Old Soldier Issue 7-4

Vol. 7 No.
OLD SOLDIERS
Dedicated to History, the Preservation and Play of Out Of Print Wargames, and to the Support of the Small Wargame Companies Last Issue
Dec 2013
Website www.oldsoldiersmagazine.com
Variants, Strategy, Tactics, Series Replays, Scenarios, Military Book Reviews and Annotations, and Historical Articles
Game Articles:
Columbia Games Synopsis of their Borodino Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History Be Sure To Check Out page 68 for Legion Wargames Latest Game Picket Duty Sure to be an instant classic like B-17 and B-29
History Articles
Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony, The Sikh War Sourcebook, 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805, Sikh Source Book OOB Example 2nd Mahratta War, Battles of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-1743
Vol. 7 No. 3
Old Soldiers
FROM THE DESK OF THE EDITOR
questions like, why? Why the cockroaches scrambled beneath the spotlight of the press and found all that missing paperwork and signed it all. Amazing what things can get done when you look really stupid in front of a camera. So, now the museum is back in the rightful hands of the people who created and saved the birthplace home of Ernie Pyle from the very beginning. We now face a daunting task. For nearly 15 years the Indiana DNR has neglected any and all small and large maintenance items, which caused them to grow to be BIG problems, which were not disclosed to the Friends of Ernie Pyle, or we would have back then raised funds for the necessary repairs. We have now found out that the state neglected maintenance on the site and no one about it. So much for good management and honesty in government.
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My calendar tells me its been 2 years since the last issue of the magazine has seen publication. A great deal has gone on since then. My mothers broken back has healed. Shes fighting peripheral artery disease now. My 90 year old father is still alive and kicking. He has even fixed the museums parade jeep a few times. The Ernie Pyle Museum is now re-named, The Ernie Pyle WWII Museum and is back in the hands of the private non profit that created the museum to begin with and helped subsidize the states running of the facility. Unlike so many other facilities, where the state subsidizes their running, in the case of the Ernie Pyle Historic Site (as it was named while it was in the hands of the Indiana DNR) the state actually took private not for profit money to maintain the site because the Indiana DNR couldnt afford to do it, or wouldnt as the case may actually have been. But, once the New York Times showed up in Governor Daniels office miracle of miracles occurred, what the Indiana DNR claimed would take 6 months (and then they lost the paper work they claimed) actually took Governor Daniels two hours to cough up and sign giving the museum back to the Friends of Ernie Pyle, the original not for profit that built the museum from the very beginning in 1975 and had paid for or organized the funds for every major repair or upgrade of the museums facilities. Bless his heart, it only took Mitch Daniels 2 hours to get done what his Indiana DNR couldnt do in 8 months ... that is once the New York Times showed up asking
The museum faces some daunting tasks. 1. Quonset Hut Roofs Leak (both of them). 2. Birthplace Home Roof needs replaced (it doesnt yet leak, but its over 20 years old). 3. Planking on the side of the Birthplace home has dry rot and much needs replacing. 4. The Birthplace Home needs painting. 5. The Audio Visual System (which shows 3 documentaries and plays 3 audio recordings) is breaking down bit by bit. One Audio Player has entirely failed. One Audio speaker system has failed. A DVD player is failing. The entire system is 15 years old. 6. The Basement Leaks 7. We need to develop a teaching curriculum to take to schools (the DNR ceased doing that 10 years ago.) (Continued on Page 88)
www.erniepyle.org
Index
Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony The Sikh War Sourcebook 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805 Sikh Source Book OOB Example 2nd Mahratta War Columbia Games Synopsis of their Borodino Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History Battles of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-1743
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The Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony In The Conduct Of The Seven Years War An Annotated Bibliography
By Robert Fulton especially Hanover. It was only after Pitt and Newcastle rebuilt their war ministry, energized the war effort, and devised a global strategy that Britain rose off the ropes and went on to score tremendous victory after victory. This strategy was not always clearly defined or effectively prosecuted; yet Pitts steadfastness with respect to strategy and the leadership of both Admiral Edward Hawke and General Jeffrey Amherst allowed the British to triumph militarily against the French in what soon became a global conflict. The British were, however, always conflicted about a ground war in Europe. This was no longer the age of Marlborough. They consistently preferred to send money rather than troops to aide both Ferdinand and Frederick. It was only the adamant attitude of George II concerning Hanover that required the British to keep some token military forces in the western German principalities for as long as they did. While the French had a few good generals, leadership was inconsistent and many of the generals were reluctant to risk their armies in major battles. Thus it was British money, the superb generalship of Ferdinand, and French disorganization that allowed Ferdinand to retake Hanover and keep Fredericks western territories safe from French deprivations. However, by 1761 George II was dead and George III had different ideas about Hanover. In addition, throughout the war the
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Introduction: The bibliography listed below represents a wide-ranging set of both popular and academic historians of the Seven Years War period. These books all feature, in a direct way, a focus on Britains goals, strategies, motivations, and challenges with respect to that war. The exception to this is Franz Szabos The Seven Years Way in Europe, 1756-1763; nevertheless, this is a valuable addition to this bibliography because which represents an interesting and well-argued (in this readers opinion) thesis that Frederick was, to put it mildly, a real loser with respect to military prowess and that Prussia merely survived the war because of squabbling enemies but more importantly due to Britains financing. It may have been George Washingtons bumbling around in the backwoods in 1754 that got the French and British to face off in North America, but it was Fredericks aggressive stance towards his rapidly coalescing European enemies that kicked the war into high gear. Frederick constantly gambled his army in battle, and more often lost than won. Indeed, the war went very badly for the British, Prussians, and Hanoverians during the first two years, from 1756 to 1758. British were themselves on the brink of total defeat in 1757 and early 1758, with losses in North America, the Mediterranean, and
French focused on European rather than colonial operations, thus allowing the British a fairly free hand in dealing with French Canada and the Caribbean as well as India. Spanish entry in 1761 came too late and was disastrous for the Bourbons. In the end peace was agreed because of the change in government in England and the death of the Empress Elizabeth in Russia. George IIIs lukewarm support for his fathers war and Tsar Pauls betrayal of the Austrians finally forced an exhausted Prussian, a frustrated Austria, a bankrupt France, and a victorious Britain to the negotiating table. Despite the overwhelming nature of Britains victories, she gave back to France and Spain much of what she had fought hard to gain. Pitt was apoplectic at these concessions, but being out of government at George IIIs initiative, there was little he could do except fume and vent. Thus while Britain kept Canada and much of its Indian subcontinent gains, she gave back most of the Caribbean island conquests, Havana (Cuba), the Philippines, and French colonies in Africa. India and Canada were the trump cards. Canada served in the opposite role. The French did not desire its return as it was an economic drain. The removal of the French created a vacuum in North America; the British colonists needed an enemy to
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causes and its outcomes. Presented as an integral part of a series of events in building the British Empire, we see the war as part of an intentional strategy. If the author errs at all, it is in not providing more of the context around the age-old conflict between England and France and how that conflict spread to their respective colonial empires. Many contemporary private or public accounts are used to effectively weave together knowledge and facts into a readable narrative. His notes are particularly helpful in coloring in the details such as politics and loyalties. Each chapter offers the reader extensive notes and annotations which in many cases are minicommentaries about the authors sources; these notes address the quality and the biases of the sources. His source work covers a wide array of valuable documentation, including diaries. Crucible of War is epic and is a pleasant and comfortable read for both the scholar and the casual historian. The story line builds towards British victory at the end of the war, with the anti-climax of mismanagement of the peace in the final chapters. In addition the author provides the context for the next war, the American War of Independence. In doing so, he gives us a crucial piece of the puzzle we need to understand the loss of the American colonies in the aftermath of the war and thus the importance of this seminal conflict to us as well as to Europe.
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(Continued) McLynn, Frank. 1759: The Year Britain Became Master of the World. New York: Grove Press, 2004. 422 pages. The author sets out to paint a portrait of the titanic struggle between Britain and France and that reached it zenith during this war by examining the critical events of one year, 1759. This he does quite diligently and academically. The previous wars of the 17th and 18th centuries between these two powers are seen as setting the stage for this final conflicts. In 1759 Britain became master of the world, and William Pitt the elder was the driving force behind the victory. The convergence of the characters and events related to each of the defining victories in 1759 is the main focus of the book. Principle players in the drama, such as of Bonnie Prince Charlie (the Stuart Pretender), receive detailed descriptive treatment. His main arguments for the victory of the British support his painting of convergence of factors and circumstances; he convinces through his research that Britains strategy was focused, that Frances efforts were feeble and disorganized, and that British determination overcame adversity and French fortunes. The research is thorough and evident. His bibliography is extensive, and he uses a number of published and unpublished primary sources, as well as secondary material. References
The Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony

galvanize them; over the ten years from 1763 to 1773, the British government replaced the French as the object of North American colonial hatreds. British victory in North America led directly to the loss of much of Britains first empire. India of course allowed the British to create a second empire from the ashes, and over the next seventyfive years became a powerhouse of the British colonial economy and it featured prominently in colonial policy for 150 years. Annotated Bibliographies: Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: The Seven Years War and the Fate of Empire in British North America 1754-1766. New York: Vintage Books, 2001. 912 pages. Mr. Anderson has produced a singularly valuable modern resource on the Seven Years War in the colonies, as seminal and valuable to the researcher as Francis Parkmans Montcalm and Wolfe (see below). His theme is focused on changing the view that this was just another colonial war; in doing so he shows that this war set the stage for our war of independence even as it significantly impacted the formation of the British Empire. The narrative provides the reader with a broad viewpoint of unfolding proceedings to provide proper perspective and understanding. The work is a wellwritten and exhaustively researched treatise on the war, its
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book, and his scholarship shows in a number of ways. He was able to gather a vast array of material and compile it effectively. The authors intent is to provide us with a full and detailed account of the significant events, characters and impacts of the war. Each chapter contains numerous footnotes, as well as notes at the end of the chapter that serve as extended descriptions he was not able to work into the text itself. For example, on page 417 and 418 at the end of the chapter on General James Wolfe, the author provides details regarding Wolfes correspondence and other materials used as source work. He also tells us of a story, which grew in the telling, of Wolfes last interview with Pitt. Facts and his sources are cross-checked, and these include items such as the number of those killed in the massacre at Fort Edward, or, the Acadian deportations. There is extensive appendix material that includes quotes from correspondence, excerpts from official government reports and other documents, and explanations of how and why his source material is useful and appropriate. Many of his sources are French; he was able to gain access to many private collections from England, France, Canada and the United States. His footnotes, extended end-of-chapter notes and his Appendix material serve as his bibliography. While Parkman sometimes seems to be a bit biased in favor of the English, he is always very
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(Continued) careful with his facts. His bias in no way detracts from the excellence of the work. On the contrary, he seems to be generally aware of this bias and makes every effort to explain controversial events from both sides of the matter. His careful and painstaking research shine through in this book and the works value to the historian is consequently enormous. It remains an essential work for all Seven Years War scholars. Middleton, Richard. The Bells of Victory: The Pitt-Newcastle Ministry and Conduct of the Seven Years' War 1757-1762. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 [1985]. 268 pages. The title refers to the celebrations which took place all over England upon receiving news of Wolfe's victory at Quebec in October 1759. This book takes the old arguments about Pitt and his master strategy for the war and qualifies these traditional accounts of the Seven Years' War. While Pitts energy, dedication to victory, enthusiasm, and coordination were crucial, he did not have operational control over the forces arrayed on multiple fronts, nor could he dictate actions on the ground. In addition, he was part of the government formed by Newcastle and had to work within constitutional and political constraints. Not only could Pitt not,

are cross-checked and opinions are not accepted at face value. Prior work is appropriately cited, but is also updated with new evidence or research. Mr. McLynn provides ample information to support his conclusions from personal diaries, personal letters and governmental records, and he uses these contemporary sources to complete his descriptions. Mr. McLynns book does an excellent job putting us into the thick of the politics and campaigns of 1759, and the author does not engage in wild speculations. Instead he has provided us with his synthesis of the views of the actual participants. He puts us in 1759 and does it well. Parkman, Francis. Montcalm and Wolfe: The French and Indian War. New York: Da Capo Press, 2001 reprint. 356 pages. Even after more than 125 years since it appeared in print, Parkmans biography of these protagonists of the French and Indian War still serves both as seminal resource material for scholars researching the war and as enlightenment on how that war fundamentally impacted American history for the casual reader. Despite the title, the book is a complete history of the colonial war; in its sweep and scope belongs with such classic war histories as Thucydides The Peloponnesian Wars. Parkman spent many years researching this
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chapter is a survey within a survey, providing us with the background material from the early colonization of America and the first colonial wars to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The authors footnotes are detailed, and his bibliography fairly extensive. Much of his material comes from contemporary sources, although he relies much on past scholars such as Parkman and Henry Gipson. One of the nice features of the book is that the author provides a personalities list to help us keep track of minor players, such as James De Lancey, Lt. Governor of New York. The maps are well-drawn and plentiful and are at times topographic in style. All in all, his research is solid, if a bit lacking in French source work. The book serves as an abridged version of Parkmans Montcalm and Wolfe which he quotes from and references extensively. Thus, while it does not add significantly to our knowledge of the war and its impact, it does present a picture of the comprehensiveness of the war and the principle drivers behind Britains conduct of the war. Furneaux, Rupert. The Seven Years War. London: Granada Publishing, Ltd, 1973. 208 pages. This book represents the first in a series of books, edited by Ludovic Kennedy, entitled The British Army at War. As such, it is the authors intent to present the war from Britains point of view specifically limiting coverage to British political and military
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(Continued) actions. Other items of significant are mentioned only in passing and only where they relate to the topic at hand. This narrowness of focus does not detract from the value of the book. The author seeks to take the reader through the series of defeats and victories that the British army suffered or gained during the war to provide a comprehensive view of wartime British strategy and diplomacy. Each of the major battles of the war is enumerated, along with the events leading up to the battle and the aftermath or significance. The reader should not, however, expect to see these significant events described in minute detail. Each chapter is more of a sketch to give the reader a sense of importance; prelude, action and aftermath are the format he employs. Pitt and the politics of Parliament are covered in light of Pitts lust for power and his desire to see Britain annihilate the French empire and colonial trade. On page 45 the author states that He [Pitt] never doubted his ability to carry his war to a successful conclusion. This sums up Pitts vision and focus. The author does a good job of describing the workings of Pitts inner circle of colleagues, his attention to detail, and how he ran the war cabinet during his time in office. Mr. Furneauxs bibliography is selected, but contains a number of excellent

guarantee victory on the ground, he could also not forever maintain support for actions that required political compromise and expediency. Like all politicians in a democratic government, Pitt worked with a wide variety of people whom he needed to accomplish his goals. Sometimes frustrated in his goals, sometimes inspiring, he was a effective leader to be sure but in a limited capacity. In the end, he was a subject as any politician to the whims of the king and the kings favorites. In 1761, on the accession of George III, James Stuart, Earl of Bute, Georges favorite, created a new cabinet that did not include Pitt. Pitt was sidelined and Butes chosen ministers began to pursue a more peace-oriented strategy that ended up giving back much of what Britain had won and set the stage for a new confrontation in North America not ten years later.
Borneman, Walter R. The French and Indian War: Deciding the Fate of North America. New York: Harper-Collins Publishers, 2006. 416 pages. Mr. Bornemans goal in writing this book was to present the triumphs and tragedies of this struggle; place them in the context of France and Great Britains greater global conflict; and emphasize that from the seeds of discord grown here grew the American Revolution. He succeeds in this goal by providing us with a scholarly survey of the major events and characters. In fact, his first
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find one with which he is satisfied. Only a few chapters are devoted to the Seven Years War; however they are effective at putting the war and its associated politics into a strategic framework. The end of the chapter is disappointing, as it is devoted to second guessing and pulling down improperly deified British heroes of the war. He expresses incredulity at Montcalms attack on Wolfe at Quebec, and attributes the decision to the fact that perhaps the most overlooked determining factor in history has been stupidity (page 151). Hindsight is wonderful but generals need to make critical decisions where the difference between victory and defeat may hinge upon the ability to size up a situation and make a decision. Sometimes its the wrong one and has nothing to do with stupidity. The author does do a good job placing the conflicts between England and France in light of the ongoing struggle for economic and trade supremacy. The notes at the end of each chapter serve as his bibliography, and they offer a wide sample of both contemporary and modern source work on the topic. The maps are first class but are too few to truly follow the action (which is not his intent anyway). Finally, there is an added chapter in the back of the book entitled For Further Reading that serves as an excellent list of references for scholars. This is certainly one of the redeeming features of this book.
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(Continued) Leckie, Robert. A Few Acres of Snow: The Saga of the French and Indian Wars. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1999. 388 pages. While we find some desirable qualities to this extended invective against usurpers and corrupt colonial officials, for the most part Mr. Leckie is intent on convincing his readers that France lost its colonial empire because of the rampant corruption that existed within the colony in 1759. While the story is at times gripping and smooth-flowing, he glosses over or ignores evidence contrary to his opinion. The author also interrupts the story with pointless sidebars and tangents and sometimes whole chapters of detractions, the purpose of which are never made clear to the reader. There are other difficulties as well. Extraneous material aside, he allows much subjective judgment to enter his narrative. For example, in chapter twelve the author begins a lengthy digression on the usurper William III. Next, the bibliography is quite sparse and is called selected. No contemporary sources are cited or noted; only modern source work is listed. Because of this the reader cant tell how extensively he researched the topic. There are no footnotes anywhere in the book; the sources for some of his quotes are not even cited. It is unclear at many points where he gets his facts and arguments. As the

works that are in and of themselves high quality references. All in all, this book provides a concise and wellresearched view of the British army and the strategic considerations around its employment. Lenman, Bruce. Modern Wars in Perspective (series): Britains Colonial Wars 1688-1783. Edinburgh Gate, UK: Pearson Education, Ltd., 2001. 284 pages. This book is part of a larger series of educational books entitled, Modern Wars in Perspective. The series is generally well-written and researched but sometimes suffers from a tendency to move in circular (non-chronological) fashion, thus confusing the linear reader; in addition, the series will many times gloss over events the author does not consider to be important. This book suffers from these drawbacks as well. Each of the chapters overlaps others to a varying extent in describing events and protagonists. Mr. Lenman praises both Francis Parkman and Fred Anderson (see their respective entries) for their critical studies; unfortunately, this book does not really add to this scholarship. While the research is thorough, the author spends much of his time searching for a paradigm in which to place the expansion of the British Empire from William III through the American Revolution. He does not really
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won because of the military skill and steadfast strategic pursuit of victory by Frederick II of Prussia. In establishing his arguments, the author is able to defend his thesis that it was British money, a disorganized and contentious enemy alliance, and fortunes of war that saved Prussia and Frederick from total defeat. Fredericks inconsistent leadership and rash operational and tactical battlefield decisions cost him and his nation dearly. He lost battles more often than won them and little credit has historically been given to the more effective leadership of figures such as Fredericks brother Prince Henry. Szabos work is a balanced and deep narrative using a wide variety of source materials. He deals effectively with political, economic, military, and diplomatic history and in doing so have provided both scholars and interested history buffs with a fastpaced and exciting read. Macksey, Piers. The Coward of Minden: The Affair of Lord George Sackville. New York: St. Martins Press, 1979. 279 pages. As Mr. Macksey explains in the books introduction, Historians have not judged Lord George Sackville with charity. Lord George Sackville was drummed out of the British army for his cowardly conduct at the Battle of Minden, which pitted Prince Ferdinand of Brunswicks Hanoverian-English army against a French army commanded by Marshall Contades. The author
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(Continued) sets out on a search for historical facts to amend that record, painted in innuendo and colored by tradition, and he does it with skill. In order to provide the reader with a full understanding of the situation, Mr. Macksey takes us on campaign Prince Ferdinand and the army. He describes the character traits and foibles of the main characters and creates a realistic picture of the challenge of managing this polyglot army. The author reconstructs the day of the battle using diaries, official records and correspondence. He shows us that Prince Ferdinand issued confusing and contradictory orders that could have led to the delay in bring the British cavalry forward. Finally, the trial of Lord George is covered in its entirety, with a focus on the significant and relevant facts and contradictions of testimony. Mr. Macksey also provides us with a different view of Mr. Pitt than most. The Great Commoner is portrayed as a man of limitless ambition and ruthlessness who, while seeking global hegemony for Britain, was willing to sacrifice anyone to achieve that goal. Prince Ferdinand was essential to victory in Hanover against the French, as there is no one else capable of defeating them. It becomes evident that Mr. Pitt and the cabinet have little or no interest in seeing Lord Sackville exonerated, and they have every reason to see him hung for treason.

book progresses, it becomes more evident that many of his conclusions are his and his alone. However, it would be unfair to characterize the book in a purely negative light. The author does an excellent job describing a number of issues and events. For example, we learn why the Iroquois and the French were almost perpetually at war. In addition, the author does supply some good maps that show, at various points in time, the extent of British and French colonization. His main argument that unscrupulous and evil governors and Intendants robbed the country blind and covered it up by allowing Wolfes army take Quebec does not stand up under scrutiny. He does not do justice to those who fought and gave their lives to keep Canada out of British hands. In the end, this is not a work of academic research but the authors extended opinion. It might have suffered less and been more interesting without all the criticism. Szabo, Franz A. J. The Seven Years Way in Europe, 17561763. Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Ltd., 2008. 512 pages. This work, while dealing only tangentially with British strategy, nonetheless illustrates how crucial Britains participation in the war was for Frederick. The author contends against the well-heeled argument that the Seven Years War was
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By interweaves political and military developments with popular literature, songs, white papers and pamphleteering, the author shows us how England at mid-century was a hotbed of political divisiveness. Many publications of the time including open letters were underwritten or sponsored by those seeking to influence opinion or to manipulate the public, politicians, or both. Coffee houses played a central role in communicating and disseminating information among commoners. Authors used ballads and plays convey political messages and foment action. There are twenty fine samples of the type of graphic images (mostly caricatures) used by pamphleteers and by political cartoonists. The author explores the authenticity, authorship and purpose behind many popular caricatures, ballads and poems written during the war. In weaving each chapters tale, Mr. Cardwell supplies both verbal and artistic examples of different types of literature, and does so competently. The ability of public opinion to impact political discourse, and visa versa, was demonstrated in numerous ways during the Seven Years War. This work makes those notions clear to us. Corbett, Sir Julian Stafford. England in the Seven Years War, 1759-63. 2 Volumes, 2nd edition. London: Greenhill Books, 1992. 416 pages. Sir Julian was primarily a naval historian, and sets out to
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(Continued) convince the reader that the British navy was the reason and method behind the greatness of the British Empire and the victories of the eighteenth century. The original edition appeared early in the 20th century. This new edition features an excellent introduction by Christopher Duffy, a widely acknowledged expert on eighteenth-century military affairs. Mr. Duffy has actually added a supplemental bibliography that should entice the scholar. He corrects and appends some of Corbetts original source work and conclusions. He also updates the scholarship and puts the information into perspective. The maps are all in the front of the book and thus easy to find when needing to reference them. They are well-drawn and readable. The footnotes serve as a bibliography, and there are explanations provided for certain footnotes that will enlighten the reader as to the type of source, the content, dates or importance. The author in his zeal for all things naval, sometimes give short shrift to significant political considerations, such as the importance placed by George II on the defense of Hanover. He seems to believe that the defense of Hanover was an issue of sea lanes and shipping: there lay bound up in [Hanover] that old paramount question of naval positions in the North Sea (I, 23). In fact, the issue was quite complex and related to the legitimacy of the Hanoverian

The book is engaging and fairly fast-paced. Mr. Macksey provides a complete list of references for all sources used, including the trial records. He makes it plain that Lord Georges official trial documentation was much more detailed and informative than some of the actual court records. The source work is also evaluated for its usefulness and scholarship. The result is a book which, by way of example, helps the reader to better understand critical the conduct of strategic operations was to Britain during the Seven Years War. Cardwell, John. Arts & Arms: Literature, Politics and Patriotism during the Seven Years War. New York: Manchester University Press, 2004. 306 pages. During the Seven Years War newspapers, pamphlets and literature (in the form of plays, ballads, poems and other verse) were important modes of communicating war news, opinion and propaganda. The public demanded news about the war and about government conduct, and received it through many different venues. The authors intent is to describe Englands rich literary heritage at this time by concentrating upon the literary response to the wars most intense, politically significant crises (pg. 2). He achieves this purpose with skillfully.
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so interconnected that neither can be fully understood in isolation but also that traditional interpretations of the war are largely inaccurate. His work also reveals how the French navy, supposedly utterly crushed, could have figured so prominently in the War of American Independence only fifteen years later. A comprehensive work integrating diplomatic, naval, military, and political history, The French Navy and the Seven Years War thoroughly explores the French perspective on the Seven Years War. It also studies British diplomacy and war strategy as well as the roles played by the American colonies, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sweden, and Portugal. As this history unfolds, it becomes clear that French policy was more consistent, logical, and successful than has previously been acknowledged, and that King Louis XVs conduct of the war profoundly affected the outcome of Americas subsequent Revolutionary War. Other Sources: Fowler, Jr., William M. Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763. Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2009. 368 pages. Marston, Daniel. The Seven Years' War. Volume 2 of Essential Histories. Taylor & Francis, 2001. 95 pages. There are many books that have been written on the colonial American French and Indian War (just do a Google Books or Amazon search if you want to test
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(Continued) me here) and some are well-written. Most deal with the war as prelude to US independence and the removal of the French threat to the colonies. One of the sources I recommend for examining events after the war in this context is: Calloway, Colin G. The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America: 1763 and the Transformation of North America. Pivotal Moments in American History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 240 pages. Well-written, wellresearched, and a riveting read. [Robert Fulton is a doctoral candidate in history at Northwestern University. He is preparing for a trip in the spring to France to complete his thesis on the subject of the French and Indian War.: editor] [1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805 Completed From Page 25] Garrison of Bhurtpore: 50,000 Troops (Regular and Irregular Infantry) A large number of guns (cannon) Covering Force: Amir Khan/Holkar Scindhian Horse (approx. 12,000)

succession in English politics of the time. However, because of Sir Julians focus on naval supremacy he has created a book that contributes much to the historical background for this war. The maintenance of a large and highly trained fleet was more than just about winning battles; the fleet was employed to support both wider political and military activities such as diplomatic pressure and protection of British commerce. Its part in the grand scheme of the Seven Years War was strategic, and it was quite effectively employed by its admirals in pursuit of victory. Dull, Jonathan R. The French Navy and the Seven Years War. France Overseas. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005. 445 pages. The Seven Years War was the worlds first global conflict, spanning five continents and the critical sea lanes that connected them. This book is the fullest account ever written of the French navys role in the hostilities. It is also the most complete survey of both phases of the war: the French and Indian War in North America (175460) and the Seven Years War in Europe (175663), which are almost always treated independently. By considering both phases of the war from every angle, award-winning historian Jonathan R. Dull shows not only that the two conflicts are
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Publication Expected Late Fall / Early Winter 2013/2014
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The Sikh War Sourcebook
By: Andrew Preziosi To Be Published by: The Virtual Armchair General (TVAG)
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In January of 2004, Khyber Pass Games published the First Sikh War Order of Battle, which included the first detailed regimental orders of battle for both sides during the four battles fought between the Anglo-Indian and Sikh armies in 1845-1846. The booklet included a concise account of the 1st Sikh War, political background that led up to the war, and a comprehensive article on the Sikh artillery. While it enjoyed a minor success, the ideal was to expand it to include the 2nd Sikh War. Fortunately, several key books and other resources previously unavailable came on line, and a copy of the hitherto impossible to find Khalsa Durbar Records (KDR) was located and provided by Gentleman Scholar, Dennis McKinney. With the KDR, it was possible to track the rise of the Khalsa from a band of seminomadic feudal horse to the formidable army that fought so courageously against the AngloIndian Army, and almost ended the British Raj in two separate razor close battles. Now, a highly detailed account of the rise of the Khalsa, the Sikh Brotherhood of Arms, has been compiled, in which every infantry battalion, cavalry regiment and artillery battery, along with the colorful Ghorchurras, can be tracked and identified in all battles they engaged in. And while written for the Sikh/Sub-Continent History buffs, the entire work is
also war games friendly in its details and adaptability. Even though the growth of the Khalsa, tracked across fifty years, is the heart of this work, there is a wealth of information that has either been forgotten or overlooked by virtually every author of the war since 1850. For example, the AngloIndian victory at Aliwal, the Battle without a mistake, was actually preceded by a near disastrous action at Buddewal, in which a Sikh general, dismissed as incompetent, almost wiped out Sir Harry Smith and his stripped down 1st Division before they could even fight their much touted battle. And that poor planning and execution on the part of British staff officers prevented troops from arriving at the front in a timely manner at the start of both wars. Many other widely held preconceptions of the conduct of the war will be challenged by information lost in the in cracks of history by decidedly pro-Raj writers for more than and a century and a half. Among the almost forgotten resources appearing in the Sikh Wars Source Book is Sir Colin Campbells privately published pamphlet in defense of his actions at Chillianwalla, published in 1851. An rare item generously provided by Dr. Robert Pye by way of a copy made from a rare original in the UK, it was hand transcribed to correct errors, and its information has not seen the light of dayor the eyes of most historiansfor over 160 years.
One such unique contribution is an analysis of the same Second Sikh War Battle of Chillianwallah, but this time by Major Agha Khan, PAVO 11th Cavalry Regiment (rtd). Finally, a view of this crucial action from the other side of the hill, one of the two razors edge battles on which the British Raj was staked. The Majors detailed account and analysis of this almost legendary contest is accompanied by maps of his own devising, detailing the maneuvers and opportunities taken and lost by the combatants that made this one, too close to call. In keeping with the theme of the work, to cast light on all aspects of the wars, the seemingly disjointed combats of Ramnuggar and Suddulapore are now combined into what they actually werea campaign of its own, and the amazing story of Fort Jubbur is a vital link in this narrative. Never 'eard of Fort Jubbur before? Very few people have, but imagine being Gough, Cureton or Campbell and having one of your brigadiers send this brief message: "By the by, did you know that there's a rather substantial fort, almost fortress, about ten miles off your flank from which 2,000 trained Jagirdari troops have been riding out daily to raid grazing livestock and beasts of burden from us, plundering sutlers attempting to join the tail,
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well supported by the local population of young men and Utes, andOh, yesthey are fully aware that I'm escorting the armys' entire Artillery Train, Engineer Park and military chest? This campaign in miniature comes out of one of those cracks in history for a full account in the narrative. The Daily March and Event Logs compiled for the book are the first attempts to trace the movements and actions of the Armies of the Sutlej and Punjab on a daily basis during the course of the Sikh Wars. March distances per day, distances between points, conditions encountered, and more help put the reader on the actual tracks, trails, and paths across the Punjab. A number of sidebars appear distributed through the text, Two brief examples of which are: The Curious Case of Colin Campbell's Colonelcy and Commands How a Lt. Colonel newly arrived in India, rose to a division commander in less than a year, going over the head of at least one Officer of greater experience and talent by way of seniority and cronyism. Skirmishing in the Sikh Wars Inspired by a war gamers question, this article lists every major engagement fought during the Sikh Wars and explains if skirmishers were used, or not,
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and the reasons behind such decisions. Finally, there will be a large number of illustrations of all manner of items, personalities, maps, etc, from contemporary sources (newspapers, journals, professional publications, etc), modern contributions, and more. Many of these have either not been seen since the original events, or have be contributed from unseen, private sources. The current Table of Contents follows below as the simplest way of providing a good sense of most of what the published work will include. Among these are contributions from a number of other modern researchers who have collaborated with the Author by accessing even more lost sources, all helping shed more light on military and other aspects of the subject. Introduction & Acknowledgements, 2nd Edition Khalsa to Catastrophe: Chaos as Statecraft, by Chris Ferree A Concise History of the First Sikh War, 1845-46 The Lion of the Punjab I, Ranjit The Road to War Far from Blind, But Hard of Hearing Organization of the Armies Opening Moves The Battle of Mudki
Ferozeshah: An Empire Trembles Buddewal, The Secret Defeat Aliwal: The Battle without a Mistake Sobraon: The Final Victory Postscript (including Analysis and Commentary) Sikh Treachery (Sidebar) The Interim Years: 1846-1848 Kangra Kot and the Jullundur Campaign The Kashmir Campaign Taming the Northwest Frontier Blindness Sets In Treachery and Trenches: The Multan Campaign, 1848 A Murder of Residents The Fatal Pause A Lieutenant in the Middle Dancing in the Dust The Lieutenant Becomes a Field Marshal Late, But Not Better Than Never Treachery Final Siege and Assault Fraying at the Edges A chapter bridging the events that occurred during and after the Mooltan Revolt to the actual start of the 2nd Sikh War. Ranging from the Northwest Frontier, to the Jullundur Doab, and into the very heartland of the Sikh nation, both major and minor events are covered to complete the picture.
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A Concise History of the Second Sikh War, 1848-49 The Opening Moves The Chenab River Campaign: Ramnuggar-Fort Jubbur-Sadulapore Advance to Chillianwalla: Fate Tosses A Coin Regrouping If Only Every Battle Had Been So Well Planned: Gujerat Pursuit to Peshawar Commentary and Analysis The View from the Other Side The Battle of ChillianwalaBy ex-Major Agha Khan, 11th PAVO Cavalry Regiment, Contributor to the Pakistani Defense Journal magazine Colin Campbells Memorandum on The Part Played by The 3rd Infantry Division at the Battle of Chillianwala Appendices: The Rise and Evolution of the Khalsa: A Brief Overview of Ranjit Singhs Life and Military Career Twenty Nine Parade States and Orders of Battle dealing with the Evolution of the Khalsa, 17991849. Tackling the Khalsa Durbar Records The Other Side: Sikh Orders of Battle Four Parade States and Orders of Battle 1st Sikh War Orders of Battle:
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Twenty Orders of Battle Notes on British Orders of Battle Problems with Sikh Sources The Northwest Frontier, 1837-1848 Twenty Orders of Battle Mooltan Campaign Orders of Battle: Twelve Orders of Battle 2nd Sikh War Orders of Battle: Eleven Orders of Battle Daily March and Event LogsFor Each major formation. Route March Rates and Waypoints Artillery Weights and Measures Calculations for Provisioning a March Column The Lions Teeth: The Artillery of the Khalsa, contributed by Neil Carleton The Regiments and Weapons of the Opposing Forces--by Dennis McKinney A complete listing of the regiments that were involved in the war, including details of their weaponry for both sides. Glossary, Abbreviations and Spellings of Sikh Names Sidebars: (Various short articles, including these.) The Honorable East India Company (HEIC) Weather, Terrain You, Sirrah, were Drunk!
The General Health and Well Beingor Lack Thereofof Certain Senior Officers The Curious Commands of Colin Campbell The Use of Skirmishers in Combat Flashman and the Mountain of Light The Bengal Artillery
Bibliography The final page count of the Source Book is impossible as yet to determine, but this will be no pamphlet or digest size work. It will include more information under one cover than might be found in hundreds of individual volumes, even if readily available, as so many are not. Hopefully, the editing and layout will be completed in a matter of months as every part is checked and rechecked for accuracy and completeness, and more material may yet be added to help round out the work so that when truly ready for print, it will be the single most thorough resource on this subject in published history. Tentatively, that event will be in the Autumn of 2013or as close to that date as possible! Those with questions, ideas, or interests relevant to this project are welcome to contact the Author at PreziosiA@aol.com, or the Publisher at TVAG@att.net.
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1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805
By: Andrew Preziosi
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Introduction A truce had been called, negotiations were underway with the one holdout and peace seemed at hand, but that illusion was shattered in July1804 when a major detachment of Gerard Lord Lakes vaunted army was swarmed under by the very man being negotiated with. Once more, the Army of India took the field to avenge this loss and in another series of brilliant maneuvers, the enemy was once more brought to battle and defeated, while another impregnable fortress was stormed and captured in short order. The enemy was on the run and had nowhere to go but the assumed safety of a mud-walled fortress commanded by an erstwhile ally. When General Lake and his dirty shirts arrived before this barrier, everyone was confident that it too would soon fall to their efforts; after all nothing had stood before them yet and everyone knew that victory here meant peace. The Edge of Empire It would take volumes to attempt to describe the political situation that England faced in India at the turn of the 19th Century and that is far outside the scope of this article, but it can be boiled down to a few simple truths. As late as 1796, England and its agent on the subcontinent, The Honorable East India Company (HEIC), honestly did not covet anything
more than a financial empire. True, their small factory posts had expanded exponentially in less than forty years into vast land holdings and they never turned a good deal down when it came to acquiring wealth, whether it be in a small but lucrative grain contract or gaining control of a huge tract of land through default of payment, but the idea of acquiring a land Empire just wasnt (quite) there. It is also true that while the HEIC used its three presidential armies and its own small navy in order to engage in two rather abortive wars (1st Mahratta and 1st Mysore) during the time frame of the American War of Independence; England and the HEIC generally used every trick in the book to keep potential enemies off balance on the field of commerce rather than trying to engage them in battle. In their collective minds, they had enough benefits and problems with their current holdings to even think of venturing further into the interior and facing the unknown. By the 1790s that attitude began to change for two major reasons. The first was the French Revolution and its attendant wars. While initially confined to continental boundaries, various French governments soon did all they could to try and stir up trouble for England outside of Europe and during the next twenty years, the threat to India became the favorite cats paw to be employed. Amazingly enough, for all of their political acumen, England and the HEIC never quite understood that Frances threat to India was just that; despite small
French efforts and expeditions that never really succeeded, England always believed India to be vulnerable to French advances and spent a great deal of money and effort to insure their holdings on the subcontinent were secure. From 1790 through 1792, the HEIC was caught up in a second war with Mysore and its eccentric ruler, Tippoo Sultan. While not the general his father, the late Hyder Ali, had been, Tippoo was good enough to keep the Anglo-Indian armies of the three presidencies bouncing around until the then Governor General and Commander in Chief, Charles Lord Cornwallis finally took command and control in 1791 and forced Tippoo to sue for peace within a year. These two events now set the stage for the second reason that turned England from the worlds most powerful merchant to a country now looking to build an Empire and that reason was in the shape of a single man; Richard Wellesely, 1st Earl of Mornington. In 1797, Prime Minister William Pitt appointed Wellesley as Governor General of India to replace Cornwallis and pretty much gave him free reign to do as he wished, as long as the British hold on India was strengthened. Wellesleys opinion was that England had lost its most lucrative colony when America won its war of Independence and he was determined to see India fill the void as its richest holding, especially with money so desperately needed to fight France.
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Upon his arrival in 1798, Wellesley, already well versed in regards to India, quickly assessed the current situation and took the first steps towards empire by making sure that the Kingdoms of Mysore and Hyderabad would never again pose a threat to India and England. With British forces mobilized, the Nizam of Hyderabad was given an option; relieve and remove all of the French officers, NCOs and technicians that commanded the European trained battalions and brigades in his army immediately or face war. After a brief game of bluff, the Nizam acceded to Wellesleys demand and not only rid his army of the French threat, but soon became a firm and reliable ally to the HEIC. It was next learned that Tippoo Sultan was in communication with General Bonaparte in order to form an alliance that would give Bonaparte a large and welcome addition to his own army, when he eventually arrived overland from Egypt. Today, its well known that Bonaparte was just thumping his chest across the waters, but already hed become something of a bogey-man to England, and there was no guarantee that he wouldnt arrive in India and if so, Tippoo had to be gone. The 3rd Mysore War was efficiently planned for in advance and executed in 1799. In just a few months, Tippoo was dead, his kingdom dissolved and the threat removed. Soon enough, Wellesley faced another formidable foe and resolved to either bring them to heel or bring
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them down. The Road to the Next War The Mahratta Empire was actually a very loosely knit confederacy that stretched across Northern and Central India, bordering each of presidencies and was usually considered no more than a dull headache for the HEIC. They had been a major power in the time of Clive, but were decisively defeated at the battle of Panipat in 1761 and pretty much faded into the background for the next twenty years. During that time an obscure Gwalior Chieftain, Mahadji Scindhia began a slow but steady crawl to the top of the heap and by the late 1770s was both the kingmaker and de facto ruler of the confederacy. The period just after the 1st Mahratta War was a time of great change, for that was when Mahadji met an obscure soldier of fortune from Savoy, Benoit de Boigne. Though their relationship got off to a rocky start, Scindia was impressed by the skills, intelligence and bravery of de Boigne, but upon discovering that de Boigne was also a man of honor who could not be bought or swayed, they cemented a friendship and partnership that would last a lifetime. In short order de Boigne agreed to form a small, European lead and trained, native infantry brigade, with its own artillery battery, forged in de Boignes private foundry that had been established for him by Mahadji at Agra.
In five short years, with de Boignes assistance, Scindhia solidified his position as kingmaker and the real power within the Mahratta Empire. Taking on all comers, including recalcitrant Mahratta rajahs, Jats, Rajputs and even the forces of the decaying Moghul Empire, Scindhia entered Delhi in 1788 and became the defender and Vice Regent of the Emperor Shah Alam II, basically the same exact titles and positions he occupied within the Mahratta Confederacy. The Mahratta Empire was now at the height of its strength and influence, stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Bay of Bengal, from as far south as the border of Mysore to the edge of the Northwest Frontier and Mahadji Scindhia was the most powerful man on the subcontinent. But Mahadji was also threatened by jealous Mahratta princes and chieftains, so while engaging in a consummate game of politics and intrigue, he asked de Boigne to increase his European trained forces from one small brigade to three large ones, complete with artillery, cavalry, engineers and a siege train. At the same time, other Mahratta rulers began to recruit European officers to train their own private armies, all of which were ostensibly under the Peswha at Poona (and thus Mahadji), but it soon became common for one kingdom to fight its neighbor for a piece of land, a fortress or the hand of a woman. Mahadji allowed these conflicts to take place, as they

were generally small in nature and kept the princes weak, but if they got out of hand, de Boigne or one of his lieutenants would be there to stamp out the embers. The HEIC and British government now became quite alarmed at the rise of Mahratta power throughout the subcontinent; especially since intelligence reports from their factors and civil servants confirmed that the European trained brigades were almost (or) as good as the Sepoy brigades fielded by the three presidencies. But there was little they could do in the near future, due to Tippoo Sultan of Mysore. 1795, however, was another fateful year for the Mahratta Empire. Within the space of twelve months, Mahadji was assassinated and de Boigne, seeing both his position threatened and peace-keeping efforts thwarted, decided to retire to Europe. The nebulous Mahratta Empire now truly devolved once more into a squabbling confederacy and the worst traits of its peoples and rulers now rose to the fore, forcing the British government, the HEIC and even other Indian rulers to turn a cold hard eye on their erstwhile neighbors. Despite the veneer of civilization and the powerful influence of Mahadji and de Boigne, the Mahrattas at this point in time, were actually a rapacious semi-nomadic people who did everything they could to benefit from others efforts, rather than work diligently to build their own kingdoms and
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provinces from within. Civil war now pretty much broke out between the individual states and their allies, but these alliances could (and would) change on an almost monthly basis. The European officered and trained brigades of the satellite kingdoms now became the nucleus of marauding armies who no longer engaged in limited warfare, but employed wholesale slaughter and terror in order to defeat their enemies. While the brigades maintained their discipline, in exchange for a piece of the action, the Mahrattas were returning to form by unleashing their most dreaded secret weapon, the Pindarees, against their foe. The Pindarees were journeymen freebooters and brigands who had always been part of the Mahratta power structure. After the battle of Panipat and under Mahadji, their power had been kept in check, but now it was allowed to bloom once more. Coupled with traditional armed bands and mobs raised by various chieftains and rulers, the Pindarees swept forth and were allowed to do as they pleased, as long as they shared their loot with whatever Rajah or Nizam who sent them forth. Nothing was out of bounds; looting, raping and pillaging now became commonplace throughout non-HEIC controlled territory. Towns and villages would be held hostage, parents would be trussed up and then forced to watch as babies and grandmothers were raped and killed in front of them, daughters of marrying age mutilated and then allowed to live, while sons or grandfathers had
bags of glowing embers placed over their face, hanged upside down and then beaten to die simultaneously of asphyxiation and being burned to death, just so they would divulge where the family treasure (if any) was secreted. If there was a silver lining to such barbarity though, it usually only took a few examples of such treatment for word to spread and those targeted next were usually only too happy to have what little wealth and food they had ready and waiting for the taking by the Pindarees, who were equally happy to take such easy pickings and quickly move on to the next target. For now though, the Pindarees were just one element of the Mahratta scourge, as stated before, civil war had broken out between the various princes and large scale battles soon became the norm. It was at Poonah however that the final threshold was crossed, for it was here that two of the rival armies, complete with their European brigades, engaged in one of the largest battles fought to date, in order to determine just who would be the next Peshwa of the Confederacy. What was truly amazing though is that the battle took place right under the very nose of the British commissioner and his small Madras infantry escort brigade, who literally had a grandstand view of the entire battle unfolding before them! This battle and its subsequent results convinced the Governor General to prepare for war; fortunately he had a fine weapon within his

quill, the newly arrived Commander in Chief, General Lake, a solid officer of mixed fortunes. In Bengal, Lord Lake had a small army directly under his command, but during the three years he had been present, he had forged it into the finest all-arms force yet seen on the subcontinent by instituting a series of large scale maneuvers and exercises, the likes of which had never been seen before in India. Knowing his terrain, troops and enemy, Lake created a very balanced army of two infantry divisions and a large ad hoc cavalry division, supported by the renowned Bengal Artillery and the nascent Bengal Pioneers. When war came, Lake would have the finest sword available. Whirlwind Victory Staggering Defeat! Lakes first campaign against the Mahrattas was, nothing short of miraculous. In less then ninety days, he led his Dirty Shirted 10,000to glory by engaging in two pitched battles, two smaller combats, a brief siege and the successful storming of a second fortress that had been deemed impregnable. The end result was that Delhi and the Moghul Emperor were now under HEIC control and protection and that the plains of Hindustan were wide open. The once vaunted Mahratta European trained brigades were decimated, the first group falling apart when many of their officers either resigned their commissions or
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quickly retired, thereby completely destroying the morale of their troops. Reinforcements from the Deccan, under a first-rate native general fared much better and fought quite well at the decisive battle of Laswaree, but in the end, they too were completely trounced. Coupled with Arthur Wellesleys rather hard fought, but equally successful campaign in the Deccan, the war seemed to be over almost as soon as it started. The Mahrattas were a proud people and still commanded large forces and much respect, so peace negotiations were rather lengthy, but proceeded steadily. Wisely, Lake kept his army in being, while reinforcements from Bombay were placed on their northern border, because one man, Deswant Rao Holkar, could not be brought to terms. At first it seemed like the usual Mahratta stall, but as weeks stretched into months it was decided to put more than diplomatic and financial pressure on Holkar. A Colonel Murray (who was to be Wellesleys deus ex machina during the Peninsular War) was ordered north from the Bombay territories with a small force of HM and native troops, while Lake was to send a small division to the borders of Hindustan in order to cooperate. This seemingly intelligent move was anything but. Murray was somewhat cowed by Holkar, supplies were intermittent and his cavalry was almost non-existent. Due to death and promotions, Lake was restricted in his choice of leaders and resolved to send his division out under the command of
Brigadier Monson of the 76th Highlanders. Monson was a great tactician and the bravest man in the British army, he proved as much during the storming of the then impregnable Aligarh fortress in September, but he was also as dumb as a brick when it came to higher concepts. Monson was given a reinforced veteran native infantry brigade, a battery of artillery and a very large irregular cavalry force; the consensus being that these two forces would soon bring Holkar back to the bargaining table. Monson and Murray were within twenty miles of each other when Holkar turned the tables. A massive weather front had moved in and after a quick feint towards Murray, Holkar attacked Monson. The first victim was the Irregular Cavalry, under command of a newly promoted lieutenant, which was attacked by almost 20,000 of Holkars cavalry and then completely routed when one of the hitherto allied bands turned on the young officer. Monson himself was next when he was caught with his back against a river during a torrential rainstorm. Extricating most of his troops in relatively good order; he lost the bulk of his artillery, transport and supplies. After that, it was just a matter of time; attacked and harassed several times a day, in hostile territory whose people refused to assist, his once proud division began to disintegrate until Monson himself gave the order for his starving troops to scatter and flee as best they could. While a good solid portion

of the troops did reach army lines, the Marquess of Wellesley had but one recourse available, to order Lord Lake and his army back into service and defeat Holkar. Another Blitzkrieg Lord Lakes army was much smaller this time but still a well balanced force, with reinforcements promised in the near future. His opponent, while still having European trained brigades available, had what was now a more traditional Mahratta force, very strong in irregular light horse, Pindarees, a heavy but mobile artillery train and a selection of infantry ranging from untrained mobs to fairly reliable warriors. Despite their nomenclature, the Light Dragoons and Bengal Light Cavalry pursuing Holkar just werent as fast, but where the Anglo-Indian cavalry excelled was in dogged pursuit and being (relatively) well supplied. With Holkar now loose in Hindustan and Delhi at risk, Lake divided his army in two. Leading the bulk of the cavalry division, some light artillery and the reserve infantry brigade, Lake decided to pursue Holkar. Newly arrived MG Fraser was given the bulk of the infantry, field artillery and some cavalry to follow on and take on any enemy forces that he came across. Lake crossed the border from Secundra on October 1st and soon got wind of Holkar, whose camp came very close to being surprise attacked at dawn a
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week later, had it not been for a few astute pickets. With Fraser following on, Lake wisely decided to march on Delhi and arrived in the vicinity not a moment too soon, because Holkar had detached one of his sons with almost 20,000 men to capture the Moghul capital. Fortunately, the year before, Lake had left two of the finest Bengal Army officers available in command of the city and had been able to send them some reinforcements during the interim. Nonetheless Lt. Colonels Ochterlony and Burn had only 2.5 battalions of Bengal regulars and some ex-Scindhian service battalions of mixed quality to hold the fort and city, along with artillery and a fairly large force of Irregular cavalry, including the escort regiment from last year, which was now commanded by a young Eurasian James Skinner. For almost ten days, this scratch force repulsed every attempt made against Delhi until the final day, when during the middle of a full, formal assault, the enemy army just left the field of battle; Lord Lake was near. While Lake continued his pursuit, Fraser had been marching steadily in support and in midNovember the entire army got lucky. Though not a complete success, Lake once more surprised Holkar at Furruckabad and sent him packing, completely dispersing his force and capturing his baggage. Fraser, woefully outnumbered and outgunned, met Holkars regular army near the fortress of Deeg and completely vanquished his foe, though losing his life in so doing. Almost 90 of
the 160 cannon fielded by the enemy at Deeg were captured, including some of the guns captured from Monson in August, while the remnants of Holkars brigades now either disappeared in a poof or entered Deeg. Holkar went from the power in Hindustan to a veritable beggar in the space of a week and the war would have ended right there and then, had it not been for the formerly loyal Rajah of Bhurtpore, who despite being rewarded for his stance during the first phase of the war by the HEIC, had been in communication with Holkar before and during Monsons retreat and then sent his cavalry and artillery to assist Holkars forces at Deeg. Declaring treachery, the Government and Lord Lake were now forced to reduce the Rajahs holdings. Deeg was immediately covered by Lakes column, while Frasers wing (now under Monson), reinforcements and the siege train moved to join. By December 13th, Deeg was under siege, a breach was created ten days later and on Christmas Eve, the town and fortress were stormed and taken with relatively few casualties, while the Mahratta and Jat troops fled to the nearby fortress on Bhurtpore; the last citadel to be conquered before final British victory could be declared. Bhurtpore: The First Assault By January 1st, 1805, Lakes Army was en route for Bhurtpore, with a cavalry screen

already in position; being joined in the process by Major General William Dowdeswell with His Majestys 75th Foot and a much needed supply and stores column. Combher was reached on the 3rd and camp was soon set up; it being a rectangular formation with the cavalry facing out towards the plain and the infantry facing Bhurtpore proper. A small grove was captured that evening and on the following day a breaching battery was established and siege lines begun. Bhurtpore stood pretty much alone on an open plain, a rather perfect position, all things considered; Holkar and his cavalry swarm could raid and threaten the British lines of communication and rear, while the Rajahs troops and remnants of the Scindhian brigades manned the walls, complete with numerous and powerful artillery. Bhurtpore proper was surrounded by both a ditch and a very thick mud wall, which would prove almost impervious to artillery. While surrounded by a relatively open plane, the immediate environs of Bhurtpore consisted of groves, tropical jungle, swampy land, watery marshes and various watercourses, all of which were designed to disrupt any assault. By January 9th, a practicable breach had been created and plans for the assault were made. Lt. Colonel James Maitland would lead the Main Column, consisting of the Flank companies of the HM infantry regiments then present (22nd,
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75th and 76th Highlanders), two Bengal native infantry battalions, a small battery of four 6-pndr cannon (which never joined) and the Forlorn Hope of thirteen men lead by a young Sergeant John Shipp. The Left Column was commanded by Major Walter Hawkes, 1st/2nd BNI and consisted of two companies of HM 75th, Hawkes own battalion and an artillery section of two 6-pndrs. The Right Column was under command of Lt. Colonel Robert Rayne, 1st BEIR and consisted two more companies of HM 75th, 1st Bengal European Infantry Regiment and another artillery section. Maitland was to go for the breach, Rayne to a small gateway on the right, while Hawkes was to clear a small forward enemy battery and then assault through another bastion. The columns were to make short, sharp work of their objectives and follow so close to the retreating enemy that they would be amongst their foe as they fled from the walls. Once the breach was taken and secured, a larger column would follow to insure victory. The assault began at 8PM and from the beginning things went wrong. Firing had ceased on the breach just after sunset (almost four hours earlier), allowing the defenders time to both repair it and establish new defenses. The moon was in its 2nd quarter and assisted by firebrand lighting along the walls and from the outlying positions, it was never much darker than the original sunset had been, allowing the enemy to know exactly what was going on below at all times. Worst of all, while
Hawkes column did secure its initial objective, the Main and Left columns became entangled due to the fact that they both moved out simultaneously across the same broken terrain. Hawkes took the enemy battery but could not get close to the walls and moved to support Maitland. After untangling from Maitland, Rayne moved to his assault position but was stymied by not only the ditch, but a huge drain-field which he could not cross, also forcing him to move to support Maitland. Maitland reached the breach, but thwarted by the ditch and enemy gunfire, could get few troops across. What was worse, the ladder bearers, for all of the columns, instead of being veteran native infantry (who would normally get a bonus and, if killed or wounded, a small pension for their families) were civilian pioneers who, not being offered any inducements, dropped their wooden charges when they came under fire and fled. Shipp and his Forlorn Hope came close to the breach, a small party of the 22nd Foot actually reached and climbed that obstacle to just below the lip, but despite the efforts of Maitland, who was killed trying to get troops into the city, the assault, literally taking place under bright lights, failed and had to be called back. The army lost almost five hundred men and since many of the wounded could either not be found or carried back while under fire, they were murdered in a most gruesome manner by the garrison later that evening.

Amazingly, despite their first ever real check on the field of battle, Lakes dirty shirts retained their morale and spirits; mistakes had been made but they would be set right next time and then, they would win. The 2nd Assault The next breach was made practicable late on January 19th; the following day, three native cavalry troopers broke from the British lines and made a dash for Bhurtpore. Despite swift pursuit and furious firing from outlying pickets, the trio made their way along the ditch, now covered by enemy fire and was directed to a gate near the breach. It was here; just as the gate opened that the trio drew up, laughed and then headed back to army lines, arriving safely despite murderous gunfire from the very men whod been covering those just moments earlier. Between hearty congratulations and promotions, the three troopers reported, to the very best of their knowledge, the height, depth and breadth of the ditch near the breach, to which specifications the nascent Bengal Engineers finished building several ladder bridges with which to cross the water barrier and mount the breach. Learning their lessons from before, two columns were formed to assault Bhurtpore during sunlight the following day. The Main column, under Lt. Colonel Kenneth Macrae, HM 75th, once more consisted of Shipps Forlorn Hope, over 400
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European troops, two native infantry battalions, a battery of four 6-pndrs and a picked corps of European troops and regular native infantry to carry the custom made ladder-bridges and scaling ladders. Lt. Colonel Simpson with the Right Column, consisting of two Bengal infantry battalions, was to cover Macraes flank and then proceed to another nearby gateway and force entrance, thereby allowing a larger force to follow. At 3PM on the 21st, the assault went forward. At almost the same moment, a huge mass of enemy cavalry appeared on the plain forcing Lake to take the bulk of the cavalry and galloper guns to confront this threat. The assault proceeded smoothly until reaching the ditch in front of the breach. To the amazement of everyone, the garrison had managed to widen and redirect the ditch during the night and it was now impossible to cross with the ladder bridges, mainly because proposed float barrels had been replaced with bladders that could burst and no hooks had been added to the ends in order to make larger bridges. This time casualties numbered close to six-hundred men, mainly because of the fire brought to bear on the milling crowd in front of the breach while awaiting events. With no other option, Macrae ordered a withdrawal, while out on the plain; Lake easily repulsed Meer Khan, who had been reported en route earlier with a strong force of allied cavalry to assist Holkar and the Raja.
Third and Fourth Assaults Just prior to this assault and for the following month, reinforcement and supply columns arrived and departed regularly, while the siege itself progressed. At the same time, MG Smith was detached once more with the bulk of the cavalry to pursue Meer Khan and his mounted host in order to at least keep him away from Bhurtpore, if unable to bring him to battle. The details of the 3rd attempt are a bit too complicated for this article, but it can be boiled down quickly to the fact that the night before the storm and even that morning, the enemy sortied from the town and destroyed all of the scaling equipment and forward trenches, which had traditionally been vacated by the troops prior to any attempt. They also repaired the breach, set up inner and outer defenses and made great show of digging a mine. Nonetheless, the storming parties went forward and this time made progress, including having a small party take a section of the wall. The column commander called for reinforcements, but the European troops, headed by the 76th Foot, which had been nicknamed the Heroes of Hindoostan for their service throughout the entire war, balked at going forward, fearing a mine would be exploded under them at the moment of victory. Again, retreat was ordered and this time the army suffered almost 1,000 casualties.

Lake addressed the European troops the following morning; instead of breathing fire, he took the tone of an affectionate father who regretted a sons rash actions and within moments his troops were clamoring for another attempt. Despite the setbacks, Lake was still beloved by his troops, especially the native sepoys, who believed him to be invincible. With Shipp still dangerously wounded, Lieutenant Templeton of the 76th Highlanders was given the Forlorn Hope, followed by the entire European infantry, two Bombay and two more Bengal battalions; all lead by Monson. The artillery had shifted its focus somewhat to the right of the breach during the night and had pitted and blasted the wall enough to where it would provide a protected staging area to go in from there. At 3PM the assault went in with a will; individuals and entire units vied with each other to get into Bhurtpore and they came very close to success, but again, the enemy was waiting with small arms and artillery fire, on top of which they emptied pots of boiling oil, huge timbers, bales of cotton soaked in oil and set aflame-followed immediately by pots filled with gunpowder and other explosives. The breach could still not be taken, but other portions of the wall seemed accessible and the men did everything they could to get to the top, including using bayonets as step ladders, but all to no avail. The breach had been sealed and the enemy too numerous,
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(Continued)
active and well supplied with ammunition of all sorts to be swept from the walls and for the final time the assault was called off, with another 1,000 casualties, including Templeton, who had been killed. Endgame That was it, supplies were dangerously low, ammunition almost completely expended and with over three thousand casualties, the siege was over. But Lake refused to submit, his lines of communication were still open and supplies were en route, so he decided to blockade Bhurtpore and amazingly, within days, negotiations were underway. During this period Lake did another night march and came upon Holkar at dawn, his cavalry went in and this time the transport and supplies of the Pindarees, the Rajah and Meer Khan were captured and the entire force dispersed. Hearing this, the Rajah signed the surrender papers on April 10th, 1805 and two days later his son was received by Lake as hostage barring final ratification. Holkar himself was finally run to ground several months later while taking refuge with the Sikhs, who were just now creating a kingdom under Ranjit Singh. By years end, the war was over and the army marched back to its cantonments. Final Thoughts There were several reasons Bhurtpore never fell to the Dirty Shirts, many of which are
evidenced in the assaults themselves, but most students of the siege agree that Bhurtpore did not fall for three main reasons. The Mud Wall: Most of Lakes troops and officers initially scoffed at this obstacle, but others, including the Bengal Artillery, knew just what they were facing. Bhurtpores walls were very thick and very old, you couldnt blast holes through them, all you could do was crumble them very slowly, allowing the garrison to strengthen and even rebuild it from the inside, with little risk to themselves. The Bengal Pioneers: Were indeed the pioneers of the Bengal Sappers and Miners who would be covered with glory during the next fifty years, but they were not yet that famed corps and much had to be learned, both by their young (and relatively inexperienced) officers and men; Bhurtpore was their very first harsh headmaster. Lord Lake had a reputation second to none before Bhurtpore and there were even rumors that he might very well be returned to England to command an army in the field once again, but that was not to be. Constant, swift success had lead to such expectations and the biggest mistake made in front of Bhurtpore was the failure of General Lake in not blockading the fortress, taking a big breath and then implementing a proper and formal siege, headed by experienced senior officers of the Bengal Artillery, instead of

letting junior engineer officers pick objectives each time an assault failed. It would have taken time, but in the end, Lake used two months and the lives of three thousand troops to fail. Experienced officers, taking young professionals under wing and doing things right almost assuredly would have made the difference and had that been done, Bhurtpore would have fallen. As it was, the legend of Bhurtpore grew, while the reputation of the Bengal Army was somewhat tarnished. It would take twenty years and another siege for Bhurtpore to fall, but that story is for another time! Bibliography, Siege of Bhurtpore: Primary Sources: The London Gazette, 1804-1806 Times of London, ditto Official Dispatches, Orders, Letters, etc Secondary Sources: Bidwell, Shelford, Swords for Hire: European Mercenaries 18th C. India Grant Duff, History of the Mahrattas, Volumes 2 and 3 Keene, H.G., Hindustan under the Free Lances Khanna, D.D. (Young), The 2nd Maratha Campaign, 1804-1805 (Diary of Lt. James Young, Bengal Horse Artillery) Pearse, Col. Hugh W., Memoir ofViscount Lake, Baron Lake
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(Continued)
of Delhi Preziosi, Andrew, The Preziosi Order of Battle Collection, 2nd Mahratta War Stubbs, History of the Bengal Artillery, Volume 1 Thorn, Captain, Memoir of the Late War in India Wellesley, Marquess of Dispatches and Notes Relative to the Late Transactions in the Mahratta Empire
1st Battalion/15th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion/15th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/ 21st Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 3rd Infantry Brigade: Brigadier (Lt. Colonel) George Ball, 1st/8th BNI HM 75th Foot Regiment (joined Dec. 31st) 1st Battalion/8th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion/22nd Bengal Native Infantry Regiment The Reserve of Infantry (Brigade): Lt. Colonel Patrick Don, 2nd/8th BNI HM 22nd Foot Regiment (Flank Companies) 1st Battalion/12th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion/12th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/ 21st Bengal Native Infantry Regiment (Ad Hoc) Cavalry Division: Brigadier (Colonel & Lt. Colonel) Robert Macan, 29th LD Lt. Colonel John Sullivan Wood, HM 8th LD (superseded Macan on Jan 8th, due to new regulations) 1st Brigade: Major (Brevet Lt Colonel) John Ormsby Vandeleur, HM 8th LD HM 8th Light Dragoon Regiment 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry Regiment
Order of Battle, British Army of India, 2nd Phase of the War, Bhurtpore Campaign, December 28th, 1804 April 10th, 1805 Commander in Chief, Army of India: General Sir Gerard Lake, HMs Forces Infantry (Division): Major General William Dowdeswell, HM 86th Foot (joined Dec. 31st) 1st Infantry Brigade: Brigadier (Colonel and Lt. Colonel) The Hon. William Monson, HM 76th HM 76th Foot Regiment 1st Battalion/2nd Bengal (Grenadiers) Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Brigade: Brigadier (Lt. Colonel) George S. Brown, 1st/4th BNI 1st Bengal European Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/15th Bengal

2nd Bengal Light Cavalry Regiment 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry Regiment 6th Bengal Light Cavalry Regiment Artillery: 6 x Galloper guns (2/regiment, except HM 8th) 2nd Brigade: Lt. Colonel Thomas Browne, BLC HM 27th Light Dragoon Regiment HM 29th Light Dragoon Regiment 1st Bengal Light Cavalry Regiment 4th Bengal Light Cavalry (Lancer) Regiment Artillery: 8 x Galloper guns (2/regiment) Artillery: (attached) The (1st Bengal) Experimental Horse Artillery Troop (6 pieces)Captain-Lieutenant Clements Brown Army Troops: Army Artillery: Brevet Lt. Colonel (Major) John Horsford, BA Manned by (initially): Fifteen Officers One (Brevet) Lt Colonel Four Captains Seven Lieutenants (Subalterns) 184 European gunners 800 gun Lascars:
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(Continued)
800 gun Lascars: 492 Gun Lascars 137 Irregular Golandauz 174 Ex-Scindiahs Golandauz Details: (initial) The (1st Bengal) Experimental Horse Artillery Troop 1st Company, 1st Battalion, BA (detail) 2nd Company, 1st Battalion, BA 3rd Company, 1st Battalion, BA 3rd Company, 2nd Battalion, BA Subsequently joined: 4th Company, 2nd Battalion, BA 5th Company, 3rd Battalion, BA Equipment: Horse Artillery Troop (4 x 6-pndrs, 2 x 5.5 Howitzers) Cavalry Gallopers (14 x 6pndrs) Battalion Guns (22 x 6pndrs) Field Pieces (in Park or Battery): 7 x 12-pndrs 8 x 6-pndrs 6 x 5.5 Howitzers 2 x 4.2/5 Howitzers Siege Equipment: 6 x 18-pndrs 4 x 5.5 Mortars 4 x 8 Mortars Siege Materiel, Engineer Supplies and Ordnance Store Depot: Allahabad Engineer and Pioneer Corps: (forerunner, Bengal Sapper and Miner) (Three Engineer Officers and Three Pioneer [Infantry] Officers,
initially) Lt. Colonel Alexander Kydd, BE Three companies of Pioneers Strengths: (8,800 men, total) British (European) Infantry (1,000) British Cavalry (800) Native Infantry (4,400) Native Cavalry (1,600) Bengal Artillery (1,000) Subsequent Reinforcements (& Detachments): Bhurtpore Campaign January 18th, 1805: (1,600) Major General John Smith, HMs Service 3 x Bengal Native Battalions (exAgra garrison) 2nd Battalion/ 9th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/ 14th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment ? Battalion/? Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 100 European convalescents 6 x 6-pndr Battalion guns Pathan (ex-Scindhian) Cavalry (500)-Ismail Beg Major General Smiths Pursuit Column: February 8, 1805 (vs. Amir Khan) March 23rd The Cavalry Division: (1,800) HM 8th, 27th and 29th Light Dragoon Regiments 1st, 3rd and 6th BNC Regiments The Experimental Troop of BHA Skinners Irregular Horse (500) joined Feb. 11th
VOL. 7 NO. 4 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805 [Continued]

Bombay Division: (ex-Murrays Division) February 11th Major General (Lt. Colonel) Richard Jones, Bombay Artillery HM 65th Foot (8 companies) HM 86th Foot 1st Bombay Grenadier Battalion (1st/1st Bombay IR) 2nd Battalion/2nd Bombay Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/3rd Bombay Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/9th Bombay Infantry Regiment The (1st) Troop of Bombay Cavalry (120) The Gaekwars Irregular Horse (500) Artillery: One Bombay Artillery Company 5th Company, 3rd Battalion, BA 2 x 12-pndrs 12 x 6-pndrs 2 x Field Howitzers 700 Europeans 2,400 Native Infantry and Cavalry
Reinforcement and Supply Column: Lt. Colonel George Holmes, Bombay Infantry 2nd Battalion/ 1st Bombay Infantry Regiment (detached from Jones) 2nd Battalion/ 9th Bombay Infantry Regiment
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Sikh Source Book OOB Example 2nd Mahratta War, 2nd Phase
Order of Battle, British Army of India, 2nd Phase of the War, Bhurtpore Campaign, December 28th, 1804 - April 10th, 1805 [Editors Note: This OOB is provided as an example of the scholarship that is to be found in the Sikh Wars Source Book advertised prior to the Siege of Bhurtpore article. I have Andrew Praziosis earlier work, The Sudan Source Book, which covers the wars against the Mad Mhadi of Sudan in the late 1800s. That book was a joy to read and contained important information that provides crucial data for the wargame enthusiast. I am sure the scholarship in Andrews Sikh War Source Book will undoubtedly be of equal usefulness and accuracy.] Commander in Chief, Army of India: General Sir Gerard Lake, HMs Forces Military Secretary: Major (Brevet Lt. Colonel) George Augustus Frederick Lake, HM 29th Foot Aides-de-Camp: Major (Brevet Lt. Colonel) George Augustus Frederick Lake, HM 29th Foot Major William Nicholson, HM 72nd Captain (Brevet Major) James Menzies, HM 22nd Foot (KIA) Captain John M Johnson Captain Alexander Morrison, 21st BNI Personal Physician: (Surgeon) Dr. Robert Leny, Esq.
PAGE 25
Commander in Chiefs Bodyguard: One troop, 3rd BLC-Lieutenant Thomas Martin (see below, however) Army Staff: Acting Adjutant General, Kings Troops: Major William Nicholson, HM 72nd Acting Quartermaster General, Kings Troops: Major (Brevet Lt. Colonel) George Augustus Frederick Lake, HM 29th Foot Adjutant General, HEIC Troops: Lt. Colonel John Gerard, BNI Deputy Quartermaster General, HEIC Troops: Major Thomas Salkeld, 1st BNI (W) Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General, HEIC Troops: Captain John Covell, HM 76th (W) Political Department: Mr. Graeme Mercer, Governor Generals Agent Lt. Colonel John Malcolm (returned near the end) Mr. Charles Theophilus Metcalf, AGGO
Versus: The Army of Scindhia: Jeswant Rao Holkar Raja Ranjit Singh of Bhurtpore [Completed on Page 10]
VOL. 7 NO. 4
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(Continued)
Sikh Source Book OOB Example 2nd Mahratta War

Agent for Grain and Camels: Major John Campbell, BNI Captain I.Y. Bradford, BNI Commissary of Grain and Bazaars: Captain William Morrison, 1st Battalion, MA Persian Interpreter: Captain-Lieutenant William Storrock, 16th BNI Surgeon General: Doctor Peter Cochrane, Esq. Paymaster: Mr. James Edmiston, Deputy Paymaster, Fatehgarh Infantry (Division): Major General William Dowdeswell, HM 86th Foot (joined Dec. 31st) Aide-de-Camp: (and Military Secretary) Captain John Harvey, HM 80th Divisional Major of Brigade: Captain John Wallace, 15th BNI (mistakenly written as Wallis by Young) 1 Infantry Brigade: Brigadier (Colonel and Lt. Colonel) The Hon. William Monson, HM 76th Major of Brigade: Captain Lieutenant J. Frederick Carr, 11th BNI Brigade Quartermaster: Lieutenant William Casement, 4th BNI
st
HM 76th Foot Regiment 1st Battalion/2nd Bengal (Grenadiers) Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Brigade: Brigadier (Lt. Colonel) George S. Brown, 1st/4th BNI Major of Brigade: Lieutenant John Vaughan, BNI Brigade Quartermaster: Lieutenant John Greenstreet, 15th BNI 1st Bengal European Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/15th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment-Captain Walsh/Welsh 2nd Battalion/15th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/ 21st Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 3rd Infantry Brigade: Brigadier (Lt. Colonel) George Ball, 1st/8th BNI Major of Brigade: Captain Wanaee (no such name, or variation of, listed under Dodwell) Brigade Quartermaster: Lieutenant John Ker, 8th BNI (D) HM 75th Foot Regiment (joined Dec. 31st)-Lt. Colonel the Hon. James Maitland 1st Battalion/8th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion/22nd Bengal Native Infantry Regiment The Reserve of Infantry (Brigade): Lt. Colonel Patrick Don, 2nd/8th BNI
Major of Brigade: Captain Robert Stephenson, 12th BNI Brigade Quartermaster: Lieutenant Norman Shairp, 12th BNI HM 22nd Foot Regiment (Flank Companies) 1st Battalion/12th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 2nd Battalion/12th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/ 21st Bengal Native Infantry Regiment (Ad Hoc) Cavalry Division: Brigadier (Colonel & Lt. Colonel) Robert Macan, 29th LD Lt. Colonel John Sullivan Wood, HM 8th LD (superseded Macan on Jan 8th, due to new regulations) Aide-de-Camp: Major of Brigade: Captain Thomas Martin, 3rd BLC (replaced Macan) Chief of Horse Artillery: Captain-Lieutenant Clements Brown, BA 1st Brigade: Major (Brevet Lt Colonel) John Ormsby Vandeleur, HM 8th LD Major of Brigade: Captain George Bolton, HM 8th LD Brigade Quartermaster: Captain Charles Augustus Mary de Peyron, 3rd BLC
VOL. 7 NO. 4
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(Continued)

HM 8th Light Dragoon Regiment 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry Regiment 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry Regiment-Major R. Doveton 6th Bengal Light Cavalry Regiment Artillery: 6 x Galloper guns (2/regiment, except HM 8th) 2 Brigade: Lt. Colonel Thomas Browne, BLC Major of Brigade: Captain Robert Houstoun, BLC Brigade Quartermaster: Lieutenant Thomas Shubrick, 4th BLC HM 27th Light Dragoon Regiment-Lt. Colonel Samuel Need HM 29th Light Dragoon Regiment-Brevet Major (Captain) William Carden (vice Gore Wade) 1st Bengal Light Cavalry Regiment 4th Bengal Light Cavalry (Lancer) Regiment Artillery: 8 x Galloper guns (2/regiment) Artillery: The (1st Bengal) Experimental Horse Artillery Troop (5 pieces)Captain-Lieutenant Clements Brown
nd
Army Troops: Army Artillery: Brevet Lt. Colonel (Major) John Horsford, BA Second in Command: (subsequent reinforcement) Major Alexander Hind (6th Company, 1st Battalion, BA) Brigade Major, Quartermaster and Adjutant: Lieutenant Marmaduke Williamson Brown, BA Supernumerary Officers: (subsequent reinforcements) Captain Gervaise Pennington, BA (W) (Acting Commissary of Ordnance, Agra) (W) Lieutenant Warren Hastings Leslie Frith, BA Mr. Conductor James Whale, BA (W) Manned by (initially): Fifteen Officers One (Brevet) Lt Colonel Four Captains Seven Lieutenants (Subalterns) 184 European gunners 800 gun Lascars: 492 Gun Lascars 137 Irregular Golandauz 174 Ex-Scindiahs Golandauz Details: (initial) The Experimental Troop of Horse Artillery: Captain-Lieutenant Clements Brown Lieutenant Henry Stark Lieutenant James Young 1st Company, 1st Battalion, BA (detail) Lieutenant George Swiney (W) 2nd Company, 1st Battalion, BA
Captain George Raban Lieutenant Rayner Gowing (KIA) 3rd Company, 1st Battalion, BA Captain John Nelly (GW) Lieutenant George Pollock 3rd Company, 2nd Battalion, BA Lieutenant Samuel Sinclair Hay Lieutenant George Percival (KIA) Subsequently joined: 4th Company, 2nd Battalion, BA Captain-Lieutenant Edward William Butler* Lieutenant John D. Smith 5th Company, 3rd Battalion, BA Captain Andrew Dunn Equipment: Horse Artillery Troop (4 x 6pndrs, 2 x 5.5 Howitzers) Cavalry Gallopers (14 x 6-pndrs) Battalion Guns (22 x 6-pndrs) Field Pieces (in Park or Battery): 7 x 12-pndrs 8 x 6-pndrs 6 x 5.5 Howitzers 2 x 4.2/5 Howitzers Siege Equipment: 6 x 18-pndrs 4 x 5.5 Mortars 4 x 8 Mortars Siege Materiel, Engineer Supplies and Ordnance Store Depot: Allahabad Engineer and Pioneer Corps: (fore-runner, Bengal Sapper and Miner) (Three Engineer Officers and Three Pioneer [Infantry] Officers, initially) Lt. Colonel Alexander Kydd, BE Brevet Captain (Lieutenant) Thomas Wood, BNI Brevet Captain (Lieutenant) Thomas Robertson
VOL. 7 NO. 4
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(Continued)

Brevet Captain (Lieutenant) John Swinton, 12th BNI Brevet Captain (Lieutenant) William Cowper, Bombay Engineers (joined after initial phase) Lieutenant Henry William Carmichael Smyth, BE Lieutenant Richard Tickell, BE (transferred by Bengal Artillery) (ditto) Lieutenant William Forrest, 1st/2nd BNI Lieutenant Archibald Galloway, BNI (W) Lieutenant Abraham Lockett (W) Ensign John Heming Jones Three companies of Pioneers Pathan (ex-Scindhian) Cavalry (500) -Ismail Beg Major General Smiths Pursuit Column: February 8, 1805 (vs. Amir Khan) March 23rd Plus, Mr. Charles Theophilus Metcalf, AGGO The Cavalry Division: (1,800) HM 8th, 27th and 29th Light Dragoon Regiments 1st, 3rd and 6th BNC Regiments The Experimental Troop of BHA Skinners Irregular Horse (500) joined Feb. 11th Bombay Division: (ex-Murrays Division) February 11th Major General (Lt. Colonel) Richard Jones, Bombay Artillery Brigadier: (later during campaign) Major George Cuyler, HM 86th Acting Brigade Major: (later during campaign) Lieutenant George Charles dAguilar, HM 86th HM 65th Foot (8 companies)Brevet Lt. Colonel (Major) George Maddison HM 86th Foot-Captain John Grant 1st Bombay Grenadier Battalion (1st/1st Bombay IR) 2nd Battalion/2nd Bombay Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/3rd Bombay Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/9th Bombay Infantry Regiment-Lt. Colonel Taylor The (1st) Troop of Bombay Cavalry (120) The Gaekwars Irregular Horse (500)
Artillery: One Bombay Artillery Company 5th Company, 3rd Battalion, BACaptain Andrew Dunn (only officer present) 2 x 12-pndrs 12 x 6-pndrs 2 x Field Howitzers 700 Europeans 2,400 Native Infantry and Cavalry Reinforcement and Supply Column: Lt. Colonel George Holmes, Bombay Infantry 2nd Battalion/ 1st Bombay Infantry Regiment (detached from Jones) 2nd Battalion/ 9th Bombay Infantry Regiment April 1st, 1805: HM 27th LD renamed HM 24th HM 29th LD renamed HM 25th Staff Officers not accounted for: Brigade Major: Captain John Wallace, 15th BNI (KIA, 1st Assault) (This may have been Dowdeswells Divisional [Wing] Brigade Major, but I cannot be certain) Brigade Major: Lieutenant James Durant. BNI (W, 4th Assault) (Wallaces Replacement?) Versus: The Army of Scindhia: Jeswant Rao Holkar Raja Ranjit Singh of Bhurtpore [Continued on Page 58]
Strengths: (8,800 men, total) British (European) Infantry (1,000) British Cavalry (800) Native Infantry (4,400) Native Cavalry (1,600) Bengal Artillery (1,000) Subsequent Reinforcements (& Detachments): Bhurtpore Campaign January 18th, 1805: (1,600) Major General John Smith, HMs Service 3 x Bengal Native Battalions (exAgra garrison) 2nd Battalion/ 9th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 1st Battalion/ 14th Bengal Native Infantry Regiment ? Battalion/? Bengal Native Infantry Regiment 100 European convalescents 6 x 6-pndr Battalion guns
VOL. 7 NO. 4
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VOL. 7 NO. 4
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PAGE 30
Borodino was fought between the Army of Imperial Russia and Napoleons Grand Arme on September 7, 1812. The battle ended with a French victory, but strategic defeat. Losses were terrible on both sides, but the Russians could replace theirs. One week after the battle Napoleon occupied an undefended Moscow, hoping to impose a peace, but after four weeks was forced to retreat home with calamitous results. The historical battle involved wave after wave of frontal attacks by both sides, focusing on the Russian redoubts. However, the game shows all the options available to Napoleon and Kutuzov, including some not attempted historically. The French player has several possible lines of attack and the Russian player must try to anticipate and counter them all. The tactical interaction of Napoleonic infantry, cavalry and artillery is also emphasized, including cavalry charges and squares. This makes for exciting and
tense gaming. Movement and combat are resolved within areas. The game plays using the fast-paced MoveMove-Battle sequence seen in Shiloh. Players activate leaders to command divisions of the same corps. Game time is 3-4 hours. COVER ART La Moskowa by Mark Churms The scene depicts the French 1st Carabiniers charging at Borodino. Borodino Battle History On September 5, 1812, the French Grande Arme under the command of Emperor Napoleon I, advancing along the main highway from Smolensk, approached the village of Borodino where the Russians under Gen. Mikhail Kutuzov had resolved to make a stand to save their ancient capital of Moscow from the invader. Three months before in late June, the French and their allies gathered from all across Europe had crossed the
Niemen River with about 450,000 men, and over 225,000 more in reserve and covering the flanks. Though the Russians under Tsar Alexander I could also call on about 500,000 active troops throughout their vast empire, only about 200,000 were at the front facing the invader, and so the Russians began to fall back as Napoleon pursued closely, hoping to defeat them in detail. The two main Russian armies, the 1st under Gen. Barclay de Tolly and the 2nd under Prince Bagration, finally joined at Smolensk in August, where they fought for the city but were forced to abandon it to Napoleons superior forces, after each side suffered heavy losses. Following this defeat, the Tsar appointed the elderly veteran Kutuzov to lead the two combined armies. By this time, heavy attrition, battle losses and detachments of corps to cover long flanks and supply lines had reduced Napoleons Grande Arme to only about 135,000 men and 587 guns. At last the Russians, who had about 120,000 regulars
and Cossacks and at least 624 guns, along with some 30,000 militia from Moscow and Smolensk, could fight an evenly matched battle. The Russians chose a position with their right flank covered by the Kolocha River, and improved their left flank to the south of the Kolocha with several redoubts, while further south their position was covered by marshy woods around the village of Utitsa. The stage was set for what Napoleon afterward called the "most terrible" of all his battles, immortalized by Leo Tolstoy in "War and Peace." After a preliminary engagement for control of the Shevardino redoubt on the Russians' far left on September 5, and a delay on September 6 while the rest of the French army arrived and moved into position, the main battle was fought on September 7, the single bloodiest day of fighting in the Napoleonic Wars. Borodino cost the French about 28,000-30,000 and the Russians between 44,000-50,000 casualties, and
VOL. 7 NO. 4 Borodino

while the battle opened the gates of Moscow to the French, the Russians managed to retire in good order and rebuilt their army, while Napoleon could receive few reinforcements so far from France. The Tsar would not negotiate, despite the loss of Moscow, with his army still in the field. In the end, the French limited victory at Borodino only paved the way for the destruction of the remains of the Grande Arme during the Russian winter of 1812. The Map and Russian Place Names - The game map provides considerably more information about the battlefield than in most other previously published games on the battle of Borodino. The names used here are based on the original Russian spelling and pronunciation, with modern transcription of Cyrillic letters, to avoid many inconsistencies in historical sources. Many of the smaller villages on the map that existed in 1812 have since disappeared, including Aleksinki, Ashchenkovo, Maloye Selo, Maslovo, Mikhailovskoye, Miyshina, Myasoyedovo, Palubino, Putyatino, Ratovo, and Zakharino, and Uspenskoye (just off the east map edge, where Napoleon had his HQ on the day after the battle of Borodino once the Russians had withdrawn) has changed its name to Kriushino. The game map uses a compass orientation to the northwest, as on many 19th century maps, to allow more of the relevant area of the battlefield to be shown.
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Borodino - The largest of the villages scattered across the several miles of fields and woodland where the armies met, Borodino was a cluster of wooden houses around the 1701 two-level brick Church of the Nativity (the only surviving structure that witnessed the battle), lying at the center of the Russian army's front on the western side of the bridge where the New Smolensk Post Highway crossed the Kolocha River. The first action on September 7 was a quick assault by the French IV Corps to drive out the garrison of Russian Guard Jagers and the Russian artillery observers in the two onion-domed steeples of the church. The French held the village for the rest of the battle though they were unable to force a crossing of the Kolocha River at the bridge, which the Russians then burned. Semyonovskoye - The small village of Semyonovskoye (the correct Russian pronunciation, though often also spelled Semenovskoye) lay at the center of the Russian left wing positions, and was the scene of very heavy fighting in the late morning and afternoon as the French sought to maneuver around the Great Redoubt after capturing the Fleches. The village had been partly demolished by the Russians before the battle on September 7 to allow for unobstructed artillery fire, but the foundations of the houses provided cover for troops, as did a small redoubt the Russians had built nearby (considered part of the village on the map).
The Main Roads - The main roads running from west to east through the battlefield were critical to lines of supply and retreat. The central New Smolensk Post Highway crossed the Kolocha River by a bridge at Borodino, continuing through Gorki where Kutuzov had his battle command post on the hill providing a good view of the Russian positions (the main Russian administrative headquarters lay further down the road at Tatarinovo). The southern Old Smolensk Road ran through the village of Utitsa and the woods and swamps surrounding it. Separated by the Kolocha River on the west side of the field, the two roads run closely together where they exit the field in the east, joining together off the map edge just before the large town of Mozhaisk. The third main road, entering the map to the north at Gryaz, continues southeast across the Kolocha River and then turns east just above the New Smolensk Post Highway, becoming the Old Ruzskaya Road. The French army approached the Borodino battlefield in three columns, with Napoleon and the bulk of the French army entering the field along the New Smolensk Post Highway. The Polish V Corps used the Old Smolensk Road, entering at the village of Yelnya and flanking the Russian position at the Shevardino Redoubt, and Eugene's IV Corps entered to the north along the road from Gryaz, covering Napoleons left flank against any possible advance by

the Russian 1st Army. The Redoubts - The Russians constructed several significant redoubts across the battlefield, especially on their left wing which was more vulnerable as the right wing was protected by the ravine of the Kolocha River. These were improvised fieldworks built of earth and logs, reinforced with entrenchments, palisades and wolf pits to snare cavalry, capable of providing effective shelter for a few batteries of guns and some regiments of supporting infantry. The Great Redoubt (or Grand or Rayevski Redoubt), the Fleches (or Bagration Fleches), and Shevardino, named for the nearby village, all saw heavy fighting. The large Great Redoubt to the south of Borodino, at the top of a hill with two angled sides but partly open toward the back with some palisades, was the scene of a very spirited defense by Rayevski's Russian VII Corps in the late morning of Sept. 7, but finally fell in mid-afternoon to Eugene's IV Corps and French cavalry. The three arrow-shaped Fleches on level ground between Semyonovskoye and the woods surrounding Utitsa, also open to the back, were the first target of the main French morning attack on Sept. 7, and Borozdin's VIII Corps, aided by part of Tuchkov's III Corps, suffered severe losses trying to defend them against Davout's French I Corps and French cavalry, finally being driven out by late morning
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The smaller Shevardino redoubt, a pentagon almost fully enclosed, was the focus of the preliminary fighting on September 5 between the French I and V Corps and cavalry, and the Russian VIII Corps, and Napoleon had his command post there on September 7. Another group of three Russian redoubts protecting the Russian far right along the west side of the Moskva River, the Maslovo Redoubts or Fleches, at right angles to each other and open only on the inside, were not fought over. There were a number of smaller Russian redoubts or artillery positions scattered across the battlefield, most of which are not depicted on the map as they would not have had a significant effect on the fighting at the scale of this game. One of these smaller redoubts is depicted, however, on the main road before Gorki, along the east bank of the Kolocha and near Semyonovskoye, as it was substantial enough to hold nearly a full artillery battery and guarded Kutuzov's HQ position, had the French crossed the Kolocha River from Borodino. The Kolocha River - The Kolocha, a tributary of the larger and impassable Moskva, enters the battlefield from the west as a relatively minor waterway with low banks and can readily be crossed in summer and early fall, much as the other streams on the battlefield. However, as it passes Borodino and turns northeast, it enters a ravine with steep banks and becomes more of an obstacle; at Borodino, the Kolocha is about 3-6 feet deep and 6-10 feet wide,
but the ravine about 12 feet deep. Two bridges crossed the Kolocha River near Borodino, including one on the main New Smolensk Post Highway leading to Gorki (treated together for game purposes), and a mill dam near Borodino could also be used to cross. Kutuzov and his staff anticipated a major French assault across the Kolocha and positioned the Russian II, IV, and VI Corps as well as the Cossacks along or near the river in the north to prevent it, but Napoleon never tried to force the river north of Borodino after the failure of the French IV Corps to cross at Borodino on the early morning of Sept. 7, and eventually most of these Russian forces were shifted southward to reinforce the tottering Russian 2nd Army. The Russians burned the main Borodino bridge, while the French used other bridges that they built to the west of Borodino to aid their attack over the river toward the Great Redoubt (represented by the French Bridge in the game). Platov's Cossacks and Uvarov's I Cavalry Corps, with little

artillery and no infantry support, launched the one major Russian counterattack against the French flank at midday across the Kolocha fords at Novoye Selo and Maloye Selo, which was finally repulsed by French infantry of the Guard formed into squares. THE FRENCH AND RUSSIAN COMMANDERS AT BORODINO Note on Ranks: The highest rank in the French army, below the Emperor, was Marshal of the Empire. Marshals could command corps, or even armies where the Emperor was not present (as in Spain), or portions of the Imperial Guard, or serve in other high positions at Imperial Headquarters. 11 of Napoleons 23 Marshals in 1812 accompanied him to Russia, and seven were at Borodino, including Davout, Ney, Mortier, and Murat as corps commanders, Lefebvre (grouped with Mortier in command of the Guard corps), Bessiers (commanding the Guard Cavalry Division), and Berthier (who was Napoleons chief of staff in charge of Imperial Headquarters), while four others (Augerau, MacDonald, Oudinot and Victor) served elsewhere in Russia. Three French generals serving in Russia became Marshals (St. Cyr was promoted in Russia but was not at Borodino, while Poniatowski and Grouchy, who were both at Borodino, were promoted in later campaigns). Below the Marshals were Generals of Division, such
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as Poniatowski or Junot in 1812, who could also command corps. One corps (IV) was led by a unique leader, Eugene, who was not only a General of Division but also the Viceroy of Italy and Napoleons stepson. The Russian army of 1812 followed Peter the Great's Table of Ranks, under which the highest rank of Field Marshal was a rarely accorded honor which no active officer held at the time of Borodino, though Kutuzov and Barclay de Tolly were later to earn this rank. At the time of Borodino, the highest-ranking commanders below the Tsar were Generals of Infantry, or of Cavalry, who could command armies or corps. Lieutenant Generals, who also commanded corps, were next in rank. It is difficult to compare the ranks of French and Russian general officers exactly. French Marshals regularly held commands comparable to Russian Lieutenant Generals, or Generals of Infantry or Cavalry. The French Commanders Napoleon I - In 1812 Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of the French and King of Italy, was master of Europe from Spain to Poland, and the greatest captain of his era. He had risen from minor Corsican aristocracy to lead France to victory in campaigns throughout Europe, and had defeated the Russians several times before in Austria and Poland. But his legendary abilities were not at their best in his 1812 campaign in Russia; he underestimated the immense logistical difficulties
and the Russian determination to resist; and was in ill health at Borodino. The disastrous winter retreat from Moscow shattered the widespread belief in Napoleons invincibility, leading to final defeat and exile to St. Helena where he died in 1821. Joachim Murat - Napoleons brother-in-law, Marshal Murat was France's greatest cavalry leader and the most flamboyant of the Emperor's commanders. An innkeeper's son, Murat rose to King of Naples by 1808, and led Napoleons Cavalry Reserve during the invasion of Russia. Murat was well known to the Russians, and some Cossacks even asked him to switch sides and become their Hetman! But his end was humiliating; after double-crossing both Napoleon and then the Allies, he was captured in Italy and executed by firing squad on Oct. 13, 1815. Adolphe-Edouard-CasimirJoseph Mortier - One of the two commanders of Napoleons Imperial Guard infantry in Russia, Marshal Mortier, Duke of Treviso, was known as a capable soldier and man of honor. Napoleon called him "the big mortar with a short range." Mortier's Guard infantry was given no chance to fight at Borodino, but as Governor of Moscow he tried to blow up the Kremlin. After Napoleons fall Mortier regained favor with the Bourbons and became ambassador to Russia, but was killed by a terrorist's "infernal machine" in 1835.

Louis-Nicolas Davout - The most capable of all Napoleons Marshals, from a noble Burgundian family that fought in the Crusades, the Duke of Auerstadt and Prince of Eckmuhl played a critical role in Napoleons greatest victories. Napoleon praised Davout as "one of the purest glories of France," and the discipline and attention to detail of the "Iron Marshal" ensured that his I Corps was the best in the Grande Arme in 1812. At Borodino, Davout urged a wide flanking march to the south of the Russians, but Napoleon rejected the maneuver as too dangerous, and Davout was wounded in the assault on the Fleches redoubts but stayed in command. After Napoleons fall, Davout was reinstated by the Bourbons and survived his master by two years. Michel Ney - Marshal Ney rose from son of a barrel-cooper to Duke of Elchingen. Always a lion in battle, Napoleon called him "the bravest of the brave." Ney commanded III Corps in the Russian invasion, storming the Russian center at the battle of Borodino at the head of his troops and taking Semyonovskoye and the Fleches. He then led the rearguard during the winter retreat, earning the title of Prince of the Moscowa. Ney joined the Bourbons in 1814, but switched sides and fought with Napoleon at Waterloo, for which he was shot on Dec. 7, 1815, brave to the last.
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Eugene de Beauharnais Napoleons stepson by his divorced Empress Josephine, Prince Eugene proved to be one of the most capable of the many relatives that Napoleon elevated to high positions. He became a General of Division and then Viceroy of Napoleons Kingdom of Italy in 1805. Eugene commanded a large part of the Italian army in his IV Corps in 1812, and led the final successful third assault on the Great Redoubt at Borodino after a critical twohour delay. Eugene did not rejoin Napoleon in 1815 and retired to Munich until his early but natural death. Josef Anton Poniatowski - The Poles loyally and enthusiastically committed their entire army to the Russian campaign. Prince Poniatowski, nephew of the last King of Poland, a Polish liberal and nationalist, and one of the reputed lovers of Napoleons sister Pauline, led the all-Polish V Corps as General of Division, and commander in chief of the Polish army. At Borodino, he commanded his corps well on the French right, despite heavy losses, taking the Russian position at Utitsa from the Russian III Corps, and later brought the few survivors of his army out of Russia with most of their guns. Poniatowski was finally made a Marshal in 1813, just before he was killed at the Battle of Leipzig. Jean-Andoche Junot - Last and least of the French corps commanders at Borodino, General of Division Junot, Duke of
Abrantes, was put in command of the Westphalian VIII Corps in 1812 after Napoleons untalented brother King Jerome quit. Junot had never been promoted to Marshal, as his invasion of Portugal in 1807 had been defeated by Wellington, and the Westphalians were held in low regard by Napoleon, who left them to dispose of the corpses and wounded after Borodino while the rest of the army pushed on to Moscow. Napoleon faulted Junot for "gross blunders" in allowing the Russians to retreat at Smolensk, and though at Borodino he provided useful aid to Poniatowski's Poles on the French right, he was never given another important combat command after Russia and went mad, dying in 1813 by jumping out of a window. The Russian Commanders Mikhail Ilarionovich Golenishchev-Kutuzov - Fat and wily, old General of Infantry Prince Kutuzov, from an illustrious noble family, had over fifty years of military service to his credit by the time of the battle of Borodino. He successfully ended a war with Turkey in 1812, just in time for his Army of the Danube to join in the fight against Napoleon. Tsar Alexander I appointed Kutuzov to supreme command in August 1812 after the loss of Smolensk, as a result of the popular outcry for a "real Russian" general who would fight, despite Kutuzov's earlier defeat by Napoleon at Austerlitz. Some officers saw

Kutuzov as lethargic, selfindulgent and fatalistic, delegating much responsibility, but he was beloved and trusted by the Russian troops, and after Borodino the one-eyed general could also see the need to abandon Moscow to save the army. Promoted to Field Marshal and made Prince of Smolensk as a reward for his triumph in the 1812 campaign, Kutuzov died on April 28, 1813, and is honored as the savior of Russia in the Napoleonic Wars. Mikhail Andreas (or Bogdanovich) Barclay de Tolly - General of Infantry Barclay de Tolly was the Russian Minister of War in 1812, and commanded the 1st Army, Russia's largest. The son of a pastor, from a recently ennobled Livonian Scottish family, Barclay rose in the Russian army from enlisted man to the highest ranks by his own merits. A cool and deliberate strategist and skilled administrator, Barclay had reorganized the Russian army after its earlier defeats at Napoleons hands, and was held in high regard by the Tsar, but was resented by many Russians as part of the "foreign" element in the army. Though Barclay's decision to retreat from Napoleons superior forces was heavily criticized in 1812, it saved the Russian army from an early defeat, and at Borodino, commanding the Russian right, Barclay took a very active part in the battle, having several horses shot out from under him. Barclay regained supreme command after
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Kutuzov's death, and led the Russian army into Germany and France in 1813-15, winning promotion to Field Marshal and Prince, though after his death in 1818 his reputation was overshadowed by Kutuzov's. Pyotr Ivanovich Bagration Fiery, brave and impetuous, Prince Bagration (pronounced "bah-grahtee-ON") was descended from the Georgian royal family, and rose to General of Infantry in the Tsar's service, achieving a remarkable record of combat. During the 1812 campaign, he commanded the Russian 2nd Army, but only narrowly escaped being isolated and destroyed by Napoleon due to his reluctance to retreat, and urged fighting the French at Smolensk. Bagration's intrigues against Barclay, his temperamental opposite, helped to bring about Kutuzov's appointment. At Borodino, Bagration led his army courageously on the Russian left defending Semyonovskoye and the Fleches, bearing the brunt of Napoleons assaults and losing nearly half his men, but obstinately defending his positions until Barclay could send him critical reinforcements. Bagration's army was disheartened when he was mortally wounded in late morning leading a counterattack; he had never been wounded in battle before and was believed invulnerable. He died on Sept. 24, 1812, only after being satisfied that the Russians would not negotiate with Napoleon despite the loss of Moscow.
Matvei Ivanovich Platov - After suffering disgrace, imprisonment and exile under the half-mad Tsar Paul, Platov was restored to favor by Alexander I, who made him General of Cavalry and Ataman of the Don Cossacks. In 1812, with an extraordinary 46 years of service in the Don Cossack Host, he commanded the Cossack corps, and guarded the Russian right flank at Borodino. Platov suggested and led a massive cavalry flanking attack with his Cossacks, accompanied by Uvarov's I Cavalry Corps. This forced the French assault on the Great Redoubt to be delayed, but failed to achieve decisive results, so that Kutuzov denied Platov the honors given to other Russian generals. Platov was said to be drunk at Borodino, but was among the last to retreat from the field. Platov successfully harassed the French army retreating from Moscow and in the campaigns of 1813-14, was made a Count, and retired to his Cossack homeland where he died in 1818. Karl Fedorovich Baggovut (or Karl Gustav von Baggehufwudt) - A soldier from the Baltic provinces who served under the Russified version of his Norwegian noble family name, Lt. Gen. Baggovut commanded the II Corps initially on the Russian far right at Borodino. He marched to reinforce Tuchkov on the far left flank, and helped to contain the French assaults along the Old Smolensk Road, earning high honor. When killed by a

cannonball at the battle of Tarutino on Oct. 18, 1812, he is said to have been too fat to see his mortal wound. Nikolai Alexseyevich Tuchkov One of two brothers from a prominent Russian noble family who fought at Borodino as generals and lost their lives there, Lt. Gen. Nikolai A. Tuchkov commanded the III Corps, which by Sept. 7 was shifted from the 1st Army to defend the far left flank of the Russian army at Utitsa. Tuchkov effectively delayed the advance of the Poles until he was wounded by midday while leading a bayonet counterattack on the Utitskii Kurgan, dying of his wounds in November 1812 at Yaroslavl. Alexander Ivanovich Osterman-Tolstoy - A member of the great aristocratic Russian family that also included Leo Tolstoy, Lt. Gen. Count Osterman-Tolstoy was one of the most respected Russian generals. At Borodino, Osterman-Tolstoy commanded his IV Corps with skill, personally leading his troops forward repeatedly, until, wounded and shell-shocked after a counterattack around Semyonovskoye, he had to be taken off the field. OstermanTolstoy supported Kutuzov's decision to abandon Moscow after Borodino, and continued to fight capably through 1813-14, being promoted to General of Infantry after the war. But he resigned and left Russia after quarreling with the new Tsar Nicholas I, dying in Switzerland
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in 1857, the last of the Borodino army and corps commanders. Nikolai Ivanovich Lavrov - The noble Lt. Gen. Lavrov normally commanded the Guards infantry division, but also assumed leadership of the V Guards Corps at Borodino, as his superior, Grand Duke Constantine, was absent at St. Petersburg after one of his quarrels with Barclay. Lavrov turned out to be one of the less effective corps commanders at Borodino, once nearly paralyzed under heavy French artillery fire and unable to mount his horse, though his Guard never wavered. He became seriously ill after the end of the campaign, dying in September 1813. Dmitri Sergeyevich Dokhturov General of Infantry Dokhturov, of noble birth and one of the most experienced of the Russian corps commanders, led the VI Corps in the Russian center at Borodino. Dokhturov had won honor for his defense of Smolensk, and took over command of the 2nd Army at Borodino after Bagration was mortally wounded, for which he earned high recognition. He favored defending Moscow against Napoleon, and served in all the major battles of the 1812 campaign as well as in the liberation of Germany and the invasion of France, but then retired due to ill health and died in 1816. Nikolai Nikolayevich Rayevski From a well-connected noble family, Rayevski suffered dismissal by Tsar Paul but was restored to favor and made
Lieutenant General by Alexander I. Rayevski had distinguished himself in 1812 at Smolensk, and against Davout's I Corps, before becoming a hero at Borodino, where he bravely defended the Great Redoubt with his VII Corps, repulsing two French assaults though losing half of his men. His conduct won the admiration of Kutuzov, and the Russians only lost the position to a third overwhelming attack in the afternoon after Rayevski's troops had been relieved by VI Corps. Rayevski supported Kutuzov's decision to abandon Moscow after Borodino, and in 1813-15 he continued to fight against Napoleon, winning promotion to General of Cavalry and participating in the capture of Paris. Rayevski's family later suffered disgrace when two sons and other relatives were implicated in the Decembrist uprising against the new Tsar Nicholas I, though Rayevski was not involved and survived until 1829. Mikhail Mikhailovich Borozdin - Lt. Gen. Borozdin, a member of an ancient noble family, was put in command of the Russian VIII Corps in the 1812 campaign, even though unlike all the other Russian army and corps commanders he lacked any experience fighting Napoleon. At Borodino the most severe of Napoleons blows fell on this least prepared of the Russian leaders; VIII Corps was [Continued on Page 63]
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Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History
By: Carl Willner
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Columbias Borodino: Napoleon in Russia, 1812 game, published in the 200th anniversary year of Napoleons invasion of Russia, has now joined the ranks of many earlier wargaming recreations of this famous battle. This treatment of Borodino, part of Columbias Great Battles of History series, is distinguished by a high degree of faithfulness to history. The game map, drawn from multiple 19th and 20th century Russian, English and French sources as well as personal exploration of the battlefield by this designer, reveals terrain and the Russian names in greater detail than most other games on Borodino, including some features that have not appeared on any previous game maps of the battle. In addition, the order of battle,
while presenting the armies on a division and corps scale, goes deeply into the latest research and historical sources on the Russian and French armies at Borodino. At the same time, Columbias game retains the relative simplicity of rules mechanics and the fog of war approach that have distinguished its earlier releases, while capturing the flavor of Napoleonic combat with squares, artillery bombardments, the famous redoubts at Borodino, and combined arms tactics. As a result, this great battle extending over two days can be recreated in a few hours of play. Many gamers have shown interest in the history of the campaign and battle, and how it relates to the Borodino 1812 game. This article provides a behind the scenes look from the perspective
of one of the designers. The map features, OB and game rules of Borodino 1812 were repeatedly compared to the actual battle history in the design process, to ensure that it was possible to recreate the historical actions of the commanders and that they made sense in game terms, while still allowing the players full scope to explore alternative strategies, some considered by the historical commanders but rejected. Setting the Stage: Napoleons Invasion of Russia When Napoleon commenced his invasion of Russia on June 2324, 1812 he had amassed the single largest army ever seen in Europe to that time along the Niemen River. 450,000 French
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and allied troops invaded Russia at the outset, and with the part of the reserves later sent into Russia as well, about 500,000 troops under the Emperors command actually took part in the campaign. In the center, the main mass of the Grande Arme consisted of the Guard (Marshals Mortier and Lefebvre, both represented by Mortier in the game), I (Marshal Davout), II (Marshal Oudinot), III (Marshal Ney), IV (Army of Italy, headed by the Viceroy, Gen. Division Prince Eugene de Beauharnais, Napoleons stepson), V Polish (Gen. Division Prince Poniatowski), VI Bavarian (Gen. Division St. Cyr), VII Saxon (Gen. Division Reynier), and VIII Westphalian (initially headed by Napoleons brother King Jerome and Gen. Division Vandamme) Corps and the four cavalry corps (I-IV) of Marshal Murats Reserve Cavalry. The Franco-Prussian X Corps (Marshal MacDonald) to the north and an Austrian auxiliary corps (Gen. Prince Schwarzenberg) to the south guarded the flanks. In reserve were the IX (Marshal Victor) and XI (Marshal Augerau) Corps, and other garrisons scattered throughout Poland and Germany, and of these forces, the entire IX Corps was sent into Russia in September, with various smaller units coming in as well. The 225,000 men in reserve, together with the initial invasion force, totaled 675,000 men available to Napoleon. These included 513,000 infantry and 98,000 cavalry, a total of over 611,000. But, surprisingly, this massive array did not give Napoleon an overall numerical advantage over the Russians, for Tsar Alexander I could also draw on enormous forces throughout his vast dominions. The Russians had some 517-528,000 regular troops, plus 64,000 Cossacks and other irregular cavalry initially available and another 40,000 raised during the campaign, for a total of over 100,000 irregular light cavalry, and to these more than 600,000 troops the Russians could also add 223,000 militia of dubious combat value. Napoleons key initial advantage lay not in total numbers but, as so often in his other campaigns, in superior concentration. The Russians had three armies deployed along their frontier, with the 1st Army under War Minister Gen. Barclay de Tolly the largest, numbering 127,800 136,000 men with I, II, III, IV, V Guard, and VI Corps, the I, II, and III Cavalry Corps and a Cossack cavalry corps. This force was positioned to cover Lithuania and the approaches to either St. Petersburg or Moscow. To its south was Gen. Prince Bagrations 2nd Army, with 52,000 57,000 men and the VII and VIII Corps and IV Cavalry Corps, covering Byelorussia. And further south below the great obstacle of the Pripyet Marshes, protecting the Ukraine and separated from the other two frontline armies during most of the campaign, was Gen. Tormasovs 3rd Army, with IX, X, and XI Corps and a cavalry corps in reserve, altogether 45,800
48,000 men. This front line force of 225,600 241,000 was outnumbered at the outset two to one by the forces of Napoleons Grande Arme that initially crossed the border, as much of the Russian army was still on other fronts at the start of the campaign. The Army of the Danube/Moldavia, recently commanded by Gen. Kutuzov and replaced by Admiral Chichagov, faced Turkey with 50,000 -54,500 men, while the Finland Corps, with 28,500 30,000 men, held this province captured from Sweden in 1809. The Crimea had a garrison of 19,500 men, and in the Caucasus the Georgian Corps deployed another 24-34,000, while behind the Russian lines in the center were 84,000 more men in the I and II Reserve Corps. Most of these 206,000 222,000 men would eventually join the Russian forces facing Napoleon, apart from those in the Caucasus, but the ones from other fronts would have to march great distances to do so and could not be used in the struggle against Napoleon for the first few months. The French and Russian Armies: 1812 (Russian strength is total army at the outset of the campaign; French strength counts forces available for the Russian campaign in Poland and Germany, but not on other fronts like Spain)
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Formations Infantry Corps Cavalry Corps Infantry Divisions Cavalry Divisions Infantry Regiments Cavalry Regiments
French and Allies 13 4 41 24 204 120
Russians 15 6 (including 1 Cossack) 51 19 170 (not counting militia) 66 + 83 Cossack, irregular into the Russian heartland. Napoleon was forced to detach three entire corps from the Grande Arme, the II, IV and VII, to cover the ever-lengthening flanks, and leave other detachments behind from the remaining corps as garrisons. The Russians, too, had to detach the strong I Corps (Lt. Gen. Wittgenstein) with 1st Cavalry Division from their 1st Army to cover the approaches to St. Petersburg, as the rest of 1st Army fell back toward Moscow. At last the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies combined at Smolensk and sought to give battle for the city in mid-August. Though Napoleons advantage in the strength of the main armies had narrowed from the initial 2-1 to just 1.5-1, the 120,000 Russians were still heavily outnumbered by Napoleons remaining 180,000 and they were forced to abandon the city after significant losses by both sides. Following this defeat, the Tsar appointed the elderly Kutuzov, fresh from his successful conclusion of a peace with Turkey, to overall command of the combined 1st and 2nd Armies, though he kept both of the original army commanders in charge of their armies as well, creating an overly complex command
Napoleon struck into Russia with the objective of bringing on a battle near the border, and dividing the Russian 1st and 2nd Armies, seeking to isolate and destroy the smaller 2nd Army first. But those two Russian armies, following the strategy urged by Barclay in light of Napoleons numerical advantage in the center, fell back and refused to give battle. The more aggressive Bagration retreated reluctantly and only narrowly escaped the trap set for him, with Davouts I Corps at one point getting ahead of the Russian 2nd Army in its advance. Napoleon blamed Jeromes slowness for Bagrations escape, and in a huff the King quit and returned to Westphalia. Napoleons opening advantage in concentration now began to work against him, as the territory through which the Grande Arme was passing could not support its enormous numbers, and severe attrition afflicted the French and their allies during the opening months of the campaign. Also, as Napoleon advanced deeper into Russia, the broad front of the advance north of the Pripyet Marshes increasingly narrowed, resembling a rapier thrust deep
structure. Kutuzov determined to fight again to try to save Moscow, and the place he chose was Borodino. Attrition, battle losses at Smolensk and detachments had still further reduced Napoleons Grande Arme to 135,117 men, with the corps remaining Guard, I, III, IV, V, VIII (now commanded by Gen. Division Junot), and the four in the Cavalry Reserve down to an average of about 45% of the troops with which they had crossed the Russian border in June. Napoleon, realizing that a major battle was about to take place, halted his army at Gzhatsk on Sept. 2 and 3, and the muster there gives us an accurate total of the strength of each of the corps of the French army just before the battle, with about 123,000 present and another 12,000 due to return within 5 days, in time for the battle. Though it is not certain if all these detachments arrived, the largest of them, including most of IV Cavalry Corps (though one brigade was absent) and a division of II Cavalry Corps, are indeed known to have returned in time. And with some additional troops of the Young Guard not counted in those totals that likely reached the battle, and men attached to Napoleons AHQ, the total of 135,000 fairly represents what Napoleon had for Borodino. Though the Russians had not suffered as heavily as Napoleon, the 180-193,000 that the two Russian armies had at the start had now been reduced to only a little over 100,000, plus
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12,500 militia brought along from Smolensk. By late August, the recorded strength of 1st Army was 65,598, with 432 guns, and of 2nd Army 34,923, with 173 guns, plus a few thousand more army-level HQ staffs and attached troops. 15,568 regular replacements brought by Gen. Miloradovich at the end of August, on the eve of the battle, helped to restore the depleted Russian formations, raising their strength in regulars to over 108,000 counting HQ troops, plus another 10,000 Cossack and other irregular cavalry. 10,073 of these reinforcements (9,535 infantry, 538 cavalry) went to 1st Army and 5,495 (5,053 infantry, 442 cavalry) to 2nd Army, so that 1st Army now reached a strength of about 77,100 and 2nd Army about 41,500. Gen. Barclays 1st Army, with nearly two-thirds of the regular and Cossack troops, included II (Lt. Gen. Baggovut), III (Lt. Gen. Tuchkov), IV (Lt. Gen Osterman-Tolstoy), V Guards including the 1st Cuirassier Div. (Lt. Gen. Lavrov, temporarily in command in place of the Tsars brother Grand Duke Constantine who was absent in St. Petersburg), and VI (Gen. Dokhturov) Corps, and I, II, and III Cavalry Corps as well as the Cossack Corps (Gen. Platov, Ataman of the Don Cossacks). Gen. Bagrations 2nd Army, with slightly over a third of the regulars and Cossacks, included VII (Lt. Gen. Rayevski) and VIII (Lt. Gen. Borozdin) Corps, as well as all of its cavalry under the command of Lt. Gen. Golitsyn, including IV Cavalry Corps, the 2nd Cuirassier Div. and several regiments of Cossacks. And the arrival of some 21,000 Moscow militia boosted the total Russian forces to about 150,000, finally giving the Russians a numerical advantage over Napoleon, even though more than 40,000 of those troops were irregulars, of lower combat value than the regulars of the Grande Arme. Though the Russian records do not provide a single tally of the corps strength of the entire army as the French have for the muster at Gzhatsk, they do give details of the strength of each of the corps of 1st Army immediately before the battle (though these need to be adjusted for the merging of the Russian rearguard of Cossacks, Jaeger light infantry and a division of 3rd Corps back into their parent corps). But individual infantry division strengths immediately before the battle of Borodino are usually not available in either the French or Russian records, except for the French Guard divisions and the Russian VIII Corps, and must be estimated from the battalion and squadron strengths of the individual divisions and the overall strengths of their corps. The French and Allied Army The French Army of the 1812 campaign was a remarkably multiethnic force. Though the French were of course by far the largest national contingent, with so much of his army committed to the Spanish campaign, Napoleon could not match the entire Russian
army in numbers relying on French troops alone. He had called on his allies throughout Europe to fill out the ranks of the Grande Arme. Against Russia also marched Poles, Italians, Germans from Prussia, Saxony, Bavaria, Westphalia and an array of minor states, Austrians, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, Swiss, Illyrians, Dalmatians and Croats. Nothing like this had been seen in Europe before, since Xerxes marched all the peoples of the Persian Empire against Greece. HQs (Leaders): One significant advantage that the French enjoyed was their leaders overall superiority in military experience and talent. For many years, the French had been fighting and usually winning battles all across Europe. They drew their commanders not just from a narrow noble class but, thanks to the French Revolution, from a broader pool of talent in all of French society. Most of the French commanders, apart from the aristocratic Davout, came from relatively humble origins, unlike the leaders of the Ancien Regime armies they faced. The very presence of Napoleon exerted a demoralizing influence on his opponents, with his nearly unbroken record of success where he commanded in person, even if at Borodino he was not at his best. And other French corps commanders present at Borodino were likewise respected and feared by their foes. Davout,
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Napoleons finest Marshal, and nearly the equal of the Emperor himself, had long demonstrated his ability to exercise independent command. Only he, along with Napoleon, has three steps in the game above the zero level, able to operate on his own for three hours without resupply. Napoleon and Davout also enjoy a command radius of three, able to command units from three areas away, reflecting their high administrative and tactical ability, which no other French leaders share. Murat, the King of Naples, was considered the finest cavalry commander in Europe and a formidable fighter in melee. Most other French leaders, including Ney, Eugene, Poniatowski and Mortier, if not in the same league as Napoleon or Davout, were nonetheless a match for almost any general the Russians could throw against them. Eugene and Poniatowski are good overall commanders in the game, and while Ney and Mortier have shorter command ranges of 1, reflecting their more limited grasp of an overall battle, Ney in particular is a fierce fighter in melee. The one weak link in Napoleons high command at Borodino was Junot, now considered half-mad, and only a year away from full madness and his death by jumping from a window. His single step above the zero level, reflecting the need for close supervision, seriously limits the potential of his Westphalian VIII Corps, a hard-luck force that Napoleon left behind on the battlefield of Borodino to dispose of corpses and tend to wounded while the rest of his army pressed on to Moscow after the victory. Significantly, unlike the Russians with their more regular corps structure, Napoleon was willing to vary the strengths of his corps considerably to reflect the abilities of their commanders. Thus, Davout commands by far the most powerful corps at Borodino, and Murat, Eugene and Mortier also have strong forces. By activating just these four corps in the game, the French player can put the large majority of his forces into combat, even while the weaker corps of Ney, Poniatowski and Junot are held back. The HQ units in the game principally represent the value of the commanders, and their ability to inspire and rally troops, though the Napoleon AHQ had a significant escort of an infantry battalion and a cavalry regiment, plus some squadrons added from other cavalry regiments. Infantry: The French and their allies fielded in the Russian campaign 41 infantry divisions, including the Old, Middle and Young Guard, the Legion of the Vistula, the Italian Guard, and regular infantry divisions numbered from 1-34 (with no 29th), as well as 3 Austrian divisions. 18 of these infantry divisions, including four of the Guard (with the Young Guard mostly not present), and the 1st -5th, 10th- 11th, 13th 14th, 16th, 18th, and 23rd-25th, were present for Borodino.
The French and allied infantry was principally divided into line and light infantry regiments, and at Borodino there were a total of 65 infantry regiments, including 42 line and 6 light regiments in the regular infantry. The Guard divisions had a number of unique regimental designations of their own, and the 17 Guards regiments at Borodino included 3 grenadiers, 2 chasseurs, 2 tirailleurs, 3 voltigeurs, and 2 fusiliers, as well as 3 Polish Legion of the Vistula and 2 Italian Guard regiments. Various types of regiments were combined in the divisions, and the number of battalions in them could also vary, from as few as two to as many as five in Davouts powerful divisions. A few regiments were even represented by just one of their battalions. For the most part the light infantry remains combined with its parent divisions in the game. However, recognizing that the French often deployed screens of light voltigeurs to cover areas unprotected by other forces or to provide extra support for the regulars, there are three 1-step voltigeur units in the game, better able to engage and retreat quickly than regular infantry. The voltigeurs, like their Russian Jaeger counterparts, are doublecounted in the game along with the light infantry in their parent divisions, since the voltigeur screens could be formed from any infantry divisions as needed.
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There are 58 steps of French infantry in the game, apart from the 3 steps of voltigeur detachments. At 1600 men per step, these 58 steps represent 92,800 men, about 1 step more than the actual French infantry total of 90,507 reported on Sept. 2. The difference is mainly due to the addition of a step to the Middle Guard representing a 2000-man brigade of the Young Guard that had likely arrived by the time of the battle, but was not yet counted in the earlier totals. Cavalry: The French and their allies had a total of 24 cavalry divisions in the Russian campaign, including the elite cavalry division in the Guard, the mainly light cavalry divisions attached to each of the other infantry corps, and the total of 11 cavalry divisions in the four cavalry corps 3 each in I, II, and III, and 2 in IV Cavalry Corps, numbered Heavy 1-7, and Light 1-4. 17 of these cavalry divisions including the Guard, the corps cavalry of I, III, IV, V, VI (attached to IV Corps, though the rest of the corps was absent), and VIII Corps, and 10 of the 11 divisions in the cavalry corps (all except 3rd Heavy) were also present for Borodino. In the game, the corps cavalry divisions are shown separately, but the 10 divisions forming the four cavalry corps are combined into their parent corps to show the full effect of the massed French cavalry; separately, they would mostly be 1 step and in no case more than 2 step units and would be considerably less effective than they were in real life, hardly capable of the feats they accomplished including battering their way into the Great Redoubt. As in many of the other armies of Europe, the French and allied cavalry fielded a bewildering array of unit types, including the heavy cuirassiers and carabiniers, dragoons, hussars, lancers (or their German counterparts, uhlans), chasseurs (or their German counterparts, jaegers-zu-pferde), and light horse (chevaux-legers). The cuirassiers, carabiniers and dragoons are normally found in the Heavy divisions in the reserve cavalry, and the other types in the light and corps cavalry divisions. The elite Guards, in addition to several of these types, even had their own horse grenadiers. Each regiment usually had 4 squadrons, though sometimes only 2 or 3, or as many as 5 in the Guard. Napoleons cavalry at the time of Borodino, notwithstanding the heavy attrition already suffered, was still a very potent force, and after the disaster of the Russian winter Napoleon found these experienced troops and their mounts the hardest to replace. At Borodino, there were 6 regiments of cavalry in the French Guard (1 dragoon, 1 chasseur, 1 grenadier, 2 lancer, and 1 gendarmarie), as well as 19 chasseur and 2 jaeger-zu-pferde, 14 lancer, 11 hussar, 9 chevauxleger, 6 dragoon (inc. 2 Italian Guard), 2 carabinier, and 15 cuirassier (including 1 Saxon gardes du corps) regiments,
including some Italian and German guard cavalry regiments mixed with the regulars, a total of 84. As with the infantry, a few regiments had only one of their squadrons present. There are 23 steps of French cavalry in the game, which at 1200 men per step represents 27,600 men, about one step less than the actual total of 29,219 reported on Sept. 2. The difference mainly reflects the handling of IV Cavalry Corps, the weakest of the four in cavalrymen. It was estimated to have 3200 cavalry for Sept. 2, but some sources indicate only had about 2600 present for Borodino, giving it 2 rather than 3 steps. This also better fits the overall Reserve Cavalry strength (with 15,780 cavalry and 1905 artillerymen on Sept. 2, a total of 13 steps of cavalry, 11 of which are accounted for in I, II and III Cavalry Corps). Here, and also with the III Corps cavalry, the French cavalry has been rounded down in close cases to reflect the worse condition of their mounts by this point in the campaign compared with the Russians. The remaining men in the army were in the artillery and train, totaling 15,391.
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The following table shows the strengths of the French and allied corps at the outset of the Russian campaign, and the strength that each of the ones that fought at Borodino had available there as of Sept. 2 for the battle. The French corps that fought at Borodino, beginning with a total of 298,873 men and 682 guns, was reduced to a total of 135,117 men and 587 guns by the time of the battle, 45.2% of their starting manpower and 86.1% of their artillery. Corps Men June 1812 47,283 72,051 37,139 39,342 45,798 36,311 25,134 17,194 17,935 33,567 32,497 50,700 est. 34,148 12,077 10,436 9,676 7,964 Guns June 1812 112 150 92 86 116 70 55 50 34 80 84 60 60 30 30 30 24 Men Sept. 1812 Guns Sept. 1812 109 147 % starting strength men/guns 39%/97% 56%/98%
6 guns were in a horse battery supporting the corps cavalry divisions of I and III Corps.
The infantry, cavalry, and artillery/train manpower in each of the French corps at Borodino, based on the Sept. 2 muster (with arrival of detachments), were as follows: (see 2nd table below) Of the corps present at Borodino, the Guard, IV and V Corps, and III Cavalry Corps had the largest share of their forces missing at the time of the battle. Guard: The Hessian Guard Regiment had been left at Vilna and the Guard Flankers Regiment of the Middle Guard at Smolensk, 6 of the 12 battalions of the Polish Vistula Legion were detached, and of the Young Guard, at least a full brigade of three regiments was still en route from Smolensk, with no more than one brigade present at Borodino. That brigade, which would only be a 1 step unit by itself in game terms, has been combined with the Middle Guard Division. I Corps: One regiment of the 4th Division, 33rd Light, had been left behind in Minsk and Smolensk, so that this division is weaker than the others in the corps. A few infantry battalions of regiments from minor German states were also left behind in garrisons, so that some German regiments attached to this corps are represented at Borodino by single battalions. The corps cavalry division of I Corps, which would only be a 1 step
Guard I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI Austrian I Cavalry II Cavalry III Cavalry IV Cavalry
18,849 40,392 Not present 13,186 25,021 10,328 Not present Not present 9,656 Not present Not present Not present Not present 5,159 5,343 3,583 3,600
69 + 6* 33%/87% 88 55%/76% 50 28%/71%
30
54%/88%
25 29 10 24
43%/83% 51%/97% 37%/33% 45%/100%
Corps Guard I III IV (inc. VI corps cav.) V VIII I Cavalry II Cavalry III Cavalry IV Cavalry
Infantry 11,562 36,625 9,831 18,753 6,896 7,440
Cavalry 4,000 1,206 1,908 3,492 1,638 1,195 4,474 4,660 3,446 3,200
Artillery/Train 3,287 3,161 1,536 2,776 1,794 1,021 685 683 137 400
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unit in game terms by itself, has been combined with the corps cavalry of III Corps, so that I Corps is the only French corps that does not have its own corps cavalry division appearing in the game OB. Both of these cavalry divisions historically fought together at Borodino under Murats command and are sometimes mingled in French OB data. III Corps: The corps cavalry division, which would only be a 1 step unit in game terms, has been reinforced with the still smaller cavalry division of I Corps to make them into a single 2 step unit. III Corps had three infantry divisions, but one of them, the 25th Wuerttemberg, had been so heavily reduced by this time that its several regiments had been turned into a single regiment of three provisional battalions, with only about 2000 men remaining; this unit, which would have only 1 step on its own, has been combined with the 10th Division, alongside which it fought during the battle. III Corps had also detached the Illyrian Regiment from 11th Division, and the 129th Regiment from 10th Division. IV Corps: The Italian 15th Division (Pino) only arrived with its five regiments and divisional guns on the evening of Sept. 7, too late to fight. On the plus side, IV Corps had been able to borrow the Bavarian cavalry of the VI Corps, even though the infantry of that corps was detached in support of Oudinot, making the corps cavalry of IV Corps (Ornano) stronger than most of the others. The corps cavalry unit also includes the cavalry of the Italian Guard. V Corps: The Polish 17th Division (Dombrowski), with four regiments and its divisional guns, was detached, busy pursuing partisans and protecting lines of communication, and another regiment from 16th Division had been left behind as well, as well as 4 cavalry squadrons, leaving the Polish corps weak with only two infantry divisions of three regiments each. VIII Corps: Its two Westphalian infantry divisions, the 23rd and 24th, are combined in the game into one unit, since the 24th had only four battalions and no regiments by this point and by itself would have just one step; the two divisions fought alongside during the battle. This corps had left significant numbers of troops in garrisons behind its advance. III Cavalry Corps: One of its cavalry divisions, the 3rd Heavy, was detached with 4 regiments, including 16 squadrons and 12 guns, to Oudinots II Corps, causing this cavalry corps to be missing a larger part of its starting strength than the others. IV Cavalry Corps: This corps, which had one less cavalry division than the other three at the start, had also detached one brigade of 3 Polish regiments with 9-12 squadrons to support Dombrowskis division chasing partisans, making it the weakest of the four in cavalry strength (though it had slightly more men than III Cavalry in the Sept. 2 totals due to its larger artillery contingent).
The Russian Army The Russian Army of 1812 was a considerably more homogenous force than the Grande Arme, with all of its regular soldiers subjects of the Tsar and principally ethnic Russians, Ukrainians or Byelorussians, though there were some more exotic nationalities thrown into the mix from the borderlands of the Russian Empire. At the level of the officer corps, though, there was a significant contingent of foreigners, especially Germans, in the service of the Tsar, having left their own conquered homelands. Among these the most famous name is Clausewitz, at the time serving on the staff of the Russian I Cavalry Corps, giving him an opportunity to participate in the battle of Borodino. Many other highranking officers with nonRussian ancestry, including Barclay (Scottish), Baggovut (Norwegian) and Bagration (a Georgian prince), actually came from lands under the rule of the Tsar but could still seem foreign; the Baltic provinces from which Barclay hailed were still culturally distinct, with their German-speaking nobility. HQs (Leaders):
The Russian officer corps, drawn very heavily from the nobility, had a narrower pool of talent than the French, and was also often seen as less professional, notably by the Germans who came to Russia as advisers to the Tsar. Though the
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average ability of the Russian commanders was not as high as the French, as reflected by their ratings in the game, nonetheless the Russians do have a number of reasonably able generals, and most of them, except Borozdin, had fought against Napoleon before. None of them enjoy the three steps of Napoleon or Davout, and only Barclay de Tolly shares their command radius of 3. Kutuzov, though the overall army commander and a competent general, was rather lethargic during the battle and took a less active role, while Barclay was always in the thick of the action, having several horses shot from under him. Barclay, the Russian War Minister, was rather unique in the Russian high command. He had, like many of the French, risen from a relatively humble station to the highest levels by his own merit, and through impressing the Tsar with his considerable administrative skills, thus exciting the jealousy of many other generals. Bagration is the fiercest fighting general on the Russian side, a match for Murat or Ney, and though he had never been wounded in battle before, he paid the price for his aggressiveness at Borodino when he fell in the fighting for the Fleches and Semyonovskoye. Most of the other Russian generals have at least the two steps needed to conduct a respectable defense, though their command ranges are usually short, only 1. Dokhturov and Platov are the exceptions with command ranges of 2, as full generals who showed their ability to command over wider areas (Dokhturov even replaced Bagration in command of 2nd Army). Some of the Russian generals, like Rayevski, Tuchkov, and Osterman-Tolstoi, are good fighters as they demonstrated at Borodino. The weak link on the Russian side is Lavrov, with only 1 step above zero; he normally commanded the Guards division but was temporarily filling in for Grand Duke Constantine, and during the battle was reported as being paralyzed under fire. Unfortunately for the Russians, he does not command a weak corps like Junot but the invaluable V Guard Corps, and historically Barclay and Kutuzov often stepped in directly to deploy his forces. As a result of the Russian command structure, with more and smaller corps reflecting the more limited abilities of generals, and the multiple army commands, the Russians are able to bring considerably less of their forces into action during any game turn than the French. This compels them to play a more defensive role and they are generally only able to counterattack on a single front. This was true in the historical battle as well. As with the French, the main strength of the HQ units in the game derives from the abilities of the commanders themselves, but the Russians also had escort troops for the AHQs detached from the main army 2 infantry battalions, 2 cavalry regiments and a Cossack regiment for Kutuzovs and Barclays AHQs, and a Cossack regiment and a militia
battalion for Bagrations AHQ. Infantry: Of the 51 infantry divisions in the Russian Army in 1812, 30 were formed from the Guard and regular regiments of the army, and can be considered front-line formations in every sense. These were the Guard, 1st Grenadier, 2nd Grenadier, 3rd through 27th, 1st Combined Grenadier, and 2nd Combined Grenadier divisions. The Combined Grenadiers divisions were unique formations, without regiments of their own and taking their battalions from elite Grenadier companies of the other regular divisions; all of the other divisions at Borodino, apart from the Guards, contributed usually two and at least one battalion to the Combined Grenadiers. The Guard and four Grenadier divisions were all elite units, even though the Grenadiers were considered part of the regular army, and all were present for Borodino, along with the 3rd 4th, 7th, 11th 12th, 17th, 23rd 24th, and 26th 27th Divisions, with the other regular divisions in the other armies and corps elsewhere. The remaining 21 infantry divisions, 28th through 48th, were formed from reserve troops depot battalions of regular regiments and garrisons and were not usually as strong as the front-line formations. None of them were used at Borodino, though some saw action on secondary fronts. The Russian infantry corps typically had two infantry divisions each, though
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the VIII Corps at Borodino had three. The Russian regular infantry had 170 regiments, including 96 infantry regiments, 50 Jaeger light infantry regiments, 14 grenadier regiments, 6 Guard regiments (including 1 Guard Jaeger) and 4 marine regiments. All of the Guard, 12 of the Grenadier, 39 of the infantry and 19 of the Jaeger regiments were present for Borodino, a total of 66. The structure of the Russian infantry divisions was more consistent than in the French army, with a normal infantry division having four infantry and two Jaeger regiments of two battalions each, while the Grenadier divisions had six grenadier regiments of two battalions each, and the Guards infantry division had all six of the guards regiments, but at increased strength with three battalions each. The typical Russian regular infantry divisions all have 3 steps in the game, but two are weaker with 2 steps, the 23rd which was missing two of the normal six regiments, and the 3rd, which had been weakened during its rearguard role. Two Russian divisions are also stronger, the relatively fresh 27th at 4 steps, which had come from Moscow at the start of the campaign, and the powerful Guards with 6 step thanks to their extra battalions, with the greatest total firepower (steps x fire rating) of any unit in the game. Like the French, the Russians also occasionally deployed large screens of light infantry Jaeger regiments, reflected by the three Jaeger units in the game that can be commanded by any HQ, even though the Jaeger regiments are normally operating with their parent infantry divisions. These Jaeger detachments, as with the French voltigeurs, are doublecounted with the Jaeger regiments in the infantry divisions since these screens could be formed from any infantry division with Jaegers in it. In the game, there are 47 steps of Guard and regular infantry, excluding the 3 steps of double-counted Jaeger detachments. At 1600 men per step, the regular and Guard infantry total are 75,200, closely matching the actual Russian corps infantry strength of about 75,300 men. The Russian militia (opolcheniye) at Borodino were from Moscow, formed into three divisions (1st-3rd) with 8 regiments of jaegers and infantry and 32 battalions, and from Smolensk, formed into 11 battalion-like districts. In the game, the three Moscow militia divisions, which were of widely differing strengths, have been merged into Moscow 1 and 2, given that it is not clear how many of the regiments of each division actually fought. These troops were motivated to defend their homeland, but ill-trained and ill-armed with a mixture of muskets and pikes. Of the 12,530 Smolensk militia available for Borodino, about 2000 were left nearby at Mozhaisk with 10,000 present on the field, while 20,74821,694 Moscow militia were present with another several thousand en route. But given the
equipment of these recently raised troops (many had just pikes), only about half of them, around 15,000, performed in a combat role at Borodino, with the rest in various noncombatant roles, helping to build redoubts, carry away wounded, etc. Those that fought were initially held in reserve along the Old Smolensk Road behind III Corps on Sept. 7th, but eventually were used to aid in the defense of the Utitskii Kurgan. There are 9 steps of Russian militia infantry in the game, at 1600 men per step a total of 14,400, which reasonably corresponds to the half of the militia that actually were available to fight. Cavalry: The Russian army had fewer cavalry divisions than the French, largely because the masses of Cossacks were not formed into divisions. The 19 cavalry divisions included the Guard cavalry, 1st and 2nd Cuirassiers, and the 1st 8th Divisions formed from regular cavalry regiments, as well as the 9th 16th Divisions consisting of reserve squadrons. Unlike the French army, with multiple cavalry divisions in each cavalry corps, the Russians normally had just one cavalry division in each corps at Borodino, I Cavalry Corps had most of the Guards cavalry division with the rest in 1st Cuirassiers, and II, III and IV Cavalry respectively had the 2nd 4th Divisions, each consisting of several regiments. But each
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Russian infantry corps normally had a large regiment of regular cavalry attached as well, and before the battle of Borodino those attached regiments were removed and merged with the cavalry corps to beef them up for action, raising most of the cavalry corps from 2 steps in game terms to 3. Only the 2nd Cavalry Corps remained weaker, for while it was reinforced from the corps too it also had to give up two of its normal regiments to serve as AHQ escort. The Russian regular cavalry had 66 regiments, including 6 Guards, 8 cuirassier, 36 dragoon, 11 hussar, and 5 uhlans (lancers). All of the Guards and cuirassier regiments were present for Borodino (four of the Guards regiments in I Cavalry Corps, and the two heavier Guards regiments in 1st Cuirassiers), along with 13 dragoon regiments, 6 hussar regiments and one of uhlans, a total of 34. The Russian cavalry regiments normally had four squadrons in the field, but the hussars and uhlans were doublestrength with 8 squadrons. In the game, there are 15 steps of Russian regular or Guards cavalry, which at 1200 men per step totals 18,000 men. This corresponds well to the actual Russian regular corps cavalry strength of about 17,500 men at Borodino (18,500 with attached artillery). The most colorful element of the Russian army was its irregular cavalry, primarily Cossacks from the Don, Ukraine, Siberia and other areas, with other Asiatic nationalities thrown in Bashkirs, Tatars, and Kalmucks. They were not formed into regular divisions, with their highest formations normally regiments and occasionally brigades, though for the 1812 campaign an entire Cossack Corps was formed under the Ataman of the Don Cossacks, Platov. These horsemen were superb at scouting, skirmishing and raiding, readily able on their light mounts to traverse all terrain, but preferred to avoid close combat and avoided head-on attacks against organized infantry, making themselves scarce when artillery came into play. For Borodino, 24 of these Cossack regiments were present, out of the 83 Cossack and other irregular regiments that had been present with the Russian army at the start of the campaign (60 Don Cossacks, 14 other Cossacks, and 9 non-Cossack irregulars) and 67 later raised. The great majority of the Cossacks at Borodino were from the Don, a total of 16 regiments, as was true of the Cossacks overall, but there were also 3 Bug and 1 Teptyarsk Cossack regiments, as well as 1 Bashkir, 2 Tatar, and 1 Kalmuck regiments. The Cossacks typically had 5 sotnias (hundreds) in place of squadrons in each regiment, while one reinforced Ataman regiment had 7-10. In the game, there are 9 steps of Cossack cavalry, which at 1200 men per step total 10,800 men, reasonably corresponding to the total number of about 10,000 Cossacks and other irregular cavalry in the field at Borodino.
At least 5600 and likely between 6000-7000 of these were with Platovs Cossack Corps (the 1 and 2 Cossacks units, with a combined total of 14 regiments), and 3016 with 2nd Army (the 3 Cossacks unit, with 8 regiments), while there were two more regiments of about 400 men each as AHQ escorts, one each with 1st and 2nd Army. Each of the three Cossack units in the game represents somewhat over 3000 men rounded up to 3 steps. The Cossack force has often been underestimated, in part because there is no contemporaneous separate total for all the Cossacks at Borodino in the Russian records -- parts of them are grouped with advanced guards or other detachments. The remaining 16,000 men in the regular army are accounted for by the artillery and train, including HQ staff and escorts, pioneers and pontooniers. These men, together with the 75,200 infantry, 18,000 cavalry and 10,800 Cossacks in the steps represented in the game, bring the total for the Russian army other than the militia to 120,000, no more than 1400 above the actual overall strength of about 118,600 for the Russians (due to rounding off). With the combatant part of the militia, the Russians are about even in numbers with the French. Though there is no single tally of manpower for the Russian forces at the time of Borodino, a good estimate of the actual Russian strength can be derived from the records of 1st Army and partial ones for 2nd Army
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As of Sept. 5, 1812, 1st Army recorded these corps strengths:
Corps I Cavalry 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Advanced Guard Manpower 2434 Infantry Battalions (excluding militia) Cavalry Squadrons (including Cossacks) 20 (+8 added from infantry corps before battle) 31 (+25 added from infantry corps before battle) 98 (inc. 26 Cossacks returned to 2nd Army before battle, rest of Cossacks, 72, with Platov) 6.5 (transferred to cavalry before battle) 7.5 (transferred to cavalry before battle) 5.5 (transferred to cavalry before battle) 28 (20 retained, 8 transferred to cavalry before battle) 6 (transferred to cavalry before battle) 202.5 (-26 returned to 2nd Army; + 13 sent to AHQ = 189.5)
3439
15,370
II Corps
11,452
25 (inc. 11 reg. inf. returned to III Corps, 6 Comb. Gren. to V Corps, 8 jaegers to VI Corps) 24
III Corps
6,791
IV Corps
10,468
V Guards Corps
17,260
12 (+11 added from Advanced Guard, + 1 sent to AHQ) 21 (inc. one Comb. Gren., other Comb. Gren. sent to AHQ) 22 (+6 Comb. Gren. added from Advanced Guard) 16 (+8 added from Advanced Guard) 120 (+2 at AHQ = 122)
VI Corps
8,465
Total
75,542 (with about 2000 of these returned to 2nd Army from the Advanced Guard)
The totals in this Sept. 5 tally do not count AHQ staffs, escort troops detached from corps (2 infantry battalions, 2 cavalry regiments with 4 squadrons each, and a Cossack regiment of 5 squadrons, added to the chart), and attached pioneer and pontoonier companies in 1st Army and Kutuzovs AHQs, accounting for some 3500 more men. Nor does this tally reflect the substantial reorganization that took place just before the battle (as shown in the parentheticals in the table). All
of the attached cavalry were removed from the infantry corps and added to the cavalry corps, except the 20 squadrons of cavalry attached to the Guard in 1st Cuirassier Division, adding 33 squadrons to the cavalry corps. In addition, a large part of the corps artillery was taken away and aggregated in army reserves, and there was also some shifting of guns between 1st and 2nd Armies, with the 1st Army reserve getting the bulk of the horse artillery. The Advanced Guard, which had been covering the armys retreat along the New Smolensk Post Highway, was also recombined with its parent corps just before the battle after its task was complete. This force appears to have included (1) all of the 72 squadrons of Cossacks with Platov in 1st Army, (2) 26 squadrons of Cossacks returned to 2nd Army before the battle (out of 31 that had been borrowed from 2nd Army for the Advanced Guard, 5 of which stayed with 1st Army), (3) 11 battalions of the 3rd Infantry Division in III Corps (the 12th battalion was detached as an AHQ escort), (4) the four Jaeger regiments of VI Corps with 8 battalions, and (5) 6 battalions of Combined Grenadiers from the 1st Combined Grenadiers Division. The artillery strength of 1st Army was given as 432 guns, including 144 position guns (12 batteries), 212 light guns (18 batteries, one below full strength with 8 guns), and 76 horse guns (7 batteries, including the two in the Guard with only 8 guns each).
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For 2nd Army, the composition of VIII Corps is known in detail for each division as of the start of the battle, and data for the other corps is available or can be estimated:
Corps/Division Manpower Infantry Battalions (excluding militia) 24 Cavalry Squadrons (including Cossacks)
VII Corps VIII Corps total - 27th Division - 2nd Grenadier Div. - 2nd Comb.Gren. Div. - Artillery 2nd Cuirassier Div. IV Cavalry
12,500 est., inc. artillery 17,410, inc. artillery 6112 (excl. artillery) 5136 (excl. artillery) 4912 (excl. artillery) 1250 est. (1058 on 9/7, in 6 batteries) 2800 est. 4300 est., inc. artillery
12 12 11
Cossacks
3016 (+400 est. at AHQ)
Total
40,026 (40,426)
59
20 32 (inc. 8 added from VII Corps before battle) 40 (includes 14 +26 others returned from 1st Army Advanced Guard, +5 at AHQ) 92 (97)
The two armies together, with HQ escorts, fielded 181 infantry battalions of regulars and Guards, 164 cavalry squadrons of regulars and Guards, and 122 Cossack sotnias (squadron equivalents), with 53 batteries of artillery (+1 in reserve at Mozhaisk, not counted). The combined strength of the two armies apart from militia was about 118,600, including about 75,300 infantry, 17,500 cavalry (not counting artillery attached to the infantry and cavalry), 9,800 Cossack and other irregular cavalry (other than those in the artillery and HQs), 10,000 in the army-level artillery reserves and train, HQ staff and escorts, and 6000 artillery and train still with the corps. The final organization of the two armies at the time of the battle is shown in the OB tables at the end, matching the individual units in the game to the names of the regiments, and numbers of battalions or squadrons and artillery batteries, included in them. The Role of Artillery at Borodino Players of Borodino 1812 have recognized the power of the artillery of the two armies in the game and that is as it should be. Napoleon called Borodino the most terrible of all his battles, and September 7 saw the largest casualties of any single day in the Napoleonic Wars. It was largely the predominance of artillery at Borodino that caused
These totals include (in parentheticals) the AHQ escort in 2nd Army of one Cossack regiment of 5 squadrons (though not the militia battalion attached to AHQ). However, they do not reflect the AHQ staff, pioneers and pontooniers, which probably added another 1100 men to the total. The 2nd Army had the remainder of the 624 guns before the battle, including 5 position batteries (60 guns), 5 light batteries (60 guns), and 6 horse batteries (72 guns), a total of 192, with 2 heavy, 3 light and 1 horse batteries in VIII Corps. By comparison, in late August 2nd Army was known to have had 54 position guns (4.5 batteries), 72 light guns (6 batteries), and 48 horse guns (4 batteries). With the reorganization before the battle some of these guns were shifted around between the two armies, and 2nd Army ended up with only 186 guns and considerably fewer horse batteries.
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caused this, as the ratio of guns to men was one of the highest in any Napoleonic battle. The French and Russians began the campaign with very large numbers of artillery, but not an unusual ratio of guns to men. Napoleons forces available for the campaign at the start massed a close to 1400 guns various sources give 1372, 1393, or 1412. Compared with the 675,000 men Napoleon had available, this was about 485 men per gun, taking the middle of the range for the gun total. The Russians had even more guns available among all their scattered forces, a total of 1484 in 124 batteries, which compared with the 623,000 regulars and Cossacks available yields 418 men per gun. These ratios appear similar to other Napoleonic campaigns and battles. For example, in the 1815 Waterloo campaign, the three armies had 362,000 men and 894 guns together, a ratio of 405 men per gun. But by the time of Borodino, though attrition, battle losses and detachments had dramatically reduced the strength of the French corps in the battle to an average of only 45% of the manpower they had at the start of the campaign, the French had done a much better job of preserving their artillery forces, and still had 86% of the guns with which those corps began the campaign 587 out of the original 682. The Russian artillery force was also still largely intact, with 624 guns on the battlefield (and another 12 in reserve at Mozhaisk). The 285,000 men on the Borodino battlefield and 1211 guns result in a ratio of only 235 men per gun. And this artillery was intensely used as well the French estimated that they fired about 60,000 artillery rounds, and the Russians, who used their artillery less efficiently, still managed about 40,000. In the other major battles of the Napoleonic Wars, the ratio of guns to men was typically much lower. At Austerlitz, with 158,400 men on both sides and 417 guns, there were 380 men per gun; at JenaAuerstadt, with 247,760 men on both sides and 441 guns, there were 335 men per gun; and at Wagram, with 328,200 men on both sides and 1031 guns, there were 318 men per gun. Indeed, in some of the battles in Spain, the artillery played an extremely minor role compared with Borodino. At Talavera, with 110,579 men in the French, British and Spanish armies and 126-142 guns, the ratio of men to guns was between 715-806. French Artillery: On the French side at Borodino, the principal gun types were 12 pounders, 6 pounders (used by both foot and horse artillery), howitzers, and 3 or 4 pounder guns used for regimental infantry support (usually 2 per regiment where available at all, but 4 per regiment in Davouts wellequipped I Corps). Apart from the 3-4 pounders, the artillery was organized in batteries at the divisional and corps reserve levels,
usually with the heavier guns in corps reserves while the lighter foot and horse batteries were attached to the infantry divisions, with a battery each of foot and horse guns with each division. A French foot battery would typically have 6 cannon (either heavy 12 pounders or the lighter 6 pounders) and 2 howitzers, and a French horse battery 4 cannon (6 pounders) and 2 howitzers. Some of the French allies followed the French organization, while others differed in battery strengths. And just as the French corps varied considerably in size, so did their artillery contingents, all the way from the 147 guns Davout controlled in I Corps to the mere 30 Junot had in VIII Corps. In the game, however, all of this artillery is massed at the corps level, following the Napoleonic principle of massing of guns into grand batteries, to allow its full effect to be felt in battle. Indeed, Napoleon regularly made coordinated use of the guns of multiple corps to get the most powerful artillery effect for example, in his bombardment of the Fleches redoubts, he employed guns from the Guard, I Corps and III Corps. Given that almost all of the corps had mixed types of guns, the artillery units are also classified in the game according to the predominant types of guns in them, even though other types are also included. Heavy artillery units always contain some 12 pounders, generally 50% or more, but usually have some lighter guns too. These
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units, in the game, are the least mobile, unable to move into a battle but only bombard from an adjoining area, or defend. Light artillery units are mainly light foot artillery but often have some horse guns, or regimental 3 or 4 pounders mixed in. They can move into battle, but, like heavy guns, not retreat from battles in the first round. Finally, the horse artillery units which are either pure horse guns as in Murats cavalry, or at most have a smaller number of light foot guns mixed in as in IV Corps are the most mobile, able both to move into a battle and to disengage easily in the first round. With 587 guns, at 24 guns per step the French have 24 steps of artillery in the game, and the individual corps artillery strengths generally match the 24 guns per step standard as well. Only Davouts I Corps artillery, at 5 steps, appears a step weaker than the 6 steps it would normally be expected to have with 147 guns. That is because of the large number of less effective regimental 3 pounders in I Corps artillery; taking a step from Davouts light artillery brings the French overall total of artillery steps to what it should be and avoids overvaluing the power of the I Corps guns. The French have 7 heavy, 11 light, and 6 horse artillery steps in their total of 24, reasonably corresponding to the totals of gun types, though the French army had 39 foot and 36 horse batteries. Each French artillery step, with 24 guns, represents about 3 foot or 4 horse batteries. The French have about 2/3 of their horse guns represented in horse artillery steps, with the rest mixed into light artillery units in the corps. Russian Artillery: In the Russian army, the artillery organization was more logical, reflecting the reforms undertaken by Barclay and others before the 1812 campaign to establish more systematic corps structures. The Russians had three standard types of batteries, each with 12 guns regardless of type. The horse batteries contained 8 6 pounders and 4 10 pounder licorne howitzers, while the two types of foot batteries, position and light, similarly contained 8 guns and 4 howitzers, but in the light batteries the gun types tracked the horse batteries, while the heavy position batteries contained 8 12 pounders and 4 20 pounder licorne howitzers. Each corps normally had two artillery brigades in support, one for each of the two divisions, and each containing three batteries (often one position and two light). The infantry corps could also have a horse artillery battery, and the cavalry corps also typically had a horse artillery battery attached. Only the Russian Guard was somewhat unusual in artillery support, with two position batteries, two light batteries, and also two horse batteries (with only 8 guns each), plus two 3 pounders in the Marine Guard Equipage battalion, a type that had otherwise been abolished from the Russian artillery.
Had the Russians stuck with this structure for the battle, each Russian infantry corps would have had 3 steps of artillery in support in the game, much as the Guard does. But just before the battle, the Russians decided on a major reorganization of their artillery, massing a large part of the guns at the army level to create artillery reserves directly under the command of Barclay and Bagration. Horse guns (except in the Guard) only remained at the corps level in support of cavalry units, with many going into the 1st Army reserve, and each of the infantry corps gave up in theory twothirds of their foot batteries as well to the army reserves, even though some of them were reinforced again as battle neared or appear to have retained more of their guns in practice. This decision weakened the artillery of all of the corps apart from the Guard, leaving them in game terms with only one step of artillery (III, VII Corps) or at most two (II, IV, VI, VIII Corps). In return, Bagration ended up with 4 steps of artillery in game terms under his direct control, 3 light and 1 heavy (half the guns in his army, out of 8 steps, or 9 after adding III Corps), and Barclay similarly ended up with 7 steps of artillery in game terms under his control (3 light, 1 heavy and 3 horse), which, added to the 3 steps of Guard artillery that were in reserve with the entire Guard corps at the start, meant that more than half of the artillery of 1st Army was in reserve (10 out of 18 steps, counting Tuchkovs III Corps with 1st Army at the start).
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The artillery reserve concept, though attractive in theory as a way to match Napoleons massing of guns into grand batteries (and one the Russians have often used throughout history, as with their massive artillery reserve corps in World War II), did not work out so well here in practice. Bagration who in game terms is at least able to command both of his artillery units at full strength was mortally wounded by midday, and with his AHQ out of action, Dokhturovs CHQ had to take over responsibility for the 2nd Army reserve. And Barclays total army reserve, with the three artillery units and three cavalry corps, is far more than he can possibly command on any one turn in the game; even with Kutuzovs help, two of the six units would be out of command and have to act as stragglers, if at all. It was not supposed to be that way. But Barclays commander of the 1st Army artillery reserve, the young Maj. Gen. Kutaisov, managed to get himself killed early in the battle on Sept. 7, acting entirely outside his proper role by enthusiastically leading a bayonet counterattack. His death is assumed and he is not depicted in the game as a result could one imagine any sensible player using his artillery reserve commander that way? Due to his loss, the main Russian artillery reserve was not properly coordinated as the Russians had planned, and a number of batteries were not even brought into action. With 624 guns, at 24 guns per step, the Russians have 26 steps of artillery in the game, exactly as they should. Each step of 24 guns equals two full-strength Russian batteries, and the Russians had 17 position batteries, 23 light batteries, and 13 horse batteries. The types of Russian artillery steps match the battery types almost exactly, with 9 heavy steps, 12 light steps and 5 horse steps. The lower total for horse artillery steps is due to the two 8-gun Guard horse artillery batteries being merged into the Guard artillery unit, which is classified as light on average since it also mixes light and heavy batteries. The Field of Borodino and the Strategies of Napoleon and Kutuzov The Borodino battlefield in 1812 was a region of well-settled countryside with numerous villages (some of which appear for the first time in any Borodino game on Columbias map, thanks to new historical research), lying just to the west of the Moskva River. Most are smaller villages, though three shown on the map were larger, including Borodino, Yelnya and Utitsa (as well as Uspenskoye just off the map to the east), but on the scale of this game the varying sizes of the villages do not have different effects. The game designers have opted for more of a north-south orientation of the map, rather than the east-west orientation that appears in most Borodino games, to afford maximum opportunity for maneuver and flanking
strategies, and better show the strategies of the commanders and what underlay them. There are three principal roads running from east to west across the battlefield, which do not differ from the much more extensive network of minor roads for movement purposes, but do affect supply (they would have been more useful for baggage trains). The main New Smolensk Post Highway is in the center, coming from Smolensk and heading toward the town of Mozhaisk and on to Moscow (with two supply points for both sides in the game at either end). To the south, the Old Smolensk Road enters at Yelnya to the west, and exits to the east nearly in parallel and just below the New Smolensk Post Highway, heading toward Mozhaisk and Moscow. Finally, the third main road enters at Gryaz to the north, and then heads west and southward, nearly joining with the New Smolensk Post Highway at one point where it becomes the Old Ruzskaya Road, and continuing east to cross the Moskva river, heading on toward the town of Ruza and then Moscow. This road is often overlooked in descriptions of the battle, but research has shown that it was important for the advance of the parallel column of Eugenes IV Corps to the north of Napoleons main force. Each of these other two main roads has one supply point for either side at each end. The Kolocha River, a tributary of the Moskva, runs from the west across the
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battlefield, and then turns northward after passing Borodino village to join with the Moskva. Both rivers could form significant obstacles to movement, particularly with the Kolochas ravine near Borodino and the high banks on the eastern side of the Kolocha east of Borodino, but are fordable at several points, with a bridge also crossing the Kolocha on the New Smolensk Post Highway at Borodino. On the southern edge of the battlefield, forests and swamps traversed by only one significant road, the Old Smolensk Road, made it difficult though not impossible to flank the Russian position. The most vulnerable points were in the clear areas just south of the Kolocha, and there the Russians improved their position with several redoubts the hilltop Shevardino Redoubt furthest to the west, and closer together and able to support each other, the three arrow-shaped Fleches redoubts as well as the hilltop Great Redoubt, protecting the Russian left and center. Behind these redoubts lay the Semyonovskaya Heights, affording the Russians an elevated position for artillery supporting their defense and for counterattacking reserves. On the Gorki hill that Kutuzov chose for his headquarters, with a good view of the battlefield, a smaller redoubt-like artillery position was also built, and furthest to the east, between the Moskva river and the Maslovskii Forest, the Russians built another complex of three redoubts near the village of Maslovo. This last, seemingly isolated position behind the Russian lines offers a key insight to how Kutuzov expected to fight the battle. He initially anticipated that Napoleon would try to cross the Kolocha river near to its confluence with the Moskva, and sweep along the west bank of the Moskva to cut the Russians off from their supply sources, forcing them away from Moscow. At the outset, Kutuzov did not foresee any significant French attack along the Old Smolensk Road, and did not deploy any regular troops that far south until after the opening battle on Sept. 5. Napoleon was happy to encourage this misperception. His armies, advancing in three columns, were well positioned to attack on either the northern or southern flank, or in the center, with an effort in any direction able to be reinforced from the main body on the New Smolensk Post Highway. Napoleon rejected making his main effort in the north, which would require him to force the Kolocha against the strong opposition of 1st Army, but he kept Eugenes IV Corps deployed in the north to focus Russian attention there, and even reinforced it on Sept. 7 with two of Davouts five infantry divisions, the 1st and 3rd (in the game, players can decide whether to reassign those two divisions to strengthen the northern flank, or keep Davouts powerful I Corps intact). Eugene would use these borrowed divisions to the fullest, risking them more than his own troops.
Davout proposed a major flanking effort to the south, on or below the Old Smolensk Road, with both the I Corps and the Polish V Corps, which would have had to negotiate some difficult terrain but held out the prospect of cutting the Russians off from two of their main supply roads leading to the town of Mozhaisk, and trapping them against the Moskva. But Napoleon rejected this alternative, which would have put part of his army well out of reach of support from the rest. The Emperor chose instead to concentrate his main effort against the Russian 2nd Army on the center-left, first clearing the Shevardino Redoubt to link up his army, and then driving with the main remaining force of I Corps, III Corps, part of IV Corps, and the Cavalry Reserve against the Fleches and the Great Redoubt. He aimed to crush 2nd Army before Kutuzov realized what Napoleon was about, and could reinforce 2nd Army by redeploying the corps of 1st Army. VIII Corps, initially planned as a reserve for III Corps in the center, was eventually shifted southward to reinforce the Poles, while the Guard formed the ultimate reserve, to be used, apart from its artillery, only if essential. With this decision to make a frontal assault, relying on the artillery, cavalry and tactical skill of the French commanders to prevail, the stage was set for one of the bloodiest of Napoleons battles.
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The Armies at Borodino Compared Formations Infantry Corps Cavalry Corps Infantry Divisions Cavalry Divisions Infantry Regiments Cavalry Regiments Infantry Battalions Cavalry Squadrons Artillery Batteries Total Guns French and Allies 6 4 18 17 65 84 214 (out of 556 whole army) 312 (out of 480 whole army) 75 587 Russians 7 5 (including 1 Cossack) 15 + 3 militia 6 76 + 8 militia 34 + 24 Cossack, irregular 181 + 43 militia 164 + 122 Cossack, irregular 53 (including 2 Cossack) 624
French and Russian Steps and Firepower in Borodino 1812 Unit Types French Steps Infantry 61 Cavalry 23 Artillery 24 HQs (Leaders) 17 Total 125 French Firepower 59 (inc. 9 mil.) 137 24 (inc. 9 Coss.) 60 26 60 23 41 132 298 Russian Steps Russian Firepower 125 48 64 38 275
While the total number of French steps in the game, at 125, is slightly less than the Russian total of 132, the French have the edge in firepower (steps x fire ratings of units), though the overall difference is less than 10%. This French firepower edge is due to the Russians having a large share of their steps, 18 overall, in irregular militia infantry and Cossack cavalry units with fire ratings of only 1, while all the French non-HQ units have at least 2 as regulars. The two armies are nearly equal in number of elite unit steps rated 3s or 4s (Guards, grenadiers and heavy cavalry, though not non-Guards heavy artillery), at 27 for the French and 28 for the Russians, and here firepower is comparable as well, at 89 for the French and 86 for the Russians. The Russian and French artillery are also close in steps and firepower, and indeed this is one area where the Russians even have the firepower edge, taking all gun types into account. With the advantage of the defense and terrain obstacles, this slight French edge in firepower would be readily offset, were it not for the ability of the French to bring considerably more of their firepower into action each turn for the same expenditure of supplies.
The French advantage comes from concentration of their corps and superior leadership, allowing more troops to be commanded by fewer leaders. If the French and Russians both use four supply points to activate their four strongest corps Guard, I, IV and Cavalry Reserve plus voltigeurs for the French, and V Guard, VIII, 2nd Army Cavalry, and either II or VI plus militia and Jaegers for the Russians the French are able to bring 74% of their steps and 76% of their firepower into action, while the Russians can only bring 47% of their steps and 49% of their firepower into action. The difference between being able to deploy three-quarters of the French strength, and slightly under half of the Russian strength, for the same amount of supply, is what makes the strong offensive possible that the French need to win. But both armies can throw their entire strength into action if necessary during a turn, by draining their reserves of supplies in the game, so a powerful Russian counterattack at a critical juncture is still possible, and the French can never be entirely secure. If the Russian bear seems rather slow and sleepy much of the time, he can be formidable if roused.
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September 5: The Opening Engagement at Shevardino Turn by Turn This shorter scenario presents challenges for both players, whether played on a standalone basis or as part of a longer campaign game with the main battle. The French player must decide where to commit his reserves, as he can bring in I Corps and the Guard on any of the three entry roads. This choice can critically affect how the battle unfolds, particularly whether the French player reinforces the Poles at Yelnya or commits everything to the main thrust on the New Smolensk Post Highway. The French have limited time to achieve their victory objectives, only 7 hours (turns) before darkness, and must act quickly, while at the same time trying to minimize their own unit losses. In the standalone scenario, since the Russians will usually be able to hold four of the five redoubts, the French must try to at least capture Shevardino, both for the points and to link up the rest of their army with the isolated Polish V Corps coming in on the Old Smolensk Road, and kill three or more Russian units while losing none of their own or kill even more Russians if the French suffer losses too. The Russians must decide whether to play this scenario essentially as a delaying action, expecting to lose Shevardino in the end but trying to minimize their own losses for the win, or to make a larger commitment of forces and use up more valuable supply, trying to kill French units in the north or south before Napoleons army is fully assembled. In the campaign game, both sides will be playing more for position than points on the first day, but need to be concerned not only about unit losses but about step losses too, taking care not to weaken themselves too much before the main battle on Sept. 7. Historically, the Russians committed only a small part of their forces, including VIII Corps and the cavalry of 2nd Army, as well as some artillery and jaegers, and most of the fighting was limited to the Shevardino redoubt area. Since Kutuzov was focused on the threat of a French attack across the Kolocha River east of Borodino, as was evident from his opening deployment, Napoleon encouraged this delusion by keeping Eugenes IV Corps and the Guard north of the Kolocha. As a result, the Russian 1st Army and even some parts of the 2nd Army, such as VII Corps, stayed largely immobile on September 5, while Napoleon concentrated Davouts powerful I Corps, Poniatowskis Polish V Corps, and the two strong cavalry corps of Murats Cavalry Reserve that had arrived on the 5th, I Cavalry (1CC ) and II Cavalry (2CC), against the Russians defending Shevardino. In the game, it is possible for the Russians to commit more units to the battle, but the corps leaders of 1st Army all start below their full strength to reflect the Russians uncertainty about which way Napoleon intended to move (strategic fog of war) and
Kutuzovs resulting unwillingness to bring his army fully into action. Kutuzov consciously preferred to give the initiative to Napoleon and react to what the Emperor did, having bitter experience with the danger of attacking Napoleon from Austerlitz. And in the game, this conservative approach to the battle leaves the Russians more supplies to build up their 1st Army CHQs for the main battle to come. At the outset, all of the Russian army is deployed on the map, with set locations for HQs but some limited flexibility for individual units. The Russian rearguard of Platovs Cossacks, the 3rd Division (Konovnitsyn), and screening jaegers, which had also been aided by I Cavalry Corps (Uvarov), has just rejoined the main army and taken up positions. Napoleons Grande Arme is approaching from the west in three parallel columns. The northern flanking column, coming through Gryaz, consists of Eugenes IV Corps, with some screening voltigeurs. The southern flanking column, coming through Yelnya on the Old Smolensk Road, consists of Poniatowskis V Corps, again with some voltigeurs. And the main central column, on the New Smolensk Post Highway, has at the outset Napoleons AHQ, Murat with the I and II Cavalry Corps and half of his horse artillery, and the remaining voltigeurs. Davouts I Corps and the Guard are approaching behind on the New Smolensk Post Highway, and enter at the
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rate of one corps per turn each on the second and third turns, but could be diverted to either of the other entry roads. 2 pm Napoleon, Eugene, and Murat are all active on the French side, while the Russians activate Golitsyn, Platov and Borozdin. The initial French forces advance, Napoleon and the French cavalry under Murat moving up toward Valuyevo where he establishes his HQ for Sept. 5, while Eugene moves toward the Voina stream where he has been directed to take up positions and threaten the Russian left flank. The Russians have established a screen of jaegers along the Kolocha River in front of Shevardino, a total of three regiments north of the redoubt around Fomkino and another three south of the redoubt facing the Poles, while behind this screen is the 27th Division (Neverovsky) shielding the redoubt, with artillery. This is enough to deter the French from crossing the Kolocha on the first hour of their entry; they will have to wait and prepare to attack. Three Russian batteries with 36 guns are positioned in and around the redoubt. The Russian IV Cavalry Corps (Sievers) moves up to protect the Shevardino redoubt to the west, but other divisions of the VIII Corps, including the 2nd Grenadiers (Mecklenburg) and 2nd Combined Grenadiers (Vorontsov), for the time remain in reserve behind the redoubt, along with the 2nd Cuirassiers (Duka). The Russian Cossacks of 2nd Army (Karpov) move southward to oppose the Poles, and some of the Russian militia (within Golitsyns command range) also move forward to Utitsa to cover the Old Smolensk Road, while Platov moves forward in the north, preparing his forces to meet Eugene and cover the Russian line north of Borodino. 3 pm Eugene, Davout, Murat and Poniatowski are all active on the French side, while the Russians again activate Golitsyn and Borozdin. Eugenes 13th (Delzons) and 14th (Broussier) Divisions advance to the western bank of the Voina, flanked to the north by the IV Corps cavalry division (Ornano). Davouts I Corps enters along the New Smolensk Post Highway. The powerful 5th Division (Compans) advances toward Fomkino, where one of the two French cavalry corps, I Cavalry Corps (Nansouty) and II Cavalry Corps (Montbrun), forces a crossing, driving back the screening Russian forces, with the other remaining north of the river at Valuyevo for now (only one French cavalry can cross the dam to Fomkino as there is also an uphill slope here, but bombardment by some of Davouts guns from the entry area across the Kolocha can help convince the Russians to fall back). The other divisions of I Corps move further down the New Smolensk Post Highway. The 3rd Division (Gerard) likely does not move south of the Kolocha during the battle on the 5th, remaining in support of Eugene west of Borodino, though also available as
a reserve supporting the other divisions of the corps (with Davouts command radius of 3 it is possible to keep these widely separated divisions under common control, even before the 1st and 3rd Divisions come under Eugenes direct control for Sept. 7). But the other two strong divisions, 1st (Morand) and 2nd (Friant), plan to force a river crossing, while the weaker 4th (Dessaix) remains in reserve behind them and does not get involved in the fighting. Polish cavalry encounters the Cossacks near Yelnya, but the Cossacks fall back, covering Utitsa. 4 pm On the French side, Davout, Murat, Poniatowski, Eugene and Mortier are all active, though after moving forward to join Napoleon Mortier does little, while the Russians activate Golitsyn, Borozdin and Bagration, bringing the AHQ forward to aid in the battle. The French 5th Division moves into Fomkino, while the French cavalry moves to its flank, taking the area on the southern bank of the Kolocha below Valuyevo. There is some skirmishing between Eugenes forces and Russian Cossacks, jaegers and artillery defending the area of Borodino, but this appears to be more of a demonstration on the part of the French to draw the Russians attention here. The French are driven back from an attack toward Borodino by strong Russian forces including Uvarovs I Cavalry Corps (1CC), jaegers and horse artillery, even though they do succeed in
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crossing the Voina at Bezzubovo and drive back Platovs Cossacks to threaten Borodino from the north. After this, there is little action in the north on Sept. 5 as the French do not press the attack. French Guard reinforcements begin arriving on the New Smolensk Post Highway, but they only move up to the Valuyevo area, held in reserve protecting Napoleon on Sept. 5, and are not committed to the battle. The Poles advance through the swamps and forests to the south of Shevardino with their 16th Division (Krasinski) and voltigeurs toward the redoubt, while the 18th Division (Kniaziewicz) and corps cavalry protect the Old Smolensk Road against the Cossacks. The Poles withstand a cavalry counterattack by regiments of the Russian IV Cavalry Corps. 5 pm The French activate Davout, Poniatowski, and Eugene (who is reorganizing the French troops in the north) while the Russians activate Golitsyn and Bagration (who is bringing more artillery from the reserve into position). The French 5th Division moves into Doronino, forcing back Russian defenders and withstanding a Russian cavalry counterattack by IV Cavalry Corps with its troops forming square. French artillery of I Corps is brought into position to bombard the Shevardino redoubt from adjoining areas including Doronino. Meanwhile, the French 1st and 2nd Divisions force another crossing of the Kolocha
at Alexsinki. The Poles push back screening Russian jaegers in the south, linking up with the main Grande Arme. 5 pm turn: Doronino Area
French (attacking): 5th Infantry Division (6) (coming from Fomkino area), I Corps Light Artillery (3) (coming from Fomkino area), Polish 16th Infantry Division (2) (coming from Kudinovo Swamp area), Voltigeur B2 (1) (coming from Malvinka Swamp area). Russian (defending): 4CC Cavalry Corps (3), Jager B2 (1).
Result: Russians retreat (they are conducting a delaying action here and do not attempt to put up a strong fight against the much more powerful French attackers, minimizing losses), with the French and Poles finally linking up
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6 pm On the French side, Murat and Davout are both activated, while the Russians activate Golitsyn and Borozdin. The French 5th Division and some of Murats supporting cavalry, in II Cavalry Corps, attack the Shevardino redoubt following a bombardment, and the French infantry spearheading the attack force their way into the redoubt in fierce fighting with the Russian 27th Division and artillery, even though these are reinforced by the 2nd Grenadiers and 2nd Cuirassiers. The Russians wield their bayonets to good effect against the attacking French. The Russian defenders, though forced back, manage to save most of their guns. The French I Cavalry Corps has moved around the Shevardino Redoubt to the south in support of the Poles. 6 pm turn: Shevardino Redoubt Area French (attacking): 5th Infantry Division (6) (coming from Doronino area), 2CC Cavalry Corps (4) (coming from area to north of Shevardino redoubt), and Horse Artillery 1 (2) (coming from area to north of Shevardino redoubt; attack is supported by bombardment using Davout's I Corps Heavy Artillery (2) (from Fomkino area) and Light Artillery (3) from Doronino area Russians (defending): 27th Infantry Division (4, but reduced to 3 by artillery bombardment), VIII Corps Heavy Artillery (2), reinforced by 2nd Grenadier Division (3), 2nd Cuirassier Division (2) Result: Russians retreat by 3rd round, with step losses to Russian
27th Infantry, 2nd Grenadier, and French 5th Infantry Divisions, and French 2CC Cavalry Corps, but prolonged resistance aided by the double defense benefit of the redoubt allows Russian heavy artillery to be pulled back without loss (historically the Russians lost only 3 of their guns in the redoubt), and the Russian 2nd Grenadier and French 5th Infantry Divisions each recover a step from supply Continued From Page 28

Garrison of Bhurtpore: 50,000 Troops (Regular and Irregular Infantry) A large number of guns (cannon) Covering Force: Amir Khan/Holkar: Scindhian Horse (approx. 12,000) = Note: Young insists that Butler was the Artillery Brigade Major, at least on January 10th, he may have been promoted/reassigned due to casualties at some point during the campaign, oddly Stubbs does not make this clear. Sources: Khanna, D.D. (Young), The 2nd Maratha Campaign, 1804-1805 (Diary of Lt. James Young, Bengal Horse Artillery) Pearse, Col. Hugh W., Memoir ofViscount Lake, Baron Lake of Delhi Stubbs, History of the Bengal Artillery Thorn, Captain, Memoir of the Late War in India
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7 pm turn: Shevardino Village & Redoubt Area
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7 pm The Russians activate all three of their leaders on hand, Bagration, Borozdin, and Golitsyn, while the French have Davout, Murat and Poniatowski all active. The Russians, seizing the initiative for once, attempt a major combined arms counterattack on the Shevardino Redoubt, with the elite infantry of the 2nd Grenadiers and 2nd Combined Grenadiers and the heavy cavalry of the 2nd Cuirassiers supported by a strong artillery bombardment. The 2nd Cuirassiers inflict serious damage on the French 5th Division, overrunning one of its regiments before it can form square. But the counterattack is finally repulsed, with losses to the Russians as well. In support of the French defending the Shevardino redoubt, the French infantry from Alexsinki, the 1st and 2nd Divisions, force their way into Shevardino village, forcing back the Russian IV Cavalry Corps and protecting the flank of the French position. The Poles have reached the foot of the Kamenka Hill south of the Shevardino redoubt, threatening the flank of the Russian position. Shevardino Redoubt Area Russians (attacking): 2nd Grenadier Division (3) (coming from area SE of redoubt), 2nd Combined Grenadier Division (3) (coming from Shevardino village area), 2nd Cuirassier Division (2) (coming from area SE of redoubt); attack is supported by bombardment involving VIII Corps Heavy Artillery (2) from Shevardino village area, and II Army Light Artillery (3) from area SE of redoubt
French (defending): 5th Infantry Division (6, but reduced to 4 by artillery bombardment), 2CC Cavalry Corps (3), Horse Artillery 1 (2), reinforced by I Corps Light Artillery (3) Result: Russian counterattack repulsed, Russians retreat but with step losses on both sides to Russian 2nd Grenadier and 2nd Combined Grenadier Divisions, and French 5th Infantry Division Shevardino Village Area French (attacking): 1st Infantry Division (4), 2nd Infantry Division (5) Russians (defending): 4 CC Cavalry Corps (3), VIII Corps Heavy Artillery (2) (because the Russians had the initiative this turn, their heavy artillery in the Shevardino village area was able to bombard and their 2nd Combined Grenadier Division to
move from the Shevardino village area before the French moved in to attack, but the French were able to take advantage of the weakening of the Russian position in Shevardino village to attack in response) Result: Russians retreat by 2nd round, with step losses to Russian 4CC Cavalry Corps and French 2nd Infantry Division; the Russians cannot use the Shevardino village area to retreat from the battle in the Shevardino redoubt as a result of the French attack but can still retreat their forces in that battle into the other area they attacked from SE of the redoubt
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Where are the rest of the armies while these actions are going on? On the Russian side, the corps of I Army are largely inactive, though with some skirmishing around Borodino against Eugene's IV Corps in the French army, with the B3 Jager unit supported by the Russian 1CC Cavalry Corps (which pulls back late on Sept. 5) and Platov's Cossacks (which redeploy to the rear after Sept. 5) defending Borodino and Bezzubovo. Eugene's forces, supported by most of the French Voltigeurs, are largely making a demonstration to keep the attention of the Russians on this flank, rather than pressing an attack with all their strength, though they do clear the Russians out of Bezzubovo. Golitsyn's 3 Cossacks with some militia are screening Utitsa against part of the Polish V Corps (18th Division and artillery), with no serious fighting on the southern flank this day. The two Jager B2 units supporting II Army on Sept. 5 are screening the flanks of that army, one to the south of the Shevardino redoubt, being gradually forced back by the French 1CC Cavalry Corps and the part of the Poles that has moved north from Yelnya (though buying the Russians time and space to retreat their forces from the Shevardino redoubt battles), while the other Jager unit is on the northern flank, having been driven back gradually from Fomkino to Alexsinki and then into the woods west of the Great Redoubt. Though most of Davout's corps is engaged, the 3rd Division remains north of the Kolocha in support of Eugene, and the weaker 4th Division remains in reserve behind the advancing French. The French Guard, which came in after the other French forces, has remained in reserve with Napoleon around Valuyevo and does not move forward toward the Shevardino redoubt until after Davout has secured it and the Russians start withdrawing around 8 pm. This powerful force also serves to keep the Russians guessing about the possible direction of the French attack, maintaining the threat of reinforcing Eugene in the north. Before Sept. 7 the French are able to repair the damage to their cavalry and some of the damage to their infantry, though the 5th Infantry Division remains a step below full strength at 4. The Russians have used the 8 pm turn to pull back behind the Sept. 7 start line, with the shot-up 27th Infantry and VIII Corps Heavy Artillery taking up their positions in the Fleches; the Russians have also been able to repair some of their damage, but the 27th Infantry remains a step below full strength at 3, and the 2nd Grenadiers also a step below full strength at 2. I've given considerable attention to the positions and losses on Sept. 5 because it's important to ensure that the French and Russians are able to be in their Sept. 7 starting positions (the Russians need to be able to withdraw in time and also redeploy two corps, while the French need to be able to move up to Shevardino with Napoleon, be
in position on both sides of the river to build the French Bridge, and be able to deploy their incoming Sept. 6 reinforcements), and to account for the damage on certain units that they have not been able to repair even with the end-game Sept. 5 and doubled Sept. 6 supply before the Sept. 7 battle begins. This will be less important at the end of Sept. 7 as there is no continuation of the battle; all that matters then are the losses both sides have suffered and the point count. Note that neither side has suffered any unit losses on Sept. 5, since the Russians have for the most part just conducted a delaying action and the French have also avoided an all-out commitment of their available strength in the north, so the only points are for redoubt control; if this were played as the standalone Sept. 5 scenario, the Russians would win with 4 points for 4 redoubts held to 2 French points for the Shevardino redoubt. 8 pm The fighting dies down for the evening as darkness begins to fall. The Russians activate Bagration, Borozdin, Golitsyn, and Barclay (to pull back Uvarovs I Cavalry Corps and the supporting horse artillery, leaving just the jaegers in Borodino) while the French activate Napoleon, Davout, Mortier, Murat, Poniatowski, and Eugene. The Russians, recognizing that it is no longer possible to retake the Shevardino redoubt, take advantage of the
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initiative to pull their forces back toward the Fleches, across the start line on the game map (positioning their HQs in what becomes their starting positions for Sept. 7, though in the campaign game the HQs need not end up in the same place on Sept. 7 as they are assigned in the stand-alone scenario, since their starting positions for the next day of battle will depend on where they have ended up on Sept. 5). The French decline to press the attack further, but reorganize and consolidate their own positions (corresponding to the starting positions for the HQs for Sept. 7, though again in the campaign game the French HQs could end up in different positions for that day), bringing Napoleon, Mortier and the French Guard up from Valuyevo to the area of the captured Shevardino Redoubt. Historically, the French lost about 4,000-5,000 men in the fighting on Sept. 5, and the Russians about 6,000, while each side lost about three guns. The most serious losses from the days fighting were to the French 5th Division, which had borne the brunt of the battle throughout the day, and to the Russian 2nd Combined Grenadiers and the 27th Division, both heavily engaged in the fighting for the redoubt. Rallying and resupply after the days fighting are insufficient to restore these three units, all of which start the battle on the 7th at a step below strength (for the 5th Division, this is a double-strength step so that the unit actually starts 2 below its full strength). Based on activations of leaders, the French expended at least 26 steps of supply in game terms, while the Russians used at least 19. Since both sides receive 21 during the Sept. 5 scenario (3 each for the 7 turns), plus 8 more after the battle if continuing to Sept. 7, assuming that they kept the activated leaders up to strength by the end of the scenario, this leaves the Russians with a surplus of 10, though they need to use 6 of those to bring the 6 CHQs of 1st Army up to full strength if continuing to Sept. 7, leaving 4 to provide replacements for damaged units. The French surplus is less, with only 3 remaining to provide replacements for damaged units, as the French have borne the burden of advancing into position and of attacking, and needed to activate leaders more frequently. In light of this, it is not surprising that both sides are not able to restore all of the historically damaged units in the game. But some losses are able to be restored, and all of the HQs brought up to their full strength for the battle on Sept. 7. Neither the French nor the Russians have actually had any units shattered, so the only gains for the French this day, in victory points, are for the Shevardino Redoubt itself. The Russians historically saw the battle on the 5th as a failure, having been forced out of their position with losses. But in terms of the stand-alone Shevardino scenario, the days battle is a win for the Russians, who still have more redoubt points, with their main position intact, even though the French have secured a good position for
beginning the next stage of the battle. The absence of kills of Russian units means that the French have missed a chance to weaken the Russians seriously before the main battle. Napoleon is said to have been astonished that no Russian prisoners were taken on the 5th, a foretaste of the sturdy resistance he would face two days later. Between Sept. 5 and 7, there is a quiet day on Sept. 6 while Napoleon was waiting for the rest of his army to assemble, and the Russians were reorganizing and preparing for the main battle. If the French control the areas on the map on both ends of the French Bridge (actually a group of several small bridges the French built here), as they did historically, this bridge is now considered built and aids in maneuver across the Kolocha ravine during the Sept. 7 battle. The French should aim to be in a position at the end of Sept. 5 to build it if possible. Napoleon historically received Neys III Corps and Junots Westphalian VIII Corps, coming in behind the rest of the army on the New Smolensk Post Highway. These troops are deployed in the game in range of their CHQs, which must in turn be deployed within command range of Napoleon, so where the French player locates Napoleon at the end of Sept. 5 critically affects his deployment for Sept. 7. Historically, Napoleon shifted the location of his HQ and the Guard from Valuyevo, where he had been during the fighting on Sept. 5, to the captured
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Shevardino Redoubt before the battle began on Sept. 7 (though in game terms, that would need to be done by the last turn on Sept. 5 to get Napoleon in position in the center, as shown above). Murats two remaining cavalry corps, III Cavalry Corps (3CC)(Grouchy) and IV Cavalry Corps (4CC) (Latour-Maubourg), and the remaining half of Murats horse artillery, also arrive on Sept. 6 and deploy within range of the Murat CHQ. Grouchys 3CC had been operating in support of Eugene earlier, but did not make an appearance in the action on Sept. 5, and 4CC, which had been detached, was the last of Napoleons principal formations to arrive in time for the battle, turning up late on Sept. 6. Though the Russians get no reinforcement units, they do have the opportunity to redeploy two of their corps before the battle on Sept. 7. Historically, the redeployed corps were Tuchkovs III Corps, which was shifted from the center of the battlefield to the far south at Utitsa, and Platovs Cossack Cavalry Corps, which was pulled back from its exposed front line position in the north facing Eugenes IV Corps into the Russian cavalry reserve behind the Maslovo redoubts. Since the Russian III Corps gets switched automatically from 1st Army to 2nd Army in the game between Sept. 5 and 7, it almost always makes sense to have that corps be one of the two that redeploys, to get it nearer to the Bagration AHQ, unless the Russian player has already moved it there during Sept. 5. Alternatively, redeployments can be used to pull Russian corps back from exposed positions where they have been left at the end of Sept. 5, before the Sept. 7 fighting begins. The redeployments need to be to a friendly area, which requires occupation by a Russian unit; for example, the redeployment of Tuchkovs III Corps from the center around Gorki to Utitsa in the south would require the Russian player to plan ahead by occupying Utitsa before the end of Sept. 5. This can easily be done by moving up a militia unit along the Old Smolensk Road from the Utitskii Kurgan, under command of any nearby corps leader or as a straggler, or sending the Cossacks 3 unit or jaegers there, which helps also on Sept. 5 to deter any French flanking movement by the Poles in the south. The historical redeployment of Platovs Cossacks to the rear in the center is a less obvious move for the Russians, but does give them the flexibility to move north or south as needed, and to cover Russian supply sources and lines of retreat from their reserve position. One of the units in Barclays 1st Army reserve, with his long command range of 3, can be positioned at the start of Sept. 5 to be in that area and enable the redeployment, even if 1st Army does not move otherwise.
September 7: The Main Battle Turn by Turn 6 am On the French side, Napoleon, Eugene, Davout, and Poniatowski are all active, while the Russians activate Golitsyn and Borozdin, as well as Bagration to maneuver the 2nd Armys reserve artillery. The Russians are still waiting to see the direction of the French attack and conserving their supplies. Napoleon orders the use of over 100 guns for the bombardment of the Fleches, drawn from I and III Corps and the Guard. The French begin to fire on the Fleches with their massed batteries in front of Shevardino, but most of their artillery has to be moved forward as it was originally positioned out of range of the Fleches during the night. In game terms, only one of the French artillery units can initially fire directly across the Kamenka stream in front of the Fleches, while the other artillery needs to cross the start line and deploy into the wooded areas to the north and south of the Fleches before it can fire, delaying the onset of the full bombardment for a turn. Eugenes IV Corps advances to attack the village of Borodino, and Delzons 13th Division, already across the Voina near Bezzubovo, moves south and drives out the Russian Guard Jaeger regiment (the Jaeger B3 in the game), which loses half its strength and is effectively eliminated. The Russians could reasonably have expected this unit to be able to
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6 AM Sept 7: Borodino Village
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retreat across the bridge from the French infantry, but historically it was taken by surprise, and in game terms it is the preliminary bombardment of Borodino by Eugenes guns that destroys it. This opening attack on the northern flank succeeds for the time in diverting Kutuzovs attention from Napoleons planned main attack in the center. Compans 5th Division of Davouts I Corps advances toward the Fleches, supported by Friants 2nd and Dessaixs 4th Divisions, not yet attacking the redoubt itself but securing the wooded areas to the north and in the western Utitskii forest to the south. Poniatowskis V Corps begins advancing up the Old Smolensk Road toward Utitsa, the 16th Division (Krasinski) leading followed by artillery, cavalry and the 18th Division (Kniaziewicz). The Russians dispatch the Cossacks (Cossack 3) from the 2nd Army cavalry reserve toward Miyshina to cover the Russian southern flank. Borodino Village Area
Borodino (Continued From Page 36)

French (attacking): 13th Infantry Division (5) and IV Corps Horse Artillery (2) (attacking from Bezzubovo area); IV Corps Heavy Artillery (2) bombarding in support from area on New Smolensk Post Highway to the west of Borodino village across bridge (IV Corps HQ deployment area) Russians (defending): Jager B3 (1) Result: French capture Borodino village without loss, Russian Jager B3 eliminated (the Russians had expected the Jagers to be able to retreat back across the bridge over heavily attacked on the Russian far left on Sept. 5 at Shevardino by Davout's formidable I Corps, and again on Sept. 7 defending the Fleches, where most of Borozdin's troops fell. By the end of the battle VIII Corps was nearly destroyed, but Borozdin earned little recognition, in sharp contrast to his heroic brother Maj. Gen. Nikolai Borozdin, who led the elite 1st Cuirassiers Guards cavalry division at Borodino. After 1812, Borozdin was not assigned any major command, only participating in the capture of Danzig in 1813. He retired after the end of the Napoleonic Wars on grounds of poor health, but a quiet life evidently suited him as lived on until 1837 in the pleasant climate of his family's Crimean estates. Dmitry Vladimirovich Golitsyn - Born to the Moscow branch of the great Golitsyn noble house, Lt. Gen. Golitsyn had studied at the Ecole Militaire in Paris just before the Revolution. He quickly rose to [Continued and Completed on Page 64]
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Kolocha when attacked but they were taken by surprise, and in game terms the Jagers are effectively destroyed either by the preliminary bombardment or by the Horse Artillery attacking before the Jagers can retreat, though this does delay the movement of Eugene's heavy guns into Borodino) 7 am The French activate Mortier, Davout, Poniatowski, Eugene, Murat, Ney and Junot, a heavy expenditure of supply, while the Russians have Bagration, Tuchkov and Barclay (to command artillery near Borodino) in action. Delzons division attempts to cross the Kolocha River at Borodino, flush from its victory over the Russian Jaegers, but is repulsed with losses by massed Russian artillery on the heights around Gorki. The Russians then burn the bridge over the road at Borodino. The French III and VIII Corps begin to advance toward the battle, III Corps entering the woods north of the Fleches. The French I Corps and Guard artillery, now all in range with some positioned along the edges of the woods to the north and south, pound the Fleches, and Compans division, joined by Dessaixs division and backed by Friants division, then begins the first attack on the Fleches. These redoubts are defended by the Russian VIII Corps, with the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division (Vorontsov) and 27th Division (Neverovski) holding the redoubts along with artillery, reinforced by the 2nd Grenadier Division (Mecklenberg) which had been covering Semyonovskoye; the IV Cavalry Corps (Sievers) covers the flank to the south, while the 12th Division (Vasilchikov) of VII Corps protects the flank to the north at the Great Redoubt., and Borozdin is now positioned to the rear of the redoubt. The French break into the southernmost fleche but are then repulsed with heavy losses, and Marshal Davout is wounded in the fighting, but remains in command of his corps. This bloody setback effectively costs the French one of the divisions of I Corps, likely Dessaixs weak unit which plays little part in the rest of the battle; with many French units massing behind Davout, who had expected to do better, Dessaix is likely unable to retreat without losing its last step in game terms. To the south, Poniatowskis V Corps deploys for attack against Utitsa village, which is defended by the 1st Grenadier Division (Stroganov) of Tuchkovs III Corps, backed up by Konovnitsyns 3rd Division to the rear, but Tuchkov is ordered to send his 3rd Division northward to aid in the developing battle for the Fleches.
Borodino
(Continued From Page 63) Lieutenant General by 1800, and won distinction leading cavalry charges against the French at the battle of Eylau. Though Golitsyn retired from the army in 1809 after being replaced in his corps command by Barclay during the Finnish war, he returned to fight in 1812, at first leading the 2nd Cuirassier Division and then being promoted to command all the cavalry of 2nd Army at Borodino on the left flank of the army. Golitsyn continued to lead cavalry effectively in the campaigns in Germany and France in 1813-14, fighting at Kulm and Leipzig, and winning promotion to full General of Cavalry in 1814. After the war, he served as military governor of Moscow from 1820, leading the rebuilding of the city, until he became ill and gave up his position in 1841. Ironically, Golitsyn died in 1844 in Paris, where he had gone to recuperate, and was buried with great honors in Moscow. [Borodino Finished]
Old Soldiers Magazine

OLD SOLDIERS has been a quarterly magazine published by Tom Cundiff. It is a collection of variant, strategy, tactics and other articles covering out of print wargames as well as games published by the smaller wargame publishers and general military history related articles. Authors have contributed freely, without remuneration, in the hopes that the magazine grows, for the betterment of the hobby. Rejected articles will be returned to their authors. Submitted articles may not have previously been published. Previously published articles may be printed IF permission is granted in writing from the prior publisher and that notice is transmitted or mailed to Old Soldiers. This is the last issue of Old Soldiers Magazine. December 2013.
Editor: Tom Cundiff Box 53 St. Bernice, IN 47875
765-832-3259 tdcgsl@yahoo.com Copyright 2013
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7 AM Turn: Les Fleches Area
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7 AM: Les Fleches Area French (attacking): 2nd Infantry Division (5) (across Kamenka stream from woods area to north of Les Fleches), 4th Infantry Division (3), 5th Infantry Division (4) (both from northwestern area of Utitskii Forest), Davout CHQ (2) (across Kamenka stream from Shevardino village area); supported by massive bombardment by Guard Heavy Artillery (2) (from Shevardino village area), I Corps Heavy Artillery (2) (from woods area north of Les Fleches), and I Corps Light Artillery (3) (from northwestern area of Utitskii Forest) - the French have had to set up this attack carefully by first occupying the northwestern Utitskii forest and woods north of Les Fleches in the 6 am turn, moving up their artillery and infantry to attack Les Fleches from multiple areas Russians (defending): 27th Infantry Division (initially at 3, reduced to 2 by preliminary bombardment), 2nd Grenadier Division (2), 2nd Combined Grenadier Division (3, Utitskii Forest and Shevardino reduced to 2 by preliminary village areas, while the Russian bombardment), VIII Corps Heavy infantry divisions all suffer step Artillery (2) losses as well but hold their ground. The French had made a Result: a bloody repulse for the French, in a battle that continues the powerful attack with good artillery support, but lacking cavalry for a full four rounds thanks to the combined arms effect, the attack double defense benefits of Les still failed thanks to a vigorous Fleches redoubt for the Russians; defense by the elite Russian the French 4th Infantry Division is grenadier infantry and point-blank eliminated (unable to retreat heavy artillery fire; the French through units of other corps massing behind without losing final would learn their lesson when next attacking Les Fleches. step), and the 2nd and 5th Infantry Divisions and Davout CHQ all suffer multiple step losses but retreat back into northwestern
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8 AM Turn: Utitsa Village Area
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8 am On the French side, Eugene, Poniatowski, Junot, Ney, Davout and Murat are all activated, while the Russians activate Baggovut, Lavrov, Golitsyn, and Bagration, as well as Platov whose Cossacks move up to the eastern bank of the Kolocha. Eugene leaves Delzons division to garrison Borodino and moves up his artillery batteries to there, where they can fire on the Great Redoubt, while moving the rest of his infantry back out of Russian artillery range, with Ornanos cavalry deployed around Bezzubovo covering his northern flank. Eugenes two borrowed infantry divisions, the 1st and 3rd, and Broussiers 14th, begin to maneuver across the French Bridge to the south of the Kolocha. Poniatowskis V Corps attacks the Russians at Utitsa and drives out the 1st Grenadier Division, which retreats and soon takes up a new position with artillery on the Utitskii Kurgan, since Tuchkovs III Corps --- which likely could have held against the Poles at full strength -- has been weakened by having to detach its 3rd Division northward to aid the defense around the Fleches. Junots VIII Corps moves into the area of Kamenka Hill, near the western edge of the Utitskii Forest, to fill the gap between the French I and V Corps, in a position to aid either. The Russians begin to commit their reserves. Now that the direction of the French attack is clearer, Kutuzov and Barclay release Baggovuts II Corps to begin marching toward the Russian left flank, with Platovs Cossacks taking their place along the river. The Russians also start marching most of their V Guard Corps, including the 1st Cuirassiers
Division (N.M. Borozdin), 1st Combined Grenadiers Division (Kantakuzin), and corps artillery, toward the battle in the center, and Dukas 2nd Cuirassiers Division also moves up from the 2nd Army cavalry reserve to a position southeast of the Fleches. The French prepare to resume their assault on the Fleches; Ney takes the leading role around the Fleches after Davout is wounded though Davout continues to head his I Corps, and Ledrus 10th Division and the 25th Wurttemberg Division of Neys III Corps (the 10/25 French infantry division in the game), as well as Razouts 11th Division, advance to the north and center of the Fleches to join the battle, taking the place of Davouts shot-up troops in the line. At the same time, some of Murats cavalry, including the I and III Corps cavalry divisions (the combined III Corps cavalry division in the game) and the I Cavalry Corps (Nansouty) and II
Cavalry Corps (Montbrun), moves into position to the center and south of the Fleches to enter the fighting as well. Bagration takes personal command of the Russian forces defending the Fleches. 8 AM Turn: Utitsa Village Area French (attacking): Polish 16th Infantry Division (2) (from woods area on Old Smolensk road to west of Utitsa, across Antipino swamp), Polish 18th Infantry Division (2) (from woods area to south of Old Smolensk Road west of Utitsa, across Antipino swamp), and Polish V Corps Cavalry (1) and Voltigeurs B2 (1) (from clear area to south of Utitsa village) ; supported by preliminary bombardment by Polish V Corps Light Artillery (2) from woods area on Old Smolensk Road to west of Utitsa, across Antipino swamp), Polish 18th Infantry
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9 AM Turn: Les Fleches Area
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Division (2) (from woods area to south of Old Smolensk Road west of Utitsa, across Antipino swamp), and Polish V Corps Cavalry (1) and Voltigeurs B2 (1) (from clear area to south of Utitsa village); supported by preliminary bombardment by Polish V Corps Light Artillery (2) from woods area on Old Smolensk Road to west of Utitsa Russians (defending): 1st Grenadier Division (3, reduced to 2 by preliminary bombardment), III Corps Light Artillery (1), Tuchkov CHQ (2) Result: French occupy Utitsa village area, with Russians retreating along Old Smolensk Road toward Utitskii Kurgan; Russian 1st Grenadier Division and Tuchkov CHQ both take step losses, as does one of the Polish infantry divisions (18th). The Russian defense was weakened by having to send one of the divisions of III Corps, the 3rd Infantry, northward to support the defense around Les Fleches, while the Poles set up their attack carefully through preliminary maneuvering to launch a combined arms attack with their full corps strength from multiple directions with artillery support. In this way, even a relatively weak French (Polish) corps is able to dislodge a Russian corps despite the defensive benefit of the village on round 1. The Utitskii Kurgan is an even better defensive position, though, and the Russians realize it is more important to preserve the III Corps to defend there than to fight it out to the death for Utitsa village. 9 AM The French have Napoleon (for the Guard artillery), Eugene,
Ney, Junot and Murat all active, while the Russians activate Baggovut (to continue his southward march), Bagration, and Tuchkov (falling back to take up position on the Utitskii Kurgan). Poniatowski pauses to reorganize his Polish forces, realizing the Russian position is difficult to take unsupported. The French divisions of Morand (1st ), Gerard (3rd ) and Broussier (14th ) in IV Corps have finished crossing the Kolocha River using the French Bridge and deploy for attack against the Great Redoubt into the woods, while French artillery starts to bombard the redoubt. Broussiers division, in the lead, launches an attack toward the Great Redoubt through the woods but this is merely a reconnaissance in force, quickly broken off. The French at last launch a successful combined arms assault on the Fleches, Murat personally leading his I and II Cavalry Corps supported by the I and III Corps
cavalry divisions into battle, while the 10th/ 25th Divisions and 11th Division of Neys corps provides the needed infantry spine for the fight, countering Russian attempts to form squares in defense. This powerful French attack overruns all the redoubts of the Fleches and effectively destroy the 2nd Combined Grenadiers and 27th Divisions and supporting artillery, only 2nd Grenadiers escaping for the moment. Razouts 11th Division of III Corps probes toward Semyonovskoye unsuccessfully (again, like Broussiers move, this is not a full attack, which would not be possible in the game before control of the Fleches, but more of a move into position through the Fleches area, where it is participating on the flank of the battle). 9 AM: Les Fleches Area French (attacking): 10th/25th Infantry Division (4) from
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Murats cavalry along with the 25th Wurttemberg Division (10th /25th Division), and Bagration is mortally wounded while 2nd Grenadier Division is effectively destroyed (though remnants continue to form part of the Russian line on the Semyonovskoye Heights). In game terms, a player will normally try to protect this valuable AHQ, but its loss could take place either from the elimination of the entire force with which it is fighting (though this did not happen here), or more likely through inability to retreat in time either it could find itself unable to retreat through an overstacked area once down to its zero step, or, as a Brated unit, the Russians could risk leaving it behind to cover the retreat while other C units escape first, but it could then end up destroyed by A or B-rated French defenders. The French finally secure the Fleches, and the remaining Russians around the Fleches fall back over the Semyonovskii stream, discouraged by Bagrations loss. Dokhturov takes command of the Russian 2nd Army after Bagration is put out of action by his mortal wound. Eugenes IV Corps soon thereafter launches a second, more serious assault on the Great Redoubt closely following Broussiers reconnaissance, led by Morands 1st Division followed by Gerards 3rd Division, with Broussiers 14th Division behind in support. This attack is also covered on the flank by the II Cavalry Corps, and supported by heavy artillery fire. In game terms, at most only three French units can make the attack into the Great Redoubt at this time, two from the woods and one from the Fleches across the Semyonovskii stream, since the Russians still control the Semyonovskaya heights. And since movement from the Fleches is effectively preempted by the Russian attack there first, the burden of the attack falls on just the two leading French infantry divisions, the 1st and 3rd. The Great Redoubt is defended by Rayevskis VII Corps with Vasilchikovs 12th and Paskevichs 26th Divisions, and artillery in the redoubt itself as well as Rayevskis CHQ, with the Russian II (Korf) and III (Kreutz) Cavalry Corps in reserve behind the position. Rayevski commands from the Great Redoubt in person. Morands division takes the brunt of the attack for the French and breaks into the Great Redoubt briefly, with the surviving Russians retreating back to the heights and across the Ognik after a stout defense that wears the French down, setting them up for a counterattack. Effectively, one of Rayevskis infantry divisions is lost but not his corps artillery, and the corps is not broken like Borozdins, so Rayevski can still rally what remains to fight on. Poniatowskis V Corps resumes its advance toward the Utitskii Kurgan. 10 AM: Les Fleches Area Russians (attacking): Bagration AHQ (2, but reduced to 1 after having activated), 2nd Grenadier
Division (2), 2nd Cuirassier Division (2), 3rd Infantry Division (2); supported by bombardment from VII Corps Heavy Artillery (1) (in Great Redoubt), II Army Light Artillery (3) (in Semyonovskoye village area, firing from the upslope position) French (defending): 10th/25th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), 11th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), 2 CC Cavalry Corps (3); reinforced by III Corps Cavalry Division (2) (commanded by Murat) (the I CC Cavalry Corps which had been in Les Fleches for the previous French attack has regrouped back to the Utitskii Forest to protect the flank) Result: a disastrous repulse for the Russians, with 2nd Grenadier Division and the Bagration AHQ eliminated, though 2nd Cuirassier Division and the 3rd Infantry Division are able to retreat; the Russians had hoped that the weakened state of the French troops after taking the Fleches coupled with the preliminary bombardment would give them a chance to expel the French from the redoubts, but a stout French defense with reinforcements, even without getting the double defense for the redoubts (only the Russians enjoy this benefit), turned the tables. The French do suffer some further step losses in their infantry (1 each, leaving Ney's infantry divisions too weak to do much for the rest of the battle),
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but not enough to make this counterattack worthwhile for the Russians, although the attack did serve another useful purpose, by preventing the French from sending reinforcements from the Les Fleches area to participate in their own attack on the Great Redoubt taking place in the same hour. 10 AM: Great Redoubt Area French (attacking): 1st Infantry Division (4) and 3rd Infantry Division (5) (coming from woods to west of Great Redoubt, across Semyonovskii stream) (these are the two divisions Eugene has borrowed from Davout's I Corps); supported by bombardment from IV Corps Heavy Artillery (2) (moved up to Borodino) and IV Corps Horse Artillery (2) (now moved back to IV Corps deployment area west of Borodino) Russians (defending): Rayevski CHQ (2), 12th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), 26th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), VII Corps Heavy Artillery (1) Result: a costly and temporary French victory, in a battle going 3 rounds, with one of Rayevski's two infantry divisions lost, but the CHQ, heavy artillery and the other Russian infantry division survive to fight on, retreating to the Goruzka Valley or the Semyonovskaya heights; the two French infantry divisions are also heavily reduced, to a strength of 2 each, but occupy the Great Redoubt in a position very vulnerable to Russian counterattack - which the Russians are well aware. 11 AM The Russians activate Barclay, Platov, Baggovut (still completing his long march southward), Rayevski, Dokhturov, Lavrov, and also OstermanTolstoi, whose troops are brought forward into the center from their initial position along the Kolocha, while the French activate Davout, Ney and Poniatowski. The Russians take the initiative, and the French are ousted from the Great Redoubt by a counterattack mounted by the shot-up VII Corps aided by the 24th Division (Likhachev) of VI Corps, and III Cavalry Corps, with heavy artillery support. In game terms, the 24th Division can participate in this attack from across the Ognik stream, while the surviving division of VII Corps and III Cavalry Corps attack downhill from the Semyonovskoye area. Morands 1st Division is especially hard hit, losing a captured regimental commander in the Great Redoubt, which greatly excites the Russians who at first believe they have captured Murat! Effectively, Morands division is destroyed though remnants continue to participate in the battle during the afternoon, the second division of Davouts corps to be put out of action by heavy losses. The 4th Division (Wurttemberg) of II Corps has been diverted from its southward march and moved into position on the flank of the Russian counterattack. Even
Barclay comes under French artillery fire during this desperate struggle, after which the fighting around the Great Redoubt falls off until mid-afternoon. The final Russian reserve, the Guards Division (Lavrov) along with 1st Combined Grendiers (Kantakuzin), moves up from reserve to a position behind Semyonovskoye on the Heights. And at this critical moment Platovs Cossack Corps, joined by Uvarovs I Cavalry Corps and some horse artillery, crosses the Kolocha River around Novoye Selo and Maloye Selo, beginning a sweeping counterattack against the French left flank. The Russians see an opportunity for decisively affecting the battle, with hardly any French units remaining north of the Kolocha, only a portion of IV Corps, and the French supplies and lines of communication exposed. In the south, Poniatowski maneuvers to the south of the Utitskii Kurgan, preparing to launch an attack on the hill from both the front and southern flank. 11 AM: Great Redoubt Area Russians (attacking): 24th Infantry Division (3) (from Goruzka Valley area), and 3 CC Cavalry Corps (3) and 12th Infantry Division (2) (both from Semyonovskaya village area); supported by strong bombardment from VI Corps Heavy Artillery (2)(in area to east of Borodino across Kolocha river bridge), VII Corps Heavy Artillery (1) (in Semyonovskoye village area), and I Army Light
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Artillery (3) (in Goruzka Valley area). Rayevski's CHQ (at 1, reduced to 0 by activating) is nearby commanding from the Goruzka Valley area, Dokhturov's CHQ (at 2, reduced to 1 for activating) is also nearby commanding from the Goruzka Valley area, having taken command of II Army in place of Bagration, but for this turn still directing the troops of his own corps, as he cannot function both as a CHQ and AHQ in the same turn), while Barclay further back commands the I Army artillery and 3 CC. French (defending): 1st Infantry Division (2, reduced to 1 by bombardment), 3rd Infantry Division (2) (reduced to 1 by bombardment), reinforced by 14th Infantry Division (4) moving in from woods to west of Great Redoubt, as straggler. Result: a Russian victory, recapturing the Great Redoubt and destroying the French 1st Infantry Division in the 1st round attack, though the 3rd Infantry Division, with the help of the 14th, manages to escape on the 2nd round, and the 14th also retreats after it suffers a step loss. This very effective combined arms counterattack was the most successful of the entire battle, taking out a significant part of the strength of Eugene's corps and enabling the Russians to hold the Great Redoubt for several hours more. 12 Noon The French activate Napoleon, Murat, Davout, Poniatowski and Eugene, while the Russians activate Barclay (who with his command radius of 3 can control I Cavalry Corps north of the
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Artillery (3) (in Goruzka Valley area). Rayevski's CHQ (at 1, reduced to 0 by activating) is nearby commanding from the Goruzka Valley area, Dokhturov's CHQ (at 2, reduced to 1 for activating) is also nearby commanding from the Goruzka Valley area, having taken command of II Army in place of Bagration, but for this turn still directing the troops of his own corps, as he cannot function both as a CHQ and AHQ in the same turn), while Barclay further back commands the I Army artillery and 3 CC. French (defending): 1st Infantry Division (2, reduced to 1 by bombardment), 3rd Infantry Division (2) (reduced to 1 by bombardment), reinforced by 14th Infantry Division (4) moving in from woods to west of Great Redoubt, as straggler. Result: a Russian victory, recapturing the Great Redoubt and destroying the French 1st Infantry Division in the 1st round attack, though the 3rd Infantry Division, with the help of the 14th, manages to escape on the 2nd round, and the 14th also retreats after it suffers a step loss. This very effective combined arms counterattack was the most successful of the entire battle, taking out a significant part of the strength of Eugene's corps and enabling the Russians to hold the Great Redoubt for several hours more. 12 Noon The French activate Napoleon, Murat, Davout, Poniatowski and Eugene, while the Russians activate Barclay (who with his command radius of 3 can control I Cavalry Corps north of the Kolocha), Platov, Osterman-Tolstoy, and Baggovut. At this phase of the battle, the initiative has shifted to the Russians in the north, but the French are still pressing the offensive in the center and south. Barclay has brought Osterman-Tolstoys IV Corps, transferred from the northern flank, into the gap behind Semyonovskoye between the Great Redoubt and the Guards infantry to bolster the Russian defense. The French launch a heavy assault on the Russian center around Semyonovskoye and to the south of the village, led by Davout, with elements of the French I Corps, and Murat with elements of the I and II Cavalry Corps supported by the IV Cavalry Corps, along with a strong artillery bombardment. In game terms, only three of the French infantry and
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cavalry units can make this attack across the stream and onto the heights, likely the rallied 2nd Infantry Division and the I and II Cavalry Corps which are the strongest formations available to lead the assault. The village is defended by the 1st Combined Grenadiers with Konovnitsyns 3rd Division from III Corps, backed by the Guards Division, 1st Cuirassiers and Wurttembergs 4th Division from II Corps, as well as Sievers IV Cavalry Corps available on the flanks to the south, and strong artillery. The French cavalry, after overrunning some Russian line infantry, is unable to break through the squares of the Russian Guard, inside which even Barclay is forced to shelter for a time. However, the French bombardment has heavily weakened the Russians and Friants 2nd Division manages to seize the ruined village of Semyonovskoye from the Russians, and 3rd Division is effectively lost, forcing the Russians to fall back to avoid risking the Guard further. Napoleons Marshals begin urging him to send the French Guard into the struggle for a decisive blow. The Russian cavalry, sweeping across the plain north of the Kolocha River, reaches Bezzubovo where it routs Ornanos IV Corps cavalry division, effectively eliminating this formation during the battle. On the southern flank, Poniatowskis Poles take the Utitskii Kurgan from the weakened Russians of III Corps, who retreat, with Tuchkov mortally wounded. In this fight, the Russian suffer the loss of the CHQ as well as some supporting Jaegers, though the artillery and 1st Grenadiers Division have fallen back in time. As with Bagration, the loss of this valuable CHQ could happen through destruction of the entire defending force, or, as is more likely in this case, through inability to retreat through an overstacked area once down to its zero step, or elimination by a French. A unit while covering the retreat. But Baggovuts II Corps has finally arrived with its 17th Division (Olsufiev) and artillery, and reinforces the battle, becoming the attacker after Tuchkovs remnants have fallen back. Baggovuts fresh troops supported by Russian militia succeed in their counterattack on the Utitskii Kurgan, throwing back the weakened Poles, who effectively lose one of their divisions. Baggovut is now in sole command on this flank (in game terms, Baggovut can lead his own corps and the militia, while the III Corps survivors must fight as stragglers). 12 Noon: Semyonovskoye Village Area, and Area to the South French (attacking): 2nd Infantry Division (4) (attacking from Les Fleches into Semyonovskoye area), 2 CC Cavalry Corps (4) (attacking from Utitskii Forest into Semyonovskoye area) and 1 CC Cavalry Corps (4) (attacking into area south of Semyonovskoye across Semyonovskii stream from Utitskii Forest; supported by
bombardment of Guard Heavy Artillery (2) from Les Fleches and Guard Light Artillery (3) from Utitskii Forest, both firing into Semyonovskoye village area. Russians (defending): In Semyonovskoye village area 3rd Infantry Division (2, reduced to 1 by preliminary bombardment), 1st Combined Grenadier Division (3, reduced to 2 by preliminary bombardment), II Army Light Artillery (3, reduced to 2 by preliminary bombardment), reinforced by the Guards Infantry Division (6) (the unpinned VII Corps Heavy Artillery unit, which was in this area at the start, has moved to the Great Redoubt, making way for a Russian reinforcement to come in). In area south of Semyonovskoye east of Semyonovskii stream - 4th Infantry Division (3), 4 CC Cavalry Corps (3), II Army Cavalry Horse Artillery (1) Result - an unlikely French victory in the Semyonovskoye village area, with the Guards Division, 1st Combined Grenadier Division and II Army Light Artillery all retreating after they take step losses, while the 3rd Infantry is eliminated, though the French cavalry and infantry both suffer step losses as well and are unable to push ahead again for some time; the French attack south of the Semyonovskoye area, unsupported by artillery, is more
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of a spoiling effort intended to prevent that area from being used for reinforcements or retreats by the Russians, and the French 1 CC cavalry fall back from there into the Utitskii Forest after taking a step loss. This attack secures the critical area of the heights for the French, who manage to hold it against Russian counter bombardments and attacks through the day, giving them a foothold for a flanking attack on the Great Redoubt later in the afternoon. 12 Noon: Utitskii Kurgan Area French (Poles) (attacking): 16th Infantry Division (2) (from Old Smolensk Road to west of the Utitskii Kurgan), 18th Infantry Division (2) (from Sadovskoye swamp to south of Utitskii Kurgan). Most of the remainder of the Polish V Corps, including the Poniatowski CHQ commanding the attack (2, reduced to 1 for activating), and the corps artillery (2), are also in the Old Smolensk Road area west of the Kurgan but unable to take a role in the battle due to terrain limitations, with the Polish corps cavalry (1) and attached Voltigeurs B2 (1) in the area to the south of the road keeping an eye on the Russian Cossacks on the flank. Russians (initially defending, then counterattacking): Tuchkov CHQ (at 0 step), III Corps Light Artillery (1), 1st Grenadier Division (1), Jagers B2 (1), but with unpinned III Corps Light Artillery moving out of area and 17th Infantry Division (3) of II Corps reinforcing area from Old Smolensk Road area to east, while Russian militia (Moscow 1, 3 steps) move into the Sadovskoye swamp vacated by the Polish infantry, restricting their retreat. Result: Russian victory; initially the Poles are successful, with the Tuchkov CHQ and Jagers eliminated in the first round of the battle and the remnants of the 1st Grenadier Division retreating along the Old Smolensk Road, though one of the Polish divisions also takes a step loss; this shifts the Poles from the role of attacker to defender, but the fresh Russian 17th Division goes at them with the bayonet and routs the Poles from the Kurgan, eliminating one of the Polish divisions and reducing the other to 1 step, while losing a step of its own. 12 Noon: Bezzubovo Village Russians (attacking): 1 Cossacks (3) and 2 Cossacks (3) (from area east of Bezzubovo across Korcheshka stream), and 1CC Cavalry Corps (3) (from Zhakarino area to south of Bezzubovo); the attack is supported by bombardment from the Cossack Horse Artillery (1) in the area east of Bezzubovo, where the Platov CHQ (2, reduced to 1 for activating) is also located, commanding the Cossacks. The 1 CC cavalry is separately commanded by Barclay's AHQ from further away. French (defending): IV Corps Cavalry Division (3)
Result: Russian victory, with the French IV Corps cavalry routed and effectively eliminated; the French, expecting to face mere Cossacks and choosing to put up a defense, were taken aback by the presence of the powerful Russian 1CC Cavalry Corps as well, and though the village initially afforded some protection, the French cavalry, outnumbered 31, were overrun, leaving Napoleon's left flank open to the Russian cavalry. 1 pm The French activate Murat and Napoleon, while the Russians activate Barclay, Platov. and Osterman-Tolstoi. In the north, Platovs Cossacks cross the Voina stream, attacking across the dam (ford) at Bezzubovo and swinging far to the west through the woods toward Valuyevo and the French baggage trains on the New Smolensk Post Highway. In game terms, a Cossack breakthrough here could deprive the French army of a major part of its supply and cripple the attack no wonder Napoleon was worried! Meanwhile, Uvarov moves along the bank of the Voina, covering the French position at Borodino to the south. However, the French deal with the attack of this strong Russian cavalry force by forming Delzons 13th Division, supported on the flank by the Italian Guard, into infantry squares, inside which Eugene takes shelter. The French infantry are prepared to meet the Russians who lack infantry support or
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sufficient artillery. The Russian cavalry repeatedly charges the French squares with no success, and Uvarovs advance is blocked by Delzons division and the Italian Guard north of Borodino. But as the Russian cavalry do not suffer heavy losses and are not pressing home their attacks strongly, it appears that their main purpose is just to cover Platovs thrust westward. As Platov cannot command Uvarovs regular cavalry, the I Cavalry Corps ability to attack depends on staying within range of Barclay or Kutuzov, or else attack as stragglers, so it is not surprising that Uvarov stays closer to the main body of the Russian army and does not charge westward through the Bezzubovskii Forest after Platov. Grouchys III Cavalry Corps moves to threaten the Russian cavalry north of the Kolocha, joined by remnants of Ornanos cavalry. In the center, OstermanTolstoys IV Corps launches a counterattack against Semyonovskoye with at least one of its two divisions, 11th (N.N. Bakhmetiev) and 23rd (A.N. Bakhmetiev), but this is thrown back, with the corps commander wounded. Napoleon, who had been considering committing his Imperial Guard to the battle in the center to aid in a renewed assault on the Great Redoubt, calls off the attacks there due to the Russian cavalry threat in the north, and dispatches the Middle Guard (including the elements of the Young Guard that are present) and the Legion of the Vistula north of the Kolocha River to aid Eugene and protect Valuyevo, while he commits the Guard artillery fully to join in the battle in the center. Napoleon himself moves up from his post at Shevardino to the left flank, prepared to take command there if needed 1 PM: Borodino Area Russians (attacking): 1 CC Cavalry Corps (3) (from Bezzubovo area) French (defending): 13th Infantry Division (4, reduced from an earlier unsuccessful effort at 7 pm to force the Borodino Bridge before the Russians burned it), IV Corps Heavy Artillery (2) Result: French victory; the Russian cavalry, finding itself confronted with strong infantry in squares supported by artillery, quickly pulls back after some charging at the French positions, suffering little loss.
2 PM The Russians activate Platov, Barclay, Rayevski, Dokhturov, Kutuzov and Lavrov, reordering their lines in the center, while the French activate Junot (who by this point has been nearly forgotten his men were actually ordered to stack arms in the Utitskii Forest), Napoleon, Davout and Ney. Junots Westphalian VIII Corps finally links up with Poniatowskis V Corps, its 23rd Division (Tharreau) facing off against the Russian 4th Division which has moved down from the center, while the Westphalian 24th Division (von Ochs) guards the northern flank of the corps (these two Westphalian divisions are combined in the game and fight as a single unit). The crisis past in the north, some fighting resumes around Semyonovskoye between Davout with his battered I Corps and Ney with his III Corps against the Russian center, but to little effect. The Russian cavalry makes its final attacks on the French in the north and then starts to fall back, unable to break the French squares. However, the cavalry counterattack has brought the Russians critical time in the center, where Russian artillery is bombarding the immobile French cavalry around the Great Redoubt and Semyonovskoye. 2 PM: Valuyevo Village Area Russians (attacking): 1 Cossacks (3) and 2 Cossacks (3) (from wooded area north of Valuyevo) French (defending): Middle Guard (4)
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Result: French victory; the overextended Cossacks, finding themselves confronted by French Guard infantry formed up in squares to protect the main supply road, beat a hasty retreat despite their numerical superiority. By this time the French have formed a line from Borodino all the way to northwest of Valuyevo, including the troops mentioned above as well as the 3 CC Cavalry Corps (3), Italian Guard (2), and Legion of the Vistula (2), and Voltigeurs B3 and B2 (1 each) to cover their northern flank and supplies against the Russian cavalry raiders. Faced with this solid opposition, the Russian cavalry now decide to fall back whence they came. 3 PM - Napoleon, Eugene, Murat and Junot all activate on the French side, while the Russians activate Barclay and Platov. Napoleon returns to his post at Shevardino, with his northern flank stabilized. The Russian cavalry there withdraws toward the Kolocha again. In the south, Junot pushes forward through the eastern Utitskii Forest to take up positions north of the Utitskii Kurgan. The French renew their assault on the Great Redoubt, the third and finally successful attempt. Everything available is committed short of the Guard, still in reserve apart from its artillery. Montbruns II Cavalry Corps leads the way along with Latour-Maubourgs IV Cavalry Corps on the southern side of the redoubt, as the French massed artillery batteries bombard the redoubt in a crossfire from positions extending between Borodino and the Fleches. Supporting the attack are elements of Grouchys III Cavalry Corps on the northern side of the redoubt, though this corps has not yet fully moved down from fending off the Cossacks in the north. The infantry component of this combined arms attack is provided by three of Eugenes infantry divisions, Broussiers 14th, Gerards 3rd, and the remnants of Morands 1st, attacking from the front of the redoubt. In game terms, only four of these six units can be fully committed to the battle, and the ones fully engaged are the French II and IV Cavalry Corps, and likely Broussier and Gerard, since Morand was badly shot up in the earlier assault and
thrown back from the redoubt, while Grouchys cavalry is not fully present and stays in reserve. The Great Redoubt is now defended by artillery and the Russian 24th Division of VI Corps, supported on the flank by the 11th Division of the Russian IV Corps and the III Corps Cavalry, along with the 7th Division (Kaptsevich) of VI Corps on the right flank, backed up by the II Cavalry Corps, the 23rd Division of the Russian IV Corps guarding the left, and the battered 12th and 26th Divisions (effectively just one division remaining) of VII Corps in the rear. Once again, only four of these units can actually defend the redoubt area in game terms, including the 24th Division and likely the 11th Division, the III Cavalry Corps, and the artillery
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in the redoubt, with others in reserve in the Goruzka Valley area behind the redoubt or the area to the north of the Stonets. The fighting around the redoubt is immensely bloody, and the first to break in are French or allied German and Polish cavalry coming from the rear, followed by the infantry to the front. The artillery is lost, the Russian 24th Division is destroyed and its commander Likhachev captured, the most senior Russian general taken prisoner in the battle, with the 11th Division damaged sufficiently to be out of action as well, though the cavalry retreat in time. Likhachev is brought before Napoleon, who attempts to make the gesture of returning the generals sword, but Likhachev fails to accept the weapon and the frustrated Emperor finally commands, Take this idiot away! 3 PM: Great Redoubt Area French (attacking): 2 CC Cavalry Corps (4) and 4 CC Cavalry Corps (from Semyonovskoye village area), 3rd Infantry Division (2) and 14th Infantry Division (4) (from woods to west of Great Redoubt; supported by strong bombardment from IV Corps Heavy Artillery (2) (Borodino area), IV Corps Horse Artillery (2) (from IV Corps deployment area west of Borodino) and Guard Heavy Artillery (2) (from Les Fleches) Russians (defending): 24th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), 3 CC Cavalry Corps (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), 11th Infantry Division (3, reduced to 2 by bombardment), VII Corps Heavy Artillery (1) Result: Decisive French victory, with the French securing control of the Great Redoubt and the Russian 24th and 11th Infantry Divisions destroyed along with the VII Corps Heavy Artillery, though the 3 CC Cavalry retreat in time to escape, and the French 2CC cavalry and 14th Infantry suffer step losses. The powerful combined arms attack with
strong artillery support proves enough this time to overcome even the double defense benefit of the Great Redoubt, and with the Semyonovskaya Heights under French control as well, this time the Russians are not able to mount an effective counterattack.
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4 PM - The French activate Napoleon, Murat, Junot and Poniatowski, while Barclay, Kutuzov, Platov, Baggovut and Lavrov all activate on the Russian side. In the south the Westphalians of VIII Corps, supported by the French 5th Division, press the Russian 17th Division backward, while the Poles threaten the Utitskii Kurgan again. Following their victory at the Great Redoubt, the French press forward with Eugenes command and their cavalry against the Russian center, held by the surviving 7th Division of VI Corps as well as the 23rd Division of IV Corps, and the Russian II and III Cavalry Corps, and repel Russian counterattacks. However, the French cavalry is unable to break the Russian infantry squares. Barclay now commits all of his remaining cavalry to a counterattack, leading to the largest cavalry melee of the battle, in which the Russian II and III Cavalry Corps are all heavily engaged with the French on the plateau to the east of the Great Redoubt, while the Russian Guards and 1st Cuirassiers advance toward the French lines on the Semyonovskaya Heights. Though the lines do not shift significantly on either side, the cavalry battles effectively cost the French one of their already weakened cavalry corps, likely IV Cavalry. Barclay, personally leading the Russians, has several horses shot out from under him. Artillery on both sides pounds the combatants. In the north, Platovs and Uvarovs cavalry finish their retreat over the Kolocha. In the south, the Westphalians of VIII Corps advance against Baggovuts forces, leading the
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Russians to fall back about half a mile. The Poles and Westphalians are now engaged in both artillery duels and melee with the Russians in the woods south of Semyonovskoye and on the Utitskii Kurgan, with the Westphalian 23rd Division supporting the Poles while the smaller 24th Division occupies the gap between Poniatowskis Poles and Davouts I Corps (again, these two divisions are fighting together as one unit in the same area in game terms). After hearing of the fall of the Great Redoubt, Poniatowski launches a two-pronged attack on the Utitskii Kurgan from the north and south. The Russians are defending the hill with the 17th Division of II Corps, supported by the weakened 1st Grenadier Division, Karpovs Cossack cavalry and Moscow militia on the flanks. Though the northern attack is repulsed, the southern attack makes good progress and takes the Utitskii Kurgan, the last major French victory of the battle. 4 PM: Goruzka Valley Area, east of Great Redoubt French (attacking): 2 CC Cavalry (3) and 1 CC Cavalry (3) (from Semyonovskoye village area), 4 CC Cavalry (2) (from Great Redoubt) Russians (defending): 7th Infantry Division (3), 23rd Infantry Division (2), 2 CC Cavalry Corps (2), 3 CC Cavalry Corps (2) Result: Russian victory, with the massed French cavalry repulsed by the effective combination of infantry in squares and strong Russian cavalry support; the French cavalry all suffer step losses, and one of their cavalry units, 4CC, is effectively destroyed. The French victory at the Great Redoubt had placed them beyond the range of the artillery bombardment support they normally depended on for their successful attacks. After this experience, they would bring their most powerful artillery units up onto the heights, to renew their bombardment of the Russian lines. 4 PM: Semonovskoye Village Area Russians (attacking): Guard Infantry Division (4) (from woods to east of Semyonovskoye village area), 1st Cuirassier Division (2) (from area south of woods, to east of Semyonovskoye village area); supported by bombardment from Guard Light Artillery (3) (from woods to east of Semyonovskoye village area) French (defending): 2nd Infantry Division (4, reduced to 2 by preliminary bombardment), Guard Light Artillery (3) Result: French victory. The Russians had thought to take advantage of the French cavalry moves into the Goruzka valley to strike at their weakened position on the Semyonovskaya Heights, but even so the French defense reinforced by their Guard artillery at last moving up proves too
strong to risk the Russian Guards, who pull back. 4 PM: Utitskii Kurgan Area French (Poles and Westphalians) (attacking): Polish 16th Division (2) (from the Sadovskoye Swamp area, having pushed the Russian militia back out again), V Corps Light Artillery (2) (from area west of Kurgan on Old Smolensk Road), 23rd/24th Westphalian Infantry Division (4) (from Utitskii Forest north of Kurgan); supported by bombardment from VIII Corps Heavy Artillery (1) on Old Smolensk Road west of Kurgan. Poniatowski (2, reduced to 1 by activating) is in the Old Smolensk road area east of the Kurgan commanding his troops, with his cavalry (1) and Voltigeurs B2 (1) to the south of the road covering the flank against the Russian Cossacks, and Junot (1, reduced to 0 by activating) is in the Utitskii Forest area northwest of Poniatowski, while his cavalry (1) remains in the eastern Utitskii forest area, with these other troops not being committed to the battle. Russians (defending): 17th Infantry Division (2, reduced from earlier fighting), II Corps Heavy Artillery (2), reinforced by one militia unit (Smolensk, at 3, from the Old Smolensk Road area east of the Kurgan). Other Russian troops are nearby covering the flanks, including Cossacks 3 at Miyshina, Russian Moscow militia in the woods to
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the south, and Baggovut's CHQ (2, reduced to 1 for activating) and the weakened 1st Grenadier Division (1) behind the Kurgan on the Old Smolensk Road to the east, but are not committed to the final battle. Result: A hard-fought French victory, the last one of the battle on Sept. 7. Though the Polish infantry suffers a step loss and the Westphalian infantry suffers two step losses, the Russian infantry, militia and artillery units each lose a step too, but retreat from the Kurgan in time to avoid elimination. After the 4 pm turn, the action starts to die down. The French, in game terms, have secured enough points to be confident of a win, with firm control of three of the five redoubts (Shevardino, Les Fleches, Great Redoubt) and heavier Russian point losses for eliminated units than for the French, including the losses of one Russian AHQ (Bagration) and one Russian CHQ (Tuchkov). For the French, many of whose units are badly battered, further attacks only risk losing units and are unnecessary, and so the French content themselves with opportunistic artillery barrages against the Russian lines hoping for another kill, or at least to damage the Russians enough to deter counterattacks. And the Russians, at last tiring of this punishment by the French guns, pull their front back about one area along most of their front line to minimize further losses, unable to find any good place to mount a further counterattack; though many of the French divisions are weakened and vulnerable, the Russians are even more so, with no intact reserves remaining. 5 pm For the French, Napoleon and Murat are activated, while the Russians activate Barclay, Lavrov and Baggovut. The great cavalry melee starts to die down in the center, the last French cavalry attacks taking place. Napoleon leaves Shevardino and advances to the Semyonovskaya heights, to inspect the captured redoubts and Semyonovskoye village, coming under Russian fire. Some of Napoleons Marshals once again urge him to commit his Guard for a final breakthrough, but other Marshals advise against it and again he refuses, unwilling to risk his last reserve and shocked by the small numbers of Russian prisoners. Instead, Napoleon opts to continue artillery attacks on the Russians in the center, and the French Guard artillery is brought into position on the Semyonovskaya Heights. The Russian Guard threatens to counterattack Semyonovskoye, but is deterred by the French artillery and instead forms squares to block the French cavalry. 6 pm The Russians activate Baggovut and Kutuzov, while the French activate Napoleon and Murat. Baggovut, after an unsuccessful counterattack with the 4th Division which has at last arrived from the center to rejoin II Corps, starts to withdraw his army
along the Old Smolensk Road. The French launch no further melee attacks, but instead begin an artillery duel in the center, pounding the Russian Guard drawn up to hold off the French cavalry. Kutuzov agrees to pull his army back about a mile, planning to align it with the Russian reserve artillery across the central plateau, along a front running from Gorki to Psarevo. Kutuzov does not yet realize the full extent of the Russian losses and overestimates the French ones, believing that he can counterattack the next day after replenishing overnight. 7 pm The French activate Napoleon, while the Russians activate Kutuzov, Baggovut, Barclay, Lavrov, OstermanTolstoy, Dokhturov, and Golitsyn to conduct their planned withdrawal. The artillery duel between the French and Russians continues sporadically, and the Russian Guards Division suffers heavy losses, as the Russians complete their withdrawal into the new position. Both armies seek to rest and replenish their heavily damaged forces. 8 pm - The Russians activate Kutuzov, Barclay and Dokhturov to complete their planned withdrawal, while the French do not choose to activate leaders this time, seeing the battle as won and with the Russians mostly out of range. The battle dies down as darkness approaches, and the armies continue to rest and resupply. Kutuzov, finally realizing how badly the Russian
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army has suffered, and that Napoleon still has intact reserves the Old Guard and Guard Cavalry have remained inactive throughout the battle decides after nightfall not to continue the battle and withdraws toward Mozhaisk along the two main roads running south of the Moskva. The French attempt no immediate pursuit, being too exhausted by the fighting. During the Sept. 7 scenario, both sides have available 60 supply points, 4 for each of the 15 turns, as neither side lost any supply sources. In addition, the French can draw down 17 steps with their leaders for activations before reaching the zero steps, while the Russians can draw down 23 steps with their leaders for activations before reaching the zero steps, giving the French a maximum of 77 supply points and the Russians 83. The French, based on activations of leaders alone, have used 53, while the Russians have used 61 for their leaders, leaving the French just 24 supply points and the Russians 22 to provide resupply for damaged units and keep leaders able to fight. It is hardly surprising, after 15 turns of battle, that both the French and Russian armies are severely weakened in step strength, as it has been impossible for either side to keep up with the heavy losses. The French Guard is the only intact corps remaining on the field of battle. The Russian and French Losses Russian losses have been calculated at 44,000-50,000 men, with the higher figure probably accounting for Shevardino losses as well. Among the top leadership, Bagration and Tuchkov were both mortally wounded, with other corps commanders including Osterman-Tolstoy and possibly Borozdin wounded. The Russians also had numerous divisional commanders either killed (Kantakuzin in 1st Combined Grenadiers), or wounded (Konovnitsyn from III Corps, both Bakhmetievs commanding the two divisions of IV Corps, and all three of the division commanders in VIII Corps, Neverovski, Mecklenberg, and Vorontsov). The Russians kept good accounts of the losses of their regular formations after the battle, although there are no records for the Cossacks and only partial ones for the militia. Several Russian units were evidently shattered during the battle, with very heavy losses. These include all three of the divisions of VIII Corps, the 27th, 2nd Grenadiers, and 2nd Combined Grenadiers, as well as the corps artillery, mostly lost with the fall of the Fleches. The Russians also lost the bulk of the 24th Division of VI Corps with the fall of the Great Redoubt in the afternoon, along with its commander Likhachev captured, the highest ranking Russian prisoner, and the artillery of VII Corps in the redoubt. One Jaeger regiment, representing the Guard Jaeger regiment screen, was shattered in Borodino at the outset,
and likely another in the fighting on the southern flank. Some other Russian divisions, likely including one from VII Corps, one from IV Corps, and one from III Corps, may be considered shattered as well. However, no Russian cavalry corps or divisions were badly damaged enough to be considered shattered, and some of them came off with relatively little damage. The Russians lost about 40 guns, enough to account for the two artillery units from VII and VIII Corps, but not severe damage to the artillery. From the available data, it appears that on the Russian side, I Cavalry Corps lost only about 4-5% of its strength, about 101129 men, reflecting its failure to press the attack against the French at Borodino. On the other hand, II and III Cavalry Corps, which fought harder in the center, lost about 16% of their combined strength, 1184 men. IV Cavalry Corps also was not badly hit, with 324-325 men lost, 9%. Of the Russian cavalry formations, the cuirassier divisions were the most heavily engaged and suffered the most losses, 592 for the 1st Cuirassier, 25%, and 630-31 for the 2nd Cuirassier, 27%. Infantry losses were much more severe. Of the two corps that fought in the south, II Corps lost 3718-3764, 36%, while III Corps lost 32373294, 40-41%. The forces in the center from 1st Army had comparably heavy losses. IV Corps lost 3739-3763, or 39-40% and VI Corps lost 3616-
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3622, or 37%. Even the Guard infantry lost 4673, or 32%. Worst hit were the two corps of 2nd Army, which suffered the full force of Napoleons opening attacks. VII Corps lost 57915978, or 54-55%. And VIII Corps lost a staggering 86059260, from 59-70%. Even the artillery reserves of the two armies had substantial losses 1181 in 1st Army, or 14%, and 651 in 2nd Army, or 27%. Overall, 1st Army lost 27-28% of its strength in regulars, while 2nd Army lost 47-49%. Though Cossack and Smolensk militia losses are unknown, it appears that the Moscow militia lost some 5,793 men to combat and desertion. These totals, taking the higher figures, account for 42,610 men, with the missing Cossacks likely bringing the total to about 44,000. After the battle, the Russians readily drafted many of the remaining militia into the ranks of the regular divisions to replace their huge losses. On the French side losses from the fighting on Sept. 7 were about 28,000-30,000, including Davout wounded. The French had one cavalry corps commander, Montbrun, and one infantry division commander, Tharreau, killed, while many others generals were wounded, including all three of the other cavalry corps commanders, Nansouty, Grouchy, and LatourMaubourg, and four of the five infantry division commanders in I Corps, Compans, Dessaix, Friant, and Morand. It is somewhat harder to assess which
French divisions were shattered after the battle, since no complete records remain of individual infantry division losses in the Grande Arme after Borodino. But the corps-level losses are known, and from this it is evident that Davouts I Corps and the Polish V Corps suffered the most heavily, as well as Murats cavalry. It is likely that one or two of Davouts divisions were effectively shattered (likely Dessaixs 4th and Morands 1st ), as well as one of Murats cavalry corps (Montbruns II Cavalry, Nansoutys I Cavalry and Latour-Maubourgs IV Cavalry all suffered heavy damage, and of these IV Cavalry was the weakest to begin with in cavalry, so the most likely loss from the final cavalry struggles) and one of the Polish divisions (16th or 18th ). Ornanos IV Corps cavalry may also have been shattered by the initial impact of Uvarovs and Platovs cavalry at Bezzubovo, for when it appears later at Moscow it is a shadow of its former power. But on the French side, it is clear that no artillery units were lost; the French artillery strength at Moscow was nearly equal to what they had at Borodino, and it appears that only 8 French guns were lost at Borodino. , French Corps At Borodino Moscow Moscow Oct. 18 end of Sept. Guard 18,849, 109 guns 18,706 22,480, 112 guns I Corps 40,392, 147 guns 24,818 28,949, 144 guns III Corps 13,186, 75 guns 6,243 10,498, 71 guns IV Corps 25,021, 88 guns 27,326 25,624, 92 guns V Corps 10,328, 50 guns 6,923 5,712, 49 guns VIII Corps 9,656, 30 guns 5,000 est. 5,691, 34 guns Reserve Cav. 17,685, 88 guns 11,759 9,000, 67 guns Corps (with about 4,000 of the cavalry dismounted) While Napoleon had 135,117 men and 587 guns available for Borodino, at the end of September in Moscow he had 100,775 and 571 guns, and at the time he left Moscow, with reinforcements that had caught up and return of lightly wounded troops to the ranks, his strength had actually grown to 107,954 men, with 569 guns. The Guard, not committed to combat at Borodino apart from the artillery, suffered insignificant losses, and was actually stronger on leaving Moscow than it had been at Borodino due to the arrival of reinforcements including the rest of the Young Guard. However, I Corps had massive losses of at least 11,500 and more likely close to 15,000 men. III Corps lost between 2,600 and 4,900 men. For IV Corps, these figures appear to show no losses, but that is because of the addition of the 6000 men of Pinos 15th Division to IV Corps after the battle; taking that into account, IV Corps losses appear more like 2,700 men. Polish V Corps losses were about 3,400. Westphalian VIII Corps suffered losses of about 4,000 by the time it left Moscow, and while this probably includes some post-battle attrition,
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it is known to have suffered at least 1433 battle losses. Finally, losses to the four corps of the Reserve Cavalry appear to have been about 5,800; the most heavily hit were I Corps (down to 2,721 at the end of September from 5,159) and IV Corps (down to 1,775 at the end of September from 3600), while III Cavalry Corps came off lightly with 3,000 men remaining at the end of September out of 3,583, and II Cavalry Corps still had 4,263 men out of 5,343, but this included cavalry from Neys III Corps counted with them at that time. These totals largely account for the 32,000 that the French likely lost between the two days of battle at Shevardino and Borodino. Between the two sides, there were over 50,000 dead or mortally wounded left on the field. Borodino was a French victory by all the standards normally used to define the outcome of battles: the French held the field, and their losses had been less than that of their opponents. In game terms, the French have ended with about 22 victory points (6 for redoubts, 5 for the two Russian AHQs and CHQs lost, and 11 for other Russian units killed) to the Russian 12 (2 for the remaining redoubts in Russian hands, and 10 for 5 French units killed, as the Russians get two points for each French kill), a clear French battle win with a margin of 10 points. On the northern front above the Kolocha, the Russians actually appear to have an edge in points, with 2 points for the IV Corps cavalry division vs. 1 French point for the jaegers killed in Borodino. And on the southern front, honors are nearly, with 2 Russian points for killing a Polish division vs. 3 French points for the Tuchkov CHQ and some Jaegers. But on the central front, where Napoleon chose to make his main attack, his strategy is vindicated in game terms by the clear advantage in points - 6 Russian points gained for 2 French infantry divisions and 1 cavalry corps, against 16 French points for kills of 9 Russian units, the Bagration AHQ and two redoubts captured on Sept. 7 (with the remaining two for Shevardino, captured on Sept. 5). This was mainly thanks to the effective French use of artillery bombardments and tactical skill in combined arms attacks, aided by superior corps leadership in bringing their units into battle. But in reality, Napoleon had missed the last chance he would have to deal a decisive blow to the Russians by destroying Kutuzovs army, the only thing that might have brought the Tsar to the negotiating table or enabled him to maintain his position in Russia over the coming winter. To claim a decisive victory of that magnitude, in game terms, the French would likely need to have a margin of 20 points or more over the Russians. The Aftermath The Russian defeat at Borodino led directly to the fall of Moscow a week later. Though the Russians
could eventually draw on many reserves to replace their losses, it would still take time to rebuild from the heavy losses of Borodino, amounting to about a third of the army. In a dramatic debate at Fili, the Russian commanders divided on whether to fight another battle to defend Moscow, and Kutuzov finally had to take the momentous decision to abandon Russias ancient capital. On the French side, though losses had only amounted to somewhat under a quarter of the army, and the Guard remained intact, replacements were a more serious problem. Napoleons resources were not yet exhausted. On the evening after the battle on Sept. 7s, Pinos Italian 15th Division rejoined Eugenes IV Corps. The remainder of the Young Guard also caught up with Napoleon by Moscow, and other troops filtered in there, so that the Guard and IV Corps actually found themselves stronger after their stay in Moscow than they had been just before Borodino. But Tsar Alexander would not negotiate with Napoleon, for he still had an army in the field, and Napoleons position in Moscow, at the far end of the long rapier thrust into Russia, was becoming more tenuous every day. The vulnerability of the French was now apparent, even at the high water mark of the Grande Armees advance; raiding Cossacks could easily cut Napoleons lines of communication back to France, and the reviving strength of
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Kutuzovs army menaced the French position, while the Russian reinforcements arriving from the Army of the Danube in the south and Finland in the north now enabled the Russians to press on the French flanks and threaten to cut off Napoleons retreat entirely. Napoleon spoke truly when he afterward remarked about Borodino that no battle had cost him so much or gained him so little. When Napoleon finally left Moscow in mid-October, he still had over 100,000 men available, and nearly as much artillery as at Borodino. But, blocked by the Russians from retreating into the Ukraine where ample supplies were still available, the French had to retrace their route through Smolensk and the devastated lands of Byelorussia and Lithuania, with Kutuzov in close pursuit. What was left of the Grande Arme, even with reinforcements from drawing in the corps guarding the flanks and Victors IX Corps reserves, steadily disintegrated during the late fall and winter march. The crossing of the Berezina in late November was the last straw; though Napoleon narrowly escaped being cut off by the forces of Chichagov, with the merged 3rd Army and Army of the Danube, to the south, and Wittgensteins corps to the north, with Kutuzov pressing from behind, only remnants were left after this battle from the 50,000 Napoleon still had at its start. By the time Napoleon abandoned the army to return to France in early December, only the Guard retained any semblance of order, and a bare 10,000 troops under arms, with a host of stragglers behind, made the last march to Vilna and the Russian border. Marshal Ney, who had commanded the rearguard through the retreat, earning the title bravest of the brave from Napoleon, was said to be the last man of the Grande Arme to leave Russia. The old Grande Arme that had won so many victories for Napoleon had effectively been destroyed in Russia. Though the Emperor still commanded a large army in Spain, and reserves from which a new army in Germany could be reconstituted in 1813, and his most experienced Marshals remained to lead that force, the fighting power of the Grande Arme would never be the same again, and the legend of Napoleons invincibility was shattered forever. The French Order of Battle at Borodino (Composition of Game Units) Napoleon AHQ army staff, escort - 1 bn. 2nd Baden Line Rgt., Portuguese Legion Chasseurs Rgt. (3 sq.), 28th Chasseurs Rgt. (2 sq., detached from regiment in III Corps), Saxon Prinz Albrecht Chevau-Leger Rgt. (1 sq., detached from regiment in III Cavalry Corps) = 1 bn., 6 sq. There is considerable difference in the sources regarding which units were attached to Napoleons AHQ at Borodino, but these are all units known to have been attached to the AHQ when it reached Moscow. Imperial Guard
Mortier CHQ corps staff Old Guard Infantry 1st, 2nd, 3rd Grenadiers, 1st, 2nd Foot Chasseurs Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 10 bns. Middle Guard Infantry 1st Voltigeurs, 1st Tirailleurs, Fusiliers-Chasseurs, FusiliersGrenadiers Rgts. (2 bns. ea.), combined with 1 brigade of Young Guard, 4th, 5th Voltigeurs, 4th Tirailleurs Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 14 bns. (Legion of the) Vistula Infantry 1st, 2nd, 3rd Vistula Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 6 bns. Guard Heavy Artillery 6 foot batteries (49 guns) Guard Light Artillery 4 foot (30 guns), 4 horse batteries (24 guns), 6 regimental guns Guard Cavalry Horse Grenadiers, Horse Chasseurs, Empress Dragoons Rgts. (5 sq. ea.), 1st Polish Lancers, 2nd Dutch Lancers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Gendarmes delite (2 sq.), Mamelukes (1 sq.) = 26 sq. I Corps Davout CHQ corps staff 1st Infantry 13th Light, 17th, 30th Line Rgts. (5 bns. ea.) (+ 1 bn. of 2nd Baden Rgt. detached to AHQ) = 15 bns 2nd Infantry 15th Light, 33rd Line, 48th Line Rgts. (5 bns. ea), Joseph Napoleon (Spanish) Rgt. (2 bns.) = 17 bns. 3rd Infantry 7th Light, 12th, 21st Line Rgts. (5 bns. ea.), and 127th Line Rgt. (2 bns.) (in reserve, guarding I Corps parks), 1st Mecklenburg Bn. from 8th Rhine
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(Continued) Chasseurs Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 12th Polish Lancers Rgt. (4 sq.), 13th Polish Hussars Rgt. (4 sq.) = 17 sq. V Corps Light Artillery 5 foot batteries (32 guns), 1 horse battery (6 guns), 12 regimental guns VIII Corps Junot CHQ corps staff 23rd / 24th Infantry from 23rd Division 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th Westphalian Line Rgts. (2 bns. ea., 3 bns. in 7th ), 2 Westphalian Light bns.; from 24th Division 1 guard grenadier, 1 guard jaeger, 1 jaeger-carabinier, 1 light bns., all Westphalian = 15 bns. VIII Corps Cavalry 1st, 2nd Westphalian Hussars Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Westphalian Guard ChevauLeger Rgt. (4 sq.) = 12 sq. VIII Corps Heavy Artillery 2 foot batteries (16 guns), 1 horse battery (6 guns), 8 regimental guns (Reserve) Cavalry Corps Murat CHQ corps staff I Cavalry Corps (1CC) in 1st Heavy Cavalry Division - 2nd, 3rd, 9th, Cuirassiers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 1st Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt. (2 sq.); in 5th Heavy Cavalry Division - 6th, 11th, 12th Cuirassiers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 5th Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt. (1 sq.); in 1st Light Cavalry Division - 7th, 8th Hussars Rgts., 9th Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt., 16th Chasseurs Rgt., 6th, 8th Polish Lancers Rgts., 2nd Combined Prussian Hussar Rgt. (4 sq. ea.) = 55 sq.

Confederation Rgt. (1 bn.)(in reserve, guarding I Corps parks) = 18 bns. 4th Infantry 85th, 108th Line Rgts. (5 bns. ea.), and 2nd Bn. Hesse-Darmstadt Lieb Rgt. (1 bn.) (in reserve, guarding I Corps parks, or possibly detached to AHQ) = 11 bns. 5th Infantry 25th, 57th, 61st, 111th Line Rgts. (5 bns. ea.) = 20 bns. I Corps Heavy Artillery 6 foot batteries (48 guns) I Corps Light Artillery 2 foot batteries (16 guns), 5 horse batteries (30 guns), 53 regimental guns III Corps Ney CHQ corps staff 10th /25th Infantry from 10th Division 24th Light, 46th, 72nd Line Rgts. (4 bns. ea.), 1st Portuguese Legion Line Rgt. (2 bns.); from 25th Wuerttemberg Division 1 temporary Line Rgt. (3 provisional bns.) = 17 bns. 11th Infantry 4th, 18th, 93rd Line Rgts. (4 bns. ea.), 2nd Portuguese Legion Line Rgt. (2 bns.) = 14 bns. III Corps Cavalry (including I Corps Cavalry) from III Corps Cavalry 6th Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt. (3 sq.), 4th Chasseurs Rgt. (4 sq.), 28th Chasseurs Rgt. (2 sq., + 2 sq. detached to AHQ), 11th (Dutch) Hussars Rgt. (4 sq.), 1st, 2nd Wuerttemberg Chevau-Leger Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 4th Wuerttemberg Jaeger-zu-Pferde Rgt. (4 sq.) ; from I Corps Cavalry 1st, 2nd, 3rd Chasseurs, 9th Polish Lancers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.) = 41 sq III Corps Light Artillery 6 foot batteries (41 guns), 4 horse batteries (22 guns), 12 regimental guns
IV Corps Eugene CHQ corps staff Italian Guard Infantry Guard Inf., Guard Conscript Rgts. (2 bns. ea.), Royal Velites (2 bns.) = 6 bns. 13th Infantry 8th Light Rgt. (2 bns.), 84th, 92nd, 106th Line Rgts. (4 bns. ea.), 1st Provisional Croat Rgt. (2 bns.) = 16 bns. 14th Infantry 18th Light Rgt. (2 bns.), 9th, 35th, 53rd Line Rgts. (4 bns. ea.), Joseph Napoleon (Spanish) Rgt. (2 bns.) = 16 bns IV Corps Cavalry (including VI Corps Cavalry) Guard Dragoons (Italian) Rgt. (2 sq.), Queens Dragoons (Italian) Rgt. (4 sq.), Guards of Honor (1 sq.), 2nd, 3rd Italian Chasseurs Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 9th, 19th Chasseurs Rgts. (3 sq ea.), 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th Bavarian ChevauLeger Rgts. (4 sq. ea.) = 37 sq. IV Corps Heavy Artillery 6 foot batteries (44 guns) IV Corps Horse Artillery 2 foot batteries (12 guns), 4 horse batteries (24 guns), 8 regimental guns V Corps Poniatowski CHQ corps staff 16th Infantry 3rd, 15th, 16th Polish Line Rgts. (3 bns. ea.) = 9 bns. 18th Infantry 2nd, 8th, 12th Polish Line Rgts. (3 bns. ea.) = 9 bns. V Corps Cavalry 1st Polish Chasseurs Rgt. (1 sq. present, others at Smolensk), 4th, 5th Polish
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II Cavalry Corps (2CC) in 2nd Heavy Cavalry Division - 5th, 8th, 10th Cuirassiers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 2nd Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt. (2 sq.); in 4th Heavy Cavalry Division - 1st Cuirassier Rgt. (4 sq.), 1st, 2nd Carabinier Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 4th Chevau-Leger Lancers Rgt.. (1 sq.); in 2nd Light Cavalry Division - 11th, 12th Chasseurs Rgts. (3 sq. ea.), 5th, 9th Hussars Rgts., 3rd Wuerttemberg Jaeger-zu-Pferde Rgt., (4 sq. ea.), 10th Polish Hussars Rgt. (3 sq. ea.), 1st Combined Prussian Uhlans Rgt. (4 sq. ea.) = 52 sq. III Cavalry Corps (3CC) in 6th Heavy Cavalry Division - 7th , 23rd, 28th, 30th Dragoon Rgts. (3 sq. ea.); in 3rd Light Cavalry Division - 6th Hussars Rgt. (3 sq.), 6th, 8th, 25th Chasseurs Rgts. (3 sq. ea., except 4 sq. in 8th ), 1st, 2nd Bavarian Chevau-Leger Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Saxon Prinz Albrecht Chevau-Leger Rgt. (3 sq., +1 detached to AHQ) = 36 sq. IV Cavalry Corps (4CC) in 7 Heavy Cavalry Division - Saxon Gardes du Corps (Cuirassiers) Rgt., Saxon Zastrow Cuirassiers Rgt., 1st, 2nd Westphalian Cuirassiers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), 14th Polish Cuirassiers Rgt. (2 sq.); in 4th Light Cavalry Division - 3rd, 15th, 16th Polish Lancers (3 sq. ea.) = 27 sq. Horse Artillery 1 (I, II Cavalry Corps) 10 horse batteries (54 guns) Horse Artillery 2 (III, IV Cavalry Corps) - 7 horse batteries (34 guns)
th
Voltigeurs (Detachments) 1xB3, 2xB2 represent light infantry drawn from infantry divisions as needed, not separate regiments The Russian Order of Battle at Borodino (Composition of Game Units) Kutuzov AHQ corps staff, escort - 1 bn. Selenginsk Rgt. from III Corps, 1 bn. Combined Grenadiers from IV Corps, Ingermanland, Kargopol Dragoon Rgts. (4 sq. ea.) from II Cavalry Corps = 2 bns., 8 sq. (the available information does not clearly identify which of the 1st Army AHQ escorts were with the Kutuzov AHQ and which were with the Barclay AHQs, which operated near to each other; the assignment of most of the escorts to Kutuzov, while giving the Cossack escort to Barclay, parallels the Cossack escort of Bagrations AHQ) I Army Barclay AHQ army staff, escort - 2nd Bug Cossacks Rgt. (5 sq.) I Army Heavy Artillery 2 position batteries (24 guns) I Army Light Artillery 7 light batteries (84 guns) I Army Horse Artillery 7 horse batteries (including ones attached to cavalry corps) (84 guns) I Cavalry Corps (1CC) Life Guard Dragoon, Life Guard Uhlan, Life Guard Hussar Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Life Guard Cossack Rgt. (3 sq), Black Sea Guard Cossack sotnia (1 sq.), Yelizavetgrad Hussar Rgt. (8 sq.), Nezhinsk Dragoon Rgt. (4 sq.) = 28 sq. II Cavalry Corps (2CC) Moscow
Dragoon, Pskov Dragoon Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Izumsk Hussar, Polish Uhlan Rgts. (8 sq. ea.) = 24 sq. III Cavalry Corps (3CC) Kurland, Orenburg, Irkutsk, Siberia Dragoon Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Mariupol, Sumsk Hussar Rgts. (8 sq. ea.) = 32 sq. II Corps Baggovut CHQ corps staff 4th Infantry Tobolsk, Volhynia, Kremenchug, Minsk Rgts., 4th, 34th Jaeger Rgts (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. 17th Infantry Ryazan, Brest, Belozersk, Willmanstrand Rgts., 30th, 48th Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. II Corps Heavy Artillery 2 position batteries, 2 light batteries (48 guns) III Corps (with I Army Sept. 5, with II Army Sept. 7) Tuchkov CHQ corps staff 1st Grenadier Infantry Life Grenadier, Arakcheyev Grenadier, Pavlovsk Grenadier, Yekatarinoslav Grenadier, St. Petersburg Grenadier, Taurida Grenadier Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. 3rd Infantry Murom, Revel, Chernigov Rgts. (2 bns. ea), Selenginsk Rgt. (1 bn., with 1 detached to AHQ; regiment attached from IV Corps), 20th, 21st Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 11 bns. (may have also received back its 2 bns. of Combined Grenadiers from 1st Combined Grenadier Division as attachments for the battle on Sept. 7, but for game purposes
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1st Teptyarsk Cossack Rgt. (5 sq.), and 1st Bashkir Rgt. (5 sq.) = 37 sq. Cossack 2 Cavalry 5 Don Cossack Rgts., inc. Ilovaisky V, Grekov XVIII, Denisov VII, Zhirov, Kharitonov VII (5 sq. ea.), Perekop Horse Tatar, Simferopol Horse Tatar Rgts. (5 sq. ea.) = 35 sq. Cossack Horse Artillery 2 horse batteries (24 guns) II Army Bagration AHQ corps staff, 3rd Bug Cossack Rgt. (5 sq.), 1 Smolensk militia bn. II Army Heavy Artillery 2 position batteries (24 guns) II Army Light Artillery 4 2/3 light batteries (56 guns) VII Corps Rayevski CHQ corps staff 12th Infantry Narva, Smolensk, New Ingermanland, Alexopol Rgts., 6th, 41st Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. 26th Infantry Nizhni Novgorod, Orel, Ladoga, Poltava Rgts. 5th, 42nd Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. VII Corps Heavy Artillery- 1 position battery, 1 light battery (24 guns) VIII Corps Borozdin CHQ corps staff 2nd Grenadier Infantry Kiev Grenadier, Moscow Grenadier, Astrakhan Grenadier, Fanagoria Grenadier, Siberia Grenadier, Little Russia Grenadier Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. 27th Infantry Odessa, Tarnopol, Vilna, Simbirsk Rgts., 49th, 50th Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. 2nd Combined Grenadier Infantry 11 Combined Grenadier bns. from 2nd Grenadier, 7th, 12th, 24th, 27th (2 each.) and 26th (1 bn.) Divisions; at least 7 bns. in one brigade remained with division during battle, while 4

these are still shown with their parent division) III Corps Light Artillery 0.5 position battery, 1 light battery (18 guns) IV Corps Osterman-Tolstoi CHQ corps staff 11th Infantry Kexholm, Pernau, Polotsk, Yeletsk Rgts., 1st, 33rd Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns., + 1 bn. Combined Grenadiers remained attached (other detached to AHQ) 23rd Infantry Yekaterinburg, Rylsk, Koporsk (regiment attached from IV Corps) Rgts., 18th Jaeger Rgt. (2 bns. ea.) = 8 bns. (corps may have also received 3 other bns. of Combined Grenadiers from 1st Combined Grenadier Division, along with the bn. it already had, as 2nd Combined Grenadier Brigade attached for the battle on Sept. 7, but for game purposes these are still shown with their parent division) IV Corps Light Artillery 1 position battery, 2.5 light batteries (42 guns) V Guard Corps Lavrov CHQ (in absence of Grand Duke Constantine) corps staff Guards Infantry Life Guard Preobrazhenskii, Semyonovskii, Izmailovskii, Litovskii (Lithuanian), Finlyandskii (Finland), Jaeger Rgts. (3 bns. ea.), Marine Guard Equipage bn. = 19 bns. 1st Combined Grenadiers
Infantry 9 Combined Grenadier bns. from 1st Grenadier, 3rd, 4th, 17th (2 bns. ea.), 23rd (1 bn.) Divisions (+ 1 Combined Grenadier bn. from 11th Div. that stayed with that division, and 1 Combined Grenadier bn. from 11th Division with AHQ, not counted in this total) 4 bns. likely deployed forward in battle in 2nd Brigade with IV Corps (inc. 2 bns. from 17th Division, 1 bn. from 23rd Division, + 1 bn. already with 11th Division), and 2 bns. from 3rd Division may also have been deployed forward with their parent division again, while 4 bns. from 1st Grenadier, 4th Divisions in 1st Brigade clearly remained with 1st Combined Grenadier Division, but the two brigades and other detachments to III Corps remain united for game purposes 1st Cuirassier Cavalry Chevalier Guard, Life Guard Horse, His Imperial Majestys Life Cuirassiers, Her Imperial Majestys Life Cuirassiers, Astrakhan Cuirassiers Rgts. (4 sq. ea.) = 20 sq. Guard Light Artillery 2 position batteries, 2 light batteries, and 2 horse (only 8 guns each in horse) batteries, + 2 Marine Equipage guns (66 guns) VI Corps Dokhturov CHQ corps staff 7th Infantry Moscow, Pskov, Libau, Sofia Rgts., 11th, 36th Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. 24th Infantry Ufa, Shirvan, Butyrsk, Tomsk Rgts., 19th, 40th Jaeger Rgts. (2 bns. ea.) = 12 bns. VI Corps Heavy Artillery 2 position batteries, 2 light batteries (48 guns). Cossack Corps Platov CHQ corps staff Cossack 1 Cavalry 4 Don Cossack Rgts., inc. Ataman (7 sq.), Adrianov II, Chernozubov VIII, and Vlasov III (5 sq. ea.), 1st Bug Cossack Rgt. (5
sq.), 1st Teptyarsk Cossack Rgt. (5
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Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History From the Desk of the Editor [Continued From Page 2]
And importantly we seek to hire a full time curator at approximately $50K a year and benefits, understanding that curators make significantly more. We will also likely develop a newsletter too and I will likely write for or publish that. Our short term needs can be covered by approximately $150,000 in repairs. Long Term we need to build an endowment that will fund the museum in perpetuity. Interest rates being what they are, we believe annual maintenance and salaries will run us about $130,000, thus with interest at about 1.5% our target for an endowment is $15 Million. With that we hope to build a new building and create a military history library to rival the Pritsker in Chicago. The historians we have spoken to and who have visited the museum have all commented on how nice it is to be able to park on a street where the traffic is about 1 car every 10 minutes, where people say Howdy when they walk past you on the street, and where you can sit down at Dannys Bar and Grill, Peebles Pizza, or the R&R Restaurant for a home town meal and never have to fear being mugged, which in Chicago these days is a definite risk. In fact one historian from Chicago said hed rather drive 3 hours to Dana to study in a military library than drive downtown in Chicago to the Pritsker. And there are plenty of Bed and Breakfasts in the area. But, for now, thats a pipe dream, but a dream we do hope to attain. ALL of these things require money, most especially the upkeep and repairs to the existing facilities. We are in desperate need of $150,000. One of the things I never realized
may have been deployed forward in another brigade with VI Corps in I Army, but the division remains united for game purposes VIII Corps Heavy Artillery - 4.5 position batteries, 1/3 light battery (58 guns) Cavalry Corps (not a formal corps like others, but aggregates the II Army cavalry, which was all under the authority of Golitsyn as the armys cavalry commander) Golitsyn CHQ corps staff 2nd Cuirassier Cavalry Yekaterinoslavl, Military Order, Glukhov, Little Russia, Novgorod Cuirassier Rgts. (4 sq. ea.) = 20 sq. IV Cavalry Corps (4CC) Kharkov, Chernigov, Kiev, Novorossiisk Dragoon Rgts. (4 sq. ea.), Akhtyrsk, Lithuanian Hussar Rgts. (8 sq. ea.) = 32 sq. Corps Horse Artillery 2 horse batteries (24 guns) Cossack 3 Cavalry 8 Don Cossack Rgts,. inc. Bykhalov 1, Grekov XXI, Ilovaisky X, Ilovaisky XI, Karpov II, Kommisarov I, Melnikov IV, Sysoyov III (5 sq. ea.) = 40 sq. Opolcheniye (Militia) Moscow 1 Infantry includes 1t, 2nd Moscow militia divisions, total 4 rgts., 16 bns. Moscow 2 Infantry - includes 3rd Moscow militia division, total 4 rgts., 16 bns. Smolensk Infantry includes 11 districts (battalion equivalents) Jaegers (Detachments) 1xB3, 2xB2 represent light infantry drawn from infantry divisions as needed, not separate regiments.
about a not for profit 501(c)3 organization is that we cannot be shy about asking people for money. I grew up in the country and we would never have conceived of asking anyone for help that way. BUT, those personal feelings must be subjugated to the needs of the museum. SO, I AM ASKING: PLEASE PLEASE IF THERE ARE SUBSCRIBERS WHO CAN AFFORD THAT KIND OF A DONATION, NOT ONLY WILL IT BE APPRECIATED, BUT THE ENTIRE BOARD AND THE TOWN OF DANA WOULD BE ECSTATIC !!! You would be helping to save a national and indeed world treasure. Contact me via my e-mail: tdcgsl@yahoo.com or at the museums website www.erniepyle.org 1-765-665-3633 The Ernie Pyle WWII Museum is a tax deductible 501(c)3 Not For Profit And, yes Paypal Donations can be made at the website above www.erniepyle.org Now, about Old Soldiers. This will be the last issue of Old Soldiers, closing out Volume 7. In the end there just wasnt enough concrete material submitted to keep the magazine alive. I will write for Jon Comptons new magazine CounterFacts. Jon is the ex editor of Fire and Movement, for whom I once wrote. I will continue to make counters for anyone who asks. And I believe White Dog Games also seeks to build their own news letter and I will likely write and edit that.
VOL. 7 NO. 4
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Battles of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-1743
Wilmanstrand and Korpostrm Written by Ian Weir. Maps by Paul Dangel
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The following is compiled from material used in the authors recently published double wargame on the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-43 (A Lesser Wrath & Somar Skrla, by Red Sash Games).
Most readers are no doubt aware that in the 17th and 18th Centuries Sweden ranked as one of the Great Powers, and that her primary rival, Russia, achieved the same status during that time. Russia cemented her rise by challenging Sweden to a duel for supremacy in what is called the Great Northern War (1700-1721). Two decades later, the Swedes sought a rematch. The War of the Hats, sometimes the Hats War, or again the Russo-Swedish War of 1741-43, is not well remembered outside of Sweden and Finland, but it is nonetheless instructive. By 1741, the Swedes were clinging desperately to the last vestiges of their imperial power. Swedens defeat had been shattering. In 1720 the State was near bankruptcy, the economy ruined, and the armed forces in tatters. The root of all these evils was a lack of ready money. When Sweden had been at her maximum territorial extent, she controlled numerous commercial hubs in Germany, and even more importantly, she controlled the grain fields of Livonia. This rich farmland was worked by
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soldiers and gentlemen, the inference being that the Hats were the Patriot party and their opponents, the Nightcaps or Caps (Mssorna), at best a group of sleepy dodderers. The Hats originated in the salon-culture of the 1720s. Salons, officers clubs, and the like, were not native to Sweden, but French imports. A great many Swedish officers had seen service with the French Army and picked up French habits. Apropos, one of the most influential of these officers clubs was the little generalitet, which served as a forum for discussion of the latest military thinking and as a hatchery for up-andcoming young officers. One of the leading lights of the club was General Carl Emil Lewenhaupt. Lewenhaupt was a veteran of the Great Northern War, respected for his forward thinking and clear judgment on matters military. He had held, and would again hold on outbreak of war with Russia, the office of Lantmarskalk Speaker of the Upper House. The Lantmarskalk was a key member of the Secret Committee. That is, after the demise of Arved Horn, Lewenhaupt was the closest thing to a prime minister Sweden possessed. He was also the man chosen to lead the Swedish Army in Finland against the Russians. There was a dark side to the clubs. Through them, French agents were able to influence Swedish foreign policy. Many ordinary Swedes saw France as their best friend in Europe; the Francophile clubs believed
Battles of the Russo-Swedish War

serfs on an industrial scale, which left Swedens native peasantry free to participate in the State as citizen-soldiers, with wages paid from the commercial side of Swedens empire. All that wealth was now gone. During the 1720s and 1730s Sweden remained at peace with her neighbours and the economy recovered, so far as it was able. The military remained weak since there were not the resources to feed it. This did not sit well with the minor nobility, who, as in many other countries of the period, provided the bulk of the officer corps; commonly impoverished, their swords were their only source of income and status. Agitation for a war of revanche against Russia began to spread. Many of the rich also supported such a policy. For the large landowners there was the little matter of tariffs placed upon grain coming from their farms in Livonia, now under Russian rule. For the merchants there were war contracts to be had. Unfortunately there is no room here to discuss the political manoeuvring leading up to the war. Much of it followed a very modern pattern. Swedens Government was a curious blend, with a parliament and an elective monarchy (though the candidates had to have ties to the dynasty). Under a strong man like Gustavus Adolphus or Charles XII the Government was an extension of the Kings will. Under a weak one, parliament the riksdag ruled. Swedens parliament imbued elements of both the British and Polish systems. English-style, it had an upper house for the Order of Nobles and a lower house for the other three Orders (uniquely, Sweden had a fourth Estate the [free] Peasants who were allowed the right of petition). Polish-style, under a weak king the riksdag became a forum for factional strife. In the absence of royal authority executive power therefore devolved onto a handful of standing committees, the most important of which was the Secret Committee essentially the Cabinet. During the 1720s and 1730s the Secret Committee, and the riksdag in general, were dominated by the chief minister of the regime, Arved Horn, who was committed to rebuilding Swedens economy and kept a tight rein on the more militant of his colleagues. He was ousted in 1738, leaving no successor of sufficient stature to control the unruly parliament. The king, Fredrik V, was uninterested in ruling; moreover, the constitution of 1720, instituted by Horn, restricted his powers. Fredrik was simultaneously Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. Needing the revenues of that state to support his lifestyle, he was wary of incurring the wrath of those more powerful than him in Germany. To counterbalance the fact that he rented Hesses army to the British, he cultivated a pro-French attitude as King of Sweden. The French nation was generally admired in Sweden. The group that ousted Horn called themselves the Hats (Hattarna) a reference to the tricorne worn by
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removed from power. On the second occasion the French themselves had a change of heart, seeing more to be gained by acting as Mediator in the conflict (they earned lucrative trading privileges in Syria). This left the Swedes in confusion. About all they accomplished was to tip the Russians off with some halfhearted troop movements. The Russians redeployed 80,000 men to the Baltic theatre in the closing months of the war. Severely bruised at the time, by 1741 these units would be in peak condition. After this false start and in the general exhaustion produced by the Russo-Turkish war another conflict might have been avoided for some time to come, but for two very important deaths in 1740: that of Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor, and that of the Russian Empress, Anna Ivanova. Charles death can be attributed to the RussoTurkish war. The Empire was involved as an ally of Russia and the catastrophic defeat suffered by Austria on the Danube they lost Belgrade to the Turks broke the emperors health. Because his successor was a woman, the famous Maria Theresa, a new war broke out in Europe, the War of the Austrian Succession. Prussia began her hundred-year-long drive to take Austrias place as leader of Germany. For France, likewise at odds with Austria, it became essential to prevent Russian interference on behalf of the Habsburgs. Having switched off the Swedes two years before, the French now tried to switch them on again.

France was Swedens salvation. (The alternative ally, England, was respected too, but everyone understood her balance of power doctrine was designed exclusively to serve her own ends.) The clubs reflected French diplomatic opinions on Eastern Europe and the Baltic, and the role Europe expected the Swedes to play. Sinisterly, however, members were also paid to advocate French aims. Admittedly, bribery was so common in European ministerial circles that a man was regarded as suspect if he was not on the take. In the present case, however, French money would prove ruinous to Sweden. Moreover, the French did not merely support the pernicious habit of personal bribery indulged in by all the powers. They also provided foreign aid state bribery, in effect. After the loss of empire Sweden could not field a large military without subsidies. Her first rise to greatness, during the Thirty Years War, pointed the way; France had provided the subsidies that enabled her to establish herself. Ironically, the fact that the current government was an oligarchy, however hawkish, made rearmament harder, since the aristos were unwilling to contribute the taxes necessary to run a war on domestic steam alone. The price to be paid was a heavy one: though the Hats and the French both wanted a RussoSwedish war, if funded by France it would be in aid of French schemes and on a French timetable. Given that the subsidies did little more than commission the outfitting of 20 warships and pay the expeditionary corps wages for a few months, the subsidies would prove a bad bargain. And, the war would be delayed until the coffers were once again empty. In this period, French foreign policy was famously driven by fear of Habsburg encirclement. That is a simplification. By the 1730s, there was a friendly Bourbon regime in Spain, so France could hardly be said to be encircled. French influence in Germany grew stronger by the day. However, the Austrian Habsburgs, Holy Roman Emperors, were still powerful rivals. In addition, they were allies of Russia. The Habsburgs were perceived by both Paris and Moscow, if not by Vienna as Russian proxies, and France feared Russia far more than the Empire. Habsburg Encirclement was already becoming something of a euphemism for the much more potent combination of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. France and Russia clashed openly in the 1730s over the succession to the Polish crown. A Russian corps penetrated to the Rhine for the first time in history. Its commander, by the by, would lead Russias forces in the coming war. Immediately after, Russia became bogged down in a struggle with the Turks. In both cases France urged Sweden to intervene. On the first occasion Arved Horn prevented his more bellicose countrymen from going off halfcocked; that was why he was
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aside and the Swedish strike force would enter the northern capital and assist Elisabeth to the throne, directing the coup in a manner favourable to Sweden. In gratitude, the princess would grant territorial concessions; even the Russian government had long admitted some locations were up for discussion. Since the Swedes and French paid for her coup, perhaps she would pay for the war? But, if the worst came to the worst, one Swede was worth ten Russians any day. Unfortunately, Sweden fought her war in isolation. The Ottomans were not interested in helping. Though technically victorious over the Empire they had not done so well against the Russians, and needed a long period of peace to recover. And this was to be denied them, since, even before their war ended, they found themselves embroiled with the Persians. France became stuck in a German quagmire and had no will or means to aid Sweden after the first shots were fired. Initially, the Swedes could care less. The Hats had come to power on an antiRussian platform. More support for a war had been gained in 1740 with the Sinclair affair, the brutal murder of a Swedish diplomatic courier (he was also a member of parliament) by Russian agents. Tit-for-tat trade sanctions were imposed, and merchant ships were harassed on both sides. But, there were difficulties. The Swedish military was underfunded and undermanned.

Russia at this time was ruled, either directly or by proxy, by the descendants of Peter the Great, all of them women, and all of them German that is daughters of the various North German ducal houses. The tsars, if any, were minors. Anna Ivanova ruled through the 30s, presiding over the Germanification period, when the machinery of state was run by a bevy of German officials and other foreign experts first imported by Peter the Great. Immigration rules were delightfully lax for those hoping to make their fortunes in the East. The Russian populace and the old nobility found fault with all of this, however, and, despite its efficiency (by Russian standards) the regime was inherently unstable. Comparable in personality and build to a female stormtrooper, Anna Ivanova, though disliked, was not challenged. Her death, however, opened the floodgates: her replacement, the Regent Anna Leopoldovna, was not only unpopular, but neurotic and lazy, and the German clique at the top of society began to fight amongst themselves. This gave the French an idea. Why not replace the Regent (who stood in for her son, the infant Ivan VI) with a pro-French relation, and one who would qualify as a full empress? It would be easier for their Swedish proxies than an all-out war. And cheaper. There was such a person, Annas sister, the childless and unmarried Princess. Elisabeth. Though not exactly proFrench, she was at least open to influence, and apparently unhappy with the current state of affairs. Life in the shadow of the throne could be stifling. The Swedes (and possibly the Turks) would mobilize in her support. The Russian Army, reputedly in bad shape after the Turkish war, would be unlikely to put up much resistance. Moreover, Elisabeth was the Armys favourite. There might not even be a war at all, only a putsch. As a matter of record, the coup, which took place some five months after the Russo-Swedish war started, went off all right. The regime was taken by surprise. (Since the ditzy princess only made up her own mind at the eleventh hour this was hardly amazing.) Swedens declaration of war the previous summer was deemed a necessary step in the destabilization process. Such a declaration could no longer be avoided in any case. At the first hint of French backing for a war with the Bear, the patriot party was over the moon. Attacking overland from bases in Finland, the Swedes would threaten St. Petersburg (Petersburg at that date). The reliable elements of the Russian Army would leave the city to defend the Karelian isthmus. The Guards would likely be kept back, and the Guards were loyal to Elisabeth. Indeed those regiments almost mutinied out of a rumour that they would be sent to the war. In the best case scenario, a disaffected and weak Russian corps would surrender or step
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Both sides employed regiments of foot as administrative units and battalions as the basic combat unit. Organizations higher than the regiment were ad hoc, with brigades being the primary operational unit. Several brigades might be grouped as a corps, and a couple of corps would form an army, but such arrangements depended on how the campaign unfolded. In Finland, with only a single main road, there was no point in having multiple corps. The bulk of the forces marched as one army, and a small one at that, while detached brigades combining a mix of infantry and cavalry covered the primitive side roads. In battle, both sides infantry battalions fought in four ranks and used combat by fire only at very close range or not at all. However, there the similarities ended. Russian regiments had, with a few exceptions, a permanent twobattalion structure, backed by a third dept battalion used to organize replacements. Battalions had four fusilier companies and a grenadier company, which was usually, like the grenadiers of other armies, split off and combined with other grenadier companies to form elite assault formations. Swedish regiments had no permanent battalion structure. Instead, their foundation was the company. Recruitment was based on a cantonal system similar to Prussias, so that the company personnel would all come from

Though harsh taxation was employed in Finland, that duchys defences were totally inadequate. For reasons of funding, and in an attempt to maintain surprise, local forces were mustered only at the last minute, while Swedish regiments trickled in for months after the war began. The Navy was immediately crippled by an outbreak of ships fever probably typhus and could only be manned by drafts from the Army. Nonetheless the Hats forged ahead. For a variety of reasons, the declaration of war came rather late in the year on July 28th, 1741 leaving little time for action before the winter, and, given that the campaign would be waged in southern Finland, the window for decisive manoeuvres was very small indeed. Swedens expeditionary force in Finland was not notified until August 12th and the Russian reply not received until the 13th. The Russian troops were informed on the 25th. But by then they were already participating in the build up for the first campaign. The war was not to begin with a surprise attack, thanks to the penetration of the Secret Committee by Russian agents. Neither was the Russian Army in poor shape; rather the reverse. Of the 80,000 men in the theatre, roughly 10,000 would participate in the initial campaign of 1741, and no more than 40,000 during the course of the war. This would prove sufficient to crush the Swedes utterly. Against the Russian juggernaut the Swedes could pit one of the most technologically advanced, best organized, superbly led formations for the year 1704. They were 30 years behind the times; even their order of battle was copied from that set down in 1716. Many of the officers and men were veterans of the Great Northern War, but that just meant they were elderly; the Swedes had not fought a war since 1721. The Russians had fought two. In the heyday of Charles XII the Swedes might still have bested this massive organism, but the Russian Army of 1741 was not only large, it was efficient. Its cadres had been schooled in a decade of war and its leadership included some of the best fighting generals in Europe. The Armies
Superficially, the opposing armies had much in common. A closer examination, however, reveals several key differences. The building blocks of both were battalions of infantry, regiments of cavalry, and batteries of guns. The Russians had more reserves, but in the initial campaign the numbers on each side were about equal. A Swedish drive on Moscow would have been hopeless, however. On top of the 40-50 odd regiments of foot and 30-plus mounted regular units in the Russian Army there was an entirely separate Garrison Army, as strong again as the field force. Much of it was billeted in the Baltic regions. Against 40,000 regulars and another 40,000 garrison troops the Swedes could field less than 30,000 men. Swedish lan was high, but not that high.
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possible. It appears that retreats, as one of the four phases of war, were not practiced at all, either for the battlefield or operationally. The tactics of the pure offensive would let the Swedes down. At Wilmanstrand their counterattack would be flanked, bringing destruction; in the campaign as a whole, the necessity to conduct a series of fallback defensive operations would bring a collapse in morale. Cavalry regiments on both sides had roughly the same organization (the Swedish cavalry did have a fixed structure): regiments of four squadron, each of two troops. The Swedes still outclassed their opponents. Unfortunately, Finland possessed almost no terrain suitable for shock action, and few districts where adequate fodder was available, so the horse were not accorded priority of transport when preparing for the campaign. Only one locally raised dragoon regiment would participate in the battle at Wilmanstrand. The Swedish dragoons, most of whom were Finnish, even in those units not cantoned in Finland, had a high reputation. Modeled on the Russians, they had greater lan and often engaged in mounted charges. But for some reason, probably the fact that the men had only just mustered, the regiments performance at Wilmanstrand was abysmal. The Russians had only a handful of experimental cuirassier regiments, on the Saxon model, whose training was minimal and whose mounts were weak; they

the same district, like the British Pals Battalions of World War I. It gave greater cohesion, but it also meant that a company could have a group opinion. Given Swedens political climate, this was dangerous. On the outbreak of war, a regiment would muster a variable number of companies and group them into battalions. With more than six companies a regiment would have two battalions. Companies had no fixed size, either, but averaged 150 men. Despite the moral cohesion given by district recruitment, this procedure undoubtedly contributed to the Swedes poor command performance during the war, because the Russians gave them no time to train as battalions. Swedish grenadier companies were also ad hoc; each line company had a file of 10-12 grenadiers who would be pulled out as needed. It seems companies were rarely concentrated into battalions, though. The above describes the practice of what were called Indelta units. There were also a number of Vvarde regiments. Indelta contained a high proportion of national Swedish and Finnish troops. Essentially, they were the state or royal regiments (to apply a French model). Vvarde are usually interpreted to be mercenary or foreign units, either composed of individual volunteers or hired in bulk from various smaller states. That interpretation applies more to the old days; at the present time the Vvarde regiments were fully integrated. However, they did include a higher proportion of foreigners. These men were not just riffraff. The Swedes were very picky about which nationalities they accepted French, Scottish, English, and Germans being the most common. If the Indelta regiments are likened to royal regiments, Vvarde regiments correspond to the French colonels regiments, raised by nobles who received a contract, or commission to do so. Each side had its own tactical preferences. However, in this war the protagonists would trade roles; it was the Swedes who would be on the defence. In the attack, the Russian preference was for charging with the bayonet fixed (the men were not issued scabbards) but the cult of the bayonet did not yet override common sense. On the defence, which was preferred, normal musketry drill was followed. The Russians were universally recognized as nearly invincible when holding ground it is not sufficient to kill a Russian soldier, you must also push him over, as Napoleon quipped. The Swedes preferred to attack. They had their patented Ga Pa tactic, subtly different from a simple bayonet charge. The battalion would advance in silence until within pistol range, upon which the first two ranks discharged a volley. If necessary, the rear ranks would do the same, otherwise they would charge with the bayonet, joined by the front ranks when ready. The Swedes did not passively hold a line, but sought to counterattack as soon as
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single battery, the since the train proper had been sent back in anticipation of a withdrawal. Swedish light pieces were 4pounders, while the Russians had 3-pounders; the latter employed a large number of small coehorn mortars as well. Field artillery on both sides came in 8- and 12pounder weight, though naturally guns of any calibre and of uncertain ancestry would be used in a pinch.

fought on foot without shame. Likewise, Russia possessed a few hussar units, formed at least notionally from refugees from the Turkish wars; expert opinion agreed they were twice as expensive as Cossacks and half as effective. The bulk of the Russian mounted arm consisted of regiments of dragoons. Riding steppe ponies which the State purchased by the tens of thousands from their Tartar foes in the intervals of peace, Russian dragoons were not much more than mounted infantry. The regiments even had grenadier companies which could be converged in the usual manner. No vestige remained of the old, half-barbaric Streltsi units, but the Russians made extensive use of the Cossack bands, whose transition from the old free companies of frontiersmen to official formations was underway but far from complete. The Cossacks of the Don were the most reliable group, as well as the largest, and a contingent of them would participate in the war. The Cossacks were neither cavalry nor infantry, but warriors, though fighting on horseback was preferred, as being more manly (and safer). The Asiatic frontier provided Kalmyk and Bashkir tribesmen, still fighting with sword and lance, bow and arrow. The pagan Bashkirs came from the Urals, the Kalmyks from the south; these latter were Buddhists, and their shrine at Elista is still perhaps the largest such building outside of Tibet. Of limited use on a conventional battlefield, their role was to sow terror. (In 1919 a White Finnish attack on Petrograd would be staved off by the threat of unleashing the Bashkirs.) The Swedes had nothing to match these irregulars. They did not employ light infantry. However, the line regiments were familiar with open order fighting, a plus in the Finnish woods. The Swedes had some guard units, but in practice these were merely high-priced line formations. The Russian Guards regiments, of which there were three, had a similar model to the line units, but had better equipment, more guns, and were of three field battalions four in the case of Preobrazhenski. The latter also had attached artillery in the form of a bombardier company. A depository for the sons of noblemen, throughout their history the Imperial Guards fluctuated between elite fighting formations and palace decoration; at this time they were probably worse than the regiments of the line, but not entirely useless. Like the rest of their army, the Swedish artillery train was a superbly equipped, small, but professional body. The train itself even the Finnish division of it was not available at Wilmanstrand, so the Swedes had to make do with guns from the fort. They had enough to make a strong battery that wreaked considerable damage before it was overrun. Light battalion guns were supposed to be used for local fire support but often wound up being concentrated. At Wilmanstrand the Russians concentrated theirs in a
The Leaders
Intuitively, one would expect the Swedish Army to be commanded by a brilliant, aggressive individual, matching his wits against a somewhat slow, if stolid Russian with limited imagination. In fact, the advantages were all on the Russian side. Overall command of the Swedish forces in Finland was given to Count Carl Emil Lewenhaupt (1691-1743). This choice was universally applauded at the time. Though some modern sources describe him as both inexperienced and incompetent, Lewenhaupts reputation was actually pretty solid, and he was extremely popular with the Swedish people at least, those who mattered. He was a veteran of the Great Northern War and respected as a good tactician. Most importantly, he would be, by the time war broke out, Lantmarskalk Speaker of the House of Nobles and Marshal of the Diet which ought to give him the necessary powers to ensure smooth war.
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hawkish of all the Swedish commanders. If there are rumours that Lewenhaupt lied to promote the war, the evidence that Buddenbrog did so is blatantly obvious. Wrangel by contrast, was apolitical, even a closet Cap. But he was brave to the point of impetuosity and happy to participate. Buddenbrog (1685-1743) was born in Livonia. His career ran as follows: Captain in the Livgardet (1711), Major of Grenadiers (1715), Major General (1721), elevated to the status of friherre (1731), Lieutenant General of Infantry (1739). Executed in 1743, as will be explained. Wrangel was born in Sweden and he joined the Army at 15. Captain in the Livgardet, Lieutenant Colonel of the Sknska stndsdragonerna. Captured at Poltava (1709). Repatriated in 1722. Colonel of the Nyland cavalry regiment (1722), of the Tavastehus Regiment (1727), Nyland.

the riksdag, becoming a member of the Privy Councillor and a member of the Secret Committee. He had been Lantmarskalk once before, in 1734. Lewenhaupt was also head of the French club called the little generalitet. This group of prominent senior officers had a major impact on the thinking of young, aspiring officers during the 1730s. There may have been a spectrum of opinion among the members, but the group was decidedly pro-French and antiRussian. Lewenhaupt received his new appointment as Lantmarskalk at an extraordinary diet held in December of 1740. The vote was nearly unanimous; even the Caps agreed as to his personal integrity, and they had no candidate of their own to match him. He had already been appointed commander of the forces in Finland, replacing General Cronstedt, who thought the idea of an offensive against Russia was pure folly. (Though Cronstedt was officially sacked for antagonizing the Finns with a regimen of heavy taxation.) But Lewenhaupts political duties prevented him from overseeing the war preparations in person. In his stead, one of his cronies from the little generalitet, Lieutenant General Baron Henrik Magnus von Buddenbrog, superintended matters on the ground. Given that Lewenhaupt would miss the battle at Wilmanstrand, Buddenbrog was one of two Swedes to figure prominently in the coming campaign. The other was Major General Carl Henrik Wrangel. Buddenbrog was perhaps the most
Count Carl Emil Lewenhaupt
(1691-1743) Opinion is divided on his politics. He was a Hat, and the contemporary chronicler Manstein credits him with telling fibs about the state of his armys preparedness, just so he could have a nice little war. It is also said that he had dreams of acquiring the governorship of Finland perhaps even ruling it as a breakaway state. Others portray him as lukewarm, going through the motions in what was supposed to be nothing more than a show of force in aid of a regime change. Like many German Swedes, Lewenhaupt first entered the Dutch service, at 16, becoming Captain in 1709. In 1710 he joined the Swedish service. In 1712 he fought, as a Lieutenant Colonel, at Gadebusch (the last Swedish victory of the Great Northern War). At the end of the Great Northern War he was made a Major General (1722). During the years of peace he served in
General Wrangel
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gained by destabilizing the imperial throne and establishing a pro-Swedish regime, well and good. If not, the Swedes must so press the Russians that they would beg for peace. Later in the war he would face insurmountable opposition from the Holsteiners, who by that point were worried that by making war on Carl Peters future empire they were sowing trouble for themselves. No such issues divided the Russian side. Command was given to Marshal Piotr Petrovitch Lascy (1678-1751). During the course of his life Lascy participated, by his own count, in 18 battles, 18 sieges, and 31 campaigns. In 1735 he had taken a Russian army to the Rhine. In 1736, 1737, and 1738 he had taken one to the Black Sea. In 1741 he would take one north and west, into Finland, and possibly to Sweden. But Lascy was not a Russian. His real name was Pierce Edmond de Lacy, of the House of Bruff, and he was

Though not really germane to the battle of Wilmanstrand, a brief summary may help explain the situation or perhaps only muddy the waters. After the battle a succession crisis would break, when Queen Eleonora died. She and King Fredrik had no legitimate children. Fortunately or unfortunately, Swedens monarchy had been made elective for just such an emergency, and there were a number of prominent foreign candidates. The officers favoured this or that one, and a great many supported Carl Peter of HolsteinGottorp. He was shortly to become Peter III of Russia, and was made Grand Duke of Moscow during the war. Eligible by birth to be King of Sweden and Tsar of Russia by his descent from both Charles XII and Peter the Great, he could have twisted history in an interesting way if he had chosen to. In the event he would decline the Swedish candidacy in favour of the imperial title alone. Other contenders were the prince Royal of Denmark and a couple of German dukes. Ultimately, one of the latter, a candidate favourable to Russia (actually Carl Peters guardian) would be chosen. Understand that in 1741 the Swedish Holsteiners could justify war against the Leopoldovna Regency in support of the princess Elisabeth because Carl Peter was the latters protg; they did not, however, believe they should be trying to defeat Russia. In contrast, General Lewenhaupt, belonged to that group of the Hats who desired concessions from Russia regardless of the consequences. If they could be
Baron Henrik Magnus von Buddenbrog (1685-1743) Dragoons (1729), Skaraborgs Regiment (1739) Major General (1732). In 1739 he was offered a seat on the Privy Council but declined in order to keep his Army commission. Captured at Wilmanstrand (1741) and repatriated in 1742, he returned to Sweden a hero. In 1743 he was promoted to Lieutenant General, and in 1754 to Field Marshal. Descending from these rarified heights, the bulk of the Swedish officer corps was competent enough, no better or worse than that of other armies. Many had years of service in the French Army under their belt; others were German soldiers of fortune. But there was one overriding problem that perhaps did more than anything else to ensure the ruin of Swedish hopes: the Army was riven by faction. Although the situation became dire only at years end, cracks were already appearing.
Field Marshal Lacy
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to France; in 1719 he returned to Scotland and fought with the Spanish against King Georges men at Glenshiel. Transferring to the Spanish service at that time, he also participated in the abortive Siege of Gibraltar (1727). Due to his Protestant religion, promotion in the Spanish service came slowly. So, he went to Russia; Peter II (or rather the Regent of the day, Catherine I) gave him command of a Guards regiment. Like Lacy, Keith fought with skill in the War of the Polish Succession and the Russo-Turkish campaigns. Upon the outbreak of war with Sweden, he was a General of Infantry. He was also noted for his abilities in civil administration and was respected for a liberal humanity and sense of justice which were unusual for the period, and even more glaring in Russia. Both men were apolitical. Russian-born officers did have to concern themselves with their position at Court, and even foreign experts working on contract worried when there was a shakeup at the top, but whereas certain of such men had foolishly involved themselves with politics, Lacy and Keith just went about their duties. Their reputations were clean and their skills so recognized that they had little to fear. Lacy conducted the campaign of 1741 on behalf of the Regency. When the coup took place and he was woken in the dead of night with the news, he was asked where his loyalties lay. Without hesitation he said with the reigning empress and

became a Colonel in 1706; at Poltava, where he distinguished himself, he was a Brigadier. Then came the conquest of Livland (northern Latvia and southern Estonia) and his appointment as Chatelain of Riga Castle. In 1719 he participated in the invasion of Sweden proper, when the Russian Army marched over the ice across the Gulf of Bothnia. After the war he entered the tsars new Military College (that is, the Ministry of Defence, not an educational institution) as a General, then took command of the occupation army of Livland as Governor of Riga. Here, he came into contact with the future Tsaritsa, Anna Ivanova. Under her, Lacy fought in the War of the Polish Succession and the RussoTurkish war of 1736-39, before returning to his governorship as a Field Marshal. Now, he had been appointed by Anna Leopoldovna to command in Finland. He had fought against the Swede Lewenhaupt once before, defeating him at the battle of Tnningen in 1714. The credentials of Lacys second-in-command were no less impressive. James Francis Edward Keith (1696-1758), was, as his Christian names imply, a Scottish Jacobite. Born at Inverugie Castle in Aberdeenshire, he was the son of the 9th Earl Marishal of Scotland (his brother, also a confirmed Jacobite, eventually took the title). His early training was for the law and literature, but his own tastes were for soldiering. In 1715 he took up arms for the Old Pretender, James Edward Stuart, and was forced to flee
General James Francis Edward Keith (1696-1758) born at Kileedy, in County Limerick, Ireland. Described by a Russian source as one of the best type of foreign generals of Peters time, who knew and loved the art of warfare, he was perhaps the greatest Russian general before the appearance of Suvorov. He took part in his first action at the age of 13, hastily commissioned as a Lieutenant and leading a band of his countrymen defending the town of Limerick against the army of William of Orange (1691). At the peace that year, Lacys father, his brother, and himself, took flight with the Wild Geese going to France to join the Irish Brigade. Lacy lost his relatives while fighting in Italy during the Nine Years War, and went over to the Austrian service. Two years later, in company with his commander, he joined the Russian Army in time to participate in much of the Great Northern War. Beginning as a Lieutenant at Narva, he
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waterlogged. If there is no lake on a given patch of ground, there will be a swamp. On firm ground, the forests are dense, cut by tracks known only to the locals. Even on the main coast road, the so-called Kings Road, the Russians would find themselves having to hack a path through for their artillery. A band of low hills runs parallel to the shores of Lake Saimaa, containing all that water and keeping the Karelian region north of Vyborg relatively dry. There are, however, a number of smallish rivers. The well known Vuoksi that connects Saimaa with Lake Ladoga was at that date more a string of lakes than a single channel. The town of Wilmanstrand, now Lappeenranta, lies on the south shore of Lake Saimaa. Though small, it was an important place: a point of departure for water transport heading north and a post on the northernmost of two east-west roads south of the lake the other being the Kings Road running along the coast. Wilmanstrand was also the terminus of a road running southeast across the border to Vyborg. The town was situated on a tongue of land jutting out into the lake. The landward side was protected by substantial earthworks, but the defences were not particularly formidable. Despite harsh taxation prior to the war there was barely enough money to pay the garrison of Finland, let alone improve the state of her defences.

went back to sleep. The following year he fought on behalf of Elisabeth with equal professionalism. Even the usual petty jealousies did not affect the conduct of the Russians operations. Generals Keith and Lwendahl, a capable Dane who later went on to serve under Maurice de Saxe, did not get along, but there is no evidence that either jeopardized the campaign by failing to support the other. In contrast, many Swedish officers would leave the front in 1742 to take care of the political agendas of their factions, leaving their general to cope with a council of commissars that subjected every troop movement to a vote of approval. The presence of men such as Lacy and Keith, supported by a plethora of German soldiers of fortune and somewhat more cautious but equally capable native officers, ensured that the Russian Army was not merely a giant immovable block, but flexible and mobile. Lacy was confident enough of its prowess that he was prepared to take risks, ones that usually paid off. Tactics were adjusted to meet the demands of the campaign. Against the Turks on the open steppe, huge moving squares of men, like those later used by Napoleon in Egypt were the norm. Against the Swedes, defending river lines and narrow defiles in swamps and dense woodland, multiple small columns probed and outflanked. The Russians have always been noted for their strength on the defence, but in the Finnish campaign they were to demonstrate both skill and doggedness in the offence.
The Theatre
Before the war, the border between Finland and Russia began at Hamina then Frederikshamn and closely followed the coast eastward for some distance before heading east-north-east. Vyborg (Vipuri), it should be noted, was a Russian possession. Frederikshamn was the most important of Swedens border posts, though not as well fortified as the Russians would later make it. Wilmanstrand was the middlemost border post, actually a few kilometers behind the border. Once past Wilmanstrand the border cut sharply northeast, passing some distance north of Lake Ladoga before heading directly north (along roughly modern lines). At a narrow crossing point in Lake Saimaa, well to the northeast of Wilmanstrand, was Nyslott (Savonlinna), the third and last of Swedens border posts. It controlled roads heading into the interior of Finland. Overall, the terrain was well suited for the defence. Even today movement is pretty much restricted to the roads, and in the 18th Century there were no railroads. Finland is the land of lakes. Much of the country has only recently, in geologic terms, sprung up, like a wet sponge, after the retreat of the ice age glaciers, and sponge-like, the ground is still
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Russians from occupying it. The rest of the ground is extremely broken and intersected; there is nothing but woods, marshes, bushes, rocks, and ravines; so that it is very difficult to approach except by the high road. Here and there only one may find little bits of fields, cultivated and enclosed. Manstein, Memoirs of Russia, pp. 306-307 (Manstein is General von Manstein. Though obscure in comparison with his famous namesake (who was adopted into the family), the General was a man of some ability, as will be seen. He left a detailed account of this war, in which he participated as a junior officer. Later, he went into the Prussian service.)
Dispositions
Baltic Sea and Scandinavia While the town was sited on a knob of elevated ground, much of the surrounding terrain was low lying and swampy, or consisted of forest dotted with cleared smallholdings and hamlets. A ridge lay to the south and west, and beyond it another such ridge. These dominated the town, and the northernmost was within cannon range of the town center. The road from Vyborg ran straight into the town with the ridges to its left (as one approached the gate), while the east-west road ran along the top of the nearer ridge. It is a little town, at the distance of full four German miles [30 Km; the present border is 20 Km or so] from the frontier of Russia, situate on the side of a great lake; this covered it behind, so that there was no attacking it but in front, where it was fortified with a covered way, a dry ditch palisaded, and a staked rampart, the whole made of earth and fascines. The town, though itself situated on an eminence, has hills all round, which command it. The highest is on its proper right, where there was a windmill. The Swedes had posted a detachment there, to hinder the Wilmanstrands prewar garrison comprised 500 men of Willebrands battalion (part of the Bjrneborgs regemente; Colonel Willebrand was the town commandant). Attached to the garrison was the Karelska dragonregemente of Finnish dragoons (600 men). Perhaps 100 men from Karelska were detached and posted to the southeast, on the road from Vyborg, just on the Swedish side of the border. Discounting various march columns and regiments still assembling, General Lewenhaupts strike force was camped (due to lack of billets) in columns near the frontier, a days
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his Christian names imply, Keith was a Scottish Jacobite. In fact, he was the General Keith, who became one of Frederick the Greats favourite marshals. This was to be his last war in the Russian service. The expeditionary corps consisted of the following: Three dragoon regiments: Iambourgski, Kazanski, and Kievski. Plus the horse grenadier companies from all three regiments, converged into a fourth unit. Nine fusilier regiments, each of two battalions: Ingermanlandski Rostovski Narvski Novgorodski Nevski Velikoloutskiy Astrakhanski Nizovski Apcheronski (Ingermanlandski was the only regiment in this list to have three battalions on the books, though the third was not present.) Plus two battalions of converged grenadier companies from the above regiments. 9,900 men in all. The Russians also brought with them an unspecified amount of artillery. At the battle, Lacy would have one battery of light pieces. Heavier guns were brought along, only, having been sent to the rear in case the Russians had to withdraw, they did not participate.

march apart from each other. His intentions were to converge these columns on Vyborg, probably consolidating on the Kings Road west of that town, after he was sure Wilmanstrand was not under threat. Of course, the General was not yet in-country. He would arrive at bo (Turku) some days march to the west, on September 3rd, the day of the battle. Wrangel commanded the smaller column, of 4,000 men, posted at Davidstadt (Luumki). This was a crossroads astride the east-west road from Wilmanstrand. From Davidstadt another road led off southwest to the coast just west of Frederikshamn, and one more ran southeast to the Kings Road about midway between Frederikshamn and Vyborg. Davidstadt is about 33 Km from Wilmanstrand i.e. a days forced march. The deputy Commanderin-Chief, Buddenbrog, commanded the larger column (5,000 men), based at Qvarnby, an outlying village northwest of Frederikshamn, where the aforementioned southwest road from Davidstadt came down to the coast. Qvarnby was a key supply dump. And, because of the lay of the ground, an army camped at Qvarnby could rotate troops through a besieged Frederikshamn at will the latter town could not be properly invested thanks to the estuary that covered its northern flank, while the defenders had access to bridges into the town. Qvarnby is 66 Km from Wilmanstrand; i.e. two days march. (The full breakdown of the Swedish forces was 2,730 dragoons, 12,945 indelta and 1,600 vvarde, plus 800 gunners. 24,500 horse and foot remained in Sweden, at least on paper.) The Russians, meanwhile, were assembling. At its peak strength in 1742, this force would comprise no more than half the total available manpower in the region; the rest would garrison Estonia and Livonia. In the autumn of 1741, however, Marshal Lacy had at his disposal only 10,500 men. The marshals campaign plan for 1741 was based on the knowledge, gleaned from contacts in Finland, that the Swedes were disorganized and weak. Buddenbrog tried to give the impression that the entire Swedish Army was poised like a coiled spring, but not very successfully. Lacy decided to upstage the enemy. Since the season was late, a quick foray would have to do. His troops would cross the frontier with only five days rations, take Wilmanstrand, and withdraw, leaving parties of Cossacks and Kalmyk tribesmen behind to make the winter unpleasant for the Finns. Like the Swedes, the Russians were deployed in two camps, one in the Red Hills district just north of St. Petersburg, and the other at Vyborg. General James Francis Edward Keith was appointed Lacys second in command and had the responsibility of organizing the expedition and conducting preliminary reconnaissance. As
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between them, dragoons, then infantry, only 30-40 paces apart, laying on their arms. This nearly proved fatal to the commanders. About 11pm, four Swedish soldiers from Wilmanstrand who were conducting a reconnaissance alerted a Russian sentry, who fired upon them. Being near the first line of infantry, he spooked the second line, which rose up en masse and shot volleys and battalion guns at the first line for about half an hour! Lacy and Keith, lying between the lines, had several bullet holes through their tents. An officer and 17 men were killed in the first line. This tragic farce had a sequel. Some 200 horses broke their pickets in the confusion and galloped off to Wilmanstrand. The Swedish advance guard two kilometers farther up the road imagined they were being charged and fled into the town with the horses on their heels a point being that they had to flee across a drawbridge, which no one thought to raise until it was too late. That was of no immediate import, since the Russians were not actually pursuing. But the affair did have a consequence that would set the course of the campaign. From his camp, General Wrangel heard the cannon fire. Fearing that the town was already under attack, he decided to go to the rescue without waiting for his superior, setting off at daybreak after sending a request for aid to the latter. This was directly contrary to his instructions, which were on
Battles of the Russo-Swedish War Preliminary Moves

The Swedish declaration of war was read out by Keith to his assembled troops on August 26th. On the 28th he led the Russians northwest toward the frontier. The going was difficult: The army could only march in one column: for in all that country there is no practicable way but the high road. On each side are thick woods, marshes, and rocks. In all Finland there is scarce a plain found large enough to encamp with four regiments in front. Manstein, Memoirs of Russia, p. 304. On the first night, part of the army camped at Cananoia, a village 4 Km from the frontier, and the rest about 2 Km further back along the road. At Cananoia they had their first brush with the enemy a courier who blundered into their lines at night and barely escaped with his life. (Cananoia is probably Cansola, about 14-16 Km SW of Lappeenranta. In 1741 Cansola would have been 12-14 Km from the border.) Marshal Lacy joined the army on the 31st. From deserters, Lacy ascertained that Wrangel and Buddenbrog had not moved, and were probably not even aware of his presence. He estimated the Swedes would need at least three weeks before their army was ready for an offensive. His own army carried rations for a mere 15 days, and the marshal intended to be safely back on his side of the frontier before they ran out. Still, the Russians were gambling. The Swedes were habitually aggressive foes, swift to respond. If they concentrated at Wilmanstrand before the Russians arrived, it would be even odds; by a dictum of Peter the Great, Russian troops should not engage Swedish troops at odds of less than 4:3, or even 3:2. Even the prospect of attacking Wrangels column at Wilmanstrand by itself, presumably dug in, was felt to be a very risky undertaking. Lacy, always an aggressive commander, decided to go ahead. He was convinced the enemy were unprepared. The regimental commanders were all summoned to his presence and given their orders personally. On September 1st, the Russians crossed the frontier, leaving all their baggage behind and taking only five days rations. (The baggage guard was composed of detachments from all the regiments (100 men and 3 officers each), plus the full Nizhgorodski Regiment, which had just arrived.) Despite the roughness of the way, the march to Wilmanstrand did not take long. The first day, the Russians made six kilometers beyond the frontier, encountering no opposition but seeing the locals take to the woods. They camped for the night in three lines, with Lacys HQ
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no account to give battle without Buddenbrog. On the 2nd, the Russians made little progress. The Swedes had broken down a bridge over a small river only four kilometers farther on, which took some hours to rebuild. Leaving the Kievski dragoons to guard it, Lacy marched on. Around noon, the Russian advance guard clashed with about 100 Swedish dragoons (elements of Karelska) and chased them off, taking a prisoner. At about 4pm, Wilmanstrand was reached. Lacy camped at the village of Armila, a kilometer from the town (now part of central Lappeenranta). He and Keith conducted a reconnaissance (protected by a battalion and 200 mounted grenadiers) to within musket shot (250 yards) of the ramparts, then returned. As they did so, it was reported that Wrangels column was arriving from the west but of course, the report only stated that several thousand men had shown up; this could be Wrangel and Buddenbrog both Lacy immediately set his men to occupy the high ground between the two armies, but night intervened and there was no engagement. Next morning, the Russians saw Wrangels corps camped on the ridge between the ramparts and a windmill, a few hundred yards from the town. It was a good position, hard to assail. Around 10am, the Swedes conducted their own reconnaissance.
1741 Campaign Map

Lacy, according to his subordinate, Manstein, still did not know if he was facing Wrangel only, or twice that number. Because of this he had already sent the artillery park back to the reconstructed bridge, along with his quartermasters, who were to lay out a camp there. However, he was soon reassured, and resolved to risk an attack. This decision was confirmed in a lunchhour council of war, without dissension. Including the town garrison, Wrangel had 5,256 men. Lacy had 9,900. The Swedish regiments were one battalion each of: Willebrand the garrison Sdermansland regemente Dalregementet Vsterbottens regemente Tavastehus lns regemente (Finnish) Savolax och Nyslotts lns regemente (Finnish) And the Karelska dragonregemente (also Finnish) attached to the garrison The Russian regiments were those named earlier, less the Kievski dragoons. The Battle of Wilmanstrand was thus a small battle, but, like the contemporary battles of Campo Santo in Italy and Mollwitz in Silesia, it was to have a significant impact.
The Battle of Wilmanstrand, September 3rd, 1741

The Russians began their attack around 2pm. Wrangel deployed from his camp to receive them. A battery of guns taken from the town defences was placed by the windmill, which was built on a hillock standing above the rest of the ridge the Qvarnbcken it was
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wide, with the fusilier battalions behind. From Swedish accounts it appears that the whole of the Russian line advanced, perhaps leading from the right, perhaps simultaneously. Probably, the low ground between the armies was studded with copses; Manstein repeatedly makes the point that there was no room to manoeuvre on Finnish battlefields. This would mean the rest of the line also moved up in clumps. (It is not even clear that the whole Russian army formed up before attacking, though that would be odd.) The grenadiers took heavy losses passing through the defile in column, after which they had to climb out of the gully. The Swedish guns seem to have done all the damage. The suggestion is that the grenadiers attacked toward the Qvarnbcken in a northwesterly direction, though it is just as likely they took flanking fire. Either way, the grenadiers fell back in confusion before reaching the Swedish line. Although he is listed as belonging in the second line, Major General Ukskul commanded this attack; he was the sole general officer casualty on the Russian side perhaps one reason the grenadiers retreated. To avoid the contagion of rout, as the grenadiers retired Manstein received a direct order from Lacy to cut to his right and attack the left flank of the enemy. The Marshal had seen the Swedes begin a movement forward, abandoning their

called and the Swedish foot stretched in single line of battalions for some 800 to 1000 yards along the crest line, running southwest, starting at a point about a musket shot, or 250 yards, from the ramparts. The six battalions were paired into three ersatz regiments, a common Swedish practice. One regiment apparently lay east of the battery, and two to the west of it. The Swedish foot were covered on their left by a ravine, really a sharp portion of a gully running between the armies. There is a period map of the battle, from which the map attached to this exposition is taken. It does not show on this map, but both flanks lay relatively close to the lake shore, with just enough room for the one regiment of dragoons to manoeuvre. Manstein states the Swedish dragoons were positioned on a plain beside a village, on the opposite side of the hill. It is difficult to see where this could have been from either the period or a modern map. The most obvious place is actually the village lying outside the ramparts on the right of the Swedish line. Manstein says the Swedish dragoons covered the right flank, but Swedish sources indicate the dragoons also operated on the left. The most likely interpretation, therefore, is that the dragoons were camped outside the walls, in the nearby village they would likely have kept their old billets after Wrangel set up his command slightly to the west and were split to cover both flanks during the battle. Lacy sited his artillery (two 6-pounders and some 3-pounders) on high ground opposite the Swedish batteries and began an artillery duel. Though damage was minimal, the Swedes had the best of it, and began to inflict casualties. The Russians had left their camp in no particular sort of order, but drew up facing the Swedes on the rise to the south. The original map shows their line bent behind their battery. There were sufficient battalions to make two complete lines. Initially, the Russian dragoons were drawn up on either flank, but Manstein says those on the right could make no progress through the thick terrain and were diverted to the left. The two regiments were augmented by the converged horse grenadier companies of all three regiments (i.e. including those of Kievski). Manstein led a critical flank attack in this engagement; his account of the events on his wing are quite detailed, but the other actions are only summarized. From his perspective, the attack is described as an advance by the two grenadier battalions, shown in the period map as being on the extreme right, followed by the battalions of Ingermanlandski and Astrakhanski, under Mansteins command. These last are shown lined up beside the grenadiers, but according to Manstein, the attack had to be made in column due to the constricted terrain, so that the grenadiers advanced in column of companies, only two companies
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The Swedish dragoons fled the battlefield entirely. Small groups of men (there is some mention of marines, possibly gunners) scattered to hide in the swamps and forests. The rest of the army escaped into the town, where they rallied and manned the ramparts. With the Qvarnbcken and the Swedes own artillery in Russian hands, Wilmanstrand came under heavy bombardment, catching fire in several places. At this point, Lacy summoned the town to surrender, but when the parley drummer was shot, the Russians stormed the town. Some sources say Lacy gave a direct order to storm after the drummer was killed. Such a decision was common practice and obeyed the current laws of war. Manstein says only that the Russians were angry, implying the troops just could not be stopped. That also would be quite natural, especially if his men were already fighting hand to hand on the ramparts. The tragedy lay in the fact that the whole thing was accidental. The commandant raised the white flag when the Russians were crossing the ditch, but neglected to inform all his posts of the fact. Thus, some positions continued to fire. The Russians soon broke in, and by 7pm Wilmanstrand was in their hands. Wrangel was captured, along with seven of his staff. The commandant, Willebrand, was killed. The Russians took 1,250 prisoners of war, 2,000 horses, 4 standards, 12 colours, 12 guns, and a

superior position to conduct their traditional Ga Pa counterattack. Mansteins own attack was highly successful. When his men arose from the ravine at 60 paces, they found they had taken the two Swedish battalions to the east of the battery Willebrand and Savolax fully in flank. A single volley sent the enemy scrambling for the town. If there were any Finnish dragoons supporting them, they bolted without a fight. Wrangel, on his way from the Swedish right, was not in time to stop the rout. Manstein pursued to the glacis and, according to his recollection, his men began an immediate assault though actually, some other things occurred first. On the Swedish right, the Russians closed with the enemy, but the line held. Wrangel was in personal command here, but as soon as the Russians were repulsed, he took himself off to the left. Immediately after, one of the regiments on the Swedish right Sdermanland (500 men) commanded by a highborn but impetuous officer, lost control of itself in the excitement and left the line to chase the fleeing enemy. They advanced so far that the Swedish guns had to cease fire for fear of hitting them. The commander of Sdermanland tried to repair his mistake by retreating to the ridge, but was taunted by his men, who called him an old man. From an interpretation of all accounts, it appears that the other Swedish battalions likewise began to advance. Such was Swedish doctrine, but in this instance it proved their undoing. Manstein was presented with a perfect target, while on the right, the Russian dragoons, under Colonel Lieven, swiftly had the better of an encounter with the Swedish dragoons, routing them. They then attacked the Swedish foot, particularly Sdermanland and Dalregementet, in conjunction with the reformed Russian left which had returned to the advance. (It is unclear if Russian battalions from the second line took part, but quite possible.) The remaining four Swedish battalions did not break immediately, but were forced back onto the Qvarnbcken. In the center, the Vsterbotten Regiment fought like men out of some ancient saga. Next to them, the Tavastehus Regiment took three volleys, but that was enough. They fled, leaving their officers standing there. Wrangel had his right arm smashed by a ball at this point and was taken off the field before he could rally the troops. The remnants of Sdermanland and Dalregementet closed up with Vsterbotten. The surviving regiments fought for a half hour more, but by 5 PM they had been dislodged from the hill, the remnants falling back in good order under command of a Corporal Carlberg, the senior surviving member of his regiment. They made such a fine show that General Keith cancelled an attack by six of his battalions against them, saying it would be too costly.
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PAGE 106 (Continued) Postmortem

There is general agreement that the battle was a tossup. The Swedes had bad luck in losing Wrangel at a critical moment, and the butchers bill proves they fought extremely hard. They were undone by their aggressive doctrine and to some extent by general disorganization. This verdict holds both for the battle itself, and the campaign. Wrangels first mistake was in disobeying orders and fighting at all, but he was praised for his action except by his superior. Even then, the battle might have been won, if the Swedes had not tried to launch a counterattack and abandoned an excellent position, just at the time both their flanks were turned.
a mortar, besides a war chest of 8,000 crowns (a paltry sum according to Manstein). The population of Wilmanstrand was deported to Russia and, after being plundered, the town was razed (September 4th). 3,300 Swedish dead were counted on the battlefield (Swedish sources say 1,300 killed and wounded, and 1,000 POWs). Less than 500, mostly dragoons, escaped, turning up as far away as Nyslott. The Russians lost a major general Ukskul three staff officers, eleven combat officers, and 514 men (the Swedes say 2,400 men killed and wounded, including a lieutenant general). Manstein, no raw recruit, reports that the gunfire during the battle was intense, and lasted over four hours.
Battle of Wilmanstrand - Phase 1 (above) And Battle of Wilmanstrand - Phase 2 below
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Swedish Navy, ruining the entire plan of campaign. The Swedish Galley Fleet, plus a supporting force of frigates and ships of the line, led by one of Swedens best fighting admirals, had positioned itself deep within the Gulf of Finland, ready to act in concert with the Army in its advance (or pretended advance) on St. Petersburg. At the critical moment. an outbreak of ships fever typhus devastated the fleet. The admiral was one of the many dead. Although the disease struck the Russians equally, and their navy was inert in any case, this was not realized by the Swedes. The offensive had to be delayed while new plans were made. And Lacy took advantage of the change in momentum. With the Swedish offensive disrupted, the Russian marshal recrossed the border, leaving Cossacks and bands of Kalmyks (perhaps 3,000 irregulars) to prosecute the kline krieg, and handing command over to Keith, who took his men into winter quarters on November 8th. General Lewenhaupt arrived at the front in midSeptember. Even after the debacle of Wilmanstrand he had 22,800 men (or 23,700) under arms. But this count includes 8,000 reinforcements that arrived in October, plus the remnants of the Fleet, most of which was in the process of departing for Sweden. Of effectives he had only 15,400. He faced 16,000 Russians in Karelia. It was a standoff. Lewenhaupt camped around Frederickshamn, and the Russians at Vyborg.

One suspects the newly levied Finnish units fled out of mere confusion: first they are told to advance, then perhaps someone tells them not to, then they are shot at from the flank. That flank attack was perfectly timed, but even Lacy was not that good. The Swedish practice of cobbling companies together to form battalions meant that, in this rushed campaign, the units had not had time to shake down. It would have been far better for them to remain on the defensive but the Swedes never trained for that. The sources uniformly say the Swedish counterattack was a mistake. But that may be the wisdom of hindsight. Swedish tactical doctrine did not omit passive defence, but it was discouraged. The men of Sdermanland mocked their commander for wanting to fall back to the ridge; they did not curse him for leading a foolish charge. While it is possible Wrangel instructed his regiments to seize any opportunity to counterattack, the general sense of the accounts indicates that either he said nothing at all on the subject, assumed there would be a general counterattack on his orders, or wanted his troops to simply hold the line. This last option made the most sense. Presumably, if the Swedes held the line until dark, Buddenbrog would show up on the morrow, the Russians would have to retreat, and Wrangels initiative would be applauded. A coordinated counterattack could also have worked, and if successful could have yielded up the Russian baggage train as a prize. Wrangel was a brave and vigorous commander; this option seems more in line with his personality. What seems to have happened, unfortunately, is that Sdermanland took matters into its own hands, and this inspired a ripple effect down the line, Sdermanlands unplanned charge being interpreted as the start of a general counterattack by the other regiments, whose commanders would have seen Wrangel passing down the line, apparently approving (though in reality not seeing) the advance. Thus the Swedish left was just leaving its positions as Manstein flanked it. The flight of the Finnish dragoons compounded matters, permitting a double envelopment.
After
Buddenbrog, meanwhile, was having a frustrating time. His troops were too disorganized, according to his own account, to march off immediately, and he was two days from Wilmanstrand. That said, the evening of the battle, fleeing dragoons not marching at regulation pace, mind you rushed his camp. The sentries fired at them in error, then fled themselves, taking with them most of the camp. Buddenbrog and his officers emerged from their quarters to find themselves alone. It took most of the following morning to sort things out. The generals immediate problems were compounded by a disaster that had overtaken the
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Hats, who were trying to salvage at least something from the wreck. One more battle would be fought before it was all over. A naval battle. The Battle of Korpo.

Swedish morale was low. They tried Cossack-hunting, but those wily horsemen had the better of them. Swedish morale sagged still further. After failing to persuade the crippled Navy to support a general advance, Lewenhaupt would make one, critical probe in early November before entering winter quarters. With the Kings Road buried in snow, he led a column of only a few thousand men toward St. Petersburg, hoping to join in the coup that was now immanent and so justify Swedens claim for compensation. He never even reached Vyborg. The supply sledges fell apart after only a few miles and the Swedes were forced to abandon the attempt. Although rejoicing at his success, the Regency was not pleased with Lacys too-brief dip into war, but the Swedish Army was still a bogeyman to the rank and file, and it would not do for Lacy to place his men in a spot where his command might be destroyed through sudden panic. He had already lost 2,000 men in this brief thrust. There was also the question of the large number of POWs to be guarded, a lack of provisions, and oh, by the way, what happened to my reinforcements? Such arguments were irrefutable. Next year, Lewenhaupt would plan a big offensive, only to be hamstrung by ships fever and politics. Forced onto the defensive, the Swedes would fall back continuously from the frontier, abandoning one strong position after another through a combination of factors. One time it would be a seaward outflanking by the Russian galley fleet carrying thousands of troops, another time it would be through the panicky folly of the local commander, another time by the will of the Stockholm-imposed council of war with whom Lewenhaupt was forced to deal. At Helsingfors (Helsinki) late that summer the Swedes Army would surrender en masse, despite having a good defensive position, enough supplies for the rest of the season, and numerical parity with the enemy. Lewenhaupt and Buddenbrog would be summoned home, placed on trial, and executed as scapegoats to prevent a full inquiry into the conduct of the Hat Administration which was under attack for corruption and mismanagement of the war. Wrangel, whom Manstein blames for the debacle of Wilmanstrand, would be lauded as the wars hero, again out of necessity. The generals execution might have been avoided, but for the fact that the trial concluded just at the time a pro-Danish peasant revolt was threatening the capital. This was in 1743. Forced to evacuate Finland the previous year, peace with Russia was under discussion but not concluded. A mlange of issues boiled that spring the Succession, fears of Danish intervention, war weariness, Russian demands for reparations (some wanted to demilitarize Finland or to annex it, while others were content to see a pro-Russian royal election), the peasants revolt, and a desperate intransigence on the part of the
The Naval War

The naval war was a fitful affair. Neither side accomplished any great deeds of valour in the first two years. Strategically, the war went in Russias favour, but that was more through luck than superiority. As noted earlier, the Swedes could commission only about 20 warships; generally, 1517 were active. Russia commissioned a similar number. Operations in 1741 focused at the Russian end of the Gulf of Finland a close blockade of Kronstadt. However, because of the outbreak of ships fever, the Swedes were forced to pull back to the entrance to the gulf, off Hango, for operations in 1742. Some ships were so undermanned that they could not tack in high winds. The Russians had problems of their own and never even left port in 1741. They suffered a similar but milder outbreak of disease, but primarily they lacked skilled seamen of all kinds. Prewar training cruises usually took them no farther than a few kilometers up the coast before they had to turn back, and only a handful of ships were involved in these drills. In 1742 things went better, but only because the Swedes were so obviously weak. Actions occurring that year were mere
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begin to move until May. (Technically, the lands, where Swedish is spoken, lie only at the west end of the archipelago. The eastern islands are the bo Archipelago. By the by, the region has more land than water; do not rely on a map for inspiration, use a satellite image. No map, whether ancient or modern, shows the region correctly. Must be those Finnish elves.) May 14th saw the embarkation of the bulk of the expedition aboard the galleys at St. Petersburg 34 galleys and 70 konchebras (cantischibasses). More regiments marched along the coast road, toward bo. The Tsaritsa led the divine service on board Lacys flagship before wishing him every success and repairing to her palace to watch the fleet depart. (This was a show of support for Lacy, demonstrating that Elisabeth approved of the marshals disobedient conduct the previous year, when he had crossed the Kymen River against orders, enabling the total defeat of the Swedes.) (A konchebras was a small ship of Turkish origin, powered by a mix of lateen sails and oars and crewed by around 80 men.) The galleys were organized into a van under General Leveshov, seconded by Lieutenant General Brilly and Major General Wedel, a main body under Marshal Lacy and Major General Lopukhin,

posturing. Neither side engaged, even when occasionally coming within cannon range. Unable to risk battle, the Swedes let the weather and poor Russian seamanship work in their favour, so that their enemies suffered some attritional losses, but nothing that could not be put right by the following year. Moreover, with the Swedish battle fleet held back off Hango or patrolling the waters off Gotland, the Russians were free to employ their large galley fleet along the southern Finnish coast. It provided close support of the land operations through gunfire, resupply, and the threat of naval landings. The Swedes failure to hinder these activities did more perhaps to lose them the war than their Armys internal troubles. Sweden had her own galley fleet, but it was of recent construction and initially there were only 20 or so war vessels. By the end of the war this would jump to 70 or so, but the Russians started with double that number and they too maintained a continuous building program. Galleys were simple to construct and required muscle rather than brain power; they were the preserve of the Army. galleys, so the control of sheltered waterways was needed. Although both sides were primarily posturing for the benefit of the peace talks, the Russians did hope to place themselves in a position to threaten the Swedish homeland. The Swedes, on the other hand, needed to defend against such a move, and, in addition, had plans (which fell apart) to spark a Finnish uprising by a thrust from the Arctic supported by landings of their own. There were only two places galleys could safely cross the Gulf of Bothnia: the chain of islands between Vaasa and Ume, and the narrow strip of water between the Swedish coast and the land Islands the land-hav. The latter, in view of its proximity to various points of interest, like Stockholm, was the obvious choice. The other advantage of the southern route was that the lands tend to experience warmer weather, meaning the ice would have broken up there while the gulf itself was still frozen. Vice Admiral Abraham Falkengren commanded Swedens galleys. Ordered to establish a forward base to screen the mainland and provide flank security for units planning to land on Finlands Bothnian coast, by March 26th he had secured the island of land, landing some 1,800 troops under command of Colonel Gotthard Wilhelm Marcks von Wrtemberg. The land-hav, being deep water, was already ice free; the Russians, hampered by ice in the Gulf of Finland, and by the need to bring up fresh regiments from Livonia, did not
Towards Korpo
The focus of the naval war in 1743 was the land Archipelago, the cluster of islands at Finlands southwestern tip. Large troop movements across the Baltic could only be accomplished by convoys of
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line (including two 60s), two frigates, and a snow. The commander of this vanguard was Commodore von Staude. Admiral Jean von Utfahl commanded the main fleet, which was patrolling between Gotland and Osel (now Saaremaa island). In all, Utfahl disposed of sixteen ships of the line and five frigates. A chase began with Staude retiring west into increasingly high winds. Kronstadt was the first to become damaged by the rough seas and fall behind, then Sviatoi Andrei, with split masts and a hole forward. Barsch reluctantly called off the pursuit and withdrew to effect repairs off Nargen Island (May 25th). Staude remained observing for some days, then joined Utfahl. The Admirals intention was to block the passage of the Russian galley force as it followed the Finnish coast toward the lands, so he made for Hango, arriving there on May 29th. Unfortunately, he had missed General Keiths local fleet, but he was ready for the main flotilla when it should arrive. At Hango, the galleys would have to leave the shelter of the coast, rounding the cape in open sea, and the Swedes would have them. Lacy had been delayed by contrary winds and by the ice which continued to clog the coastline. It was extremely cold. Frederickshamn was only reached on the 27th of May. Keith had two regiments in garrison here, and Lacy

and a rearguard under Count Saltykov and General Stuart. The van carried three regiments plus three companies of grenadiers, the main body three regiments and two companies of grenadiers, and the rear carried three regiments and three companies of grenadiers. 2,000 Don Cossacks, with mounts, were also embarked. On top of this, the Russians continued to build galleys and man them with troops, so that a continuous stream of reinforcements would follow Lacy. General Keith, working as governor at bo, also had a small force of galleys at his immediate disposal four from Borgo, five from Frederickshamn and ten, plus two prahms, from Helsingfors. These he called up as quickly as he could (May 11th there was still much ice). They were commanded by Lieutenant General Khruschev. Six more galleys were under construction at bo. (A prahm was a broad-beamed sailing vessel equipped to fire broadsides. Shallow-drafted and slow, they were essentially mobile gun platforms monitors that could support the galleys in narrow coastal waterways or conduct shore bombardment. Normally, they were towed into position.) Patrols by the Russian battle fleet had began as early as May 9th, but they had to contend with a large number of ice floes. Only a small portion of the Russian fleet was in play, the vanguard based at Revel, under Rear Admiral Johann Barsch: Astrakhan (54) Kronstadt (54) Azov (54) Neptunus (54) Severnaia Zvezda (54) Arkanhangelesk (54) Sviatoi Andrei (54). plus the frigate Rossia, the bomb Samson, and a snow. (Bombs were small ships equipped with forward-firing mortars; reinforced against the recoil from the pieces they were also used in Arctic exploration. Snows were small sailing vessels suitable for northern waters; the name refers to the kind of sailing rig used, which allowed high manoeuvrability.) Meanwhile, Lacys main force joined the escorting battle fleet at Kronstadt on the 15th of May, but were forced to wait two days due to the wind. On the 18th they came out of the roads, but then anchored while the Tsaritsa paid them another visit. She conferred with Lacy and Golovin, but Manstein does not record what was said. The plan was obvious. While the galleys followed the Finnish coast, Golovins fleet would clear the gulf of any threats. The Revel squadron acted first, proceeding to the west of Dager Ort on May 18th (the peninsula at the west end of the island of Hiiumaa, then known as Dager). That night, eight enemy ships were sighted. The following morning, around 8am, the Russians closed in. The Swedes turned out to be five ships of the
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anchoring some 4-5 miles southeast of the Swedes on the 17th of June. A clash was immanent.

exchanged some of his sick for 100 grenadiers, in addition to victualing the fleet. Thanks again to contrary winds, it was the 31st before they could get away. Lacy, aware that Keith was threatened by large Swedish forces, chafed extremely. The Russians did not raise Helsingfors until June 2nd. (The great argument for galleys is that they can ignore the wind. Actually, that is the argument in favour of steamships. Galleys frequently used sails, since rowers could hardly be expected to pull continuously for days on end. They also needed calm seas.) Here again they found another garrison of two regiments and a stock of supplies. After victualing (15 days rations), they left on the 5th. That very morning, word came that General Keith had won a victory over the Swedes, and a Te Deum was sung. Lacys force made good progress now that there was no need of haste, proceeded by a scouting group of two galleys and four konchebras, just rocketing along, despite some severely narrow passages, all the way to Tweermunde (Tvarminne the old name for Hango town and the anchorage on the east of the peninsula), which they reached on June 6th. Here, Lacy learned that the Swedish battle fleet was waiting for him off Hango point, and here he would have to wait. Meanwhile, Russias battle fleet emerged from Kronstadt on May 20th, arriving at Nargen on the 23rd. But, it was not until June 1st that, augmented by Barschs ships, Golovin set sail and headed west. Golovins forces, besides the Revel squadron, consisted of: Sviatoi Pyotr (66) Sviatoi Alexsandr (70) Sveryni Orel (66) Revel (66) Slava Rossia (66) Ingermanland (66) Osnovanie Blagopoluchiia (66) plus one bomb vessel, two fireships, two snows, and five small craft. The Russians had not been aware of the Swedes location, but their patrols sighted them off Hango on the 3rd of June. Closing the distance, Golovin put himself in communication with Lacy, who was waiting impatiently for the Navy to act. But a further delay of some days ensued. Golovin was one ship short of the numerical superiority required to initiate action. The delay did have some good effect. Lacy received a reinforcement of five regiments under Major General Karaoulov, 14 new galleys, and 18 new konchebras. On the 10th a storm arose and Golovin, not wishing to be blown on the rocks, took himself off to Rogervik, returning on the 12th. The Swedes scored a moral victory by riding out the storm. Three days later the Swedes spied the admirals ships returning. And, for two days more, the Russians sailed about in the vicinity, before
The Battle of Hango, 17th-18th June, 1743

The two sides were evenly matched (the Russians with 15 ships of the line to the Swedes 16) and neither wished to risk combat. On the same evening the 17th a light encounter battle in advance of the respective fleets took place. Lacy had sent Golovin 14 of his better konchebras. Did 14 galleys equated to one missing ship of the line? No, Golovin wanted their crews and soldiers. The Swedes sought to intercept. The Swedish frigate Ekholmsund (26) approached and the Russian Severnaia Zvezda (54) and frigate Rossia (32) gave chase. Utfahl detached three ships of the line to assist and Golovin five of his own. But, since neither side would come closer than maximum range, no hits were scored. In fact, only the opposing bomb vessels actually fired at all, the Russians trying their luck first. After this skirmish, Utfahl came to the decision to risk a major engagement. He could not get at the enemys galleys while the their battle fleet was present, and, as will be told in due course, things at his back were unraveling. The afternoon of the 18th the Swedes got underway.
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16 galleys 2 prahms 3 galiots and 2 armed smacks. Manpower amounted to 5,070 naval personnel, 575 marines, and 4,495 army personnel, taken from the following regiments: Permski, Kexholmski, Chernigovski, and the 1st and 2nd Landmilitz. Falkengrens command had been augmented to 28 galleys and three prahms, but he was reluctant to use them. Colonel Marcks suggested he interdict the Jungfruzund, basing himself at the anchorage of Korpostrm. Though easily lost amid the myriad islands, both were keys to the control of the archipelago. The former was the best route for galleys to travel between Hango and the west, while the latter was an excellent, centrally located anchorage, used in the Great Northern War and in future times developed as a forward naval base. Falkengren chose instead to base at Fgl (on the west side of Degerby Island), but did dispatch forces to monitor the Russians. Meanwhile, after a council of war decided not to wait for the remaining galleys, the whole Russian force, de facto commanded by Khruschev, and carrying troops taken from bo, headed out on the 18th. Course WNW across the sound lying between the Hango peninsula and the tail end of Kimito Island. Among the straggle of islands was a secure passage to the next body of open water the
Gulf of Finland 1743

The Russians, too, were in motion. The opposing fleets each formed on the starboard tack. The wind was from the WNW, with the Swedes holding the weather gauge. All night the fleets manoeuvred without firing. The next morning was calm and foggy. In the pre-dawn, the Swedish bomb Thordon fell out and found herself among the Russian fleet. As the fog lifted, she escaped with minimal damage (after inflicting none, despite firing several shots) with the help of two ships of the line. The Russians had been on the port tack when the sky lightened, and they now swung onto the starboard tack, straggling somewhat. At 11am Utfahl signaled his ships to close. This time, it was the Russians who withdrew, to the north. The Swedes pursued until evening, then turned back. But in the interim, Lacys galleys were able to slip past Hango; secure once more among rocky islets and shallow straits, they proceeded toward the lands. Having done its job, and rather weather beaten, the Russian battle fleet returned to Rogervik (June 20th).
Amphibious Operations
Meanwhile, there had been action in the lands. On May 17th, Khruschev reported the assembly of most of his forces at Hango. He was still waiting for the five Frederickshamn galleys. General Keith put aside his Governors duties and came down from bo. Khruschev had:
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15 galleys, with 2 more on the way and another 8 fitting out 15 arpins light ships with 10 guns each 1 double shallop (in actuality there were at least two) 1 prahm coming up with the extra two galleys The Russians own reconnaissance proved at least the presence of some enemy vessels 7-8 Km ahead of them, when a galley was spotted that evening. From the 23rd to the 25th, Keith and Khruschev inched forward northwest through open water no large islands but plenty of shoals. After only two kilometers they had a brief tussle with Swedish forces. A Russian patrol pushed too far ahead and was chased away. The Swedes withdrew as the enemy main body advanced in support. This was the Swedish rearguard 3 galleys and a few boats. Their main body was perhaps six kilometers away. Anchoring among the shallows, Keith reorganized his force, now augmented by the five weather beaten Frederickshamn galleys, under Major General Bratke, into three squadrons: Khruschev in the van, Keith commanding the main body, and Bratke in the rear. At dawn on the 26th, a patrol spotted six Swedish galleys (including the flag galley of Vice Admiral Falkengren) beyond some low islets, a few kilometers out from Korpo Island. The Admiral had at last sallied from Fgl.

Jungfruzund (or Jungfern Sound). Not much progress was made that first day only 10 Km. Thanks to the wind, the prahms, which were to play a critical role in any encounter, had to be towed, and thanks to the shallow waters badly charted one of them grounded. Getting her off the rocks absorbed several hours. That evening, however, the Russians heard two shots fired and saw a Swedish brigantine observing them at a distance. It was estimated that the enemy was some eight kilometers away, somewhere near the entrance to the Jungfruzund. The 19th was another slow start, but at 8am the Russians spied a Swedish force no more than a few kilometers away. It appeared to consist of 7 galleys, 1 brigantine, 1 snow, and several boats and double-boats. South of the entrance to the Jungfruzund there was a safe anchorage; a couple of passages led north between small islands to the sound. After they had closed to within half the distance, the Russians saw the Swedes upanchor and sail up one of the passages the Jungfruzundskim. The entrance proved too narrow for the Russian prahms and Keith was forced to row to another passage on his left. He was foiled in this too, when a strong northwest wind arose; having lost the enemy the Russians anchored off the village of Hitischapel (now Hiittnen or Hirslaxviken), which is situated on an island forming the southern shore of the Jungfruzund. To enter the sound from here, the Russians would have to first sail ENE and swing round to the west at a point several kilometers away. More delay. The next day the contrary wind died around noon, only to pick up again as soon as the Russians made a start. So, Keith marked time by sending out some shallops to scout for the enemy and to see if they could find a few locals with knowledge of the exceeding treacherous waterways. Better luck was had on the 21st. Starting very early (3am), the Russians took advantage of calms seas and made the Yungfruzund by noon. Here they were joined by their scouts, who reported that all the locals had fled. They also reported seeing a strange sail in the sound, and that evening a Swedish shallop closed to within a sighting distance of the Russians before turning around. Combat in the narrow waters of the archipelago would take on the nature of a land skirmish. The Yungfruzund proved a good position for the Swedes to defend in or attack from. The prevailing wind blew down the strait from the west, against the Russians. The 22nd of May was a good day. Though forced to halt around noon due to the wind, the Russians had made the exit of the sound a journey of about 20 Km and had located, not a useful pilot, but an equally useful Swedish gunner, who had been left behind on one of the islands. According to him, the Russians were facing:
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commenced ranging shots against the Russian shore battery, which was 200 yards in front of the Russian line of battle. She found the battery to be out of range. Boats were used to tow her closer; other boats formed a screen. Shortly after, at 3pm a general advance by the Swedish galleys was begun, and by 4pm the opposing lines were in range of one another. Keith forbade any firing until the Swedes had come within musket range. But almost immediately the Swedish prahm could be seen turning to bring its guns to bear and Keith ordered ranging shots made. One shot went long; the other struck the poop of the Hercules. Keith then signaled general broadsides and had himself rowed to the shore battery, from whence he would direct the battle. Both sides kept it up until 7pm. The Swedish right was exposed while their left was protected by the shore. Only three Russian galleys and the two prahms had room to fire, while the Swedes were able employ their entire fleet. Keith ordered the rest of his ships into reserve. Hercules was soon badly damaged. Other galleys suffered hits, including the Swedish flagship. Both it and the prahm withdrew behind islands, the prahm on the Swedish left and the flagship on the right. At 7pm the Swedish galleys pulled back, having received worse than they gave. Unable to follow due to the wind, which was now blowing straight into the harbour, Keith sent a few armed boats and a
Aland Campaign May 1743

Keith, sending out an advance guard of 10 boats and konchebras supported by two galleys, manoeuvred around the islets, forcing the Swedes to retreat westward toward the lands. Confirming their POWs story, the Russians counted 17 enemy galleys (plus a halfgalley, two galiots, and two armed smacks). Keith quickly secured his new position by anchoring off Korpo Island that afternoon. His forces were now halfway through the archipelago. While the Swedes lay somewhere out of sight to the west, their anchorage covered by three batteries, Keith duplicated them by establishing a battery of four guns (8-lbers), protected by 300 troops, on the right of the entrance to his harbour. The two prahms were anchored directly in front of the entrance. Keith was unable to leave due to contrary winds. So, over the next few days both sides reorganized and refitted. The Swedes received a reinforcement of galleys, and a frigate. Falkengren was only waiting for reinforcements before launching an attack. It came on the 30th. The Swedes disposed of 18 galleys and a prahm. Approaching in three divisions, the enemy spread into a single line across the harbour approaches at a range of 3,000 yards. The Russians faced the enemy with 21 galleys and 2 prahms.
The Battle of Korpostrm, May 31st 1743

A heavy thunderstorm prevented any engagement until the 31st. At noon on that day, the Swedish prahm Hercules was seen advancing. She fired flares and
VOL. 7 NO. 4
OLD SOLDIERS

a literal description and not a generalization and by looking at a map. The Russians occupied the harbour basin. To defend it, they positioned their prahms just outside the western channel leading to the harbour, and erected their battery on the promontory formed by the islet (Bjrkholm) that splits the channel. The galleys were located slightly to the east, in the narrow neck leading to the harbour. Caveat: the above is an interpretation. Manstein says the prahms were opposite the harbour, and the battery was on the right of the harbour. The question then becomes, which right? Manstein does imply on the harbour right, not on the Russians right. The course of the battle makes the most sense if one imagines General Keith being rowed about the strait looking for suitable sites. Looking toward his ships, he would see a suitable position for the battery on the right of the harbour entrance. Similarly, the prahms, being opposite, were outside the harbour, acting like turrets or bastions. Turrets is a good simile because the ships would have been sprung with anchor cables to allow them to turn rapidly. There are two alternate locations for the battery. It was on a hill, and Manstein says it was 100 fathoms from the prahms 600 feet. One alternate is on a promontory of the Korpo shore (i.e. the left of the harbour) which juts into a small bay. The

konchebras to clear away the remaining enemy small boats. The Russian prahms fired 1063 rounds, the galleys 322, and the battery 89. Wild Bull had been hit at least 39 times and suffered 3 guns disabled; Oliphant took at least 20 hits. Two galleys had suffered similar damage (one nearly being shaken apart by its own gunfire). The Russians lost 1 officer and 6 other ranks, with 8 wounded. No details are available about Swedish losses. On June 1st, Keith learned they were anchored at Rocksheera, five (German) miles away. And that is about all the historical commentary one can find on this battle. The rest must be brought out through analysis. points and leaving the rest to be understood. Without additional investigation, even the location of the battle is uncertain. Korpo is one of the larger islands. Manstein says Korpo village, suggesting the main community, but in fact the Russians anchorage lay off the smaller hamlet of Korpostrm. Now a popular camping and boating spot, it boasts a small memorial to the battle (erected in 1959). This memorial gives some proof that the battle took place here, and not off Korpo village, since the locals ought to know. Other proofs come from Mansteins description of the battle, which only fits Korpostrms environs. If the reader will refer to the maps, he will see that Korpostrm lies in the southeast corner of the island of Korpo, itself the western extremity of the bo (Turku) Archipelago. Along the south coast of Korpo lies a strait, from half a kilometer to a kilometer wide, formed by a number of islets that parallel the coast. Just before the hamlet, this strait bends to the south. Or, rather, there is an extra large gap to the south, for the strait also continues east, spilt by a large islet into two narrow channels. Korpostrm is situated on the northern channel, which widens out into a snug moorage basin and then narrows again. Having located the site of the battle, where, exactly, were the Russians deployed, and where the Swedes? Actually, the first question is easily answered by accepting Mansteins sentences as
Excursus
Korpo, or more properly, Korpostrm, is one of those battles which are at least a good exercise in analysis. Hard-fought, despite its slight butchers bill no ships were lost on either side it was important because it was the Swedes last attack, and it failed. The most detailed source of information for the battle is General Mansteins Memoirs. But in this instance Manstein was not an eyewitness, he was working from Keiths afteraction report. Moreover, the present author has used the English translation, which naturally eliminates any nuances contained in the original French. And, Mansteins account is minimalist, mentioning the key
VOL. 7 NO. 4
OLD SOLDIERS

But this fact applies to the southern route as well. The strait is narrower, but only in relative terms. The Swedes might have used both routes, but Manstein is clear that on arrival they anchored in a single line at 3000 yards (2.74 Km i.e. out of range of the 24- and 12-pounders used by both fleets), and in order to do that, they must have all occupied either the western end or the southern end, not both. Prevailing winds are from the southwest, which is not much help, but they would be more useful for a force approaching from the south. After the battle, Keiths forces were locked in the harbour by this wind. There is a greater chance the Swedes might have been pinned against the harbour mouth if they came up the western channel; coming from the south they could use the wind and tack to better effect. There are some indications that they retreated by the western passage. The Russians earlier had problems with a northwest wind, and it is likely the thunderstorm came from the north. Manstein mentions that before the battle the Swedes rode out the inclement weather behind some islands. This is easily possible if the southern route were used and the high winds were from the north. Manstein also says that while sheltering the Swedes were hidden from view. The western channel does not offer much in the way of small islands to shelter behind from either a north or a southwest wind.

other is about halfway between that spot and the neck of the harbour entrance. Of the two, the former sounds right, except that in that case the prahms would be farther out in the strait, and the galleys would likewise have to be farther out, which in turn would mean more of them could be in the line than any of the sources allow. Also, General Keith directed the battle from the battery hill. Neither of the alternates is an effective CP. The point of Bjrkholm is. All elements battery, prahms, galleys, and the enemy, would be in plain sight. As to the Russian galleys, Manstein is quite explicit: only three galleys were able to fire, bow on, and this after they had come a little forward of the harbour mouth to help the prahms. Skilled galley fleets employed a frontage per galley equal to twice the width of the ship plus the length of one bank (or side) of oars or roughly 60. Three galleys fit nicely at the channel entrance, just behind the Bjrkholm promontory. Other sources mention that seven galleys were engaged, out of the 21, but this probably means only that they took fire. Manstein does say that Keith pulled some galleys back when the Swedes began their approach. Normally, a single galley line had a zigzag shape, with the ships behind preventing the enemy from turning into the forward ships, whether for ramming (not a tactic employed at this date) or boarding. The width of the harbour entrance from shore to shore is under 400 feet, and that does not take into account shallow water. Seven galleys in an interlocking line would need 420 feet. So, probably there were initially seven, and the General removed four from the line and pulled the remaining three back so he could secure the harbour mouth. (There are also suggestions that the battle was more chaotic than the simple gun duel portrayed by Manstein. One Swedish source reports the capture of a Russian galley, the Orel (Eagle). In that case, the withdrawal may have been forced on Keith and his seven galleys may originally have been ranged outside the harbour mouth, in a NW-SE line, or lined up along the Korpo shore.) There is now the question of the Swedish approach route. There are three routes to Korpostrm: west, south, and east. The eastern route can be discounted for several reasons: it does not fit the description of the battle, the Swedes came from the lands to the west and would have had to make some tricky manoeuvres to get at the entrance, and the memorial is not located at the hamlet found at that end of the strait. The Swedes attacked either from the west or the south. Manstein does not say which, and neither does anyone else. Both are possible, the western approach appearing the best on the map, since the Swedes 18 galleys, in a single line, were all able to fire on the Russians.
VOL. 7 NO. 4
OLD SOLDIERS
Battle of Korpo 1743

The engagement began, probably, when the Swedes were within 1000 yards. Manstein says Keith initially forbade firing outside of musket range, but allowed the prahms to fire when the Swedish prahm was within a good cannon shot. Musket range and cannon shot are colloquial terms usually meaning 250 yards and 1000 yards, respectively. 24- and 12-pounder guns could fire farther than that of course, but they would not hit anything, especially not a narrow-fronted galley, and even if they did hit, the shot would be unlikely to penetrate. The Russians fired two ranging shots at the Swedish prahm and scored only one hit, even at a mere 1000 yards. During the fight, Swedish vessels took cover both to the right and the left, behind various islets. This is quite possible within the 1000 yard radius of action, but not at greater ranges. The maps attached to this article show only a possible deployment. Especially, it assumes a southern approach. It shows the Russian galleys within the harbour mouth, when they may have been deployed farther out, at least initially. The Swedes are shown with their left against Snbel Island and their right exposed. Their left may even have been behind the island; there is an account of them firing blind over an islet, which would be Snbel. The same account states their right was exposed. Manstein does not say whether the Swedes closed from their initial position, only that the action lasted about three hours and that both sides took a beating the Swedes withdrew at 7pm but sunset was not until 10:30. The maps have made the assumption that the Swedes did close, though the land battery would have made this risky. A Swedish account states that the galley Sturgeon captured a Russian galley called the Orel. That suggests close quarter fighting. But the account is very vague, and not substantiated. It can be argued that if the Swedes had remained at 1000 yards, Keith would have introduced more galleys into the fight. Factors opposing a closer approach include the presence of the land battery, the direction of the wind, and the fact that the Swedish crews were mostly conscripts unused to manoeuvring in narrow waters. Incidentally, this may be why
VOL. 7 NO. 4
OLD SOLDIERS
Aland Campaign June 1743

Falkengren was unwilling to risk combat earlier. Korpostrm came about when he was given a direct order to attack. Threatened with Russian landings, with the Dalecarlian peasant revolt approaching Stockholm, with demands by the Caps for a parliamentary inquiry into the conduct of the war, and with warlike preparations by the King of Denmark, who intended to secure his sons candidature to the Swedish throne by forces of arms, the Hats tried one last bit of posturing at the peace table. Unless the Russians signed, they would ally with Denmark. When the Russians called their bluff they caved in and agreed to accept the Russian candidate instead (plus the loss of additional territory and monetary reparations, although these conditions were milder than had been feared). News of the signing of the treaty was brought to the riksdag on the very day the members were to vote on the succession question. In a starling turnabout, Russian military aid was immediately requested against Denmark. Swedish troops arrived in the capital just in time to squash the indigenous revolt, and a Russian garrison overwintered in Sweden to help the Government keep the peace. The Russian and Swedish navies began joint exercises to intimidate Denmark! This would be the last Russo-Swedish war for a generation until 1788 in fact. The Finnish border was adjusted so that Fredrickshamn, Wilmanstrand, and Nyslott became Russian forts. The border in southern Finland now ran along the Kymen River. However, Finland was not demilitarized.
The End
After the Battle of Korpo, the Russians gradually pushed the Swedes out of the archipelago. Marshal Lacy soon arrived with his flotilla and preparations were made for descents upon the Swedish coast. Meanwhile the negotiations were proceeding apace at bo. The gunfire at Korpostrm had been clearly audible to the diplomats.
VOL. 7 NO. 4
OLD SOLDIERS
Korpo Monument
Fredrik V died in 1751, irrelevant to the last. Princess Elisabeth guided Russia through the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years War, dying in 1762. Her protg, Carl Peter, duly became Peter III, but his wife, Catherine the Great, saw to it that he would soon disappear from history. Elisabeths candidate for the Swedish throne, resident in Sweden as heir-apparent, became leader of the Hats and turned vehemently anti-Russian. The party, though chastened, retained power until later in the century, when they were brought to book for corruption and gross mismanagement of the economy.
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Vol. 7 No.

The Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony

The Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony

The Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony

The Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony

The Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony

The Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony

The Impact Of Britains Quest For Global Hegemony

Publication Expected Late Fall / Early Winter 2013/2014

VOL. 7 NO. 4 The Sikh War Sourcebook

VOL. 7 NO. 4 The Sikh War Sourcebook

VOL. 7 NO. 4 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805

VOL. 7 NO. 4 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805

VOL. 7 NO. 4 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805

VOL. 7 NO. 4 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805

VOL. 7 NO. 4 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805

VOL. 7 NO. 4 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805

VOL. 7 NO. 4 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805

VOL. 7 NO. 4 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805

VOL. 7 NO. 4 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805

VOL. 7 NO. 4 1st Siege of Bhurtpore, 1805 [Continued]

Sikh Source Book OOB Example 2nd Mahratta War

Sikh Source Book OOB Example 2nd Mahratta War

Sikh Source Book OOB Example 2nd Mahratta War

VOL. 7 NO. 4 Borodino

VOL. 7 NO. 4 Borodino

VOL. 7 NO. 4 Borodino

VOL. 7 NO. 4 Borodino

VOL. 7 NO. 4 Borodino

VOL. 7 NO. 4 Borodino

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

French and Allies 13 4 41 24 204 120

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

69 + 6* 33%/87% 88 55%/76% 50 28%/71%

43%/83% 51%/97% 37%/33% 45%/100%

Infantry 11,562 36,625 9,831 18,753 6,896 7,440

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

3016 (+400 est. at AHQ)

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Sikh Source Book OOB Example 2nd Mahratta War

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History

Borodino (Continued From Page 36)

Columbia Games Borodino 1812: The Game As History