Corpus vs.

Paje
GR No. L-26737 July 31, 1969 Venue of Crime: Lubao, Pampanga Crime: Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide and physical injuries Plaintiff: Laura Corpus, widow of offended party Marcia Accused: Felardo Paje RTC: Guilty CA: Reversed, Acquitted Separate Civil Action for Damages: Dismissed by SC. Criminal action did not exist, hence independent civil action, even if reserved, shall not prosper. CrimPro topic: Rule 111, Civil Aspect; Reckless Imprudence

Facts: Dec. 23, 1956 a passenger bus of Victory Liner driven by Paje collided with a jeepney driven by Clemente
Marcia which caused the death of the latter and physical injuries of two other persons. The heirs of the victim as represented by their mother filed information for homicide and double serious physical injuries and through reckless imprudence and reserved their right to file separate civil action for damages. He was then convicted of the crime charged by CFI Pampanga. Pending appeal of the accused, the petitioners instituted a separate civil action for damages based on the criminal act of reckless imprudence against the accused and Victory Liner, praying that both be ordered to solidarily pay damages claimed by the petitioners. CA reversed the decision of the lower court and ruled for the acquittal of the accused for finding the charge against him non-existent and that the collision was a case of pure accident. The defendant then filed motion to dismiss the civil action of the plaintiffs on the ground that the action was barred by the acquittal in the criminal action. CFI dismissed the motion nevertheless. At the pre-trial of the civil action, defendant asked the lower court to rule on their special defense that the action has already prescribed. The CFI ruled on the affirmative, stating that the cause of action for quasi delict was brought 4 years and 11 months after the accident; hence it was beyond the 4 year prescriptive period.

Issue: WON the lower court erred in dismissing the civil action. Ruling: No. Rationale: The acquittal of the defendant by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the criminal negligence charged
against him did not exist was a bar to the civil action for damages which was based on the criminal action. Criminal negligence was not one of the three crimes mentioned in Art 33 of the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of independent civil action which is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal act thus may proceed independently and may be proven only be preponderance of evidence. The offense of criminal negligence under Art 365 of RPC lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act. The law punishes the negligent act itself and not the result thereof. According to Rule 111, Sec 3 of ROC, the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal on the ground that the charge against the defendant did not exist, necessarily extinguishes also the civil action arising from the same criminal act. Assuming that the civil action for damages was based on quasi delict, the action will not prosper as well because it has already prescribed. The four year prescriptive period began to run from the day the quasi-delict was committed; and the running of the said period was not interrupted by the institution of the criminal action for reckless imprudence.