[G.R. NO. 151876 : June 21, 2005] SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE O !"E P"#L#PP#NES, Petitioners, v. ERNAN$O L.

$#%AG#&A, Respondent.

Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, merely establishes a rule of preference in imposing penalties for violations of Batas ambansa Blg. 22 !B 22", the #Bouncing Chec$s %a&.# 'hen the circumstances of both the offense and the offender indicate good faith or a clear mista$e of fact &ithout taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone - - instead of imprisonment - is the preferred penalty. As the Circular re(uires a revie& of the factual circumstances of a given case, it applies only to pending or future litigations. )t is not a penal la&* hence, it does not have retroactive effect. +either may it be used to modify final ,udgments of conviction. -he Case Before us is a etition for .evie&1 under .ule /0 of the .ules of Court, assailing the 1ctober 10, 2001 2 and the 1ctober 11, 20013 1rders of the .egional -rial Court !.-C" !Branch 0", Baguio City./ -he 1ctober 10, 2001 1rder released .espondent 2ernando %. 3imagiba from confinement and re(uired him to pay a fine of 100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. -he 1ctober 11, 2001 1rder disposed as follo&s4 #'56.621.6, 7in8 applying the doctrine as held in the above-entitled cases in this case, the instant petition for 5abeas Corpus should be, as it is hereby, 9.A+-63. -he Baguio City :ail 'arden is hereby ordered to );;63)A-6%< .6%6A=6 the petitioner from confinement unless he is being held for some other la&ful cause other than by virtue of the =entence ;ittimus dated =eptember 2>, 2001 issued by C6=A. =. ?)3@<A, Cler$ of Court, ;-C /, Baguio City. 2urther, the petitioner is re(uired to pay a fine in the amount of 100,000.00 in lieu of his imprisonment, in addition to the civil aspect of the :oint :udgment rendered by ;-C / dated :uly 1A, 1BBB.# 0 -he 2acts -he pertinent facts are not disputed. .espondent 2ernando %. 3imagiba issued to etitioner =usan 9o thirteen !13" chec$s &hich, &hen presented to the dra&ee ban$ for encashment or payment on the due dates, &ere dishonored for the reason #account closed.# A 3imagiba &as subse(uently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of B 22 C under separate Complaints filed &ith the ;unicipal -rial Court in Cities !;-CC" in Baguio City.> After a ,oint trial, the ;-CC !Branch /" rendered a 3ecision on :uly 1A, 1BBB, convicting the accused in the 13 cases. -he dispositive portion reads as follo&s4 #'56.621.6, in vie& of the foregoing dis(uisition, this Court finds the evidence of the prosecution to have established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged and imposes upon the accused the penalty of 3 months imprisonment for each count !13 counts" and to indemnify the offended party the amount of 1ne ;illion -&o 5undred +inety 2ive -housand esos ! 1,2B0,000.00" &ith legal interest per annum commencing from 1BBA after the chec$s &ere dishonored by reason DACC1@+- C%1=63D on 3ecember 13, 1BB0, to pay attorneyDs fees of 10,000.00 and to pay the costs.#B -he appeal of 3imagiba &as raffled to Branch / of the .-C in Baguio City. 10 1n ;ay 23, 2000, the .-C denied the appeal and sustained his conviction.11 -here being no further appeal to the Court of Appeals !CA", the .-C issued on 2ebruary 1, 2001, a Certificate of 2inality of the 3ecision.12 -hus, on 2ebruary 1/, 2001, the ;-CC issued an 1rder directing the arrest of 3imagiba for the service of his sentence as a result of his conviction. -he trial court also issued a 'rit of 6Eecution to enforce his civil liability. 13 1n 2ebruary 2C, 2001, 3imagiba filed a ;otion for .econsideration of the ;-CC 1rder. 5e prayed for the recall of the 1rder of Arrest and the modification of the final 3ecision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him.1/ -he arguments raised in that ;otion &ere reiterated in a ;otion for the artial Fuashal of the 'rit of 6Eecution filed on 2ebruary 2>, 2001.10 )n an 1rder dated August 22, 2001, the ;-CC denied the ;otion for .econsideration and directed the issuance of a 'arrant of Arrest against 3imagiba.1A 1n =eptember 2>, 2001, he &as arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence. 1n 1ctober B, 2001, he filed &ith the .-C of Baguio City a etition 1C for a &rit of habeas corpus. -he case &as raffled to Branch 0, &hich scheduled the hearing for 1ctober 10, 2001. Copies of the 1rder &ere served on respondentDs counsels and the city &arden. 1> .uling of the .egional -rial Court .ight after hearing the case on 1ctober 10, 2001, the .-C issued an 1rder directing the immediate release of 3imagiba from confinement and re(uiring him to pay a fine of 100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. 5o&ever, the civil aspect of the :uly 1A, 1BBB ;-CC 3ecision &as not touched upon.1B A subse(uent 1rder, eEplaining in greater detail the basis of the grant of the &rit of habeas corpus, &as issued on 1ctober 11, 2001.20 )n ,ustifying its modification of the ;-CC 3ecision, the .-C invo$ed Vaca v. Court of Appeals21 and =upreme Court Administrative Circular !=C-AC" +o. 12-2000,22 &hich allegedly re(uired the imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment also for B 22 violations, if the accused &as not a recidivist or a habitual delin(uent. -he .-C held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of 3imagiba. 23 )t

further noted that !1" he &as a first-time offender and an employer of at least 200 &or$ers &ho &ould be displaced as a result of his imprisonment* and !2" the civil liability had already been satisfied through the levy of his properties. 2/ 1n 1ctober 22, 2001, etitioner 9o filed a ;otion for .econsideration of the .-C 1rders dated 1ctober 10 and 11, 2001. 20 -hat ;otion &as denied on :anuary 1>, 2002.2A 5ence, this etition filed directly &ith this Court on pure (uestions of la&. 2C -he )ssues etitioner raises the follo&ing issues for this CourtDs consideration4 #1. 7-he .-C8 :udge &as utterly devoid of ,urisdiction in amending a final and conclusive decision of the ;unicipal -rial Court, Branch /, dated :uly 1A, 1BBB, in nullifying the =entence ;ittimus, dated =eptember 2>, 2001, issued by E E E 7the8 ;unicipal -rial Court, Branch /, Baguio City, and in ordering the release of 73imagiba8 from confinement in ,ail for the service of his sentence under the said final and conclusive ,udgment* #2. Assuming only for the sa$e of argument that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, the etition for 5abeas Corpus is utterly devoid of merit as 73imagiba &as8 not entitled to the beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and .osa %im cases and reiterated in the =upreme Court Circular +o. 12-2000* E E E #3. 9ranting for the sa$e of argument that 73imagiba &as8 entitled to the beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and .osa %im cases and reiterated in the =upreme Court Circular +o. 12-2000, the minimum fine that should be imposed on 73imagiba8 is one million and t&o hundred ninety five thousand pesos ! 1,2B0,000.00" up to double the said amount or ! 2,0B0,000", not ,ust the measly amount of 100,000* and
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#/. 7-he .-C8 ,udge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac$ or eEcess of ,urisdiction in hearing and deciding 73imagibaDs8 etition for 5abeas Corpus &ithout notice and &ithout affording procedural due process to the eople of the hilippines through the 1ffice of 7the8 City rosecutor of Baguio City or the 1ffice of the =olicitor 9eneral.# 2> )n the main, the case revolves around the (uestion of &hether the etition for habeas corpus &as validly granted. 5ence, the Court &ill discuss the four issues as they intert&ine &ith this main (uestion. 2B -he CourtDs .uling -he etition is meritorious. ;ain )ssue4 Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus -he &rit of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in &hich individuals are deprived of liberty. 30 )t &as devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unla&ful restraint* or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those &ho may have been illegally confined or imprisoned &ithout sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unla&ful custody. 31 )t is therefore a &rit of in(uiry intended to test the circumstances under &hich a person is detained. 32 -he &rit may not be availed of &hen the person in custody is under a ,udicial process or by virtue of a valid ,udgment. 33 5o&ever, as a postconviction remedy, it may be allo&ed &hen, as a conse(uence of a ,udicial proceeding, any of the follo&ing eEceptional circumstances is attendant4 !1" there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person* !2" the court had no ,urisdiction to impose the sentence* or !3" the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such eEcess.3/ )n the present case, the etition for a &rit of habeas corpus &as anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on =C-AC +o. 12-2000, &hich allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under B 22. .espondent sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being eEcessive. 2rom his allegations, the etition appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the &rit. 5o&ever, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of his sentence in a ;otion for .econsideration 30 of the ;-CCDs 6Eecution 1rder and in a ;otion for the artial Fuashal of the 'rit of 6Eecution. 3A Both &ere denied by the ;-CC on the ground that it had no po&er or authority to amend a ,udgment issued by the .-C. )n his etition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he had invo$ed in the said ;otions. 'e believe that his resort to this eEtraordinary remedy &as a procedural infirmity. -he remedy should have been an appeal of the ;-CC 1rder denying his ;otions, in

&hich he should have prayed that the eEecution of the ,udgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he had chosen, obviously &ith the intent of finding a favorable court. 5is etition for a &rit of habeas corpus &as clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and eEecutory. =uch an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. .espondent should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different action in another forum. -he Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the issuance of the &rit of habeas corpus. Preference in the Application of Penalties for Violation of P !!

-he follo&ing alternative penalties are imposable under B 224 !1" imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year* !2" a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the chec$, a fine that shall in no case eEceed 200,000* or !3" both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. 3C =C-AC +o. 12-2000, as clarified by =C-AC +o. 13-2001,3> established a rule of preference in imposing the above penalties.3B 'hen the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mista$e of fact &ithout taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty. /0 -he determination of the circumstances that &arrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the trial ,udge only./1 =hould the ,udge deem that imprisonment is appropriate, such penalty may be imposed. /2 =C-AC +o. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. -he competence to amend the la& belongs to the legislature, not to this Court./3 "napplicability of #C$AC %o. &!$!''' etitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy enunciated in =C-AC +o. 12-2000, because he is not a #first time offender.#// -his circumstance is, ho&ever, not the sole factor in determining &hether he deserves the preferred penalty of fine alone. -he penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case. /0 )t is the trial courtDs discretion to impose any penalty &ithin the confines of the la&. =C-AC +o. 13-2001 eEplains thus4 #E E E. Administrative Circular +o. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B 22 such that &here the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mista$e of fact &ithout taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. +eedless to say, the determination of &hether the circumstances &arrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the :udge. E E E. )t is, therefore, understood that4 #2. -he :udges concerned, may in the eEercise of sound discretion, and ta$ing into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine &hether the imposition of a fine alone &ould best serve the interests of ,ustice, or &hether forbearing to impose imprisonment &ould depreciate the seriousness of the offense, &or$ violence on the social order, or other&ise be contrary to the imperatives of ,ustice*# -he Court notes that the etition for a &rit of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged retroactivity of =C-AC +o. 12-2000, &hich supposedly favored B 22 offenders./A 1n this point, 3imagiba contended that his imprisonment &as violative of his right to e(ual protection of the la&s, since only a fine &ould be imposed on others similarly situated. /C -he rule on retroactivity states that criminal la&s may be applied retroactively if favorable to the accused. -his principle, embodied in the .evised enal Code,/> has been eEpanded in certain instances to cover special la&s. /B -he issue of retroactivity of =C-AC +o. 12-2000 &as settled in (e )oya v. )ail Warden of atan*as City,00 &hich &e (uote4

# etitionerDs reliance of our ruling in +rdo,-e. v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the ne& la&, citing People v. #imon, is misplaced. -hus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the .evised enal Code, =C Admin. Circular +o. 12-2000 as modified by =C Admin. Circular +o. 13-2001 should benefit her has no basis. #2irst. =C Admin. Circular +o. 12-2000 is not a penal la&* hence, Article 22 of the .evised enal Code is not applicable. -he circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final ,udgment. #=econd. As eEplained by the Court in =C Admin. Circular +o. 13-2001, =C Admin. Circular +o. 12-2000 merely lays do&n a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B. . Blg. 22. )t does not amend B. . Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the la&. =C Admin. Circular +o. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to ta$e into account not only the purpose of the la& but also the circumstances of the accused - - &hether he acted in good faith or on a clear mista$e of fact &ithout taint of negligence - - and such other circumstance &hich the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed.# 01 Because the Circular merely lays do&n a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for the trial courts. -hus, it is addressed to the ,udges, &ho are directed to consider the factual circumstances of each case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty. )n other &ords, the Administrative Circular does not confer any ne& right in favor of the accused, much less those convicted by final ,udgment.

-he competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the decision against the accused. 02 -hat decision is sub,ect only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or la&, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lac$ or eEcess of ,urisdiction. Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority. )ndeed, =C-AC +o. 12-2000 necessarily re(uires a revie& of all factual circumstances of each case. =uch a revie& can no longer be done if the ,udgment has become final and eEecutory. )n the present case, the ;-CC of Baguio City had full $no&ledge of all relevant circumstances from &hich respondentDs conviction and sentence &ere based. -he penalty imposed &as &ell &ithin the confines of the la&. @pon appeal, the conviction &as sustained by .-CBranch / of Baguio City. 6ventually, the 3ecision attained finality. 5ence, .-C-Branch 0 did not have the ,urisdiction to modify the la&ful ,udgment in the guise of granting a &rit of habeas corpus. -he doctrine of e(ual protection of la&s 03 does not apply for the same reasons as those on retroactivity. 2oremost of these reasons is that the Circular is not a la& that deletes the penalty of imprisonment. As eEplained earlier, it is merely a rule of preference as to &hich penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case. At any rate, this matter deserves scant consideration, because respondent failed to raise any substantial argument to support his contention. 0/ /odification of 0inal )ud*ment %ot Warranted -he Court is not unmindful of #o v. Court of Appeals,00 in &hich the final ,udgment of conviction for violation of B 22 &as modified by the deletion of the sentence of imprisonment and the imposition of a fine. -hat case proceeded from an #@rgent ;anifestation of an 6Etraordinary =upervening 6vent,#0A not from an unmeritorious petition for a &rit of habeas corpus, as in the present case. -he Court eEercised in that case its authority to suspend or to modify the eEecution of a final ,udgment &hen &arranted or made imperative by the higher interest of ,ustice or by supervening events.0C -he supervening event in that case &as the petitionerDs urgent need for coronary rehabilitation for at least one year under the direct supervision of a coronary care therapist* imprisonment &ould have been e(uivalent to a death sentence.0> -he peculiar circumstances of #o do not obtain in the present case. .espondentDs supposed #unhealthy physical condition due to a triple bypass operation, and aggravated by hypertension,# cited by the .-C in its 1ctober 10, 2001 1rder, 0B is totally bereft of substantial proof. -he Court notes that respondent did not ma$e any such allegation in his etition for habeas corpus. +either did he mention his physical state in his ;emorandum and Comment submitted to this Court. .espondent see$s the retroactive application of =C-AC +o. 12-2000 in his favor on the basis alone of the alleged settlement of his civil liability.A0 Citing 1riffith v. Court of Appeals,A1 he theoriGes that ans&ering for a criminal offense is no longer ,ustified after the settlement of the debt. .espondent, ho&ever, misreads 1riffith. -he Court held in that case that convicting the accused &ho, t&o years prior to the filing of the B 22 cases, had already paid his debt !from &hich the chec$s originated" &as contrary to the basic principles of fairness and ,ustice.A2 1bviously, that situation is not attendant here. -he civil liability in the present case &as satisfied through the levy and sale of the properties of respondent only after the criminal case had been terminated &ith his conviction. A3 Apparently, he had sufficient properties that could have been used to settle his liabilities prior to his conviction. )ndeed, such an early settlement &ould have been an indication that he &as in good faith, a circumstance that could have been favorably considered in determining his appropriate penalty. At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability. A/ 'hat is punished in the latter is not the failure to pay the obligation, but the issuance of chec$s that subse(uently bounced or &ere dishonored for insufficiency or lac$ of funds. A0 -he Court reiterates the reasons &hy the issuance of &orthless chec$s is criminaliGed4 #-he practice is prohibited by la& because of its deleterious effects on public interest. -he effects of the increase of &orthless chec$s transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. -he mischief it creates is not only a &rong to the payee or holder, but also an in,ury to the public. -he harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very &ell pollute the channels of trade and commerce, in,ure the ban$ing system and eventually hurt the &elfare of society and the public interest. -he la& punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order.#AA '"ERE ORE, the etition is GRAN!E$ and the assailed 1rders %233"0"E(. .espondentDs etition for habeas corpus is hereby (E%"E(. %et this case be RE/A%(E( to ;-CC of Baguio City for the re-arrest of respondent and the completion of his sentence.

[G.R. NO. 17(68) : O*t+,e- 22, 2007] RO%%EL JA.#N!O $AN!ES S#L/ER#O, Petitioner, v. REPU&L#. O !"E P"#L#PP#NES, Respondent. 'hen is a man a man and &hen is a &oman a &omanH )n particular, does the la& recogniGe the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling &ith regard to a personDs seEH ;ay a person successfully petition for a change of name and seE appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a seE reassignment surgeryH 1n +ovember 2A, 2002, petitioner .ommel :acinto 3antes =ilverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and seE in his birth certificate in the .egional -rial Court of ;anila, Branch >. -he petition, doc$eted as = Case +o. 02-10020C, impleaded the civil registrar of ;anila as respondent. etitioner alleged in his petition that he &as born in the City of ;anila to the spouses ;elecio etines =ilverio and Anita A(uino 3antes on April /, 1BA2. 5is name &as registered as #.ommel :acinto 3antes =ilverio# in his certificate of live birth !birth certificate". 5is seE &as registered as #male.# 5e further alleged that he is a male transseEual, that is, #anatomically male but feels, thin$s and acts as a female# and that he had al&ays identified himself &ith girls since childhood. 1 2eeling trapped in a manDs body, he consulted several doctors in the @nited =tates. 5e under&ent psychological eEamination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. 5is attempts to transform himself to a #&oman# culminated on :anuary 2C, 2001 &hen he under&ent seE reassignment surgery 2 in Bang$o$, -hailand. 5e &as thereafter eEamined by 3r. ;arcelino .eysio-CruG, :r., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the hilippines, &ho issued a medical certificate attesting that he !petitioner" had in fact undergone the procedure. 2rom then on, petitioner lived as a female and &as in fact engaged to be married. 5e then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from #.ommel :acinto# to #;ely,# and his seE from #male# to #female.# An order setting the case for initial hearing &as published in the eopleDs :ournal -onight, a ne&spaper of general circulation in ;etro ;anila, for three consecutive &ee$s.3Copies of the order &ere sent to the 1ffice of the =olicitor 9eneral !1=9" and the civil registrar of ;anila. 1n the scheduled initial hearing, ,urisdictional re(uirements &ere established. +o opposition to the petition &as made. 3uring trial, petitioner testified for himself. 5e also presented 3r. .eysio-CruG, :r. and his American fiancI, .ichard . 6del, as &itnesses. 1n :une /, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision / in favor of petitioner. )ts relevant portions read4 etitioner filed the present petition not to evade any la& or ,udgment or any infraction thereof or for any unla&ful motive but solely for the purpose of ma$ing his birth records compatible &ith his present seE. -he sole issue here is &hether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief as$ed for. -he 7c8ourt rules in the affirmative.

2irstly, the 7c8ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition &ould be more in consonance &ith the principles of ,ustice and e(uity. 'ith his seEual 7re-assignment8, petitioner, &ho has al&ays felt, thought and acted li$e a &oman, no& possesses the physi(ue of a female. etitionerDs misfortune to be trapped in a manDs body is not his o&n doing and should not be in any &ay ta$en against him. %i$e&ise, the 7c8ourt believes that no harm, in,ury 7or8 pre,udice &ill be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. 1n the contrary, granting the petition &ould bring the much-a&aited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her 7fiancI8 and the realiGation of their dreams. 2inally, no evidence &as presented to sho& any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. 6ven the =tate, through the 71=98 has not seen fit to interpose any 7o8pposition. '56.621.6, ,udgment is hereby rendered 9.A+-)+9 the petition and ordering the Civil .egistrar of ;anila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of 7p8etitioner, specifically for petitionerDs first name from #.ommel :acinto# to MELY and petitionerDs gender from #;ale# to FEMALE.0 1n August 1>, 2003, the .epublic of the hilippines !.epublic", thru the 1=9, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.A )t alleged that there is no la& allo&ing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of seE alteration. 1n 2ebruary 23, 200A, the Court of AppealsC rendered a decision> in favor of the .epublic. )t ruled that the trial courtDs decision lac$ed legal basis. -here is no la& allo&ing the change of either name or seE in the certificate of birth on the ground of seE reassignment through surgery. -hus, the Court of Appeals granted the .epublicDs petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of = Case +o. 02-10020C. etitioner moved for reconsideration but it &as denied. B 5ence, this petition. etitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and seE in his birth certificate is allo&ed under Articles /0C to /13 of the Civil Code, .ules 103 and 10> of the .ules of Court and .A B0/>.10 -he petition lac$s merit. A Pe-0+n10 2-0t Na3e .ann+t &e .han4ed On the G-+und +5 Se6 Rea0024n3ent etitioner invo$ed his seE reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and seE. As found by the trial court4 etitioner filed the present petition not to evade any la& or ,udgment or any infraction thereof or for any unla&ful motive but 0+7e78 5+- the 9u-9+0e +5 3a:2n4 h20 ,2-th -e*+-d0 *+39at2,7e ;2th h20 9-e0ent 0e6 . !emphasis supplied" etitioner believes that after having ac(uired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. 'e disagree. -he =tate has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 etitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 )n this connection, Article 3CA of the Civil Code provides4 A.-. 3CA. +o person can change his name or surname &ithout ,udicial authority. -his Civil Code provision &as amended by .A B0/> !Clerical 6rror %a&". )n particular, =ection 1 of .A B0/> provides4 =6C-)1+ 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or 4ypo*raphical Error and Chan*e of 0irst %ame or %ic5name. - +o entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected &ithout a ,udicial order, eEcept for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nic$name &hich can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance &ith the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. .A B0/> no& governs the change of first name.1/ )t vests the po&er and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. @nder the la&, therefore, ,urisdiction over applications for change of first name is no& primarily lodged &ith the aforementioned administrative officers. -he intent and effect of the la& is to eEclude the change of first name from the coverage of .ules 103 !Change of +ame" and 10> !Cancellation or Correction of 6ntries in the Civil .egistry" of the .ules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subse(uently denied. 10 )t li$e&ise lays do&n the corresponding venue,1A form1C and procedure. )n sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not ,udicial. .A B0/> li$e&ise provides the grounds for &hich change of first name may be allo&ed4

=6C-)1+ /. 1rounds for Chan*e of 0irst %ame or %ic5name. - -he petition for change of first name or nic$name may be allo&ed in any of the follo&ing cases4

!1" -he petitioner finds the first name or nic$name to be ridiculous, tainted &ith dishonor or eEtremely difficult to &rite or pronounce* !2" -he ne& first name or nic$name has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly $no&n by that first name or nic$name in the community* or !3" -he change &ill avoid confusion. etitionerDs basis in praying for the change of his first name &as his seE reassignment. 5e intended to ma$e his first name compatible &ith the seE he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. 5o&ever, a change of name does not alter oneDs legal capacity or civil status.1> .A B0/> does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of seE reassignment. .ather than avoiding confusion, changing petitionerDs first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason ,ustifying such change.1B )n addition, he must sho& that he &ill be pre,udiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 )n this case, he failed to sho&, or even allege, any pre,udice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. )n sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitionerDs first name &as not &ithin that courtDs primary ,urisdiction as the petition should have been filed &ith the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. )t &as an improper remedy because the proper remedy &as administrative, that is, that provided under .A B0/>. )t &as also filed in the &rong venue as the proper venue &as in the 1ffice of the Civil .egistrar of ;anila &here his birth certificate is $ept. ;ore importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not pre,udice him at all. 2or all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitionerDs petition in so far as the change of his first name &as concerned. N+ La; A77+;0 !he .han4e +5 Ent-8 #n !he &2-th .e-t252*ate A0 !+ Se6 On the G-+und +5 Se6 Rea0024n3ent -he determination of a personDs seE appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must loo$ to the statutes. 21 )n this connection, Article /12 of the Civil Code provides4 A.-. /12. +o entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected &ithout a ,udicial order. -ogether &ith Article 3CA of the Civil Code, this provision &as amended by .A B0/> in so far as clerical or typo*raphical errors are involved. -he correction or change of such matters can no& be made through administrative proceedings and &ithout the need for a ,udicial order. )n effect, .A B0/> removed from the ambit of .ule 10> of the .ules of Court the correction of such errors. 22 .ule 10> no& applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. 23 =ection 2!c" of .A B0/> defines &hat a #clerical or typographical error# is4 =6C-)1+ 2. (efinition of 4erms. - As used in this Act, the follo&ing terms shall mean4 !3" #Clerical or typographical error# refers to a mista$e committed in the performance of clerical &or$ in &riting, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the li$e, &hich is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other eEisting record or records4 Provided, ho6ever, -hat no *+--e*t2+n 3u0t 2n<+7<e the *han4e +5 nationality, age, status or 0e6of the petitioner. !emphasis supplied" @nder .A B0/>, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of seE is not a mere clerical or typographical error. )t is a substantial change for &hich the applicable procedure is .ule 10> of the .ules of Court. -he entries envisaged in Article /12 of the Civil Code and correctable under .ule 10> of the .ules of Court are those provided in Articles /0C and /0> of the Civil Code42/ A.-. /0C. Acts, events and ,udicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. A.-. /0>. -he follo&ing shall be entered in the civil register4 !1" Births* !2" marriages* !3" deaths* !/" legal separations* !0" annulments of marriage* !A" ,udgments declaring marriages void from the beginning* !C" legitimations* !>" adoptions* !B" ac$no&ledgments of natural children* !10" naturaliGation* !11" loss, or !12" recovery of citiGenship* !13" civil interdiction* !1/" ,udicial determination of filiation* !10" voluntary emancipation of a minor* and !1A" changes of name.

-he acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article /0C of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. 20 5o&ever, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can ,ustify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of seE reassignment. -o correct simply means #to ma$e or set aright* to remove the faults or error from# &hile to change means #to replace something &ith something else of the same $ind or &ith something that serves as a substitute.# 2A -he birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and seE, &ere all correct. +o correction is necessary. Article /0C of the Civil Code authoriGes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts !such as legitimations, ac$no&ledgments of illegitimate children and naturaliGation", events!such as births, marriages, naturaliGation and deaths" and 7udicial decrees !such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturaliGation, loss or recovery of citiGenship, civil interdiction, ,udicial determination of filiation and changes of name". -hese acts, events and ,udicial decrees produce legal conse(uences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. -heir effects are eEpressly sanctioned by the la&s. )n contrast, seE reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article /0C. +either is it recogniGed nor even mentioned by any la&, eEpressly or impliedly. #=tatus# refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation !that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities" of a person in vie& of his age, nationality and his family membership. 2C -he status of a person in la& includes all his personal (ualities and relations, 3+-e +- 7e00 9e-3anent 2n natu-e, n+t +-d2na-278 te-32na,7e at h20 +;n ;277, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. -he comprehensive term statusD include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. 2> !emphasis supplied" A personDs seE is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. )t is a part of a personDs legal capacity and civil status. )n this connection, Article /13 of the Civil Code provides4 A.-. /13. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special la&s. But there is no such special la& in the hilippines governing seE reassignment and its effects. -his is fatal to petitionerDs cause. ;oreover, =ection 0 of Act 3C03 !the Civil .egister %a&" provides4 =6C. 0.

Registration and certification of births. - -he declaration of the physician or mid&ife in attendance at the birth or, in default

thereof, the declaration of either parent of the ne&born child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. =uch declaration shall be eEempt from documentary stamp taE and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or mid&ife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the ne&born child. )n such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the follo&ing facts4 !a" date and hour of birth* !b" 0e6 and nationality +5 2n5ant* !c" names, citiGenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not $no&n, of the mother alone* !d" civil status of parents* !e" place &here the infant &as born* and !f" such other data as may be re(uired in the regulations to be issued. @nder the Civil .egister %a&, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they eEisted at the time of birth. 2B -hus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant !the physician or mid&ife" by eEamining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no la& legally recogniGing seE reassignment, the determination of a personDs seE made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31 'hen &ords are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. -he &ords #seE,# #male# and #female# as used in the Civil .egister %a& and la&s concerning the civil registry !and even all other la&s" should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. )n this connection, seE is defined as #the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female# 32or #the distinction bet&een male and female.#33 2emale is #the seE that produces ova or bears young# 3/ and male is #the seE that has organs to produce spermatoGoa for fertiliGing ova.#30 -hus, the &ords #male# and #female# in everyday understanding do not include persons &ho have undergone seE reassignment. 2urthermore, #&ords that are employed in a statute &hich had at the time a &ell-$no&n meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the conteEt compels to the contrary.# 3A =ince the statutory language of the Civil .egister %a& &as enacted in the early 1B00s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term #seE# as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allo&s a post-operative male-to-female transseEual to be included in the category #female.# 2or these reasons, &hile petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no la& authoriGes the change of entry as to seE in the civil registry for that reason. -hus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. Ne2the- %a8 Ent-2e0 2n the &2-th .e-t252*ate A0 t+ 2-0t Na3e +- Se6 &e .han4ed +n the G-+und +5 E=u2t8

-he trial court opined that its grant of the petition &as in consonance &ith the principles of ,ustice and e(uity. )t believed that allo&ing the petition &ould cause no harm, in,ury or pre,udice to anyone. -his is &rong. -he changes sought by petitioner &ill have serious and &ide-ranging legal and public policy conse(uences. 2irst, even the trial court itself found that the petition &as but petitionerDs first step to&ards his eventual marriage to his male fiancI. 5o&ever, marriage, one of the most

sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union bet6een a man and a 6oman.3C 1ne of its essential re(uisites is the le*al capacity of the contractin* parties 6ho must be a male and a female .3> -o grant the changes sought by petitioner &ill substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the la&s on marriage and family relations. )t &ill allo& the union of a man &ith another man &ho has undergone seE reassignment !a male-to-female post-operative transseEual". =econd, there are various la&s &hich apply particularly to &omen such as the provisions of the %abor Code on employment of &omen, 3B certain felonies under the .evised enal Code/0 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under .ule 131 of the .ules of Court, /1among others. -hese la&s underscore the public policy in relation to &omen &hich could be substantially affected if petitionerDs petition &ere to be granted. )t is true that Article B of the Civil Code mandates that #7n8o ,udge or court shall decline to render ,udgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the la&.# 5o&ever, it is not a license for courts to engage in ,udicial legislation. -he duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the la&, not to ma$e or amend it. )n our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine &hat guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of seE reassignment. -he need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case &here the claims asserted are statute-based. -o reiterate, the statutes define &ho may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, &here they may be filed, &hat grounds may be invo$ed, &hat proof must be presented and &hat procedures shall be observed. )f the legislature intends to confer on a person &ho has undergone seE reassignment the privilege to change his name and seE to conform &ith his reassigned seE, it has to enact legislation laying do&n the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. )t might be theoretically possible for this Court to &rite a protocol on &hen a person may be recogniGed as having successfully changed his seE. 5o&ever, this Court has no authority to fashion a la& on that matter, or on anything else. -he Court cannot enact a la& &here no la& eEists. )t can only apply or interpret the &ritten &ord of its co-e(ual branch of government, Congress. etitioner pleads that #7t8he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and 7the8 realiGation of their dreams.# +o argument about that. -he Court recogniGes that there are people &hose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recogniGed parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. 5o&ever, the remedies petitioner see$s involve (uestions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. '"ERE ORE, the petition is hereby $EN#E$. [G.R. NO. 16(0(1. Ju78 2), 2005] ROSEN$O AL&A v. .OUR! O APPEALS and ROSEN$O .. "ERRERA, Respondents. Assailed in this etition for Certiorari1 are the 2ebruary 2C, 200/ decision 2 and the ;ay 1/, 200/ resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA9... = +o. A1>>3, &hich dismissed petitionerDs original action for annulment of ,udgment / of the .egional -rial Court of ;anila, Branch 3C, and denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively. -he antecedent facts sho& that on 1ctober 21, 1BBA, private respondent .osendo C. 5errera filed a petition 0 for cancellation of the follo&ing entries in the birth certificate of #.osendo Alba 5errera, :r.#, to &it4 !1" the surname #5errera# as appended to the name of said child* !2" the reference to private respondent as the father of .osendo Alba 5errera, :r.* and !3" the alleged marriage of private respondent to the childDs mother, Armi A. Alba !Armi" on August /, 1B>2 in ;andaluyong City. 5e claimed that the challenged entries are false and that it &as only sometime in =eptember 1BBA that he learned of the eEistence of said birth certificate. rivate respondent alleged that he married only once, i.e., on :une 2>, 1BA0 &ith 6GperanGa C. =antos and never contracted marriage &ith Armi nor fathered .osendo Alba 5errera, :r. )n support thereof, he presented certifications from the Civil .egistrar of ;andaluyong City A and the +ational =tatistics 1ffice,C both stating that they have no record of marriage bet&een private respondent and Armi. 1n +ovember 12, 1BBA, private respondent filed an amended petition, > impleading Armi and #all the persons &ho have or claim any interest in th7e8 petition.#B 1n +ovember 2C, 1BBA, the trial court issued an 1rder setting the petition for hearing on :anuary 2/, 1BBC, and directed the publication and service of said order to Armi at her address appearing in the birth certificate &hich is +o. /1> Ar(uiGa =t., 6rmita, ;anila, and to the Civil .egistrar of the City of ;anila and the =olicitor 9eneral. -he full teEt of the order, reads4 )n a verified Amended etition for Correction of 6ntry, the etitioner prays, inter alia, that the follo&ing entries appearing in the sub,ect Certificate of %ive Birth be deleted4 1. All informations having reference to him as the father of the child mentioned therein* 2. -he surname #5errera# appended to the childDs name* 3. 5is alleged marriage &ith the natural mother of the child.

2inding the etition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the etition be set for hearing on :anuary 2/, 1BBC at nine oDcloc$ in the morning before this Branch at .ooms //C-//B, 2ourth 2loor, ;anila City 5all. All interested parties are hereby notified of the said hearing and are ordered to sho& cause &hy the etition should not be granted. %et a copy of this 1rder be published at the eEpense of the etitioner, once a &ee$ for three !3" consecutive &ee$s, in a ne&spaper of general circulation in the City of ;anila, and raffled pursuant to .3. 10CB. 2urnish the 1ffice of the =olicitor 9eneral and the 1ffice of the %ocal Civil .egistrar of the City of ;anila &ith copies of the etition and of this 1rder. %et the same be li$e&ise furnished the rivate .espondent Armi Alba 5errera at the address indicated in the sub,ect Certificate of %ive Birth. =1 1.36.63.10 1n :anuary 13, 1BBC, before the scheduled :anuary 2/, 1BBC hearing, the trial court issued an Amended 1rder 11 &ith substantially the same contents, eEcept that the hearing &as re-scheduled to 2ebruary 2A, 1BBC. A copy of said Amended 1rder &as published in #-oday#, a ne&spaper of general circulation in ;anila in its :anuary 20, 2C, and 2ebruary 3, 1BBC issues. Copies thereof &ere also sent to Armi at +o. /1> Ar(uiGa =t., 6rmita, ;anila, on :anuary 1C, 1BBC, the %ocal Civil .egistrar of ;anila and the =olicitor 9eneral. At the scheduled hearing on 2ebruary 2A, 1BBC, the counsel from the 1ffice of the =olicitor 9eneral appeared but filed no opposition to the petition. Armi, on the other hand &as not present. -he return of the notice sent to her had the follo&ing notation4 -his is to certify that on :anuary 1C, 1BBC, the undersigned 7process server8 personally served a copy of the Amended 1rder in =p. roc. +o. BA->0012 dated :anuary 13, 1BBC to the private respondent, Armi Alba 5errera at - /1> Ar(uiGa =t., 6rmita, ;anila, ,ut 5a27ed and una<a272n4 5+- -ea0+n that >02*?, 9-2<ate -e09+ndent 20 n+ 7+n4e- -e02d2n4 at 0a2d 42<en add-e00 .12 1n April 1, 1BBC, the court a 8uo rendered a decision &hich became final and eEecutory on :une 2, 1BBC. 13 -he dispositive portion thereof, states4 ACC1.3)+9%<, and pursuant to .ule 10> of the .evised .ules of Court, ,udgment is hereby rendered ordering the correction of the entries in the Certificate of %ive Birth of .osendo Alba 5errera, :r., in such a &ay that the entry under the name of the child, the surname 5errera, :r.7,8 is ordered deleted, and the child shall be $no&n as .1=6+31 A%BA* and that the entry under the date and place of marriage, the date August /, 1B>2, ;andaluyong, ;; is li$e&ise ordered deleted or cancelled. %et a copy of this 3ecision be furnished the %ocal Civil .egistrar of ;anila for proper correction and entry. =1 1.36.63. 1/ rivate respondent filed a motion10 for amendment of the decretal portion of the decision to include the cancellation of all entries having reference to him as the father of petitioner minor. -his &as granted in the August 11, 1BBC order of the trial court as follo&s4 ACC1.3)+9%<, and pursuant to .ule 10> of the .evised .ules of Court, ,udgment is hereby rendered ordering the correction of the entries in the Certificate of %ive Birth of .osendo Alba 5errera, :r., in such a &ay that the entries under the name of the child, the surname 5errera, :r., and the name of the father .osendo Caparas 5errera are ordered deleted, and the child shall be $no&n as .1=6+31 A%BA* and the entry under the date and place of marriage, the date August /, 1B>2, ;andaluyong, ;; is li$e&ise ordered deleted or cancelled. =1 1.36.63.1A 1n +ovember 2/, 2000, Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of ,udgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of eEtrinsic fraud and lac$ of ,urisdiction over their person. =he allegedly came to $no& of the decision of the trial court only on 2ebruary 2A, 1BB>, &hen =an Beda College, &here her son &as enrolled as a high school student, &as furnished by private respondent &ith a copy of a court order directing the change of petitioner minorDs surname from 5errera to Alba. Armi averred that private respondent &as a&are that her address is at @nit 302 laGa -o&ers Condominium, 11C0 %orenGo 9uerrero =t., 6rmita, ;anila, because such &as her residence &hen she and private respondent cohabited as husband and &ife from 1B>2 to 1B>>* and her abode &hen petitioner minor &as born on ;arch >, 1B>0. 6ven after their separation, private respondent continued to give support to their son until 1BB>* and that @nit 302 &as conveyed to her by private respondent on :une 1/, 1BB1 as part of his support to petitioner minor. According to Armi, her address i.e., +o. /1> Ar(uiGa =t., 6rmita, ;anila, as appearing in the birth certificate of their son, &as entered in said certificate through the erroneous information given by her sister, CoraGon 6spiritu. =he stressed that private respondent $ne& all along that +o. /1> Ar(uiGa =t., is the residence of her sister and that he deliberately caused the service of notice therein to prevent her from opposing the petition. )n his ans&er, private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his purported cohabitation &ith Armi. 5e branded the allegations of the latter as #false statements coming from a polluted source.# 1C 1n 2ebruary 2C, 200/, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding, among others, that petitioner failed to prove that private respondent employed fraud and purposely deprived them of their day in court. )t further held that as an illegitimate child, petitioner minor should bear the surname of his mother.1> etitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but &as denied.

5ence, the instant petition. @nder =ection 2, .ule /C of the 1BBC .evised .ules of Civil rocedure, ,udgments may be annulled on the grounds of lac$ of ,urisdiction and eEtrinsic fraud.1B 'hether or not the trial court ac(uired ,urisdiction over the person of petitioner and her minor child depends on the nature of private respondentDs action, that is, in personam,in rem or 8uasi in rem. An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability* an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person* &hile an action 8uasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its ob,ect is to sub,ect that personDs interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. 20 5ence, petitions directed against the #thing# itself or the res,21 &hich concerns the status of a person,22 li$e a petition for adoption,23 annulment of marriage,2/ or correction of entries in the birth certificate,20 as in the instant case, are actions in rem. )n an action in personam, ,urisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. )n a proceeding in rem or 8uasi in rem, ,urisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prere(uisite to confer ,urisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has ,urisdiction over the res. :urisdiction over theres is ac(uired either !a" by the seiGure of the property under legal process, &hereby it is brought into actual custody of the la&* or !b" as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in &hich the po&er of the court is recogniGed and made effective. 2A -he service of summons or notice to the defendant is not for the purpose of vesting the court &ith ,urisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process re(uirements. 2C )n the case at bar, the filing &ith the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested the latter ,urisdiction over the res. =ubstantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected through the institution of a petition under .ule 10> of the .evised .ules of Court, &ith the proper .egional -rial Court. 2> Being a proceeding in rem, ac(uisition of ,urisdiction over the person of petitioner is therefore not re(uired in the present case. )t is enough that the trial court is vested &ith ,urisdiction over the sub,ect matter. -he service of the order at +o. /1> Ar(uiGa =t., 6rmita, ;anila and the publication thereof in a ne&spaper of general circulation in ;anila, sufficiently complied &ith the re(uirement of due process, the essence of &hich is an opportunity to be heard. =aid address appeared in the birth certificate of petitioner minor as the residence of Armi. Considering that the Certificate of Birth bears her signature, the entries appearing therein are presumed to have been entered &ith her approval. ;oreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all indispensable parties, including Armi and petitioner minor, &hich binds the &hole &orld to the ,udgment that may be rendered in the petition. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. 2B -he absence of personal service of the order to Armi &as therefore cured by the trial courtDs compliance &ith =ection /, .ule 10>, &hich re(uires notice by publication, thus4 =6C. /. %otice and publication. - @pon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fiE the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. -he court shall also cause the order to be published once a &ee$ for three !3" consecutive &ee$s in a ne&spaper of general circulation in the province. )n arco v. Court of Appeals, the trial court granted a petition for correctionJchange of entries in a minorDs birth certificate to reflect the

name of the minorDs real father as &ell as to effect the corresponding change of her surname. )n see$ing to annul said decision, the other children of the alleged father claimed that they are indispensable parties to the petition for correction, hence, the failure to implead them is a ground to annul the decision of the trial court. -he Court of Appeals denied the petition &hich &as sustained by this Court on the ground, inter alia, that &hile petitioner is indeed an indispensable party, the failure to implead her &as cured by the publication of the order of hearing. -husD @ndoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in =ection 3 of .ule 10>. 5er interest &as affected by the petition for correction, as any ,udicial determination that :une &as the daughter of Armando &ould affect her &ardDs share in the estate of her father. )t cannot be established &hether +adina $ne& of ;ary :oyDs eEistence at the time she filed the petition for correction. )ndeed, doubt may al&ays be cast as to &hether a petitioner under .ule 10> &ould $no& of all the parties &hose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. 2or eEample, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be a&are of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of hisJher spouse or paramour. -he fact that +adina amended her petition to implead 2rancisco and 9ustilo indicates earnest effort on her part to comply &ith =ection 3 as (uoted above. <et, even though Barco &as not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect &as cured by compliance &ith =ection /, .ule 10>, &hich re(uires notice by publication, thus4 =ection /. @pon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fiE the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. -he court shall also cause the order to be published once a &ee$ for three !3" consecutive &ee$s in a ne&spaper of general circulation in the province. !he 9u-9+0e 9-e*20e78 +5 Se*t2+n (, Ru7e 108 20 t+ ,2nd the ;h+7e ;+-7d t+ the 0u,0e=uent @ud43ent +n the 9et2t2+n. !he 0;ee9 +5 the de*202+n ;+u7d *+<e- e<en 9a-t2e0 ;h+ 0h+u7d ha<e ,een 2397eaded unde- Se*t2+n A, Ru7e 108, ,ut ;e-e 2nad<e-tent78 7e5t +ut. !he .+u-t +5 A99ea70 *+--e*t78 n+ted 4

-he publication being ordered &as in compliance &ith, and borne out by the 1rder of :anuary C, 1B>0. -he actual publication of the =eptember 22, 1B>3 1rder, conferred ,urisdiction upon the respondent court to try and decide the case. 'hile #nobody appeared to oppose the instant petition# during the 3ecember A, 1B>/ hearing, that did not divest the court from its ,urisdiction over the case and of its authority to continue trying the case. 2or, the rule is &ell-settled, that ,urisdiction, once ac(uired continues until termination of the case. ?erily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. -he decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the &hole &orld. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. ublication is notice to the &hole &orld that the proceeding has for its ob,ect to bar indefinitely all &ho might be minded to ma$e an ob,ection of any sort against the right sought to be established. )t is the publication of such notice that brings in the &hole &orld as a party in the case and vests the court &ith ,urisdiction to hear and decide it. 30 2urthermore, eEtrinsic fraud, &hich &as private respondentDs alleged concealment of ArmiDs present address, &as not proven. 6Etrinsic fraud eEists &hen there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, &hereby the defeated party &as prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. 5ere, Armi contended that private respondent is a&are of her present address because they lived together as husband and &ife in the condominium unit from 1B>2 to 1B>> and because private respondent continued to give support to their son until 1BB>. -o prove her claim, she presented !1" private respondentDs title over the condominium unit* !2" receipts allegedly issued to private respondent for payment of homeo&nerDs or association dues* !2" a photocopy of a :anuary 1/, 1BB1 deed of sale of the sub,ect unit in favor of Armi* and !3" the subse(uent title issued to the latter. 5o&ever, these documents only tend to prove private respondentDs previous o&nership of the unit and the subse(uent transfer thereof to Armi, but not the claimed live-in relationship of the parties. +either does the sale prove that the conveyance of the unit &as part of private respondentDs support to petitioner minor. )ndeed, intimate relationships and family relations cannot be inferred from &hat appears to be an ordinary business transaction. Although the :anuary 1/, 1BB1 deed of sale31 stated that Armi resides at 11C0 %. 9uerrero =t., 6rmita, ;anila, the same is not sufficient to prove that private respondent has $no&ledge of ArmiDs address because the former ob,ected to the offer of the deed for being a mere photocopy.32 -he counsel for petitioners even admitted that they do not have the original of the deed and that per certification of the Cler$ of Court, the +otary ublic &ho notariGed the deed of sale did not submit a copy of the notariGed document as re(uired by the rules. 33 -he deed cannot thus be the basis of ascribing $no&ledge of ArmiDs address to private respondent inasmuch as the authenticity thereof &as neither admitted by private respondent nor proven by petitioners. 'hile Armi presented the alleged love lettersJnotes from private respondent, they &ere only attached as anneEes to the petition and not formally offered as evidence before the Court of Appeals. ;ore importantly, said lettersJnotes do not have probative value because they &ere mere photocopies and never proven to be an authentic &riting of private respondent. )n the same vein, the affidavits 3/ of Armi and her sister, CoraGon 6spiritu, are of no evidentiary &eight. -he basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are placed on the &itness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be re,ected for being hearsay. =tated differently, the declarants of &ritten statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-eEamination. 30 )nasmuch as Armi and her sister &ere not presented before the Court of Appeals to affirm the veracity of their affidavits, the same are considered hearsay and &ithout probative value. Ei incumbit probotio 8ui dicit, non 8ui ne*at. 5e &ho asserts, not he &ho denies, must prove.3A ArmiDs claim that private respondent is a&are of her present address is anchored on the assertion of a live-in relationship and support to her son. =ince the evidence presented by Armi is not sufficient to prove the purported cohabitation and support, it follo&s that private respondentDs $no&ledge of ArmiDs address &as li$e&ise not proven. -hus, private respondent could not have deliberately concealed from the court that &hich &as not sho&n to be $no&n to him. -he Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed the petition for annulment of ,udgment on the ground of failure to establish eEtrinsic fraud. -he proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals in an action to annul a ,udgment of a .egional -rial Court is a etition for .evie& on Certiorariunder .ule /0 of the .evised .ules of Civil rocedure, &here only (uestions of la& may be raised. -he resort of petitioner to the instant civil action for certiorari under .ule A0 is therefore erroneous. -he special civil action of certiorari &ill not be allo&ed as a substitute for failure to timely file a etition for .evie& under .ule /0, &hich should be instituted &ithin 10 days 3C from receipt of the assailed decision or resolution. -he &rong choice of remedy thus provides another reason to dismiss this petition. 3> 2inally, petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to annul the trial courtDs decision. )n an action for annulment of ,udgment, the petitioner must convince the court that something may indeed be achieved should the assailed decision be annulled. 3B @nder Article 1CA/0 of the 2amily Code as amended by .epublic Act !.A" +o. B200, &hich too$ effect on ;arch 1B, 200/, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recogniGes their filiation, in &hich case they may bear the fatherDs surname. )n Wan* v. Cebu Civil Re*istrar,/1 it &as held that an illegitimate child &hose filiation is not recogniGed by the father, bears only a given name and his motherDs surname. -he name of the unrecogniGed illegitimate child identifies him as such. )t is only &hen said child is recogniGed that he may use his fatherDs surname, reflecting his status as an ac$no&ledged illegitimate child. )n the present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner minor is an illegitimate child because she &as never married to private respondent. Considering that the latter strongly asserts that he is not the father of petitioner minor, the latter is therefore an unrecogniGed illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the surname of his mother. )n sum, the substantive and procedural aspects of the instant controversy do not &arrant the annulment of the trial courtDs decision.

'"ERE ORE, the petition is 3)=;)==63. -he 2ebruary 2C, 200/ decision and the ;ay 1/, 200/ resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA9... = +o. A1>>3 are A22).;63.

[A.%. NO. R!JB02B16)8. June 2A, 2005] $AN!E /#.EN!E, Petitioner, v. . JU$GE JOSE S. %AJA$U.ON, Respondent. )n a letter-complaint dated :uly 21, 2000, addressed to then Court Administrator Alfredo %. Benipayo, 3ante ?icente charged respondent :udge :ose =. ;a,aducon of the .egional -rial Court !.-C" of 9eneral =antos City, Branch 23, &ith gross ignorance of the la&, grave abuse of authority and manifest partiality, praying that he be administratively disciplined and terminated from the service. -he instant administrative complaint stemmed from a series of criminal cases involving a certain 6velyn -e of 9eneral =antos City. -he factual and procedural antecedents leading to the instant administrative case is summariGed in this CourtDs .esolution of 2ebruary 1B, 2001, in 9... +1=. 1/0C10-1> entitled, People of the Philippines v. Evelyn 4e, pertinent portions of &hich read as follo&s4
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)n a ,oint decision dated ;ay 31, 1BB0, the .egional -rial Court, Branch 23, 9eneral =antos City, found 6velyn -e guilty on four counts of violation of B. . Blg. 22, other&ise $no&n as the Bouncing Chec$s %a&, and sentenced her to t&o !2" months of imprisonment on each count. -he decision became final and eEecutory after this Court had denied -eDs etition for .evie& from the affirmance of the trial courtDs decision by the Court of Appeals. 1n ;arch 11, 2000, -e sought clarification from the trial court &hether she should serve her sentences successively or simultaneously. )n an order, dated ;ay 20, 2000, the trial court clarified that she should serve her sentences successively, but Dfor humanitarian reason and in accordance &ith Art. C0 of the .evised enal Code, it held that Dinstead of serving imprisonment of 6)95- months, the prisoner 6?6%<+ -6 should serve only siE months. 1n :une 2, 2000, -e filed a motion for reconsideration, &hich she prayed be also considered as a petition for issuance of the &rit of habeas corpus. Citing Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 2B> =C.A A0A !1BB>", in &hich the sentence of imprisonment of a party found guilty of violation of B. . Blg. 22 &as reduced to a fine e(ual to double the amount of the chec$ involved, -e prayed that her sentence be similarly modified and that she be immediately released from detention. )n a supplemental motion, -e argued that she had been denied e(ual protection of the la& because the trial ,udge in another case involving multiple counts of robbery directed the accused to simultaneously serve his sentences. 1n :une 20, 2000, the trial court denied -eDs petition for issuance of the &rit of habeas corpus on the ground that -e &as detained by virtue of a final ,udgment. 1n :une 22, 2000, -e filed an omnibus motion praying for her release on the ground that she had been in ,ail since ;arch 10, 2000 and had fully served the three months minimum of her total sentence under the )ndeterminate =entence %a&. )n the alternative, -e prayed for release on recogniGance. 1n :une 23, 2000, -e moved for reconsideration of the trial courtDs order of :une 20, 2000, alleging that the finality of the ,oint decision against her did not bar her application for the &rit of habeas corpus. =he prayed that pending determination as to &hether the ?aca ruling applied to her, she also be allo&ed to post bail pursuant to .ule 102, D1/. 1n :uly 0, 2000, the trial court allo&ed -e to post bail in the amount of one million pesos, holding that it &ould order her release upon the approval of her bail bond and thereafter certify the proceedings to the Court as the latter has concurrent ,urisdiction over proceedings for habeas corpus.

1n :uly C, 2000, the trial court approved -eDs bail bonds in the reduced amount of 000,000.00 and ordered her release. -he trial court also directed its cler$ of court to certify the proceedings to the Court. 1n :uly 11, 2000, Assistant City rosecutor ;arie 6llengred %. Baliguiat moved for reconsideration of the trial courtDs resolution of :uly 0, 2000. 1n :uly 1>, 2000, -e filed a notice of appeal from the order, dated :une 20, 2000, and the resolution, dated :uly 0, 2000, of the trial court. 1n :uly 31, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration of the Assistant City rosecutor. )t also denied due course to -eDs notice of appeal on the ground that there &as no necessity for the appeal to the Court of Appeals because it had already ordered that the &hole records be for&arded to this Court pursuant to .ule 102, D1/. 1
KLrMUll

)n the present case, complainant, &ho claims to be the station manager of .adyo Bombo, 9eneral =antos City, alleges that &hile -e &as in prison, respondent ,udge allo&ed her to be released and confined at a local hospital in the guise that she &as suffering from certain illnesses. Complainant further alleges that respondent ,udge approved -eDs application for bail as part of habeas corpus proceedings even though no petition for habeas corpus in favor of -e &as filed and doc$eted. As a result of respondent ,udgeDs order allo&ing the provisional liberty of -e, the local media in 9eneral =antos City made an uproar and criticiGed respondent ,udge for his action on the said case. )n retaliation, respondent ,udge cited for indirect contempt a group of mediamen &ho published a critical article against him. Complainant contends that respondent ,udge &ill not hesitate to use his clout and po&er to stifle criticism and dissent. )n addition, complainant alleges that in a separate case, respondent ,udge allo&ed the release of the accused &ithout the posting of the necessary bail. 1n the basis of the above allegations, complainant prays that respondent ,udge be investigated and if &arranted, be terminated and removed from service. 2 )n his Comment, dated 1ctober 1C, 2000, respondent ,udge submitted the follo&ing contentions &hich &e (uote verbatim4
KLrMUll

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1. -he certified records of the above-mentioned cases against 6velyn -e &ere for&arded to the =upreme Court on August 0, 2000, upon the order of undersigned by the Branch Cler$ of Court for revie& of our (uestioned 1rder !attached as A++6[ D1 of letter Complaint"*
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2. 1n :une 2, 2000, 6velyn -eDs counsel filed not only a motion for reconsideration denying our previous order denying her motion for release from detention but also a petition for Habeas Corpus in the same cases*
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3. )n the eEercise of sound discretion and after hearing the comment of the public prosecutor, &e issued the (uestioned 1rder, &hich is self-eEplanatory* /. 'e believed then that &e had the discretion to allo& her to be released on bail, based on =ec. 1/, .ule 102 of the .evised .ules of Court* 0. 'e &ere thin$ing then that in such a dilemma, &hether or not to release her on bail, it &as a better ,udgment to release her from bail on a &rit of habeas corpus, because, 6velyn -e might be right in her contention that she is considered to have served her sentences simultaneously. )f &e denied her petition for Habeas Corpus, and on appeal, she could get a favorable decision from the =upreme Court, surely, she could return and charge us &ith a graver offense of ignorance of the la& and abuse of discretion. =he could even file other cases against us under the .evised enal Code, such as rendering an un,ust order, or under the Civil Code for moral damages in millions of pesos*
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A. -o obviate such a possible move on -eDs part, &e opted to allo& her release on bail through the &rit of habeas corpus proceedings. Any&ay, the =upreme Court has the last say on that matter*
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C. -herefore, &e are of the vie& that the letter complaint of ;r. 3ante ?icente is legally premature as it concerned cases &hich are still sub,udice*
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>. Besides, &e are of the opinion that ;r. ?icente has no personality as a third party to charge us &ith anything as he has not sho&n any damage that he could have suffered because of our 1rder*
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B. 'e are convinced that ;r. ?icente is trying to pre-empt our move to charge his radio station for libel or cite the announcer for indirect contempt of Court &hen his radio station and announcer had been reviling and attac$ing us for many days on the air for having allo&ed 6velyn -e to be treated and confined in a hospital upon recommendation of a government doctor and for having allo&ed her release from imprisonment on bail* a certified [eroE copy of the letter of the .egional 3irector of the 3epartment of -ransportation and Communication !+ational -elecommunications Commission" dated August B, 2000, in reply to our re(uest for copies of the broast tapes, is attached here&ith as A++6[ D1*
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10. As to the charge that &e are stifling criticism by the print and broast media, &e are of the vie& that if media has the privilege to criticiGe the Courts and the :udges, &e have also the right to charge them for indirect contempt of Court and libel, because there are la&s regarding this matter. -he article of a certain :oseph :ubelag is no& a sub,ect of an indirect contempt charge before us, &hich &e are about to resolve*
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11. .egarding our 1rder in Criminal Case +o. 1/0C2 in the case of D eople v. :hoyche 9ersonin- almaD, .-C Br. 3A, it &as done &ith sound discretion on our part because it &as already A430 in the evening and the offices &ere closed and being a 2riday, the accused &ould be detained for t&o days and three nights, unless &e accepted and approved the bail bond. Besides, the la& re(uires ,udges to approve bail even during the holidays. )mmediately, on ;onday, the money in the amount of A,000.00 &as deposited &ith the Cler$ of Court as sho&n in the official receipt !A++6[ DA of letter complaint"*
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12. .egarding our competence, honesty and integrity, modesty aside, as a ,udge for the last thirteen years in 9eneral =antos City, the records of the ;unicipal -rial Court and .-C, Branches 23 and 22 !being a pairing ,udge of the latter court since 1ctober last year" sho& that most of our decisions appealed to the Court of Appeals and the =upreme Court have been sustained or affirmed*
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13. As to our reputation in the community, let other members of the media and a member of the hilippine Bar spea$ about it. 'e are enclosing here&ith a [eroE copy of a ne&s clipping of hilippine 3aily )n(uirer, :uly >, 2000 issue !attached here&ith as A++6[ D2D", about ho& &e tried and decided the celebrated case of eople v. Castracion, et. al. &hen the =upreme Court assigned us to hear the evidence of the defense and decide the case. 'e did our &or$ in that case as best &e could as &e have done in all cases being tried and decided by us, mindful of our duty to do our &or$ &ith faithful diligence, honesty, and integrity. 'e do not eEpect praises from others as &e do not also &ish to be criticiGed or attac$ed by .adio Bombo station in 9eneral =antos City especially by its manager, ;r. 3ante ?icente, &ithout basis or competent proof and evidence. Atty. .ogelio 9arcia, &ho vouched for our honesty, competence and integrity is a former assemblyman of =outh Cotabato and 9eneral =antos City, and an eE-Assistant ;inister of %abor. 5e has $no&n us in the community for almost t&enty five years*
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1/. Complainant 3ante ?icente is ,ust a ne&comer to 9eneral =antos and he and his radio station have a bad and notorious reputation of attac$ing the character and good name of some people here as sho&n by cases for libel filed in our courts. 3
KLrMUll

)n its .eport dated ;arch 11, 2002, the 1ffice of the Court Administrator !1CA" confirmed that Criminal Cases +os. B/0A-B/A0 &ere indeed certified by respondent to this Court./ 5o&ever, this Court in its .esolution of 2ebruary 1B, 2001 in 9... +1=. 1/0C10-1>, resolved to return the records of the consolidated cases to the .-C of 9eneral =antos City, Branch 23, and to order the said court to give due course to 6velyn -eDs notice of appeal from the 1rder denying her petition forhabeas corpus and from the 1rder re(uiring her to post bail in the amount of one million pesos for her release from detention. -his Court made the follo&ing pronouncements4 .ule 102, D1/ provides4 'hen person la&fully imprisoned recommitted, and &hen let to bail. )f it appears that the prisoner &as la&fully committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the &arrant of commitment &ith an offense punishable by death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. )f he is la&fully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion of the court or ,udge. )f he be admitted to bail, he shall forth&ith file a bond in such sum as the court or ,udge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his appearance before the court &here the offense is properly cogniGable to abide its order or ,udgment* and the court or ,udge shall certify the proceedings, together &ith the bond, forth&ith to the proper court. )f such bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement. -he foregoing provision, ho&ever, applies to cases &here the applicant for the &rit of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him, not &here, as here, he is serving sentence by reason of a final ,udgment. )ndeed, .ule 102, D/ disallo&s issuance of the &rit &here the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is Dsuffering imprisonment under la&ful ,udgment. -he certification of a case under .ule 102, D1/, moreover, refers to cases &here the habeas corpus court finds that the applicant is charged &ith the noncapital offense in another court. -hus, the certification of this case to this Court is clearly erroneous. 0
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1n the basis of the above-(uoted .esolution and the provisions of =ection 2/, .ule 11/ of the .ules of Court, the 1CA, in its .eport in the present case, found respondent ,udge guilty of gross ignorance of the la& and recommended that he be fined in the amount of 20,000.00.A
KLrMUll

-he Court agrees &ith the findings of the 1CA eEcept for the recommended penalty. =ection 2/, .ule 11/ of the .ules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the grant of bail after conviction by final ,udgment and after the convict has started to serve sentence. )t provides4
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=6C. 2/. %o bail after final 7ud*ment9 exception. - An a**u0ed 0ha77 n+t ,e a77+;ed ,a27 a5te- the @ud43ent ha0 ,e*+3e 52na7, un7e00 he ha0 a9972ed 5+- 9-+,at2+n ,e5+-e *+33en*2n4 t+ 0e-<e 0enten*e, the 9ena7t8 and the +55en0e ,e2n4 ;2th2n the 9u-<2e; +5 the P-+,at2+n La;. )n case the accused has applied for probation, he may be allo&ed temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail &as filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may allo& his release on recogniGance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. #n n+ *a0e 0ha77 ,a27 ,e a77+;ed a5te- the a**u0ed ha0 *+33en*ed t+ 0e-<e 0enten*e. :Emphasis supplied; -he only eEception to the above-cited provision of the .ules of Court is &hen the convict has applied for probation before he commences to serve sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are &ithin the purvie& of the robation %a&.

)n the case of 6velyn -e, the ,udgment finding her guilty of violation of

.P.

l*. !! on four counts and imposing upon her the penalty of

imprisonment for t&o months on each count has already become final and eEecutory. =he did not apply for probation. At the time respondent ,udge granted her bail she &as already serving her sentence. 2rom the foregoing, it is evident that -e is not entitled to bail. .espondent ,udge contends that under =ection 1/, .ule 102 of the .ules of Court, he has the discretion to allo& -e to be released on bail. 5o&ever, the Court reiterates its pronouncement in its .esolution of 2ebruary 1B, 2001 in 9... +1=. 1/0C10-1> that =ection 1/, .ule 102 of the .ules of Court applies only to cases &here the applicant for the &rit of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him and not in an instance, as in the case involved in the present controversy, &here the applicant is serving sentence by reason of a final ,udgment. -he Court agrees &ith the observation of the 1CA that respondent ,udgeDs ignorance or disregard of the provisions of =ection 2/, .ule 11/ and =ection 1/, .ule 102 of the .ules of Court is tantamount to gross ignorance of the la& and procedure. A ,udge is called upon to eEhibit more than ,ust a cursory ac(uaintance &ith statutes and procedural rules. C )t is imperative that he be conversant &ith basic legal principles and be a&are of &ell-settled authoritative doctrines. > 5e should strive for eEcellence eEceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of ,ustice and the .ule of %a&. B 'hen the la& is sufficiently basic, a ,udge o&es it to his office to simply apply it* anything less than that &ould be gross ignorance of the la&. 10
KLrMUll

)n the present case, considering that the granting of bail is common in the litigation of criminal cases before trial courts, &e are not impressed &ith the eEplanation of respondent ,udge in granting bail to -e. .espondent ,udge contends that he &as caught in a dilemma &hether or not to grant bail in favor of -e. 5o&ever, he thought that it &ould be better for him to release -e on bail rather than deny her application* for if such denial is later found out by the appellate courts to be erroneous, -e could charge him &ith gross ignorance of the la& and abuse of discretion, or hold him liable for rendering an un,ust order or for damages. 5ence, to obviate such possible move on -eDs part, he simply allo&ed her to be released on bail and relieved himself of any burden brought about by the case of -e by certifying the same to this Court contending that, D7a8ny&ay, the =upreme Court has the last say on !the" matter. -he Court finds respondentDs reasoning shallo& and un,ustified. 5e cannot simply shir$ responsibility by conveniently passing the buc$, so to spea$, to this Court on the preteEt that &e have the final say on the matter. -his is hardly the $ind of trait eEpected of a ,udge. .ule 3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of :udicial Conduct provides that in every case, a ,udge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable la& uns&ayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. )n (imatulac v. Villon ,11 &e held that4
KLMNMOPOrMQblMRST MUMVrWX KYMOl lMOKZ lMVbrMOrPQ

-he ,udge, on the other hand, Dshould al&ays be imbued &ith a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer ,ustice. 5e must vie& himself as a priest for the administration of ,ustice is a$in to a religious crusade. -hus, eEerting the same devotion as a priest Din the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy, the ,udge must render service &ith impartiality commensurate &ith public trust and confidence reposed in him. 12
KLrMUll

)n the present case, respondent ,udge fell short of the above-cited ideals eEpected of a magistrate. ComplainantDs allegation that no petition for habeas corpus&as filed does not hold &ater. As borne by the records, the Certification issued by one Atty. 6lmer 3. %astimosa, Cler$ of Court of the .egional -rial Court of 9eneral =antos City, sho&s that 6velyn -eDs petition for habeas corpus&as incorporated in the pleadings she filed in Criminal Cases +os. B/0A-B/A0, although no doc$et fees and other charges &ere paid.13 -here is no sho&ing that respondent should be held administratively liable for the non-payment of doc$et and other la&ful fees. At any rate, the matter may be considered in the appeal ta$en by -e, as earlier adverted to in 9... +1=. 1/0C10-1>. Complainant further claims that on several occasions, respondent ,udge allo&ed -e to be released and confined at a local hospital on account of false illnesses. 5o&ever, the Court does not find sufficient evidence to prove this charge. 1n the contrary, records on hand sho& that the confinement of -e in the hospital is recommended by a panel of government doctors and that such confinement is made &ithout the ob,ection of the public prosecutor. 1/ 5ence, the Court finds respondent ,udgeDs act of allo&ing the temporary confinement of -e in the hospital as ,ustified. -he Court agrees &ith the observation of the 1CA that in the absence of contradictory evidence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should be upheld in favor of respondent ,udge. 10
KLrMUll

-he Court li$e&ise finds no sufficient evidence to find respondent ,udge guilty of the charge that he uses his clout and po&er to stifle criticism and dissent. )n the present case, the Court finds nothing irregular or arbitrary in his act of re(uiring a number of ,ournalists to sho& cause &hy they should not be cited for indirect contempt. 2reedom of speech and of eEpression, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is not absolute.1A 2reedom of eEpression needs on occasion to be ad,usted to and accommodated &ith the re(uirements of e(ually important public interests such as the maintenance of the integrity of courts and orderly functioning of the administration of ,ustice. 1C )n the instant case, the Court finds nothing &himsical or despotic in respondent ,udgeDs act of issuing the sub,ect sho&-cause order. )nstead, respondent is merely eEercising his right to protect his honor and, more importantly, the integrity of the court &hich he represents. As to the issue that respondent ,udge allo&ed the release of an accused in Criminal Case +o. 1/0C2, entitled People v. )hoyce 1ersonin$ Palma, &ithout the re(uired bail bond being posted, it is not &ithin the ,urisdiction of this Court to resolve the same on the basis of the 1CA .eport as it is already the sub,ect of a separate administrative case against respondent. 1>
KLrMUll

5aving found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the la&, as discussed earlier, the Court no& determines the proper imposable penalty. =ection >!B", .ule 1/0 of the .ules of Court, as amended, classifies gross ignorance of the la& or procedure as a serious charge. @nder =ection 11!A" of the same .ule, the imposable penalties, in case the respondent is found culpable of a serious charge, range from a fine of

not less than 20,000.00 but not more than /0,000.00 to dismissal from the service &ith forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, eEcept accrued leaves, and dis(ualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-o&ned or controlled corporations. 5o&ever, on 2ebruary 2/, 2002, respondent retired upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of C0. 1B Considering that respondent can no longer be dismissed or suspended, the Court is left &ith no recourse but to impose the penalty of fine. 2urther, it is noted that on :uly >, 2002, the -hird 3ivision of this Court, in Administrative ;atter +o.10>C/-.et., concerning the compulsory retirement of respondent, resolved to release his retirement benefits but set aside cases still pending against him. 20
KLrMUll

100,000.00 thereof in vie& of several administrative

)n the administrative complaints filed against respondent, t&o cases have, so far, resulted in his being fined. )n Chan v. /a7aducon ,21 respondent &as found guilty of violating among others, .ules 1.01 and 2.01 and Canon 2 of the Code of :udicial conduct and &as meted the penalty of fine in the amount of 10,000.00. )n the more recent case ofAlconera v. /a7aducon,22 respondent &as found guilty of gross ignorance of procedure and &as fined /0,000.00. )n vie& of the foregoing, it is proper to impose the maEimum fine of /0,000.00 to be deducted from the 100,000.00 set aside from respondentDs retirement benefits in A.;. +o. 10>C/-.et. '"ERE ORE, respondent ,udge is found 9@)%-< of gross ignorance of the la& or procedure. 5e is ordered to pay a 2)+6 of be deducted from the 100,000.00 set aside from his retirement benefits in A.;. +o. 10>C/-.et. /0,000.00 to

[G.R. NO. 1607)2 : Au4u0t 25, 2005] #N !"E %A!!ER O !"E PE!#!#ON OR "A&EAS .ORPUS O .AP!. GARC ALEJANO v. GEN. PE$RO .A&UAC, GEN. NAR.#SO A&ACA, SE.. ANGELO RECES, and SE.. RO#LO GOLED !he .a0e -his etition for .evie& 1 see$s to nullify the 3ecision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 1C =eptember 2003 and .esolution dated 13 +ovember 2003 in CA-9... = +o. C>0/0. -he Court of AppealsD 3ecision and .esolution dismissed the petition for habeas corpus filed by la&yers 5omobono AdaGa and .oberto .afael ulido !# etitioners#" on behalf of their detained clients Capt. 9ary Ale,ano ! +-;arines", Capt. +icanor 2aeldon ! +-;arines", Capt. 9erardo 9ambala ! A", %t. =9 :ames %ayug ! +", Capt. ;ilo ;aestrecampo ! A", and %t. =9 Antonio -rillanes )? ! +" !#detainees#". etitioners named as respondent 9en. edro Cabuay !#9en. Cabuay#", Chief of the )ntelligence =ervice of the Armed 2orces of the hilippines !#)=A2 #", &ho has custody of the detainees. etitioners impleaded 9en. +arciso Abaya !#9en. Abaya#", =ec. Angelo .eyes and .oilo 9oleG, &ho are respectively the Chief of =taff of the Armed 2orces of the hilippines !#A2 #", =ecretary of +ational 3efense and +ational =ecurity Adviser, because they have command responsibility over 9en. Cabuay. Ante*edent a*t0

6arly morning of 2C :uly 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the no& detained ,unior officers, entered and too$ control of the 1a$&ood remier %uEury Apartments !#1a$&ood#", an upscale apartment compleE, located in the business district of ;a$ati City. -he soldiers disarmed the security officers of 1a$&ood and planted eEplosive devices in its immediate surroundings. -he ,unior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and called for the resignation of resident 9loria ;acapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around C400 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations &ith government emissaries. -he soldiers later defused the eEplosive devices they had earlier planted. -he soldiers then returned to their barrac$s. 1n 31 :uly 2003, 9en. Abaya, as the Chief of =taff of the A2 , issued a directive to all the ;a,or =ervice Commanders to turn over custody of ten ,unior officers to the )=A2 3etention Center. -he transfer too$ place &hile military and civilian authorities &ere investigating the soldiersD involvement in the 1a$&ood incident. 1n 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an )nformation for coup$d$etat &ith the .egional -rial Court of ;a$ati City, Branch A1, against the soldiers involved in the 2C :uly 2003 1a$&ood incident. -he government prosecutors accused the soldiers of coup d etat as defined and penaliGed under Article 13/-A of the .evised enal Code of the hilippines, as amended. -he case &as doc$eted as Criminal Case +o. 03-2C>/. -he trial court later issued the Commitment 1rders giving custody of ,unior officers %t. =9 Antonio -rillanes )? !#-rillanes#" and Capt. 9erardo 9ambala to the Commanding 1fficers of )=A2 .

1n 2 August 2003, 9en. Abaya issued a directive to all ;a,or =ervice Commanders to ta$e into custody the military personnel under their command &ho too$ part in the 1a$&ood incident eEcept the detained ,unior officers &ho &ere to remain under the custody of )=A2 . 1n 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus &ith the =upreme Court. 1n 12 August 2003, the Court issued a .esolution, &hich resolved to4 !a" #SSUE the 'R#! O "A&EAS .ORPUS* !b" re(uire respondents to ma$e a RE!URN of the &rit on ;onday, 1> August 2003, at 10400 a.m. before the Court of Appeals* !c" refer the case to the Court of Appeals for RA LE among the :ustices thereof for hearing, further

proceedings and decision thereon, after &hich a REPOR! shall be made to this Court &ithin ten !10" days from promulgation of the decision.3 -hus, the Court issued a 'rit of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003 directing respondents to ma$e a return of the &rit and to appear and produce the persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled date for hearing and further proceedings. 1n the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed &ith the .egional -rial Court of ;a$ati City a ;otion for reliminary )nvestigation, &hich the trial court granted. 1n 1> August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents submitted their .eturn of the 'rit and Ans&er to the petition and produced the detainees before the Court of Appeals during the scheduled hearing. After the parties filed their memoranda on 2> August 2003, the appellate court considered the petition submitted for decision. 1n 1C =eptember 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing the petition. +onetheless, the appellate court ordered 9en. Cabuay, &ho &as in charge of implementing the regulations in the )=A2 3etention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance &ith =tanding 1perations rocedure +o. 02A3-0/. -he appellate court directed 9en. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the detaineesD right to eEercise for t&o hours a day. !he Ru72n4 +5 the .+u-t +5 A99ea70 -he Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. -he appellate court pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup d etat before the .egional -rial Court of ;a$ati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detaineesD confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of &hich the detainees and petitioners do not even (uestion. -he Court of Appeals recogniGed that habeas corpusmay also be the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of a constitutional right. 5o&ever, the appellate court held that the constitutional rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the detaineesD liberty. -he appellate court ruled that the regulation of the detaineesD right to confer &ith their counsels is reasonable under the circumstances. -he appellate court declared that &hile the opening and reading of -rillanesD letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not ,ustify the issuance of a &rit of habeas corpus. -he violation does not amount to illegal restraint, &hich is the proper sub,ect of habeas corpus proceedings. -he Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered 9en. Cabuay to fulfill the promise he made in open court to uphold the visiting hours and the right of the detainees to eEercise for t&o hours a day. -he dispositive portion of the appellate courtDs decision reads4 '56.621.6, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby 3)=;)==63. .espondent Cabuay is hereby 1.36.63 to faithfully adhere to his commitment to uphold the constitutional rights of the detainees in accordance &ith the =tanding 1perations rocedure +o. 02A3-0/ regarding visiting hours and the right of the detainees to eEercise for t&o !2" hours a day. =1 1.36.63. / !he #00ue0 etitioners raise the follo&ing issues for resolution4 A. -56 C1@.- 12 A B. -56 C1@.- 12 A C. -56 C1@.- 12 A 6A%= 6..63 )+ .6?)6')+9 A+3 .6?6.=)+9 A 36C)=)1+ 12 -56 =@ .6;6 C1@.-* 6A%= 6..63 )+ +1- AC\+1'%639)+9 -56 A .1 .)A-6+6== 12 -56 .6;63< 6-)-)1+6.= =66\* and
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6A%= 6..63 )+ A==6.-)+9 -56 %69A%)-< 12 -56 C1+3)-)1+= 12 -56 36-A)+63 :@+)1. 122)C6.=D 36-6+-)1+. 0 !he Ru72n4 +5 the .+u-t

-he petition lac$s merit.

etitioners claim that the CourtDs 12 August 2003 1rder granted the petition and the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual hearing. etitioners thus argue that the CourtDs 1rder had already foreclosed any (uestion on the propriety and merits of their petition. etitionersD claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 1rder sho&s that the Court referred to the Court of Appeals the duty to in(uire into the cause of the ,unior officersD detention. 5ad the Court ruled for the detaineesD release, the Court &ould not have referred the hearing of the petition to the Court of Appeals. -he Court &ould have forth&ith released the detainees had the Court upheld petitionersD cause. )n a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition. A -he respondent must produce the person and eEplain the cause of his detention. C 5o&ever, this order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy. -hus, the CourtDs order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing &as not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy of habeas corpus. 2or obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. )f a court finds the alleged cause of the detention unla&ful, then it should issue the &rit and release the detainees. )n the present case, after hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no ,urisdiction to in(uire into the merits of their petition. -he Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the detaineesD complaint against the regulations and conditions in the )=A2 3etention Center. -he remedy of habeas corpus has one ob,ective4 to in(uire into the cause of detention of a person.> -he purpose of the &rit is to determine &hether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. B )f the in(uiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. )f, ho&ever, the detention is proven la&ful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. -he use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. )t is not a &rit of error.10 +either can it substitute for an appeal.11 +onetheless, case la& has eEpanded the &ritDs application to circumstances &here there is deprivation of a personDs constitutional rights. -he &rit is available &here a person continues to be unla&fully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, &here there is denial of due process, &here the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and &here a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.12 5o&ever, a mere allegation of a violation of oneDs constitutional right is not sufficient. -he courts &ill eEtend the scope of the &rit only if any of the follo&ing circumstances is present4 !a" there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the unla&ful restraint of a person* !b" the court had no ,urisdiction to impose the sentence* or !c" an eEcessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the eEcess.13 'hatever situation the petitioner invo$es, the threshold remains high. -he violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.1/ etitioners admit that they do not (uestion the legality of the detention of the detainees. +either do they dispute the la&ful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military offenses. 'hat petitioners be&ail is the regulation adopted by 9en. Cabuay in the )=A2 3etention Center preventing petitioners as la&yers from seeing the detainees - their clients - any time of the day or night. -he regulation allegedly curtails the detaineesD right to counsel and violates .epublic Act +o. C/3> !#.A C/3>#". 10 etitioners claim that the regulated visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings before the =enate and the 2eliciano Commission. etitioners also point out that the officials of the )=A2 3etention Center violated the detaineesD right to privacy of communication &hen the )=A2 officials opened and read the personal letters of -rillanes and Capt. ;ilo ;aestrecampo !#;aestrecampo#". etitioners further claim that the )=A2 officials violated the detaineesD right against cruel and unusual punishment &hen the )=A2 officials prevented the detainees from having contact &ith their visitors. ;oreover, the )=A2 officials boarded up &ith iron bars and ply&ood slabs the iron grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor light and ventilation in the detaineesD cells. re-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. 1A 5o&ever, the fact that the detainees are confined ma$es their rights more limited than those of the public. 1C .A C/3>, &hich specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers, eEpressly recogniGes the po&er of the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. =ection /!b" of .A C/3> provides4 =ection /. Penalty Clause. - a" E E E b" Any person &ho obstructs, prevents or prohibits any la&yer, any member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family &ith him, or from eEamining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at an8 h+u- +5 the da8 +-, 2n u-4ent *a0e0, +5 the n24ht shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four !/" years nor more than siE !A" years, and a fine of four thousand pesos ! /,000.00".

-he provisions of the above =ection not&ithstanding, any security officer &ith custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may unde-ta:e 0u*h -ea0+na,7e 3ea0u-e0 a0 3a8 ,e ne*e00a-8 t+ 0e*u-e h20 0a5et8 and 9-e<ent h20 e0*a9e . !Emphasis supplied"
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-rue, =ection /!b" of .A C/3> ma$es it an offense to prohibit a la&yer from visiting a detainee client #at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night.# 5o&ever, the last paragraph of the same =ection /!b" ma$es the eEpress (ualification that # n+t;2th0tand2n4# the provisions of =ection /!b", the detention officer has the po&er to underta$e such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. -he last paragraph of =ection /!b" of .A C/3> prescribes a clear standard. -he regulations governing a detaineeDs confinement must be #reasonable measures E E E to secure his safety and prevent his escape.# -hus, the regulations must be reasonably connected to the governmentDs ob,ective of securing the safety and preventing the escape of the detainee. -he la& grants the detention officer the authority to #underta$e such reasonable measures# or regulations. etitioners contend that there &as an actual prohibition of the detaineesD right to effective representation &hen petitionersD visits &ere limited by the schedule of visiting hours. etitioners assert that the violation of the detaineesD rights entitle them to be released from detention. etitionersD contention does not persuade us. -he schedule of visiting hours does not render void the detaineesD indictment for criminal and military offenses to &arrant the detaineesD release from detention. -he )=A2 officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detaineesD right to counsel. -he purpose of the regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and security of all detainees. American cases are instructive on the standards to determine &hether regulations on pre-trial confinement are permissible. )n Bell v. Wolfish,1> the @nited =tates !@.=." =upreme Court held that regulations must be reasonably related to maintaining security and must not be eEcessive in achieving that purpose. Courts &ill stri$e do&n a restriction that is arbitrary and purposeless. 1B 5o&ever, Bell v. Wolfish eEpressly discouraged courts from s$eptically (uestioning challenged restrictions in detention and prison facilities. 20 -he @.=. =upreme Court commanded the courts to afford administrators #&ide-ranging deference# in implementing policies to maintain institutional security.21 )n our ,urisdiction, the last paragraph of =ection /!b" of .A C/3> provides the standard to ma$e regulations in detention centers allo&able4 #such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainee's safety and prevent his escape .# )n the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the la&yers of the detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees. 'hile petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they &ant, the fact that the detainees still have face-to-face meetings &ith their la&yers on a da278 ,a020 clearly sho&s that there is no impairment of detaineesD right to counsel. etitioners as counsels could visit their clients bet&een >400 a.m. and 0400 p.m. &ith a lunch brea$ at 12400 p.m. -he visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours &hen la&yers normally entertain clients in their la& offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness. ;oreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could al&ays see$ permission from the )=A2 officials to confer &ith their clients beyond the visiting hours. -he scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer &ith the detainees. -he detaineesD right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. 6ven in the hearings before the =enate and the 2eliciano Commission,22 petitioners &ere given time to confer &ith the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit. 23 -hus, at no point &ere the detainees denied their right to counsel. etitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells &ith ply&ood amount to unusual and eEcessive punishment. -his argument fails to impress us. Bell v. Wolfish pointed out that &hile a detainee may not be punished prior to an ad,udication of guilt in accordance &ith due process of la&, detention inevitably interferes &ith a detaineeDs desire to live comfortably.2/ -he fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detaineesD desire to live comfortably does not convert those restrictions into punishment.20 )t is &hen the restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that courts &ill infer intent to punish.2A Courts &ill also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears eEcessive in relation to that purpose. 2C :ail officials are thus not re(uired to use the least restrictive security measure.2> -hey must only refrain from implementing a restriction that appears eEcessive to the purpose it serves. 2B 'e (uote Bell v. Wolfish4 1ne further point re(uires discussion. -he petitioners assert, and respondents concede, that the #essential ob,ective of pretrial confinement is to insure the detaineesD presence at trial.# 'hile this interest undoubtedly ,ustifies the original decision to confine an individual in some manner, &e do not accept respondentsD argument that the 9overnmentDs interest in ensuring a detaineeDs presence at trial is the only ob,ective that may ,ustify restraints and conditions once the decision is la&fully made to confine a person. #)f the government could confine or other&ise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the eEtent necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house arrest &ould in the end be the only constitutionally ,ustified form of detention.# -he 9overnment also has legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in &hich the individual is detained. -hese legitimate operational concerns may re(uire administrative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly spea$ing, necessary to ensure that the detainee sho&s up at trial. 2or eEample, the 9overnment must be

able to ta$e steps to maintain security and order at the institution and ma$e certain no &eapons or illicit drugs reach detainees. .estraints that are reasonably related to the institutionDs interest in maintaining ,ail security do not, &ithout more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee &ould not have eEperienced had he been released &hile a&aiting trial. 'e need not here attempt to detail the precise eEtent of the legitimate governmental interests that may ,ustify conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention. )t is enough simply to recogniGe that in addition to ensuring the detaineesD presence at trial, the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid ob,ective that may ,ustify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions are intended as punishment. 30 An action constitutes a punishment &hen !1" that action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or #disability,# and !2" the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate.31 unishment also re(uires that the harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of confinement.32 Block v. utherford,33 &hich reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blan$et restriction on contact visits as this practice &as reasonably

related to maintaining security. -he safety of innocent individuals &ill be ,eopardiGed if they are eEposed to detainees &ho &hile not yet convicted are a&aiting trial for serious, violent offenses and may have prior criminal conviction. 3/ Contact visits ma$e it possible for the detainees to hold visitors and ,ail staff hostage to effect escapes. 30 Contact visits also leave the ,ail vulnerable to visitors smuggling in &eapons, drugs, and other contraband.3A -he restriction on contact visits &as imposed even on lo&-ris$ detainees as they could also potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and &eapons. 3C -he security consideration in the imposition of blan$et restriction on contact visits &as ruled to out&eigh the sentiments of the detainees. 3> Block v. utherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational connection to the legitimate goal of internal security. 3B -his

case reaffirmed the #hands-off# doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of ,udicial self-restraint, based on the premise that courts should decline ,urisdiction over prison matters in deference to administrative eEpertise. /0 )n the present case, &e cannot infer punishment from the separation of the detainees from their visitors by iron bars, &hich is merely a limitation on contact visits. -he iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors prevent direct physical contact but still allo& the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact &ith their visitors. -he arrangement is not unduly restrictive. )n fact, it is not even a strict non-contact visitation regulation li$e in Block v. utherford. -he limitation on the detaineesD physical contacts &ith visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid security concerns. -he boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security &ithin the )=A2 3etention Center. -his measure intends to fortify the individual cells and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and &eapons from one cell to another. -he boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder and crime &ithin the facility. -he diminished illumination and ventilation are but discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute punishments on the detainees. 'e accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in the )=A2 3etention Center are not inhuman, degrading and cruel. 6ach detainee, eEcept for Capt. +icanor 2aeldon and Capt. 9erardo 9ambala, is confined in separate cells, unli$e ordinary cramped detention cells. -he detainees are treated &ell and given regular meals. -he Court of Appeals noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable compared to the conditions no& prevailing in the city and provincial ,ails, &hich are congested &ith detainees. -he Court of Appeals found the assailed measures to be reasonable considering that the )=A2 3etention Center is a high-ris$ detention facility. Apart from the soldiers, a suspected +e& eopleDs Army !#+ A#" member and t&o suspected Abu =ayyaf members are detained in the )=A2 3etention Center. 'e no& pass upon petitionersD argument that the officials of the )=A2 3etention Center violated the detaineesD right to privacy &hen the )=A2 officials opened and read the letters handed by detainees -rillanes and ;aestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing. etitioners point out that the letters &ere not in a sealed envelope but simply folded because there &ere no envelopes in the )=A2 3etention Center. etitioners contend that the Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citiGenDs privacy rights unless authoriGed by la&. -he =olicitor 9eneral does not deny that the )=A2 officials opened the letters. Courts in the @.=. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read all incoming and outgoing mail of convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling of contraband into the prison facility and to avert coordinated escapes. /1 6ven in the absence of statutes specifically allo&ing prison authorities from opening and inspecting mail, such practice &as upheld based on the principle of #civil deaths.# /2 )nmates &ere deemed to have no right to correspond confidentially &ith anyone. -he only restriction placed upon prison authorities &as that the right of inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the communications bet&een the inmate and his la&yer. /3 6ventually, the inmatesD outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court officials received respect. // -he confidential correspondences could not be censored./0 -he infringement of such privileged communication &as held to be a violation of the inmatesD 2irst Amendment rights./A A prisoner has a right to consult &ith his attorney in absolute privacy, &hich right is not abrogated by the legitimate interests of prison authorities in the administration of the institution. /C ;oreover, the ris$ is small that attorneys &ill conspire in plots that threaten prison security./> American ,urisprudence initially made a distinction bet&een the privacy rights en,oyed by convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. -he case of !almi"iano v. #ravisono/BrecogniGed that pre-trial detainees, unli$e convicted prisoners, en,oy a limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of pre-trial detaineesD mail addressed to public officials, courts and counsel &as held impermissible. 'hile

incoming mail may be inspected for contraband and read in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be inspected or read at all. )n the subse(uent case of Wolff v. Mc$onnell,00 involving convicted prisoners, the @.=. =upreme Court held that prison officials could open in the presence of the inmates incoming mail from attorneys to inmates. 5o&ever, prison officials could not read such mail from attorneys. 6Eplained the @.=. =upreme Court4 -he issue of the eEtent to &hich prison authorities can open and inspect incoming mail from attorneys to inmates, has been considerably narro&ed in the course of this litigation. -he prison regulation under challenge provided that D!a"ll incoming and outgoing mail &ill be read and inspected,D and no eEception &as made for attorney-prisoner mail. E E E etitioners no& concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys to inmates, but contend that they may open all letters from attorneys as long as it is done in the presence of the prisoners. -he narro& issue thus presented is &hether letters determined or found to be from attorneys may be opened by prison authorities in the presence of the inmate or &hether such mail must be delivered unopened if normal detection techni(ues fail to indicate contraband. E E E )f prison officials had to chec$ in each case &hether a communication &as from an attorney before opening it for inspection, a near impossible tas$ of administration &ould be imposed. 'e thin$ it entirely appropriate that the =tate re(uire any such communications to be specially mar$ed as originating from an attorney, &ith his name and address being given, if they are to receive special treatment. )t &ould also certainly be permissible that prison authorities re(uire that a la&yer desiring to correspond &ith a prisoner, first identify himself and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the letters mar$ed privileged are actually from members of the bar. As to the ability to open the mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no &ay constitute censorship, since the mail &ould not be read. +either could it chill such communications, since the inmateDs presence insures that prison officials &ill not read the mail. -he possibility that contraband &ill be enclosed in letters, even those from apparent attorneys, surely &arrants prison officialsD opening the letters. 'e disagree &ith the Court of Appeals that this should only be done in Dappropriate circumstances. D=ince a fleEible test, besides being un&or$able, serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible constitutional rights enumerated by respondent, &e thin$ that petitioners, by acceding to a rule &hereby the inmate is present &hen mail from attorneys is inspected, have done all, and perhaps even more, than the Constitution re(uires.01 )n %udson v. !almer,02 the @.=. =upreme Court ruled that an inmate has no reasonable eEpectation of privacy inside his cell. -he @.=. =upreme Court eEplained that prisoners necessarily lose many protections of the Constitution, thus4 5o&ever, &hile persons imprisoned for crime en,oy many protections of the Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries &ith it the circumscription or loss of many significant rights. -hese constraints on inmates, and in some cases the complete &ithdra&al of certain rights, are #,ustified by the considerations underlying our penal system.# -he curtailment of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad of #institutional needs and ob,ectives# of prison facilities, chief among &hich is internal security. 1f course, these restrictions or retractions also serve, incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of ,ustice, deterrence and retribution are factors in addition to correction.03 -he later case of &tate v. $unn,0/ citing %udson v. !almer, abandoned !almi"iano v. #ravisono and made no distinction as to the detaineesD limited right to privacy. &tate v. $unn noted the considerable ,urisprudence in the @nited =tates holding that inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of a substantial government interest such as security or discipline. &tate v. $unn declared that if complete censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. 'e (uote &tate v. $unn4 7A8 right of privacy in traditional 2ourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible &ith the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells re(uired to ensure institutional security and internal order. 'e are satisfied that society &ould insist that the prisonerDs eEpectation of privacy al&ays yield to &hat must be considered a paramount interest in institutional security. 'e believe that it is accepted by our society that #7l8oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement.# -he distinction bet&een the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a convicted inmate has been blurred as courts in the @.=. ruled that pre-trial detainees might occasionally pose an even greater security ris$ than convicted inmates. Bell v. Wolfish reasoned that those &ho are detained prior to trial may in many cases be individuals &ho are charged &ith serious crimes or &ho have prior records and may therefore pose a greater ris$ of escape than convicted inmates. 00 'alencia v. Wi""ins0A further held that #it is impractical to dra& a line bet&een convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining ,ail security.# American cases recogniGe that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detaineesD non-privileged mail poses a genuine threat to ,ail security.0C 5ence, &hen a detainee places his letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee $no&ingly eEposes his letter to

possible inspection by ,ail officials. 0> A pre-trial detainee has no reasonable eEpectation of privacy for his incoming mail. 0B 5o&ever, incoming mail from la&yers of inmates en,oys limited protection such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents &ithout violating the inmatesD right to correspond &ith his la&yer. A0 -he inspection of privileged mail is limited to physical contraband and not to verbal contraband.A1 -hus, &e do not agree &ith the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading of the detaineesD letters in the present case violated the detaineesD right to privacy of communication. -he letters &ere not in a sealed envelope. -he inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. -he letters alleged to have been read by the )=A2 authorities &ere not confidential letters bet&een the detainees and their la&yers. -he petitioner &ho received the letters from detainees -rillanes and ;aestrecampo &as merely acting as the detaineesD personal courier and not as their counsel &hen he received the letters for mailing. #n the 9-e0ent *a0e, 02n*e the 7ette-0 ;e-e n+t *+n52dent2a7 *+33un2*at2+n ,et;een the deta2nee0 and the2- 7a;8e-0, the +552*2a70 +5 the #SA P $etent2+n .ente- *+u7d -ead the 7ette-0. )f the letters are mar$ed confidential communication bet&een the detainees and their la&yers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees. -hat a la& is re(uired before an eEecutive officer could intrude on a citiGenDs privacy rights A2 is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons &ho are detained or imprisoned. -he right to privacy of those detained is sub,ect to =ection / of .A C/3>, as &ell as to the limitations inherent in la&ful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished eEpectation of privacy rights. )n assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are alleged to infringe on the constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted prisoners, @.=. courts #balance the guarantees of the Constitution &ith the legitimate concerns of prison administrators.#A3 -he deferential revie& of such regulations stems from the principle that4 7s8ub,ecting the day-to-day ,udgments of prison officials to an infleEible strict scrutiny analysis &ould seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration. A/ -he detainees in the present case are ,unior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup d etat, a crime punishable &ith reclusion perpetua.A0 -he ,unior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the 1a$&ood incident involving an armed ta$eover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are sub,ect to the Articles of 'ar.AA ;oreover, the ,unior officers are detained &ith other high-ris$ persons from the Abu =ayyaf and the + A. -hus, &e must give the military custodian a &ider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the )=A2 3etention Center. -he military custodian is in a better position to $no& the security ris$s involved in detaining the ,unior officers, together &ith the suspected Abu =ayyaf and + A members. =ince the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security ris$s involved, &e should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness. -he ruling in this case, ho&ever, does not foreclose the right of detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances. .egulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners &ill be revie&ed by the courts on a case-by-case basis. -he courts could afford in,unctive relief or damages to the detainees and prisoners sub,ected to arbitrary and inhumane conditions. 5o&ever, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to (uestion conditions of confinement.AC -he &rit of habeas corpus&ill only lie if &hat is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement. A> '"ERE ORE, &e $#S%#SS the petition. 'e A #R% the 3ecision of the Court of Appeals in CA-9... = +o. C>0/0.

[G.R. NO. 1(0A05 $e*e3,e- ), 2005] PLA!ON AN$ L#&RA$A .ERU#LA, Petitioners, v. ROS#LCN $ELAN!AR, -e9-e0ented ,8 he- 4ua-d2an, $EPAR!%EN! O SO.#AL 'EL ARE and $E/ELOP%EN!, Respondent. etitioners-spouses laton Ceruila and %ibrada 3. Ceruila !Ceruilas" filed an action &ith the .egional -rial Court !.-C" of ;anila, doc$eted as =pec. roc. +o. BC->1>B32, for the annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of ;aria .osilyn -elin 3elantar !.osilyn", the childvictim in the rape case involving .omeo :aloslos. 1 -he .-C granted the CeruilasD petition in its decision dated April 11, 1BBC 2 &hich &as nullified, ho&ever, by the Court of Appeals !CA" on :une 10, 1BBB.3 -he CA denied petitionersD motion for reconsideration./ 5ence the present petition. -he antecedents are as follo&s4 =ometime in 1BBA, .osilyn complained against her father, =implicio 3elantar !=implicio" for child abuse, particularly prostitution. =implicio &as incarcerated at the asay City :ail starting August 22, 1BBA &hich prompted the filing of a petition for involuntary commitment of .osilyn in favor of the 3epartment of =ocial 'elfare and 3evelopment !3='3", as the &hereabouts of the mother, %ibrada Ceruila, &as un$no&n. -he petition &as granted by the .-C of asay City, Branch 11B on +ovember B, 1BBA and =implicioDs motion to vacate said ,udgment &as denied by said court on :anuary 20, 1BBC.0 1n 2ebruary 3, 1BBC, the Ceruilas filed a petition before the .-C of ;anila, entitled #)+ -56 ;A--6. 12 CA+C6%%A-)1+ A+3 A++@%;6+12 -56 B).-5 C6.-)2)CA-6 12 ;A.)A .1=)%<+ -6%)+ 36%A+-A.,# praying that the birth certificate of .osilyn be canceled and declared null and void for the reasons that said birth certificate &as made an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein, as follo&s4 A. -he name of her mother &hich should not be petitioner %ibrada A. -elin* b. -he signature of informant referring to D%ibrada -. 3elantarD being a forgery* c. -he name of =implicio 3elantar as the biological father, considering that, as already mentioned, he is merely the foster father and coguardian in fact of ;aria .osilyn and the name of the natural father in !sic" un$no&n*

d. -he date of marriage of the supposed parents, since the parents reflected in said certificate &ere !sic" actually full blood brother and sister and therefore marriage bet&een the t&o is virtually impossible* e. -he status of ;aria .osilyn as a legitimate child as the same !sic" is actually not legitimate* f. -he date of actual birth of ;arial !sic" .osilyn, since the $no&n father merely made it appear that she &as born at the time the informations for the birth certificate &ere supplied by him to the civil registrar or !sic" proper recording* g. -he name of the physician &ho allegedly attended at the time of birth of ;aria .osilyn, being a fictitious D3r. =antosD. A 1n 2ebruary C, 1BBC, the .-C issued an 1rder setting the case for hearing on ;arch 1B, 1BBC and directed the publication of said order once a &ee$ for three consecutive &ee$s in a ne&spaper of general circulation. -he 1rder also stated that any person &ho is interested in the petition may interpose hisJher comment or opposition thereto on or before the scheduled hearing. C =ummons &as sent to the Civil .egister of ;anila. > 5o&ever, no representative appeared during the scheduled hearing. B 1n April 11, 1BBC, the .-C rendered its decision granting the petition of the Ceruilas as follo&s4 '56.621.6, ,udgment is hereby rendered4 1. 36C%A.)+9 the certificate of live birth of the ;inor ;aria .osilyn -elin 3elantar as registered under the %ocal Civil .egistry +o. >0-2C320 of the office of the City Civil .egistrar of ;anila as null and void ab initio4 and 2. 1.36.)+9 the City Civil .egistrar of ;anila and the +ational =tatistics 1ffice, ;anila, to eEpunge from their respective marriage registers the entry of the birth of said minor and such other documents pertaining thereto, if any. %et a copy of this 3ecision be served on the 1ffice of the City Civil .egistrar of ;anila and the +ational =tatistics 1ffice for record purposes. =1 1.36.63.10 -he .-C eEplained in its 3ecision thus4 3uring the initial trial, the petition &as read aloud in open court to find out if there is any opposition thereto. -here being none, the petitionerDs counsel, Atty. 9oering 9.C. aderanga, then established the ,urisdictional re(uirements !6Ehibits #A# to #6#". 11 -hereafter, petitioner husband laton Ceruila &as placed on the stand as the lone &itness for the petitioner and after he completed his testimony, Atty. aderanga formally offered his evidence and rested his case. -he evidence on record reveals the follo&ing4 1n ;ay 11, 1B>0, a child &as born at the 3r. :ose 2abella ;emorial 5ospital in =ta. CruG, ;anila. -he name of the child &as entered in her birth certificate as ;aria .osilyn -elin 3elantar !6Ehibit #)#". )n the said birth certificate the name of the childDs mother appear as %ibrada A. -elin !6ntry +o. A" &hile that of her father as =implicio .. 3elantar !6ntry +o. B". -he birth certificate li$e&ise sho&s that the parents of the child, =implicio .. 3elantar and %ibrada A. -elin, &ere married on 2ebruary 1/, 1BCC in ;anila !6ntry +o. 12". %i$e&ise, in 6ntry +o. 21 of the same document, it is made to appear that the mother of the child &as 2C years old &hen the child &as born and that she &as attended in her delivery thereof by 3r. =antos !6ntry +o. 13". -he birth certificate &as signed by one %ibrada -. delos =antos as the informant and mother of the child &ith her given address as 21A0 . Burgos =t., asay City !6ntry +o. 1/". -his is the very certificate of live birth that is being seriously impugned by the herein petitioners. )n support of their petition, the petitioners submitted the baptismal certificates of =implicio 3elantar !6Ehibit #:#" and %ibrada 3elantar !6Ehibit #\#" to prove that they are full blood brother and sister and could not have been possible for them to have sired .osilyn !sic". )n the said baptismal certificates, the names of the parents of =implicio and %ibrada are similarly entered as :uan 3elantar and Carila -elen !6Ehibit #:-1# and #\-1#". -he Court is inclined to concur &ith the observation of the petitioner that it is highly unli$ely that the alleged parents of .osilyn &ould commit an incestuous act and proclaim to the &hole &orld that they are the parents of the herein minor. -he court has also observed that in the baptismal certificate of %ibrada 3elantar, it is entered therein that she &as born on :anuary >, 1B/0 in -ubod, ;anglanilla, Cebu !6Ehibit #\-2#". =uch being the case, then %ibrada must have been /0 years of age at the time of the birth of .osilyn in star$ contrast to her age appearing in 6ntry +o. 2C !sic" of the birth certificate of the latter &hich sho&s that %ibrada &as 2C years old at the time of her delivery. -he presentation of the baptismal certificate of %ibrada 3elantar as secondary evidence of her birth certificate &as resorted to after the 1ffice of the %ocal Civil .egistrar of ;inglanilla, Cebu gave a certification to the effect that the records of birth on file &ith the office for the period :anuary, 1B/0 to April, 1B/0 &ere all destroyed by '1.%3 'A. )) !6Ehibit #%#". And going for the ,ugular, so to spea$, the signature of the person named %ibrada -. delos =antos in the birth certificate !6Ehibit #)#" purporting to be that of the petitioner &ife and the signature of the latter appearing in the verification of the petitioner !sic" !6Ehibit #A-A#" are so stri$ingly dissimilar that they could not have but proceeded from t&o different hands. 2or it does not re(uire the trained eye of an eEpert calligrapher to discern such discrepancy in the &riting style.

)n fine, there being an abundance of evidence to support the petitionerDs claim that the birth certificate is indeed a falsified document, the Court is left &ith no other alternative but to grant the relief prayed for in the petition. -o let the birth certificate reamin !sic" as it is &ould adversely affect the rights and interests of the herein petitioners. 12 1n :uly 10, 1BBC, .osilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the 3='3, filed, &ith the CA, a petition for the annulment of ,udgment in the petition for cancellation of entry of her birth certificate. 13 =he claimed that she and her guardian &ere not notified of the petition and the subse(uent ,udgment and learned about the same only from the ne&s on ;ay 1A, 1BBC. 1/ =he argued that the .-C decision &as issued &ithout ,urisdiction and in violation of her right to due process* that the :udge did not have authority to declare her to be illegitimate* and that mere correction of entries, not cancellation of the entire certificate, is the appropriate remedy. 10 .osilyn further argued that4 granting, &ithout admitting that %ibrada is not her mother, still it &as erroneous to cancel or annul her entire birth certificate* %ibrada is not an interested party concerning the issue of &hether =implicio is the father, the date of actual birth, and the name of the physician &ho attended to the birth* 1A %ibradaDs allegations are also contradicted by !a" the #.ecords Based on Cord 3ressing .oom Boo$ - dated April 13-;ay 2B, 1B>0,# issued by 6melita 5. Avinante, 5ead of the ;edical .ecords =ection and Admitting @nit of the 2abella 5ospital, &hich is attached to the petition for annulment as AnneE #6# and &hich states that ;aria .osilyn 3elantar &as born on ;ay 11, 1B>0 at the 2abella 5ospital and that her parents are %ibrada -elin and =implicio 3elantar* 1C and !b" the admission of =implicio in his ;otion to ?acate :udgment1> in =p. roc. +o. BA-/1B1B regarding the custody of .osilyn, &hich is attached to the petition to annul as AnneE #2,# &here he stated that he, as the rightful parent of .osilyn, should not be deprived of his parental authority. 20 1n :une 10, 1BBB, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, the dispositive portion of &hich reads4 WHERE0+RE, premises considered, the instant etition is GRAN!E$ . :udgment is hereby rendered (EC3AR"%1 %233 and V+"( the decision of the respondent .egional -rial Court dated April 11, 1BBC in =pecial roceedings +o. BC->1>B3. 'ith costs against private respondents. =1 1.36.63.21 -he CA reasoned that4 As sho&n in the caption of the petition in =pecial roceedings +o. BC->1>B3 entitled #)n the ;atter of Cancellation and Annulment of the Birth Certificate of ;aria .osilyn -elin 3elantar#, herein petitioner .osilyn 3elantar represented by her legal guardian, 3='3, &as not made a party-respondent therein, contrary to the mandatory provision of =ection 3 of .ule 10> of the .ules of CourtD )n the said =pecial roceeding +o. BC->1>B3, petitioners therein, laton Ceruila and %ibrada 3. Ceruila, sought not only a cancellation or correction of an entry in the birth certificate of .osilyn -elin 3elantar but in effect sought to annul, cancel or eEpunge from the Civil .egister the sub,ect birth certificate. 'ith more reasons, therefore, that all parties, particularly .osilyn -elin 3elantar, or thru her legal guardian, the 3='3, &hose birth certificate &as sought to be annulled or cancelled from the Civil .egister must not only be notified but must be made a party in the said petition. etitioner and her guardian are undoubtedly persons &ho have interest &hich &ould be affected by the petition for the obvious reason that it is the entry of her birth &hich is being sought to be annulled and cancelled. )n a similar case, the =upreme Court ruled that corrections of substantial entries in the certificate other than mere clerical errors, should be passed upon in an appropriate adversary proceedings &ith all the persons interested are made parties thereinD .epublic v. ?alencia !1/1 =C.A /A2* /A>-/AB* /C0-/C/". -he proceedings underta$en in said =pecial roceedings +o. BC->1>B3 is indeed &anting of the re(uired notice to all the parties having claim or interest &hich &ould be affected thereby, and of the adversarial proceedings, as disclosed in the decision dated April 11, 1BBCD 'ith the foregoing dis(uisitions, 'e find that the decision dated April 11, 1BBC null and void for &ant of ,urisdiction over the person of herein petitioner .osilyn 3elantar and the 3='3 as her legal guardian and all persons &ho have or claim any interest &hich &ould be affected by the said decision. Also, the said decision dated April 11, 1BBC is considered null and void for lac$ of due process there being no adversarial proceedings !&as" conducted by the public respondent .egional -rial Court. And, even if the same ,udgment had already become final and eEecutory, and had in fact been eEecuted, as in the instant case, still the eEecution thereof produces no legal effects.22 -he CA denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. 23 5ence, the present petition raising the follo&ing issues4 ) '56-56. 1. +1- -56 C1@.- 12 A 6A%= 6..63 A+3 C1;;)--63 9.A?6 AB@=6 12 3)=C.6-)1+ A;1@+-)+9 -1 %AC\ 12

:@.)=3)C-)1+ )+ 36C%A.)+9 +@%% A+3 ?1)3 -56 36C)=)1+ .6+36.63 B< -56 .69)1+A% -.)A% C1@.- 12 ;A+)%A B.A+C5 3> 3A-63

A .)% 11, 1BBC )+ = 6C. .1C663)+9 +1. BC->1>B3 6+-)-%634 )+ -56 ;A--6. 12 CA+C6%%A-)1+ A+3 A++@%;6+- 12 -56 B).-5 C6.-)2)CA-6 12 ;A.)A .1=)%<+ -6%)+ 36%A+-A. )) '56-56. 1. +1- -56 51+1.AB%6 C1@.- 12 A B).-5 C6.-)2)CA-6 +@%% A+3 ?1)3 AB )+)-)1.
2/

6A%= =51@%3 5A?6 6[6.C)=63 )-= 6.6; -1.< 1'6. -1 36C%A.6 -56 =@B:6C-

As to the first issue, petitioners argue that4 since the falsification of the entries in the birth certificate of .osilyn renders the same void ab initio, the case should be liberally construed as an ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of falsified documents based on Article 0 of the Civil Code20 and =ection 10, .ule A of the .ules of Court2A and not as a special proceeding* petitioners &ere only constrained to utiliGe the provisions of .ule 10> of the .ules of Court on the Cancellation or Correction of 6ntries in the Civil .egistry since Article 0 of the Civil Code provides no procedure for the nullification of void documents &hich happens to be a birth certificate in this case* since the present case involves an ordinary civil action, the cases relied upon by the CA &hich are applicable only to special proceedings should not be applied herein* the civil registrar, &hich is an indispensable party, &as duly served summons by mail* respondent, mean&hile, is not an indispensable party and granting that she is, she &as deemed duly impleaded as her name &as clearly stated in the caption of the case* respondentDs location could not be determined as she &as reported to have ran a&ay from the custody of =implicio, thus the publication of the petition and the order of the .-C setting the case for hearing once a &ee$ for three consecutive &ee$s in a ne&spaper of general circulation should be considered substantial notice and the re(uirements of due process deemed substantially complied &ith* there &as no adversarial proceeding in court because the parties &ere declared in general default thus, ,ust li$e an ordinary civil case, the court should receive evidence ex parte.2C As to the second issue, petitioners claim that4 the CA should have eEercised its peremptory po&er to declare the birth certificate of .osilyn as null and void ab initio follo&ing the doctrine that &here an instrument is void ab initio for being contrary to la&, no amount of technicalities could correct its inherent nullity* other&ise, there &ill be multiplicity of actions as the parties &ill have to file cases ane& to annul respondentDs birth certificate. 2> -hey then pray that the CA decision dated :une 10, 1BBB be reversed and that the .-C ,udgment dated April 11, 1BBC be reinstated. 2B Anent the first issue, the =olicitor 9eneral, for the respondent, contends that4 since the petitioners chose to file a petition under .ule 10> they cannot in the present action turn around and claim that their case is not a special proceeding* in any case, due process &as not complied &ith rendering the proceedings a 8uo annullable* petitioners sought to establish %ibrada CeruilaDs status, i.e., &hether or not she is the mother of respondent, thus, the action falls &ithin the ambit of =ec. 3!c", .ule 1 of the .ules of Court* 30petitioners did not allege that they are bringing the suit to enforce or protect their right or to prevent or redress a &rong, for their case to be categoriGed as an ordinary civil action* Art. 0 of the Civil Code &hich is being invo$ed by petitioners is a general provision, &hile entries of record of birth in the civil register are governed by .epublic Act +o. 3C03 !Civil .egistry %a&" as amended, and residential 3ecree +o. A01* since the la& provides for a remedy &hen an entry in a record found in the civil registry is erroneous or falsified, petitioners cannot, by their mere allegation, transport their case from the realm of the rules on special proceedings for the correction of entry to that of an ordinary civil case for annulment of a falsified document* in Republic v. Valencia,31 it &as held that the parties &ho must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are the civil registrar and all persons &ho have or &ho are claiming interests &ho &ould be affected thereby* respondent, being a person &hose interests &ould be adversely affected by the petition, is an indispensable party to the case* publication cannot be substituted for notice* respondent cannot be declared in default since she &as not properly notified.32 Anent the second issue, respondent contends that the CA has no authority to rule on the merits of the case since in a petition for annulment of ,udgment on the ground of lac$ of ,urisdiction, its authority is limited to ruling on &hether or not the petitioner &as denied due process of la&* that if the CA &ere to rule on the merits of the case, it &ould have deprived respondent of due process* and that in any case, respondentDs record of birth is not void as %ibrada &as only able to prove that she is not the mother of respondent. 33 reliminarily, this Court notes that &hile the petition states that it is one for revie& on certiorari, it claimed at the same time that the CA committed *rave abuse of discretion amountin* to lac5 of 7urisdiction , &hich is properly a ground for a petition for certiorari under Rule <= and not for a petition for revie6 on certiorari under Rule >=. Considerin* ho6ever the substance of the issues raised herein, 6e shall treat the present petition, as it claims, to be a Petition for Revie6 on Certiorari .?> )s the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of .osilyn an ordinary civil action or a special proceedingH Considering that the petition, based on its allegations, does not (uestion the fact of birth of .osilyn, all matters assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth certificate properly, including the date of birth, fall under .ule 10> of the .ules of Court &hich governs cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil .egistry. -hus, the petition filed by the Ceruilas, alleging material entries in the certificate as having been falsified, is properly considered as a special proceeding pursuant to =ection 3!c", .ule 1 and .ule 10> of the .ules of Court. 3id the Ceruilas comply &ith the re(uirements of .ule 10>H 'e ans&er in the negative. =ec. 3, .ule 10> of the .ules of Court, eEpressly states that4

=6C. 3. Parties. - - - 'hen cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons &ho have or claim any interest &hich &ould be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. )ndeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons &ho have or claim any interest &hich &ould be affected by a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be made parties thereto. 30 As enunciated in Republic v. enemerito,3A unless all possible indispensable parties &ere duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the re(uirements of the rules.3C 5ere, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of .osilynDs birth certificate than .osilyn herself. 5er filiation, legitimacy, and date of birth are at sta$e. etitioners claim that even though .osilyn &as never made a party to the proceeding, it is enough that her name &as included in the caption of the petition. =uch reasoning is &ithout merit. As &e pronounced in 3abayo$Ro6e v. Republic3> &here the mother sought changes in the entries of her t&o childrenDs birth certificates4 Dsince only the 1ffice of the =olicitor 9eneral &as notified through the 1ffice of the rovincial 2iscal, representing the .epublic of the hilippines as the only respondent, the proceedings ta$en, &hich is summary in nature, is short of &hat is re(uired in cases &here substantial alterations are sought. A02de 5-+3 the O552*e +5 the S+72*2t+- Gene-a7, a77 +the- 2nd209en0a,7e 9a-t2e0 0h+u7d ha<e ,een 3ade -e09+ndent0. !he8 2n*7ude n+t +n78 the de*7a-ed 5athe- +5 the *h27d ,ut the *h27d a0 ;e77, t+4ethe- ;2th the 9ate-na7 4-and9a-ent0, 25 an8, as their hereditary rights &ould be adversely affected thereby. A77 +the- 9e-0+n0 ;h+ 3a8 ,e a55e*ted ,8 the *han4e 0h+u7d ,e n+t252ed +- -e9-e0ented . . ..3B !Emphasis supplied"
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)n the present case, only the Civil .egistrar of ;anila &as served summons, &ho, ho&ever, did not participate in the proceedings. -his alone is clearly not sufficient to comply &ith the re(uirements laid do&n by the rules. etitioners further claim that the lac$ of summons on .osilyn &as cured by the publication of the order of the trial court setting the case for hearing for three consecutive &ee$s in a ne&spaper of general circulation. 'e do not agree. #ummons must still be served, not for the purpose of vestin* the courts 6ith 7urisdiction, but to comply 6ith the re8uirements of fair play and due process./0 -his is but proper, to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect her interest if she so chooses. )ndeed, there &ere instances &hen &e ruled that even though an interested party &as not impleaded in the petition, such defect &as cured by compliance &ith =ec. /, .ule 10> on publication. )n said cases, ho&ever, earnest efforts &ere made by the petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties./1 =uch is not the case at bar. .osilyn &as never made a party at all to the proceedings see$ing the cancellation of her birth certificate. +either did petitioners ma$e any effort to summon the =olicitor 9eneral. )t does not ta$e much to deduce the real motive of petitioners in see$ing the cancellation of .osilynDs birth certificate and in not ma$ing her, her guardian, the 3='3, and the .epublic of the hilippines, through the =olicitor 9eneral, parties to the petition. .osilyn &as involved in the rape case against .omeo :alos,os, &here her father, as appearing in the birth certificate, &as said to have pimped her into prostitution. )n the criminal case, the defense contended that the birth certificate of .osilyn should not have been considered by the trial court to prove .osilynDs age and thus find basis for statutory rape, as said birth certificate has been cancelled by the .-C of ;anila, Branch 3>, in the special proceeding antecedent to this petition. -heir efforts in this regard, ho&ever, &ere th&arted &hen the CA overturned Branch 3>Ds decision, and the Court, in 9... +1=. 132>C0-CA/2 considered other evidence as proof of .osilynDs age at the time of the commission of the crime. -here is also no merit in the contention of petitioners that because of the false entries in the birth certificate of .osilyn, the same is void ab initio, hence should be nullified under Art. 0 of the Civil Code, or should be nullified by the CA in eEercise of its peremptory po&er to declare null and void the said certificate. -he function of a petition for annulment of ,udgment, under .ule /C of the .ules of Court, is not to replace the trial courtDs decision sought to be annulled. -he action under =ections 1, 2 and C of said .ule, to &it4 =ection. 1. Covera*e. - - - -his .ule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of ,udgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of .egional -rial Courts for &hich the ordinary remedies of ne& trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. =ec. 2. 1rounds for annulment. - - - -he annulment may be based only on the grounds of eEtrinsic fraud and lac$ of ,urisdiction. 6Etrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it &as availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for ne& trial or petition for relief. =ec. C. Effect of 7ud*ment. - - - A ,udgment of annulment shall set aside the (uestioned ,udgment or final order or resolution and render the same null and void, &ithout pre,udice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. 5o&ever, &here the ,udgment or final order

or resolution is set aside on the ground of eEtrinsic fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for ne& trial had been granted therein. is merely for the annulment of the .-C 3ecision on grounds of eEtrinsic fraud and lac$ of ,urisdiction, nothing more. -he .ules do not allo& the CA to resolve the merits of the petition for the amendment and cancellation of the birth certificate of .osilyn or to substitute its o&n findings thereon. '56.621.6, the petition is $EN#E$ for lac$ of merit.

[G.R. NO. 1570(A : e,-ua-8 2, 2007] REPU&L#. O !"E P"#L#PP#NES, Petitioner, v. !R#N#$A$ R.A. .APO!E, Respondent. -his etition for .evie& on Certiorari 1 see$s to set aside the Court of Appeals !CA" decision 2 dated :anuary 13, 2003 in CA-9... C? +o. AA12>, &hich affirmed the decision of the .egional -rial Court !.-C", Branch 23 of =an :uan, =outhern %eyte dated =eptember 1/, 1BBB granting a petition for change of name. .espondent -rinidad .. A. Capote filed a petition for change of name of her &ard from 1iovanni %. 1allamaso to 1iovanni %adores on =eptember B, 1BB>. )n =pecial roceeding +o. .-/>1,3 Capote as 9iovanniDs guardian ad litem averred4 1. 7.espondent8 is a 2ilipino citiGen, of legal age, married, &hile minor 9)1?A++) +. 9A%%A;A=1, is also a 2ilipino citiGen, siEteen !1A" years old and both are residents of =an :uan, =outhern %eyte &here they can be served &ith summons and other court processes* 2. 7.espondent8 &as appointed guardian 7ad litem8 of minor 9iovanni +. 9allamaso by virtue of a court order in =pecial 7 roc.8 +o. .-/0B, dated 7August 1>, 1BB>8 EEE EEE authoriGing her to file in court a petition for change of name of said minor in accordance &ith the desire of his mother 7&ho is residing and &or$ing abroad8* 3. Both 7respondent8 and minor have permanently resided in =an :uan, =outhern %eyte, hilippines for more than fifteen !10" years prior to the filing of this instant petition, the former since 1BC0 &hile the latter since his birth 7in 1B>28* /. -he minor &as left under the care of 7respondent8 since he &as yet nine !B" years old up to the present* 0. ;inor 9)1?A++) +. 9A%%A;A=1 is the illegitimate natural child of CoraGon . +adores and 3iosdado 9allamaso. 75e8 &as born on :uly B, 1B>2 7,8 prior to the effectivity of the +e& 2amily Code and as such, his mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence

of marriage bet&een them* and 79iovanni8 has been $no&n by that name since birth 7as per his birth certificate registered at the %ocal Civil .egister of =an :uan, =outhern %eyte8* A. -he father, 3iosdado 9allamaso, from the time 79iovanni8 &as born and up to the present, failed to ta$e up his responsibilities 7to him8 on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. 79iovanniDs pleas8 for attention along that line 7fell8 on deaf ears EEE EEE C. 79iovanni8 is no& fully a&are of ho& he stands &ith his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his motherDs surname* >. 79iovanniDs8 mother might eventually petition 7him8 to ,oin her in the @nited =tates and 7his8 continued use of the surname 9allamaso, the surname of his natural father, may complicate 7his8 status as natural child* and
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B. -he change of name 7from8 9)1?A++) +. 9A%%A;A=1 to 9)1?A++) +A31.6= &ill be for the benefit of the minor. .espondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to effect the change of name on 9iovanniDs birth certificate. 5aving found respondentDs petition sufficient in form and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition. 0 ublication of the petition in a ne&spaper of general circulation in the province of =outhern %eyte once a &ee$ for three consecutive &ee$s &as li$e&ise ordered. A -he trial court also directed that the local civil registrar be notified and that the 1ffice of the =olicitor 9eneral !1=9" be sent a copy of the petition and order.C =ince there &as no opposition to the petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a courtappointed commissioner. -he 1=9, acting through the rovincial rosecutor, did not ob,ect* hence, the lo&er court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the change of name from 9iovanni +. 9allamaso to 9iovanni +adores.> 2rom this decision, petitioner .epublic of the hilippines, through the 1=9, filed an appeal &ith a lone assignment of error4 the court a 8uo erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding. .uling that the proceedings &ere sufficiently adversarial in nature as re(uired, the CA affirmed the .-C decision ordering the change of name.B )n this petition, the .epublic contends that the CA erred in affirming the trial courtDs decision &hich granted the petition for change of name despite the non-,oinder of indispensable parties.10 etitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v. 3abrador11 and claims that the purported parents and all other persons &ho may be adversely affected by the childDs change of name should have been made respondents to ma$e the proceeding adversarial.12 'e deny the petition. #-he sub,ect of rights must have a fiEed symbol for individualiGation &hich serves to distinguish him from all others* this symbol is his name.#13 @nderstandably, therefore, no person can change his name or surname &ithout ,udicial authority. 1/ -his is a reasonable re(uirement for those see$ing such change because a personDs name necessarily affects his identity, interests and interactions. -he =tate must be involved in the process and decision to change the name of any of its citiGens. -he .ules of Court provides the re(uirements and procedure for change of name. 5ere, the appropriate remedy is covered by .ule 103, 10 a separate and distinct proceeding from .ule 10> on mere cancellation and correction of entries in the civil registry !usually dealing only &ith innocuous or clerical errors thereon".1A -he issue of non-,oinder of alleged indispensable parties in the action before the court a 8uo is intert&ined &ith the nature of the proceedings there. -he point is &hether the proceedings &ere sufficiently adversarial. =ummary proceedings do not eEtensively address the issues of a case since the reason for their conduct is eEpediency. -his, according to petitioner, is not sufficient to deal &ith substantial or contentious issues allegedly resulting from a change of name, meaning, legitimacy as &ell as successional rights.1C =uch issues are ventilated only in adversarial proceedings &herein all interested parties are impleaded and due process is observed.1> 'hen 9iovanni &as born in 1B>2 !prior to the enactment and effectivity of the 2amily Code of the hilippines", 1B the pertinent provision of the Civil Code then as regards his use of a surname, read4 Art. 3AA. A natural child ac$no&ledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. )f recogniGed by only one of the parents, a natu-a7 *h27d 0ha77 e397+8 the 0u-na3e +5 the -e*+4n2E2n4 9a-ent . !emphasis ours"

Based on this provision, 9iovanni should have carried his motherDs surname from birth. -he records do not reveal any act or intention on the part of 9iovanniDs putative father to actually recogniGe him. ;ean&hile, according to the 2amily Code &hich repealed, among others, Article 3AA of the Civil Code4 Art. 1CA. #77e42t23ate *h27d-en 0ha77 u0e the 0u-na3e and shall be under the parental authority +5 the2- 3+the-, and shall be entitled to support in conformity &ith this Code. EEE EEE EEE ! emphasis ours" 1ur ruling in the recent case of "n Re@ Petition for Chan*e of %ame andAor CorrectionACancellation of Entry in Civil Re*istry of )ulian 3in Carulasan Wan*20 is enlightening4 1ur la&s on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. -he 2amily Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, &hile illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recogniGes their filiation, in &hich case they may bear the fatherDs surname. Applying these la&s, an 277e42t23ate *h27d ;h+0e 5272at2+n 20 n+t -e*+4n2Eed ,8 the 5athe- ,ea-0 +n78 a 42<en na3e and h20 3+the-1 0u-na3e, and d+e0 n+t ha<e a 32dd7e na3e . !he na3e +5 the un-e*+4n2Eed 277e42t23ate *h27d the-e5+-e 2dent252e0 h23 a0 0u*h. )t is only &hen the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subse(uent marriage of his parents or ac$no&ledged by the father in a public document or private hand&ritten instrument that he bears both his motherDs surname as his middle name and his fatherDs surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an ac$no&ledged child.
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-he foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a personDs name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. 2or sure, these matters should not be ta$en lightly as to deprive those &ho may, in any &ay, be affected by the right to present evidence in favor of or against such change. -he la& and facts obtaining here favor 9iovanniDs petition. 9iovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under .ule 103 of the .ules of Court, and complied &ith all the procedural re(uirements. After hearing, the trial court found !and the appellate court affirmed" that the evidence presented during the hearing of 9iovanniDs petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 1CA of the Civil Code, 9iovanni is entitled to change his name as he &as never recogniGed by his father &hile his mother has al&ays recogniGed him as her child. A change of name &ill erase the impression that he &as ever recogniGed by his father. )t is also to his best interest as it &ill facilitate his motherDs intended petition to have him ,oin her in the @nited =tates. -his Court &ill not stand in the &ay of the reunification of mother and son. ;oreover, it is note&orthy that the cases cited by petitioner 22 in support of its position deal &ith cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, a proceeding separate and distinct from the special proceedings for change of name. -hose cases deal &ith the application and interpretation of .ule 10> of the .ules of Court &hile this case &as correctly filed under .ule 103. -hus, the cases cited by petitioner are irrelevant and have no bearing on respondentDs case. 'hile the 1=9 is correct in its stance that the proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, the 1=9 cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on account of its o&n failure to participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled4 -he 1=9 is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. @nli$e petitions for the cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under .ule 10> of the .ules of Court, a petition for change of name under .ule 103 cannot be decided through a summary proceeding. -here is no doubt that this petition does not fall under .ule 10> for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors. -he relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change in the entry is also re(uired to reflect the change in name. #n th20 -e4a-d, [a99e77ee] .a9+te *+3972ed ;2th the -e=u2-e3ent 5+- an ad<e-0a-2a7 9-+*eed2n4 ,8 9+0t2n4 2n a ne;09a9e- +5 4ene-a7 *2-*u7at2+n n+t2*e +5 the 5272n4 +5 the 9et2t2+n. !he 7+;e- *+u-t a70+ 5u-n20hed the OSG a *+98 the-e+5. $e092te the n+t2*e, n+ +ne *a3e 5+-;a-d t+ +99+0e the 9et2t2+n 2n*7ud2n4 the OSG. !he 5a*t that n+ +ne +99+0ed the 9et2t2+n d2d n+t de9-2<e the *+u-t +5 2t0 @u-20d2*t2+n t+ hea- the 0a3e n+- d+e0 2t 3a:e the 9-+*eed2n4 7e00 ad<e-0a-2a7 2n natu-e. -he lo&er court is still eEpected to eEercise its ,udgment to determine &hether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the 1=9 neither opposed the petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte &hen it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot no& complain that the proceedings in the lo&er court &ere not adversarial enough.23 !emphasis supplied" A proceeding is adversarial &here the party see$ing relief has given legal &arning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.2/ .espondent gave notice of the petition through publication as re(uired by the rules. 20 'ith this, all interested parties &ere deemed notified and the &hole &orld considered bound by the ,udgment therein. )n addition, the trial court gave due notice to the 1=9 by serving a copy of the petition on it. -hus, all the re(uirements to ma$e a proceeding adversarial &ere satisfied &hen all interested parties, including petitioner as represented by the 1=9, &ere afforded the opportunity to contest the petition. '"ERE ORE, the petition is hereby $EN#E$ and the :anuary 13, 2003 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-9... C? +o. AA12> A #R%E$.