Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No.

85333 February 26, 1990 CARMELITO L. PALACOL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, MANILA CCBPI SALES FORCE UNION, and COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (PHILIPPINES), INC., respondents. Wellington B. Lachica for petitioners. Adolpho M. Guerzon for respondent Union.

GANCAYCO, J.: Can a special assessment be validly deducted by a labor union from the lump-sum pay of its members, granted under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), notwithstanding a subsequent disauthorization of the same by a majority of the union members? This is the main issue for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari. As gleaned from the records of the case, the pertinent facts are as follows: On October 12, 1987, the respondent Manila CCBPI Sales Force Union (hereinafter referred to as the Union), as the collective bargaining agent of all regular salesmen, regular helpers, and relief helpers of the Manila Plant and Metro Manila Sales Office of the respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers (Philippines), Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the Company) concluded a new collective bargaining agreement with the latter. 1 Among the compensation benefits granted to the employees was a general salary increase to be given in lump sum including recomputation of actual commissions earned based on the new rates of increase. On the same day, the president of the Union submitted to the Company the ratification by the union members of the new CBA and authorization for the Company to deduct union dues equivalent to P10.00 every payday or P20.00 every month and, in addition, 10% by way of special assessment, from the CBA lump-sum pay granted to the union members. The last one among the aforementioned is the subject of the instant petition. As embodied in the Board Resolution of the Union dated September 29, 1987, the purpose of the special assessment sought to be levied is "to put up a cooperative and credit union; purchase vehicles and other items needed for the benefit of the officers and the general membership; and for the payment for services rendered by union officers, consultants and others." 2 There was also an additional proviso stating that the "matter of allocation ... shall be at the discretion of our incumbent Union President." This "Authorization and CBA Ratification" was obtained by the Union through a secret referendum held in separate local membership meetings on various dates. 3 The total membership of the Union was about 800. Of this number, 672 members originally authorized the 10% special assessment, while 173 opposed the same. 4 Subsequently however, one hundred seventy (170) members of the Union submitted documents to the Company stating that although they have ratified the new CBA, they are withdrawing or disauthorizing the deduction of any amount from their CBA lump sum. Later, 185 other union members submitted similar documents expressing the same intent. These members, numbering 355 in all (170 + 185), added to the original oppositors of 173, turned the

tide in favor of disauthorization for the special assessment, with a total of 528 objectors and a remainder of 272 supporters. 5 On account of the above-mentioned disauthorization, the Company, being in a quandary as to whom to remit the payment of the questioned amount, filed an action for interpleader with the Bureau of Labor Relations in order to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties concerned. Petitioners, who are regular rank-and-file employees of the Company and bona fide members of the Union, filed a motion/complaint for intervention therein in two groups of 161 and 94, respectively. They claimed to be among those union members who either did not sign any individual written authorization, or having signed one, subsequently withdrew or retracted their signatures therefrom. Petitioners assailed the 10% special assessment as a violation of Article 241(o) in relation to Article 222(b) of the Labor Code. Article 222(b) provides as follows: ART. 222. Appearances and Fees. xxx xxx xxx (b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the collective agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union; Provided, however, that attorney's fees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void. On the other hand, Article 241(o) mandates that: ART. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization. xxx xxx xxx (o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessments, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due to an employee without an individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction; As authority for their contention, petitioners cited Galvadores v. Trajano, 6 wherein it was ruled that no check-offs from any amount due employees may be effected without individual written authorizations duly signed by the employees specifically stating the amount, purpose, and beneficiary of the deduction. In its answer, the Union countered that the deductions not only have the popular indorsement and approval of the general membership, but likewise complied with the legal requirements of Article 241 (n) and (o) of the Labor Code in that the board resolution of the Union imposing the questioned special assessment had been duly approved in a general membership meeting and that the collection of a special fund for labor education and research is mandated. Article 241(n) of the Labor Code states that ART. 241. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization. xxx xxx xxx (n) No special assessment or other extraordinary fees may be levied upon the members of a labor organization unless authorized by a written resolution of a majority of all the members at a general

membership meeting duly called for the purpose. The secretary of the organization shall record the minutes of the meeting including the list of all members present, the votes cast, the purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such assessments or fees. The record shall be attested to by the president; Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz ruled in favor of petitioners in an order dated February 15, 1988 whereby he directed the Company to remit the amount it had kept in trust directly to the rank-and-file personnel without delay. On appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, however, the order of the Med-Arbiter was reversed and set aside by the respondent-Director in a resolution dated August 19, 1988 upholding the claim of the Union that the special assessment is authorized under Article 241 (n) of the Labor Code, and that the Union has complied with the requirements therein. Hence, the instant petition. Petitioners allege that the respondent-Director committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she held Article 241 (n) of the Labor Code to be the applicable provision instead of Article 222(b) in relation to Article 241(o) of the same law. According to petitioners, a cursory examination and comparison of the two provisions of Article 241 reveals that paragraph (n) cannot prevail over paragraph (o). The reason advanced is that a special assessment is not a matter of major policy affecting the entire union membership but is one which concerns the individual rights of union members. Petitioners further assert that assuming arguendo that Article 241(n) should prevail over paragraph (o), the Union has nevertheless failed to comply with the procedure to legitimize the questioned special assessment by: (1) presenting mere minutes of local membership meetings instead of a written resolution; (2) failing to call a general membership meeting; (3) having the minutes of three (3) local membership meetings recorded by a union director, and not by the union secretary as required; (4) failing to have the list of members present included in the minutes of the meetings; and (5) failing to present a record of the votes cast. 7 Petitioners concluded their argument by citing Galvadores. After a careful review of the records of this case, We are convinced that the deduction of the 10% special assessment by the Union was not made in accordance with the requirements provided by law. Petitioners are correct in citing the ruling of this Court in Galvadores which is applicable to the instant case. The principle "that employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that diminish their compensation without their known edge and consent" 8 is in accord with the constitutional principle of the State affording full protection to labor. 9 The respondent-Union brushed aside the defects pointed out by petitioners in the manner of compliance with the legal requirements as "insignificant technicalities." On the contrary, the failure of the Union to comply strictly with the requirements set out by the law invalidates the questioned special assessment. Substantial compliance is not enough in view of the fact that the special assessment will diminish the compensation of the union members. Their express consent is required, and this consent must be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must be followed to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed. The applicable provisions are clear. The Union itself admits that both paragraphs (n) and (o) of Article 241 apply. Paragraph (n) refers to "levy" while paragraph (o) refers to "check-off" of a special assessment. Both provisions must be complied with. Under paragraph (n), the Union must submit to the Company a written resolution of a majority of all the members at a general membership meeting duly called for the purpose. In addition, the secretary of the organization must record the minutes of the meeting which, in turn, must include, among others, the list of all the members present as well as the votes cast.

As earlier outlined by petitioners, the Union obviously failed to comply with the requirements of paragraph (n). It held local membership meetings on separate occasions, on different dates and at various venues, contrary to the express requirement that there must be a general membership meeting. The contention of the Union that "the local membership meetings are precisely the very general meetings required by law" 10 is untenable because the law would not have specified a general membership meeting had the legislative intent been to allow local meetings in lieu of the latter. It submitted only minutes of the local membership meetings when what is required is a written resolution adopted at the general meeting. Worse still, the minutes of three of those local meetings held were recorded by a union director and not by the union secretary. The minutes submitted to the Company contained no list of the members present and no record of the votes cast. Since it is quite evident that the Union did not comply with the law at every turn, the only conclusion that may be made therefrom is that there was no valid levy of the special assessment pursuant to paragraph (n) of Article 241 of the Labor Code. Paragraph (o) on the other hand requires an individual written authorization duly signed by every employee in order that a special assessment may be validly checked-off. Even assuming that the special assessment was validly levied pursuant to paragraph (n), and granting that individual written authorizations were obtained by the Union, nevertheless there can be no valid check-off considering that the majority of the union members had already withdrawn their individual authorizations. A withdrawal of individual authorizations is equivalent to no authorization at all. Hence, the ruling in Galvadores that "no check-offs from any amounts due employees may be effected without an individual written authorization signed by the employees ... " is applicable. The Union points out, however, that said disauthorizations are not valid for being collective in form, as they are "mere bunches of randomly procured signatures, under loose sheets of paper." 11 The contention deserves no merit for the simple reason that the documents containing the disauthorizations have the signatures of the union members. The Court finds these retractions to be valid. There is nothing in the law which requires that the disauthorization must be in individual form. Moreover, it is well-settled that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code ... shall be resolved in favor of labor." 12 And as previously stated, labor in this case refers to the union members, as employees of the Company. Their mere desire to establish a separate bargaining unit, albeit unproven, cannot be construed against them in relation to the legality of the questioned special assessment. On the contrary, the same may even be taken to reflect their dissatisfaction with their bargaining representative, the respondent-Union, as shown by the circumstances of the instant petition, and with good reason. The Med-Arbiter correctly ruled in his Order that: The mandate of the majority rank and file have (sic) to be respected considering they are the ones directly affected and the realities of the high standards of survival nowadays. To ignore the mandate of the rank and file would enure to destabilizing industrial peace and harmony within the rank and file and the employer's fold, which we cannot countenance. Moreover, it will be recalled that precisely union dues are collected from the union members to be spent for the purposes alluded to by respondent. There is no reason shown that the regular union dues being now implemented is not sufficient for the alleged expenses. Furthermore, the rank and file have spoken in withdrawing their consent to the special assessment, believing that their regular union dues are adequate for the purposes stated by the respondent. Thus, the rank and file having spoken and, as we have earlier mentioned, their sentiments should be respected. Of the stated purposes of the special assessment, as embodied in the board resolution of the Union, only the collection of a special fund for labor and education research is mandated, as correctly pointed out by the Union. The two other purposes, namely, the purchase of vehicles and other items for the benefit of the union officers and the general membership, and the payment of services rendered by union officers, consultants and others, should be supported by the regular union dues, there being no showing that the latter are not sufficient to cover the same.

The last stated purpose is contended by petitioners to fall under the coverage of Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code. The contention is impressed with merit. Article 222 (b) prohibits attorney's fees, negotiations fees and similar charges arising out of the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement from being imposed on any individual union member. The collection of the special assessment partly for the payment for services rendered by union officers, consultants and others may not be in the category of "attorney's fees or negotiations fees." But there is no question that it is an exaction which falls within the category of a "similar charge," and, therefore, within the coverage of the prohibition in the aforementioned article. There is an additional proviso giving the Union President unlimited discretion to allocate the proceeds of the special assessment. Such a proviso may open the door to abuse by the officers of the Union considering that the total amount of the special assessment is quite considerable P1,027,694.33 collected from those union members who originally authorized the deduction, and P1,267,863.39 from those who did not authorize the same, or subsequently retracted their authorizations. 13 The former amount had already been remitted to the Union, while the latter is being held in trust by the Company. The Court, therefore, stakes down the questioned special assessment for being a violation of Article 241, paragraphs (n) and (o), and Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated August 19, 1988 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, while the order of the Med-Arbiter dated February 17, 1988 is reinstated, and the respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers (Philippines), Inc. is hereby ordered to immediately remit the amount of P1,267,863.39 to the respective union members from whom the said amount was withheld. No pronouncement as to costs. This decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Cruz, J., took no part.

Verceles vs BLR G.R. No. 152322; February 15, 2005 FACTS: Private respondents Rodel E. Dalupan, et al are members of the University of the East Employees Association (UEEA). On 15 September 1997, they each received a Memorandum from the UEEA charging them with spreading false rumors and creating disinformation among the members of the said association. They were given seventy-two hours from receipt of the Memorandum to submit their Answer. Through a collective reply, they denied the allegations and further sent a letter informing the officers of UEEA informing them that the memorandum was vague and without legal basis. UEEA issued another memorandum giving the private respondents another seventy-two hours from receipt within which to properly reply because the collective reply letter was not responsive to the first memorandum. Their failure would be construed as an admission of the truthfulness and veracity of the charges. The samewas still denied by the respondents. O n 0 9 O c t o b e r 1 9 9 7 , E r n e s t o V e r c e l e s , i n h i s c a p a c i t y a s p r e s i d e n t o f t h e associa tion, through a Memorandum, informed Rodel Dalupan, e t a l . , t h a t t h e i r membership in the association has been suspended and shall take effect immediately upon receipt thereof. A result of which, a complaint for illegal suspension was filed by the private respondents before the Department of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region(DOLE-NCR). The Regional Director of the latter rendered a decision adverse to the petitioners. The petitioners appealed to the BLR-DOLE, but the same and the motion for reconsideration were denied. When appealed before the Court of Appeals, said petition was still denied due course for lack of merit. Hence, the petition is now elevated to theSupreme Court by way of petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the assent of 30% of the members of the union is required to confer jurisdiction upon the BLR or LRD in intra-union conflicts. RULING: The Court ruled in the negative. The 30% support requirement needed to report violations of rights and conditions of union membership, as found in the last paragrapho f A r t i c l e 2 4 1 o f t h e L a b o r C o d e , i s n o t m a n d a t o r y . T h e c o u r t r e i t e r a t e d i t s pronouncements made in the case of Rodriguez vs Dir., BLR, as follows he assent of 30% of the union members is not a factor in the acquisition of jurisdiction by the Bureau of Labor Relations is furnished by Article 226 of the same Labor Code, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Bureau, and the Labor Relations Division in the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor, over "all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor management relations," making no reference whatsoever to any such 30%-support requirement. Indeed, the officials mentioned are given the power to act "onall inter-union and intra-union conflicts (1) " upon request of either or both parties" aswell as (2) "at their own initiative." NOTE:Kindly relate this case to question # 1. The answer is NO. Please refer to the above ruling

SMCEU-PTGWO vs SMPPEU-PDMP Posted on March 14, 2013 by legendphil FACTS: San Miguel Corporation Employees Union Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (SMCEUPTGWO) filed with DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipinos (SMPPEU-PDMP) registration and its dropping from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations on the ground that the latter instituted fraud and falsification, and noncompliance with registration requirements in obtaining its certificate of registration. SMCEU-PTGWO also alleged that PDMP is not a legitimate labor organization, but a trade center; hence it cannot directly create a local or chapter. The RD of DOLE-NCR issued an order dismissing the allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, and irregularity in the submission of documents for certification of registration purposes by the SMPPEU-PDMP. However, on the ground that PDMP is indeed a trade center, SMPPEU, not complying with the 20% membership requirement, was ordered to be dropped from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations. On the appeal made by SMPPEU-PDMP to the BLR, the BLR reversed and set aside the decision of the RD stating, among others that, although PDMP is a trade union center, it is also a legitimate labor organization capable of creating or charter a local as per the Department Order No. 9; hence, the 20% membership requirement does not apply on SMPPEU-PDMPs case. SMCEU-PTGWO elevated the case to the CA via Rule 65, but the latter dismissed the case and affirmed the decision of the BLR. ISSUE: Whether or not a trade union center can charter a local. HELD: No. A trade union center is not one of those entities empowered by law to create or charter a local. RATIO: Department Order No. 9 mentions two labor organizations either of which is allowed to directly create a local or chapter through chartering a duly registered federation or a national union. Department Order No. 9 defines a chartered local as a labor organization in the private sector operating at the enterprise level that acquired legal personality through a charter certificate, issued by a duly registered federation or national union and reported to the Regional Office.

In sum, although PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor organization, it has no power to directly create a local or chapter. Thus, SMPPEU-PDMP cannot be created under the more lenient requirements for chartering, but must have complied with the more stringent rules for creation and registration of an independent union, including the 20% membership requirement.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNIONPHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (SMCEUPTGWO) vs. SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNIONPAMBANSANG DIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SMPPEUPDMP)| 12 September 2007| J. Chico-Nazario

Short Version: SMCEU-PTGWO challenges the legitimacy of SMPPEU-PDMP, a charter of PDMP, as a labor organization. The Court held that PDMP cannot create a charter because it is merely a trade union center. Trade union centers are not given by the Labor Code or any statute the power to create locals or charters therefore, SMPPEU-PDMP must comply with the strict requirements provided for in Art. 234, LC.

Nature: Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing CA decision affirming the decision of the petitioner Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) of DOLE which upheld the Certificate of Registration of respondent SAN MIGUEL PACKAGING PRODUCTS EMPLOYEES UNIONPAMBANSANG DIWA NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (SMPPEUPDMP); and its resolution denying petitioners MR

Characters in the case -Petitioner(s): SMCEU-PTGWO is the incumbent bargaining agent for the bargaining unit comprised of the regular monthly-paid rank and file employees of the three divisions of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), namely, the San Miguel Corporate Staff Unit (SMCSU), San Miguel Brewing Philippines (SMBP), and the San Miguel Packaging Products (SMPP), in all offices and plants of SMC, including the Metal Closure and Lithography Plant in Laguna. It had been the certified bargaining agent for 20 years (1987 to 1997). -Respondent(s): SMPPEU-PDMP is registered as a chapter PDMP.

Facts PDMP issued a charter certificate to respondent on 15 June 1999. In compliance with registration requirements, respondent submitted the requisite documents to the BLR for the purpose of acquiring legal personality. Upon submission of its charter certificate and other documents, respondent was issued Certificate of Creation of Local or Chapter by the BLR on 6 July 1999.

Respondent filed with the Med-Arbiter of the DOLE Regional Officer in NCR (DOLE-NCR), three separate petitions for certification election to represent SMPP, SMCSU, and SMBP. All three petitions were dismissed, on the ground that the separate petitions fragmented a single bargaining unit. 17 August 1999: petitioner filed with the DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of respondent's registration and its dropping from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations, accusing respondent of committing fraud and falsification, and non-compliance with registration requirements in obtaining its certificate of registration. o It alleged that respondent violated Articles 239 (a), (b) and (c) and 234 (c) of the Labor Code. Moreover, petitioner claimed that PDMP is not a legitimate labor organization, but a trade union center, hence, it cannot directly create a local or chapter. 14 July 2000: DOLE-NCR Regional Director Maximo B. Lim issued an Order dismissing the allegations. He further ruled that respondent is allowed to directly create a local or chapter. However, he found that respondent did not comply with the 20% membership requirement and, thus, ordered the cancellation of its certificate of registration and removal from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations. Respondent appealed to the BLR who granted the petition. The BLR ruled that as a chartered local union, respondent is not required to submit the number of employees and names of all its members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate. Thus, the revocation of its registration based on non-compliance with the 20% membership requirement does not have any basis in the rules. The BLR also held that although PDMP is considered as a trade union center, it is a holder of a Registration Certificate issued by the BLR on 14 February 1991, which bestowed upon it the status of a legitimate labor organization with all the rights and privileges to act as representative of its members for purposes of collective bargaining agreement. On this basis, PDMP can charter or create a local, in accordance with the provisions of Department Order No. 9. BLR denied petitioners appeal. CA affirmed BLR decision holding that Department Order No. 9 provides that a registered federation or national union may directly create a local by submitting to the BLR copies of the charter certificate, the local's constitution and by-laws, the principal office address of the local, and the names of its officers and their addresses. Upon complying with the documentary requirements, the local shall be issued a certificate and included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. Thus there is no need for SMPPEU to show a membership of 20% of the employees of the bargaining unit in order to be recognized as a legitimate labor union.

Issue: WON respondent is a legitimate labor organization even if it failed to comply with the 20% requirement as provided in Art. 234, LC. NO.

Dispositive: Petition GRANTED. CA REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

Ruling A legitimate labor organization is defined as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE, and includes any branch or local thereof." Why does the Labor Code demand strict compliance with the requirements on registration? o Registration requirements are intended to afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or use the labor organization for illegitimate ends. o A legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code, 21 and are involved in activities directly affecting matters of public interest. Legitimate labor organizations have exclusive rights under the law which cannot be exercised by non-legitimate unions, one of

which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. o The acquisition of rights by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition for certification election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not the labor organization has attained the status of a legitimate labor organization. Records show that respondent was chartered by PDMP. Article 234, LC provides that an independent labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon its registration with the BLR. However, the creation of a branch, local or chapter is treated differently. o In Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment , the Court declared that when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration are no longer necessary or compulsory. Whereas an applicant for registration of an independent union is mandated to submit, among other things, the number of employees and names of all its members comprising at least 20% of the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate, as provided under Article 234 and Sec. 2, Rule III, Book V of the Implementing Rules, the same is no longer required of a branch, local or chapter. The intent of the law in imposing less requirements in the case of a branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local union with a federation or national union in order to increase the local union's bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor. Petitioners argue that PDMP is not a legitimate labor organization, thus cannot form a charter. The Court held that the personality of a labor organization cannot be attacked collaterally. It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules.

Heres the twist: PDMP is a trade union center, THEREFORE IT CANNOT CREATE LOCALS OR CHARTERS. Trade union center was never mentioned in the Labor Code. It first appeared only in the Implementing Rules of Department Order No. 9 which defined a trade union center as any group of registered national unions or federations organized for the mutual aid and protection of its members; for assisting such members in collective bargaining; or for participating in the formulation of social and employment policies, standards, and programs, and is duly registered with the DOLE in accordance with Rule III, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules. While a "national union" or "federation" is a labor organization with at least ten locals or chapters or affiliates, each of which must be a duly certified or recognized collective bargaining agent, a trade union center, on the other hand, is composed of a group of registered national unions or federations. o The Implementing Rules, as amended by Department Order No. 9, provide that only "a duly registered federation or national union" may directly create a local or chapter. DO 9 defines a "chartered local" as a labor organization in the private sector operating at the enterprise level that acquired legal personality through a charter certificate, issued by a duly registered federation or national union and reported to the Regional Office in accordance with Rule III, Section 2-E of these Rules (Sec. 1 (i), Rule 1, Book V of the Implementing Rules, as amended by DO No. 9) RA 9481 or "An Act Strengthening the Workers' Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines" lapsed into law on 25 May 2007 and became effective on 14 June 2007. This law further amends the Labor Code provisions on Labor Relations, including trade union centers in Art. 234. However, it still makes no mention that such organizations can create a local or a charter. [Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another . Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object or thing omitted must have been omitted intentionally. ] o Therefore, since under the pertinent status and applicable implementing rules, the power granted to labor organizations to directly create a chapter or local through chartering is given to a federation or national union, then a trade union center is without authority to charter directly.

WHY? To prevent circumvention of labor union requirements. As a legitimate labor organization is entitled to specific rights under the Labor Code and involved in activities directly affecting public interest, it is necessary that the law afford utmost protection to the parties affected.

Atty. Marino et. al. vs. Dr. Gamilla et. al. G.R. No. 149763, July 7, 2009

FACTS: Petitioners are among the executive officers and directors of University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) while respondents are composed of UST faculty and USTFU members. The dispute arose when UST and USTFU, represented by petitioners herein, entered a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) whereby UST faculty members belonging to the CBA unit were granted additional economic benefits and at the same time stipulated a 10% check-off over said benefits to cover union dues and special assessment for Labor Education Fund and attorneys fees. Respondents filed with the Med Arbiter a complaint assailing, among others, the check-off for union dues and attorneys fees collected under the MOA for being violative of the rights and conditions of membership in USTFU. DOLE Regional Director, by virtue of an order consolidating all the complaints by the respondents, rendered among others a decision in favor of the latter and ruled that the check-off collected as negotiation fees were invalid. Both the BLR and CA, on appeal, AFFIRMED said decision and ordered to return to the general membership the amount collected by way of attorneys fees; hence this petition.

ISSUE: Is the check-off of union dues and special assessment of attorneys fees inserted in the wri tten authorization ratifying the MOA benefits valid?

LAW: Article 222(b) and 241(n) and (o) of the Labor Code, as amended

RULING: NO. The economic benefits package granted under the MOA did not constitute union funds from which attorneys fees could have been validly deducted. Under Article 222(b), attorneys fees may only be paid from union funds; yet the amount to be used in paying for the same does not become union funds until it is actually deducted as attorneys fees from the benefits awarded to the employees. What the law requires is that the funds be already deemed union funds even before the attorneys fees are deducted or paid therefrom; it does not become union funds after the deduction or payment. To rule otherwise will also render the general prohibition stated in Article 222(b) nugatory, because all that the union needs to do is to deduct from the total benefits awarded to the employees the amount

intended for attorneys fees and, thus, convert the latter to union funds, which could th en be used to pay for the said attorneys fees. Furthermore, the inclusion of the authorization for a check-off of union dues and special assessments for the Labor Education Fund and attorneys fees in the same document for the ratification of the MOA gran ting the economic benefits package, necessarily vitiated the consent of USTFU members for there was no way for any individual union member to separate his or her consent to the ratification of the MOA from his or her authorization of the checkoff of union dues and special assessments. As it were, the ratification of the MOA carried with it the automatic authorization of the check-off of union dues and special assessments in favor of the union. Substantial compliance is not enough in view of the fact that the special assessment will diminish the compensation of the union members. Their express consent is required, and this consent must be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must be followed to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed.

OPINION: I concur with great conviction. . . The instant case is a pure demonstration of a finesse and intelligent attempt to circumvent the law; but not good enough under the watchful eyes of our magistrate. A check-off provision is in effect an encumbrance over the wages/salaries of the worker, and under our laws, the salaries/wages of the labor should be left unencumbered except for legal purposes or as a consequence of benefits received. The very nature of a check-off warrants regulation from the State which is, among others, what is ought to be achieved by Article 222 and Article 241. An attempt to stale mate a worker by incorporating a check-off provision in an agreement for additional benefits cannot stand in the eyes of law. A separate consent is essential, to validate and authorize a stipulation for fees and cannot be incorporated in an agreement granting benefits for the very reason that the two are just not meant for each other and one cannot give and at the same time take what has been given.

Galvadores v. Trajano September 15, 1986 Melencio-Herrera, J.

Petitioners:CARLOS P. GALVADORES, ET AL.

Respondents:CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS (FIWU), PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE COMPANY (PLDT), and JOSE C. ESPINAS

Facts: Petitioner employees of PLDT and members of respondent Free Telephone Workers Union (Union), question the legality of the check-off for attorney's fees amounting to P1M, more or less, of respondent Atty. Jose C. Espinas (hereinafter referred to as "Respondent Counsel") from the monetary benefits awarded to PLDT employees in a deadlocked collective bargaining agreement negotiations between the PLDT and the Union. The case stemmed from the following facts: Atty. Espinas hired on a case to case by the Union on contingent fee basis. He received a letter from the Union President reading: o The Free Telephone Workers Union once again request you to appear as counsel in the on going labor dispute at PLDT. In consideration of your services therein, the union binds itself to compensate you for your fees and expenses therein on a contingent basis. The amount shall be 10% of any improvement, with retroactive effect, of the PLDT's last offer to the deadlock in CBA negotiations which we know will result in a compulsory arbitration. A supporting board resolution will later confirm the letter. The Minister of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction over all unresolved issues in the bargaining deadlock and proceeded to resolve the same by compulsory arbitration. o Minister of Labor awarded across-the-board wage increases in addition to the Christmas bonus of 1/2 month pay per employee and other fringe benefits. As will be noted, there were improvements obtained from PLDT's "last offer." The Executive Board of the Union passed a resolution requesting PLDT to deduct P115.00 per employee for the legal services extended by Atty. Espinas. Employees, initially numbering 600 and finally 5,258, filed a letter-complaint before the MOLE through their authorized representative, Galvadores, assailing the imposition of P130.00 (later corrected to P155.00) per employee as attorney's fees of respondents counsel. o Employees took the position that the attorney's fees were not only unreasonable but also violative of Article 242(o) of the Labor Code; and that the deductions cannot given legal effect by a mere Board resolution. o Union and Counsel, on the other hand, proferred the argument that the attorneys fees being exacted pertained to his services during compulsory arbitration proceedings and cannot be considered as negotiation fees or attorney's fees within the context of Article 242(o) of the Labor Code. o Employees proposed a solution offering to pay P10/employee, but Atty. Espinas refused.

In the meantime, PLDT filed notice that assessment had been withheld from the differential pay due petitioners but that the same would not be turned over to the Union without prior MOLE authority so as not to involve management in the intra-union disagreement. The Minister of Labor referred the dispute to the Bureau of Labor Relations for being intra-union nature. Several hearings were held by that Bureau. The Union filed a Manifestation to the effect that about 6,067 members of the Union ratified the resolution of the legislative council in a plebiscite called for that purpose. On the basis thereof, Counsel moved for the payment of his legal fees. The employees questioned the plebiscite on the ground that Question No. 2, which reads: Question No. 2. Do you approve of the use of P1 million (P500,000.00 to be withdrawn from PECCI and another P500,000.00 from IBAA) from our CBA negotiation fund together with the attorney's fees (P1 million) that was collected and to be loaned to the MKP/FTWU as our counterpart of the seed money to start the housing program as agreed by the PLDT management and our union panel and included in the award of the MOLE? o was misleading and deceptive as it assumed that there was no dispute regarding the deduction of attorney's fees from the monetary benefits awarded to PLDT employees. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dismissed employees' complaint for lack of merit reasoning that "the outcome of the plebiscite negates any further question on the right of the union counsel to collect the amount of P115 from each of the employees involved." o This Decision that is assailed by petitioners principally on the ground that the individual written authorization of an the employees must first be obtained before any assessment can be made against the monetary benefits awarded to them pursuant to Article 242(o) of the Labor Code; and that assuming that Respondent Counsel is entitled to attorney's fees, the same should be taken from Union funds. o Union and Counsel argue that compulsory arbitration is a "mandatory activity" and an exception to Article 242(o) of the Labor Code, and that the Union members approved the questioned deduction in the plebiscite of January, 1984, under the condition that P lM of the same would be made available for the Union's housing project.

Issue:WON the compulsory arbitration is a mandatory activity Held:NO. The provisions are clear. No check-offs from any amounts due employees may be effected without individual written authorizations duly signed by the employee specifically stating the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction. The required individual authorizations in this case are wanting. In fact, petitioner employees are vigorously objecting. The question asked in the plebiscite, besides not being explicit, assumed that there was no dispute relative to attorney's fees.

Ratio: Relevant provisions: o Article 222(b) of the Labor Code provides: Article 222. Appearance and Fees. (b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining negotiations or conclusion of the collective bargaining agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting union; Provided, however, that attorney's fees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void. Article 242 of the same Code reads:

Art. 242. Rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization. The following are the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization: (o) Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessment, attorney's fees, negotiation fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off "from any amount due an employee without individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should specifically state the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction. The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code also provide that deductions from wages of the employees may only be made by the employer in cases authorized by law, including deductions for insurance premiums advanced by the employer on behalf of the employees as well as union dues where the right to check-off is authorized in writing by the individual employee himself. Contrary to Union's and Counsel's stand, the benefits awarded to PLDT employees still formed part of the collective bargaining negotiations although placed already under compulsory arbitration. This is not the "mandatory activity" under the Code which dispenses with individual written authorizations for check-offs, notwithstanding its "compulsory" nature. It is a judicial process of settling disputes laid down by law. Besides, Article 222(b) does not except a CBA, later placed under compulsory arbitration, from the ambit of its prohibition. The cardinal principle should be borne in mind that employees are protected by law from unwarranted practices that diminish their compensation without their knowledge and consent. o

Decision:Decision rendered by Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations SET ASIDE. The attorney's fees herein involved may be charged against Union funds pursuant to Article 222(b) of the Labor Code, as may be agreed upon between them.

- Migs Cardenas

VENGCO vs TRAJANO (May 5, 1989)

[AMBROCIO VENGCO, RAMON MOISES, EUGENIA REYES, RAFAEL WAGAS and 80 others per attached list, petitioners vs. HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, in his capacity as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations and EMMANUEL TIMBUNGCO, respondents.] Ponente: Medialdea, J. Nature: Petition for certiorari FACTS: -The Management of the Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation and the Kapisananng Manggagawasa AngloAmerican Tobacco Corporation (FOITAF) entered into a compromise agreement. -The company is to pay the union members 150k for their claims arising from unpaid emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) and other benefits which were the subject of their complaint before the Ministry of Labor. -Timbungco (Union President) received the money in installments and distributed it among the members. Vengco et al (union members) aver that Timbungco was not authorized to get the money and that 10% attorneys fees had been deducted from the 150k without their written authorization in violation of 241 (o). They demanded accounting from Timbungco which the latter did not give. -Vengco et al filed a complaint against Timbungco with the Ministry of Labor. - Timbungco alleged among others, that he was authorized by a resolution signed by the majority of the union members to receive and distribute the 150k among workers; that the 10% attorney's fees was in relation to the claim for payment of ECOLA before the MoL which is totally distinct and separate from the negotiation of the CBA; and that the deduction was in accordance with Section II, Rule No. VIII, Book No. III of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code and therefore, no authorization from the union members is required. -Med Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit -Vengco et al appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations -Director Trajano of the Bureau of Labor Relations granted the appeal and ordered Timbungco to render a full accounting of the 150k and to publish in the unions bulletin board the recipient union mems and the respective amount they received -Timbungco filed a MfR.Vengco et al filed opposition to said motion. -Officer in Charge Calaycay set aside the decision and ordered an audit examination of the Books of Account of the union.

-Vengco sought recon contending that the examination of the books of accounts of the union is irrelevant considering that the issue involved in the case does not consist of union funds but back pay and that Timbungco did not remit the money to the union treasurer so the amount was not entered in the records of the union. -Trajano denied the motion for recon and affirmed the audit of the Books of Account. -Hence this petition ISSUES 1. WON Timbunco is guilty of illegally deducting 10% attorneys fees from backwages YES. 2. WON Trajano gravely abused discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering examination of union books instead of affirming his previous order expelling Timbungco and ordering him to render accounting YES RATIO: 1. Art.241 states that no attorneys fees may be checked off from any amount due an employee without individual written authorization duly signed by employee which states amount, purpose, and beneficiary of deduction. Attorneys fees may not be deducted except for mandatory activities1. Here, the amicable settlement entered by management and union cant be a mandatory activity. Although union did claim for ECOLA before Ministry of Labor, this case never reached its conclusion in view of the parties agreement. It was also not shown that Atty. Sebastian was inst rumental in forging the said agreement. Also, Timbungco says that the Kapasiyahan gave him authority to deduct but the Kapasiyahan was defective (it was not dated, pages were not captioned, did not state purpose) and so the signatories were not properly apprised and had no knowledge of the deduction. The Kapasiyahan merely indicated intention of workers to get claim on first week and cant confer authority upon Timbungco authority to receive benefits for them. Lastly, BookIII,RuleVIII,SecII of IRR (cited by Timboncgo) which disposes of the written authorization, does not apply because such applies when theres judicial or administrative proceedings for recovery of wages. In this case, the benefits consist of unpaid ECOLA2 which are distinct from wages. Also, the payment of benefits were effected through settlement and not administrative proceedings. 2. Timbungco should bear consequences and be expelled. Also, the issue does not touch on union dues or funds and money turned over was not given to the treasurer nor entered into the books, thus orders have no basis.

DISPOSITIVE:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The assailed Orders dated May 23, 1983 of Officer-in-Charge Victoriano R. Calaycay of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and April 2, 1986 of respondent Director Cresenciano B. Trajano of the same Bureau are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the latter's decision dated December 29, 1982 is hereby reinstated. No costs. SO ORDERED. VOTE: 1st Division. Narvasa, Cruz, and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur. Gancayco, J., is on leave.

1 Judicial process of settling dispute laid down by the law 2 Allowances are benefits over and above basic salaries.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 146073. January 13, 2003]

JERRY E. ACEDERA, ANTONIO PARILLA, AND OTHERS LISTED IN ANNEX A, petitionersappellants, vs. INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC. (ICTSI), NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees. DECISION CARPIO-MORALES, J.: For consideration is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter denying herein petitioners-appellants Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion for Intervention. The antecedent facts are as follows: Petitioners-appellants Jerry Acedera, et al. are employees of herein private respondent International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) and are officers/members of Associated Port Checkers & Workers Union-International Container Terminal Services, Inc. Local Chapter (APCWU-ICTSI), a labor organization duly registered as a local affiliate of the Associated Port Checkers & Workers Union (APCWU). When ICTSI started its operations in 1988, it determined the rate of pay of its employees by using 304 days, the number of days of work of the employees in a year, as divisor.[2] On September 28, 1990, ICTSI entered into its first Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with APCWU with a term of five years effective until September 28, 1995. [3] The CBA was renegotiated and thereafter renewed through a second CBA that took effect on September 29, 1995, effective for another five years.[4] Both CBAs contained an identically-worded provision on hours and days of work reading: Article IX Regular Hours of Work and Days of Labor Section 1. The regular working days in a week shall be five (5) days on any day from Monday to Sunday, as may be scheduled by the COMPANY, upon seven (7) days prior notice unless any of this day is declared a special holiday.[5] (Underscoring omitted) In accordance with the above-quoted provision of the CBA, the employees work week was reduced to five days or a total of 250 days a year. ICTSI, however, continued using the 304-day divisor in computing the wages of the employees.[6] On November 10, 1990, the Regional Tripartite Wage and Productivity Board (RTWPB) in the National Capital Region decreed a P17.00 daily wage increase for all workers and employees receiving P125.00 per day or lower in the National Capital Region.[7] The then president of APCWU, together with some union members, thus requested the ICTSIs Human Resource Department/Personnel Manager to compute the actual monthly increase in the employees wages by multiplying the RTWPB [8] mandated increase by 365 days and dividing the product by 12 months.

[1]

Heeding the proposal and following the implementation of the new wage order, ICTSI stopped using 304 days as divisor and started using 365 days in determining the daily wage of its employees and other consequential compensation, even if the employees work week consisted of only five days as agreed upon in the CBA.[9] In early 1997, ICTSI went on a retrenchment program and laid off its on-call employees. This prompted the APCWU-ICTSI to file a notice of strike which included as cause of action not only the retrenchment of the employees but also ICTSIs use of 365 days as divisor in the computation of [11] [12] wages. The dispute respecting the retrenchment was resolved by a compromise settlement while [13] that respecting the computation of wages was referred to the Labor Arbiter. On February 26, 1997, APCWU, on behalf of its members and other employees similarly situated, filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against ICTSI which was dismissed for APCWUs failure to file its [14] position paper. Upon the demand of herein petitioners-appellants, APCWU filed a motion to revive the case which was granted. APCWU thereupon filed its position paper on August 22, 1997.[15] On December 8, 1997, petitioners-appellants filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion to Intervene.[16] In the petition at bar, they justified their move to intervene in this wise: [S]hould the union succeed in prosecuting the case and in getting a favorable reward it is actually they that would benefit from the decision. On the other hand, should the union fail to prove its case, or to prosecute the case diligently, the individual workers or members of the union would suffer great and immeasurable loss. [t]hey wanted to insure by their intervention that the case would thereafter be prosecuted with all due diligence and would not again be dismissed for lack of interest to prosecute on the part of the union. [17] The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered declaring that the correct divisor in computing the daily wage and other labor standard benefits of the employees of respondent ICTSI who are members of complainant Union as well as the other employees similarly situated is two hundred fifty (250) days such that said respondent is hereby ordered to pay the employees concerned the differentials representing the underpayment of said salaries and other benefits reckoned three (3) years back from February 26, 1997, the date of filing of this complaint or computed from February 27 1994 until paid, but for purposes of appeal, the salary differentials are temporarily computed for one year in the amount of Four Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand Forty Pesos (P468,040.00).[18] In the same decision, the Labor Arbiter denied petitioners-appellants Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion for Intervention upon a finding that they are already well represented by APCWU. [19] On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed APCWUs complaint for lack of merit.[20] The denial of petitioners-appellants intervention was, however, affirmed.[21] Unsatisfied with the decision of the NLRC, APCWU filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals while petitioners-appellants filed theirs with this Court which referred the petition[22] to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed APCWUs petition on the following grounds: failure to allege when its motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision was filed, failure to attach the necessary appendices to the petition, and failure to file its motion for extension to file its petition within the reglementary [23] period. As for petitioners-appellants petition for certiorari, it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in this wise: It is clear from the records that herein petitioners, claiming to be employees of respondent ICTSI, are already well represented by its employees union, APCWU, in the petition before this Court (CA-G.R. SP. No. 53266) although the same has been dismissed. The present petition is, therefore a superfluity that deserves to be dismissed. Furthermore, only Acedera signed the Certificate of non-forum shopping. On this score alone, this
[10]

petition should likewise be dismissed. We find that the same has no merit considering that herein petitioners have not presented any meritorious argument that would justify the reversal of the Decision of the NLRC. Article IX of the CBA provides: REGULAR HOURS OF WORK AND DAYS OF LABOR Section 1. The regular working days in a week shall be five (5) days on any day from Monday to Sunday, as may be scheduled by the COMPANY, upon seven (7) days prior notice unless any of this day is declared a special holiday. This provision categorically states the required number of working days an employee is expected to work for a week. It does not, however, indicate the manner in which an empl oyees salary is to be computed. In fact, nothing in the CBA makes any referral to any divisor which should be the basis for determining the salary. The NLRC, therefore, correctly ruled that xxx the absence of any express or specific provision in the CBA that 250 days should be used as divisor altogether makes the position of the Union untenable. xxx Considering that herein petitioners themselves requested that 365 days be used as the divisor in computing their wage increase and later did not raise or object to the same during the negotiations of the new CBA, they are clearly estopped to now complain of such computation only because they no longer benefit from it. Indeed, the 365 divisor for the past seven (7) years has already become practice and law between the company and its employees.[24] (Emphasis supplied) xxx Hence, the present petition of petitioners-appellants who fault the Court of Appeals as follows: I . . . IN REJECTING THE CBA OF THE PARTIES AS THE SOURCE OF THE DIVISOR TO DETERMINE THE WORKERS DAILY RATE TOTALLY DISREGARDED THE APPLICABLE LANDMARK DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ON THE MATTER. II . . . [IN] DISREGARD[ING] APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS ARE ALREADY IN ESTOPPEL. III . . . IN RULING THAT THE PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS HAVE NO LEGAL RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN AND PURSUE THIS CASE AND THAT THEIR INTERVENTION IS A SUPERFLUITY. IV . . . IN HOLDING, ALTHOUGH MERELY AS AN OBITER DICTUM, THAT ONLY PETITIONER JERRY ACEDERA SIGNED THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING.[25] The third assigned error respecting petitioners-appellants right to intervene shall first be passed upon, it being determinative of their right to raise the other assigned errors.

Petitioners-appellants anchor their right to intervene on Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of which reads: Section 1. Who may intervene.- A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors right may be fully protected in a separate proceeding. They stress that they have complied with the requisites for intervention because (1) they are the ones who stand to gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of any judgment that may be rendered in this case, (2) no undue delay or prejudice would result from their intervention since their Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion for Intervention was filed while the Labor Arbiter was still hearing the case and before any decision thereon was rendered, and (3) it was not possible for them to file a separate case as they would be guilty of forum shopping because the only forum available for them was [26] the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners-appellants, however, failed to consider, in addition to the rule on intervention, the rule on representation, thusly: Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.- Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. . . [27] (Emphasis supplied) A labor union is one such party authorized to represent its members under Article 242(a) of the Labor Code which provides that a union may act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining. This authority includes the power to represent its members for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the CBA. That APCWU acted in a representative capacity for and in behalf of its Union members and other employees similarly situated, the title of the case filed by it at the Labor Arbiters Office so expressly states. While a party acting in a representative capacity, such as a union, may be permitted to intervene in a case, ordinarily, a person whose interests are already represented will not be permitted to do the same[28] except when there is a suggestion of fraud or collusion or that the representative will not act in good faith for the protection of all interests represented by him.[29] Petitioners-appellants cite the dismissal of the case filed by ICTSI, first by the Labor Arbiter, and later [30] by the Court of Appeals. The dismissal of the case does not, however, by itself show the existence of fraud or collusion or a lack of good faith on the part of APCWU. There must be clear and convincing evidence of fraud or collusion or lack of good faith independently of the dismissal. This, petitionersappellants failed to proffer. Petitioners-appellants likewise express their fear that APCWU would not prosecute the case diligently because of its sweetheart relationship with ICTSI.[31] There is nothing on record, however, to support this alleged relationship which allegation surfaces as a mere afterthought because it was never raised early on. It was raised only in petitioners-appellants reply to ICTSIs comment in the petition at bar, the last pleading submitted to this Court, which was filed on June 20, 2001 or more than 42 months after petitioners-appellants filed their Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion to Intervene with the Labor Arbiter. To reiterate, for a member of a class to be permitted to intervene in a representative action, fraud or collusion or lack of good faith on the part of the representative must be proven. It must be based on facts borne on record. Mere assertions, as what petitioners-appellants proffer, do not suffice. The foregoing discussion leaves it unnecessary to discuss the other assigned errors.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. Puno, J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Golden Donuts, Inc. v. NLRC [G.R. Nos. 113666-68, January 19, 2000.]

FACTS: Private respondents were the complainants in three consolidated cases submitted with the Labor Arbiter. Complainants were members of the KMDD-CFW whose CBA with the corporationexpired. During the negotiations, the management panel arrived late causing the union panel to walk out. The management addressed aletter of apology to the union and requested for negotiations to resume. The union panel did not show up despite letters from management advising the former of the CBA meetings. The union struck. A compliant was filed by Golden Donuts to declare the strike illegal. Counsel for the union and strikers pleaded for a compromise whereupon both parties would desist from continuing their cases against each other. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision upholding the dismissal of private respondents and ruling that they were bound by the compromise agreement entered into by the union with petitioners. Private respondents appealed to the NLRC, claiming that the union had no authority to waive or compromise their individual rights and they were not bound by the compromise agreement entered into by the union with petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not a union may compromise or waive the right to security of tenure and money claims of its minority members, without the latters consent.

HELD: No. Absent a showing of the unions special authority to compromise the individual claims of private respondents for reinstatement and backwages, there is no valid waiver of the aforesaid rights. The judgment of the Labor Arbiter based on the compromise agreement does not have the effect of res judicata upon private respondents who did not agree thereto since the requirement of identity of parties is not satisfied. A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment and is conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies. Private respondents have not waived their right to security of tenure nor can they be barred from entitlement of their individual claims. Since there was no evidence that private respondents committed any illegal act, petitioners failure to reinstate them after the settlement of the strike amounts to illegal dismissal.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Baguio City THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 161933 April 22, 2008

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (SCBEU-NUBE), petitioner, vs. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK and ANNEMARIE DURBIN, in her capacity as Chief Executive Officer, Philippines, Standard Chartered Bank, respondents. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: For resolution is an appeal by certiorari filed by petitioner under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1 dated October 9, 2002 and Resolution2 dated January 26, 2004 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), dismissing their petition and affirming the Secretary of Labor and Employment's Orders dated May 31, 2001 and August 30, 2001. Petitioner and the Standard Chartered Bank (Bank) began negotiating for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) in May 2000 as their 1998-2000 CBA already expired. Due to a deadlock in the negotiations, petitioner filed a Notice of Strike prompting the Secretary of Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. On May 31, 2001, Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued an Order with the following dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Standard Chartered Bank and the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union are directed to execute their collective bargaining agreement effective 01 April 2001 until 30 March 2003 incorporating therein the foregoing dispositions and the agreements they reached in the course of negotiations and conciliation. All other submitted issues that were not passed upon are dismissed. The charge of unfair labor practice for bargaining in bad faith and the claim for damages relating thereto are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Finally, the charge of unfair labor practice for gross violation of the economic provisions of the CBA is hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction. SO ORDERED.3 Both petitioner and the Bank filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which were denied by the 4 Secretary per Order dated August 30, 2001. Petitioner sought recourse with the CA via a petition for certiorari, and in the assailed Decision dated 5 6 October 9, 2002 and Resolution dated January 26, 2004, the CA dismissed their petition and affirmed the Secretary's Orders. Hence, herein petition based on the following grounds:

I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECIDING THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR REVISING THE SCOPE OF EXCLUSIONS FROM THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT UNDER THE CBA. II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECIDING THAT A ONE-MONTH OR LESS TEMPORARY OCCUPATION OF A POSITION (ACTING CAPACITY) DOES NOT MERIT ADJUSTMENT IN REMUNERATION.7 The resolution of this case has been overtaken by the execution of the parties' 2003-2005 CBA. While this would render the case moot and academic, nevertheless, the likelihood that the same issues will come up in the parties' future CBA negotiations is not far-fetched, thus compelling its resolution. Courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.[8] The CBA provisions in dispute are the exclusion of certain employees from the appropriate bargaining unit and the adjustment of remuneration for employees serving in an acting capacity for one month. In their proposal, petitioner sought the exclusion of only the following employees from the appropriate bargaining unit all managers who are vested with the right to hire and fire employees, confidential employees, those with access to labor relations materials, Chief Cashiers, Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex Department and one Human Resources (HR) staff.9 In the previous 1998-2000 CBA,10 the excluded employees are as follows: A. All covenanted and assistant officers (now called National Officers) B. One confidential secretary of each of the: 1. Chief Executive, Philippine Branches 2. Deputy Chief Executive/Head, Corporate Banking Group 3. Head, Finance 4. Head, Human Resources 5. Manager, Cebu 6. Manager, Iloilo 7. Covenanted Officers provided said positions shall be filled by new recruits. C. The Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers in Manila, Cebu and Iloilo, and in any other branch that the BANK may establish in the country. D. Personnel of the Telex Department E. All Security Guards

F. Probationary employees, without prejudice to Article 277 (c) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, casuals or emergency employees; and G. One (1) HR Staff
11

The Secretary, however, maintained the previous exclusions because petitioner failed to show that the employees sought to be removed from the list qualify for exclusion. 12 With regard to the remuneration of employees working in an acting capacity, it was petitioner's position that additional pay should be given to an employee who has been serving in a temporary/acting capacity for one week. The Secretary likewise rejected petitioner's proposal and instead, allowed additional pay for those who had been working in such capacity for one month. The Secretary agreed with the Bank's position that a restrictive provision would curtail management's prerogative, and at the same time, recognized that employees should not be made to work in an acting capacity for long periods of time without adequate compensation. The Secretary's disposition of the issues raised by petitioner were affirmed by the CA. 13 The Court sustains the CA. Whether or not the employees sought to be excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit are confidential employees is a question of fact, which is not a proper issue in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.14 This holds more true in the present case in which petitioner failed to controvert with evidence the findings of the Secretary and the CA. The disqualification of managerial and confidential employees from joining a bargaining unit for rank and file employees is already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. While Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential records.15 In this case, the question that needs to be answered is whether the Bank's Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex Department and HR staff are confidential employees, such that they should be excluded. As regards the qualification of bank cashiers as confidential employees, National Association of Trade 16 Unions (NATU) Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Torres declared that they are confidential employees having control, custody and/or access to confidential matters, e.g., the branch's cash position, statements of financial condition, vault combination, cash codes for telegraphic transfers, demand drafts and other negotiable instruments, pursuant to Sec. 1166.4 of the Central Bank Manual regarding joint custody, and therefore, disqualified from joining or assisting a union; or joining, assisting or forming any other labor organization.17 Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja18 meanwhile stated that "confidential employees such as accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access to confidential information, may become the source of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement."19 Finally, in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,20 the Court designatedpersonnel staff, in which human resources staff may be qualified, as confidential employees because by the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations.

Petitioner insists that the foregoing employees are not confidential employees; however, it failed to buttress its claim. Aside from its generalized arguments, and despite the Secretary's finding that there was no evidence to support it, petitioner still failed to substantiate its claim. Petitioner did not even bother to state the nature of the duties and functions of these employees, depriving the Court of any basis on which it may be concluded that they are indeed confidential employees. As aptly stated by the CA: While We agree that petitioner's proposed revision is in accordance with the law, this does not necessarily mean that the list of exclusions enumerated in the 1998-2000 CBA is contrary to law. As found by public respondent, petitioner failed to show that the employees sought to be removed from the list of exclusions are actually rank and file employees who are not managerial or confidential in status and should, accordingly, be included in the appropriate bargaining unit. Absent any proof that Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex department and one (1) HR Staff have mutuality of interest with the other rank and file employees, then they are rightfully excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit. x x x21(Emphasis supplied) Petitioner cannot simply rely on jurisprudence without explaining how and why it should apply to this case. Allegations must be supported by evidence. In this case, there is barely any at all. There is likewise no reason for the Court to disturb the conclusion of the Secretary and the CA that the additional remuneration should be given to employees placed in an acting capacity for one month. The CA correctly stated: Likewise, We uphold the public respondent's Order that no employee should be temporarily placed in a position (acting capacity) for more than one month without the corresponding adjustment in the salary. Such order of the public respondent is not in violation of the "equal pay for equal work" principle, considering that after one (1) month, the employee performing the job in an acting capacity will be entitled to salary corresponding to such position. xxxx In arriving at its Order, the public respondent took all the relevant evidence into account and weighed both parties arguments extensively. Thus, public respondent concluded that a restrictive provision with respect to employees being placed in an acting capacity may curtail management's valid exercise of its prerogative. At the same time, it recognized that employees should not be made to perform work in an acting capacity for extended periods of time without being adequately compensated. x x x22 Thus, the Court reiterates the doctrine that: [T]he office of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that it shall raise only questions of law. The factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Department of Labor and Employment, when supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their respective fields. Judicial review of labor cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence on which the labor official's findings rest. It is not our function to assess and evaluate all over again the evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties to an appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court (here, the DOLE Secretary) and the appellate court on the matter coincide, as in this case at bar. The Rule limits that function of the Court to the review or revision of errors of law and not to a second analysis of the evidence. x x x Thus, absent any showing of whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, and unless lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the appellate 23 court be amply demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual findings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.