You are on page 1of 14

Direct Democracy

Linda Maduz
University of Zurich | Center for International and Comparative Studies | maduz@ipz.uzh.ch

First published: March 2010 Most recent version available at http://www.livingreviews.org/lrd-2010-1 The rising use of direct democratic procedures within states ut also cross!nationally increases the interest in and the relevance of the research on direct democracy. "t the theoretical as well as at the empirical level# scholars# who have een participating in the long!standing de ate on direct democracy# came up with different conclusions and evidence a out the e$tent and %ind of impact that direct democratic procedures have on the political processes and system as a whole. The purpose of the article is to give a thorough picture of ma&or contri utions that have helped to advance this dynamic field of research. It will e shown how the theoretical and empirical approaches applied have considera ly changed and improved over time# whereas the 'uestions at the heart of the direct democracy de ate have asically remained the same.

Introduction
Shaun (owler )*++*, *-.f./ once noted that few other terms in political science generate such heated and hostile de ates within the academic community as 0direct democracy1 2 and that it would 0raise the lood pressure1 not only of political scientists ut also of politicians. There are two asic theoretical views of how direct democracy 2 or participatory democracy as it is also called 2 can e understood and defined, either as a variation on the democratic form of regime )e.g. in contrast to representative democracy/ or alternatively as the essential form of democracy. If we define democracy as a concept referring to popular rule in a road and general sense# direct democracy is used to descri e a system # in which the people literally rule themselves directly. 3hereas all democracy is to some degree participatory# with some form of an original consent given )e.g. constitution/ and periodic popular elections# according to its advocates direct democracy involves# the e$tensive and active engagement of citizens in the self!governing process. Seen in this light# direct or participatory democracy can e descri ed as democracy itself# properly understood )See The 4ncyclopedia of 5emocracy# edited y 6ipset 788./. The focus of this article is on empirical studies. 3hen appropriate however# reference will e made to normative models of democracy. In line with the definition a ove# we consider two road types# into which the wide range of normative models of democracy can e categorized )9eld 78-:# *++;/. The first< li eral or representative democracy refers to a system in which the citizens= role is essentially restricted to the election of 0officers1 in charge of 0representing1 the interests and views of citizens within a fi$ed framewor% of 0the rule of law1. The second< participatory or direct democracy corresponds to a situation where citizens are directly and widely included in the political decision!ma%ing. >rom the perspective of the adherents of the participatory model# direct democracy is 0strong democracy1. Thus# in (ar er=s )78-?/ words# it is a system of 0self!government y citizens rather than representative government in the name of citizens1. 5irect democracy=s adherents consider that in order to achieve this self!determination y citizens# democratic rights should not e

restricted to political decision!ma%ing# ut e e$tended from the State to all important societal institutions )@ateman 78:+/.7 In practice# direct democracy is a term denoting a variety of processes and institutions# guaranteeing people=s )direct/ involvement in political decision!ma%ing. These processes include initiatives and referendums. The research on these two direct democratic institutions# which are the most important and widely used direct democratic processes# forms the focus of this literature review article. "t the theoretical# as well as the empirical level# scholars# who have een participating in the long!standing direct democracy de ate# have come up with diverging evidence and conclusions on the e$tent and %ind of impact that direct democratic procedures have on the political processes and system as a whole. 3hile the 'uestions at the heart of the de ate have asically remained the same# the theoretical and empirical approaches applied have changed considera ly and improved over time. "s for the 'uestions# 6upia and Aatsusa%a )*++?/ have discerned four 0old1 'uestions at the center of the direct democracy de ate# which are, "re voters competentB 3hat role does money playB 9ow does direct democracy affect policyB 5oes direct democracy enefit the many or the fewB * In search of answers to these 'uestions# scholars in the past have mostly ta%en descriptive or normative approaches. In recent decades# researchers started to use more systematically empirical procedures to test the scientific propositions made in the conte$t of direct democracy. The growing sophistication of econometrics and the introduction of low!cost computing have allowed them to wor% with large data sets# and ma%e it possi le to identify %ey effects and esta lish ro ust empirical relations. Aoreover# new theoretical tools# such as formal modelling# have een developed and theoretical approaches have een com ined with approaches used in other scientific disciplines. This gives scholars the possi ility of a more sophisticated e$amination of direct democracy=s policy!related# informational# and strategic aspects. Ta%ing 6upias and Aatsusa%a=s )*++?/ four 0old1 'uestions as a starting point# the purpose of this review article is to e$plore the recent literature on direct democracy and to e$tend the discussion to additional aspects not touched upon y their
7

>or a detailed discussion on the differences etween representative and direct democracy# see Criesi )*++./. * See also Aatsusa%a )*++./.

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010

review. Thus# we shall also discuss 'uestions referring to the educative effects of direct democracy. The oo%s and articles are presented in terms of their contri utions to one of the four central 'uestions a ove. 9ow these 'uestions at the heart of the direct democratic de ate are answered depends among other things# on the institutional conte$t# which varies etween the countries and geographical regions under study. This ecomes evident when considering how diverse the design and use of direct democratic institutions are in different countries. 3e shall# therefore# egin with a discussion of the country!specific focus of recent literature on direct!democratic procedures )section */. 3e then )section D/ turn to the central 'uestions of the de ate on direct democracy# and the answers provided y contemporary research. Section ? concludes.

countries have as%ed their citizens to vote in a referendum at least once. These recent developments in 4astern 4urope attract the interest of many academic researchers )see "uer and (Itzer *++7/. The ul% of the literature on direct democracy focuses however# on the esta lished democracies of the Jorth "tlantic region and# in particular# on Switzerland and the US". In a worldwide comparison# these two countries stand out for their long! standing and e$tensive e$perience with direct!democratic procedures. 3hen loo%ing at the specific form of direct democracy that e$ists in the two countries# we find some important differences, The practice in the mem er states of the U.S. can e characterized as an unmediated# populist form of direct democracy )(udge 788D# Criesi *++-/. The original purpose of the popular initiative was to circumvent state parliaments controlled y political parties# and today still it is primarily used y social movements and interest groups with the same goal.. (y contrast# in Switzerland direct democracy is much more organized and more tightly controlled y the political elites< direct!democratic procedures are closely lin%ed to the procedures of representative democracy and parties have a full role to play )(udge *++7/. In the Swiss conte$t# two main instruments shape the direct democratic system# i.e. the popular initiative and the referendum. The latter is the earlier form of direct!democracy in Switzerland# and in contrast to the US conte$t# it is the procedure that plays the most important role in Swiss direct democracy# and in all other 4uropean varieties of direct democracy )Criesi *++-/. Switzerland is often portrayed as the country where the roots of direct democracy lie )Co ach 788D# 6loyd 78+:# Zimmermann 7888/.5epicting direct democracy as having a purely Swiss lineage would# however# e erroneous )see e.g. "uer 788;/. Important contri utions on the functioning# implications# and conse'uences of the Swiss direct democratic system include oo%s written y CirchgKssner et al. )7888/# Criesi )*++./# 6inder )*++./# and @apadopoulos )788-/. "mong the studies that provide a good overview of the direct!democratic institutions as used at the different su !national political levels in Switzerland# we find the analyses y (Itzer )*++:/# 6adner and (Ihlmann )*++:/# Trechsel )*+++/# Trechsel and SerdIlt )7888/# and Latter )*++*/#. "ssuming that the mechanisms and logic ehind direct democratic voting are not specific to the country# ut relevant for all places with direct democratic e$perience# many authors consider the Swiss case to offer a fruitful asis for the analysis of direct!democratic choice and procedures and to allow for general conclusions on direct democracy. The most e$tensive literature in the field of direct democracy# however# covers the "merican case. In the United States# direct democratic procedures are widely practiced# ut their use is restricted to the state and city level )Tol ert and Smith *++;/. (owler et al. )788-/# Cronin )78-8/# 4llis )*++*/# Aagle y )78-?/# and Sa ato et al. )*++7/ are among the authors who wrote standard wor%s# containing general overviews on the direct democratic system in the US". " recent trend# which can e o served in the direct democracy literature# is that more and more countries that had een neglected for studies# have now ecome the su &ect of detailed analyses. 4$amples are the studies of Clar%e et al. )*++?/ or Aendelsohn and Cutler )*+++/ on Canada# 9igley and Ac"llister )*++*/ on "ustralia# "imer and Ailler )*++*/ or
Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010 2

The country-specific focus of direct democracy literature


The recently o served increase in the use of direct democratic instruments in different regions of the world )i.e.# referendums and initiatives/# as well as the incorporation of related provisions in a num er of new constitutions# e$plains the growing interest in the su &ect matter. " classical overview that covers e$periences with direct democracy across the world is provided y (utler and Eanney )788?/. 6i%e many other scholars# they analyze the spread of direct democracy in terms of how fre'uently relevant devices are used. Scarrow )*++7/# y contrast# focuses on institutional changes as indicators to evaluate direct democracy=s glo al spread# and for this purpose studies the e$perience of ** F4C5!countries in different parts of the world. Cain# 5alton# and Scarrow )*++D/ further continue this line of research and provide an assessment of the e$tent of institutional reform in contemporary democracies# including an analysis of how the actors of representative democracies respond to the new structures. In a recent pu lication# edited y >reitag and 3agschal )*++:/# the authors ta%e stoc% of current developments in the well!esta lished direct democratic systems of Germany# 4urope# US"# and Switzerland. >urther useful insights into the glo al spread and development of direct democratic institutions are given y 6e5uc )*++D/ or 6e5uc et al. )*++*/. Fther overviews of direct democracy literature have a more regional focus. 05irect 5emocracy in 4urope1 has# for instance# een the su &ect of a recent collection of essays )@Hllinger et al. *++:/ that comprises theoretical and empirical studies on direct democratic institutions at the local# national# and 4uropean level. Compared to earlier writers on direct democracy in the 4uropean conte$t# researchers today have access to a wide range of information on the various provisions# practices and trends within 4urope )@allinger et al. *++:, 7/ >or instance# updated information on direct democratic procedures in 4urope is availa le at www.iri!europe.org )Initiative and Eeferendum Institute/. Eeflecting the historical path of direct democratic developments in 4urope# earlier studies e$hi it a clear focus on the direct democratic e$perience of 3estern 4urope )see e.g. 0The Eeferendum 4$perience in 4urope1 y Gallagher and Uleri 788;/. In recent times# the post!communist countries of 4astern 4urope have underta%en a num er of institutional reforms# favoura le to direct democracy. Aoreover# new procedures# li%e the referendum# are eing used more and more fre'uently. 4$cept for (ulgaria# all new 4astern 4uropean

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

@ar%inson )*++7/ on Jew Zealand# Svensson )*++*/ on 5enmar%# Sinnott )*++*/ on Ireland# >reire and (aum )*++D/ on @ortugal# and 5enver )*++*/ on Scotland and 3ales. 3ei$ner )*++*/ wrote an interesting study on Germany# where 2 after the reunification of the country 2 an e$tension and more intense use of citizens= direct participatory rights can e o served. She also contri uted to a pu lication y the (undeszentrale fIr politische (ildung )*++;/ that gives a good overview on the direct democratic system in Germany. "n interesting strand of writings within the general direct democratic literature is concerned with comparative treatments of direct democratic procedures. Lon "r$ )*++*/ provides# for instance# a valua le comparison of the Swiss and "merican institutions. In the 4uropean conte$t# Christin and 9ug )*++*/# 9ug )*++*/# and 9ug and Sciarini )*+++/ compare countries= e$perience with referendums on 4U integration. Given the similar conte$t that many )su !groups of/ 4uropean countries are facing# these countries lend themselves as a good asis for comparative studies. "lthough some of the findings gained from these country! or region!specific studies can e generalized and are not only valid for the specific case )s/ under investigation# it is important to put them into conte$t. "s a conse'uence of the different institutional settings and also of the different factors that influence and shape the use of direct democratic instruments in a given country or region# including for e$ample# the economic# social and organizational environment# in which citizens reside and vote )see e.g. (Itzer *++: and Trechsel *+++/# the focus and emphasis of the studies# as well as the resulting conclusions differ considera ly. >or instance# articles and oo%s on the "merican case generally e$hi it a higher interest in the influence of money in direct democratic votes than studies on the Swiss case. The conte$t# in which studies are written# also determines and e$plains the differences in terms of the answers they provide to the 0four old 'uestions1.

restricted to the election of representatives, 0The mass of the citizens are not 'ualified to decide high policy# so they can e allowed to influence it only indirectly# y choosing those who are to decide rather than deciding themselves1 )(udge 788;/. (y contrast# adherents of the participatory model argue that the inclusion of citizens in the decision!ma%ing creates the preconditions for their participation and competent choices. In their view# direct democratic participation has an educative# empowering effect on the citizens engaging in it. The competence of the voters In order to e a le to &udge on an empirical asis whether voters are competent enough# one needs to %now how they arrive at their choices. Techni'ues that have een developed in recent times# such as specially designed surveys# game theoretic communication models# and la oratory e$periments )see 6upia and Aatsusa%a *++?/ allow researchers to more accurately study and empirically assess the conte$t and mechanisms that lead citizens to ma%e a given choice in a direct democratic vote. @articularly important in this regard are the analytical approaches and insights gained from the research in the psychology of attitudes )see e.g. Simon 78.:# Tvers%y and Cahneman 78:?/. 4arly empirical wor% on pu lic opinion in the 78.+s and 78;+s tended to strongly confirm elief in the ignorance and incompetence of ordinary citizens# and in doing so supported the view of the proponents of the representative model of direct democracy. "ccording to the dominant paradigm of pu lic opinion research at that time# mass pu lics were distinguished y their minimal levels of political attention and competence )Sniderman 788D/. Aore recently# this traditional 0minimalist1 view of voters has een challenged y what Sniderman calls 0the Jew 6oo% in @u lic Fpinion Eesearch1. @roponents of this view )including 6upia and Ac Cu ins 788-# @age and Shapiro 788*/# while recognizing that most citizens are usually little interested in politics and adly informed a out it# argue that voters are nonetheless capa le of ma%ing reasona le decisions ased upon cognitive short!cuts or heuristics. Such 0short!cuts1 or 0cues1# as they are also called# can e provided for instance y political parties# interest groups# or the media. Scholars differ in their presentation of the %inds and num er of short!cuts that are availa le to the voters and in regard to which short!cut)s/ they consider to e most relevant. In one of the first direct empirical e$aminations in this strand of literature# 6upia )788?/ shows that voters can use simple pieces of information as su stitutes for more detailed information. Fn the asis of data drawn from an e$it poll# 6upia defines three categories. 9e distinguishes a first category of voters who %now neither the answers to the detailed 'uestions a out the propositions to e voted on# nor the preferences of the actor that has launched the initiative. " second category consists of 0model citizens1 who %now the answers to oth the detailed 'uestions and the 0initiator=s1 preferences# and a third# middle! range category with respondents who are not a le to answer the detailed 'uestions ut who %now the 0initiator=s preferences1. The finding that leads 6upia to a positive conclusion a out the use of cues is that the 0model citizens1 as well as voters of the middle!range category vote in very similar ways )see 6upia *++7# 6upia and Aatsusu%a *++?/. In the same vein as 6upia=s )*++7/ analysis# (owler and 5onovan )788-/ conducted a more e$pansive empirical study# including numerous states and elections )with a focus on
Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010 !

Answers to the key questions of direct democracy research


Are voters competent? The increased use of direct democratic procedures in well! esta lished# as well as in newer democracies# has led to a more direct and larger participation y citizens in the decision! ma%ing process of these countries. There has# therefore# een a growing interest in the 'uestion of whether citizens in direct democratic systems are competent enough to ma%e reasona le decisions. Contrasting normative positions on this issue are provided y the participatory and the representative model of democracy respectively. 3hereas in the participatory model# citizens are seen as sufficiently 'ualified to participate in political decisions# and conse'uently should e directly involved in the decision!ma%ing process# the representative model of democracy puts citizens= competence into 'uestion. Schumpeter )78;*/ and other adherents of the representativeM li eral model support the view that ordinary citizens lac% political interest and the competence to directly participate in decision!ma%ing. This e$plains their s%epticism regarding direct democratic procedures and why# according to their view# citizens= participatory rights in the decision!ma%ing process should e

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

California/# using oth individual!level survey data and aggregate data. They show how citizens employ cues and heuristics in various conte$ts# focusing on three elements they consider to e decisive in the voter=s decision!ma%ing, 0avoiding uncertainty y voting no# using instrumental evaluations of propositions# and ta%ing cues from political elites1 )9ug *+++, ?../. Their finding is that citizens# although not eing fully informed a out the details of a vote# 0appear to e a le to figure out what they are for and against in ways that ma%e sense in terms of their underlying values and interests. >ailing that# others appear to use a strategy of voting Nno=# when information is lac%ing or when worries a out general state conditions are greatest.1 They note that 0&ust as legislators do# these voters ma%e choices purposefully# using availa le information1 )(owler and 5onovan 788-/. 9ow voters cope with informational demands in Swiss referendum voting# is the su &ect of Christin et al.=s )*++*/ study. >ollowing 4agly and Chai%en=s )788D/ dual process theory# two 'ualitatively different paths or strategies of individual opinion formation can e distinguished, in addition to the heuristic )shortcut! ased/ path# there is also a systematic path. 3hereas heuristic opinion formation relies on cues# not ma%ing any reference to su stantive arguments# systematic opinion formation is essentially argument ased. Eesearchers differ on the 'uestions of what the relative importance of short!cuts or argument! ased voting is# and what circumstances ma%e voters choose a specific type of cue or strategy. "pplying insights from the psychology of attitudes to the study of direct democracy# many studies 2 primarily those conducted in the U.S. conte$t 2 found that people ase their choices mostly on relatively simple %inds of information# even when the issue de ated is of high relevance and comple$ity )see 6upia and Aatsusa%a *++?/. The results of Criesi=s )*++./ study# which focuses on the Swiss e$perience# challenge this finding and allow a rather optimistic conclusion with regard to citizens= competence. Criesi shows that argument! ased decisions are generally highly important in direct democratic votes and that citizens are conse'uently less minimalist than is usually assumed. 9e finds that citizens who actually participate in the vote prove to e significantly more competent than the electorate overall# i.e. the most incompetent usually do not participate in the vote. This %ind of self!elimination mechanism of the incompetent thus leads to a 'uasi!automatic reduction of the possi ility of an unreasona le decision 2 a finding that has the potential to appease the fears of the critics of direct! democratic procedures. "s a decisive factor in determining citizens= competence# Criesi )*++./ identifies the role played y the political elite during the campaign preceding a vote. Com ining individual!level survey data and aggregate data# Criesi studies the interaction process etween citizens and the political elites# and is a le to show that the more intense a campaign is# the more information is provided to the average voter# which in turn raises the voters= issue!specific competence and conse'uently increases argument! ased voting. Criesi demonstrates that the political elite# eing in a position to determine the intensity of the campaign that precedes a vote# decisively influences the 'uality of the vote. Competence as considered in Criesi=s study# is a dynamic concept which is su &ect to changes that depend# amongst others# on the ehavior of the political elite )See also the discussion on 4ducative effects of direct democracy/. Criesi=s study covers a period of almost *+ years and should e

seen as a continuation and e$tension of the recently emerged direct democracy literature on Switzerland that uilds on Zaller=s )788*/ theory on the nature and origin of pu lic opinion. @revious contri utions in this field include studies written y Sciarini )*+++/ and Sciarini and Aar'uis )*+++/# which mainly focus on votes on foreign policy issues. In the same strand of literature# we also find studies that consider a larger set of policy areas and propositions# as for e$ample# (Itzer and Aar'uis )*++*/. To conclude# the recent studies considered here on voter competence in direct democratic systems# indicate that citizens are sufficiently competent to ma%e the %inds of decisions they face in direct democratic votes. ducative effects of direct democracy The literature on educative effects completes the discussion on the level of voter competency. "t the same time it is an e$tension to the research wor% on direct democracy=s effects on pu lic policy )see 9ow does direct democracy affect policyB/. 4ducative effects can e understood as spillover effects of direct democracy )Smith and Tol ert *++:# Tol ert and Smith *++;/. The research focus here is not on the su stantive policy conse'uences that result from direct democratic votes# ut on how direct democratic voting measures potentially affect the electoral process itself. The focus lays on the changes in citizen attitudes and ehavior and includes considerations on changes in the strategies of interest groups and political parties )Tol ert and Smith *++;/. Studies on direct democracy=s educative effects conclude that citizens who are e$posed to initiatives have more political %nowledge )A. Smith *++*# Tol ert and Ac Jeal *++D/ and interest in politics )Tol ert and Ac Jeal *++D/. In e$plaining the mechanism leading to more political %nowledge and interest# different authors emphasize the importance of the institutional particularities of a direct democratic system. Criesi )*++./ ma%es this point with regard to the Swiss system# where direct democratic votes ta%e place in a well!structured conte$t# and where the format of the vote is standardized and well %nown y the citizens. In such a setting# with regularly and fre'uently organized votes# voters have een shown to e li%ely to Oaccumulate a set of ha its allowing them to manage the tas% of voting with a minimal amount of effortO )Criesi *++., 7D-/. (aran%ay et al. )*++D/ also concluded that the educative effect of direct!democratic procedures depends on the institutional specificities. Their focus is on institutional openness# which they measure y the num er of signatures necessary to force a allot and the time limit within which they have to e gathered. 5ata for allots in the Swiss cantons for the period from 78:+ to 788; serve as the asis for their empirical analysis. The re'uirement of a large num er of signatures has a positive effect on awareness in the population at large# and generates more information a out the issues at hand# which 2 and this is a %ey finding of their study 2 eventually leads more voters to turn out. !ow does direct democracy affect policy? The 'uestion of how direct democracy affects policy is crucial. It also pre!structures the possi le answers to the other two remaining 0old1 'uestions# i.e. the 'uestion relating to the role of money# and the 'uestion of who the main eneficiaries of a direct democratic system are 2 0the many or the few1.
Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010 "

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

5irect democratic institutions affect policy in various ways. Eesearchers generally distinguish etween direct and indirect effects. This distinction was already made y early writers on direct democracy )e.g. Cey and Crouch 78D8# Eappard 787*/ and has een further developed y a growing num er of recent theoretical models dealing with referendums# such as those proposed y (esley and Coate )*++7/# Ger er )788;/# 9ug )*++?/# Aatsusa%a and Ac!Carty )*++7/# and Steunen erg )788?/.D 5irect effects can e defined as the effects engendered y the adoption of a proposition y the voters that would not have found the necessary support in the legislature. Thus# direct effects are the immediate conse'uences of popular votes. Indirect effects of direct democracy# y contrast# refer to differences in policies that do not depend on the success of a popular vote on a given proposal< they concern the changes in legislative ehavior through the anticipation of the possi le use of direct democratic procedures )see (owler and 5onovan *++?# Ger er and 9ug *++7/. 5irect and indirect effects of direct democratic institutions often interact in comple$ and su tle ways and sometimes may even cancel each other out. >rom an empirical perspective# it is conse'uently e$tremely difficult to ma%e a distinction etween them and study them separately )Ger er and 9ug *++7/. 3e focus here on direct effects and discuss the indirect effects in the ne$t section. Eegarding the study of direct democracy=s direct effects# scholars often center their research on the 'uestion of whether initiative and referendum lead to etter or to worse decisions and outcomes. Is direct democracy desira le or notB This is an essential 'uestion that has een e$tensively addressed in the literature# going to the very heart of the direct democracy de ate# dividing the proponents of participatory democracy and proponents of representative democracy into two opposing camps. "mong these studies we find those that attempted to assess the 'uality of pu lic decisions in terms of the economic success that a given political unit has had# i.e. they use economic indicators to measure direct democracy=s effect on the political system. >or Switzerland# a num er of authors have conducted comparisons at the cantonal and local level and found a eneficial effect of direct democratic institutions in that they would 2 through the more direct control 2 lead to etter macro!economic performance# lower pu lic de t# lower pu lic e$penditures in general and lower health e$penditures in particular# lower levels of ta$ evasion# and etter pu lic services )>eld and CirchgKssner *++7# >eld and Aatsusa%a *++D# >eld and Savioz 788:# CirchgKssner et al. 7888# >reitag and Latter *+++# @ommerehne 78:-# Latter *++*# Latter and EIefli *++D# 3agschal 788:/. (lom erg et al. )*++7/ also adopt a macroeconomic approach to studying the differences etween "merican states with and without a direct democratic system. The finding is that states with the initiative system e$perience faster growth in output per capita than those without# and that the same states perform etter in terms of pu lic spending# i.e. pu lic spending in these states is found to e less wasteful )see also Aatsusa%a 788./. Studies concluding that direct democracy has an overall eneficial effect on a country=s economy are challenged y scholars# such as (orner and Eentsch )788:/ whose research focuses on direct democracy=s effects on economic growth. "ccording to their theoretical argumentation and empirical findings# direct democratic instruments compromise the conditions that allow an economy to grow successfully. The e$istence of a direct democratic system would have a negative
D

impact on a country=s capacity to innovate and to adapt to changing circumstances< it would give interest groups the power to slow down reform processes and may even ena le them to render a coherent and consistent strategy impossi le. In this perspective# direct democracy is presented as a danger for sta le# foreseea le framewor% conditions. The primacy of popular sovereignty would lead to ar itrariness in state actions# and hinder the political system in the setting of clear priorities. The uncertainty related to such a political system would also negatively impact on a country=s e$ternal relations 2 another factor considered to e vital for the prosperity of a country=s economy. "s a particularly stri%ing e$ample in this conte$t (orner and Eentsch cite Switzerland=s re&ection of entering the 4uropean 4conomic "rea in 788*# which# according to them# can e traced ac% to the country=s institutional setting# i.e. Switzerland=s direct democratic system. The recent statistics! ased research is informed y theoretical models which consider the uncertainty on various aspects of the political process# with which the government and the legislature are confronted in a direct democratic system. Importantly# these models suggest that the effect of direct legislation on policy outcomes crucially depends on voter preferences# which conse'uently should e ta%en into consideration when studying direct democracy=s effects on pu lic policy. In contrast to the large num er of studies focusing on economic outcomes# studies of non!economic policies# which developed more recently# attempt to ma%e this lin% etween preferences and e$pected changes in policy conse'uences clearer y employing more direct measures of preferences ased on survey results )Ger er and 9ug *++7/. Ger er=s well!%nown studies )788; and 7888/ on the differences that e$ist etween US states with regard to particular sets of social policies are e$amples of such studies. Ger er finds that states with direct democratic e$perience are more li%ely to re'uire parental notification when minors see% a ortion and are more li%ely to use capital punishment. @lacing the focus on voter preferences also allows us to etter understand why effects of direct democratic procedures on pu lic policies may differ considera ly depending on the policy area under consideration# i.e. different policy issues may respond to direct democratic institutions in heterogeneous ways. Conte$t factors may play a %ey role. >or the area of defense policy# (Ihlmann et al. )*++;/ identify a num er of political# economic# and sociological factors as eing of importance in determining policy outcomes. These include< unemployment rate# proportion of foreign population# population density# religion# as well as the composition of the cantonal or municipal government )proportion of women# presence of right!center ma&ority/. 3ith regard to foreign policy# Sciarini and Aar'uis )*+++/ compare the process of voters= opinion formation in foreign policy with the process in domestic politics in general and find that while the process as such is not intrinsically different# foreign policy appears nevertheless as a particular case concerning the circumstances in which opinion formation ta%es place )higher level of conflict# higher intensity of campaign# different alignment within the party system/.?

>or details see 9ug and 9Kfliger )*++:/.

>or a detailed discussion on the particularity of foreign policy in the conte$t of the Swiss direct democracy de ate and its compara ility and interconnectedness with domestic politics# see 5elley )7888/. See also, Aar'uis )*++;/.

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010

"mong the scholars who highlight the importance of institutions in determining policy outcomes# there are those who point to particularities in the institutional framewor% as eing highly relevant. Starting from the criticism that most studies on direct democracy=s effect on policy have simply assumed that all initiatives are the same# (owler and 5onovan )*++?/ show that the impact of the initiative process varies depending on its specific design and use. They find that the initiative has a greater impact where it is easier to get a measure on the allot# where it can more easily circumvent the legislative process# and where it is used the most. "lso interesting in this conte$t is Criesi=s )*++./ finding that the two main direct democratic instruments e$isting in Switzerland#. the referendum and the popular initiative# differ in terms of the degree of impact they have< the referendum has een found to e more challenging for the government than the initiative# which is considera ly less successful in votes. The contri utions a ove ma%e it clear that the relationship etween policy# voters# legislatures# and institutions is highly comple$ )Ger er and 9ug *++7/. 5epending on the theoretical model employed and the empirical specification# these factors are attri uted different importance in e$plaining direct democracy=s effect on policy. The assessment of whether direct democracy has eneficial effects will therefore differ. This can# for instance# e illustrated y the e$ample of some of the studies cited in this section# which analyze direct democracy=s effect on government spending )e.g. >eld and Circhgaessner )*++7/# Aatsusa%a )788./ cited a ove/. >un% and Gathmann=s )*++;/ criticize these studies for omitting voter preferences in their analysis. "s a conse'uence of this omission the impact of institutions on policy!ma%ing would e overstated. >un% and Gathmann=s results demonstrate that oth voter preferences and the institutional framewor% matter for the size and scope of government )measured in terms of e$penditures/# ut that conditional on voter preferences# the effect of direct democracy declines y ?+P. 9ug and Tse elis )*++*/# further provide an analysis in which this comple$ relationship etween institutions and voter preferences is investigated into depth at the theoretical# as well as the empirical level. !ow direct democracy affects the political system ffects on the "ehavior of the le#islature The literature e$plicitly dealing with indirect effects of direct democracy is e$tensive and well developed for the Swiss case. " standard wor% on 0the institutional logic1 of direct democracy is Jeidhart=s )78:+/ treatise on the transformation of the Swiss Nple iscitary democracy= into a Nnegotiation democracy=. Jeidhart demonstrates how democratic institutions e$ert strong pressure on political actors to come up with compromise solutions. The veto power given to the people through the referendum forces the legislature to ta%e into account the citizens= preferences and to adapt their policies respectively.. The introduction of procedures to consult interest groups a out new legislation# as well as the e$istence of a grand coalition government at the federal level# in which the four ma&or Swiss political parties are represented )since 78.8/# illustrate the need for argaining in a direct democratic system.

Jeidhart=s argument has su se'uently een further developed and refined y other scholars )e.g. Immergut 788*/.; Indirect effects of direct democracy may ta%e different forms depending on the specific instrument under consideration. In a comparison of the Swiss cantons# Latter )*+++/ shows that optional referendums without a 'uorum of consent correspond to ma&oritarian forms of democracy# whereas mandatory referendums and initiatives with a 'uorum of consent share similarities with forms of power!sharing that are typical for consensus democracies.: Fther authors# such as 6inder )7888/# point out the contrasting effects of the two %ey devices of Swiss direct democracy< the referendum and the initiative. The referendum has een found to e an instrument that preserves the status 'uo )i.e. having a conservative effect/# whereas the initiative has a innovative effect# ringing new issues to the political agenda. >reitag and Latter )*++;/ investigate the 'uestion of whether direct citizen participation in politics act as a ra%e or as an accelerator with regard to fiscal e$pansion in Swiss cantons. Fn the asis of their pooled time!series analyses they can confirm the e$pected slowing down effect of the fiscal referendum# ut not the postulated accelerating effect of the initiative. 4mploying a comparative research design# a num er of 'uantitative studies confirm the 'ualitative research findings with regard to direct democracy=s indirect effects< that the simple threat of initiatives may influence how legislators ehave. 4vidence in this regard has# for e$ample# een provided y Ger er=s )7888/ study on the differences etween different U.S. states= a ortion policies# where it is shown that interest groups can indirectly influence policy outcomes y invo%ing the threat of an initiative to spur legislators into action. These %ind of indirect effects have een found to e relevant in a variety of additional policy areas# including the death penalty )Ger er 7888/# ta$ and spending )Aatsusa%a 788.# *+++# Schaltegger and >eld *++7/# and minority rights )Ger er and 9ug 7888/. ffects on political or#anizations @olitical parties have een found to adopt different strategies in response to the challenges in a direct democracy. Smith and Tol ert )*++?/ demonstrate that the use of initiatives in the United States is# amongst others# lin%ed to mo ilizing political parties )see also e.g. (owler and 5onovan 788-# Smith and Tol ert *++7/. They investigated political parties= strategic use of direct democracy and found clear evidence that political organizations use the process not only for instrumental ends# ut also to change and shape the electoral landscape y mo ilizing ase supporters# driving wedges into opposing coalitions# and draining the coffers of political opponents )Tol ert and Smith *++;/. In an empirical study of the *; Swiss cantons# 6adner and (rKndle )7888/ show that direct democracy in Switzerland functions hand in hand with more professional and formalized party organizations. This interesting finding is in opposition to the widely shared view in the literature that direct democracy wea%ens political parties 2 a view# for which de Lreese )*++;/ has provided empirical support in a recent study. 5e Lreese# investigating the
;

The empowering effect that direct democratic instruments can have on citizens is highlighted in >rey=s )788?/ study which portrays# initiatives and referenda as Oeffective means y which the voters can regain control over politiciansO< direct participation would serve to %eep the ultimate agenda!setting power with the voters.

>or a detailed discussion of how direct democracy affects the size and scope of government activity# see 3agschal )788:/# Latter )*+++/# and Latter and >reitag )*++:/. : 9e there y is a le to esta lish# theoretically and empirically# the connection etween direct democracy and 6i&phart=s )7888/ theory of the two competing democracy types# i.e. the ma&oritarian democracy and the concensus democracy )see also Latter and >reitag *++:/.

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010

challenges that political parties face in referendums# concludes that their control over outcomes and the electorate is considera ly restricted. 3hile political parties are still %ey actors in a referendum campaign# a num er of factors have een found to wea%en their position, am iguous cueing# internal dissidence# electoral volatility and limited impact on citizens= prime information sources all reduce the influence of political parties. Aoreover# he shows that smaller parties campaigning with a clear message and supported y a fairly homogeneous electoral segment are successful in aligning their voters with the party# while larger and roader political parties are less successful. To some e$tent this latter point is in line with the finding of @apadopoulos )7887/ who# in his study e$plicitly focusing on direct democracy=s effect on small parties in Switzerland# shows how right wing parties had een strengthened through the availa ility of direct democratic procedures. Eecent research in the Swiss conte$t confirms from a more general perspective the strengthening effect of direct democracy on political parties )see the studies y 9Qglinger *++- and Tresch *++-. @olitical parties= ehavior during campaigns 2 and the strategy of the political elite more specifically 2 has een found to play an important role regarding the outcome ofvotes# as well as participation rates. The results of Criesi=s )*++./ study suggest that a campaign=s intensity# which reflects the mo ilization effort y the political elite# is very important in view of the 'uality of the citizens= voting choice. " general finding of various studies is that consensus within the political elite is decisive for the outcome of a vote )e.g. >reire and (aum *++D# Aar'uis *++;/. Consensual strategies y the elite have een found to allow for a certain control over the effects of direct democratic instruments )Trechsel *+++/. In the case of a division within the political elite# this control is considera ly diminished. (y controlling the intensity of the campaign# the elites determine to a great e$tent the level of participation y the citizens. Thus# mo ilization y the elite during the campaign preceding the vote increases oth the citizens= capacity to vote and their motivation to do so )Criesi *++./. This positive effect that direct democracy can have on voter turnout )see also (aran%ay et al. *++D a ove/# which is considered to e a particularly important educative effect# could also e confirmed for the U.S. conte$t )5onovan and Smith *++?# A. Smith *++7/. Eesearch finds that the e$istence of direct democratic procedures# and the presence of the initiative in particular# increases political participation in low!profile mid!term elections )e.g. A. Smith *++7/ as well as in higher!profile presidential elections )Tol ert and Smith *++./. In line with Criesi=s )*++./ findings Smith )*++7/ argues that campaign efforts 2 in com ination with salient propositions 2 can increase the turnout.>urthermore# citizens living in places with direct democratic e$perience have een found to e more li%ely to contri ute to citizen interest groups )Smith and Tol ert *++?/. "ccording to (oehm%e=s )*++*/ findings# the e$istence of the initiative process potentially increases the num er of interest groups active in a state.8 In his comparative analysis of the *? Swiss
8

cantons# >reitag )*++;/ also arrives at the conclusion that having direct democracy in place promotes a lively associational life. >reitag highlights the importance of this finding with regard to the concept of social capital and the latter=s relevance to the functioning of a democracy, direct democratic procedures# together with an inclusive government coalition and a high degree of local autonomy are political institutions that are eneficial to the creation of social capital. 9e sees in these institutions the asis for a feasi le Ntop!down= solution to escape the vicious circle of distrust# disengagement and wea% democracy# from which entities lac%ing social capital suffer )see @utnam 788D, 77:/. ffects on the #eneral democratic functionin# and support There are studies demonstrating that political efficacy is enhanced y direct democratic procedures )(owler and 5onovan *++*# 9ero and Tol ert *++?# Aendelsohn and Cutler *+++/. Aoreover# a large num er of scholars confirm that democratic procedures have eneficial effects on the political process as a whole. Fn the asis of the Swiss e$perience# @apadopoulos )*++7/ esta lishes# for instance# that direct democratic institutions have an integrative and legitimizing function. "llowing citizens to directly participate in decision! ma%ing appears to lead to the acceptance of collective decisions and in doing so contri utes to the sta ilization and the legitimization of a democratic polity )see also @apadopoulos 788-/. Eelated to this legitimization function# >rey and Stutzer )*++*/ find that people living in Swiss cantons where the direct democratic system is more developed are happier and more satisfied. They argue that this greater satisfaction does not only result from the higher level of pu lic performance# ut that it is also a direct conse'uence of the greater legitimacy of pu lic decisions made in direct democratic procedures. >rey and Stutzer succeed in empirically separating these two effects# the effects of direct!democratic institutions on pu lic performance and their purely procedural effects 2 and are# thus# a le to confirm their hypotheses. They find that the opportunity for direct!democratic participation does indeed have a direct effect on the general life!satisfaction of Swiss citizens ! an effect which is highly ro ust. The relationship etween cantonal direct democracy and perceived su &ective well! eing in Switzerland has een re!evaluated and challenged y different contri utions# such studies y 5orn et al. )*++-/ and >ischer )*++./. >ischer shows that the results are pro lematic since they are not reproduci le with other data# and that the empirical analyses themselves cause crucial pro lems of inference. Using new data from the Swiss 9ousehold @anel# 5orn et al. find that once language is controlled for# no ro ust significant relationship etween the e$tent of direct democracy and life!satisfaction can e o served# and that direct democracy does not affect well! eing within language groups in Switzerland. >urthermore# Latter )*+++/ highlights the potential of popular rights as Oeffective and sensitive instruments for conflict regulationO and their potential contri ution to the Ogeneral improvement of democratic functioningO# which is particularly relevant for highly developed societies# characterized y Oheterogeneity and polyvalence of political groups and su culturesO in densely populated ur an areas )see also Trechsel and Criesi 788;# Latter *+++, 7-.!-:/.

Tol ert and Smith )*++./# p. *8; >or a more detailed overview on the literature on educative effects# see Tol ert and Smith )*++./# Tol ert and Smith )*++;/# or Smith and

Tol ert )*++:/.

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010

Does direct democracy "enefit the many or the few? In the scope of the discussion on the eneficial or non! eneficial effect of direct democracy# some scholars focus on the 'uestion of whether direct democracy enefits the many# meaning citizens# or the few# meaning special interest groups. " possi le way to approach the 'uestion# which has een the focus of several studies# is to evaluate how close the correspondence is etween citizens= preferences and policy outcomes in political entities with# and without referendums or initiatives. "lmost all theoretical models conceived to study direct democratic instruments )including (esley and Coate *++7# 5enzau# Aac%ay and 3eaver 78-7# Ger er 788;# 9ug *++?# Aatsusa%a and AcCarty *++7# Eomer and Eosenthal 78:8# and Steunen erg 788?/ come to the conclusion that if a particular political entity has a system of direct democracy# policy outcomes should reflect more closely the preferences of citizens than in entities without such a system. The empirical evidence# however# is mi$ed. "mong the scholars who share the view that direct democracy favors special interest groups over the general population# we find the Swiss economist (orner )(orner et al. 788+# (orner and Eentsch 788:/# who argues that the referendum as well as the initiative# rather than eing instruments of the people as a whole# mainly serve organized interests and promote rent!see%ing ehavior. "ccording to (orner# through the e$istence of direct democratic procedures# small interest groups are e given a veto power and are in a position to e$ert direct influence on political processes. "s a conse'uence# the state=s capacity to act is considera ly restricted or completely loc%ed. Fther scholars that criticize direct democratic institutions for iasing policies toward the preferences of interest groups include (roder )*+++/# Schrag )788-/# and Smith )788-/. (roder for instance# not only fears that direct democracy ris%s eing transformed from a tool of the regular citizen to an instrument of special interest groups )see also Ger er=s )7888/ 0populist parado$1/# ut argues that y opening the door to demagogues and influential and wealthy interest groups and individuals# direct democracy has evolved to ecome a threat to "merica=s representative democratic system. Fther researchers who challenge the general assumption that direct democratic processes lead to pu lic policy that etter reflects mass preferences are scholars# such as Camo reco )788-/# 9agen et al. )*++7/# and 6ascher et al. )788;/# who empirically show that direct democratic institutions have no significant positive influence with regard to the recognition of citizens= preferences )Aatsusa%a *++7, 7/. >rom a theoretical perspective# however 2 as has een noted y 9ug and 9Kfliger )*++:/ 2 very narrow assumptions have to e made in order to o tain models that predict policy outcomes that are iased toward the will of special interest groups )9ug *++?# Aatsusa%a and AcCarty *++7/. In the same study# 9ug and 9Kfliger ma%e the o servation that despite the wealth of theoretical models which e$ist on this topic# empirical studies which test for this specific theoretical implication are rather scarce. "mong them# we find Ger er )788;/# Ger er )7888/# 9ug )*++?/# Aatsusa%a )*++?/# and Aatsusa%a )*++;/. The authors have two e$planations for the scarcity of empirical analyses in this specific research area. >irstly# researchers have encountered difficulty in o taining good information on the preferences of voters in the policy areas under e$amination# and secondly# sophisticated empirical models are needed that allow

for un iased inferences and a correct assessment of whether referendums lead to policies more closely reflecting the voter preferences. Eegarding the latter point# it is important to distinguish cases where policy outcomes can e measured dichotomously )e.g. presence or a sence of a policy/# and cases where policy outcomes are continuous. >or dichotomous policy outcomes# a simple empirical model can e ade'uate )such as a correctly specified inary response model or a simple comparison of voter preferences and outcomes/# ut this is not possi le when policy outcomes are continuous. This point was made y 9ug )*++7/ and Aatsusa%a )*++7/# who have oth proposed possi le solutions to this analytical challenge. In agreement with the large ma&ority of the theoretical models# Aatsusa%a )*++?/ finds that it is mainly the many# the citizens# who enefit from the direct democratic process and not the few# i.e. the special interests. "fter assem ling and analyzing ta$ and spending data to determine initiatives= effects on policies# Aatsusa%a compared these policies with the e$pressed preferences of citizens derived from previously e$amined opinion data. The 'uestion of who enefits from direct democracy presents a special twist with regard to countries with a dominating political ma&ority and one or several minorities. Latter )*+++/ presents direct democratic procedures as su stitute power! sharing instruments for minorities that are not sufficiently integrated. 9e provides empirical evidence that optional referendums and initiatives are used more readily y underrepresented minorities where the political system is less consensual# and they therefore serve as alternative instruments of power distri ution. In contrast to studies that shine a positive light on direct democracy=s integrating function# Gam le )788:/ states in her analysis on civil rights initiatives in the United States for the period etween 78.8 and 788D# that the political ma&ority has repeatedly used direct democracy to put the rights of political minorities to a popular vote# and that anti!civil rights initiatives Ohave an e$traordinary record of successO )Gam le 788:, *;7/. The 'uestion of whether direct democracy is eneficial or detrimental to minorities is also of special interest in ethnically divided societies. 9a&nal et al. )*++*/ respond to critics that Oargue that direct legislation allows an electoral ma&ority to undermine the interests and rights of racial and ethnic minoritiesO. They conclude their analysis of direct democracy outcomes in California etween 78:- and *+++ y stating that there is Olittle overall anti!minority ias in the system of direct democracyO )9a&nal et al. *++*, 7.?# 7:?/. Their study shows that critics have overstated the negative impact of direct democracy y narrowly focusing on one# or a few minority!targeted initiatives. In the de ate on how minority rights fare in direct democracy votes )see also Ger er and 9ug 7888# 9aider!Aar%el *++:/# the &ury is still out. 3e can now turn to the 'uestion of what role money plays in direct democratic votes# since this 'uestion can also e lin%ed to the discussion of who enefits from direct democracy. $hat role does money play? Aany scholars have attempted to measure the effect of money on direct democratic votes. 4arly contri utions in this research field# li%e the study written y Aagle y )78-?/# compare passage rates for small samples of initiatives in which one side clearly outspent the other# to passage rates where spending was roughly e'ual )see also 6ee 78:-# 6owenstein 78-*# Fwens and
Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010 &

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

3ade 78-;# Shoc%ley 78-+# and Zis% 78-:/. The results indicate that heavy spending against a proposition tends to lead to the proposition=s defeat# whereas heavy spending supporting a proposition has a minimal effect )6upia and Aatsusa%a *++?/. This general finding has een confirmed y more recent studies# which were a le to employ more sophisticated techni'ues. Ger er )7888/ for instance# estimates regressions for a sample of 7*. propositions in eight "merican states in order to assess the effect of spending in favor and against a measure on the measure=s success )it is controlled for the type of spending and other varia les/.7+ In line with the earlier contri utions# her analysis shows that spending against a proposition has a large and statistically relevant negative effect on its li%elihood to e passed# whereas spending in favor of the proposition has a small and rather insignificant effect. Ger er concludes that 0the empirical evidence provides further asis for re&ecting the allegation that economic interest groups uy policy outcomes through the direct legislation process1 2 a conclusion that finds further support in a related wor% y (owler and 5onovan )788-/. In contrast to these studies stands the wor% y "merican &ournalist (roder )*+++/. Claiming that money has a significant impact oth on whether an initiative is passed or fails# (roder argues that interest groups who spend significantly more will win. The results of his descriptive study agree with scholarly research# which has shown that interest group contri utions do have an impact on the outcome of allots )4llis *++*# Schrag 788-# Smith 788-/. (roder )*+++/ holds the view that in the past )the @rogressive era/# citizen groups controlled the process and that democracy was derailed due to the passage of time. Fver time# grassroots campaigns turned into a lucrative political industry# with a lot of money involved. In this manner# he promotes an idealized vision of direct democracy as it was in the past. This view has een challenged y the evidence provided in "llswang=s )*+++/ study on the California allot# in which he evaluates all the initiatives and referendums from 787* to 788-. (y placing the direct democratic instruments into a historical conte$t# "llswang tries to further a etter understanding of their contemporary use. 9e finds that the U.S. direct legislation politics in the past display a strong similarity to those of the present regarding various aspects# including the role that money plays. (ased on historical e$amples he is a le to show that the money spent y organized economic interest groups played a crucial role from the eginning. In a comprehensive review of the contri utions to the 'uestion of what role money plays in direct democratic votes in the "merican conte$t# 6upia and Aatsusa%a )*++?/ conclude that money matters# ut in a nuanced way. They emphasize that the evidence on spending also indicates that the initiative process does not necessarily lead to policies that are contrary to the positions of the ma&ority. In the a sence of pree$isting pu lic support# the financial resources of usiness groups would e ineffective in changing the status 'uo. Aoreover# the financial resources of the ma&ority of citizen groups would e too scarce to ring a out a decisive change.

" recent study y Stratmann )*++;/ voices some general criticism regarding the literature that e$amines the importance of campaign spending in terms of their impact on the success or defeat of allot measures. 9e points out that the methods# as for instance used y Ger er )7888/# do not control for the endogeneity of interest group campaigning. Groups may spend strategically# depending on the e$pected outcome of the allot measure. Stratmann addresses this methodological challenge y suggesting a research design that allows for controlling of voter preferences and initiative particulars# and is thus a le to show that not only opposing# ut also supporting interest groups= campaigning has a 'uantitatively important and statistically significant influence on allot measure outcomes. In addressing the 'uestion of the role of money in direct democratic systems# we have so far concentrated on the studies# written in the conte$t of "merican politics# which constitute the ul% of the literature with regard to this specific 'uestion. In the literature on the Swiss direct democratic system# the role of money# although eing an important su &ect# does not receive the same level of attention. It is still worth mentioning a num er of valua le contri utions that have een made in this conte$t. Criesi )*++./ for instance# finds that the overall relationship etween the direction of campaign spending and the outcome of the vote in Switzerland is rather wea%. 9e e$plains that this surprising result is partly due to the fact that initiatives# for which the campaigns in Switzerland are much more intensive than for referenda# are almost always re&ected y the government and virtually always fail to pass in at the allot. 3hen anticipating a close vote# the government=s camp invests large sums in the campaign against the initiatives# and is in most cases a le to impose itself against its challengers. >or the referenda# it has een found that the overall relationship etween the direction of spending and the outcome of the vote is closer than for initiatives# ut is still relatively wea%. The reason for this is that the minorities challenging the government=s pro&ect y an optional referendum invest in their cause# no matter whether they anticipate a close vote or not. In his study# Criesi has een a le however# to discern one situation in which the direction of investment in a campaign ecomes decisive. In the case of referenda that are highly contested# the side that is a le to mo ilize more resources during the course of the campaign will virtually always impose itself against the other camp. This result supports in a very specific conte$t the general conclusion of 9ertig )78-*/# who maintains that money plays a decisive role in influencing the results of a vote# and that in theory# it is possi le to uy the outcome of a vote in Switzerland. " note of caution has to e added however on such general statements on the effect of spending in Switzerland# as made y 9ertig, in oth wor%s cited# it is not information on campaign spending as such that is used# ut pro$ies are employed.

%onclusion
The literature reviewed in this article included for the most part oo%s and articles written on the "merican and Swiss e$perience with direct democracy. This reflects the general research concentration that e$ists in the field. 9owever# the introduction and more fre'uent use of direct democratic procedures in more recently esta lished democracies such as in the post!communist countries of 4astern 4urope leads to a new dynamic and offers ground for new studies. The insights gained from the direct democratic e$perience in the 0older1
Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010 '

7+

In her analysis# she e$amines the effects of contri utions from economic groups who she defined as groups that are rich ut have a small mem ership ase# and of citizen groups displaying the opposite characteristics.

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

democracies can serve as a useful asis for continuing academic wor%# as well as for policy!ma%ing in these countries. This review also highlights the need to e cautious with regard to generalizing findings gained in a specific conte$t. (y studying the literature on the "merican and Swiss case more in detail# it was possi le to carve out important differences. The study of the role of money in direct democratic votes and the 'uestion of who direct democratic systems enefit 2 the many or the few 2 are e$tensively treated in the literature on the "merican case# whereas we cannot find the same interest in these 'uestions on the part of the authors studying the Swiss direct democratic system. This can e e$plained y the differences that e$ist etween the direct democratic systems in the two countries. Conse'uently# for a comprehensive understanding of the functioning and the effects of direct democracy# it does not suffice to narrowly focus on studying the direct democratic instruments as such. It is important to open the scope of research and to ta%e into account the igger conte$t in which direct democratic procedures are placed# including the general institutional framewor%# the strategies of political elites# and voter preferences# as well as economic and sociological conte$t factors. The leading scholars on direct democracy whose oo%s and articles have een reviewed here give an overall picture of direct democratic procedures and their conse'uences# which is somewhat positive. This optimistic view can e illustrated y the answers the scholars found to the four 0old1 'uestions. Eecent research has demonstrated that voters are more competent and the relationship etween money and power is less nefarious than has een suggested. >urthermore# direct democracy has een found to potentially enhance citizens= political interest and competence. Fther evidence shows that the e$istence and use of direct democratic procedures lead to pu lic policy that is more responsive to voter preferences. 5espite the important num er of wor%s highlighting the eneficial effects of direct democracy# the empirical evidence is nevertheless mi$ed. The sometimes even contradicting results of studies on direct democracy are also a conse'uence of the fact that the relationship etween direct democratic institutions# policy# voter preferences# and further relevant varia les is highly comple$# and that these factors= respective roles in determining policy outcomes is difficult to assess. 5epending on the approach ta%en and the emphasis laid on different factors and how they are lin%ed to each other# results may considera ly differ. Eeviewing the literature# we have found a general consensus that direct democracy affects policy 2 directly and indirectly 2 and furthermore# has an impact on the political system as a whole. "s regards direct policy conse'uences of direct democracy# scholars have identified potentially positive effects# such as etter macro!economic performance and etter pu lic services etc.# as well as less eneficial effects such as slower economic growth# inconsistent and incoherent policies. In contrast# research on direct democracy=s indirect policy conse'uences generally refers to changes in the attitudes and ehavior of political actors# including the legislature# political parties# and citizens. Studies on more general influences on the political system# such as a potentially sta ilizing and integrating effect of direct democratic procedures# form an additional strand within the literature. "s nature of the research topic is highly comple$# the answers to the 'uestion of how direct democracy affects policy are often diverse and comple$

themselves. Jevertheless# all of the implications resulting from direct democratic institutions prove to e interesting and worth loo%ing into. 3ith the rise of the use of direct democratic procedures within states ut also cross!nationally# the study of direct democracy will continue to e a dynamic field of research that is of high relevance and interest.

&eferences
"imer# @eter and Eaymond Ailler. *++*. 0@artisanship and @rinciple, Loters and the Jew Zealand 4lectoral Eeferendum of 788D.0 European Journal of Political Research, ?7);/, :8.!-7+# doi,7+.7777M7?:.! ;:;..t+7!7!+++D*. "llswang# Rohn A. *+++. The initiative and referendum in California, 1898-1998. Stanford, Stanford University @ress. "r$# von Jicolas. *++*. hnlich, aber anders !ie "ol#sinitiative in $alifornien und in der %ch&ei'. (asel, 9el ing und 6ichtenhahn. "uer# "ndreas and Aichael (Itzer )eds/. *++7. !irect !emocrac( The Eastern and Central European E)perience. "ldershot, "shgate. "uer# "ndreas )ed./. 788;. *es ori+ines de la d,mocratie directe en %uisse. (asel, 9el ling und 6ichtenhahn. (aran%ay# Iwan# Sciarini# @ascal and "le$ander Trechsel. *++D. 0Institutional Fpenness and the Use of Eeferendums and @opular Initiatives. 4vidence >rom Swiss Cantons.1 %&iss Political %cience Revie& 8# 7;8 ! 788. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.ingentaconnect.comMcontentMspsaMspsrM*++DM+++++++8M++++ +++7Mart++++:BcrawlerStrue. (ar er# (en&amin E. 78-?. %tron+ !emocrac( Participator( Politics for a -e& .+e. (er%eley, University of California @ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidS*T evnCU"hgC. (esley# Timothy and Stephen Coate. *++7. OIssue Un undling via CitizensV Initiatives.O San "ntonio, @aper prepared for presentation at the "nnual Aeeting of the @u lic Choice Society# Aarch 8!7*# doi,7+.7.;7M7++.++++-+.8. (oehm%e# >rederic% R. *++*. WThe 4ffect of 5irect 5emocracy on the Size and 5iversity of State Interest Group @opulations.0 Journal of Politics# ;? )D/, -*:!??# doi,7+.7777M++**!D-7;.++7?-. (lom erg S. (roc%# Gregory 5. 9ess# and "%ila 3eerapana. *++7. The impact of voter initiatives on economic activit(. 3ellesley College 3or% @ap. *++7!+:# doi,7+.*7D8Mssrn.*--?*8. (orner# Silvio and 9ans Eentsch. 788:. /ieviel dire#te !emo#ratie vertr0+t die %ch&ei'1 Chur, Euegger. (orner# Silvio# "ymo (runetti# and Thomas Strau haar. 788+. %ch&ei' .23 "om %onderfall 'um %anierun+sfall1 Lerlag JZZ, ZIrich. (owler# Shaun. *++*. 0Eeview. Eeviewed wor%, The (attle over Citizen 6awma%ing, " Collection of 4ssays y A. 5ane 3aters1. The Journal of Politics# ;? )7/, *-.!*-:. (owler# Shaun# and Todd 5onovan. *++?. 0Aeasuring the effect of direct democracy on state policy, Jot all initiatives are created e'ual.1 %tate Politics and Polic( 4uarterl(, ? )D/, D?.!;D. (owler# Shaun# and Todd 5onovan. *++*. 05emocracy# Institutions# and "ttitudes a out Citizen Influence on Government1 5ritish Journal of Political %cience, D*, D:7!8+# doi,7+.7+7:MS+++:7*D?+*+++7.:. (owler# Shaun# and Todd 5onovan. 788-. !emandin+ Choices 6pinion, "otin+, and !irect !emocrac(. "nn "r or, University of Aichigan @ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidSRXyfa5f43LAC. (owler# Shaun# Todd 5onovan# and Caroline R. Tol ert )eds/. 788-. Citi'ens as *e+islators !irect !emocrac( in the 7nited %tates. Colum us, Fhio State University @ress. (roder# 5avid S. *+++. !emocrac( !erailed 8nitiative Campai+ns and the Po&er of 9one(. Jew Tor%, 9arcourt. (udge# Ian. 788;. The -e& Challen+e of !irect !emocrac(. Cam ridge# A", @olity @ress. (udge# Ian. 788D. 05irect democracy, setting appropriate terms for de ate.1 Prospects for !emocrac(, ed. 5avid 9eld. Cam ridge, @olity

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010

10

@ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.chM oo%sB idS+.ea""""I""R. (Ihlmann# Aarc# >ritz Sager# and "drian Latter. *++;. "erteidi+un+spoliti# in der dire#ten !emo#ratie eine .nal(se der sicherheits- und milit0rpolitischen .bstimmun+en in der %ch&ei' '&ischen 198: und ;::<. ZIrich, EIegger. (undeszentrale fIr politische (ildung )ed./. *++;. W"us @oliti% und Zeitgeschichte.0 (eilage zur Zeitung !as Parlament3 (onn. (utler# 5avid and "ustin Eanney. 788?. Referendums around the /orld The 2ro&in+ 7se of !irect !emocrac(. 6ondon, Aacmillan. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.chM oo%sB idSGUL!9>n%Y8wC. (Itzer Aichael. *++:. !ire#te !emo#ratie in %ch&ei'er %t0dten 7rsprun+, .us+estaltun+ und 2ebrauch im "er+leich. (aden!(aden, Jomos. (Itzer# Aichael# and 6ionel Aar'uis. *++*. W@u lic Fpinion >ormation in Swiss >ederal Eeferendums.0 !o Political Campai+ns 9atter1 Campai+n Effects in Elections and Referendums# eds. 5avid A. >arrell and EIdiger Schmitt!(ec%. 6ondon, Eoutledge# pp. 7;D!-*. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.chM oo%sB idS:@X8oTcX9i?C. Cain# (ruce 4.# Eussel R. 5alton and Susan 4. Scarrow )eds./. *++D. !emocrac( Transformed1 E)pandin+ Political 6pportunities in .dvanced 8ndustrial !emocracies. F$ford and Jew Tor%# J.T., F$ford University @ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.chM oo%sBidSRDu(so4"gi"C. Camo reco# Rohn (. 788-. 0@references# >iscal @olicies# and Initiative @rocess3= Journal of Politics# ;+, -78!*8. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.&stor.orgMsta leM*;?:;.+. Christin# Thomas# 9ug# Simon and @ascal Sciarini. *++*. 0Interests and information in referendum voting, "n analysis of Swiss voters.0 European Journal of Political Research# ?7, :.8!::;# doi,7+.7777M7?:.!;:;..t+7!7!+++D+. Christin# Thomas and Simon 9ug. *++*. 0Eeferendums and Citizen Support for 4uropean Integration.1 Comparative Political %tudies# D.)./, .-;!;7-# doi,7+.77::M++7+?7?++*+D.++.++?. Clar%e# 9arold 5.# "llan Corn erg# and Aarianne C. Stewart. *++?. 0Eeferendum Loting as @olitical Choice, The Case of Xue ec1# 5ritish Journal of Political %cience, D?, D?.!..# doi,7+.7+7:MS+++:7*D?+?++++8*. Cronin# Thomas 4. 78-8. !irect !emocrac( The Politics of 8nitiative, Referendum, and Recall. Cam ridge# A", Cam ridge University @ress. 5elley# Rean!5aniel )ed./. 7888. !,mocratie directe et politi>ue ,tran+?re en %uisse. (asel# Geneva Zetc.[ , 9el ing \ 6ichtenhahn. 5enver# 5. *++*. 0Loting in the 788: Scottish and 3elsh 5evolution Eeferendums, Information# Interests and Fpinions.0 European Journal of Political Research, ? );/, -*:!??# doi,7+.7777M7?:.!;:;..+++D?. 5e Lreese# Claes 9. *++;. 0@olitical parties in dire straitsB Conse'uences of national referendums for political parties.1 Part( Politics# 7* )./, .-7!.8-# doi,7+.77::M7D.?+;--+;+;;:-:. 5enzau# "rthur# Eo ert Aac%ay and Carolyn 6. 3eaver. 78-7. 0Fn the Initiative Eeferendum Fption and the Control of Aonopoly Government1. Ta) and E)penditure *imitations# eds. 9elen >. 6add and T. Jicolaus Tideman. 3ashington, The Ur an Institute @ress# pp. 787! ***. 5onovan# Todd and 5aniel. ". Smith. *++?. OTurning on and turning out, "ssessing the indirect effects of allot measures on voter participation.O @aper presented at the >ourth "nnual Conference on State @olitics and @olicy# Cent State University# Cent# F9# "pril D+! Aay *. 5orn# 5avid# >ischer# Rustina# CirchgKssner# Ge hard# and "lfonso Sousa!@oza# *++-. W5irect democracy and life satisfaction revisited, new evidence for Switzerland.0 Rournal of 9appiness Studies. Springer# 8 )*/, **:!*..# doi,7+.7++:Ms7+8+*!++:!8+.+!8. 4agly# "lice 9.# and Shelly Chai%en. 788D. The Ps(cholo+( of .ttitudes. Jew Tor%, 9arcourt (race Rovanovich. 4llis# Eichard R. *++*. !emocratic !elusions The 8nitiative Process in .merica. 6awrence, University of Cansas @ress.

>eld# 6ars @. and Rohn G. Aatsusa%a. *++D. 1(udget Eeferendums and Government Spending, 4vidence from Swiss Cantons.1 Journal of Public Economics# -:, *:+D!*?# doi,7+.7+7;MS++?:!*:*:)+*/++7?+!-. >eld# 6ars @.# and Ge hard CirchgKssner. *++7. 05oes 5irect 5emocracy Eeduce @u lic 5e tB 4vidence from Swiss Aunicipalities#1 Public Choice, 7+8, D?:!:+# doi,7+.7+*DM",7+7D+::7*78?*. >eld# 6ars @. and Aarcel E. Savioz. 788:. 05irect 5emocracy Aatters for 4conomic @erformance, "n 4mpirical Investigation.0 $(#los, .+, .+:!D-# doi,7+.7777M&.7?;:!;?D..788:.t +7D+7.$. >erraiolo# Cathleen. *++:. 0@reserving the initiative, State legislative response to direct democracy3@ Polit(# D8 )?/,?*.2??-# doi,7+.7+.:Mpalgrave.polity.*D+++-:. >ischer# Rustina ".L. *++.. The 8mpact of !irect !emocrac( on %ociet(. (am erg, 5ifo! 5ruc% Gm 9. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww. i lio.unisg.chMwwwMedis.nsfMwww5isplayIdentifierMD+:?M] >I64MdisD+:?.pdf. >reire# "ndr^ and Aichael ". (aum. *++D. 0Eeferenda Loting in @ortugal# 788-, The 4ffects of @arty Sympathies# Social Structure# and @ressure Groups1# European Joural of Political Research, ?* )7/, 7D.! ;7# doi,7+.7777M7?:.!;:;..+++:-. >reitag# Aar%us and Uwe 3agschal. *++:. !ire#te !emo#ratie3 5estandsaufnahmen und /ir#un+en im internationalen "er+leich3 AInchen, 6IT. >reitag# Aar%us und "drian Latter. *++;. 0(owling the State (ac% in, @olitical Institutions and the Creation of Social Capital.1 European Journal of Political Research# ?.)7/, 7*D!7.*# 7+.7777M&.7?:.! ;:;..*++..++*8D.$. >reitag# Aar%us und "drian Latter. *+++. W5ire%te 5emo%ratie# Con%ordanz und 3irtschaftsleistung. 4in Lergleich der Schweizer Cantone.0 %ch&ei'erische Aeitschrift fBr "ol#s&irtschaft und %tatisti## 7D; )?/, .:8!;+;. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.s&es.chMpapersM*+++!IL!..pdf. >rey# (runo S. and "lois Stutzer. *++*. Cappiness and Economics Co& the Econom( and 8nstitutions .ffect Cuman /ell-5ein+. @rinceton# JR, @rinceton University @ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidS>a!Dg&zdh5cC. >rey# (runo. 788?. 05irect 5emocracy, @olitico!4conomic 6essons from Swiss 4$perience.1 .merican Economic Revie& -?, DD-!D?*. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.&stor.orgMsta leM*77:-... >un%# @atricia and Christina Gathmann. *++;. 14stimating the 4ffect of 5irect 5emocracy on @olicy Futcomes, @references Aatter_1 @aper presented atthe annual meeting of the Aidwest @olitical Science "ssociation# @almer 9ouse 9ilton# Chicago# Illinois. http,MMpapers.ssrn.comMsolDMpapers.cfmBa stractYidS:-???; Gallagher# Aichael and @ier Lincenzo Uleri )eds./. 788;. The Referendum E)perience in Europe. 6ondon, Aacmillan. Gam le# (ar ara. 788:. 0@utting Civil Eights to a @opular Lote.1 .merican Journal of Political %cience ?7 )7/, *?.!*;8. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.&stor.orgMsta leM*777:7.. Ger er# 4lisa eth E. 7888. The Populist Parado) 8nterest 2roup 8nfluence and the Promise of !irect *e+islation. @rinceton# JR, @rinceton University @ress. Ger er# 4lisa eth E. and Simon 9ug. 7888. 9inorit( Ri+hts and !irect *e+islation3 Theor(, 9ethods and Evidence3 6a Rolla, University of California# San 5iego. Ger er# 4lisa eth E. 788;. 06egislative Eesponse to the Threat of @opular Initiatives.0 .merican Journal of Political %cience, ?+)7/,88! 7*-. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.&stor.orgMsta leM*777;8;. Ger er# 4lisa eth and Simon 9ug. *++7. 06egislative Eesponse to 5irect 6egislation.1 Referendum !emocrac(# eds. A. Aendelsohn and ". @ar%in3 Jew Tor%, @algrave. 9agen# Aichael G.# 4dward 6. 6ascher# Rr.# and Rohn >. Camo reco. *++7. 0Eesponse to Aatsusa%a, 4stimating the 4ffect of (allot Initiatives on @olicy Eesponsiveness.0 Journal of Politics, ;D,7*.:!;D# doi,7+.7777M++**!D-7;.++77+. 9aider!Aar%el# 5onald @.# "lana Xuerze# and Cara 6indaman. *++:. 06ose# 3in# or 5rawB " Eee$amination of 5irect 5emocracy and

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010

11

Ainority Eights.1 Political Research 4uarterl( ;+)*/,D+?!D7?# doi,7+.77::M7+;.87*8+:D+78-?. 9a&nal# Zoltan# Ger er# 4lisa eth and 9ugh 6ough. *++*. 0Ainorities and 5irect 6egislation, 4vidence from California (allot @roposition 4lections.1 Journal of Politics ;? )7/, 7.?!7::# doi,7+.7777M7?;-! *.+-.++7**. 9eld# 5avid. *++;3 9odels of !emocrac( Drd edition. Cam ridge# A", @olity @ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidSXTLZDT&6+!UC. 9eld# 5avid. 78-:. 9odels of !emocrac(. Cam ridge# A", @olity @ress. 9ero# Eodney 4.# and Caroline R. Tol ert. *++?. 0Ainority Loices and Citizen "ttitudes a out Government Eesponsiveness in the "merican States, 5o Social and Institutional Conte$t AatterB1 5ritish Journal of Political %cience, D?, 7+8!*7# doi,7+.7+7:MS+++:7*D?+D+++D:7. 9ertig# 9ans!@eter. 78-*. WSind " stimmungserfolge %KuflichB 4lemente der Aeinungs ildung ei eidgenQssischen " stimmungen.0 %ch&ei'erisches Jahrbuch fBr Politische /issenschaften# **, D.2.:. 9igley# Rohn and Ian Ac"llister. *++*. 04lite 5ivision and Loter Confusion, "ustralia=s Eepu lic Eeferendum in 7888.0 European Journal of Political Research, ?7 );/, -?.!;D# doi,7+.7777M7?:.! ;:;..t+7!7!+++D.. 9oeglinger# 5ominic. *++-. OLerschafft die dire%te 5emo%ratie den (enachteiligten mehr GehoerB 5er 4influss institutioneller Eahmen edingungen auf die mediale @raesenzO politischer "%teure. %&iss Political %cience Revie&# 7?)*/, *+:!*?D. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.ingentaconnect.comMcontentMspsaMspsrM*++-M++++++7?M++++ +++*Mart++++7BcrawlerStrue. 9ug# Simon and Ursula 9Kfliger. *++:. O@olicy Conse'uences of Eeferendums in Switzerland.O @aper presented at the International Conference on 5irect 5emocracy in 6atin "merica# (uenos "ires# "rgentina# Aarch 7?!7.. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.dd!la.chMdownloadM9ugYSimon.pdf. 9ug# Simon. *++?. 0Fccurrence and @olicy Conse'uences of Eeferendums, " Theoretical Aodel and 4mpirical 4vidence.0 Journal of Theoretical Politics, 7;, D*7!D.;# doi,7+.77::M+8.7;*8-+?+?D*+.. 9ug# Simon. *++*. "oices of Europe3 Citi'ens, Referendums, and European 8nte+ration. 6anham# A5, Eowman \ 6ittlefield. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidSJ*Y@fR! UAfTC. 9ug# Simon and George Tse elis. *++*. 0Leto @layers and Eeferendums "round the 3orld.1 Journal of Theoretical Politics, 7?, ?;. 2 .7.# doi,7+.77::M+8.7;8*-+*+7?++?+?. 9ug# Simon. *++7. 0@olicy Conse'uences of 5irect 6egislation in the States. Theory# 4mpirical Aodels and 4vidence.O @aper prepared for presentation at the "nnual Aeeting of the @u lic Choice Society# San "ntonio# Aarch 8!7*. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.iandrinstitute.orgMJewP*+IEIP*+3e siteP*+InfoMI\E P*+EesearchP*+andP*+9istoryMI\EP*+StudiesM9ugP*+! P*+@olicyP*+Conse'uencesP*+ofP*+I\EP*+inP*+theP*+States P*+IEI.pdf 9ug# Simon. *+++. 0Eeview. Eeviewed wor%, 5emanding Choices, Fpinion# Loting# and 5irect 5emocracy.0 The .merican Political %cience Revie&# 8? )*/, ?..!?.;. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.&stor.orgMsta leM*.-;+D:. 9ug# Simon# and @ascal Sciarini. *+++. 0Eeferendums on 4uropean Integration, 5o Institutions Aatter in the Loter=s 5ecisionB1 Comparative Political %tudies, DD, D!D;# doi,7+.77::M++7+?7?++++DD++7++7. Immergut# 4llen A. 788*. WThe rules of the game, The logic of health policy!ma%ing in >rance# Switzerland# and Sweden.1 %tructurin+ Politics# eds. Sven Steinmo# Cathleen Thelen and >ran% 6ongstreth. Cam ridge, Cam ridge University @ress# pp. .:!-8. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidS&pF>6.9>D++C. Cey# L. +. Rr. and 3inston 3. Crouch. 78D8. The 8nitiative and the Referendum in California. (er%eley, University of California @ress. CirchgKssner# Ge hard# 6ars @. >eld# and Aarcel E. Savioz. 7888. !ie dire#te !emo#ratie3 9odern, erfol+reich, ent&ic#lun+s- und e)portf0hi+. (asel, 9el ing und 6ichtenhahn.

Co ach# Cris 3. 788D. The Referendum !irect !emocrac( in %&it'erland. "ldershot# UC, 5artmouth University @ress. Co i# Silvia. 788-. !es cito(ens suisses contre lE,lite politi>ue le cas des votations f,d,rales, 19F9-199<.@aris, 6=9armattan. Criesi# 9anspeter. *++-. 05irect democracy 2 the Swiss e$perience.1 @aper presented at the International 3or%shop!Conference, 5emocratic Innovations 2 Theoretical and @ractical Challenges of 4valuation# 3Z(!(erlin# ; >e ruary. Criesi# 9anspeter. *++.. !irect !emocratic Choice The %&iss E)perience. F$ford, 6e$ington (oo%s. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidS>LapIcFGvTsC. Criesi# 9anspeter# and 3isler# 5. 788;. 0Social movements and direct democracy.0 European Journal of Political Research, D+, 782?+# doi,7+.7777M&.7?:.!;:;..788;.t ++;;;.$. 6adner# "ndreas und Aarc (Ihlmann. *++:. !emo#ratie in den 2emeinden3 !er Einfluss der 2emeinde+rGsse und anderer Ha#toren auf die 4ualit0t der !emo#ratie in den 2emeinden. ZIrichM Chur, EIegger. 6adner# "ndreas and Aichael (rKndle. 7888. 05oes 5irect 5emocracy Aatter for @olitical @artiesB1 Part( Politics# . )D/, *-D!D+*# doi,7+.77::M7D.?+;--88++.++D++*. 6ascher# 4dward# Aichael G. 9agen# and Steven ". Eochlin. 788;. WGun (ehind the 5oorB (allot Initiatives# State @olicies# and @u lic Fpinion.0 Journal of Politics# .-, :;+!:.# doi,7+.*D+:M*8;+??D. 6e5uc# 6awrence. *++D. The Politics of !irect !emocrac( Referendums in 2lobal Perspective. (roadview @ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.chM oo%sBidS awC>C$5>ZoC. 6e5uc# 6awrence# Eichard Jiemi# and @ippa Jorris )eds/. *++*. Comparin+ !emocracies ; -e& Challen+es in the %tud( of Elections and "otin+. 6ondon, Sage. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidSh7T?9Rd?:mTC. 6ee# 4ugene# 78:-. 0California.1 Referendums . Comparative %tud( of Practice and Theor(# eds. 5avid (utler and "ustin Eanney. 3ashington, "4I @ress# pp. -:!7**. 6i&phart# "rend. 7888. Patterns of democrac(. Jew 9aven, Tale University @ress. 6inder# 3olf. *++.. %ch&ei'erische !emo#ratie3 8nstitutionen I Pro'esse I Perspe#tiven. 9aupt. 6inder# 3olf. 7888. %&iss !emocrac( Possible %olutions to Conflict in 9ulticultural %ocieties3 (asingsto%e, Aacmillan. 6ipset# Seymour Aartin )ed./. 788.. TheEnc(clopaedia of !emocrac(. 6ondon, Eoutledge. 6loyd# 9enry 5emarest. 78+:. . %overei+n People . %tud( of %&iss !emocrac(. ed. R. ". 9o son. Jew Tor%, 5ou leday# @age and Company. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidSe+?AASe;8isC. 6owenstein# 5aniel 9. 78-*. WCampaign Spending and (allot @ropositions, Eecent 4$perience# @u lic Choice Theory and the >irst "mendment.0 7C*% *a& Revie&# *8 ).+./, .+.!;?7. 6upia# "rthur and Rohn G. Aatsusa%a. *++?. 05irect democracy, Jew approaches to old 'uestions.0 .nnual Revie& of Political %cience# :,?;D!?-*# doi,7+.77?;Mannurev.polisci.:.+7*++D.7+?:D+. 6upia# "rthur. *++7. 03hat 3e Should Cnow, Can Frdinary Citizens Aa%e 4$traordinary. ChoicesB1 @aper prepared for 3>CI" Conference. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.scri d.comMdocM*.D+.*-M3hat!3e!Should!Cnow!Can! Frdinary!Citizens!Aa%e!4$traordinary!Choices!. 6upia# "rthur. 788?. 0Shortcuts versus 4ncyclopedias, Information and Loting (ehavior in California Insurance Eeform 4lections1# .merican Political %cience Revie&, -- )7/, ;D!:;. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.&stor.orgMsta leM*8??--*. 6upia# "rthur and Aathew 5. AcCu ins. 788-. The !emocratic !ilemma Can Citi'ens *earn /hat The( -eed to $no&1 Cam ridge# UC, Cam ridge University @ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidS*Lv;(h6C;9UC.

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010

12

Aagle y# 5avid (. 78-?. !irect *e+islation "otin+ on 5allot Propositions in the 7nited %tates. (altimore# A5, Rohns 9op%ins University @ress. Aar'uis# 6ionel. *++;. *a formation de lJopinion publi>ue en d,mocratie directe *es r,f,rendums sur la politi>ue e)t,rieure suisse 1981-199<. Zurich, Seismo. Aatsusa%a# Rohn G. *++;. 0Institutions and @opular Control of @u lic @olicy.O University of Southern California. http,MMssrn.comMa stractS8?;-*Aatsusa%a# Rohn G. *++.. 05irect 5emocracy 3or%s1. Journal of Economic Perspectives# 78 )*/, 7-.!*+;# doi,7+.7*.:M+-8.DD++.?+?-:7D. Aatsusa%a# Rohn G. *++?. Hor the 9an( or the He& The 8nitiative, Public Polic(, and .merican !emocrac(. Chicago, The University of Chicago @ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidS-*l"d%l8UG+C. Aatsusa%a# Rohn G. and Jolan A. AcCarty. *++7. 0@olitical Eesource "llocation, The (enefits and Costs of Loter Initiatives.0 Journal of *a&, Economics, K6r+ani'ation, 7:,?7D!??-. http,MMssrn.comMa stractS*:*?-; Aatsusa%a# Rohn G. *++7. 0@ro lems with a Aethodology Used to Test 3hether @olicy Is Aore or 6ess Eesponsive to @u lic Fpinion in States with Loter Initiatives.O Journal of Politics, ;D)?/,7*.+!7*.;# doi,7+.7777M++**!D-7;.++7+8. Aatsusa%a# Rohn G. *+++. 0>iscal 4ffects of the Loter Initiative in the >irst 9alf of the Twentieth Century1 Journal of *a& and Economics# U6III, ;78!;.+. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.&stor.orgMsta leM:*.;-+. Aatsusa%a# Rohn. 788.. 0>iscal 4ffects of the Loter Initiative, 4vidence from the 6ast D+ Tears.1 Journal of Political Econom( 7+D,.-:!;*D. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.&stor.orgMsta leM*7D-:++. Aendelsohn# Aatthew# and >red Cutler. *+++. 0The 4ffect of Eeferendums on 5emocratic Citizens, Information# @oliticization# 4fficacy# and Tolerance1# 5ritish Journal of Political %cience D+ )?/, ;-.!8:# doi,7+.7+7:MS+++:7*D?++**+*8*. Jeidhart# 6eonhard. 78:+. Plebis'it und pluralit0re !emo#ratie Eine .nal(se der Hun#tion des sch&ei'erischen 2eset'esreferendums. (ern, >ranc%e. Fwens# Rohn E.# and 6arry 6. 3ade. 78-;. 0Campaign Spending on California (allot @ropositions# 78*?!78-?, Trends and Loting 4ffects.0 /estern Political 4uarterl(, D8, ;:.!-8# doi,7+.77::M7+;.87*8-;+D8++?+-. @age# (en&amin I. and Eo ert T. Shapiro. 788*. The Rational Public. Chicago, University of Chicago @ress. @Hllinger# Zoltan.# (runo Caufmann# 3ilfried Aar$er# Theo Schiller )eds/. *++:. !irect !emocrac( in Europe !evelopments and Prospects. 3ies aden, LS Lerlag fIr Sozialwissenschaften. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sB idSh+T>'csLwiUC. @apadopoulos# Tannis. *++7. O9ow does 5irect 5emocracy AatterB The Impact of Eeferendum Lotes on @olitics and @olicy!Aa%ing1# /est European Politics, *? )*/, D.!.-# doi,7+.7+-+M+7?+*D-+7+-?*.?D*. @apadopoulos# Tannis. 788-. !,mocratie directe. @aris, 4conomica. @apadopoulos# Tannis. 7887. OXuel r`le pour les petits partis dans la d^mocratie dir^cteBO. .nnuaire suisse de science politi>ue# D7, 7D7!7.+. @ar%inson# Rohn. *++7. 03ho Cnows (estB The Creation of the Citizen! Initiated Eeferendum in Jew Zealand.0 2overnment and 6pposition, D; )D/, ?+D!*7# doi,7+.7777M7?::!:+.D.+++:*. @ateman# Carol. 78:+. Participation and !emocratic Theor(. Cam ridge# UC, Cam ridge University @ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidS:ZJiFo-84r?C. @ommerehne# 3erner. 78:-. 1Institutional "pproaches to @u lic 4$penditures, 4mpirical 4vidence from Swiss Aunicipalities.1 Journal of Public Economics# 8, *..!-+. http,MM4con@apers.repec.orgMEe@4c,eee,pu eco,v,8,y,78:-,i,*,p,*..! *-+

@utnam# Eo ert 5. 788D. 9a#in+ !emocrac( /or#3 Civic Traditions in 9odern 8tal(3 @rinceton, @rinceton University @ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidSgCZ@-YTp*:UC. Eappard# 3illiam 4. 787*. 0The Initiative# Eeferendum and Eecall in Switzerland.1 .merican Political %cience Revie&, ;)D/,D?.!D;;. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.&stor.orgMsta leM7+7*.?*. Eomer# Thomas and 9oward Eosenthal. 78:8. O(ureaucrats versus Loters, Fn the @olitical 4conomy of Eesource "llocation y 5irect 5emocracy.O 4uarterl( Journal of Economics, 8D)?/,.;7!.-:. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.&stor.orgMsta leM7--??:+. Sa ato# 6arry R.# (ruce ". 6arson# and 9oward E. 4rnst )eds./. *++7. !an+erous !emocrac(1 The 5attle over 5allot 8nitiatives in .merica. 6anham# A5, Eowman\6ittlefield. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidS&:!5o;9CdmgC. Scarrow# Susan 4. *++7 05irect 5emocracy and Institutional Change. " Comparative Investigation.1 Comparative Political %tudies# D? );/, ;.7 2 ;;.# doi,7+.77::M++7+?7?++7+D?++;++D. Schaltegger# C. and 6. @. >eld. *++7. 0Fn government centralisation and udget referendums.0 C4S 3or%ing @aper. Jo. ;7.# Center for 4conomic Study# Aunich# Germany. doi,7+.7+7;M&.euroecorev.*++:.+..++.. Schrag# @eter. 788-. Paradise *ost CaliforniaEs E)perience, .mericaEs Huture. Jew Tor%, Jew @ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidSU9((9?yUL8+C. Schumpeter# Roseph ". Z78?*[ 78;*. Capitalism, %ocialism, and !emocrac(. 6ondon, "llen and Unwin. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidS;eA;TrA&?;sC. Sciarini# @ascal. *+++. 06a formation des opinions dans les votations populaires de politi'ue e$t^rieure.0 Revue suisse de science politi>ue, ; )D/, :7!-?. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.ingentaconnect.comMcontentMspsaMspsrM*+++M+++++++;M++++ +++DMart++++? Sciarini# @ascal# and 6ionel Aar'uis. *+++. 0Fpinion pu li'ue et politi'ue e$t^rieure, le cas des votations populaires en Suisse.0 8nternational Political %cience Revie&, *7 )*/, 7?8!:7# doi,7+.77::M+78*.7*7++*7*++D. Shoc%ley# Rohn. 78-+. 0The Initiative @rocess in Colorado @olitics, "n "ssessment. (ureau of Governmental Eesearch and Service.1 University of Colarado. Simon# 9er ert ". 78.:. .dministrative 5ehavior . %tud( of !ecision9a#in+ Processes in .dministrative 6r+ani'ations. Jew Tor%, >re @ress. Sinnott# Eichard. *++*. 0Cleavages# @arties# and Eeferendums, Eelationship etween Eepresentative and 5irect 5emocracy in the Eepu lic of Ireland.0 European Journal of Political Research, ?7 );/, -77!*;# doi,7+.7777M7?:.!;:;..+++DD. Smith# 5aniel ". and Caroline R. Tol ert. *++:. 0The Instrumental and 4ducative 4ffects of (allot Aeasures, Eesearch on 5irect 5emocracy in the "merican States1# %tate Politics and Polic( 4uarterl(# : )?/, ?7:! ??;. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.clas.ufl.eduMusersMdasmithMS@@X*++:.pdf. Smith# 5aniel ".# and Caroline R. Tol ert. *++?. Educated b( 8nitiative The Effects of !irect !emocrac( on Citi'ens and Political 6r+ani'ations in the .merican %tates. "nn "r or, University of Aichigan @ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidS7LEh(pp4@UsC. Smith# 5aniel ".# and Caroline R. Tol ert. *++7. 0The initiative to party, @artisanship and allot initiatives in California1# Part( Politics# :, :D8! :.:# doi,7+.77::M7D.?+;--+7++:++;++?. Smith# 5aniel ". 788-. Ta) Crusaders and the Politics of !irect !emocrac(. Jew Tor%, Eoutledge. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidS5v7eei$X88UC. Smith# Aar% ". *++*. 0(allot initiatives and the democratic citizen.0 Journal of Politics# ;?, -8*!8+D# doi,7+.7777M++**!D-7;.++7.7. Smith# Aar% ". *++7. 0The contingent effects of allot initiatives and candidate races on turnout.0 .merican Journal of Political %cience# ?., :++!:+;. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.&stor.orgMsta leM*;;8*?;.

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010

1!

Sniderman# @aul ". 788D. 0The Jew 6oo% in @u lic Fpinion Eesearch.1 Political %cience The %tate of !iscipline 88# ed. "da 3. >inifter. 3ashington# 5.C., The "merican @olitical Science "ssociation# pp. *78!*?.. Steunen erg# (ernard. 788?. 05ecision Aa%ing under 5ifferent Institutional "rrangements, 6egislation y the 4uropean Community.0 Journal of 8nstitutional and Theoretical Economics, 7.+)?/, ;?*!;;8. Stratmann# Thomas. *++;. 0Is Spending Aore @otent for or against a @ropositionB 4vidence from (allot Aeasures.0 .merican Journal of Political %cience# .+ )D/. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MMwww.&stor.orgMsta leMD;8?*?8. Svensson# @alle. *++*. 0>ive 5anish Eeferendums on the 4uropean Community and 4uropean Union, " Critical "ssessment of the >ran%lin Thesis1# European Journal of Political Research, ?7 );/, ;*.!?-# doi,7+.7777M7?:.!;:;..+++*Tol ert# Caroline R. and 5aniel ". Smith. *++;. 0Eepresentation and 5irect 5emocracy in the United States1# Representation# ?* )7/# doi,7+.7+-+M++D??-8+;++.-D:?D. Tol ert# Caroline R. and 5aniel ". Smith. *++.. 0The 4ducative 4ffects of (allot Initiatives on Loter Turnout1. .merican Politics Research# DD )*/# doi,7+.77::M7.D*;:DU+?*:78+?. Tol ert# Caroline R. and E. Ac Jeal. *++D. 0Unraveling the effects of the Internet on political participation.1 Political Research 4uarterl(# .;, 7:.!7-.# doi,7+.77::M7+;.87*8+D+.;++*+;. Trechsel# "le$ander. *+++. Heuer&er# "ol#srechte die "ol#sabstimmun+en in den sch&ei'erischen $antonen 19F:- 199L. (asel, 9el ing \ 6ichtenhahn. Trechsel# "le$ander and Uwe SerdIlt. 7888. $aledis#op "ol#srechte3 8nstitutionen der dire#ten !emo#ratie in den sch&ei'erischen $antonen 19F:-199L. (asel, 9el ing und 6ichtenhahn. Trechsel# "le$ander and 9anspeter Criesi. 788;. 0Switzerland, The referendum and initiative as a centrepiece of the political system1. The referendum e)perience in Europe# eds. A. Gallagher \ @.L. Uleri )eds/. 6ondon and Jew Tor%, AacAillan @ress, 7-.2*+:.

Tresch# "n%e. *++-. Mffentlich#eit und %prachenvielfalt3 9edienvermittelte $ommuni#ation 'ur Europapoliti# in der !eutschund /estsch&ei'. (aden!(aden, Jomos. Tvers%y# "mos and 5aniel Cahneman. 78:?. 0Rudgement under Uncertainty, 9euristics and (iases.0 %cience 78., 77*?!D7# doi,7+.77*;Mscience.7-..?7.:.77*?. Latter# "drian and Aar%us >reitag. *++:. 0The Contradictory 4ffects of Consensus 5emocracy on the Size of Government, 4vidence from the Swiss Cantons.1 5ritish Journal of Political %cience# D; )*/, D.8!D:7# doi,7+.7+7:MS+++:7*D?+:+++7:-. Latter# "drian and Christian EIefli. *++D. 05o @olitical >actors Aatter for 9ealth Care 4$penditureB1 Rournal of @u lic @olicy# *D )D/, 7!D7# doi,7+.7+7:MS+7?D-7?U+D++D7?D. Latter# "drian. *++*. $antonale !emo#ratien im "er+leich3 Entstehun+s+rBnde, 8ntera#tionen und /ir#un+en politischer 8nstitutionen in den %ch&ei'er $antonen. Fpladen, 6es%e\(udrich. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sB idS:6UvvTUC&X"C. Latter# "drian. *+++. 0Consensus and 5irect 5emocracy, Theoretical and 4mpirical 6in%ages.1 European Journal of Political Research# D)*/, *?.!*;-# doi,7+.7777M7?:.!;:;..++.D7. 3agschal# Uwe. 788:. 05irect 5emocracy and @u lic @olicyma%ing.1 Journal of Public Polic( 7:, **D!*?.# doi,7+.7+7:MS+7?D-7?U++++D..U. 3ei$ner# (Kr el. *++*. !ire#te !emo#ratie in den 5undesl0ndern3 "erfassun+srechtlicher und empirischer 5efund aus politi#&issenschaftlicher %icht. Fpladen. Zaller# Rohn E. 788*. The -ature and 6ri+ins of 9ass 6pinion. Cam ridge# UC, Cam ridge University @ress. UE6 )cited on 8 >e ruary *+7+/, http,MM oo%s.google.comM oo%sBidS-DyJzu;toisC. Zimmermann# Roseph. 7888. The initiative Citi'en la&-ma#in+. 3estport# CT, @raeger. Zis%# (etty. 78-:. 9one(, 9edia, and the 2rass Roots %tate 5allot 8ssues and the Electoral Process. Jew ury @ar%# C", Sage.

Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich

Living Reviews in Democracy, 2010

1"

You might also like