37 JAIME S. PEREZ,both in his personal and official capacity as Chief, Marikina Demolition Office vs. SPOUSES FORTUNITO L.

MADRONA and YOLANDA B. PANTE G.R. No. 184478 March 21, 2012 VILLARAMA, JR., J.: FACTS: Respondent-spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante are registered owners of a residential property located in Lot 22, Block 5, France Street cornerItaly Street, Greenheights Subdivision, Phase II, Marikina CitY. In 1989, respondents built their house thereon and enclosed it with a concrete fence and steel gate. In 1999, respondents received the following letter dated May 25, 1999 from petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Marikina Demolition Office. As response, respondent Madrona sent petitioner a three-page letter dated June 8, 1999 stating that the May 25, 1999 letter (1) contained an accusation libelous in nature as it is condemning him and his property without due process; (2) has no basis and authority since there is no court order authorizing him to demolish their structure; (3) cited legal bases which do not expressly give petitioner authority to demolish; and (4) contained a false accusation since their fence did not in fact extend to the sidewalk. On June 9, 1999, respondents received a letter from petitioner requesting them to provide his office a copy of the relocation survey on the subject property. Respondents, however, did not oblige because it was as if petitioner was fishing evidence from them. More than a year later or on February 28, 2001, petitioner sent another letter with the same contents as the May 25, 1999 letter but this time giving respondents ten days from receipt thereof to remove the structure allegedly protruding to the sidewalk. This prompted respondents to file a complaint for injunction before the Marikina City RTC on March 12, 2001. In respondents injunction complaint, they alleged that (1) petitioners letters made it appear that their fence was encroaching on the sidewalk and directed them to remove it, otherwise he would take the corresponding action; (2) petitioners threat of action would be damaging and adverse to respondents and appears real, earnest and imminent; (3) the removal of their fence, which would include the main gate, would certainly expose the premises and its occupants to intruders or third persons; (4) petitioner has no legal authority to demolish structures in private properties and the laws he cited in his letters do not give him any authority to do so; (5) respondents enjoy the legal presumption of rightful possession of every inch of their property; (6) if petitioner accuses them of erroneous possession, he should so prove only through the proper forum which is the courts; (7) their fence is beside the sidewalk and the land on which it stands has never been the subject of acquisition either by negotiation or expropriation from the government; (8) petitioners intended act of demolition even in the guise of a road right of way has no factual or legal basis since there is no existing infrastructure project of the national government or Marikina City government; and (9) petitioners letter and his intended act of demolition are malicious, unfounded, meant only to harass respondents in gross violation of their rights and in excess and outside the scope of his authority, thereby rendering him accountable both in his personal and official capacity. ISSUE: Whether or not a nuisance per accidens may be summarily abated without judicial intervention.

38

RULING: If petitioner indeed found respondents fence to have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish the same summarily after respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead, he should go to court and prove respondents supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial intervention. Respondents fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily to secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed out by respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that respondents fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.

39 JEAN TAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 193443 April 16, 2012 REYES, J.: FACTS: On June 14, 2001, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naic, Cavite, an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9972, Cad-459-D of Indang Cadastre, situated in Barangay Bancod, Indang, Cavite and with an area of 6,920 square meters. The petitioners alleged that they acquired the subject property from Gregonio Gatdula pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1996; and they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. ISSUE: Whether the petitioners have proven themselves qualified to the benefits under the relevant laws on the confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. RULING: There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. For one to invoke the provisions of Section 14(2) and set up acquisitive prescription against the State, it is primordial that the status of the property as patrimonial be first established. Furthermore, the period of possession preceding the classification of the property as patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive period. Adverse, continuous, open, public possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law and the burden to prove it by clear, positive and convincing evidence is on the applicant. A claim of ownership will not proper on the basis of tax declarations if unaccompanied by proof of actual possession. The counting of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period for purposes of acquiring ownership of a public land under Section 14(2) can only start from the issuance of DARCO Conversion Order. Before the property was declared patrimonial by virtue of such conversion order, it cannot be acquired by prescription appellees have the right to register their title on such land despite the fact that their possession commenced only after 12 June 1945. Records show that the appellees possession over the subject property can be reckoned only from 21 June 1983, the date when according to evidence, the subject property became alienable and disposable. From said date up to the filing of the application for registration of title over the subject property on 14 June 2001, only eighteen (18) years had lapsed. Thus, appellees possession of the subject property fell short of the requirement of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years.

40 Moreover, there was no adequate evidence which would show that appellees and their predecessors-in-interest exercised acts of dominion over the subject land as to indicate possession in the concept of owner. The testimonies of appellees witnesses regarding actual possession are belied by the absence of evidence on actual use of or improvements on the subject property. Appellees presented only various tax declarations to prove possession. However, except for the Certification, showing payment of tax due on tax declaration for the year 2003, there are no other evidence showing that all the taxes due corresponding to the rest of the tax declarations were in fact paid by appellees or their predecessors-in-interest. In sum, appellees were unable to prove that they or their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, which possession is characterized as open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, in the concept of an owner. Appellees failed to discharge their duty of substantiating possession and title to the subject land.

41 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PHILIPPINE RECLAMATION AUTHORITY (PRA) vs. CITY OF PARANAQUE G.R. No. 191109 July 18, 2012 MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government corporation created by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1084 (Creating the Public Estates Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes) which took effect on February 4, 1977 to provide a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands, and the administration and operation of lands belonging to, managed and/or operated by, the government with the object of maximizing their utilization and hastening their development consistent with public interest. On February 14, 1979, by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 525 issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos, PEA was designated as the agency primarily responsible for integrating, directing and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay, including those located in Paraaque City. On February 19, 2003, then Paraaque City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo (Carabeo) issued Warrants of Levy on PRAs reclaimed properties (Central Business Park and Barangay San Dionisio) located in Paraaque City based on the assessment for delinquent real property taxes made by then Paraaque City Assessor Soledad Medina Cue for tax years 2001 and 2002. On March 26, 2003, PRA filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction against Carabeo before the RTC. On January 8, 2010, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing PRAs petition. In ruling that PRA was not exempt from payment of real property taxes, the RTC reasoned out that it was a GOCC under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1084. It was organized as a stock corporation because it had an authorized capital stock divided into no par value shares. In fact, PRA admitted its corporate personality and that said properties were registered in its name as shown by the certificates of title. Therefore, as a GOCC, local tax exemption is withdrawn by virtue of Section 193 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 Local Government Code (LGC) which was the prevailing law in 2001 and 2002 with respect to real property taxation. The RTC also ruled that the tax exemption claimed by PRA under E.O. No. 654 had already been expressly repealed by R.A. No. 7160 and that PRA failed to comply with the procedural requirements in Section 206 thereof. ISSUE: Whether PRA is a GOCC not exempt from the payment of real property tax. RULING: It is clear that a GOCC must be "organized as a stock or non-stock corporation" while an instrumentality is vested by law with corporate powers. Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although not integrated with the department framework.

42 Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become stock or non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is deemed a GOCC. Examples are the Mactan International Airport Authority, the Philippine Ports Authority, the University of the Philippines, and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. All these government instrumentalities exercise corporate powers but they are not organized as stock or non-stock corporations as required by Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. These government instrumentalities are sometimes loosely called government corporate entities. They are not, however, GOCCs in the strict sense as understood under the Administrative Code, which is the governing law defining the legal relationship and status of government entities. Similarly, Article 420 of the Civil Code enumerates properties belonging to the State: Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Here, the subject lands are reclaimed lands, specifically portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. As such, these lands remain public lands and form part of the public domain. In the case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and AMARI Coastal Development Corporation, the Court held that foreshore and submerged areas irrefutably belonged to the public domain and were inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition and further declared no longer needed for public service. The fact that alienable lands of the public domain were transferred to the PEA (now PRA) and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEAs name did not automatically make such lands private. This Court also held therein that reclaimed lands retained their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands. Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as well as "any and all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEA's name does not automatically make such lands private. As the Court has repeatedly ruled, properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or foreclosure sale. Thus, the assessment, levy and foreclosure made on the subject reclaimed lands by respondent, as well as the issuances of certificates of title in favor of respondent, are without basis. All reclaimed properties owned by the Philippine Reclamation Authority are declared EXEMPT from real estate taxes.

43 SPOUSES CRISPIN GALANG and CARlOAD GALANG vs. SPOUSES CONRADO S. REYES AND FE DE KASTRO REYES G.R. No. 184746 August 8, 2012 MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: On September 4, 1997, spouses Conrado S. Reyes and Fe de Kastro Reyes (the Reyeses) filed a case for the annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-928 against spouses Crispin and Caridad Galang (the Galangs) with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal (RTC),docketed as Civil Case No. 97-4560. In their Complaint, the Reyeses alleged that they owned two properties: (1) a subdivision project known as Ponderosa Heights Subdivision (Ponderosa), and (2) an adjoining property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title(TCT) No. 185252, with an area of 1,201 sq.m.; that the properties were separated by the Marigman Creek, which dried up sometime in 1980 when it changed its course and passed through Ponderosa; that the Galangs, by employing manipulation and fraud, were able to obtain a certificate of title over the dried up creek bed from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), through its Provincial Office (PENRO); that, specifically, the property was denominated as Lot 5735, Cad 29 Ext., Case-1, with an area of 1,573 sq.m. covered by OCT No. P-928; that they discovered the existence of the certificate of title sometime in March 1997 when their caretaker, Federico Enteroso (Enteroso), informed them that the subject property had been fraudulently titled in the names of the Galangs; that in 1984, prior to such discovery, Enteroso applied for the titling of the property, as he had been occupying it since 1968 and had built his house on it; that, later, Enteroso requested them to continue the application because of financial constraints on his part; that they continued the application, but later learned that the application papers were lost in the Assessors Office; and that as the owners of the land where the new course of water passed, they are entitled to the ownership of the property to compensate them for the loss of the land being occupied by the new creek. The Galangs in their Answer denied that the land subject of the complaint was part of a creek and countered that OCT No. P-928 was issued to them after they had complied with the free patent requirements of the DENR, through the PENRO; that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in possession, occupation, cultivation, and ownership of the land for quite some time; that the property described under TCT No. 185252 belonged to Apolonio Galang, their predecessor-in-interest, under OCT No. 3991; that the property was transferred in the names of the Reyeses through falsified document;8 that assuming ex gratia argumenti that the creek had indeed changed its course and passed through Ponderosa, the Reyeses had already claimed for themselves the portion of the dried creek which adjoined and co-existed with their property; that Enteroso was able to occupy a portion of their land by means of force, coercion, machinations, and stealth in 1981; that such unlawful entry was then the subject of an Accion Publiciana before the RTC of Antipolo City (Branch 72); and that at the time of the filing of the Complaint, the matter was still subject of an appeal before the CA, under CA-G.R. CV No. 53509. The CA reversed the RTC decision giving the reason that the property was the former bed of Marigman Creek, which changed its course and passed through their Ponderosa property, thus, ownership of the subject property was automatically vested in them. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property was the former bed of Marigman Creek, which changed its course and passed through the Ponderosa property, thus, ownership of the subject property was automatically vested in the respondents.

44 RULING: If indeed a property was the former bed of a creek that changed its course and passed through the property of the claimant, then, pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of course wasautomatically acquired by the claimant. Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be shown, that is, it must be proven that the creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this case the Reyeses, must prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are: (1) the old course of the creek, (2) the new course of the creek, and (3) the change of course of the creek from the old location to the new location by natural occurrence. The law in this regard is covered by Article 461 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed. If indeed a property was the former bed of a creek that changed its course and passed through the property of the claimant, then, pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of course wasautomatically acquired by the claimant. Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of naturalabandonment of the old course must be shown, that is, it must be proven that the creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made intervention. Thus, the claimant, in this case the Reyeses, must prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are: (1) the old course of the creek, (2) the new course of the creek, and (3) the change of course of the creek from the old location to the new location by natural occurrence. In this regard, the Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old course, its natural abandonmentand the new course. In the face of a Torrens title issued by the government, which is presumed to have been regularly issued, the evidence of the Reyeses was clearly wanting. Uncorroborated testimonial evidence will not suffice to convince the Court to order the reconveyance of the property to them. This failure did not escape the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General. Thus, it commented:

In the case at bar, it is not clear whether or not the Marigman Creek dried-up naturally back in 1980. Neither did private respondents submit any findings or report from the Bureau of Lands or the DENR Regional Executive Director, who has the jurisdiction over the subject lot, regarding thenature of change in the course of the creeks waters. Worse, what is even uncertain in the present case is the exact location of the subject matter of dispute. Notably, private respondents failed to submit during trial any convincing proof of a similar declaration by the government that a portion of the Marigman Creek had already dried-up and that the same is already considered alienable and disposable agricultural land which they could acquire through acquisitive prescription. The conflicting claims here are (1) the title of the Galangs issued by the DENR, through the PENRO, and (2) the claim of the Reyeses, based on unsubstantiated testimony, that the land in question is the former bed of a dried up creek. As between these two claims, this Court is inclined to decide in favor of the Galangs who hold a valid and subsisting title to the property which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court presumes to have been issued by the PENRO in the regular performance of its official duty.

45 NUMERIANO P. ABOBON vs. FELICITAS ABATA ABOBON and GELIMA ABATA ABOBON G.R. No. 155830 August 15, 2012 BERSAMIN, J.: FACTS: The controversy involves the rightful possession of a parcel of registered land. The respondents, who were the registered owners, sued the petitioner, their first cousin, to recover the possession of the land in question stating that they had only allowed the petitioner to use the land out of pure benevolence, but the petitioner asserted that the land belonged to him as owner by right of succession from his parents. Respondents Felicitas and Gelima Abobon were the plaintiffs in this action fer recovery of possession and damages brought against petitioner Numeriano Abobon (Numeriano) in the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Labrador-Sual in Pangasinan (MCTC). They averred that they were the registered owners of that parcel of unirrigated riceland with an area of 4,668 square meters, more or less, and situated in Poblacion, Labrador, Pangasinan, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 201367 of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan (Exhibit A); that they had allowed Numeriano, their first cousin, the free use of the land out of benevolence; and that they now immediately needed the parcel of land for their own use and had accordingly demanded that Numeriano should vacate and return it to them but he had refused. In his answer, Numeriano admitted being the first cousin of the respondents and the existence of TCT No. 201367 covering the land in question, and having received the demand for him to vacate. He alleged, however, that he did not vacate because he was the owner of the land in question. He asserted that if the land in question related to the unirrigated riceland with an area of 3,000 square meters that he was presently tilling and covered by tax declaration no. 2 in the name of his father, Rafael Abobon (Rafael), then the respondents did not have a valid cause of action against him because he had inherited that portion from his parents; that he and his predecessors-in-interest had also continuously, publicly and adversely and in the concept of owner possessed the parcel of land for more than 59 years; that in 1937, his grandfather Emilio Abobon (Emilio), the original owner, had granted that portion of 3,000 square meters to Rafael when he got married to his mother, Apolonia Pascua, by means of a donation propter nuptias; that since then his parents had possessed and tilled the land; that he himself had exclusively inherited the land from his parents in 1969 because his brother Jose had received his own inheritance from their parents; that the possession of his parents and his own had continued until the present; that assuming that the respondents were the true owners of the land, they were already estopped by laches from recovering the portion of 3,000 square meters from him. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have the preferential right to the possession of the land in question. RULING: It is beyond question under the law that the owner has not only the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law, but also the right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it. He may exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal of the thing, and, for this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

46 The respondents have the preferential right conformed to the age-old rule that whoever held a Torrens title in his name is entitled to the possession of the land covered by the title. Indeed, possession, which is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right, was but an attribute of their registered ownership. It is beyond question under the law that the owner has not only the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law, but also the right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it. He may exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal of the thing, and, for this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.