacting that Iegisla-
Ionand I think we shouldnot have such0. general statute.
500
Senator BIDEX. 'Would youexplain that l \Vhcrc are we doing tnat
now?
Mr. I-lALl>ERIN. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee ac-
companying S. 1437, the revision of the Federal Criminal Code, ] l US
a which suggests that the statute under which Ellsuel'('
was indicted, U.S.C. 793 (d) and (e) in fact was i ntended to b;
used for leaks and in situations wherc there was no intent of injun
to the national security of the United States. ..
This statement was made in that committee report. I think that
that was not t he intent of Congress. Congress previously comment ing-
on the espionage laws has said that there was no statute, .general
espionage statute, punishing releasing information without an int ent
to injure the national defense.
I find that comment in the committee report extremely disturbing,
because it suggests committee endorsement of the new, find
tially dangerous, interpretation of the existing espionage statutes.
The second category has to do with the transfer of inf or mat ion
to agents of a foreign power and there the committee has had called
to its attention t he existence of U.S.C. 782(b). It can be used to
punish the secret transfer of information to a foreign power with out
making it public. . . . . .
'Ve already have on the books a statute that applies to Govern-
ment officials that give information to foreign powers. I think the
committee ought to inquire into the question of why the statute has
not, in fact, been used in the espionage indictments, that it looked
at, whefe a decision has been made not to prosecute.
The third has to do wi th the question of narrow statutes dealing
with particular kinds of informat ion. We have two such st at ut es,
really three. Two dealing with communication and codes and the
other dealing with atomic energy information.
. 'Vith regard to a "sources and met hods" statute, it is hard t o
define that reasonablv. It is eit her so narrow or so useless or so broa d
that it becomes, in effect, an official secrets act. Unless some way can
be 'found to do that, there is no way to proceed with that.
.1 appreciate the opportunity to be here. I would be glad to answer
any questions. .
Senator RIDEX. Has the American Civil Liberties Union taken all
official position on the pretrial procedures set out in your statement?
1- Mr. HALPERIN. Yes. The written statement that I presented ha s
lthp. endorsement of the American Civil Liberties Union.
Senator RIDEN. One of the options you suggested dealing with the
use of classified information was simplification of statutes so classi-
fied information is not necessary to prove the case or in rel evant
defenses. As to crimes for a violation of intelligence agencies' char-
ters would not an appropriate defense that the defendant had n good
faith belief that he was act ing pursuant to the lawful authority
bas-d on the pattern of practices as to ambiguous grounds in the pa::t.
. 'Volllrl not such a defense require the. disclosure of considerable
cl,.""ifip(l. information? ' . . .
Mr. HAT.PF.JlTN. That may ormav not be the case now. That 15
wh"ther Mr. Kearny, for example, has a defense under the st at utes
under which he is indicted. I do not know. My tendency is to think
501 _,
_ . ..J\ '.
thnt it is not a defense of burglary to say that many other people
J 'lve committed burglaries and have gotten away with it.
I'lt seems to me t hat that problem wo:uld b.e erased if qongress
II
cted
a comprehensive statute .on intelligence agenCles. Then It
"'ould be like saying to the intelligence agencies, whatever came
before, whatever may have been the practices and patterns of your
\.IChavior prior to the enactment of this legislation are no longer
relevant . The Congress is now telli ng :you in very p.recise and very
clear terms what it is that you may do and what it I S that you may
not do.
1 we say in th is legisl at ion that you need a warrant to break
[nto somebody' s house it would not be a defense to a prosecution
thnt prior to the enact ment of this legislation there was a pattern
of behavior of not getting a warrant. I
At least f or fu ture events, I think you could avoid most of this
simply by making it clear t hat the past patterns do not apply. .....
Senat or BIDEN. I s the ACLU prepared to simplify the criminal
statntes to obviate the need for classified information and consider
simplificat ion of t he espionage statutes to avoid the same problems
Mr. HALPERIN. The ACLU does not have a position on that. I will
give you my personal view.
Senat or BIDEN. I would like to hear it.
HALPERIN. I do not t hink there is any civil liberties issue in-
volved in the secret transfer of information t o agents of a foreign
power. Therefore, in my view, a deal can be done in light of
the committee's report on t he inabilit y to prosecute the various cases.
The. committee ought to look hardest at whether something should
be done which would permit the Government to prosecute in cases
of espionage without being forced to review the content of the infor-
mation involved.
As I say. I think the statute provides a basis for doing that. If
ther e have been problems in using that statute, I think one ought to
look at them and consider whether or not that statute can be modi-
fied in whatever ways are necessary to do that. .
BIDEN. You have not had an opportunity to do that up to
this point t . . . ' .
Mr. HALPERIN. I do not see what you need. That statute says, if
you are an employee of the U.S. Government and you transfer a
that. you know to be classified to somebody whom you
IS a f?relgn power or agent of a foreign power, you have com-
mitted a crime. .
Under the court of appeals decision, all you have to do is prove
those things, You have to prove the person is a Government official,
pr ove he knew the document was classified; which can come in from
testi mony that there are stamps letters on the t op and
bot tom of it and he saw it. and you have to prove that there are
those stamps, which comes from testifying as to the fact that there
\Vere stamps. .
, Th e content of the document does not have to be made public and
IS irrelevant to the prosecution. I do not understand why that statute
tannot be used .in.these cases.
,
; r ,
502
. I do not know how 't o fix: up th e statu te, because. it seem's to rue
very clear, very precise, and per fectly capable of domg- -
: . Senator I understand yonI' dilemma.
Mr. lIALrERIN. I th ink the committee ought to ask specifically
that, in t he cases that it has looked at, did t he Government conside'!,
using the stat ute If so, why was it not used
. Senator Bmn, Do you t hink t here is any mer it- you indiYidu_
ally or t he ACLU has 'taken a posit ion on attempting to work On a
definition of sources and meth ods
. Mr. lLu.rERIN. I t hink th at t he problem, the problem t here is that
I do not t hink that one can be dr afted which gIves the kind of pro-
tection even as Mr. Colby wants and is not so bro ad as to cast a
shadow on a great deal of additi onal info rmation. . .
. I do not know how t o do that. The draft legislat ion of the Senate
I nt ell igence Committee ta lks about infor mation, something t hat
would directly lead to revealing the name of an agent. I suspect that
t hat will not go far enough to sat isfy most of the peopl e who want
such legislat ion. . '
I do not kn ow how it , in f act, can be done, but my impression is
that th at is not a very seri ous problem. There have been very few
indivi duals who have gotte n access to informat ion and ha ve 'revealed
intell igence. sources and methods, and I would say for the record
that Mr. Snep p, I think, went out .of his way- - . . ' . :
: [Pause] . . . . . .
-, Sena tor The reason why I stopped you at t ha t poin t , the
staff st udy of th e damages assessments t he staff has looked at indi-
cates that there not only was a leak of substantive inf or mation in a
nu mber of cases, but th at th at release directly leads to the source
and met hod question. It identifies t he par ty.
, ,Mr. . .These are leaks t o t he press, notto agents of f or-
eign .' . ' ; ' , , .. '. ;. . .
, Senator BIDEN. Both. ' . , . ' .. . , " .
. : Mr. HALPERI)<. Where there lire leaks 't o agent s o{a foreign power,
as I say, th ose are .a, separate issue, I t hi nk we, already have,a st atute.
If we do not , I th ink It should be easy t o draft one.'
. ' The problem with the press, first of . all, my guess is that in
of th ose cases t hat leaks were by senior officials. If you look at ) 11' .
Sn epp's book he gi ves you several instances of such leaks. by Ambos-
sador Mart in and high offi cials of th e CIA in which t hat occurs and
which he says, in an effort t o prove something t o somebody,
Ambassador released information which jeopardized some of hIS
agents,' That is one of the things he is upset about..That is one of the
reasons he wrote the book. . . .. ' '. .
, 'Then ' I th ink you run into :the.' question of what is'an
disclosure. There isclearlv some level of the' U. S. Government which
has a right t o, rel ease ' infor mati on even if it is going to jeop ardize
the source. I suggest 'th at you ' are going .to run into 'questions such
. as, ,t he to a country have the, right. to .do tha t, ,does
the DIrector of Central I nt elligencej 'who ' does , ' . '. .. '
" .In many cases, I woul d suspect you ' would run.into those
problems. ::. .... " J . ... . !' .; : . , , --:: . ! , j ' ,
Second. I t hink the problem is, as you say, information that would
lead to the release of a source, if you have a general statute th at
503
J1lnkes' it n. crime an oflicial or official to publl ciz infor-
J1lation which could jeopardize an intelligence source 01' IfH:1hnd, you
",ould have an enor mous, chill ing effect on a whole body oe ill Cor-
Illation, precisely because nobody precisely knows how to dI'lL w t hat
line or precisely what t he j ury will say about t he infornrution.
I would say I do take exception to Mr. Col by's SIWgl;;,l. i IJ/l t hllt you
can define an issue of fact as an issue of law and have tho judge
decide .it, I do not think you can do that. .
I t hink the question of wheth er informat ion is an
source or met hod as it is defined is a quest ion of fad, lind J do not
think under a syst em which requires a public trial, you I;UI1 get
around it by making it a question of law. . .
If you are about a secret transfer, you can simply make It
a crime that th e thing was stamped with a special sturnp, tf) trans-
mit it. If you are talking about public disclosure, if 11 ztatute
would be unconst it ut ional it would be equa lly unconatitutional to
have t he judge make t hat det ermination in camera.
The Supreme Court, in looking at the phrase rel ated tl') the na-
tional defense in 18 U.S.C. 793 said explicity that t hat 1'\ matter
of fact and mus t go t o th e jury. I th ink t hat issue is :-.J'ltti'"l
' 1 really donot fhink you can get around it by ;.,: .
, Senator BIDEN. 'Vould it be the ACLU's position, (; \ " ::r l r we en-,
acted all the pretrial procedures su ested by you in -y',-';r paper \
that a special prosecutors' office still ,be necessary trJ handle
cases where national security is a factor I
Mr. HALPERIN.. Yes. Our f eeling about the special fJ rf....N:1ff.lr has
to do with the ' conflict between the Attorney Genera l' s as, III
fact, the Director of the FBI and his role as the person ::.'o.ke the
decision about :whether or not to prosecute. , " .
. The Attorney General has said many times in WIth
decisions 'on ,whether to' prosecute that he is concerned 70;',:. '.2'le mo-
rale of t he. FBr. is properly concerned about !:..... :"':::: the
FBI because the DIrector of the FBI conducts hi::
That produces a pure conflict of interests ' in his role "':; .. of.
t,he' l!'BI who 'on that organization, and !." con-
cerned about Its ' morale, and the deCISIOns that hI:. ....."" 'x made
about 'prosecutions which are decisions that should ;-:::!,-:'<; inde-:
of the question of whether' they adversely :::-. 1'; znorale
of t he F BI.- ' ' , .. ;..,. r ' . . ..
9
u
r view is that there is a pure conflict of reo'
qUll'es .t he,'appoint ment of' a' special prosecutor to an
criminal' activity' on th e part of the
If you look atthe experience of the Watergate
that the ' special pm.::e:-::-.::.t<_ pr:e-
WIth J!lailagmg the agency, :wi :: more
III gettmg over these allegationsthat )'OU ,,;.!'ocecd,
prosecutions becaus e it 'would reveal,
an who III the channel: of protecting In-
as well as !n thechannel for' deciding. or- .
" Senator 'BIDEN. Would' the ACLU be in favor ot ,1. prose- \
as .proposed in H.R. 61, title handling llUi
rosecutJons as well as violations of civil liberties 1 ' : , ..
504
Mr. HALPERIN. I do not think we have a position on that. I would
be glad to inquire to see whether we could get you one.
Senator DlDEN. I would appreciate that very much.
Your proposal in the civil area suggests t he development of an
analogous in camera. procedure. Do you envision such a pJ'ocec!Ul'e
being enacted by legislation 1 Second, would it be modeled af ter
rule 509 of the Rul es of Procedures proposed by the Supreme Court
in 19741
Mr. HALPERIN. I am not familiar with th at r ule. I t hink i t can
and should be, enacted by legislation to make clear, on the one hand'
the obligation of the judge to conduct as fu ll an adversary
ing as possible before he goes into any in camera proceeding j sec-
ond, to make clear that the judge does have the author ity to accept
material ex parte in camera; third, to aut horize the judge to engage
in a proceeding under a protective order when he deems it appro-
priate to do so. .
I think the judges have authority to do all of those things already.
There has been sufficient uncertainty about it in various courtrooms
so that it seems to me to be worth codifying that in the for m of
amendments to the rules of civil procedure.
Senator BIDEN. One possible problem with such a procedure, if
there is not a suffici ently high threshold for the initiation of civil
litigation .in camera or discovery proced ures, or any discovery pro-
.cedures that could be used by an adversary in frivolous litigation
to gain access to value int elli gence information, how would you re-
spond to that problem 1
Mr. HAI,PERIN. I think that is a very real problem. I would re-
spond to it by giving the judge discret.ion to engage in an ex parte
in camera examination of the mater-ial when he has doubts of
whether the claim was f rivolous or whether there was any substan-
tial basis for it or not; and to determine for himself whether there
are serious charges involved prior to any adve rsary proceeding.
Senator RIDEN. Has the ACLU drafted a procedure of threshold
as you suggested1 Do you have any draft 1
. Mr. HALPERIN. 'Ve have not. We are in the middle of litigation
on this issue, in the case involving t he NSA's intercept of national
cable traffic where the Government has invoked successfully in the
district court the state secret's privilege to refuse to confirm or deny
whether any particular individuals had their cable traffic inter-
. ' . ,
. It is our position that in that case we have exceeded whatever the
threshold is, and I would be glad to make our brief on that case
available to the committee, where we do argue the issue. . .
. Senator BIDEN. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Halperin. I appreciate your testi mony.
With your permission, we would like to-I realize you are It very
busy man-possibly get back to you with a few written questions.
_ Mr. HALPERIN. I would be glad to.
Senator BroEN. Thank you very much. .
. These hearings will be recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.
I'Thr-reupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at
tlie call of the Chair.]
505
Not ice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication
in the Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Heports. Users are requested
to noti fy the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be
sn
ade
before the bound volumes go to press.
1lhtitrll tutra <lhtltl11lf lq
t
ltNtla
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 77-1922
ADELE HALKIN, ET AL., APPELLANTS
v.
RICHARD HELMS, Department of State, ET AL.
/
No. 77-1923
. ADELE HALKIN, ET AL.
v.
RICHARD HELMS, Department of State, ET AL.
H AROLD BROWN, Secretary, Department of Defense
in his official capacity, APPELLANT
On Suggestion for Rehearing En Bane ...,
(D.C. Civil 75-1773)
Filed January 16, 1979
Bills of eosts must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. The
court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of eosts out of time.
506
Before; WRIGHT, Chief Judge, BAZELON, TAMM, LEV.
ENTHAL, ROBINSON, MACKINNON, ROBB and WILKEY,
Circuit Judges.
ORDER
The sugges tion of appellants' Adele Halkin, et al., for
rehearing en bane having been transmitted to the full
court and there not being a majority of the judges in
regularactiveser vicein favor ofhavingthis case reheard
en bane, itis
ORDERED by the court, en bane that the aforesaid
suggestion for rehearing en bane is denied.
Per Curi am
Chief Judge WRIGHT, and CircuitJudges BAZELON and
ROBINSON would grant rehearing en bane.
Statement of BAZELON,Circuit Judge, with whom
WRIGHT, Chief Judge, joins, as to why
he voted for rehearing en banco
I.
Appellantsinthiscase, individuals whowereactiveand
vocal opponents of the Vietnam War, challenge the con-
stitutionalityof certainwarrantlesssurveillance acti viti es
allegedly conducted by the National Security Agency
(NSA).1 Thegovernment, invokingan evidentiary"privi-
1 Appellantschallengetwoparticularsurveillanceoperat ions
conducted by NSA, SHAMROCK and MINARET. Both of
these projects have been described in some detail in Foreign
and Military Intelligence: Final Report of the Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect
to Intelligence Activities, S.REP. No. 94-755, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (hereinafter Senate Select Committee Report or the
Report). According to the Report, operation SHAMROCK
provided the NSA with copies of virtually all .ie1egraphic
traffic sent to, from or transitting the United States uom
507
lege" based on "state secrets" decli ned to answer cer tain
of appellants' complaint. A panel of this court
has now upheld this claim of privilege in a decision that
1945 to 1975. It was the largest government interception
program affecting Americans, dwarfing CIA's mail opening
program by comparison. Report, Bk. III at740. The second
Burveillance project, MINARET, involved the interce ti on
and dissemination of "the internal mumca ions of
seec e mencan cItIzens and groups on the basis of IS s 0
names atchlists' su hed bothergovt:l'iiment
.at739. "Theprogram apphed not only to a ege oreign
influence on domestic dissent, but also to American groups
and individuals, whose activities 'may result in civil disturb-
ances . . . .' " Id., quoting MINARET charter, 7/1/69.
Shortly after this suit was filed, the Secretary of Defense
int erposeda claim of privilege,arguingthatsimplyadmitting
or denying the plaintiffs' allegations that NSA had inter-
cepted their communications would disclose "state secrets."
After further attempts to elucidate the claim of privilege,
including thepresentation of in camera affidavits andatleast
one in camera witness, the districtcourt sustained the claim
of privilege "except as it might extend to communications
originat ed within the United States by the plaintiffs and
acquired by NSA through its operation and SHAMROCK",
Order of June 30, 1977 at 1 (App. 108), because the court
concluded "that, in view of matters which have to date been
made public about the SHAMROCK source, the claim of
privilege cannot be extended to preclude the federal defend-
ants from admitting or denying the fact vel non of acquisi-
tion of a plaintiff's communications originated in the United
States for transmission abroad, where itconclusively can be
determinedfrom recordsand materials now retained by NSA
that such communication was obtained through the SHAM-
ROCK source." Order of June 30, 1977 at 5-6 (App, 112-
113) . Appellants appealed from that portion of the order
dismissing with prejudice parts of their suit; the govern-
ment obtained certification for an interlocutory appeal of
those matters decided adversely to the claim of privilege. On
appeal, the panel concluded that the government's claim of
Pri vilege should be sustained in its entirety, which in effect,
put an end to plaintiffs' suit.
509
508
is dangerously close to an open-ended warran e
on I er leS 'uaranteec y e ourt Amendme t. Be-
cause f eel that e panel has clearly misconceived the
nature of the so-called "state secrets privilege" and the
standard of review applicable t o the asser tion of that
privilege, I voted to rehear this case en bane.
The panel's analysis contains two fundamental flaws.
Fi rst, the panel fails to assess the compelling counter_
vailing interest in disclosure before upholding the claim
of privilege, contrary to the teaching of Reynolds v.
United States, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) . Second, the panel
defers to the executive invocation of the privilege without
makin g the de novo assessment of the propriety of the
privilege required by this court's decisions in such cases
as Ray v. Turner, No. 77-1401 (D.C.Cir. August 24,
1978).
II.
In United States v. Reynolds, the Supreme Court made
clear that any claim of privilege must be measured
against the need for the information that the government
seeks to suppress. "Where there is a strong showing of
necessity, the claim of privilege should not be lightly ac-
cepted.. .." 12 It is difficult to imagine a stronger instance
of need than this case. Unlike Reynolds, where the "state
secret" was only coincidental to the plaintiffs' tort suit,
and did not precl ude liti gation of the case, upholding the
privilege in this case pr ecludes all judicial scrutiny of the
signals intelligence operations of NSA, regardless of the
degree to which such activity invades the protections of
the Fourth Amendment.' The necessity to which Reynolds
2345 U.S. at 11.
3 In this Stat ement , I refer primarily to the Fourth Amend-
ment claim. However, plaintiffs' statutory claim under 605
of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 is also substan-
tial. See Senate Select Committee Report, Bk. II at 139 (con-
cluding SHAMROCK was a violation of 605). Furthermore,
directs us to look is, in this case, twofold: (1) The infor-
mation is necessary if plaintiffs' suit is to continue and
(2) it is necessary to assure that simply because private
communications become entangled with sophisticated in-
telligence gathering methods, the constitutional protec- .
tions for those communications are not unlawfully and
cavalierly tossed aside. The panel opinion notes in passing
the first element of necessity;' the vital second element-
the core of plaintiffs' suit-is nowhere considered.
Only a total disregard for the importance of the Fourth
Amendment interest could lead the panel to decide this
case without first considering the significance of the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. United
States District Court (Keith) / and this court's en bamc
decision in Zweibon v. Mitchell.
G
These t wo decisions erect
firm limits on the authority of the Executive to conduct
warrantless surveillance, even in the name of national
significant First Amendment interests are implicated by a
surveillance operation targeted at those opposed to govern-
ment policies.
The close interplay of Fourth and First Amendment pro-
tections was noted by Justice Powell in Unit ed States v,
United States District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314
(1972) , where the Court expressly limited t he power of the
government to intercept communications for the purpose of
"national security."
History abundantly documents the t endency of Govern-
ment-however benevolent and benign its motives-to
view with suspicion those who most fervently dispute
its policies. Fourth Amendment protections become the
more necessary when the targets of official surveillance
may be t hose suspected of unorthodoxy iri-the}r political
beliefs.
.cHalkin v. Helms, Nos. 77-1922, 77-1923 (D.C.Cir., June
16, 1978) at 15.
& 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
8516 :F.2d 594 (D.C.Cir. 1975) (en bane).
510
security/ Yet in this case, the panel uses the evidenti ary
privilege to immunize conduct tha t appears to be pro-
T In Keith the Supreme Court held thatjudicial warrants
were required before t he government could undertake r ~
veillance of domestic dissidents in internal security matters,
where neither the source nor the focus of the dissent was a
foreign power. Zweibon extended t he same Fourth Amend-
mentprotection to a group of domestic dissidents, the Jewish
DefenseLeague, wherethefocus of dissentwas theactiviti es
of a foreign power, the Soviet Union, and where the gover n,
ment claimed that the dissidents' activities had an adverse
effect on national security. Zweibon's narrow holding was
stated succinctly: "a warrant mus t be obtained before a
wiretapis installed on a domesticorganization thatis neither
theagentof noractingin collaboration witha foreign power,
even ifthe surveillance is installed under presidential di rec-
tive in the name of foreign intelligence gathering for pro-
tectionof thenationalsecurity."516 F.2d at614. Thus, a key
issue in Halkin has been left open by Keith and Zweibon-
whetherthereis anexemption from the warrant requirement
whenthegovernmentinterceptscommunications withatleast
one terminaloutsidethe United States. To saythatt he ques-
tion is open, however, is not to deny its importance nor to
sanction an analysis of the "state secrets" privi'lege which
foreclosesanyinquiryinto theconstitutionalrightsimplicated
by unfettered government surveillance of Americans' inter-
nationalcommunications.
However, theMINARETcharterby itsverytermsappears
to offend thethrustof theSupremeCourt 's decision in Keith.
The Senate Select Committee Report noted: "[MINARET]
applied not only to alleged foreign influence on domestic
dissent but also on American groups and individuals whose
activities 'may result in civil disturbances or otherwise sub-
vertthenationalsecurityof the U.S.''' Bk. IIIat739.
At its height, the watchlist contained the names of 600
Americans (1,200 names of Americans duringthelife of the
program) and produced 2,000 reports disseminated to other
agenciesduringtheperiod1967-1973. "NSAestimates10per-
cent of these reports were derived from communications be-
tween two American citizens." Bk. III at 747. Among the
communications intercepted and disseminated to government
agencies were, according to the Senate Select Committee Re-
511
scribed by the Fourth Amendment," As elaborated by the
panel, the privilege becomes a shield behind which the
governmentmayinsulateunlawful behaviorfrom scrutiny
and redressby citizens who arethe targetof the govern-
ment's surveillance.
The statesecrets privilege, weakly rooted in our juris-
prudence," cannot and should not be a device for the
port: "discussion of a peace concert; the interestof thewife
of a U.S. Senator in peace causes; a correspondent's report
from SoutheastAsia to his magazine in New York; an anti-
waractivist's request for a speaker in New York." Bk. II at
108.
I Although the precise question posed in this case on the
meritshasnotfully been answered, see note 7 supra, we have
previouslyindicatedinZweibon, 516F.2d at613-14 (dictum):
"[A]nanalysis of the policies implicated by foreign security
surveillance indicates that, absent exigent circumstances, all
warrantlesselectronicsurveillance is unreasonableand there-
fore unconstitutional. ..." (footnote omitted)
9 Although the existence of the state secrets privilege "has
never been doubted," 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2378 at 794
(McNaughten Rev. 1961), ithas surfaced only rarely in the
United States. Most cases have concerned commercial litiga-
tion, particularly patent cases. See, e.q., In re Grove, 180 F;
62 (3d Cir. 1910) ;Pollen v. Ford Instrument,26 F.Supp. 583
(E.D.N.Y. 1939) ; FirthSterlingSteel Co.v. Bethlehem Steel
Co., 199 F. 353 (E.D.Pa. 1912) ; Pollen v. United States, 85
Ct. Cl. 673 (1937). See also Totten v, United States, 92 U.S.
105 (1875) (contractual claim for espionage services) ; Re-
public of Chinav, National Union FireIns., 142 F.Supp. 551
(D.Md. 1956) (claim by United States on an insurance
policy). ..
Only one courthasheretoforeconf ronted the i ~ s h between
two substantial public interests-national security and the
civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights-in ruling on
a claim of "state secrets" privilege. In Jabara v, Kelly, 75
F.R.D. 475 (E.D. Mich. 1977), the court faced a challenge
to certainelectronicsurveillanceactivitieswhichin partover-
lap withthesurveillance challenged in this case. In thatcase
512
governmentto escape the stricturesof the Four th Amend-
ment. "Oursystem of jurisprudence rests on the assump,
tion that all individuals, whatever their positi on in gov-
ernment, ar e subject to feder al law." 10 The panel employs
an evidentiarypri vilege tocarve outan exception to thi s
basicprincipleofconstitutional limitat ions 011 government.
III.
The panel's failur e to consider the weighty Four th
Amendment inter ests at stake in this litigation is ex-
acer bated by its abdication of responsibility for scru tiniz-
ing searchingly the government's clai m of pri vilege. The
t eaching of R eyriolds is clear: "[t]he court itself must
determine whether the circumstances are appr opr iate for
the claim of privilege."-11 The "utmost defer ence" which
the panel has gi ven the government's ex parte, in camera
assert ions is not j usti fied in precedent, conflicts with
the court upheld the privilege. Significantly the privilege
was upheld only af ter t he government admit ted intercept ing
Jabara's messages (the very infonnation NSA ref uses to
divulge here). Id. at 490. Moreover, upholding the privilege
in response to J abara's reques t for discovery did not have
the effect of foreclosing the plai ntiff's suit . Se e also Kinoy
v. Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (claim fordamages
arising out of alleged unauthorized electr onic surveillance;
during discovery government's claim of state secrets de-
nied becausethe privilegewas notproperly invoked) .
The constitutional basis of the state secrets privilege is
unclear. In Reynolds the Court suggested that the pri vilege
was rooted in the separation of powers. 345 U.S.at6 n.s, In
Unit ed Sta tes v. Nixon, however, the Court appears to have
derived theprivilegefrom the President's ArticleII duties as
Commander in Chief and his responsibility for the conduct
of foreign affairs. 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
10 Butz v. Economou, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2910 (1978).
11 845U.S.at8.
11 Halkin v. Helms, slip op, at14. This standard is derived
fromthedictumin UnitedStatesv,Nixon, 418U.S.at710.
513
other decisions of this court as well as Congress' clear
mandate for review of national security claims under
FOrA, and slights the role of the court in protecting the
civil liberties guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
Courtshave a particularly importantrole inmediating
between Fourth Amendment protections and the need of
the executive to conduct surveillance for legitimate na-
tional security purposes. Even assuming that, in the
extreme case, lithe most compelling necessity cannot over-
come the .claim of privilege if the court is ultimately
satisfied that military secrets are at stake,":" the court
itself must make the ultimate determination. "Judicial
control over the evidence in a case cannotbe abdicated to
the caprice of executive officers."14
While judges "should acknowledge their limitation in
areas where they lack.expertise,"-15 the difficult task of
assessing a claim of "state secrets" privilege calls for a
particularly judicial expertise-balancing the govern-
ment'sneedforsecrecy againstthe rightsof individuals."
As the Supreme Court observed in Keith:
:II Reynolds, 845U.S.at11.
. 141d. at9-10.
1D Zweibon, 516 F.2dat657n.207.
. .
Iii When theprivilegerelatesto officialpapers and infonna-
tion sought'by the citizen as a means of proof in the
assertion of his claims, and the disclosure is opposed as
harmful to general security, the question is one of bal-
ancing conflicting policies. Thehead of an executive de-
partment can appraise the public interest-of.secrecy as
weIl (or perhaps in some cases better) than the judge,
buthisofficial habitandleaningtendtoswayhim toward
a minimizing of the interestof the individual. . . . The
determinat ion of questionsof fa ct and theapplicationsof
legal standards thereto in passing upon theadmissibility
of evidenceand thevalidityof claims of evidential privi-
lege aretraditionally the responsibility of the judge. As
514
We cannot accept the Gover nment's ar gument that
inter nal securi ty matters ar e too subtle and complex
for judicial evaluat ion. Courts regularly deal wi th
the most diffi cult issues of our society. There is no
reason to believe that federal judges will be insensi-
tive to or uncomprehending of the issues involved in
domes tic security cases."
The role Congr ess has assigned t he courts in assessing
claims of "national security" under the Freedom of I nfor-
mation Act gives further support to the need for an
independent , de novo assessment of the government ' s
claim of privilege. In amending FOIA in 1974, Congress
explicitly r ejected both the Supreme Court's decision in
EPA v. Mi nk/
8
(limiti ng the cour ts' role in assessing
securityclassifications under FOIA) an d PresidentFor d' s
argument in opposit ion to the amendments ("the courts
should not be forced to make what amountsto the initial
classificati on decision in sensiti ve and complex areas
a public functionary he has respect f or the executive's
scr uples against disclosure and at the same t ime his
duties requi re him constantly to appraise private inter-
estsand to reconcilethemwit hconflictingpublicpoliciesi
he may thus seem better qualified than the executive to
weighbothinterests understandinglyand tostrikeawise
balance.
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed.
1972) at235.
11 407U.S.at 320 (emphasis added) . The Court's observa-
tion is applicableto the foreign securitycontext as well:
Although the judicial competence factor arguably has
more force when made in the foreign rather than the
domestic security context, the response of Keith to the
analogous argument is nevertheless pertinent to any
claim thatforeign security involves decisions and infor-
mation beyondthe scopeof judicial expertiseandexper i-
ence.
Zweibon, 516F.2dat641.
11410U.S.78 (1978).
515
where they have no particular expertise."Ie) The 1974
Amendments explicitlyempowercourts to makeade novo
determination of the propriety of a security classifi-
cation."
Thiscourthasrecently affirmed in theindependentrole
of the courtunderFOIAin Ray v. Turner. We observed:
The legislative history underscor es that the intent
of Congress regarding de novo review stood in con-
trast to, and wasa rejection of, the alternative sug-
gestionproposed bytheAdministrationandsupported
by some Senators: thatin the national security con-
text the court should be limited to determining
whether there was a reasonable basisfor the decision
by the appropriateofficialto withhold the document,"
:Ie Message from President Gerald R. Ford Vetoing H.R.
12471,H. Doc.No.93-383, 93dCong.,2d Sess. (1974).
20
5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1) (1976):
(b) This section doesnot apply to matters thatare-
(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria
established by an Executive order to be kept secret
in the interestof national defense or foreign policy
and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to
such Executive order....
On the legislative history of the 1974Amendments, which
make clear Congress' intentionfor the courtsto conduct a de
novo review of an agency's decision to withhold documents
on national security grounds,see Rayv. Turner, No.77-1401
(D.C.Cir. August 24,1978) 5-14i id.- (Wright , C.J., concur-
ring) at 15-23.
21 Ray at12. The panel in the instantcase remarks on the
"substantial weight" which the Conference Commit t ee indi-
cated shouldbeaccordedthe agency's affidavit in determining
the propriety of withholding documents under Exemption 1.
AsChiefJudgeWrightcogentlyexplainedinRay, the require-
ment thatthe affidavitbegiven substantial weight in no way
undercuts the need for de novo review, nor justifiesthe "ut-
most deference" which the panel would accord the govern-
ment's assertion of privilege. See id. (Wright, C.J., concur-
ring) at31-88.
516
Thestandardappliedby thepanel in thiscase ("utmost
deference") directly conflicts with our decision in Ray,
and producestheanomalousresultthata FOrArequester ,
who may have no special need for the requested infor-
mation," is given broader access to government informa-
tion thana plaintiffwho requirestheinformation in order
to pursue remedies for violation of constitutional rights.
Thus, farfrom takinginto accounttheplaintiffs' need f or
.information, as required by Reynolds, thepanel has stood
Reynolds on itshead and penalized theplaintiffsprecisely
becausetheirneed differsfrom thatof thepublicatlarge.
Not only does this result defy common sense, but ulti -
mately itwillsimplyleadto a wasteof judicial resources.
Henceforth, plaintiffs seeking information in a civil suit
will simply file a simultaneous FOrA request to reap the
advantage of the broader inquiry under FOrA. Nothing
will be gained except duplication and delay."
22 "TheFreedom of Information Act does not depend on a
showing ofneedorinterestbytheparticularapplicant forthe
records. Any showing of need or interestis irrelevant." For-
shamv.Califano, No.76-1308 (D.C.Cir.,July 11, 1978) at10;
accord SterlingDrugInc.v.FTC,450F.2d698,705 (D.C.Cir.
1971) .
23 In discussing Supreme Court Standard 509-Secrets of
State and Other Official Information (the proposed Federal
Rule of Evidence 509 which"was not adopted), one commen-
tator explained the relationship between the evidentiary
privilegeand theFreedom of Information Act:
Anything that would be available to a member of the
publicunderthe Actshouldbeexempt from the privil ege
in Standard 509, since a litigant is entitled to relevant
information atleastas much as a member of the public
merits materials for which he need not demonstrate any
particularneed.Casesorderingdisclosures under the Act
are therefore pertinent in delineating the kind of infor-
mation which should be immune to Standard 509claims
of privilege.
2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE ,-) 509[06] (1977) at 509-42.
517
IV.
The failure to de novo the claim of pr ivilege has
led panel to completely the. significance of
the Widespread publIc.disclosur es concerning operation
SHAMROCK. These dIsclosur es undermine the govern-
ment's ex parte assertion that simply admi tting acquisi-
tion of some of plaintiffs' messages will pose a danger to
national security.
The disclosures concerning SHAMROCK are extensive.
SHAMROCKwasthe subjectof extensivehearingsbefore
theSenateSelectCommittee, and is discussed atlengthin
that' Committee's Report.
2 4
Even more pertinent are
NSA's.disclosures ill; Ja,bara v. Kelly,25 where!hegovern-
ment not only admitted that NSA had acquired six of
Jabara'smessages, butwent on to disclose theplace from
which the intercepted messages originated.
28
In sever al
FOrAcasesNSAhasfurtherexpanded thestoreof public
knowledge concerning SHAMROCK,2T although in' those
cases the NSA has not revealed "whether the materi al ...
was derived from the interception of the [FOrA plain-
tiffs] own messages or the interception of messages be-
tween otherpartieswhich included r eference to plai nt iffs'
2<1 See Report, supra note 1, atBk.III,PP740-41, 765-776.
25
75 F.R.D. 475 (E.D.Mich. 19:T7). See note 9 supra.
2G Appendix (App.) 124. It isnoteworthythatNSA didnot
appeal or otherwise seek reconsideration of the order to dis-
close the identity of the agency that intercepted Jabara' s
messages. Nor has NSA offered to demonstrate how the dis-
closures in Jabara differ in their potential harm to national
securityfrom the limited disclosuresplaintiffsseekhere.
2T See, e.g., Hayden and Fonda v. NSA, Nos. 76-0286, 76-
0287 (D.D.C.)i FoundingChurchof Scientologyv.NSA,No.
76-1494 (D.D.C.July21, 1977),appeal pending, No. 77-1975
(D.C.Cir.). -
518
names."2 8 Most recently, a di strict judge in the Di st ri ct
of Columbia has again allowed access to SHAMROCK
derived material under FOIA.2u Nor should i t be forgot-
ten thatthedistrict j udge in this case, who had the bene-
fit of NSA's in camera, ex parte testimony was also
unconvinced th at admitt ing acquisi ti on of t he SHAM-
ROCK material would pose any reasonable danger to
national security sufficient t o uphold the government' s
claim of privilege."
Taken together, these developments demonstrate that
the panel could have r eached its decision only by taking
2 8 Petition for r eheari ng at 5 n.7. The NSA's disclosures
in Hayden and Fonda and Founding Church of Scientology
are contained in affidavits filed in those cases by Norman
Boardman, Information Officer of the National Securi ty
Agency, attached as Addendum tothePeti t ion for Reheari ng.
19 Baezv, NSA, No. 76-1921 (D.D.C. Nov. 2, 1978) . In Baez,
Chief J udge Bryant not ed that "N.S.A. has already chosen to
r eveal to plaint iff thatsome of hercommunications werein-
tercept ed and recor ded." Slip op. at 3. The court there ordered
the NSA to make public all but two paragraphs of the in
camera affi davit filedin thatcase.See note 31infra.
10 Halkin v, Helms, No. 75-1773 (D.D.C. June 30, 1977) at
5-6:
Withrespect t oNSAcommuni cati ons intercept ionactivi-
t ies pertaining to-wireortelegraphiccommunications ap-
peari ng to have been ori ginated by certain of the plain-
ti ffs within the United States and to have been acquired
by NSA through the SHAMROCK source, however, the
Courtfinds andconcludes that, in view of matterswhich
have to date been made public about the SHAMROCK
source, theclaim of pr ivilege cannotbe extended to pre-
clude the federal defendants from admitting or denying
the fact vel non of acquisition of a plaintiff's communi-
. cation originated in the United States for transmission
.abroad, where it conclusively can be determined f rom
records and materials now retained by NSA that such
communication was obtained through the SHAMROCK
source.
519
the government's ex parte affidavits at face value and
refusing to assess their credibili ty in light of reason and
the information already made public, the minimal ele-
ments of de novo review. My own examination of the in
camera affidavitsreinforcesthisconclusion." To my mind,
at In its in camera affidavits to the district court, particu-
larly NSA Deputy Director Drake's in camera affidavit of
June 17, 1977, NSA seeks to justify its conclusion that ad-
mitting or denying acquisition of plaintiffs' messages would
pose a danger to national security. Because these affidavits
werefiledin camera, and inlightofthe dispositionofthiscase
by the panel, and the court en bane, I am precluded from
demonstrating in detail why I believe those arguments are
insufficient as a matterof law to justifyupholding the privi-
lege in this case. However, it is instructive to consider the
observations of Judge Bryantin his opinion in Baez, slip op.
at1-2,in a relatedcontext:
The Agency has presented basically three arguments
why the disclosure of any information about these docu-
ments would threatenthenational securityor reveal the
structureor activitiesof N.S.A. Firstof all,foreign gov-
ernments do notknow which international common car-
rier facilities the N.S.A. is capable of monitori ng. Sec-
ondly, foreign governments do not know theactual intel-
ligencetargetsoftheN.S.A. And,thirdly,foreigngovern-
ments do not know the particular communications cir-
cuits which the N.S.A. is now monitoring or has in the
pastmonitored.'
"1 These arguments have been made by the agency
atoral argumentin another F.O.LA. case involving
the National Security Agency, Founding Church of
ScientologyofWashington,D.C.v: NationalSecurity
Agency, No. 77-1975 (D.C.Cir. argued ~ a c h 27,
1978). "
The Court finds all three ar guments unconvincing.
From news articles and congressional investigations the
Ameri can public, and consequently any aware foreign
government,knows thatN.S.A. can and doescollectmost
messages to or from the United States transmitted by
international common carrier facilities, both pri vate and
520
the panel engaged in the "willing suspension of disbe-
lief." The Constitution simply does not permit the cour ts
such a luxury."
commercial. This includes messages passed by radio,
satellite or other electromagnet ic means. Therefore,
N.S.A.'s capability to perform this sort of functi on is
public knowledge.
Similarly, as plaint iff point s out, Congress has pUb-
licizedthefact that N.S.A.iscapableof targetingcertain
persons. It can select, by comput er , informat ion about
these people from t he massive number of collected mes-
sages. The N.S.A. did target certain antiwar act ivists
in thepast, andsothefa ct that Joan Baezmay havebeen
targeted is not a nati onal securi ty secret .
Fur thermore, the agency is known publicly t o be cap-
able of monitor ing all messages carried by electromag-
net ic means, to and from the United States. Even if
plaint iff knows on whi ch particular circuit the message
was sent ,shewouldknownomore thanat thatpart icular
t ime the N.S.A. intercepted that circuit. She already
knows that the N.S.A. is capable of monitori ng anysuch
circuit whi ch ori ginates or ends in the United Stat es.
Therefore, the Courtorders to be made public all but
two paragraphs of the in camera affi davitsubmitted by
defendants.
I also note that the panel never explains why it ignores
the disti nction between materi al deri ved from SHAMROCK
and mater ial derived from other sources, which the district
judgefound to be controlling.
'1 Congress hasalreadylimited someof the pernicious con-
sequences of the panel's opinion in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Actof 1978, P.L.95-511, 92 Stat. 1783. The Act
limits elect ronic surveillance of U.S. citi zens and permanent
resident aliens in the United States (including international
cable communications) to situations where there is probable
cause to believe that the target of the communi cation is a
foreign power oran agent of a foreign power, and requires
that such surveillance beconducted pursuant to a warrant
issued by any of the special judges appointed by the Chief
Justiceto issue such warrants. Violators of the Act are sub-
jectto civil and criminal liability. The purpose of this legis-
521
lation was "to permit the Government to gather necessary
foreign intelligence information by means of electronic sur-
veillance but under limitati ons and according to procedural
guidelines which will better safeguard t he rights of indi-
viduals. S.REP. No. 96-604 (part I ) 95th Cong., 2d Sses.
(1978) at 9. Congress thus saw thet wocompetingneeds and
struck a balance between them, resolving a tension which
the panel in this casehas tota lly failed to recognizeor grapple
with. I intimateno views on theeffect of the For eign Int elli-
gence Surveillance Act on the instantcase, except to observe
thatits enactment does not dissuade me that this important
caseshould be rehear d en bane.
.;..' c,:/::
522
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOI S
EASTERN DIVISION
AMERICAN CI VIL LI BERTIES
UNION, et a 1.,
(-I"
Plainti ffs,
{ . T , ( , -A:;,
vs . NO. 75 C 3295
CITY OF CHI CAGO, et al., CONSOLI DATED DISCOVERY WITH
NO. 74 C 3268 and
Defendants. NO. 76 C 1982
ACLU PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO FEDERAL DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO RECONSIDER JUNE 7, 1977
ORDER RELATING TO INFORMER'S
PRIVILEGE
INTRODUCTION
ACLU plaintiffs submit this memorandum i n oppos ition to the
federal defendants' motion to reconsider t hi s Court's June 7 , 19 77
Or der. Th at order, entered after full br iefing, overrules fede r a l
defendants' in fo rmer ' s privilege objections to ACLU plaintiffs'
discovery requests and requires the FBI to produce informat ion
which would allegedly tend to identify informers. Production is
to be made under a strict protective order limiting disclosure to
plainti ffs' legal team.> (75 F. R. D. 441, 445-46.)
On June 22, 1977, the federal defendants moved for recons i d e r a -
tion, based on an affidavit of FBI Official James B. Adams.
> "Plal.ntl.ffs' legal team," f o r purposes of the J un e 7, 1977 Pro-
t ective Order, c onsists of four persons: Robert J. Volle n ,
Robert C. Howard, and Douglass W. Cas sel, Jr., t h r e e o f pl a i n-
tiffs' attorneys of record, whose cond uct in this c a s e h a s
been personally observed by t he Co urt ove r a per iod o f ye a r s ,
and Nancy Stone, a paralegal assist ant whose aff i da vi t a p pea r s
in the Re c o r d Appendix at A. l . , a nd who h as been respons i b l e
for plaintiffs' review and :i l i ng of thousands of d o c ume n t s subjec t
to t he general protective or der in this case for several years.
* * They ine xpli cably chos e not t o fi- l e Hr. Ada ms' af f idavit b e f or e
t he Court r u led , e ve n though, n ine mon t h s e a rli er , Mr. h ad
exe cuted a ver y similar a f f i duvat i n the Ne w Yor k So c ial i s t \'1orker s
Pa rty laws ui t. (Adams Dep . a t 22 -2 4 ; A. 875 . 1
523
Becaus e o f t he new c onc l usory a nd spe c u l a t ive fa c tua l
in Mr . Adams' a f f i da v i t , p lai nt i ffs s o ugh t a n oppor t uni t y for d i s-
covery t o p r o vi de a f ac t ua l r e c ord t o s uppo r t t he corre c t ne s s o f
the Court ' s r ul i ng . On J ul y 2 , 197 7, t he Cour t gr a n ted plaintiff:
an oppo r t unity to r espond, and stayed production of mate r i a l s un de:
the J une 7 Or de r pendi ng a rul i ng on de f endants' moti on t o r e c o n-
si der.
Federal defend ants r e pe a t e d l y del a y e d c omplyi ng wi t h o r re-
fused p lai nt i f f s ' discove r y r e q uests conc e r n i n g t h e informe r ' s pri--
vilege iss ue , in r e sponse to whi c h the Co ur t r e peat edly o rde red
production. Pre tri a l Orde r No . II, 2(c) , 2(0) (J a n. 11,
197 8); Me m. Op . and Or der, Mar . 28, 1978, a t 2- 3 , 5- 7 ; Mem. Op.
and Orde r , J une 20 , 1978, at 3- 4 . ) Th e r esul t o f f ede r a l
dilat ory tac ti c s was that they did no t fi na l ly c omp lete
of the documen ts a nd info r mat i on ordered t o be pro du c e d until Sept=r.-
ber 1 3, 1978, after wh i c h p laint iffs were a ble t o c on clude t h e
sition o f Mr . Ad ams with r egard t o th e informe r 's pr i v i l ege ,an d pr=-
pare and s ubmi t thi s me mo r an d um.
Th is memorandum wi l l not r e-argue the law on t he inf or me r ' s f:i -
vilege. go verni ng legal p rincipl es we r e ful ly b r i e f e d p rior
this Court ' s J un e 7 , 19 77 r ul i ng a nd are set f o r t h t herein, and
the Court 's earli er opi n ions o f Ma r c h 5 , 1976, and Ma r c h 26, 197 6 _..
the related Al l i a nc e c ase . (The Ma r c h 5 , 19 76 Al l i ance ruling is : e-
Por t e d in 75 F . R. D. 430 , 431 . )* Rathe r , this memo r an dum summari ze ;
....... f"' , _
" "'''' c a ao t he r e c e nt deci si o n i n the New Yo r k Soc ial i s t h'o r k e : :
Party l l. t iga t ion , hol d i ng At t or ne y Ge ne r a l Be l l i n ci vi l c on-
t e mpt fo r f ailur e t o c ompl y with an o r de r t o d i s c l o s e t he i c :c.-
t itie s o f d ome stic Lnt. eLl i qenc e i n f o r mers t o p lai nt .-i.IS',' cou-.-
s e l , unoff i ci al l y r e po r t e d i n n V. S. L. I' . 202 7 (S.D.tl. Y .,
J un e 30 , 1978 ), sta ye d pe ndi n, a ppeal , 47 U. S . L.W. 1009 .
524
factual information discovered by plaintiffs since the June 7 rul-
ing,'which shows that the Court correctly applied the law to this
case.
That information is embodied in plaintiffs' Record Appendi x ,
filed herewith.* (Hereinafter pages of the Record Appendix are
cited as "A. ").
The evidence both supports the Court's June 7 rUling and re-
buts Mr. Adams' affidavit. It shows that, as federal defendants
themselves now admit, 'the FBI Chicago Field Office files on the 27
named plaintiffs, since 1966 alone, contain the identities of
a small army of some 837 informers (hereafter "the 837 informers
on the named all of whom reported on the named plain-
tiffs',l a wfUl political actiVities, views, or beliefs, and
of whom reported on any unlawful activities by the named plaint i ffs.
(A. 74 and n.5, 79-80.) Thus, the carefully limited disclosure
ordered by this Court, which is designed to enable plaintiffs to
discover information about informers Who reported on laWful act iv i-
ties, while minimiZing disclosure of informers who reported on un -
lawful activities, will accomplish both purpOses.
(75 F.R.D. at
445-46.)
In addition, the evidence shows that the FBI has administra t i ve -
ly classified domestic intelligence informers separately from c ri min-
*- ------rne-Record Appendix consists of three volumes: Volume I ,
pp. 1-215; Volume II, pp. 216-549; Volume III, pp. 550-86 8.
A summary of contents and detailed table of contents of the
full Record Appendix are attached hereto and also appear at
the beginning of each volume. In addition, plaintiffs are
separately filing herewith three volumes of excerpts fr om the
FBI file on an exposed FBI domestic intelligence informer .
A brief sununary of these Voluminous excerpts is included in
the Record Appendix, Volume III, at pp. 794-803. Pursuant to
the general protecti ve order in this case, all these record
materials are being filed under seal.
525
3
1
i n f o rme r s . Th us, as is truc of the City defendants, the FBI
can f urni s h info rmation a lle gedl y i de nt i fyi ng domest i c intell i -
gence i n f or me r s wi tho ut i denti f y i ng c r i mi na l informers. (See
75 F. R. D. a t 44 5. ) In t h i s s ingle r e s pe ct (d i s c us s e d inf ra),
the new l y obtained e videnc e jus tifi e s a c la r i f i c a t i o n o f t he
court's June 7 , 1977 Order t o init i a l ly exemp t FBI " crimin a l "
informers from discl osu re.
Sect i on I o f t h i s memor a ndum s umma r i ze s t he evi de nce whic h
demonst r a t e s pla i nt i f f s ' need f or t he informa t ion a nd Section II
sununa ri zes the e vi den c e rebutt ing de f e nda n t s ' att a c k on t h e Co urt 's
Order. Together; both sections s how tha t t he federal defenda n ts'
motion for r econsi deration must b e deni e d .
I. THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS THIS COURT' S RULING
THAT PLAI NTI FFS' COUNSEL ARE ENTI TLED TO
MATERIALS ALLEGEDLY TENDI NG TO IDENTIFY DOMESTI C
I N'i'ELLI GENCE INFORHERS.
Under the claim of "informer's privilege " , t he f e de ral de-
fendants seek to withhol d not only the n a me s of FBI i n f ormers but,
because they cl aim it would tend t o re veal the info rmers ' i denti-
ties, they also seek to wi t hh o l d almost all informat i on ab out the
informers' a c t i vi t i e s . Thus , the FBI really a sse rts an " inf o rmer' s
activi t ies privilege" , wh i c h wo ul d enable it to c onc e a l massi ve
wrongdoi n g . To allow t h i s claim wou l d effecti ve l y block proof o f
this l awsuit's central allegations tha t the FBI - t hrough its i n-
formers - h a s t r amp l e d upon t h e Firs t a nd Fo urth Amendment r i gh t s
of Chica go's c i t ze n r y . (ACLU Comp l a i n t , 1 2 , 1 3. )
The al l - pe r vasi ve e xt ent o f t hi s c on c e a l me n t i s demons trat e d
by the s he e r quant i t y of evi de nc e t o d a t e unde r the FBI 'S
claim of informe r ' s p rivilege. Of the 14. 500 page s i n t he-:_FBJ;:
526
Chi cago Fie ld Office fil e s on the name d p l a i n t i ffs , a p p r o xi-
ma t ely 5 , 50 0 pa ge s , o r we ll over one-thi rd o f the t o tal , ha ve
be en withheld in whol e or pa r t be c a us e t hey alle ge dly tend to
iden tify informers . Of t hese , 2, 500 pa ge s have
been withheld in their e n t i rety, and 3 ,000 h a ve been pro-
d uc e d with de l etions r an g i ng from one or a f e w wo rds t o vir tually
the enti r e page .
(A. l .) Simil arly extensi ve por tions of FBI He a d-
q ua rters f i les , and FBI i nvestigati ve files on c lass membe rs , are
being wi t hheld for t h e same r eason. (A. 2 . )
In addition t o these investigative files, the FBI 's informer
f iles (which collec t a l l i nfo r mation r eceived f rom or r elating t o
a par ti cul a r i n f o r me r ) are rende r e d pr a cti cally worth l e s s by the
FBI 's c lai m o f i nfor mer 's pri vi l e ge. Th e de vastating impact on disc ove -
ry caused by the FBI ' s c laim of infor mer's privil e ge i s well i l lus -
trated by t h e s tark c on t rast betwe en the 40 FBI info r me r fil e s pr o-
duc ed subj ect to the claim, and the single FBI infor mer fi l e p ro-
duced s ub j ect to the claim (because t he informer 's i dentit y ha s
be en disc l osed ). To gethe r, t he 40 deleted files reveal a lmost not h-
i n g about what FBI i nformers repo r ted or di d (A.2-2a ), whe reas t he
one unde leted f ile exte ns i vely revea l s t he a cti vities of the i nf o r m-
er , i n c l udi ng hun dreds of r e p o rt s on the t argets' l awful polit i c a l
activities and their personal live s.
(A.79 4- 80 3.)
The evidence t he FBI see ks t o shield by i t s " informe r s '
a c t i vi t i e s privilege" is n o t only vo l umi no us a nd a cr uci a l sou r c e
of l e a ds t o other informa t ion , it i s also, in a nd o f i tse l f , direct -
l y releva nt t o and hi ghl y p roba t i ve o f many of p laint if f s ' mos t
s er ious al l e ga tions . I t is , i n sh o rt , evi de nce es s e nt ia l t o proo f
o f t h e c rucial issues i n t h i s
527
Fo r e xa mp l e , FBI pol icy documents indi cate t ha t the informer
document s being wi t hhe l d wi l l s how that the FBI rel i e d ext e ns i ve-
ly on infor me rs, not just to ga t h er i nformati o n, bu t a lso to a c -
tively dis r upt a nd h a rass p l a i n t i f f clas s membe r s . The s e ve r a l
FBI COINTELPRO programs - de s i g ne d to " e xpos e , d i s r upt , misdirect,
discredi t o r othe rwise neutrali ze " their t arget s A. 9 7) -
expr essly s anc t i o ned the us e of informer s t o d is r upt. The direc-
tive which inaugur ated the very fi r s t COINTELPRO o ffens ive r equi red
Chicago and o the r key FBI fi e l d o f fices t o sele ct " i n f o r man t s who
will c arry out the dis r upt i ve pr og r a m. " (A. 87- 8 8 , 103, 10 5. ) In-
formers were t o " seize every op por t Uni t y t o carry out the disrup-
tive act i vity not o n l y a t meet i ngs, conve n t ion s , e t cetera, b ut
also during social and othe r contacts with CP member s and leade r s . "
(A.87.) All l a t e r COI NTELPRO progr a ms we r e modeled o n this one.
(A.9 l - l01.)
To wha t e xt e nt d i d FBI inf o r me r s in fac t c arr y o ut this "di s-
ruptive program" ? By wh a t Againstwhom? Wi t h wha t e f f e c t ?
Unless pla int i ffs h a ve a cce ss to the i nformer e vi dence now be-
ing withh e l d , wh i c h wou l d show what t h e info rmers did a s we ll a s
who the y a re, pl a i ntiff s will be depr i ved of t he e vi d e nce t o pr o ve
the answers to the se q ues t i ons r . an d hence a number of the i r import-
ant specific al lega tions . ACLU Comp l a i n t , , ' s 9-l-a , 9- l - b,
9-l-i, 9-1- 1 , 9-4, 10- 15, 12- b, 13-1, 1 3- 2 , 1 3-3 , a nd 13- 4 . ) I n-
f ormed judi c i a l r evi ew of alle ged FBI mis c onduct wi l l have be e n
crippl ed , if no t null i f i e d.
Ev e n when FBI do c uments r e ve a l no t merely po l i c i es b u t a c t ual
use o f i nfor mers t o d i s rupt, t h e y o ften ra i s e cruci al
.: .." \
528
may go unanswered unless plaintiffs c a n obtain the informer/ di s_
rupters' identities and interrogate them. To illustrate, a 1971
FBI "airtel" from th e Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago of-
fice to FBI Headquarters, reported as follows:
The current split i n the above two *
groups continues in Chicago. The
loyal to the headquarters has raided
the headquarters at
Street, Chicago, breaking windows ana-Deat-
ing up several persons. members have
filed court suits against the people
and have sworn out warrants of arrest on
several of them. The is attempting
to wrest control of the-EUrlding at
through legal means. -----
Chicago is encouraging all of the above
through informants.
(A. 119.) (emphasis added.)
What role did the FBI informer/disrupters play here? How did
they "encourage" beatings and property damage? Did they instigate
them? Lead them? Did the FBI instruct them to do so?
Without ' ac c ess to the informer/disrupters' identities, so
that they may be interviewed or deposed and their FBI "informer"
files reviewed, plaintiffs' counsel - and the Court - will never
know. (Extensive examples of partially disclosed di sruptive acti-
vity by FBI "informers" raise equally compelling questions, answer-
able only by production of the information claimed by the FBI to be
p ri vaLe'qed, (A.l03-167.))
-.
Names of target individuals and organizations are deleted fr om
this memorandum pursuant to the protective order, except wh ere
their identities have previously been made public. The names
appear in the Record Appendi x, filed under s eal.
529
Eve n wh en t he FBI's informers are not express ly "e ncour aged"
to d i s rupt , they i nhere n t l y disrupt and mi s l ead po l i t i c a l pr ot e s t
organizations, a ccording to a lea d i ng na t i ona l expe r t c n do me sti c
(A.168-82.) Thi s i s b eca us e FBI inform-
intelligence informers.
er
s
do more than the term "informer" i mplie s . The y a r e not mere-
ly pass i ve obs ervers and note-takers , b u t acti ve pa r t i c i pa nt s in
the orga n i zati ons they i nfiltrate. At t he FBI's urgi ng , t he y s e e k
and obta i n not only members hip but also po s i t i ons o f r esponsib il-
ity and leadership i n protest gr o ups , a nd t he n , deliberately or not,
tend t o a l ter the gro up s ' poli cies, s tra tegi e s and effectiveness.
(A.173- 79 ; s ee als o A.182c, 182g, 612b, 612e, 63 7, 63 9, 800- 01.)
Yet (although the expe r t ' s opini ons are corroborat ed i n the case
of the one un deleted FBI informer file prod uce d to date (A.79 4-
803)), as the e xpert points out , onl y the vo l uminouS infor ma tion
sought to b e wi t hhe l d under the FBI's clai m of i nformer ' s pri vilege
could conclusively demonstrate this "inherent disruption" in Ch i ca-
go, and r e ve a l the ext e nt t o whi c h ithas impaired Fi rs t Amendme n t
acti vity.
(A.180 .) (See also ACLU Complaint,
's cited supra, and
'9-1-c. )
Disruption by FBI " i n f o r mers" a ppea r s to b e only one of many
FBI mi s de eds c o nceale d b eh i nd t h e inf o r me r's privi l eg e . FBI po licy
documents, and partially di sclosed FBI reports on a c t u a l inci de nts,
suggest that the documents bei ng wi thhe l d cont a i n e xtens i ve evi -
dence t ha t t he FBI has use d it s i nfo rmers t o do the f ollowi ng ,
among other:
(1 ) t o ob tai n by i l l e ga l o r un-
constituti on al means, such a s burgl ari e s ,
..- ....
r; ' ;'
530
mail opening , r oom b ugging , "tra sh c ov-
e rs," and i llegal dis closur e o f f e der al
income tax r eturns. (A.1 8 3- 215.)*
(2) to obta in i nformation "on pers onal side-
l i gh t s. . which would not norma l l y be re-
porte d" (A. 216) in l egiti mate FBI i nves-
t iga t ion s, such as reports on sexual
pract ices, p r oblems , use of a l-
c ohol, and medical problems, f or
o f intimi dation and disrup tion (A. 216-60 ,
799);
(3) t o man ipulate and s ubve rt t he free p res s
(A.261-349) ;**
( 4) to report e x tensive l y on lawf u l pol i ti c a l
me e t i n gs a nd a cti v i ti es o f pOl itica l part-
i es, community grou ps , ci v il li berti es
o rgani za t ions, and g r o' lp s a c t i ve in the
a ntiwa r , c ivil rights , and "women's libera-
t. ion" movements (A. 350-414; 798.). Thus all
of the FBI's 837 i n f o r me r s on the name d
pla int i ffs r eported on their lawful po li tica l
act i vi t i es, v iews or b eliefs. (A.80.)
produced i t s f ile on pl a int iff Dr. Que n tin
Yo unq an enti r e s ix-pa ge doc ument was withheld on the gro un d
that i t wo u:.d r e veal an FBI. s our ce . (A.18 3.) Only l ater , i n
response t o a specifi c i n t e r rogatory c onc erni n g b ur g l ari e s , did
th e FBI produce nocument - a l ist o f sustainers of t he
go Commi tte e To De f:!l:ld t he Bill of Ri ghts. (A. 186-91, 19lf . )
This "anony mous s ou r c e " ::\ ' r n e d out t o be an FBI burglary of the
Commi ttee ' s o ffices . (A.184, 185. ) St ill, the re remai n s e ve r a l
de l e t ions o f i nformat i o n which would tend t o reve a l a n info rme r .
(I.d.) If plaint iffs c ould ques t ion the FBI informer o r i n f ormers
i nvol ved in t his burglary, or in the proposed burgl ary o f another
organizat ion (A.19 2-94), all of whose identities remain und is-
c l o sed , we c ould a s k , for e xample, How many other FBI b urgl a r i e s ,
i f any, was t he informer asked to a i d and abet ?
** Although the e x ten t and many i mpo r t ant detai ls a r e unclear , docu-
ments produc ed to d a t e s how that the FBI used or attempted t o use
" rel i able" c ontacts in t he media, inc l udi ng e di t ors o f t he Chica-
go Tr ibune A. 321- 26) and t he Chica go Dai ly News
A. 270-76) (whos e names a r e del e ted under the c La am o f 10i nforme r ' s
pri vi lege" ) , for such p urposes a s p l a nt ing a ph ony s t o r y t o coun t -
er publi ci ty abo ut a United St a t es Supr e me Cou r t de c ision a dverse
to the FBI (A.26 1-276) , pa s s i ng al o ng Foliti cal info rmat ion de -
si gned to disc redit a nd f a c t i o na l i z e certai n g r oups A. 321-
26, 32 9) , and fe eding q uest ions t o a reForte r fcr use at a pr e s s
con f e r ence (A.302-07) .
531
As t he i nfo r mer di s rup t ion evidence , whi le the heaVily
de l e t e d FBI docUll!ent s reveal each of t he s e wrong ful p ract ice s ,
t he y do s o on l y part ial ly and t he y r a i s e c ruci al q ue s t ions wh i c h
are un answerat le e xcept t hrough acces s to t he withhel d i n f o r ma-
t i on. Pla i nt iff s need the evi dence wi t h hel d by the FBI t o pro ve
t he a c t ua l s cope , extent , and c ul pa bi li ty of FBI i nvo l ve ment , as
well a s what h appened i n p articul a r instances. Pl aint i f f s need
to e xa mi ne the un e xpur gated po licy do c uments and the f u l l f ile s
on pl a i n t i f f s a nd c las s members; t o int e r v i e w o r de pos e the i n-
for me r s and exami ne t heir f i l e s ; a nd to f o l low up l o gi c a l l e a ds .
I f t h e FBI is pe rmitte d t o riddle the fi l e s produced unde r the
Cour t' s cl a ss disco ve r y o r der wi t h e x t e ns i ve "in f o r me r ' s privi -
l ege " dele t ions , no ne of thi s i s possib le. The FBI ' s ma s sive de-
l e t i on s r e n de r the docume nts not h i ng b ut a samp l e of p a rti a l trut h s ,
r a i si ng more q ues tions th a n th ey answer.
Nor i s t he fore goi ng d iscuss ion exha us t ive . Ma ny o t he r impor t -
ant aven ue s o f inqui r y a r e simi l a r l y blocke d by t he FBI 's e xt e ns i ve
de l e t i on s and wi thho l d i ng o f witnesses un de r the cla im o f i n f o rme r ' s
pri vi l e ge . *
Fo r examp le: To wh a t e x t e nt a nd h ow has t he FBI used info r mer s to :
(1) Inves t i gat e a n d i n t imida te a t torne ys wh o r e p r e sent " sut vers i ve "
i ndividuals , t hereby i mpa i r i ng t he right o f t he s e cl ien t s t o ef fe c t-
i ve and vi go r o us repr e sen tation , a s we l l a s i n t r ud ing i n t o a t torney-
c li e n t c ommunicati ons and liti ga t i on pl anning me e t i ngs ? (E.g. ,
A.41 5- 46 l , 800 .)
(2 ) To ob t ai n pe rsona l information from c r e d i t burea us a nd bank s
i n viol a t i on of s t a t ut ory or co nst i cut-Lohal pri vacy r i gh ts? (E. g . ,
Adams Dep. a t 156 - 6 5 ; 799.)
( 3) To e ngage in a c t i Vi t i e s on campus whi c h i mpa i r aca de mi c f r e e d om?
(E. g . , A. 490- 549 . )
0: .' ,::t,
In gen eral , t he more .i nt rus i ve an FBI informer 's' a c t ivi i e s , t he
more lik e l y t hey a re t o be withheld from disclos ure . Thus , f em i n -
former me e t s pr i vately wi th o ne pe r s o n in a bedrocrn , h s r epor t
532
In s um, the parti al e v i de n ce ob ta ined to da te fully suppo r t s
th i s Co urt' s June 7, 1977 ruling that pl ai ntif f s' c ounse l mus t
h a ve a c cess to mater ia ls alle gedl y i dent ifyi ng do me sti c i nt elli-
gen ce info r mers t o p r ove t heir case .
II. THE EVIDENCE REBUTS DEFENiJAllTS' AT'rACK ON TIl lS COURT' S
ORDER.
Th e f e deral defendants' mo t i o n t o r econside r th i s Cou r t 's
June 7 , 1977 Orde r i s b ase d on t he affi da vit o f FBI of f icial
James B. Adams, who claims that the ruling wo u ld have a "destruc-
tive effect '! on t he FBI's "informant pr ogram." (AfL 1. ) Spe-
cifically , he a sser ts that informers are o ne o f the be s t investi-
gative tools for "law e nforcement " a nd the most e ffe c t i ve t ool
for investi gating "revolutionary " groups (AfL 3, 4); that the
FBI 's informer program is "totally dependent" o n an "explicit pr o-
mis e o f conf i de n t i a l i t y " 6, 7); and that d isclosure of FBI in-
f ormers to plaintiffs' c ounsel would expose themto possible phy-
si cal retaliation and harassment 10-17), and would adversely
affect FBI r ecruitment of informers in other case s, i mpairing t he
"o ve r a l l effect i veness of law en f or-cemen t ;." (1!26).
As demonstrated be l ow, Mr . Adams ' concl us ory, s p ecul a t ive as-
sertions are;in large measure, either irrel evant or unfounded.
A. Key Porti ons o f Mr. Adams ' Affi davit Ar e Irrele vant.
In thi s case chall e nging gove r nme nt s urve i l lance o f p l a i n t i ffs '
Footnote con t i n ue d :
is more l ikely t o b e withhel d by defe nd ant s th an i f he covers
a public meet ing o f 25 persons . (A. 6 3 , 68- 69 . ) Si mi lar ly ,
if h e i nfiltrates a n o rga niz a tion and b ecomes an offi cer in a
pos ition t o misd i r e c t i t s ac ti vi t ies , h is r e ports a r e more
likely to be withhe l d t ha n if he a t tends ope n meet ings
of the o rgani za t i o n . (Se e A.63. )
533
lawf ul a c t i vi t y , key porti ons o f Mr . Ada ms ' a ffi da vi t a re i r re-
levant, becaus e they pre dict an a dve r s e e f f e c t On FBI cri mi na l
investigati ons which might r e sult from pub l i c di sclos ur e o f FBI
sEimi n al i n f orme r s . Th us , Mr . Adams r e pe ate dl y s t r e s s e s t h e
value o f informers t o "l aw enfo r c e men t " (AfL \:' s 3 , 6 , 8 , 9 ,
26 a nd 2 7) , he enume r ates arres ts and r ecoveri e s of s t o len pro-
pert y ob tai ned t hrough info r mers and he warns agai ns t pub-
lic e xpos ure o f i nformers by citi ng 25 murde r s o f cr i mi nal in-
f or me r s who were e xpos e d o r sus pected
I t goes witho ut questi on t hat FBI informers o n the orga nize d
crime s yndica t e s ho ul d not be expos e d in t h is lawsuit (if ever) .
As this Court h as r epeatedly ruled, inf ormers who r eport o n
activity are pr o t e c t e d by the q ua l i fied informer's privilege
recog nized i n Roviaro v . Un ited States, 353 U.S . 53 , 59- 60 (1957) .
75 F. R.D. at 445 . Here, however , eve n t he . government now
admit s that of the FBI's 837 informers on the named p l a i nt i ffs
report ed on an y un l a wf u l a ctivities o f t he named p l a i n t i ffs . (A. 79 . )
As t h is illustrates, plaint iffs see k t he i dentities o f domesti c in-
t elli gence i nformers, not o f cr i mi n a l i nformers, muc h less of the
organized or i me informers whose public e xpos ure was reli ed on by
Mr . Adams i n h i s aff idavit .
Likewis e, under the J une 7, 19 77 Orde r , e xtens ive dis c los u re
of FBI cr i mi na l i nformers would not occ ur i n any eve n t , s ince di s -
covery here i nvol ves only domes t i c in t e l l igenc e fi l e s - no t f iles
i n crimi na l oases . (See Me m. Op . a nd Or der, 27, 1978, at 5.)
h a ve be e n d isclosed (th o ugh
However, o r i minal i nfo r me r s
19 77 Orde r , bec a us e
June 7 r
only to p lai nt if f s ' couns e l ) unde r
t he f ac t s t h en av a ilabl e t o a nd t he Co ur t dI d r e ve al
that t h e FBI had admi n i s t rat ivel y s epara t ed i t s c r i mi na l i nfo r mers,
534
some o f whom mi gh t be ide ntifi e d i n domest i c intelli ge nc e f i les .
75 F . R. D. a t 445- 46 .
Eve n thi s n arrowl y li mi ted p otential disc losure of FBI c r i mi n-
a l i nformers c a n now b e elimi n a te d . FBI doc umen t s r ece i ve d since
t he J une 7, 19 77 r u l i ng mak e clear that t he Bureau ha s i n fact ad-
mini s t r a t i v e l y dist i ngui shed criminal i n f or me r s f rom domes t i c i n-
t el l ige nce i nfo rmers. Unt il rece nt l y , FBI c r i mi n al inf o rme r s were
de s i gn a t e d e i t her b y the f ile c l a s s i ficat ion numbe r "1 37 , " or a s
" c r i mi nal, " o r bot h . Simi l a r l y , FBI " s e c u r i t y " informers we re c l as-
sifie d a s "134 , " a nd FBI "extremi st " o r "r a c ia l" i nfo r me rs a s "170"
info rmers. (A.S53- 5S. ) Al t h ough the th r e e cl as sifications we r e
merged 'i n Nov ember 1976 into a single category , eac h info r mer ' s s ym-
bol nu mber now has a separate suffix , " C" for c r iminal i nforme r s ,
and "S" f o r secur i t y i nfo rme r s , so t h a t c r i mi na l i nforme r s and domes -
tic int e lli ge nce i nformers are st i l l a dmini s t r a t i v e l y di stinguished.
(Ad ams De p . at 220- 27 ; A. 556- 57, 575 , 643. )
Thus , Mr. Ada ms ' s peculations about broad expos ur e of FBI cr i min-
al i nfor me r s unde r t he J une 7 Or de r , i nc r e d i b l e in any e vent , can ,
now b e further p ut to res t. In denying the i nstan t mot io n for re-
cons i de r a t i o n , t he Co u rt can ma ke c l e a r that its di s c l os ur e orde r
aoe s not ge ne r a l l y apply t o "137" or crimi n al info r mers before Novembe r
19 76, or t o info rmers a fter November , 1976 wi th " C" (cr i mina l ) s uf-
fi xes. Thus, for e x a mp l e , t h e 21 "cr i mi na l " i nfor mers among the 837
FBI i n f o r mers on the narne d p laint i f f s nee d no t be di sc l os ed i ni t i a l -
ly (e ve n tho ugh none o f t hese " cr i mi n al" i n f or ",e r s a c t ually reported
on any un l awf ul ac t ivi ty by t h e p l a int i f f s ) . (A. 74 , 79.) ( In the
event i t late r appears tha t p a r ticul ar " 1 37" i n f o r mer s a c t ua l l y e n ga ge d
i n domesti c i nt elli ge nc e s ur ve i l lanc e , the Cour t coul d r e sol ve r e que s t s
fo r t heir d i s c los u r e cas e-by- cas e , if and when the y a rise .)
535
Thus the FBI, l i ke the chi c a go pol i ce Depa rtment , can discl o s e
its d omestic intell i g e nce informers without the r e by e xpos i ng i t s
criminal informers. Se e 75 F .R.D. a t 44 5 . As a r e s ult, t he di r e
speculation in Mr. Adams ' affidavit about expos ur e of cr i minal in-
formers is s imp l y irrelevant to this cas e.
B. The FBI "Pledge of Confi de ntiality" to Inf or mer s .
Mr. Adams asserts that t he FBI i nformer pr ogr am is "totally
dependent" on an "explicit promise of confide nti ality", and wou ld
thus be destroyed by disclosure of informers' identities to plain-
(Aft. ~ s 6, 7.) However, it was not until 1977,
tiffs' counse l.
whe n threatened by court-ordered disclosures of FBI domesti c intel-
ligence informers, that the FBI revised its Ma nua l of Instructions
to require agents to assure informers that the "FBI will take all
( A. 644.)
possible steps to maintain... full confidentiality."
Prior to 19 77 , and thus during most of the period c ov ered by
this lawsuit, FBI pol i c y wa s , s t a t e d in a 196 8 me mo r a nd um from
Director Hoover to all field offices :
[Tlhe ultimate deci sion as to the release o f
an informant will be ma de by the At to rne y Gen -
eral in the best interest of national securi ty.
As a general rule, all of our security i nf orm-
ants are considered available for lnterview by
Departmenta Attorneys an or testlmo
n
1 ne e d-
ed. Only a very few are urnis lng lnformatlon
or s uch a highly s e ns i t i ve and important nature
as to preclude their use. (A.587 (e mphasi s a dde d )'
See also A. 6 40 . )
In short , a ll but a "very f ew" FBI domes t i c int el ligenc e in-
former s assumed t he risk that t he gove r nmen t wo u l d c hoos e t o expos e
Indeed, it has not
them, a nd we r e "conditione d" t o t his f act. ' ( I d . )
b e e n uncommon f or FBI i n for me r s t o be c alle d t o t e s tify publicly
o r oth erwi s e t o be exposed by t he gove r nme nt , whe n it des i r e d the i r
- ;..
(A.656-89.) Defendants sometimes refer to t l l ~ :'s " s i mp l y
t est imony .
536
a ma t te r o f s ur faci n g an informa n t a s the government' s witne ss. "
(A. 592 . ) Now, whe n " s ur f a c i n g " t he i n f or me r s (though only to
plaint iffs' c ounse l ) migh t we l l res ult in estab lishing de fendants'
l i ab ili t y for the v i ol a t i on o f f unda me nt a l cons ti tuti onal r i gh t s ,
they s eek t o keep thei r i n f or me r s s ubme r ge d .
Eve n Mr. Adams admits that i n f or me r s "unde rsta nd they may
e v e ntua l l y h ave t o test ify agains t the or organizations
t hey r e po r t on." (Af f . Although he cl a i ms t h at they expect
conf identiality " a t a l l other t i mes " (i d . ) , informers a r e a lso on
notice t hat t h e c our ts , t oo , c a n requi re the i r exposure, a s courts
have been emp owered to do for ye ars. supra, 353
U.S. a t 60 -61.
I n s um, t h e FBI's abi l ity t o r ecrui t a nd r etain inf ormers has
neve r de pe nded on a ny p l e dge of unq ua l i fied con f i de nti a li t y , be-
cause the FBI ga ve no s uc h pledge. I nformers knew that t hey we re
sub ject to being e xpos e d , ei ther by the Bureau (at lea s t un t i l
1977) or by co u r t order ( as i n thi s c as e ). I ndeed , the Bureau' s
ob serva n c e of conf ident i a l i ty has bee n quite s ele c t i ve. As recent-
l y as J u l y , 19 77 - l ess t h a n a month a f t e r Ada ms f i led his af-
f i da vi t - t h e FBI pub licl y releas e d the n a me s of at l e as t fi ve
f o r me r ACLU off i c i als who ha d provided inf orma t ion to th e Bu reau
under expres s or i mp l i e d understandi ng s of c onfident iality . (A.80 4- 07. )
Yet, despite r epeated exposures of domest ic i ntelligence informe r s
during the las t three dec a des A.656- 89), t h e FBI i n f o r me r progr a m
has no t been destroy ed. Thi s has occurred in l a r ge pa r t because of
two incenti ve s not menti oned in Adams ' affi davit. Firs t is money.
ht a 1968 nationwide FBI conf c r e r.c e o n r aci al i n f o r mer s ,
537
Th e c o nf e r e es we re un ani mous in thei r obs erva-
t i on t h a t money i s t he p r i ma r y mot i va t ing
force i n de veloping rac ial informants .
(A. 1 82e . )
Second i s FBI c oe r ci on . As an e xpe r t on FBI domes t i c i nt el-
l i ge nce in f o r me r s h as e xp lai ne d ,
In additi on , the i nf o rme r re cruit may be 1' 110 oke d ,11
tha t i s , i n act ua l o r pot e n t i a l troubl e with the
l aw, a nd henc e eage r t o c l e a r h imself by c oope r a-
t i on with the Burea u. The a ge n t-re crui ter some-
t i me S b a i t s h i s pi t c h with t i dbi t s of personal
i n forma t ion abo u t t h e p r os p e c t (a cquired f rom
other i nformers) whi ch s e r ve s as a discreet f o rm
o f bla c kmai l . (A. l ? 3 : s e e a lso A.182a- 18 2b . )
I n f a c t , far f rom having to p l e dge ab s o lute c onf i de nt i a l i ty
t o r ecruitdome s t i c i nte lligence i n f o rme rs , the FBI has had to
indo ctri n a t e i n formers no t t o expo s e t he ms e l ve s . " Th i s is t o pr o-
tect t he Burea u f r om " emb a rras sment." Th u s a n FBI memor a nd um r e-
p or t e d seve r a l i nci de nts i n 1969 "whe r e individua l s pub l i c l y d i s-
cl osed t heir c on f i de nt ial r elat i o nshi p wi th the PBI a ft e r vo lun-
(A.622 . ) Th e
t arily f ur ni shi ng va luab l e s ecur i t y inf ormati o n . "
memorand um emphas ized t he need " p a r t i c ul a r l y t o prevent stude nt
informants from deli be r a t e s e lf-exposur e i n a n atte mpt t o e xp loi t
the r el a t ions h ip wi th the Bureau or otherwi s e emba r rass the Bureau ... "
(A.622 .) Ano the r t o p-le v e l FBI memo randum, not i ng 2 s t uden t i n-
fo rmants who "we nt s our , " added , liThe iI':'lportant cons i de ra t i o n , o f
c our s e, i s to protec t the Bure au f r om pos sib l e emba r ras sme nt. "
(A. 6 15- l 6 J :See also A.6 00- 6 24c , 637 , 641 . )
In ternal FBI admrnistr ati ve for pr ocess ing i nformers o ften
c on t a i n s uch l a ng ua ge as the fol lowing :
INDOCTRINATION
Every opport un ity has to properly indoct rinate
thi s info r mant agai ns t (;:':'"'.)' dis c losure o f 1.1) S r cr at i onsh i p
wi t h t h e FBI t h r o ugh a ny meJ ia . (A. 6 12c , 61it ; also A.637,
6 39 , 6 44 , 80 2- 0 3. )
538
Avoiding e mba rras sment (or wo r s e ) r e ma i ns the " i mportant
c onsiderat ion " in the FBI 's effort to concea l i t s domest i c i n-
te l ligence inf or me r s and t he i r wr ong do i ng from
t h i s Co ur t. As warned by one o f the t elexes on
ba s e d h is a ffi da vi t (and which t he FBI refused
ordered to do s o by this Cou rt ), the FBI shou ld
pl ainti ffs and
whic h Mr . Adams
to produc e unt i l
r esis t di s clo-
sure o f i nforme r s in a s imilar ci vi l s u i t b ecaus e itwoul d e nabl e
plainti ffs "to discove r i f a ny a c t i on c oul d r i ghtly o r wrongly
be at tributed to [the i n f o r mer s ) whi ch c ou l d be al lege d t o be e n-
tra pme nt, h arassment or counter- inte l l i gence ac t i on s by the i n-
fo r mants act ing on beha l f of t he FBI." (A. 636. )
Even i f t he FBI h a d attempt e d to p romi s e its i nfor me r s i m-
munity fr om c o u r t - o rde r e d d isc l os ure, itwou l d h ave h ad no a uth-
ori t y to do
c o urts. I n
Bureau has
Mr . Ad ams '
reconsi der
t e l l i ge nc e
so, and i t s pr omi s e c oul d ha r d l y be b inding on
f a ct , the FBI c o cument s di scussed ab ove show tha t the
never ma de such a promi s e . Fo r both the s e r eas ons ,
s o- c a l l e d "Pl e d ge of Confide n t i a l i t y " i s not caus e t o
this Cour t ' s Or der r e q ui r i n g d isc los u r e o f d ome st i c i n-
i n f o r me r s t o p laint i f f s ' counse l.
C. Di s c los i n g FBI Domesti c I nt e l l i ge nc e Informe r s To Plai n-
t i f f s ' Counse l Wi ll Not I mpai r Th e FBI ' s Performanc e o f
Le g iti mat e Law Enfor c ement Func t i ons .
Once Mr . Adams' irr e l e vant s t a t e me n t s c once r ni ng c rimi nal i n-
formers are put t o one side , l i t t l e r emai ns o f hi s s pecu-
l a t i ve predict i ons about t he e ffe c t of this Co urt 's J un e 7 , 1977
Or de r on FBI l aw e n f o r c e me n t . Nonetheless, plaint iffs res pon d bri ef-
ly to each of hi s rema ining point s.
Fi rs t , Mr . Ada ms ' a s s erted f ear that di sclosing i nforme r s t o
plainti f f s ' counsel "ill j e opardize pnysi ca I safe ty, or othe r-
539
wi s e s ub j ect t he m t o i mpr o pe r r etribution (Af f . \ ' s 10, 16), is
a n a ffr o nt t o th i s Co urt 's inte l l i ge nce. Pl ai n ti ff s' l e ga l t e a m
(c ons ist ing , f or
and 1 para l e ga l )
o f cour s e r e s pe c t
JO its tha t he has
c a l r e t a l i a t ion
De p . a t 64) and
whi c h d i scl o sure
pur po ses o f t he June 7 , 19 77 o r de r , o f 3 l a"Ye r s
pr e s e n t s no t hrea t t o FBI i n f or me rs, and wi l l
thi s Cour t ' s pr o tect ive Or de r . (Mr . Adams a d-
no knowledg e o f a ny a c t s o f
by c oun s e l or t he ACLU name d
f ur t he r that he is unawa r e o f
o f a n i n former ' s i dentity t o
h a r a ssment o r phy s i -
p lai nt iffs (Adams
a sing l e c a se in
couns el under a pro-
t ectiv e order eve r re sulted in any sort of r etribution a gainst a n
FBI i nformer . (Ada ms Dep. a t 190. "
Even i TlOnere we r e t o be an a c cide nt al d iscl os ure to a person
o the r t han plainti ffs ' c ounsel , i t woul d be ext r e me l y unl ikely
t o pos e a s e r i ous threat t o any domest ic i nt e l l i genc e i n f o rmer.
Mr . Ad ams ' brazen attempt t o equate t he p lai nti ffs he r e - or-
ga n iza t i ons such a s t he Amer ican Ci vil Libert ies Uni o n, the
Ame r i c a n Friends Se r v i ce Committ e e a nd the Inde pende n t Vo t e r s o f
I l l i no i s , a nd individuals suc h as Reve rend J ess e J a c kson a nd
Dr . Que nt i n Yo un g - with t he c r ime s yndi c a t e, i n t e rms o f t he i r
likely t r eatme nt o f e xposed i n f o rmers , i s pat e n t ly i nc r e d ible and
uns uppor t a b l e . Fe w i f any e x pose d FBI i n forme r s who r eporte d on
pe a c e f ul pol itic al a c t ivi t y ( a s o p posed to c r imina l vi o l ence) ha ve
ever s uffe r ed s e riou s r eprisa l. (A. 1 81- 82; s ee , e. g. , A. 845-51. ) -
Inde ed, defendan t s themse l ve s h a ve pub licly e xpos ed man y FBI
domesti c intelli gence i nf o rme r s , mos t of whom we r e trus t e d members
of t he i nfiltrat ed organizat i ons right up t o t he ve r y mome n t o f
p ubli c l y tes t i fying a gai nst t h e m. (A. 656-89 ; s e e a l s o Adams De p .
at 190- 91. ) (Here a lmost a l l o f those whose i de n t i t ies mi gh t a cci den-
t a l l y be di sc l osed a r e no l o nge r FBI inf o rme r s , and ma ny of t hem
do not r e s i de in t he Chica go area. A. 74 . )
The J us t ice Departme n t ' s Wi t ne s s Protec ti on Pr o gram, cite d by
Mr . Adams ( ' 15 ), h a s nothi ng t o do with most domesti c i ntellige nc e
in f o rme r s . Th a t Progr am, ba s ed on spec i f i c s tat u t o ry a ut ho r i za t ion
on ly in org an iz e d crime ca ses (A.6 46, 6 48, 6 49 ) , author izes pay-
ments to and re locat ion of wi tnesses , on ly i f the Assi stant Atto rne y
General finds evidence "that the life o f a witness or of a member
o f h i s f ami l y is in immedi a t e j e op ardy. " (A.64 6 .) Mr . Ada ms wa s
una b l e t o c ite a s i ng l e i ns t a nc e o f an FBI domes t i c i n t e l l i ge nc e in-
fo r mer in Chi c a go wh o wou l d be e l i g ible fo r t h e \l1tne s s Prot ec tion
Pr og r a m, even i f e xpos e d to the gene ra l p ubli c . (Ada ms De p t . a t
192- 93.) -r . - -'
540
Second , Mr . Adams ' ass erti on t hat FBI informer programs ,
inc l udi ng t he c r iminal i nfor me r prog r a m, woul d be "subs tantial l y
damag e d" by disc los ur e unde r t his Co ur t ' s J une 7, 19 77 Orde r (Aff. ,
1, 8 , 26 , 27 ) , i s p a t e ntl y i nc r edi b l e . Only do mes t i c intel l i -
gence i n f o rme r s nee d be di s c l osed und e r tha t Or der , a nd the n o nl y
t o p l a i n t if f s ' l egal team. Mr. Ada ms t ries , b ut fa i ls to expl a i n
away these safegua r ds . Whi l e a dmit t i ng t h a t i n formers ' concerns
abou t confiden ti a l i ty c a n b e a l layed if t heir f i l e s a re di s close d
to a j ud ge (Af f . , Mr . Adams cl a i ms t h a t i f info rmers ' f i les
a r e d i s c losed t o a n a t t o r ne y f o r the pers on or organization report-
e d o n , "no exp l a n a t i on woul d s uffice. II ( I d . ) Yet Mr. Ad a ms testi-
f i e d i n h i s depos i t ion t hat neithe r he , nor a nyone e l s e in the FBI
t o h i s kn owledge, has ever made a ny e f f o r t t o e xp lai n to any FBI i n-
former the k ind o f protective orde r emb odie d in this Court 's June 7
Or der , limiti ng di sclos ure t o p lainti f f s ' l e ga l team. (Ad a ms Dep.
at 1 87- 88. ) .
Si mi l a r l y , Mr. Ad a ms asse r t s t hat FBI i n former s do no t make t he
"n i c e dis t inct ion" that they are not one o f the i nformers di s c l os e d
in a par t icul ar c a s e , or t h a t t h e y are cr i mina l i n formers an d no t
domes t i c inte l l i ge n c e i nfo r mers. (Aff., Eve n i f t his a sse rt-
ion we re subs tant iat e d , and e ven i f the FBI had made some effort t o
expl a i n t o its c r i mi n a l i n for mer s t ha t here i n vo l ve s on l y
dome s t i c inte l lige nce ,. t h e a r g ume nt prove s t oo mUCh . Unde r Mr . Adams '
t he ory, no i nformer s could eve r b e di sclos e d i n any c a s e , beca us e o ther
i n f o r mers i n other c a s e s would a l ways be ma de a ppr e he nsive by t he d i s-
c l os ur es. The qua lified priv i l e ge fo r c r i mi na l informe rs, recogni ze d
in Rov iar o , wo uld be c ome an abs ol ut e p rivi lege f o r a l l i nf o r me r s .
Ivhile that mi gh t pl e ase t he FBI , i t l S no t and neve r has be en t he l aw;
nor sho u l d iteve r b ecome t he lGw .
-"1. :;-
541
Th ird , insof a r a s Mr. Adams ' C0ncern i s abo ut t he ef f e c t of d i s -
clo s ure h ere on do me s t ic i nt e l li g e nc e i n f o r me r s in o the r c a s e s, i t is
g ross ly o v ers t a t ed. Co nf i de nt ial i t y is a l e s s i nc e ntiv e
for many FBI domes t ic i ntelli ge nce i n f o r me r s t h a n money o r i nti mi da -
t ion (see p p . 15-16 , s upra) , and a l l but a few o f t he m have i n f o r me d
for t he FBI despi t e the Bure au ' s longst an di ng pol icy tha t t he y could
be e xp osed if ne e ded for t es timon y (pp . 14-15, s u pr a ) . Here thei r
testimon y is needed.
Indeed , ma ny of t he persons who s e ident i t ies a r e being withh eld
rece ived no p romi s e o f c onf i dential i t y . The FBI s e e k s to e ncompass
under i t s cl ai m of i nformer' s p r i v i lege n ot o nl y pai d info r mers and
pe rsons who the FBI says exp li ci tly r e ques t ed some degree of c onfi den-
t i a l i t y , but a ls o pers o ns who provi de d in for mat ion unde r what the FBI
ca l ls a "pre sume d" understanding of con fi dent iality.
(A. 66 . ) x s
e x pans i vely (a nd s electively ) * inter prete d by the FBI , this pres umpt ion
can incl ude a lmost anyone who has eve r given the FBI any i nfo rmat ion
of any sort . Thus , of the 83 7 informers o n the n a me d plaint i ffs , 29 6
(A. 78 . ) Ye t
a re pers on s wh o suppos e dly " pre s ume d" con fi den tiali t y.
many of t hes e "pr esume d" i nfo rmers are cl e a r l Y not within t he reach
o r purpose o f any i nforme r's p ri Vi lege . For e xamp l e , ma ny a re govern-
ment e mpl oye e s , includi ng numerous po l ice office r s , who provi de d t he
The FBr is s elf serving ly se lect ive , s ome t i mes c onveniently
not h onoring expl i c i t requ ests for conf i d ent iality (such a s
r e que s t s by ACLU o ff i cialS t hat i nformat ion t h ey p r ovide d be
hel d "in the s t r i ctes t o f confi de nce ," "for your e yes only , "
a n d " con fi dentia lly , " e . g . , A. 80 4- 0 7 , 808 , 81 0, 812 , 819 , 8 33 ,
835 , a nd 836 ) , a nd some t i mes no c " pre s umi ng" unde r standi ng s o f
conf ide nt i a l i t y wh ere s uch a presumpt ion a ppears wa r r a n ted
(e.g. , A. 830 -32 , 837- 39).
542
FBI with inf o rma t i o n rec e i ve d in the c ours e o f their p ub l i c
mento antiwar li t e r a t ure collect e d by loc al po lice o ff ice rs
(A. 718-21 ), p lai n t i f f Reverend J e s s e J a c k s on ' s se lect ive s e r v ice
fil e d i v u l ge d by a l oca l dr a f t b o ard emp l oyee (A. 733-35 ) , postal
recor ds revealed by pos t a l ins pector s (A. 74 3 , 745 ) , e t c . (A. 6 90-
745 . ) No t o n l y doe s t he infor mer ' s p r i vi lege not pr o t e c t s uc h
gove r nme n t emp l oye e s, as t hi s Cou r t h as r ul e d (Al l i a nc e Me m. Op .
and Order , Ma r. 26 , 197 6 , at 4 ), b ut t he y a re i n many i ns t a nc e s un-
na med c o- c ons pirato rs , a nd po t e n t i a l co- de f enda nts , whose i de nti t i e s
ar e t hus imp r operly wi t hh e ld. (Se e ACLU Complaint , 7- 5 , 16 . )
More over , t o the limi t e d e x t e nt FBI domes t ic int e l ligence i n-
f ormers did expe ct c onf ide nti al ity , a n d h a ve e xpresse d a pprehe nsion
about dis c los ure , thei r appr e hens i o n a r gue s f or discl osure, not
aga inst it . Wha t the i nforme rs f e a r is not dis c los ure of t h e i r i de n-
t ities, b ut d isc los u r e o f the i r mi s de e ds . Thi s i s c andidl y a dmi tte d
by one of t he FBI t ele xe s r e lied o n i n Mr . Adams' a f f i d a vi t , wh i c h
wa r ned t ha t inf o r me r s
h ave expressed a n i n t e n s e i nteres t in t hei r i n-
d i v i d ua l pote n t i a l ci v i l li abi l i t y , b ecause of
thei r i nfor mant a cti vity , i n be i ng sued a s a r e -
sult of expos ur e throug h the l ega l d is co ve r y pro-
c e s s , through inadver tence or a s the result of
t estimon y the y might be c a lled o n ' t o gi ve o n be -
hal f of the gove r nment . They h ave a l s o r aise d the
is s ue o f wha t res pons i b i l i t y the De pa r t men t of
J usti c e a nd/ or U. S. Go vernme n t wo ul d as s ume in the
l e gal defens e of c i vil liti gat i on as we l l as i n-
de mnifi c ati on for any re sul t a n t monetary judgment
r eco very a ga i ns t t he m b e c a use of t h eir inf o rmant
a c t i vity .. [Tl he y have b e come extreme l y s e nsitive
r ega rdi ng the i r po t e nti al c i vi l l iabi li t y i n c on-
t inui ng wi th thei r info rmant a ctivi ty. (A. 62 6-
27 . )
Ca t e r i ng t o i n f o rme rs' fea r s that, if exposed, t he y wi llbe brough t
t o j us t i c e, i s no r e a s o n f o r ,this Cour t t o pe rmi t t h e FBI t o wi t h -
hold evidenc e.
543
Fourth a nd f i n a l l y , any limite d effec t of disc los ur e here on '
t he FBI's dome s t i c i ntel li ge nce progr am wi l l no t damage t h e " ove r -
a ll e f f ec tivene s s o f law en f orce me n t " (Af f . , becaus e the
FBI 's do mes t i c intelli gence progr am hus be e n a law e nfo r c ement
wa ste. Th ous ands of domestic intelligence info r me r s h a ve t oi l ed
f o r t h e FBI in the last twenty ye a r s , b oth nationwi de a nd i n Chi c a-
go , and have been pai d millions of do l l a r s .
(A. 7 46- 77 7 c ; see a l-
s o Adams De p . a t 20 1- 23 7. ) Na t ur ally , i n the cours e o f t h i s
mass ive s urve i l lanc e , they c ou l d not h elp but c ome acros s e vi de nc e
o f s uch crime s a s thefts of gove rnment typewrit e rs, a n d occasional-
ly se rious crimes.
(A.792.) However t hes e i nc i de nta l catches were
r elat i vely f ew a nd far between, a s sug gested by the f act t h at non e
o f the FBI 's 837 informers on the na med plaintiffs. dur ing more than
a de c ad e o f sur ve i l l a nc e , reported on any unlawf u l act i v i t y by a ny
named plaint iff, o r r eported any information l eading t o t he a rres t,
i ndi c tment o r conviction of a ny named pl aintiff.
(A. 79 -80. ) In-
de ed, i n t he l ast twent y y e a r s , FBI domestic intel l i ge nce in forme r s
have appa rent l y produced not a single c onvicti on or even arr es t un-
de r a ny o f the f our maj or stat utes r eli e d on by the FBI to justify
its do me s t i c intelli ge nce investigati o ns.
(Adams Dep . at 113-17;
A. 7 78-89.) A mor e wa s t e d investment in law e nfo rce me nt i s diffi-
c u l t t o i mag ine .
For a l l t hes e reasons, thi s Court' s Or de r r e q uir i ng dis c l os u r e
of ma t eri al s a l l e gedly i denti f y i ng FBI domes t i c inte l l igence in form-
e r s t o p l a i nt i ffs ' counsel wil l not i mpa i r t he FBI ' s pe r f ormanc e o f
l egit i mat e l aw e n f or c e me n t f unct ions.
-r :'
544
CONCLUSION
Unde r s t a nd abl y the FBI, which unt i l r e c e n t l y r es e r ved t he
r i gh t to e xpos e i t s do mes ti c intelligence i n fo r me r s to t es tify f or
t he Bur eau , now b a l ks a t expos ing t he m when t hey a re c al led to
tes t ify a gai n s t the Bu r e au. Howe ve r , plaint iffs have a cle a r and
compel l ing e vi de n t i a ry need f o r materials a lle gedl y t e ndi ng to i de n-
tify domesti c i nt e l l i ge nce infor mer s . Furthermor e , d i s c l os i ng t h e s e
infor mers t o pl a i n t i f fs ' c ouns e l wi l l nei ther t h r e a t e n t he m, nor i mpai r
t he o ve r a l l effec t iveness of FBI l a w e nf orce me nt . On t he c ontrary , c on-
ceal ing t he infor mers and a l l ma ter i a l s al l e gedl y tending t o i de nt ify
t he m wou l d serious l y e n f o rceme nt o f the c i vi l r i ght s l aws
a nd t h e Cons ti tut i on by t he cour t s .
The f e de r a l d e f e nda n t s h ave s hown no ground r e cons i de r this
Co urt ' s Order of J une 7 , 19 77 , r equiring disclos ure o f ma t e r i a l s a l l e ge d-
l y i den t i f y i ng do mest ic i nt e ll i gence i n f o r me r s t o p l a i n ti f f s ' c o un s e l ,
a nd t hei r motion f o r recons iderat i on of thi s Court ' s Or d e r shou l d be
de ni e d. Pl ain tiffs r e s pe ctful ly s uggest t h at t he Or der de ny i ng reconsi-
dera t i o n s hould a l so ma ke c lear t h at FBI c r i mi na l infor mer s , admi ni s t r a -
t i v e l y c ode d a s s uch by t he FBI , n e e d not be d i sclos e d unde r the J une 7
Or de r .
Re s pect f u l l y s ub mi t ted ,
Robe r t J . Vol l e n
Rob e r t C. Howa rd
Douglass W. Ca s s e l , Jr .
Jonatha n C. Mo o r e
David Gol dberge r
Loi s Li pt on
Alexa nde r L. Po likoff
Jos e ph R. Lundy
Robe r t L. Tuc ke r
At torneys f or ACLU Pl a i n t i f fs
r ->,
By:
'" ... ., (.... /'..... ' , c --...... .....
':::r:
J r .
Dt\T:E:.;D : October 2 3 , 1978
545
FOR SERVI CE:
Robe r t J. Vo l l e n
Dougl ass W. Ca ss e l , Jr.
10 9 No r t h De a r bo r n Stre e t
Sui t e 1300
Ch i cago , I l l i no i s 6060 2
( 31 2 ) 64 1- 55 70
Rob e r t C. Howa r d
J o natha n C. Moo r e
23 0 No r th Mi c h igan Ave n ue
Sui t e 1710
Chi c a go , I l l inoi s 6060 1
( 312 ) 64 1- 1181
Joseph R. Lun dy
Schif f Ha rdin & Wai t e
720 0 Se a r s Tower
23 3 So uth Wack e r Dri ve
Chicago , I l li nois 60 60 2 '
( 31 2) 876 -1000
..
546
ACLU PLAINTIFFS I RECORD APPE1JDIX
OF
Page
I. Ex t e n t o f Inf orme r Del e tions 1
II. 8 37 FBI Inf o r me r s
Plaint i ff s
on The 27 ACLU Na me d
72
I I I . Pa r tia l l y Di s c los e d
FBI Use o f Dome s ti c
To:
Evidenc e Con c e r n i ng
Int el ligence I n f o r me r s
A. Disr up t an d
Ac t ivity
Ne ut r a l i ze Lawful Pol i t i c a l
8 6
B. Obt a i n I nfor mat ion By Unlawful
Un c ons t i t u tio na l Me ans
Or
1 8 3
C. Repor t On " Pe r s on a l Side l ight s "
t he t arge ts ' s e x l i ve s , fami ly
p r ob l ems , e t c , )
(e. g . ,
216
D. Manipul a t e a n d Sub ve r t the Fre e Pr e s s 261
E. Re port On Lawf u l Poli t i cal Acti yi t y 350
F. Inves tigat e a nd Int imidate .At torneys
Wh o Repre sent "S ub ve r s i ve s " o r
" Ex t r e mi sts" 415
G. Obtain Ba nk Records 4 62
H. I mpa i r Ac a d e mic Fr e e dom 49 0
I V. Se par a t e FBI Admi ni s t r at ive De signa t i ons for
Cr imi na l Informers and Domes t i c I n t e l l i ge nc e
I nf or me r s 550
V. FBI Po l i c y
I n f o r me r s
On Exposing Do mes ti c I n t e ll i ge nce
5 83
VI. Parti a l Li st o f Publ icly Expos e d
Intelligenc e Info r mers
FBI Dome s t i c
656
VII. Pers ons Pr ovi d i ng I nformat ion t o
Unde r A " Pr e s umed " Underst a nding
Conf ident i a lity
t h e
o f
FBI
690
547
Pa ge
VI I I . Fai lure o f FBI Dome st i c I nt el l l ge nc e
I n f orme r s t o Con t ri b ut e Si gni fi c a n tl y
to Law Enforcement De s pi t e Th e i r
Zno r mo us Number s an d Co s t 7 46
IX .
Summar y o f Exc e r pt s Fr om FBI Fi le On
Expos e d FBI Domes t i c I nt ell i ge nc e
Inf ormer
794
X.
Miscel laneous and Au t he nt i c a t i ng Af f idavits 80 4
..-./ :;?:
I.
II .
III.
548
ACLU PLAINTIFFSI RECORD j, P?ENDIX
TABLB OF
Ex t e n t of In f o r mer De l e t i ons
A. Af fida v i t o f Na ncy St one
and Exhi b i t s
B. Defenda nts ' Explanation of
Del etions
837 FBI I nfo r mers on the 27 ACLU
Named Plaint i ffs
A. Number s By Cat e g ories
B. No Criminal La w Enfo r c e men t
Justification
C. No Fore ign Count erintel l igence
Justi fication
Partially Discl osed Evi de nc e Conce rnin g
FBI Use o f Dome sti c Inte ll i ge n c e
I nfor me r s To :
A. Di srupt a nd Ne u tral ize Lawf u l
Pol i tical Ac t i v i t y
1. COI NTELPRO Ini t i a t i on
Doc ument s
a . Communist Party , USA,
Augu s t 28 , 195 6
b. Soc ialist Party,
Oc tobe r 12 , 1 9 61
c . Whit e Ha te Groups,
Se p t e mber 2 , 19 6 4
d . Bl ack Na t iona l i s t - Ha t e
Group s , August 25, 19 6 7
c . Ne w Left , J une 1 0 , 1 96 8

1
1
61
72
79
8 2
86
8 6
8 6
91
92
9 7
100
549
2 . Ac t ive Disr up t i on
3. Obt a ini ng ? o r
Us e In Di s r up t i on
4 . I n f o r me r s As Inhe ren tly
Di sr up t i ve
B. Ob tain Inf o rmati on By Unlawful
or Unconst i tutional !Ieans
1. Bu r g l a r i e s
2 . "Tr a s h Covers "
3. Dis c l o s e d Feder a l
Income Ta x Returns
C. Report on ' "Personal Si del i gh t s "
(e . g . , t he t ar get s ' s e x l i ve s ,
f amil y prob lems, et c. )
D. Mani p u l a t e And Sub vert t he Fr e e
Press
1. Planting Phony Story
2 . Leak i n g Embar r a ssin g I n formati on ;
F8ed i n g Ques t ions Fo r a Repo rte r
t o Use a t Pr e ss Con f e r e nc e
3 . Pr o po s e d Plant i n g o f "Os t e n s i b l e
News Item"
4 . Feeding I n f or ma t i o n t o Di s c r e d i t
Uni ve r s i t y An t iwa r Group
5 . Feedi n g I n f o r ma t i on t o Help
"Split" SDS
6 . Us i n g Newspa pe r Re po r t e r s t o I n f or m
on Plai n tiff Don Rose by "Inter view-
i n g " Him
7. Es t a blis h i n g " Ne q r o Ne\oJS Medi a "
r -< :.: ':.
Cont acts to " Neut r a l i ze " Black
Ext r e mist Gr o u? s
8 . Di v ulgi ng "Co n f i de n t i a l " FBI Fi l e s
to Re por t e r to Ci s credi t Not ion of
Is l a m

103

1 6 8
1 8 3
1 8 3
199
2 05
21 6
2 61
261
2 78
31 5
318
321
3 30
33 4
336
38 -028 0 - 79 ..
550
Pa oe

9 . Req ue st Fo r " Pr ove n Cont a c t s "
in Pres s t o " Dr aw Up A
Program" to Di sc rec'.it Black
Pa nth e r Par ty
341
10 . Pr e v e nti n g o r I mpe di ng Di s t r i -
but i o n o f Bl a c k Panthe r Party
Newspa pe r 3 42
11. Us i ng Sources To Respond To
Pres s Cr i t i ci s m o f the FBI
a n d it s Di r e ctors 345
E. Report on Lawful Political Activ ity 350
F . Investigate and I n t imi da t e At t o r neys
\-,Tho Repr esen t " Subvers i ve s " or
"Extremi sts " 415
G. Ob tain Bank Records 462
H. I mp airAc a de mi c Fr eedom 49 0
I V. Se p ara t e FBI Admini s t rati ve Des i gna t i on s
Fo r Crimina l Informers a nd Domesti c
I n t e l l ige nc e I nformers 550
A. FBI File Cl a s sificati ons Pr i o r t o
11- 2 4-7 6 550
B. FBI I n f o r mer Cl a s s i fica ti on Changes ,
11- 2 4- 76 55 6
C. FBI F i l e Cl a ssific a t i on s As Of
Ap ri l , 1978 55 8
V. FBI Pol icy On Ex po s i n g Dome s t i c
Int e l l i ge n ce 58 3
A. I n f o r me r s To Be Exposed If Ne eded
For Tes timony 58 3
B. Co n f i de n t i a l i t y To Prot ect FBI Fr om
Emba r r a s s me n t 60 0
C. Co nf i de n tiali t y To Pr ot e c t Inf ormers
and Justice Dc partmer.t From Li a bi li ty
For I n f o r mer Wr o ng do i n g G25
D. From FBI of
Inst ruc ti ons G37
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
551
Partia l Li s t of Publi cly Expo s e d FBI
Dome sti c I n t e l l i ge n c e I n f o r me r s
(I nclUde s posi tions h eld by inf orme r
in t he i n f i ltrated o r g a n i z a t i on s )
Persons Pr ovi d ing Inf or ma t i on To The FBI
Unde r A " Pr esumed" Un de r s t a n di n g Of
Co n f i de n t i ality
A. State a nd Local Po l i ce
B. Others
Fa ilure of FBI Dome s t i c I n t e l l i ge n ce
I n f o r me r s to Cont r i b ut e Significantly
To La w En f o rcement De s p i t e Their
Enor mous Numbe r s and Cos t
A. Ex t e n t of FBI Use o f Dome s t i c
I n t e l l i ge nce I nfo r mers
1. Numbe rs - Chicago and nationwide
2. Co s t - Ch i cago only
B. Pr inc i pal St a t u t e s Enforced By Use
o f Domestic Int elligence I n f o r me rs,
Acco r d i n g t o FBI Man ua l of '
I n s t r uc t i on s
C. " Si gnifica nt" Ac c omplis hments of
Sec uri ty I nfor mers
Summa ry of Ex c erpt s From FBI Fi l e On
Exposed FBI Domes t i c I nt e l l i ge n c e Info r me r
Misce l laneous and Aut hen t icating Af f i d a v i t s
A. Haml in Af f i dav i t
B. Warden Affidavit .....
C. Cas s e l Af f i da v i t
D. Stapleton Af fidavit
E. Affidavi t s o f Co uns e l
Page
6 56
690
690
730
746
746
746
777a
778
79 0
79 4 '
80 4
8 04
840
844
845
868a
552
.....
jk:.L V
~ Y f ~ d ~
IS 1
553
Poli e y /f2 1'/
COU1t Proceedi ngs
Bail
The Union opposes a ll for ms of prevcnt ive det ent ion nne! th e applicatio n of all
conditions of ba il unrela te d 10 assur ing t he appe ar ance' of th e defenda nt a t tri al.
[Board Mi nutes , .I une 21-22, 1969. ]
The Union supports refor m of the federal bail sys te m to el iminat e th e prese nt
inju st ice of basing a defendant's rel ease not on t he probabilit ies of th e de fendant
appearing volu ntarily for trial but on how much mon ey th e per son has. Hr-loaso on
personal recogni zance sh ould be the nor mal and usu al met hod 1'01' the release of a ll
persons accus ed of cr ime. When additional ass u ra nce of appe ara nce is deemed neces-
sary, acceptable alternatives in clude:
1) release in cust ody of a person or org aniznt ion willi ng t o s upe rv ise t he
accused;
2) super vision by a proba t ion officer;
3) certain rest ri ct ions on t ra vel, association, and abode:
4) re lease dur in g daylig ht hours only;
5) 10% deposit bond; or
6) bail bond.
No person shou ld be denied bail solely because of financial inabil it y to giv e bond or
collateral. All defenda n ts should receive credi t toward service of th eir sent en ces for
time spent in custody be fore trial. [Board Min ut es, May 24, 19G1i , March 28, 1966 . ]
A defendant who is out on ba il enjoys a greater chance for acquit : al. The
defense attorney ca n be assisted in investigati ng t he fact s of th e case, assist in
preparation of t he tria l , a nd con tinue workin g to pay for invr-st ignt ive and legal costs
and for family suppor t. The defenda nt who m ust wai t m any mon ths in jail ca n do
none of t hese thi ngs, and oft en can ne ver full y re cover from the disr up tion t o his or
her life eve n ifacqu i tted. [Boa rd Minutes, May 24, 1965; Weekly Bu ll eti n, November
30, 1964 . ]
Bail procedures should be designed solely to as sure th e defendant's appear-
ance at trial. Prevent ive detention be fore a person has be en convicted of any offense
is an ex t re me ly da nge rous pr ocedure, irrelevant t o th e purpose of bail. Persons who
may be a men ace t o publi c safety if they are re leased prior to trial should be-and can
be-dealt wi t h by existi ng substantive cr iminal law or by laws re lating to the
commitment and treat me nt of t he mentally ill. Persons considered likely to flee
before trial ca n be dealt wi th under current surety bond procedures. But to add to our
present bail systemdebatable procedures for incarcerati ng soci a l undesirables would
tend on ly t o undermine t he system and t o vitiate the cons t itu ti onal pri nciples on
which it is based. [Boa rd Mi nutes, May 24, 1965; ACLU Statement on S.1357, J une
16, 1965.]
The Union th us opp oses preventive detention for all persons as all pre-trial
de fendants mus t be presumed i nnocent until proven guilty and. therefore, not ne ces -
sarily "dangerous" simply because they stand acc used. ., " ",:,'
Full review by a ppeal to higher courts should be made availa ble to any pe rson
denied bail. [Boa rd Mi nutes, Ma rch 28 , 1966. 1
POLICY UNDER REVIEW
-----------
554
1976
PolIcyfAuWe
. -



A Cl V
A-rWwh-i
It
555
Policy #'XU
Pre-Trial Publicit y
One of the most difficult. problems the Unio n has been cnll cd upon to re-
solve is t hat rai sed by the pu blicizing of pending crim inal trials. On the one
hand, t he Union has ste ad fastl y he ld as its core pr inciple th e inviolabili ty of
Firs t Amendment freedo ms, including free dom of the newspapers and electronic
media to r eport all matt er s th at t hey hold to be newsworth y. On t he oth er hand,
it has consistentl y urged even more r igor ous st andards of due proce ss in cri mina l
proceedings, including met hods of ens ur ing impar tial ju dges and ju r ies.
Any attempt t o suggest proper guidelin es in th is area doubtl essly will of-
fend what many regard as a virt ually absolute ri ght to repor t events t hat qualify
as news . Yet it is equally cer t ain that the re lea se or r epor tin g of infor mation
re lat ing to a cri minal pr osecuti on can, in a sign ificant number of inst ances, ef-
fect ively dest roy the r ight of an individual t o a fair t r ial. For, in a widely pub-
licized cas e, th at defendant often must eit her t ake hi s or her chances wit h a ju ry
whose mem bers he knows have been exposed on numerous occasions to t he pr ess'
vers ion of t he cri me, or for ego the const itutional ri ght and protecti on of a jury tr ial,
tr ust ing to the supposedly gre ate r objectivity of a j udge.
The general recognit ion of the nee d t o assur e a fair t r ial has r esult ed in
the adopt ion, by t he Amer ican Ba r Associat ion and other professional, legal and
j ourn alist ic organizations, of new stan dards for th is area .
The ACLU concurs in many of these new st andards ai med at preservi ng
the histor ic ri ght t o a fair t r ia l with out unduly limit ing public discussion an d
publ ic underst an ding of the machi nery of justice.
Regardi ng specific sta ndards, the ACLU recommen ds that all officials in-
volved in t he enforcement of law and prosecuti on of cr iminal defend ants under
the local , state, and federal laws abide by the following guidelines which app ly
t o the rel ease of infor mat ion to news medi a from the t ime of a prosecutor 's focus
on the particular defendant until t he pr oceeding has been t er minat ed by trial or
ot her wise:
1) No state ment of infor mati on shoul d be r eleas ed for the purpose of i n-
fluen cing th e outcome of a t r ial.
2) Subje ct to specific li mitat ions i mposed by law or cour t order , officials
may mak e public the following:
(a) Defendant' s name, age, residence and si milar background other th an
race, re ligi on, employment , and marit al status;
(b) Substance or text of charge;
(c) Ident ity of inv estigat ing an d arrest ing agency an d length of invest iga-
tion;
(d) Time and place of arrest.
(e) But none of th e above infor mat ion should be disclosed where su ch dis-
closure would be prej udicial comment on the case or cir cumstances ofarr est.
3) No informat ion shou ld be r eleased concerning the criminal or arrest r e-
cord or confession of a person accused of cr ime.
4) No i nfor ma t ion should be released by officials concerni ng:
(a) Obse rvations about a defendant' s character .
(b) Statements, admissions, confess ions , or alibis attributable to a defen -
da nt.
556
(c) Refe rences t o investi ga ti ve procedur es (fingerpr int" , polvgruph t est s,
et c.)
(d ) St at ements concerning iden tit y, cred ibil ity , or t ost.imony of pr ospcct ive
witnesses.
(e) St ntr-mcnt s concer ni ng evidence or arg ument in t he case,
(I) Ci rcu msta nces su rrounding a rrest (res ide nce, us e of wea pons, ct c.)
5 ) Official s in cha rge of cust ody of a dcfendnn t must protect th e dofcnd a nt
fr om hning ph ot ogr aphed or televised whil e in custody. No ph otograph of defen-
da nt sho uld be rel eased unless (hey serve a pr oper in vest igat ive fu nct ion.
6 ) No ne of th ese restri ct ions are int ended to a pply (.0 release of infor ma -
t ion concer ning a person accus ed of cr ime whe n such n ,lear,e is deemed necessar y
to apprehen d hi m or her.
Th e most t roublesome issue has been t he qu est ion of how best t o enforce
t hese infor mat ional st anda rds i n ord er t o en sure th e defenda nt's ri gh t t o a fa ir
trial. The Un ion has t aken note of t he coopera t ion bet ween the ba r and t he pr ess
wh ich has result ed in th e formul at ion of volunt ary pr ess guide l ines . Such volu n-
t ary press codes have appa re ntl y been adopted in a lmost half of t he st a tes, Th ey
arc premi sed on th e th eory of self-re gulat ion by t he press a nd ultimately rely on
th e discr et ion of news edito rs .
Th e ma in difficulty is whet her th e volunt a ry compli ance approach is effec-
ti ve in pr eserving th e defend a nt's r ight t o a fair trial. Unt il it is shown t hat t he
volu ntary approach is effective in sa feguardi ng th e defen dan t's ri ght to a fair
t r ial , we fa vor th e direct applicat ion of sanctions agai nst the pu blic officia ls who
r elease pr ejud icia l infor ma ti on. If, in addit ion to t hese rest r ict ions, news media
want to r efrain vol un ta r-il y from pu bl ishing uny pr ej udicial informati on t hey do
obta in. t he ACLU. would, of course support such sel f-restrai nt. But we cannot
support volunt ary codes in l ieu of sa ncti ons against law enforcement officials.
Reg a rding t he usc of sa ncti ons, t he ACLU favors direct ing sanctions
aga inst law enforcement officers and prosecuting at t orn eys responsible for pre-
se nt ing a case to t he pr ess in st ead of t o t he court. One simple met hod of cont rol
is t he a doption of spe cific administ r at ive mea su res a nd poli cy sta t ements by
pol ice depa rt ments and prosec ut ing attor neys' officers to guide th e conduct of
employees. I mprop er r elease of in for mat ion would t her eby be grounds for di scip-
l inary a ct ion,
In a ddit ion, a procedu r e should be ado pted by rul e or in a ll cour ts ,
all owing judges to admoni sh publi cly law enforcement officers and prosecut ion
attorneys respons ible for ai din g or cr ea ti ng prejudicial publicit y. Th e court could
also re fer th e matt er t o t he appropr ia te bar associa t ion committ ee on et hics.
Aside fr om the ad va ntages of it s det err ent effect , th e proposa l would enable a
j udge to act immedia tel y afte r t he r elease of prejudi cia l pu bl icity. rat her t han
wa it , as is now done, until th e t ri a l t o exe rcise hi s or her li mited power of inst r ucting
a j ury t o di sr egard newspaper comme nt - when it is ge nerally too la te t o di ssipat e
th e effect s of a prejudicia l repor t ing,
The ACLU beli eves th at a defense a ttorney in' cr iminal proceedings should
not he subject to j ud ici al sanct ions for pre-trial sta te ment s to th e p r (>5 S concern -
ing his or her client or t he ci rcumstances to which th e pending lit igati on relates.
The re are severa l r easons for t reati ng defense coun sel in crimina l prosecut ions
differently fr om pr osecut ion a ttorn eys:
1) Publ ic prosecut ors are a pt not to prosecute cases that a rc aga inst t he
ge nera l public se nt ime nt , while defense couns el often have t he burden of repro-
557
sent ing a n interest or person that is di sfuvorc d by t he maj or it y of t he communi-
ty;
2 ) Ther e is a gencr all y held presumpti on t hat t he prosecutor ha s ac te d ia
th e publi c interest in proceeding aga inst t he defendant , and t here fore st nt.eme ni s
by t he prosecut or are more readily bel ieved. On t he ot her ha nd, ther e is no such
preseurnpt ion t hat t he defense counsel is act ing i n th e public int erest: his or her
re marks will be received by t he publ ic wit h t he t hough t t hat t hey arc ma de on behalf
of t he cli ent whom "t h people," th rough th e prosecutor. have charge d wit h a cr ime ;
3) Defen se cou ns el often fa ces a commun i t y se nt i me nt a l r eady well-
marsh a ll ed aga inst t he defense.
4) The concept of " fai r t r i al " i n t h e pr ese nt con text is esse nti a lly t o
guarant ee th e a ccused individu al a tria l by a j ury t hat is fr ee of prej ud ice, Ab-
se nt th is premise t here would be li ttl e re ason for adding j ud icia l sa nct ions to en-
force the nea r ly univer sall y accept ed professiona l se lf-restraint. counse l have
t radit ionall y imposed on t hemselves t o assur e t hat t he j udicial process is a fai r
on e.
Th e present nar row scope of th e tradit ional challe nge for cause should be
exp anded t o permit challe nge of a ny ju ror who has gained a su bsta nt ial de gree
of knowle dge ab out a case from pr e-t r ia l publ ici ty, whe t he r or not t he j ur or
t hi nks he or she is impart ial. Thi s method would also be a fur ther discoura gemen t t o
police a nd pro secut ing att orn eys who mi ght in st iga te prejudicia l publicity in t he
hope of ma king convict ions ea sier t o obt ai n, because it would disqua lify many
prospect ive j urors an d th us delay t r ial. Wh en pr e-trial publ icit y, despi te a ll preca u-
t ions, r ea ches virtua lly a ll members of a commun it y, a chan ge of venue is usuall y
possibl e. In appropri at e ca ses where ext ens ive pre-tria l pub li city , prejudici al to t he
defen dant , ha s ema nated fro m th e government , t he defendant sha ll be ent i t led t o a
dismi ssal of t he charges . In a ny eve nt , diffi cul t y in securing an impa rtial jury is a
r easonable pri ce to pay for ensur ing t hat th e r ight to a fair trial wi ll not be destroyed
by intent iona l effor ts to sway t he communi ty t hrough publicity.
The Union feels t hat at t he pres ent t ime it would be a mi stake to enact
sact ions directl y aga inst t he pr ess. Unless exper ience under th e new rul es r eg-
ula t ing conduc t of offi cials who are more in t imately a pa rt of t he j udicial process
sh ows th em t o be inadequate . t he press should not be su bjected to con trols th at
may well viola te funda mental consti tu t ional ri ght s.
The ACLU sug ges t s that t he Judi ci a l Conference of t he Unit ed States
exp l ore t he probl em of th e pot ent ial bias t ha t inflammatory publicity may create
in judges, wit h a view to adopt ing sta nd ar ds governing t he conduct of ju dges in
sen sa t ional , well -publi cized cases, [Board Mi nutes, Febru ary 6-7, 1971 ; Ma rch
28, October 18,1 966; Press Relea se, Ap ril 22, 1971.]
#222
0;
Broadcasting and Photographi ng of Trials
Th e ri ght of t he pr ess to r eport news t o th e publ ic is a vita l civi l liberty. But
li ke a ll consti t ut iona l rights it is not absolute a nd ca n be li mited wh en it confl ict s
558
wit h unot hor cq ua lly vit a l civ il libortio j .ri nciplu. Fur xn mpl o, th e constit uti onal
guar un[.cc of a fa ;' t.rin l,
The U n ior: " oses radio or t elevision covera r,( ' or nowspnpor ph c.tog rnphs of
court room p ru cc- ',." .. The funrlumc nt a l purpo-cs of a cour t proce ed il\:J a n , 10 se ek
trut h and disp .t icc. The I: now](>d l;e 1ha t t he ir t r-st i ruony is h ?in g seen a nd
hea rd by coun t l . .ubcrs of people via radio and tulcvisiu n hus such a psych ologi-
cal i mpact. on \\ cs, attorn eys, and junge." that t ho pr i in c obj ect ivo or " t r ial is
defeat ed. A wit: : I LlS becomes more t han a wit ness - - t Il(' per son is an actor in a
cour troom drn n, .nd th e omot.ionl stat e of th e indivi du al ma y cnsilv mar tho
ac cu ra cy of his 0" her t es t imon y.
Th e conc ept of a publi c \;'ial docs not re quire t ha t n dofenda nt sur render al l
pr ivncy a nd su bmit t o newspaper ph ot ograp hs or t elevision ca mora s. The r igh t of
privacy extends also t o wit nesses who ar c un der th e pr ot ect ion of t he cou r t. If t heir
priva cy is invaded by picture-t aking, it could mak e th em rot icr-nt ab out t estifying
and t hus wea ken th e whole t r ial st ru ct ure , Th e prot ecti on of privacy should pr evai l
wit hi n a re asonab le distance of th e courthou se as wel l.
Our j udici al sys t em r equir es t ha t a tri al decision be mad e by a ju ry , not by
publ ic opinion , wh ich could beso aroused a nd infla med t hat t he re nd eri ng of an
unpopula r verd ict would be very difficul t. Moreover , t he pressu r e of publi c opinion
influenced by TV coverage might ser ious ly affect t he sele ct ion of a jury for a second
t rial if the firs t tri al re sults in a hung jury or a mist r ia l.
To give t he trial judge di scretion t o all ow or disall ow t elevision coverage
ma kes t he j udge a censor an d a t ele vi sion pro ducer , which ar e not his or her
fu nctions. The exe r cise of thi s di scr etion , fur t hermor e, is open t o t he appli cati on of
st rong pol iti ca l pr essure on t he ju dge by t he ma ss me dia , [Board Min ute s, Ma y 12,
1952, December 1, 1952; Minut es of J oint Meeting of Fre e Speech and Due Pr ocess
Committees , J ul y 30, 1958; News Rel ease, August 21, 1958. J
Fu rther information (not policy)
Th e Supreme Court has rul ed that t elevi sing and br oadcasti ng th e t ri al over
t he defenda nt' s obje ct ions dep r ived t he accused of 1. he "jud icia l ser enity a nd ca lm" t o
whi ch he or she was enti t led a nd thus deni ed a fair trial. Est es u. Texa s (1965).
However, th e usc of t elevi sion ca mera s i n t he cour t room arc not ent irely pr ohibite d.
Colorado has been experi me nt ing for severa l years wit h a program under wh ich at
the di scretion of each stat e or local ju dge sitting in each parti cular case, t elevised
cove r age of t he proceedi ngs may be permi tted. Suc h per miss ion may be r evoked at
any poi nt i n t he t ri a l whe n th e pr esid ing j udge det er mines th at the pr esence of t he
ca meras ha s altered the ju dicial cha racter of t he pr oceeding. Flor ida, under pr ess ure
from t elevision st a ti ons , has init inted a pi lot pr ogr am involving t he t elecast ing of one
civil and one cr iminal t r ia l. Th ese wi ll be moni t or ed by re pre sent atives of t he Flori da
Supreme Court, after which a deci sion will be made whet her to allow TV in t o t he
cour t r oom on a restricted bas is. The Alabama Supreme Court , un der a ne w canon of
j ud ica l et hics, has given t ri al j udges t he r ight t o a ll ow news ph otogr aphs a nd TV an d
radio br oadcas ts into th e cour t roo m un der careful gu ideli nes, As of Fe br uary 1 no
j udge had gran t ed the r igh t.
559
CLOSING REMARKS BY CHAIRMAN LOUIS STOKES
The conclusion of the testimony of Deputy Attorney General
Civiletti now brings to a close our public hearings on political
assassinations and the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy
and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
For this reason, I would like to reflect for a moment in a general
way on what the committee has seen and heard since it began
taking testimony in open session last August.
First, I am left with the impression that history itself has
marched before us. Those who have followed these hearings have
shared wit h us the experience as onlookers, as the issues of the
turbulent sixties were developed before us: The civil rights strug-
gle; one Nation's confrontation with communism in Cuba; relations
with the Soviet Union; the menace of organized crime; t he fight for
economic survival and social justice by less privileged Americans;
and, while the underlying theme of our evidence has been violence
and murder, we al so heard about love, from a friend who held a
dying victim in hi s arms.
I have also been taken aback by the range of people who have
appeared before us. Our roster of witnesses has been a representa-
tive cast of the drama of the decade, a former U.S. President, a
foreign head of state, a former Governor of Texas, Federal officials
including two former Attorneys General, Dallas and Memphis
police officers, an underworld boss, a professional gambler, young
men from the ghetto, a woman with a laundry ticket, a man with
an umbrella, and murderers, one convicted, others onl y suspected.
It may be that the committee has gathered more evidence than it
can digest in the remaining days of its life. What this committee
has, in fact, done may be up to historians to understand fully. Even
so, I believe the committee has assimilated the data in such a way
that valid conclusions can be reached and useful recommendations
can be made.
It is to that task-that of preparing a report on our findings and
recommendations, which will be submitted to the House of Repre-
sentatives on January 2-that we now turn t o.
I add, too, that arrangements are being made to publish in early
1979 the committee's investigative summaries, the public hearing
transcripts and reports by scientific projects and consultants and
the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.
At the close of the committee's public hearings on the evidence
in the assassinations of President Kennedy and Dr r King, I gave a
well-deserved word of thanks to the staff members who contributed
to the respective investigations.
Today, I would like to thank the individuals who worked on both
cases, the administrative personnel.
Most especially, I would like to express my gratitude to James
Wolf, deputy chief counsel for legal affairs. Jim has been the
committee's lawyer. As such, he has run the legal unit , he wrote
the committee's rules-which were, incidentally, termed a model
code by the American Civil Liberties Union-and he has represent-
ed the committee in court on occasion when it was necessary to file
for wr its , immunity grants, and so on.
In sum, J im was the committee's conscience and a strong right
arm.
560
I want alsot ogive t hankst oCaryl Emanuel,JimWolfsadminis-
trative assistant, and I want to t hank t he following admi ni strative
staff members:
Special counsel I. Charles Mathews and his assistant, J oyce
Larkin;
Dawne Mill er , admini st rative assistant to t he chief counsel and
press officer, and Nancy Schultz and Beverly Smith of the cleri cal
staff;
Lar ry St ickler,t he commit tee's pr inter;
Tom Howarth, budget officer, and his assistants, Anne Wilander
andEli zabethNorris;
Bob Morrison, director of security, and his assistants, Bill Cross,
Lance Svendsen, andPaul Golden;
Dick Bill ings, editor , and his assistants, Whitney Watri ss, Paul
Di Paolo,and Robin Lindley.
Las t , a word of special thanks t o our very able chiefcounsel of
this commi t tee, Prof. G. RobertBlakey who, in my opinion and in
t he opinion of this committee, has done an admirable job and very
professional,and in a way that all of us have been made very, very
proudto havebeena part oft hese hearings.
Also,theentire staff, bot h on t heKennedy invest igati on andthe
King investigat ion, and I want t o personally t hank all of my col-
leagues, bothon t he majority and minorit y side for t he manyhours
t hat all of you have devoted t o t hese public hearings, and t he fact
that you have been at t he call of t he Chair and been responsive
every t ime we have called uponyou.
A particular word to our colleague, Sam Devine, who, up until
yesterday, had made every public hearing and every execut ive
committee hearing and who, because of ill ness in t he past 2 days,
hasbeenunablet obe withus .
As the ranking minority member , Sam did a magnificantjob of
providi ng the kind of support t hat I needed with t his commit tee.
Last , may I justexpress to all of t he media, appreciation of this
committee for the coverage given our wor k, because it was impor-
tant for t his committee t hat the American people be provided with
coverage withreference to what our invest igati on had uncovered in
bothinstances.
A special word to Rick Zimmerman, my own newspaper man
from Cleveland, who has constantly provided us with the kinds of
cart oons thatprovided some humor to t hese hearings during some
veryst aid proceedings.
Las t ,I want to say a very special word to Eli zabet h Berning, the
chiefclerkand herass istant ,Olive Wagner .
Ms. Berning, if you will j uststep here a moment, in light of the
yeoman service you have given the committee, including keeping
track of over 700 commit tee documents, never losing 1, and being
able to produce all of t hem at the moment t hey were requested
during t hese two sets of hearings, for t he t ime you have expended
t o bot h subcommittees and t his full committee, as a token of our
esteem,I presentt oyou thegavel usedduring these proceedingsby
theChair.
Ms. BERNING.Thankyou very much.
ChairmanSTOKES.You arecertainlywelcome.
Gentlemen, if thereis nothingfurther--
561
Mr. PREYER. Mr. Chairman, you thanked everyone else except
yourself, andI do thinkI am sorrythatI am making up the Mark
Laneawardto give to you, butI do wantto thankyou on behalfof
the committee for the solid leadership that you furnished to this
committeethroughout.
You have been reallysuperb, andall of us who worked with you
appreciateitverymuch.
We thankyou.
ChairmanSTOKES.Thankyou, JudgePreyer.
Mr. DODD. Mr. Chair man?
ChairmanSTOKES. Thegentlemanfrom Connecticut.
Mr. DODD. I justwanted to echo Rich Preyer's words. I am glad
he spoke up, butjustt o add my 2 cents, I had not thought of the
MarkLaneaward. I would hope itwouldonlybe a one-timeaward,
not one we would have to revive each year, but you have done a
tremendousjob in theseverydifficultandhistorichearings.
I don't think there has ever been a set of hearings like these
before, andI thinkall of us on this committee, andthe public who
have listened and watched these proceedings, the media, all of us
have learned that Loui s Stokes is an extremely gifted Member of
Congress and we have been privileged to serve with you on this
committeeunderyourleadership.
ChairmanSTOKES. Thankyou verymuch.
Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Chairman, if I can just add one last word,
joiningbothJudgePreyerand Congressman Dodd, in echoingtheir
remarksandaddingone additional mention.
I have not, prior to serving on this committee, ever had the
experience of such a nonpartisan group of Republicans and Demo-
crats. I cannot remember, in the full 2 years, a single instance of
partisanshiptaken,andI thinkin anunderlyingandveryrealway
that is the ultimate tribute to your leadership on the committee.
ChairmanSTOKES.Thankyou verymuch.
Ms.BERNING. Mr.Chairman?
ChairmanSTOKES.TheChairrecognizes Ms. Berning.
Ms. BERNING. MayI saythankyou for this presentation.I think
all of us have had a very difficult job during these hearings, par-
ticularly over the past couple of months, but it has been an ex-
treme pleasure and an honor for me to work with a commit tee
composed of the members on this committee, particularlyyou, Mr.
Chairman,andI thankyou verymuchfor thisopportunity.
ChairmanSTOKES.Thankyou, Ms. Berning. . ,.: ; , r /
There being nothing further, the Chair wishes everybody a
joyous holidayseason.
Thehearingsare herebyconcluded.
[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the Select Committee on Assassina-
tionsadjourned.]
o