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The Internet in China: Just How Big of a Threat Is It to Chinese Communist Party Rule?
The Internet is a new form of communication that some people believe might lead
to the doom of the Chinese Communist Party. For more than half a century, the leaders of
China have made a dedicated effort to both censor the information that reaches the minds
of Chinese citizens and control any communication between citizens that can lead to an
communication has arrived that promotes the free flow of information and facilitates
communication between large groups of people on a scale that has never been seen
before. While this clearly is threatening to the Party, how dangerous is it for Chinese
leaders? Is this new form of technology going to cause problems on a scale that the
national government has never encountered before? Or instead, is the Internet not so
much more dangerous for the CCP than the forms of communication that existed
throughout the twentieth century? This paper analyzes two aspects of the Internet — its
ability to disseminate information and its ability to help people communicate with each
other — and the ways in which these features may or may not undermine the Party. After
providing some background on the Internet in China and different perspectives on it, the
paper explains that the Web is less of a threat than it may seem, due to both the
technological nature of the Internet and market forces that control it. Lastly, the Internet
nondemocatic rule, and demonstrates that the Internet is not entirely different. While the
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Web does pose new problems for the CCP and can never be controlled completely,
and its censorship by the Chinese Communist Party. As in most countries of the
developed world, Internet use began in China in the early 1990s and has grown at a
tremendous pace. By 2005, there were more than 100 million Internet users and
hundreds of thousands of Chinese websites. While there are large Internet content
providers (ICPs) that are based in China, such as Sina, Sohu, Netease, and Baidu, there is
also a major presence of American Internet companies, such as Yahoo!, Google, and
cyberspace; the national government has promised to allow foreigners to own 50% of
Long before the arrival of the Internet, the ruling Party has made a large-scale
effort to censor the media and control communications between citizens — and this did
not at all stop with the Internet. To handle this new and potentially threatening form of
communication, the Chinese national government created an entire set of regulations, that
involve the censoring of media and the control of communication between individuals.
At least part of this government project is known to many as Golden Shield. Gudrun
Wacker divides the Internet regulations that were introduced in the year 2000 into seven
main categories. The first is a list of forbidden contents, such as human rights,
pornographic content, or information about Falun Gong. The regulations also call for
Internet service provider (ISP). This is true for Internet cafés, which are forced to
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monitor the use of the Internet by their customers. ISPs are also required to store user
data, and both ISPs and ICPs must maintain surveillance of users, including screening of
emails and chat rooms. Lastly, the regulations call for judicial liability and serious
penalty for not following laws (Wacker 62–65). To name a few of the specific measures
taken to censor Internet content and monitor communications, the most effective method
of blocking Internet content involves censoring content providers within mainland China;
occasionally the government will physically seize websites and their operators. They also
block foreign websites, such as CNN and the New York Times, and disallow certain
terms from being used in search engines. In the case of monitoring chat rooms and e-
mail, the government does not have the physical resources to monitor all chat rooms and
forums, so the Party threatens to shut down Internet content providers who do not employ
internal staff, often known as “big mammas,” to do this for the national government
(Wikipedia).
It probably seems at first glance that the effort to regulate the flow of information
over the Internet is a lost cause; it simply changes and grows so quickly and could not be
more decentralized. This is the conclusion of many individuals who have studied the
efforts of the CCP, such as Geoffry Taubman and Jason Lacharite. Taubman comes to the
conclusion: “Given the rapid pace of diffusion of the Internet and related tools, along
with the growth in content providers and the decentralized and increasingly inexpensive
the process” (Taubman 268). Meanwhile, Lacharite focuses more on the technical
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unworkable. Not only are China’s surveillance and bureaucratic arrangements
China to ensure a relatively free flow of information” (Lacharite 333). Although both of
these scholars come to similar conclusions, Gudrun Wacker points out that “a number of
observers have begun to develop theories that cast doubt on the assertion that there is
something inherent in the nature of the Internet that puts it beyond the control of the
state.” Lawrence Lessig, James Boyle, Eric Harwit, and Duncan Clark are a few if such
scholars whose arguments will be considered later in this paper (Wacker 59). Clearly, the
political potential of the Internet in China is a highly disputed issue, but this paper tries to
illustrate the perspective of those who believe that effective control of the Internet is still
possible.
The technological nature of the Internet is one of the main factors that explains
why efforts to control the Web are not hopeless for the Chinese national government, and
this is particularly true when it comes to censoring online content. At first glance it might
seem that the Internet is an advanced form of technology, and this feature will make it
more difficult to censor. This is exactly what Jason Lacharite tries to prove, giving
detailed technological reasons why the Internet cannot be censored easily. In particular,
he mentions anti-blocking software, mirror sites, remailers, secret Usenet groups, and
anonymous e-mail services (Lacharite 333). But at the same time, more advanced
technology also means there are more advanced ways to censor the information
distributed by this technology. The difference between the Internet and some past forms
controlled to some extent. This was not true for some other technologies, such as radio
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broadcasts, which have always been a form of media that could never be blocked from
the air in China. While it was a more primitive technology, it was also impossible to
censor and the national government simply had no ability to stop broadcasts; all it could
do was tell people not to listen. With the Internet, on the other hand, the government at
least has the ability to block certain words from search engines, block particular websites,
and alter the content of webpages. Lawrence Lessig is a writer who believes in the
possibility of shaping behavior in cyberspace and thereby regulating it. One of his best
arguments involves the idea that behavior on the Internet is shaped by the code writers.
For example, code writers determine whether a user needs a password to gain access or
whether the transactions that a user completes can be linked back to the user. Lessig
explains that “code is a kind of regulation, in just the same way that the architectures of
real-space codes are a kind of regulation.” Therefore, “governments are able to indirectly
regulate the Internet by directly regulating intermediary actors,” such as Internet service
providers and Internet content providers (Wacker 59–60). Therefore, the technological
nature of the Internet makes it relatively easy for the CCP to control some of the flow of
information.
The other threatening aspect of the Internet is the way it can link people together
every telephone call and edit the content of what is spoken, but it is possible to monitor
many large chat rooms and mass emails at the same time, and to change any content if
necessary. James Boyle, another scholar who believes that the Internet is not completely
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opposed to nondemocratic rule, uses an argument that draws an analogy with a prison in
which every cell has a window facing a central tower. An unseen warden in the tower
might be watching what any individual prisoner does at any time. The prisoners act as if
they are under constant surveillance all the time, even though such surveillance is not
physically possible for a single warden. This same argument can be applied to the
Internet to show how it can indeed be controlled; Internet users always know that they
could be monitored, but they never know when. Therefore, they are cautious with what
communication will never be possible, but this does not rule out effective control.
A final point is related not just to Internet architecture but also to the philosophy
associated with that architecture. In the minds of most people, the Web is unlike other
forms of media, because it represents the whole world in an electronic format. This is
why it is often called “Cyberspace.” While the censorship might not cover every website,
an Internet that has hundreds of thousands of websites praising Party leaders but only has
a few websites about democracy will make democracy seem like it is not a very powerful
force in the world. Even if an individual knows that the CCP censors what he is reading,
an unbalanced cyberspace will create the impression that reality is somewhat similar.
This is especially true considering that the CCP censors “not only by promoting ‘positive’
ideas and images through the media, but by censoring cultural products too” (Lull 133).
The net effect of censorship is an online world that presents a seriously skewed view of
the real world. The problem with this is described well by Bill Xia, the chief executive of
Dynamic Internet Technology, who comments on the censored version of Google that is
currently present in China: “Users expect Google to return anything on the Internet.
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That’s what a search engine does.” Meanwhile, people do not know that “there are
alternative opinions from the Chinese government and there are many things being
covered up by the government” (Wired News). Another example of how the government
can create a skewed view of the world is how it generally blocks The New York Times,
but it was unblocked when Jiang Zemin was privately interviewed; when specifically
asked about the block, he replied that he would look into the matter (Wikipedia). Due to
the philosophical nature of Internet technology, censorship of the Web by the Chinese
government does not just create an incomplete store of information, but it actually
In addition to the nature of Internet technology, there are significant market forces
that contribute to the Party’s taming of the Internet. Eric Harwit and Duncan Clark
emphasize that this is a major flaw in the arguments of Taubman (Clark, Harwit 380).
While American software companies, such as Sun Microsystems and Cisco Systems,
provide the software that the Chinese government uses to censor and monitor the Web,
what is more important is that many companies have major business incentives for
complying with Party regulations (Wacker 69). While this is true for Chinese Internet
companies, such as Sina, Sohu, Netease, and Baidu, the effect can be understood most
clearly by looking at American companies competing for market share in China. Google
for example was providing search in China until 2002 when the Chinese government
completely shut down the site. Because Google is competing fiercely with other major
Internet content providers, it agreed to comply with Chinese regulations in order to keep
the site running. Not only does it allow censors in China to block particular sites that
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Google finds, but Google itself censors out various sites from its news service in China
(Wired News). Microsoft also has agreed to block certain words, and Yahoo! signed a
information that may jeopardize state security” (USA Today). While these companies
generally support the free flow of information, they are making exceptions in China to
increase profits. Wacker explains: “China’s Internet industry has become characterized
by the rapid formation of an authoritarian-capitalist coalition that has seized the central
spot that used to belong to small to medium-sized enterprises” (Wacker 68). This is in
agreement with the way that American Internet companies have bowed to Chinese
national laws.
companies is actually unique to the Internet. For instance, many American magazines
and newspapers, such as Time, USA Today, The New York Times, and The Wall Street
Journal, have refused to bow to censorship. Time Asia was banned for three years in
China after running some inappropriate material, and the magazine company placed
freedom of speech above increasing profits (USA Today). The contrast between Google
and other forms of media is interesting in light of Google’s pledge to “do no evil.” While
Google could easily post a disclaimer on the Chinese news site informing visitors that the
results might be censored, it chooses not to do this, thereby creating the impression that
what it finds is the truth. As a final example of how Internet companies collaborate with
the CCP to further their business ambitions, Yahoo! in 2005 helped Chinese officials link
journalist’s Shi Tao’s email account and computer to a message that “divulged state
secrets.” This ultimately led to a ten-year prison sentence for Shi Tao (BBC News). In
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this case, Yahoo! went beyond monitoring its email, and actually got involved with the
law in China. This illustrates the kinds of measures that American Internet companies
Perhaps it is useful to evaluate the ability of the Party to censor the Internet by a
comparison with past efforts to censor various forms of media. James Lull explains that
“especially since 1978, China has found it difficult to censor foreign materials
effectively.” A good example of this is the steamy romantic novel Lovers and Gamblers
that was considered pornographic. Although it was banned, confusion in the censors’
office prevented it from being taken off the shelves until more than 300,000 copies had
been sold. In addition, a black market for pornographic magazines and videos has
developed in China, despite laws that can punish the sellers of porn with death or life in
prison. Another example is foreign radio broadcasting, such as the Voice of America and
the British Broadcasting Corporation, which are easily received in most of China. While
listening was subject to reprimand, it was physically impossible to block such signals
from the air. In finding programs to put on China’s national television, the censors have
more problems, because the standard of what is acceptable cultural and political
information is never completely clear and changes frequently. An example of this was
when television was just starting to show programs that depict romantic entanglements
around 1985, the government suddenly insisted on a new standard for love relations.
Clearly the Chinese Communist Party has had difficulties with censorship for decades
(Lull 134–135). Just because the Internet is a new form of communication that has not
been dealt with before does not necessarily mean that the CCP is going to have a more
difficult time dealing with it. Even if the Internet is very difficult to censor, this is not
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very different from what has happened with other forms of media in the past. At the
same time, the general trend has been an increased relaxation and liberalization of the
media throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Clark, Harwit 379). The Internet is coming at a
time when compulsive censorship has already failed many times and less regulated media
There are various reasons why censorship has failed in the past, and it can be
shown that many of these are less likely to be true for the Internet. Four significant
reasons, which are all mentioned above, are the incompetence of the censors, the
ineffectiveness of laws, the lack of technology to censor various forms of media, and the
inconsistency of policy. It has already been demonstrated that the Internet is in some
ways easier to censor than other forms of media for technological reasons. Also, laws
that regulate the Internet are likely to be more effective because of the numerous business
incentives associated with following laws. The incompetence of the censors and the
inconsistency of policy are two reasons that are unlikely to be any different with the
censoring of the Internet, although it probably can be argued that these might be
diminished due to the huge amount of effort and resources being devoted to censoring the
Internet. For example, just to enforce censorship laws, the national government uses the
Ministry of Information Industry, along with licensed Internet Service Providers, local
police forces, the Data Communications Bureau, and the Ministry of State Security
(Lacharite 334). With all these resources devoted to censorship, it is likely that less
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telecommunications prior to the Web. It is probably easiest to study the effect of the
telephone in the Soviet Union, because the entry of this form of communication into
society was around the time that Stalin was dictator, prior to China’s social revolution in
country, just like China, so it can be assumed that a new form of communication would
affect the two societies in similar ways. A famous quote by Stalin was when he said, “I
255). This shows that the phone was a threat to nondemocratic society in the first half of
the twentieth century, just as the Internet is today. The danger has always been the
“public space,” forming outside of the control of the rulers. However, communism
survived in both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, despite the rise of
the telephone. It is certainly likely that computer networks will be another obstacle to
Chinese leaders just as telephones once were. As in the case of media, telephones
This paper does not try to say that the Party will be able to maintain complete
control of the Internet; it merely suggests that there are many reasons why the situation is
not hopeless for the Chinese Communist Party and the possibility of maintaining an
influential position in Cyberspace is perfectly feasible. There are both technological and
business reasons for why the Internet is less threatening than other forms of media and
communication. At the same time, nondemocratic countries have been accepting new
technologies that undermine authoritarian rule for the last century, and there are few
reasons why the Internet will be completely different. In fact, the Internet may even be
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less worrisome for several reasons. But the Web is clearly a new challenge for the
Chinese Communist Party, and only time will tell how it influences politics in China over
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Works Cited
Clark, Duncan. Harwit, Eric. “Shaping the Internet in China: Evolution of Political
Control over Network Infrastructure and Content.” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 3.
377–408.
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,65089,00.html?tw=newsletter_topsto
ries.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/internet_censorship_in_China
Kalathil, Shanthi. “Between the Lines: China’s Dot-Communism.” Foreign Policy, No.
122, 74–75.
Lull, James. “The Freedom to Have Fun: Popular Culture and Censorship in China.”
Taubman, Geoffry. “A Not-So World Wide Web: The Internet, China, and the
“U.S. Firms Help China Censor Fr**dom, D*mocr*cy.” USA Today. Online:
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2005-06-19-our-view_x.htm
Wacker, Gudrun. “The Internet and Censorship in China.” China and the Internet:
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“Yahoo ‘Helped Jail China Writer’.” BBC News. Online:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4221538.stm
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