CRIMPRO DIGEST 20140204 PEOPLE VS BURGOS - JET SIANG

People vs Burgos Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPArelated documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7. Issue: If defendants arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confisc ation of a firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful. Held: No Records disclose that when the police went to defendants house to arrest him upon the information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with themin wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the state, however powerful, doesnt have access to a mans home, his haven of refuge where his individuality can a ssert itself in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he wants around him. In the traditional formulation, a mans house, however hum ble, is his castle, and thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government. The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC: a)When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; b)When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12: A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of d efendants arrest, he wasnt in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any subversive acthe was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have been in fact or actually have been committed first; it isnt enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, assuming they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence. Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject firearm and alleged subversive documents have been disposed of in accordance with law. The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, while the governme nt should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.

UMIL VS RAMOS 1990 - ROBBY SOLIS

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UMIL VS RAMOS 1991 - SANTIAGO TIONGCO

Per Curiam

FACTS: Assailed decisions question the arrests made without warrant on Dural, Roque, Buenaobre,Espiritu, and Nazareno.

In the case of Dural, he was arrested upon confidential intelligence reports that members of the NPAs sparrow unit were in a hospital being treated for gunshot wounds. According to the SC, Durals arrest falls within the ambit of Section 5, Paragraph b, of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, i.e., arrest without a warrant when an offense has just been committed. Issue WON the arrests without warrant were lawful? YES.

In the case of Nazareno, although the killing of a certain Bunye was on December 14 and the arrest was on December 28, the 14 day delay was justified and made to still fall within the ambit of Rule 113 Section 5 b because the authorities came to know of Nazareno only on December 28, and the arrest was to prevent flight . The court admits taking notice of the extrajudicial admissions of the appellants. But the SC rationalized their actions by saying that it was not to determine guilty, but only to determine probable cause.

GO VS CA - JUAN CARLO TEJANO

Held SC notes that in the case of Dural, he was arrested on probable cause of being a member of the CPP NPA, a subversive and outlawed organization. The court held that because of the ideological base of the act, it was a continuing offense, i.e., were Dural given a chance he would have reverted back to attempting to overthrow the government. Section 5 of Rule 113 requires probable cause based on personal knowledge of facts acquired by the arresting officer or private person. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when based on actual facts, ie. Supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the officer making the arrest. The facts in this case are that soldiers from CAPCOM were actually killed by five sparrow members, one of which is Dural, who was being treated in a hospital and identified by the cops. Parenthetically, they were promptly placed under judicial custody after being charged with double murder. In the case of Buenaobre, Roque etc, the facts that supported their warrantless arrest were confidential reports that a certain house in Marikina was being used as a CPP base. They were placed under surveillance by the military, and a courtissued search warrant was obtained. Found were unlicensed firearms, subversive documents, and one Renato Constantine who admitted being a ranking member of the CPP. No prudent man could have said in these cases that it was better for the military to not have acted at all. This would have been neglect of official duties. In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions in Rule 113, whether or not the arrested are guilty of the offense is not the issue. Not evidence of guilt but only probable cause is needed. In the case of Espiritu, who said loudly Bukastuloyangwelganatinhan ggangmagkagulona, and was thereafter arrested, the SC held that they did not deny Espiritu the right to free speech. He could have used that as a defense during pre trial. But the authority of the police officers to make an arrest without a warrant at the time the words were uttered should be balanced carefully with constitutional rights. The SC tilts the scale in favour of authority, but only for purposes of making the arrest, not making the verdict. Go Vs. Court of Appeals 206 SCRA 138 G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

Facts:

1. Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off.

2. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioners plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner.

3. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him.

4. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation.

5. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.

Issue: 2. Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful. 3.

Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted continuing crimes, i.e. subve rsion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.

Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime.

4.

When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat.

Tudtud was described as big bodied and short, usually wore a hat. INVESTIGATION:Officers conducted investigation in the neighborhood consisting mainly of gathering information from the neighbors. ARREST a. Aug 1 1999 morning, Solier informed officers that Tudtud would be returning from Cotabato with marijuana. b. Officers proceeded to the corner where the suspect would disembark.They wore only civilian clothing. c. The two suspects arrived at 8pm carrying a carton marked King Flakes d. Officers approached and allegedly introduced themselves and said that the two matched the description of two suspects arriving with drugs. e. SEARCH:Officers asked Tudtud to open the box they were carrying.Although he was trembling he agreed.After opening the box, there was dried fish visible on top.The officers asked Tudtud to remove them, which revealed plastic bag of marijuana underneath. f. Suspects were informed of their rights then arrested.PNP laboratory confirmed marijuana.Charged with: Illegal possession of prohibited drugs (Rep Act 6425) DEFENSE:Framed for drug possession a. Tudtud was back from selling jeans in Cotabato when an armed individual charged him with his weapon drawn.The person asked him to open a box which did not belong to him and was arrested after drugs were found. b. Also, the two suspects claim that they only met each other after arrest.

b.

RTC:GUILTY.Reclusion perpetua + P500K fine. A:Appeal on grounds of illegal search and seizure (among others)

Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond.

I:WON there was a valid warrantless search pursuant to a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a) Rule 113 SC:NO.There was no probable cause for a warrantless arrest, and thus search was also invalid. 1. 2. 3. Arrest must precede search, not the other way around. RULE:Warrantless arrest on the basis of reliable information is insuff icient.Personal knowledge of the arresting officer is required (Pp. v. Doria elements). Citing as support: a. People v. Burgos personal knowledge required b. People v. Doria elements required to apply Section 5(a) Rule 113 i. Person to be arrested must execute overt act indicating he has just committed a, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
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LARRANAGA VS CA - REINIER JEFFREY ABDON

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PEOPLE VS TUDTUD - FELIX ADORNA

People v. Noel Tudtud and DindoBolong (2003) Tinga FACTS: 1. July-Aug 1999, police officers received information from informant BobongSolier as follows: a. Tudtudsneighbors were complaining that Tudtud was peddling marijuana

4.

5.

6.

ii. Such overt act done in the essence or within view of the arresting officer iii. Reliable information insufficient. Examples of acts not considered sufficient to establish probable cause: a. Looking from side to side while holding abdomen, standing on a corner with eyes moving fast, looking at every person who comes near, putting something in ones pocket, handing over ones ba ggage, riding a motorcycle, holding bag on board a trisikad. (citing all relevant cases) Discussion of cases that deviated from general rule. a. People v. Maspil this was a checkpoint search b. People v. Balingan search of a moving vehicle c. People v. Baigsta both checkpoint search and moving vehicle d. People v. Lising and Pp. v. Montilla consented search e. Only People v. Valdez could support prosecution case BUT:Pp. v. Valdez had a time element where an on-the-spot decision was required. NOT present in this case because officers had the whole day to procure a warrant Other grounds for concluding illegal arrest: a. Neither police nor informant conducted thorough investigation only hearsay evidence from neighbors. b. Even the police officers testified that they had no basis to get a warrant, which was why they didnt apply for one. c. There was no consented search there was evidence that the police pointed a weapon at the suspects and asked them to open the boxes.Consent was obtained through coercion and intimidation.

Nature: Automatic review of RTCs decision finding Nasario Molina y Manamat alias Bobong and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias Boboy, guilty beyond re asonable doubt of violation of Section 8,[3] of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death. Facts: The accused, in conspiracy with each other, was found to possess 946.9 grams of dried marijuana which are prohibited. Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. At about 7:30 am of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City that morning. Consequently, at 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he called for assistance of SPO4 DionisioCloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 am of August 8, 1996, a trisikad passed by. The police ordered the trisikad to stop. SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police and asked Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, Boss, if possible we will settle this. SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. On December 6, 1996, appellants jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The demurrer was denied by the trial court. MR also denied. RTCs sentence: death penalty Solicitor General: prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants.

DISPOSITIVE RTC decision reversed.Defendants acquitted. DISSENT (Quisumbing) 1. There was probable cause based on: a. Informants tip b. Verification of tip through investigation c. Identity of suspects sufficiently established by description of Solier There was no time to get a warrant. There was a consented search. QUOTABLE QUOTES:As it is often said, it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of the police, instead of critically viewing them from the placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers, courts of justice which to be of understanding assistance to law enforcement agencies in the fight against the crime.

Issue: WON the accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto.

2. 3. 4.

Ruling: No.

Search and seizure may be made without a warrant in the following exceptions: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view;

PEOPLE VS MOLINA - DAYSHEELYNBRILLO

PEOPLE V. MOLINA [G.R. No. 133917. February 19, 2001]

(5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search) Permissible warrantless arrests:

Accused-appellant BinadSy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two separate Informations. The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, all members of the police force of Angeles City. Their testimonies can be synthesized that on Sept. 21, 1996 at around 10:00 in the evening SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant the accussed was about to deliver drugs in Thunder Hotel that night. On such basis, PNP Chief of Angeles City Col. Gutierrez immediately formed a team and positioned themselves across McArthur Highway fronting Thunder Inn Hotel. At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by accusedappellant which just arrived and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SP O2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police operative s who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City. When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he found 2 big plastic bags containing crystalline substances, shabu. Accused denied the accusation and narrated a different version.(technicallyang story niyapinalabasna frame-up siya. Pinarasiyasadaan at dinalasapresin to, dinetainsacr at nangpinalabassiyapinahawaklangsakanyayungZesto-O bo x saharap ng media). RTC ruled guilty for illegal possession of shabu but acquitted for illegal posse ssion of ammunition. Hence the appeal. Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police operatives was unlawful; that in the light of the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that prior to his arrest he has been under surveillance for two years, there was therefore no compelling reason for the haste within which the arresting officers sought to arrest and search him without a warrant; that the police officers had sufficient information about him and could have easily arrested him. Accusedappellant further argues that since his arrest was null and void, the drugs that were seized should likewise be inadmissible in evidence since they were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizures and arrest. ISSUE:

(a) arrest in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest effected in hot pursuit (c) arrest of escaped prisoners People v. Doria probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion is based on actual factsA reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Reliable information alone, absent any overt act, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. cur: To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must con-

(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[38] In holding a bag on board a trisikad, appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded Boss, if possible we will settle this. Such response which allegedly reinforced the suspicion of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. The Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Dispositive: Decision of RTC REVERSED and SET ASIDE for lack of evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE VS CHUA - VICTORIA BUENAVENTURA

G.R. Nos. 136066-67 February 4, 2003 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant. FACTS:

WON the warrantless arrest and search made by the police operatives was unlawful , hence the drugs seized are likewise inadmissible. HELD: YES and YES. A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusion of the trial court that the accused was caught in flagrante delicto. It confused the two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto) and of a "stop-and-frisk." In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, instance, the law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, th e arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. While "stop-and-frisk" is the same as a "limited protective search of outer clot hing for weapons." It is a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault the police officer in the course of observing the unusual conduct of the person. In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the "stop and frisk" principles is applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on accused-appellant. Considering that the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained two years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accusedappellant and searching his person. Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended on the information given to them by their confidential informant. Accordingly, before and during that time of the arrest, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that accused-appellant had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view nor a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, or a customs search. It cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing. Furthermore, the court entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the very same items presented at the trial of this case. The items were therefore not marked at the place where they were taken. ACCUSED IS ACQUITTED

2. When Candy Dolim did not return home, her father Rico Dolim sought the help of some of their family members to search for the victim. 3. On December 12, Rico got wind of news that a young girl was found dead in SitioTinotogasan. 4. There he found the lifeless body of Candy Dolim, whose shorts and underwear were hanging from an ankle, while her shirt was rolled up to her throat. Her body manifested several wounds. 5. Rico proceeded to get the help of the police and one Barangay Captain Pedro Gomba. During that process, he heard that a certain Ronnie Cabagtong was involved in the killing of his daughter. This prompted Rico to file a complaint against Ronnie. 6. While Ronnie was under investigation at the police headquarters, his mother, AureaCabagtong, came to the station. She told Rico that she knew what actually happened to Candy and offered to be a witness. Aurea pointed to Baby Cabagtong and Renante Mendez as the perpetrators of the crime. a. Aurea claimed that on the night of December 8, Mendez and Baby went to her house, soaked from the rain. The two had bloodstains on their clothes. The two also conversed with Ronnie. 7. Ronnie Cabagtong on the other hand said that on the night of December 8, he was watching a Betamax show in Kagawad Tesoros house with Baby and Mendez. The victim was also with them. The rest of his eyewitness account are as follows: a. After the first show, Candy left to solicit PBA debts. She was accompanied by Baby and Mendez. Ronnie left five minutes later to meet a certain Dimas. b. While walking he saw Mendez and Baby ravaging Candy. Mendez was on top of Candy while Baby was holding the victims hands. Ronnie then went home. c. Baby and Mendez went to Ronnies house where they had their bloodstained clothes washed. They also threatened Ronnie not to divulge what he witnessed or else they will kill him and his family. d. On the same day Candys body was found, Ronnie and Mendez were a pprehended by one SPO2 NoliCernio. Ronnie was later released and went to Manila to avoid involvement. He eventually decided to talk about the case because he was bothered by his conscience. 8. Another eyewitness, FarvesioBanawis, testified for the prosecution. He said that as he was on his way home, he met three persons, one of whom was Candy Dolim. He said in a sworn affidavit that it was possible Mendez and Baby raped and killed Candy because they were the ones following her. 9. SPO2 Cernio was the one who testified next. He said that he questioned Ronnie and Mendez. Ronnie revealed to him that said Mendez and Baby went to his house during the night of the incident. He also investigated the aforementioned parties, including the victims father, Rico, and members of the latters family.
6

PEOPLE VS MENDEZ - JOHN DOMINIC TUZONBUHANGIN

Facts: 1. On December 8, 1996, 15 year-old Candy Dolim left their house to collect bets on the PBA ending games from the local residents.

a. SPO2Cernio further testified that he filed the case against Renante and Baby because he had been informed that they watched a Betamax show with the victim. 10. The autopsy report revealed that Candy Dolim had five wounds on different parts of her body, with the neck wound being the fatal one. 11. The defense presented its evidence, hinged on the theory that the crime was committed by one Randy Gomba. Their first witness was one Josefina Bernas who testified that she saw a girl being raped by a man. She identified the same to be Randy Gomba. Gomba then proceeded to threaten the Spouses Bernas that if they divulge what happened, hell kill them. a. Isabelo Lucero, Barangay Captain of Brgy. Guilaoangi, Laoang, Northern Samar, confirmed that Josefina told him that she had seen a girl raped and killed and that the assailant was a certain Gomba. 12. Also for the defense, Baby Cabagtong testified that he was arrested on December 13, 1996 when a certain Mejica pointed a gun at him, compelling him to go to the municipal hall of Gamay. There, SPO2 Cernio asked him one question. One Peter Longcop asked him to testify against Mendez because they wanted Baby to implicate him. Baby refused. a. Baby Cabagtong also said that Ronnies testimony was a lie and that SPO2 Cernio convinced the former to testify against them on the condition that the Ronnie be released. 13. Renante Mendez then testified, claiming that he was arrested on December 12, 1996 as a suspect in his case, together with Ronnie, by SPO2 Cernio and other police officers. He added that he was not shown any warrant of arrest. 14. As a rebuttal witness, SPO2 Cernio denied having coached Ronnie. He added that Ronnie was merely invited to the police headquarters, not arrested. On the warrantless arrest of Mendez, Cernio said that they had personal knowledge of his guilt. 15. One ZosimoMejica arrested Baby Cabagtong based on the citizens arrest law. Mejica testified that he collared Baby Cabagtong, telling him that he was being arrested as one of the suspects in the rape-slay of Candy. Mejica based his citizens arrest on AureaCabagtongs statement. 16. RTC rendered its decision convicting Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong guilty of Rape with Homicide, the penalty being death.

Yes. The SC acquitted Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong on the basis of reasonable doubt.

1. The prosecution anchored mainly on the testimonies of Ronnie Cabagtong and his mother, Aurea. Upon closer examination, certain circumstances make these testimonies suspect. a. The Court said that Ronnies testimony on positively identifying the two because of a lantern hanging about five meters away from the trail where the crime had been committed is inconsistent with Mejicas testimony that there were no houses near the area where Candys body was found. The nearest house was at least 50 meters away from the scene. b. The Court indicated that Ronnies behaviour belied that of a person who just witnessed a crime since he went home, took his supper and went to sleep as if nothing happened. c. SPO2Cernio took at face value Ronnies word that he was innocent. It has been held that, to be credible, testimonial evidence should come not only from the mouth of a credible witness, but it should itself be also credible, reasonable, and in accord with human experience. The testimonies of Ronnie and AureaCabagtong do not meet these standards. 2. Regarding circumstantial evidence, the Court said that for evidence to pass muster, these must meet the following criteria: a) there is more than one circumstance; b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the combination of evidence must leave no room for doubt as to the guilt of the accused. The prosecutions defense failed to establish the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. a. Banawis testimony that he saw Candy with the Mendez and Baby does not establish anything more than the fact that the victim was in the company of accused-appellants. This fact does not warrant the conclusion that the two raped Candy. b. The Court is puzzled why Josefina Bernas testimony was not accorded the appropriate investigation rather than persistently going after accusedappellants. c. Baby and Mendez defense is alibi. But it is settled that where the ev idence of the prosecution is itself feeble, particularly as to the identity of the accused as the author of the crime, alibi assumes importance and acquires commensurate strength. The prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of accusedappellants alibi and must rely on the strength of its own evidence. 3. There were also palpable violations of the rights of accused-appellants. They were arrested without warrants. In addition, SPO2 Cerno did not have personal knowledge of the commission of the crime so as to justify the warrantless arrest of Mendez. Personal knowledge of the facts in arrests without warrant under Sec. 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of CrimPro must be based upon probable cause an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspi7

Issue: WON the trial court erred in finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Held:

cion are reasonable when they are based on actual facts. The accused-appellants were likewise not assisted by counsel as mandated by law.

2. WoN the marijuana was seized validly for being in plain view of the police officers (NO) HELD: 1) We a hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: Sec. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; - Under Section 5 (a), a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." - In the case, Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buybust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. - However, the warrantless arrest, search and seizure of Gaddao is invalid - Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught redhanded during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. - Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." In case, there was no reasonable suspicion especially as she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused - Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs as Doria may have left the money in her house, with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. - As the arrest was illegal, the search and seizure is not incidental to the arrest

PEOPLE VS DORIA - LESTER G CAVESTANY

NOTE: Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence.

The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.

FACTS:

- Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. They decided to entrap him via a buy-bust operation. -The poseur-buyer, PO2 Manlangit set aside 1600 pesos as marked money for the entrapment operation, which was then handed to Jun upon transaction. Jun returned an hour later bringing marijuana where he and his associates subsequently arrested Jun but did not find the marked bills on him. Jun said he left the bills to his associate Neneth. Jun led the police to Neneths house. -The police went to Neneths house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. They also found the marked bills. - They arrested Jun and Neneth and brought them to headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is VioletaGaddao y Catama. - The trial court found them guilty. ISSUES: 1. WoN the warrantless arrest of Doria and Gaddao, the search of the latters pe rson and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom is valid

2) The marijuana was not in plain view of the police officers and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution as the contents of the box where the marijuana was partially hidden was not readily apparent to PO Manlangit, one of the arresting officers. - As a general rule, objects in plain view of arresting officers may be seized without a search warrant but must satisfy these requisites: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. - However, if it is not plain view of the police officers, it may not be seized without a warrant except if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. - The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana was found in the house of accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged. Dispositive: Decision of RTC Pasig acting as a Special Court is reversed and modified as follows: 1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). 2. Accused-appellant VioletaGaddao y Catama is acquitted. CONCURRING OPINION PANGANIBAN, J.: I just wish to outline some guidelines on when an arrest or asearch without a warrant is valid. Valid Arrests Without Warrants Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court lays down the basic rule on when an arrest without a warrant is lawful.It states: Sec. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (This is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrests.) (b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (otherwise known as the rule on hot pursuit arrests) (c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while

his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. I shall focus my discussion on the first two rules. In both cases the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense - Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself is a witness to the crime; under Section 5 (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.Let me elaborate. (a)In Flagrante Delicto Arrests Sec 5(a) The accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. There are two elements that must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; (2) and such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. It is not sufficient that the suspect exhibits unusual or strange acts or simply appears suspicious. There must be overt physical act on the part of the suspect, positively indicating that he had just committed a crime or was committing or attempting to commit one. In other words, the behavior or conduct of the person to be arrested must be clearly indicative of a criminal act.If there is no outward indication at all that calls for an arrest, the suspect cannot be validly apprehended under this paragraph, notwithstanding a tip from an informant that he would at the time be undertaking a felonious enterprise. The person to be arrested must manifest any suspicious behavior that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. Citing J. Panganibans own dissent in People v. Montilla -Montilla could not have been perceived as committing a crime while merely alighting from a jeepney carrying a traveling bag and a carton.He did not exhibit any overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in the minds of the police suspicion that he was embarking on a felonious undertaking.There was no outward manifestation that he had just committed or was committing or attempting to commit an offense.Mercifully, the statement of the Court that Montillas arrest was valid b ecause he was caught in flagrante delicto was only an obiter, for what finally nailed him down was his implied waiver of any objection to the validity of his arrest. (b)Hot Pursuit Arrests Sec 5(b) two elements must also concur prior to the arrest: (1) an offense has in fact just been committed,
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(2) and (2) the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrestedxxxcommitted [the offense]. In effecting this type of arrest, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.xxxThe fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. Thus, while the law enforcers may not actually witness the execution of acts constituting the offense, they must have direct knowledge or view of the crime right after its commission.They should know for a fact that a crime was committed.AND they must also perceive acts exhibited by the person to be arrested, indicating that he perpetrated the crime.Again, mere intelligence information that the suspect committed the crime will not suffice.The arresting officers themselves must have personalknowledge of facts showing that the suspect performed the criminal act.Personal knowledge means actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion, based on actual facts, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the crime.[12] In several cases wherein third persons gave law enforcers information that certain individuals or groups were engaged in some felonious activities, such relayed information was not deemed equivalent to personal knowledge of the lawmen. Exception: cases involving continuing offenses for which the culprit could be arrested any time in flagrante delicto.(example: subversion)- In Umil v. Ramos,[16] there were strong objections to the warrantless arrest of a suspected member of the New Peoples Army(NPA),while he was being treated for a gunshot wound in a hospital.He alleged that there was no valid justification for his arrest without a warrant, because he was not then committing any offense nor were there any indications that he had just committed or was about to commit one; he was in fact confined in a hospital. Unlike other so-called common offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding object of overthrowing organized government is attained.[17] In the above instances where the arrests without warrants were held unlawful, so were the searches conducted subsequent thereto. See also J. Panganibans discussion on Valid Searches Without Warrants http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299_jpanganiban.h tm

PO3 JoselitoBurdeos and companions from QC Central Police District, were aboard mobile unit patrolling Fairview, QC. They received a radio dispatch of a report of an alleged holdup of Lourdes Bulos and her daughter Bernadette. Bulos told them that the alleged holduppers had just fled.PO3 Burdeos asked the direction where the alleged holduppers fled and what they were wearing.He also requested Bulos to board the patrol unit in order to facilitate the search. Bulos informed the police officers that one of the suspects was dressed in jeans and a tshirt while the other was dressed in a black top and black pants.The police officers then noticed two men walking alongside the street. Bulos identified them as the alleged holduppers.The police officers slowed down to a stop, alighted from the vehicle, and called out to the suspects.As PO3 Burdeos was approaching the suspects, he noticed that EdwinCadua was about to pull something which was tucked at the right side of his waist.Burdeos promptly pointed his firearm at Cadua and warned him not to move.He then frisked Cadua and found in his possession an unlicensed .38-caliber paltik revolver.PO3 Reynoso Bacnat then apprehended Caduas companion, Joselito Aguilar, who possesses a fan knife. The prosecutor only found the case for Illegal Possession of Firearms warranting the filing of an Information against Cadua. QC RTC and CA found Cadua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the said crime, hence this certiorari. ISSUE: 1. 2. HELD: 1. NO. There is pertinence of par. (a) & (b) of Sec. 5, RoC 113.Through police dispatch to the scene of a crime report and in the presence of complainants, it was ascertained that a robbery had just been committed, and the arresting officers had personal knowledge that petitioner was directly implicated as a suspect. Actual possession of an unlicensed firearm, which petitioner attempted to draw out, by itself, amounts to committing an offense in the presence of the arresting officer contemplated in par. (a), Sec. 5. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is actually being committed, or soon after its commission.The right to search includes in these instances that of searching the person of one who is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means for its commission. NO. The fact that the robbery case was never brought to trial does not mean that the legality of the arrest was tainted, for such arrest does not depend upon the indubitable existence of the crime. It is not necessary that the crime should have been established as a fact in order to regard the detention as legal.The legality of apprehending the accused would not depend on the actual commission of the crime but upon the nature of the deed, where from such characterization it may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment
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WON Caduas right to be protected from any unlawful warrantless arrest has been violated. WON the filing of the charges for illegal possession of firearms is legal since Bulos admitted that the accused Cadua was not the holdupper.

2.

CADUA VS CA - LA CELEBRADO
Cadua v. CA (Celebrado) 2nd Division | G.R. No. 123123 | 19 August 1999 | Quisumbing, J. FACTS:

leaves the decision for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen. Furthermore, the Court acknowledges that police authorities can stop a person forcibly when such action is based on something more than a mere reasonable and articulable suspicion that such a person has been engaged in criminal activity. All told, the arresting officers reasonably acted upon personal knowledge at the time, and not on unreliable hearsay information, to effect a lawful arrest. That the victims of the reported robbery failed to pursue a formal complaint is NOT decisive in this case.What is material is that the officers acted in response to the events which had just transpired and called for the appropriate police response.As to the element of personal knowledge, the officers could not be faulted.It is not correct to say they acted without observing standards of reasonableness and probable cause.They responded promptly to a legitimate complaint of the victims and they had a reasonable suspicion that the persons pointed out at the scene were the perpetrators of the offense.This in itself is sufficient justification for the officers to call the attention of the accused at that point in time when he was identified as a suspect by the complainants. Petitioner avers that complainants admitted that accused was not the holdupper. A perusal of the records shows no such admission.The resolution, issued by Asst. Prosecutor Paragua in the robbery case, stated that no information could yet be filed because complainants manifested doubts as to the identity of their assailants.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.chanrobles virtual law library

The Court here pointed out that the quantum of evidence needed in the preliminary investigation of a warrantless arrest is that which suffices to "engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof, as opposed to prima facie evidence which was of a degree higher. Well-founded belief is similar to the existence of probable cause. In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. The informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to open and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily did. The bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarters for questioning. Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But, precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in appellant's luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if not downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry. Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.

PEOPLE VS MONTILLA - BIANCA DESLATE

People v Montilla

Ruben Montilla was found guilty of administering, transporting, and delivering twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are considered prohibited drugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425 and was sentenced to death.

Montilla was apprehended at around 4 am near a waiting shed at Das Marinas Cavite by two officers with the marijuana in a travelling bag and carton box. They claim to have been tipped off by an informer the day before about a drug courier who would be arriving from Baguio City. Same informer pinpointed Montilla as he alighted from the passenger jeepney.

ISSUE: w/n the warrantless arrest of Montilla is justified.

PEOPLE VS JAYSON - PAT DOMINGO

HELD: YES. However, Montillas penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua citing RPC Art. 63 Sec. 2: People v. Jayson November 18, 1997 Mendoza, J. FACTS Davao City. The information alleged the possession of a .38 caliber revolver with11

out the necessary license to possess the same. In addition, the same .38 caliber revolver was used by Jasyon in killing one Nelson Jordan. -Ihaw nightclub, shot one Nelson Jordan. He was arrested after he had been pointed by eyewitnesses as the gunman. Recovered from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial number 91955, four live bullets, and one empty shell. The firearm and ammunition were covered by a memorandum receipt and mission order issued by Major Francisco Arquillano, Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao Metropolitan District Command. The mission order authorized accused-appellant to carry the said firearm and twelve rounds of ammunition to intensify intelligence coverage and was for a three -month duration subject to several restrictions. - Jayson was initially charged with murder in an information RTC but after plea-bargaining, he was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. Jayson was charged with illegal possession of firearm. the trial court found Jayson guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced him to imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. the information charging him of illegal possession was amended in order to allege that the firearm subject of the charged had been used in the killing of one Nelson Jordan. he was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession by the RTC and sentenced him to 20 years of imprisonment. The RTC found that Jayson acted in good faith, believing that the mission order and memorandum receipt issued to him were valid. - increased the penalty on to reclusion perpetua and, in accordance with Rule 124, 13 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure to carry the firearm. He argues that the failure of the prosecution to present as witness the government official who had certified that he was not a holder of a firearms license is fatal to the prosecution of this case.

1. YES. any warrant from a court. while he and Patrolmen Camotes and Racolas were patrolling in their car, they received a radio message from their camp directing them to proceed to the Ihaw Ihaw on Bonifacio Street where there had been a shooting. Accordingly, they proceeded to the place and there saw the victim, Nelson Jordan. Bystanders pointed to Jayson as the one who had shot Jordan. They then arrested Jayson. Seized from him was a .38 caliber revolver with serial number 91955. The firearm was covered by a mission order and memorandum receipt. Procedure19: There was a shooting. The policemen summoned to the scene of the crime found the victim. Jayson was pointed to them as the assailant only moments after the shooting. In fact Jayson had not gone very far (only ten meters away from the Ihaw-Ihaw), although he was then fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted on the basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that Jayson was the assailant. -appellants person and the seizure from him of the firearm was likewise lawful under Rule 126, 1220.

2. YES. on: the gun is covered by a memorandum receipt and mission order issued by Major Francisco Arquillano, then Deputy Commander of the Civil-Military Operation and CAFGU Affairs of the Davao Metropolitan District Command. d to issue mission orders to civilian agents of the AFP as he was not any of the following officers mentioned in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866, 5(a). Major Arquillano claimed, however, that Colonel Franco Calida, had authorized him to exercise this function so that people would not be swarming in Calidas office. Full faith and credit cannot be given to such bare assertion. Not only was there no written delegation of authority to Major Arquillano, it is even doubtful whether Col. Calida, who, as commander of the unit had authority to issue mission orders, could delegate this authority to his deputy. -appellant qualified to be issued a mission order because he was a mere reserve of the Citizen Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) without regular monthly compensation. In fact he worked as a bouncer in a nightclub, and it was as a bouncer that he used the gun seized from him. clear that, in carrying the firearm inside the nightclub where he was working as a bouncer, Jayson violated the restrictions in the mission order. These restrictions
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ISSUES 1. WON the warrantless arrest and search were valid. 2. WON Jayson is guilty of illegal possession of firearm. 3. Whether the provisions of the recently enacted R.A. No. 8294, amending P.D. No. 1866, can be applied to this case on the theory that it is more favorable to Jayson.

RATIO

prohibited him from carrying firearms in places where people converge unless on official mission. issued to him sufficed as legal authority for him to carry the firearm. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses because the offense committed is malumprohibitum punishable by special law.

3. NO the new law, the latter cannot be applied in this case so as to favor Jason in view of the proviso in 1 that the first paragraph, providing for lighter penalty, does not apply to cases where another crime has been committed. Nor can the third paragraph be applied by considering the illegal possession of firearm as a mere aggravating circumstance because, although the gun seized was used in the commission of a crime, this case concerns solely the charge of illegal possession of firearm. The criminal case for homicide is not before us for consideration. ed in accordance with the ruling in People v. Quijada, that a person who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm is guilty of homicide or murder as the case may be under the Revised Penal Code and aggravated illegal possession of firearm under P.D. No. 1866, 1, par. 2. DISPOSITION The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. -

TERRY VS OHIO - MCGYVER GUILDENSTERN DORIA

On warrantless arrests Notwithstanding the ruling on the limits of a Terry search, warrantless arrests still require probable cause. Rule 113, sec. 5. (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and x xx On exclusionary rule Exclusionary rule has its limitations it cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground that such conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted intrusions upon constitutional protections. Facts: While on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many years, Cleveland Police Department detective Martin McFadden, saw two men, John W. Terry and Richard Chilton, standing on a street corner and acting in a way the officer thought was suspicious.

McFadden, well-known for his skill in apprehending pickpockets, observed the two proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window. Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a corner. After one of these trips, they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly after a brief conversation Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up", detective McFadden followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The plainclothes officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something", whereupon McFadden spun Terry around, patted down his outside clothing, and felt a pistol in his overcoat pocket. He reached inside the overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove the gun. The officer ordered the three into the store. He removed Terry's overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under Terry's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Terry and Chilton were subsequently charged with carrying concealed weapons. The defense of the charged individuals moved to suppress the use of the seized weapons as evidence on grounds that the search and subsequent seizure were a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Though the trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that Terry and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the officer for his own protection had the right to pat down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The trial court made a distinction between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a fullblown search for evidence of crime. Terry and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed the conviction, and the Ohio State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no substantial constitutional question" was involved. YES YES YES

Issue: w/n the stop and frisk of Terry et al was reasonable w/n the subsequent warrantless was valid w/n the weapons are admissible as evidence against Terry et al Held: Whether the stop and frisk of Terry was reasonable

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When is a person seized and what constitutes a search Seizure - whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away Search in Terry - a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons; a search is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly What is reasonable In justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. Objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate. In this case there can be no question, then, that Officer McFadden 'seized' petitioner and subjected him to a 'search' when he took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing. Two governmental interests are involved. a. General interest - effective crime prevention and detection It was this legitimate investigative function Officer McFadden was discharging when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions. He had observed Terry, Chilton, and Katz go through a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warranted further investigation. b. Immediate interest of the police officer self-preservation There is a need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm. Distinction between a search incident to an arrest and a limited search for weapons a. Search incident to a lawful arrest although justified in part by the acknowledged necessity to protect the arresting officer from assault with a concealed weapon, also justified on other grounds and can therefore involve a relatively extensive exploration of the person b. Limited search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer of others nearby may realistically be characterized as something less than a 'full' search, even though it remains a serious intrusion

An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual's freedom of movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. The protective search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person. It does not follow that because an officer may lawfully arrest a person only when he is apprised of facts sufficient to warrant a belief that the person has committed or is committing a crime, the officer is equally unjustified, absent that kind of evidence, in making any intrusions short of an arrest. Proper balance narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience. Whether the subsequent warrantless was valid No probable cause at the onset. BUT stop and frisk led to McFadden actually having personal knowledge that Terry and company were carrying concealed weapons contrary to law. The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with McFadden's hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery--which, it is reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve the use of weapons--and nothing in their conduct from the time he first noticed them until the time he confronted them and identified himself as a police officer gave him sufficient reason to negate that hypothesis. Whether the weapons are admissible as evidence against Terry et al The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer. We conclude that the revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence against him. At the time he seized petitioner and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous, and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was
14

appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which he sought. Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts.

PADILLA VS CA - JYRINEENTERIA
Padilla v Court of Appeals March 12, 1997 Ponente: J. Francisco

fle lying horizontally at the front by the driver's seat. It had a long magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode. He asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily that they were at his home. SPO Mercado modified the arrest of Padilla by including as its ground illegal possession of firearms. SPO Mercado then read to Padilla his constitutional rights. At the Traffic Division, Padilla voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietroberreta pistol. He also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional long magazines and one short magazine. During the investigation, Padilla admitted possession of the firearms stating that he used them for shooting. He was not able to produce any permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms. Certification that said firearms were not registered to Robin were produced later on.

FACTS

At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Manarang and Perez were inside the Manukansa Highway Restaurant to seek shelter from the rain when he noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get into an accident considering the inclement weather. Manarang heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), asked somebody to attend to the victim then reported the incident to the police via radio and thereafter gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacanbridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of petitioner. The driver rolled down the window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as the actor Robin Padilla (in a leather jacket!). Upon raising his hands, a gun tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed. SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers. SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really was covered by legal papers, it would have to be shown in the office. After disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by appellant. By that time, a crowd had formed at the place. SPO Mercado took over the matter and informed appellant that he was being arrested for the hit and run incident. He pointed out to appellant the fact that the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and the hood were dented. Padilla arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand. His gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant's back right pocket. SPO Mercado saw this and so when appellant turned around as he was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine from appellant. Suspecting that Padilla could also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented Padilla from going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door of Padilla's vehicle. He saw a baby armaliteri-

Padilla was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the RTC with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866. The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, but granted his application for bail. During the arraignment, a plea of not guilty was entered for Padilla after he refused, to make any plea. Padilla waived in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of the case.

RTC convicted Padilla of the crime charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum".

Padilla filed his notice of appeal. Pending the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor-General, convinced that the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision sustaining petitioner's conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads.CA affirmed the decision, cancelled the bailbond and directed RTC to issue the Order of Arrest of Padilla. After his vigorous resistance and success on the intramural of bail, the SolGen now makes a complete turnabout by praying for Padillas acquittal.

ISSUES

1.

WON the arrest was illegal

2. WON he is confidential agent authorized under a mission order and a memorandum receipt to carry the subject firearms. 3. WON the penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishmen RATIO
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1.

NO. The warrantless arrest is valid because of the following:

(a) Warrantless arrests are sanctioned under Sec. 521. Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene." The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime - all created a situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. A suspect cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action. Also Padilla was caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer. b) The policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Also, having stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. It can be said then that the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information.
"Sec. 5.Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Court said that objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Also, by applying for bail, petitioner waived such irregularities and defects. ON THE FIREARMS SEIZED: The authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. Revolver and M-16 rifle magazine was in plain view, and was inadvertently discovered when he raised his arm. The M-16 itself was immediately apparent as they took a casual glance at the Pajero. The other firearms were voluntarily surrendered That latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any purported defect. Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.

2.

NO

In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution.

Petitioner's purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances.

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The evidence adduced indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were prepared and executed long after appellant had been apprehended on October 26, 1992.

Issue:

Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug

The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably controverted. Police Supt. Durendes denied under oath his signature on the dorsal side of the Mission Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his behalf. His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as "Durembes." In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices have the authority to issue Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts under the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs. PNP Supt. RodialoGumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere deputy commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized source, petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and effect.

W/N the warrantless search and arrest are valid W/N the evidence is invalid by due to fruit of poisonous tree Held: Yes/Cured Invalid Ratio: Validity of Arrest

3.

NO

It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so much the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits.

Appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Based on the jurisprudence, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal

Admissibility of evidence

Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case.

PEOPLE VS RACHO - JOHN RAYMUNDFULLECIDO

People v Rancho Facts:

a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu This was informed to the PDEA Appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu.

There are exemptions on warrantless search o 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; o 2. Search of evidence in "plain view;" o 3. Search of a moving vehicle; o 4. Consented warrantless search; o 5. Customs search; o 6. Stop and Frisk; and o 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search The main cause of the arrest is the tip from the agent o The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of
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facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense.Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved from the septic tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without underwear. Her face bore bruises. Results of the autopsy revealed the following findings CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; Traumatic Head Injury, Contributory REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00 o'clock position corresponding to the face of a watch edges congested with blood clots. Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were informed by Isip that her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was missing. According to her, it was unlikely for appellant to just disappear from the apartment since whenever he would go out, he would normally return on the same day or early morning of the following day. SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a townmate of appellant was working in a pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan City. They proceeded to said place. The owner of the factory confirmed to them that appellant used to work at the factory but she did not know his present whereabouts. Appellant's townmate, on the other hand, informed them that appellant could possibly be found on 8th Street, Grace Park, Caloocan City. The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the house under construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white short pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found inside another room a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of appellant. Also found in the yard, three arms length away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellant's belongings. These items were brought to the police station. A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to the office of the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 VirgilioVillano retrieved the victim's underwear from the septic tank. After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in Barangay ObarioMatala, Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the Valenzuela Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. Also, when appellant came face to face with the victim's mother and aunt, he confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators. On July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision convicting appellant of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a total of P73,000.00 to the victim's heirs. ISSUE FOR CRIM PRO PURPOSES: WON there was a violation of Mahinays constitutional rights during the arrest and custodial investigation. HELD: THERE WAS NO VIOLATION. RATIO: Mahinay claims that he was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan, Batangas. The police officers allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in
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PEOPLE VS MAHINAY - DAN GALANG

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LARRY MAHINAY Y AMPARADO (1999) Per Curiam INFORMATION: That on or about the 26th day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion of said sexual assault, the above-named accused, choke and strangle said MARIA VICTORIA CHAN Y CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim died. FACTS: Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on November 20, 1953. His task was to take care of Isip's house which was under construction adjacent to her old residence situated inside a compound in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian Street. On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., Mahinay joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around 10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was already drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends. Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store fronting the compound, saw Ma. Victoria on that same day three to four times catching birds inside Isip's unfinished house around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The unfinished house was about 8 meters away from Rivera's store. Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed appellant that there was none left of it. She notice that appellant appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought. His hair was disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a dazed manner. She asked why he looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he left and walked back to the compound. Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that night. On the following day, June 26, 1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant alighted at the top of the bridge of the North Expressway and had thereafter disappeared. That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan.

Manila. There, appellant heard the police officer's plan to salvage him if he would not admit that he was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession. The court found out that Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been informed of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of accused Larry Mahinay given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his person. He did not even informed the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his statement on July 8, 1995 that he was forced, coersed or was promised of reward or leniency. That his confession abound with details know only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed and explained to the accused his constitutional rights and was present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the statement given by the accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem findings shows that the cause of death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the accused that he pushed the victim and the latter's head hit the table and the victim lost consciousness. There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the statement. There was no medical certificate submitted by the accused to sustain his claim that he was mauled by the police officers. Another thing that militates against appellant is his extra judicial confession, which he, however, claims was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. But his contention is belied by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438. It is high-time to educate the lawenforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal developments: 1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by said person;

2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him; 3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice; 4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf; 5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made; 6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the most expedient means - telephone, radio, letter or messenger - with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished; 7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same; 8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak; 9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun; 10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements; 11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the award of civil indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00 moral damages.

PEOPLE VS VALDEZ - CARLOS S. HERNANDEZ JR.

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People v. Valdez CarlosTheFierce Doctrine: Tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. FACTS: SPO1 Bernardo Mariano was in the Municipality of Banaue, Ifugao waiting for a ride to report for work in Lagawe, Ifugao.A civilian asset approached him and intimated that an Ilocano person was ready to transport marijuana. This asset described to him the physical appearance of the suspect as thin and possessing a green bag.Mr. Mariano invited the asset and together they proceeded to Barangay O-ong, Hingyon, Ifugao.There they alighted and stopped and ordinary Dangwa passenger bus bound for Baguio City.Aboard on this bus, they did not find the person concerned and reaching Barangay Pitawan, Hingyon, Ifugao, they stepped out of the vehicle and waited for the air conditioned Dangwa bus bound for Manila. When this bus arrived, Police Officer Mariano boarded the aircon bus and looked for that person from among the passengers and noticed him holding the green bag.He immediately ordered the person to get out of the bus. This fellow followed holding the bag.Once outside, he further ordered the suspect to open the bag and saw a water jug colored red and white and a lunch box .He told this man to open the jug and the lunch box and when opened, he saw marijuana leaves as contents. At this time, suspect revealed his name to be Samuel Yu Valdez.With this discovery, the asset was left behind and Peace Officer Mariano escorted the accused to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Provincial Headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao.He turned over the accused including the contents of the green bag to his superiors forfurther investigation. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid HELD: Yes. The warrantless arrest is valid. RATIO: 1.) Valdez was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. A crime was actually being committed by the appellant, thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, which allow a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. RULE 113, SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arreste d has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; . . . 2. There was sufficient probable cause for said police officer to believe that appellant was then and there committing a crime. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. In this case, police officer Mariano was tipped off by a civili an asset that a thin Ilocano person with a green bag was about to transport marijuana from Banaue, Ifugao.Said information was received by SPO1 Mariano the very same morning he was waiting for a ride in Banaue to report for work in Lagawe, the capital town of Ifugao province. Thus, faced with such on-the-spot information, the law enforcer had to respond quickly to the call of duty.Obviously, there was not enough time to secure a search warrant considering the time involved in the process. It must be noted that the target of the pursuit was just the thin Ilocano person with a green bag and no other.And so, when SPO1 Mariano inspec ted the bus bound for Manila, he just singled out the passenger with the green bag.Evidently, there was definite information of the identity of the person engaged in transporting prohibited drugs at a particular time and place. 3. SPO1 Mariano had probable cause to stop and search the buses coming from Banaue in view of the information he got from the civilian a sset that somebody having the same appearance as that of appellant and with a green bag would be transporting marijuana from Banaue.He likewise had probable cause to search appellants belongings since he fits the description given by the civilian asset. 4. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the police officer, any evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible against appellant. 4. Jurisprudence is replete with instances where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. People v. Malmstedt and Manalili v. Court of Appeals were cited among others as cases where the Court upheld the warrantless arrest on the basis of a tipped information.

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