Section 22.

Moveable property The words moveable property are intended to include corporeal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything, which is attached to the earth. Section 23. Wrongful gain 23. Wrongful gain. Wrongful gain is gain by unlawful meansof property to which the person gaining is not legally entitled. Wrongful loss. Wrongful loss is the loss by unlawful meansof property to which the person losing it is legally entitled. !aining wrongfully. "osing wrongfully. # person is said to gainwrongfully when such person retains wrongfully, as well as when suchperson ac$uires wrongfully. # person is said to lose wrongfully whensuch person is wrongfully %ept out of any property, as well as whensuch person is wrongfully deprived of property. Section 24. Dishonestly Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing dishonestly. Section 25. Fraudulently # person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise. Section 26. eason to believe

# person is said to have reason to believe a thing, if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise. Section 2!. "roperty in possession of #ife$ cler% or servant When property is in the possession of a person&s wife, cler% or servant, on account of that person, it is in that person&s possession within the meaning of this 'ode. (xplanation # person employed temporarily or on a particular occasion in the capacity of a cler% or servant, is a cler% or servant within the meaning of this section. Section 33. &ct '(ission The word act denotes as well a series of acts as a single act) the word omission denotes as well as series of omissions as a single omission. Section 34. &cts done by several persons in furtherance of co((on intention

3*. #cts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.+ When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. *'MM+,-S *o((on intention ,i- The burden lies on prosecution to prove that actual participation of more than one person for commission of criminal act was done in furtherence of common intention at a prior concert. /tate of 0rissa v. #r1un 2as, #34 5666 /' 3226) 5666 ,7- /'' 58*) 5666 ,9- :T 5*) 5666 ,*- 'rimes ;7 ,/'-. ,ii- Where the evidence did not establish that particular accused has dealt blow the liability would devolve on others also who were involved with common intention and as such conviction not sustainable. /tate v. T.<. /adashivaiah 2in <odimallappa, 5666 ,5- ''4 582 ,<ant-. ,iii- When the accused rushed with sword drawn itself showed that he shared the common intention hence liable for conviction under section 3==, read with section 3*. #bdulla <unhi v. /tate of <erala, #34 5665 /' *82. ,iv- The contention that the appellant was physically not in a position because of the sixty per cent. disability due to polio on his lower limbs, to hold the hand of the deceased cannot be accepted. The fact that the accused held the hand of one of the deceased to facilitate assailants to assault deceased, is said to have shared common intention of committing murder of deceased. >a1or /ingh v. /tate of ?un1ab, #34 2==3 /' 3*2. Distinction bet#een .co((on intention. and /co((on ob0ect. # clear distinction is made out between common intention and common ob1ect is that common intention denotes action in concert and necessarily postulates the existence of a pre+arranged plan implying a prior meeting of the minds, while common ob1ect does not necessarily re$uire proof of prior meeting of minds or pre+concert. Though there is a substantial difference between the two sections namely 3* and 5*6, they also to some extent overlap and it is a $uestion to be determined on the facts of each case. 'hittarmal v. /tate of 4a1asthan, #34 2==3 /' ;69. Difference in operation of section 34 and section )41 ,i- @oth sections 5*6 and 3* deal with a combination of persons who become liable to be punished as sharers in the commission of offences. The non+applicability of section is, therefore, no bar in convicting the accused under substantive section read with section 3* if the evidence discloses commission of an offence in furtherance of the common intention of them all. Aethala ?othura1u v. /tate of #ndhra ?radesh, ,5665- 'r ": 3533 ,/'-. ,ii- 3n order to convict a person vicariously liable under section 3* or section 5*6 it is not necessary to prove that each and everyone of them had indulged in overts acts. 4am @lias /ingh v. /tate of @ihar, ,5676- 'r ": 5;72) #34 5676 /' 5863. 2ngredients

,i- When an offence is sought to be proved only on circumstantial evidence, the allegations of common intention under section 3* normally cannot be established in absence of meeting of mind, the overt act of the accused, by their conduct, by using the weapons by their utterance of words. /antosh 2esai v. /tate of !oa, ,566;- 2 'rimes 999 ,@om-. ,ii- 3n order to bring a case under section 3* it is not necessary that there must be a prior conspiracy or pre+meditation, the common intention can be formed in the course of occurrence. Bari 0m v. /tate of Cttar ?radesh, ,5663- 5 'rimes 26* ,/'-. ,iii- >ere surrender by appellant alongwith accused before police does not show meeting of minds as to bring the case within ambit of section 3*. 4angaswami v. /tate of Tamil Aadu, ,5676- 'r ": 7;8) #34 5676 /' 553;. ,iv- 3t has been held that the re$uirement of statute is sharing the common intention upon being present at the place of occurrence. >ere distancing from the scene cannot absolve the accused. "allan @hai v. /tate of @ihar, #34 2==3 /' 333. Section 35. When such an act is cri(inal by reason of its being done #ith a cri(inal %no#ledge or intention Whenever an act, which is criminal only be reason of its being done with a criminal %nowledge or intention, is done by several persons, each of such persons who 1oins in the act with such %nowledge or intention is liable for the act in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone with that %nowledge or intention

Section 39. Voluntarily

A person is said to cause an effect voluntarily when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to cause it.

Section 44. Injury

The word injury denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property.