The Arab-Israeli Conflict Causes and Consequences Causes 1.

Jewish vs Arab Nationalism The Arab-Israeli Conflict Causes and Consequences Causes 1. Jewish vs Arab Nationalism 2. British decision to end mandate . !N role" #artition $lan %. Israel&s declaration of inde$endence '. Arab re(ection of the state of Israel ). Israel&s control of the area *. +ise of #alestinian Nationalist movements Consequences 1. #rotracted conflict, 1-%./ 1-')/ 1-)*/ 1-* 2. Increased su$er$ower influence in 0iddle 1ast . +ole of the #23 %. 4rowth of e5treme 6rou$s '. Increase in $olitical activism and violence ). 7ardliners on both sides *. 8low #eace #rocess 1.6. Cam$ 9avid Accords .. !N o$erations in 0id 1ast 3slo 0ediation -. :ailure of 2;;; Cam$ 9avid CA!818 1. J1<I87 vs A+AB NATI3NA2I80 Arab Nationalism The rise of Arab Nationalism too= root in the 1-th centur>/ where a national identit> too= roots amon6 the Arabic-s$ea=in6 $o$ulations of the 3ttoman 1m$ire. B> <orld <ar I/ this identit> develo$ed into a full>fled6ed revolutionar> movement/ a revolt a6ainst the 3ttoman 1m$ire.

7owever/ it was onl> after <orld <ar II when Arab nationalism 6raduall> too= the form of a $olitical movement. The $ast was 6lorified/ $olitical consciousness was raised and a nationalist s$irit was =indled b> education of >oun6 Arabs. 7owever/ Arabs had different identities and lo>alties to tribe/ sect/ re6ion/ and reli6ion. <ithin the Arab identit>/ there was tension between Iraqi/ 8>rian/ 16>$tian/ and other re6ional identities. There were differences in lan6ua6e and reli6ion also. Therefore it was hard to 6et some form of unit>. <ith such odds battlin6 a6ainst the movement/ it became all the more im$ortant to =ee$ #alestine in Arab hands. It was ho$ed that Arab unit> would be for6ed on the anvil of war a6ainst the common enem>. #an-Arabism is a movement for unification amon6 the Arab $eo$les and nations of the 0iddle 1ast. It is sim$l> defined as the desire to for6e a sin6le Arabian su$er state. #an-Arabism has tended to be secular and often socialist/ and has stron6l> o$$osed colonialism and <estern $olitical involvement in the Arab world. :rom the 1- ;s/ hostilit> toward ?ionist aims in #alestine was a ma(or rall>in6 $oint for Arab nationalists. The movement found official e5$ression after <orld <ar II in the Arab 2ea6ue and in such unification attem$ts as the Arab :ederation @1-'.A of Iraq and Jordan/ the !nited Arab +e$ublic/ the Arab !nion @1-'.A/ the !nited Arab 1mirates/ and the Arab 0a6hreb !nion. The $rinci$al instrument of #an-Arabism in the earl> 1-);s was the BaBath $art>/ which was active in most Arab states. 4amal Abdul Nasser of 16>$t/ who was not a BaBathist/ e5$ressed similar ideals of Arab unit> and socialism. The defeat of the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli <ar of 1-)* and the death @1-*;A of Nasser set bac= the cause of #an-Arabism. Jewish Nationalism Jewish Nationalism or ?ionism e5$resses the historical lin= between the Jewish $eo$le and Israel. ?ionism arose as an active national movement in the 1-th centur>. 9ue to anti-semitism/ Jews have faced $ersecution and numerous massacres/ such as the slau6hter b> the Crusaders/ burnin6 at the 8ta=e durin6 the 8$anish Inquisition and in the NaCi 7olocaust. These actions have been made on several $rete5ts/ such as social/ economic/ reli6ious or even national. Alon6side these/ the> have been e5$elled from almost ever> 1uro$ean countr>. There came a need to have a land of their own/ a $lace where no more $ersecution ta=es $lace D their 4od-6iven homeland/ Israel.

This area is =nown as the famous 2and of Israel. Accordin6 to the Bible/ $articularl> in 4enesis/ the 2and of Israel was $romised as an everlastin6 $ossession to the descendants of 7ebrew $atriarchs Abraham/ Isaac and Jacob b> 4od/ ma=in6 it the #romised 2and. 3n that da>/ 4od made a covenant with Abram/ sa>in6, ETo >our descendants I have 6iven this land/ from the river of 16>$t as far as the 6reat river the 1u$hrates. The land of the Fenites/ FeniCites/ Fadmonites" the 7ittites/ #eriCCites/ +efaim" the 1morites/ Canaanites/ 4ir6ashites and Jebusites.E - 4enesis 1',1.-21 ?ionism also $romoted a reassertion of Jewish culture. An im$ortant element in this reawa=enin6 was the revival of 7ebrew/ lon6 restricted to litur6> and literature/ as a livin6 national lan6ua6e/ for use in 6overnment and the militar>/ education and science/ the mar=et and the street. 9es$ite =nowled6e that #alestine @the 2and of IsraelA had an Arab $o$ulation/ few re6arded the Arab $resence as a real obstacle to the fulfillment of ?ionism. At that time in the late 1-th centur>/ Arab nationalism did not >et e5ist in a stron6 form/ and the Arab $o$ulation of #alestine was s$arse. :riction between it and the returnin6 Jews was believed to be easil> avoided. Contraril>/ the renewed Jewish $resence in the 2and met with militant Arab o$$osition. It was a clash between two $eo$les both re6ardin6 the countr> as their own - the Jews b> virtue of their historical and s$iritual connection/ and the Arabs because of their centuries-lon6 $resence in the countr>. 7avin6 faced much re(ection and lon6in6 for a land where their $eo$le are free from $ersecutions as the> have e5$erienced before/ the Jews naturall> feel a stron6 nationalist emotion for Israel. 2. B+ITI87 91CI8I3N T3 1N9 0AN9AT1 9urin6 <<I/ after 9amascus @in the 3ttoman 1m$ireA fell/ the ArabsB belief in British honest> in which the> had been led to believe the British would su$$ort a #alestinian state/ was shattered b> two events which too= $lace in November 1-1*. In +ussia the Bolshevi=s seiCed $ower. The> bro=e off fi6htin6 the 4ermans and $ublished the 8>=es-#icot A6reement to show the tric=er> of the Im$erial +ussian 6overnmentBs allies. The Arabs were furious when the> realised that the A6reement had been made onl> a >ear after 0c0ahon had $romised British su$$ort for their inde$endence.

<orse/ the Bolshevi=s $ublished the A6reement (ust a few da>s after the British :orei6n 8ecretar>/ Arthur Balfour/ wrote to 2ord +othsGchild/ the leadin6 ?ionist in Britain, :orei6n 3ffice November 2nd/ 1-1*. 9ear 2ord +othschild/ I have much $leasure in conve>in6 to >ou/ on behalf of 7is 0a(est>Bs 4overnment/ the followin6 declaration of s>m$ath> with Jewish ?ionist as$irations which has been submitted to/ and a$$roved b>/ the Cabinet. E7is 0a(est>Bs 4overnment view with favour the establishment in #alestine of a national home for the Jewish $eo$le/ and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this ob(ect/ it bein6 clearl> understood that nothin6 shall be done which ma> $re(udice the civil and reli6ious ri6hts of e5istin6 non-Jewish communities in #alestine/ or the ri6hts and $olitical status en(o>ed b> Jews in an> other countr>.E I should be 6rateful if >ou would brin6 this declaration to the =nowled6e of the ?ionist :ederation. Hours sincerel>/ Arthur James Balfour This letter became =nown as the Balfour 9eclaration and was the basis of British $olic> towards the settlement of Jews in #alestine. As for the #alestinian Arabs who made u$ about -2 $er cent of the $o$uGlation/ all that the> 6ot was a $romise that the British would $rotect their civil and reli6ious ri6hts. The ?ionists saw the 9eclaration as a 6reen li6ht to set u$ a national home in #alestine. To the Arabs/ it was another act of treacher>. British 0andate of #alestine The !nited Fin6dom was 6ranted control of #alestine b> the Iersailles #eace Conference which established the 2ea6ue of Nations. 9urin6 <orld <ar I/ the British had made two $romises re6ardin6 territor> in the 0iddle 1ast. Britain had $romised the local Arabs/ throu6h 2awrence of Arabia/ inde$endence for a united Arab countr> coverin6 most of the Arab 0iddle 1ast/ in e5chan6e for their su$$ortin6 the British" and Britain had $romised to create and foster a Jewish national home as laid out in the Balfour 9eclaration/ 1-1*. The 1- * #eel +e$ort ar6ued for a further $artition of #alestine/ se$aratin6 it into se$arate Arab and Jewish states. The 1- . <oodhead +e$ort reduced the Jewish 8tate to less than one $ercent of the ori6inal British 0andate. The ?ionists re(ected both. 9urin6 and after <orld <ar II/ Jewish militanc> increased/ escalatin6 as the British established relocation cam$s in C>$rus for ille6al immi6rants/ and tried

to de$ort interce$t ille6al immi6rants to their countries of ori6in/ notabl> 4erman>. The 1-%) 0orrison #lan advocated the se$aration of #alestine into two se$arate states for Jews and Arabs/ with British control over =e> areas. This was re(ected/ and the !nited Nations convened on A$ril 2nd/ 1-%* to determine #alestine&s fate. The !N voted for a se$aration of #alestine into two se$arate states/ with control 6iven to Trans(ordan. The ?ionist-led Jews tentativel> a6reed to the $lan/ while the Arabs considered it unacce$table. This led to future conflict in late 1-%* and earl> 1-%. that $receded the <ar for Inde$endence. . !N +321 AN9 T71 #A+TITI3N #2AN 7owever/ the British 6overnment $laced limitations on Jewish immi6ration to #alestine. :ollowin6 << II/ 2';/;;; Jewish refu6ees were stranded in dis$laced $ersons @9#A cam$s in 1uro$e. 9es$ite the $ressure of world o$inion/ in $articular the re$eated requests of !8 #resident 7arr> 8. Truman and the recommendations of the An6loAmerican Committee of Inquir>/ the British refused to lift the ban on immi6ration and admit onl> 1;;/;;; dis$laced $ersons to #alestine. The Jewish under6round forces then united and carried out several attac=s a6ainst the British. In 1-%)/ the Ir6un blew u$ the Fin6 9avid 7otel in Jerusalem/ the headquarters of the British administration/ =illin6 -2 $eo$le. British 6overnment decided in :ebruar> 1-%* that it would hand the $roblem over to the !nited Nations/ and would leave #alestine in 0a> 1-%.. The !nited Nations a$$ointed a 8$ecial Committee on #alestine @=nown b> its initials as !N8C3#A/ which re$orted in Au6ust 1-%* in favour of the $artition of #alestine into two states/ Jewish and Arab/ within a (oint frameGwor= which would maintain their economic unit>. The !nited Nations/ the successor to the 2ea6ue of Nations/ attem$ted to solve the dis$ute between the Jews and Arabs in #alestine.3n 2November 1-%*/ !N 4eneral Assembl> voted to 1 / with 1; abstentions/ in favour of the #artition #lan for #alestine or !nited Nations 4eneral Assembl> +esolution 1.1. The $lan would have $artitioned the territor> of <estern #alestine into Jewish and Arab states/ with the 4reater Jerusalem area/ encom$assin6 Bethlehem/ comin6 under international control. The !nited Fin6dom refused to im$lement the $lan/ ar6uin6 it was not acce$table to both sides. It also refused to share with the !N #alestine

Commission the administration of #alestine durin6 the transitional $eriod/ and decided to terminate the British mandate of #alestine on 0a> 1'th/ 1-%.. The failure of the British 6overnment and the !nited Nations to im$lement this $lan/ $rior a6reement between the Jewish A6enc> and Fin6 Abdullah to divide #alestine between them/ and re(ection of the $lan b> the Arabs resulted in the 1-%. Arab-Israeli <ar. The countr> once =nown as #alestine was now divided into three $arts/ each under se$arate $olitical control. The 8tate of Israel encom$assed over ** $ercent of the territor>. Jordan occu$ied 1ast Jerusalem and the hill countr> of central #alestine @the <est Ban=A. 16>$t too= control of the coastal $lain around the cit> of 4aCa @the 4aCa 8tri$A. The #alestinian Arab state envisioned b> the !N $artition $lan was never established. The res$onse b> #alestineBs nei6hbors was overwhelmin6l> ne6ative. Intent on $reventin6 an> Jewish entit> in the re6ion/ the> re(ected the $lan/ and in what was to be a $recursor to man> more wars/ the armies of 2ebanon/ 8>ria/ Jordan/ 16>$t and Iraq invaded the new countr> with the declared intent of destro>in6 it.

%. Israel&s declaration of inde$endence and Israel&s control of the area and the 1stablishment of 8tate of Israel The 9eclaration of Inde$endence of the 8tate of Israel was $ublicl> read in Tel Aviv on 0a> 1%/ 1-%./ before the e5$iration of the British 0andate of #alestine at midni6ht. The new state and its 6overnment was reco6niCed de facto minutes later b> the !nited 8tates and three da>s later de (ure b> the 8oviet !nion. It was/ however/ o$$osed b> man> others/ $articularl> Arabs @both the surroundin6 Arab states and the #alestinian ArabsA/ who felt it was bein6 established at their e5$ense. In 1-';/ the Fnesset@le6islative branch of the Israeli 6overnmentA $assed the 2aw of +eturn which 6ranted all Jews the ri6ht to immi6rate to Israel. This/ to6ether with the influ5 of Jewish refu6ees from 1uro$e and the later flood of e5$elled Jews from Arab countries/ had the effect of creatin6 a lar6e and a$$arentl> $ermanent Jewish ma(orit> in Israel. :uthermore/ the Absentee #ro$ert> 2aw that was $assed in the same >ear $rovided for confiscation of the $ro$ert> and land left behind b> de$artin6 #alestinians/ the so-called EabsenteesE. Arabs who never left

Israel/ and received citiCenshi$ after the war/ but sta>ed for a few da>s in a nearb> villa6e had their $ro$ert> confiscated. About ;/;;;- '/;;; #alestinians became E$resent absenteesE - $eo$le $resent at the time but considered absent. Jerusalem After establishment/ Israel $roclaimed Jerusalem as its ca$ital in 1-'; and all the branches of Israeli 6overnment @#residential/ 2e6islative/ Judicial and AdministrativeA are seated in Jerusalem. In 1-';/ 6iven that the cit> was divided between Israel and Jordan/ this $roclamation related onl> to western Jerusalem. 7owever/ after the 8i5 9a> <ar in 1-)*/ Israeli le6islation incor$orated 1ast Jerusalem into Israel/ anne5in6 it to the munici$alit> of Jerusalem/ and ma=in6 it a de facto $art of its ca$ital. Israel enshrined the status of united Jerusalem/ west and east/ as its undivided ca$ital/ in IsraelBs 1-.; Basic 2aw, Jerusalem/ Ca$ital of Israel. The Tem$le 0ount/ 6round Cero in Jerusalem/ to Jews and some Christians /or Al-7aram As-8harif @the noble sanctuar>A to Arabs and 0uslims/ was the site of the first and second Jewish Tem$le in Jerusalem. Accordin6 to Judaism/ it is to be the site of the third and final Tem$le to be rebuilt with the comin6 of the 0essiah. It is also the site of two ma(or 0uslim reli6ious shrines/ the 9ome of the +oc= and Al-Aqsa 0osque. It is the holiest site in Judaism and the third holiest site in Islam Treatment of Arabs @#alestiniansA in re6ion Israel established a militar> administration to 6overn the #alestinian residents of the occu$ied <est Ban= and 4aCa. !nder this arran6ement/ #alestinians were denied man> basic $olitical ri6hts and civil liberties/ includin6 freedom of e5$ression/ freedom of the $ress and freedom of $olitical association. #alestinian nationalism was criminaliCed as a threat to Israeli securit>/ which meant that even dis$la>in6 the #alestinian national colours was a $unishable act. All as$ects of #alestinian life were re6ulated/ and often severel> restricted b> the Israeli militar> administration. :or e5am$le/ Israel forbade the 6atherin6 wild th>me @CaJtarA/ a basic element of #alestinian cuisine. Israeli $olicies and $ractices in the <est Ban= and 4aCa have included e5tensive use of collective $unishments such as curfews/ house demolitions and closure of roads/ schools and communit> institutions. 7undreds of #alestinian $olitical activists have been de$orted to Jordan or 2ebanon/ tens of thousands of acres of #alestinian land have been confiscated/ and thousands of trees have been u$rooted. 8ince 1-)*/ over ;;/;;; #alestinians have been im$risoned without trial/ and over

half a million have been tried in the Israeli militar> court s>stem. Torture of #alestinian $risoners has been a common $ractice since at least 1-*1/ and doCens of $eo$le have died in detention from abuse or ne6lect. Israeli officials have claimed that harsh measures and hi6h rates of im$risonment are necessar> to thwart terrorism. Accordin6 to Israel/ #alestinian terrorism includes all forms of o$$osition to the occu$ation @includin6 non-violenceA. Israel has built hundreds of settlements and $ermitted hundreds of thousands of its own Jewish citiCens to move to the <est Ban= and 4aCa/ des$ite that this constitutes a breach of international law. Israel has (ustified the violation of the :ourth 4eneva Convention and other international laws 6overnin6 militar> occu$ation of forei6n territor> on the 6rounds that the <est Ban= and the 4aCa 8tri$ are not technicall> Eoccu$iedE because the> were never $art of the soverei6n territor> of an> state. Therefore/ accordin6 to this inter$retation/ Israel is not a forei6n Eoccu$ierE but a le6al EadministratorE of territor> whose status remains to be determined. The international communit> has re(ected the Israeli official $osition that the <est Ban= and 4aCa are not occu$ied/ and has maintained that international law should a$$l> there. But little effort has been mounted to enforce international law or hold Israel accountable for the numerous violations it has en6a6ed in since 1-)*. '. +I81 3: #A218TINIAN NATI3NA2I8T 03I101NT8 A dis$la> of the ArabBs resistance to the formation of the state would be the 1-%. Arab-Israeli <ar/ also =nown as the 1-%. <ar of Inde$endence. In BretaliationB of the !N #artition #lan/ the Arabs @led b> the Arab 7i6her CommitteeA immediatel> launched a three-da> $rotest stri=es and insti6ated riots on the Jewish $o$ulation/ claimin6 the lives of )2 Jews. The violence/ however/ escalated as the da>s went b>. 3n - Januar> 1-%./ a$$ro5imatel> 1/;;; Arabs @mainl> #alestinianA started attac=in6 the Jewish communities in Northern #alestinian with the hel$ from volunteers from nei6hbourin6 countries. ). A+AB +18I8TANC1 Naturall>/ the Arabs were an6ered that a $art of their land was 6iven to the Jews without bein6 informed beforehand. 1ven if the> were informed earlier/ the> would also be unha$$> about such a6reement. :irstl>/ both 6rou$s faced the $roblem of reli6ious differences. The Arabs were 0uslims and the Jews were Christians. Besides this/ man> Arab-#alestians became stateless @2Ed class citiCensA. :urthermore/ Israeli settlements were seen as insults on #alestinian di6nit> and freedom of movement. Not onl> that/ the> were also seen as a threat to their ho$es for an inde$endent #alestinian nation. 2astl>/ the Israelis

too= most of the best areas for themselves and left the #alestinians with the less desirable areas. In reaction to these causes which were seen as unreasonable treatment to them/ the> started an or6aniCation also =nown as the #alestine 2iberation 3r6anisation @#23A. The> use terrorism to tr> ma=in6 the Jews afraid of them and thereb> 6ivin6 them bac= the land. :or e5am$le/ the Arabs used leftover British vehicles durin6 the war and drive into Jewish-filled $laces and bomb $racticall> an>thin6 the> feel worth bombin6 li=e buildin6s/ $eo$le. 3ther than this t>$e of e5treme actions/ the> also or6aniCe stri=es/ refuse to $a> ta5es and 6o a6ainst the 6overnment thereb> causin6 civil unrest within the countr>. The situation was so bad that even the British and :rench found it hard to control. 7owever it seems that the more the Arabs resist/ the more the> 6et hurt. The Israelites were also unwillin6 to 6ive u$ the land for which the> fou6ht so hard to 6et. In a situation with both $arties unwillin6 to 6ive u$ their own stru66le and ideals/ the> thou6ht b> fi6htin6 it out/ the> could resolve thin6s. 7owever/ these onl> made the hatred more dee$ and casualties to both sides. C3N81K!1NC18 1. #rotracted Conflict <ars and 8=irmishes of the Arab-Israeli Conflicts aA The 1-%*-1-%- <ar @Israeli Inde$endence <arA Cause In 1-%*/ the !N $ro$osed a $artition $lan whereb> the #alestine would be divided into two states/ an Arab and a Jewish one/ with the dis$uted Jerusalem becomin6 an international Cone. ?ionists Jews a6reed to the $lan althou6h the> were unha$$> not to be offered Jerusalem. 3n the other hand/ the Arabs re(ected the $lan believin6 that the !N had acted under ?ionist $ressure. 1vent 3n November 1-%*/ the !N 6eneral Assembl> voted to acce$t the $lan and within da>s/ militar> and 6uerilla conflicts eru$ted between small Jewish and Arab forces. <ith the British de$arture from #alestine in 1' 0a> 1-%./ the ?ionists

declared the foundin6 of the state of Israel. 8oon after/ nei6hborin6 Arab countries includin6 16>$t/ 8>ria/ Trans(ordan/ 2ebanon/ 8audi Arabia and Iraq invaded the new state. The Israeli forces were seemin6l> fewer in stren6th but were better trained and or6aniCed. <hen shi$ments of arms started reachin6 Israel from 1uro$e/ the war swun6 in Israel&s favor. It was not until the !N arran6ement for a ceasefire that the war ended. Consequences !nder the !N a6reement si6ned b> the other Arab states and Israel/ former #alestine was divided into three $arts. Israel controlled **L of it/ while 1ast Jerusalem and the <est Ban= were allotted to Trans(ordan and the 4aCa 8tri$ was 6iven to 16>$t. bA The 8ueC Crisis @2- 3ctober to ) November 1-')A Causes After an arm> cou$ in 1-'2 which overthrew the 16>$tian monarch>/ 4amal Abdul Nasser emer6ed as the countr>&s leader. Nasser intensified the cam$ai6n a6ainst Israel and at the same time/ wanted to end the remainin6 British influence in the 0iddle 1ast. In Jul> 1-')/ Nasser nationaliCed the 8ueC Canal. The tolls that he can char6e on the shi$s $assin6 throu6h the canal would be a valuable source of revenue for 16>$t. Nasser also closed the canal and bloc=aded the 8traits of Tiran to Israeli shi$s/ a move which strained relations between 16>$t and Israel. 7e had also made enemies of Britain and :rance who had ma(or economic and tradin6 interests in the canal. 1vent The Israelis saw an o$$ortunit> to wea=en an over-$owerful and hostile nei6hborin6 state. An a6reement was made under the table amon6 Israel/ Britain and :rance. It was a6reed u$on that Israel would invade 16>$t and that Britain and :rance would intervene and as= the Israeli and 16>$tian armies to withdraw from the canal Cone. 0eanwhile/ the An6lo-:rench troo$s would then ta=e control of the canal. 3n 2- 3ctober/ 1-')/ Israel invaded the 4aCa 8tri$ and the 8inai #eninsula/ while advancin6 towards the canal Cone ra$idl>. As $reviousl> a6reed/ the British and :rench arm> offered to occu$> the canal actin6 as a mediator/ which Nasser disa6reed. As such/ Britain and :rance launched a (oint invasion.

But before the invasion could be carried out/ !8A $ut $ressure on Britain and :rance to withdraw their forces from the canal/ fearin6 the $ossible escalation of the conflict after the 8oviet !nion threatened to enter the war on 16>$t&s side. Consequences 9urin6 the conflict/ Israel conquered both the 8inai #eninsula as well as the 4aCa 8tri$. 7owever/ in 0arch 1-'*/ it was forced b> the !N to return to its $revious borders. Israel failed to win bac= its shi$$in6 ri6hts in the canal but mana6ed to re6ain the freedom to use the 8traits of Tiran. Throu6h mani$ulation of the media/ 16>$tian #resident Nasser $ersuaded his $eo$le/ and other Arabs/ that 16>$t had won. The Canal was more 16>$tian than before/ and he 6ained 6reat su$$ort throu6hout the Arab world. A demilitariCed Cone was set u$ e5tendin6 from the 4aCa to 8harm el8hei=h/ $oliced b> !N forces. cA The 8i5 9a> <ar @' June to 1; June 1-)*A Causes Israel set about to carr> out its National water Carrier #lan @N<C#A in Au6ust 1-) / $um$in6 water from the 8ea of 4alilee to irri6ate south and central Israel. 8>ria was 6ravel> an6ered b> the N<C#. 9urin6 1-)%/ the Arab countries met and decided to interce$t Israel&s N<C#. The> diverted the Banias 8tream/ one the sources of the +iver Jordan that feeds the 8ea of 4alilee. Israel tried to fire at 8>rian tractors and equi$ment which were wor=in6 on the diversion $ro(ect. This 8>ria res$onded with air stri=es in Israeli towns. As tensions escalated/ the 8oviet !nion informed 8>ria that Israel was massin6 troo$s on the 8>rian border in $re$arations for an invasion. The claim was untrue but 8>ria was unaware of that fact and thus called u$on 16>$t for hel$. 16>$tian troo$s be6an movin6 into the 8inai after Nasser requested for the !N troo$s to withdraw from the demilitariCed Cone. 1vent

Inter$retin6 this as an act of a66ression/ Israeli #rime 0inister/ 2evi 1sh=ol be6an its offensive at *.%'am on ' June 1-)* after bein6 informed that the !8A would not intervene. Israeli&s initiative started with a sur$rise attac= on the 16>$tian Air :orce which was the most modern and best-equi$$ed of the Arab air forces. The $oorl> defended 16>$tian air bases were bombed and in less than three hours/ the entire air force was virtuall> destro>ed. This 6ranted Israel air su$eriorit> for the entire war. The Israeli 9efense :orce @I9:A then started movin6 into the 4aCa 8tri$ and the 8inai #eninsula. After a defeat of at Abu Awei6ila/ 16>$tian troo$s retreated and the Israelis com$leted their conquest of the 8inai. Nasser/ des$erate for hel$ from Jordan/ sent a messa6e to Fin6 7ussein on ' June in which he $retended that the 16>$tians were havin6 the u$$er hand in the war. 7ussein then 6ave orders to attac= and the Jordanian arm> be6an firin6 at Israeli $ositions in Jerusalem. <hen Israeli forces counterattac=ed/ the> destro>ed the tin> Jordanian air force and soon/ conquered the <est Ban= and 1ast Jerusalem as well. Israeli&s offensive on 8>ria was an air stri=e that destro>ed two thirds of the 8>rian air force and forced the remainin6 third to retreat to distant bases. <ith Israeli bombardment on the 4olan 7ei6hts/ 8>rian forces be6an to retreat and soon/ Israel controlled the 4olan 7ei6hts also. !88+ worried for 8>ria/ a firm all> and sent a tele6ram to American #resident/ 2>ndon Johnson threatenin6 militar> action a6ainst Israeli unless the> ceased fi6htin6. Consequences Both the !8 and the !N ur6ed Israel to sto$ their advance fearin6 the escalation into a far more serious confrontation. In 1;th June 1-)*/ the Israeli ordered a ceasefire at ). ;$m. Israel emer6ed as a dominant Arab force in the re6ion/ defeatin6 a combined Arab force that was far more su$erior in wea$ons and equi$ment. Israel anne5ed the 4aCa 8tri$ and the 8inai #eninsula from 16>$t. The <est Ban= and 1ast Jerusalem was 6ained from Jordan and the 4olan 7ei6hts were conquered from 8>ria. MThe 8i5-9a> <ar made Israel the countr> with the lar6est #alestinian

$o$ulation, In round fi6ures/ %;;/;;; lived within its $re-1-)* borders @the Israeli Arab minorit>A/ and 1.1 million in the now-occu$ied territories -- );;/;;; in the <est Ban= @2;;/;;; or more/ mostl> deniCens of refu6ee cam$s/ had fled durin6 the war and its immediate aftermath to the 1ast Ban=A/ *;/;;; in 1ast Jerusalem/ and ';/;;; in the 4aCa 8tri$. 3f the <est Ban= $o$ulation/ onl> );/;;; now lived in cam$s" in the 4aCa 8tri$/ some 21;/;;; had refu6ee status/ 1*;/;;; of them in cam$s. The traumatic demolition of the status quo reawa=ened #alestinian identit> and quic=ened nationalist as$irations in the conquered territories and in the Arab states.N The !N also $assed +esolution 2%2 on Nov 22 which called for the withdrawal of Israel from the occu$ied re6ions. 7owever/ the Arabs became u$set at the increasin6 lac= of enforcement of the +esolution from the !8A and the !N. dA Hom Fi$$ur @) 3ctober to 22 3ctober 1-* A Causes After the death of Nasser/ the 16>$tian leadershi$ was handed over to Anwar 8adat/ who sou6ht 6enuine $eaceful relations with Israel. In :ebruar> 1-*1/ 8adat announced that if Israel $artiall> withdrew their forces from the 8inai/ 16>$t would reo$en the 8ueC Canal and si6n a $eace a6reement with Israel. Israel&s new #rime 0inister/ 4olda 0eir/ refused the 16>$tian offer des$ite $ressure from the Americans to acce$t. Israel now receivin6 !8 militar> aid/ felt itself in a su$erior $osition to 16>$t. Israel then started to im$lement resettlement $olicies in the 8inai and had $lans to build a 0editerranean #ort near in 8inai. This worried 8adat and he felt that the onl> wa> to recover the territor> was to sta6e an attac= on 16>$t. 1vent 3n ) 3ctober 1-* / 16>$t and 8>ria launched a (oint invasion of Israel. The> chose the da> deliberatel> as it was Hom Fi$$ur/ or the da> of Atonement/ the holiest da> in the Jewish calendar. The Israelis were cau6ht com$letel> off 6uard and soon the forces mannin6 the out$osts of the canal were destro>ed. <ithin da>s/ the 16>$tians had successfull> recovered the western ban= of the 8inai #eninsula. Israeli&s forces in the north were also outnumbered b> 8>rian tan=s and artiller>. The arrival of the Israeli reserve forces in the nic= of time mana6ed to $revent the 8>rian&s ca$ture of the 4olan 7ei6hts. 8oon/

Israel was bac= on the offensive advancin6 within artiller> ran6e of the 8>rian ca$ital/ 9amascus. <hen the Israeli arm> mana6ed to cut off the 16>$tian su$$lies/ the> advanced with 16>$t and came to within 1;; =m of Cairo. !nder $ressure from the !8A and !88+/ both sides a6reed to a ceasefire on 22 3ctober 1-* / returnin6 to the $re-war borders. Consequences After bein6 cau6ht so badl> off 6uard/ the Israeli forces mana6ed a ra$id recover> and reca$tured nearl> all the territories. 7owever/ the war also shown the 6overnment&s lac= of $re$aredness and under-estimation of the enemies which led to the resi6nation of 4olda 0eir and the 9efense 0inister/ 0oshe 9a>an. eA 3ther crises iA 1-*; D <ar of Attrition 0ilitar> clashes between 16>$t and Israel occurred intermittentl> from the end of the 8i5-8a> <ar until the s$rin6 of 1-)-. 7owever/ it was the lar6e-scale offensive mounted b> the 16>$tian arm> in 0arch 1-)-/ cou$led with NasserBs renunciation of the !.N.-9ecreed cease-fire that mar=ed the be6innin6 of the <ar of Attrition. A formal declaration of intent came later/ on June 2 / 1-)-. NasserBs immediate 6oal was to $revent the conversion of the 8ueC Canal into a de facto border with Israel/ while his ultimate 6oal was to force Israel to withdraw to the $rewar border. This conflict was resolved when the !nited states/ fearin6 another full-blown war/ ste$$ed in and offered $eace $lans. iiA 1-.2 D 2ebanon <ar In 1-.2/ the Israelis invaded southern 2ebanon. The followin6 is a hi6hli6ht of events that led to the war and how the !nited Nations later ste$$ed in. Kuoted from !NI:I2&s website/, MIn the earl> 1-*;s/ tension alon6 the Israel-2ebanon border increased/ es$eciall> after the relocation of #alestinian armed elements from Jordan to 2ebanon Osee Blac= 8e$temberP. #alestinian commando o$erations a6ainst Israel and Israeli re$risals a6ainst #alestinian bases in 2ebanon intensified. 3n 11 0arch 1-*./ a commando attac= in Israel resulted in man> dead and wounded amon6 the Israeli $o$ulation" the #alestine 2iberation 3r6aniCation @#23A claimed res$onsibilit> for that raid. In res$onse/ Israeli forces invaded 2ebanon on the ni6ht of 1%Q1' 0arch O1-*.P/ and in a few da>s occu$ied the entire southern $art of the countr> e5ce$t for the cit> of T>re and its surroundin6 area.

3n 1' 0arch 1-*./ the 2ebanese 4overnment submitted a stron6 $rotest to the O!.N.P 8ecurit> Council a6ainst the Israeli invasion/ statin6 that it had no connection with the #alestinian commando o$eration. 3n 1- 0arch O1-*.P/ the Council ado$ted resolutions %2' @1-*.A and %2) @1-*.A/ in which it called u$on Israel immediatel> to cease its militar> action and withdraw its forces from all 2ebanese territor>. It also decided on the immediate establishment of the !nited Nations Interim :orce in 2ebanon @!NI:I2A. The first !NI:I2 troo$s arrived in the area on 2 0arch 1-*..N This war had a hu6e im$act on the #23 and the #23 militar> infrastructure in southern 2ebanon was destro>ed and was driven out of Beirut. 7owever/ the #23 was not destro>ed or mortall> wounded/ as Israeli 9efense 0inister 8haron and Israeli #rime 0inister Be6in had ho$ed and $lanned. Indeed/ it could well be ar6ued that the drubbin6 the or6aniCation received drove it/ in the end/ to moderate its $ositions/ a $rocess that culminated in ArafatBs 1-.. declaration reco6niCin6 Israel and re$udiatin6 terrorism. Thus/ instead of demolishin6 the #23...it can be ar6ued that the invasion of 2ebanon had/ albeit ver> violentl>/ 6roomed the #23 for #artici$ation in the di$lomac> and $eace $rocess that was to characteriCe the 1--;s and was to $ave the wa> for its assum$tion of authorit> in $arts of the <est Ban= and 4aCa Also/ this invasion was closel> tied to the formation of 7eCbollah @#art> of 4odA and the rise of this terrorist or6aniCation. 2. +ole of #23 The #alestine 2iberation 3r6aniCation @#23A is a broad national front/ or an umbrella or6aniCation/ com$rised of numerous or6aniCations of the resistance movement/ $olitical $arties/ $o$ular or6aniCations/ and inde$endent $ersonalities and fi6ures from all sectors of life. The Arab 8ummit in 1-*% reco6niCed the #23 as the Rsole and le6itimate re$resentative of the #alestinian $eo$le& and since then the #23 has re$resented #alestine at the !nited Nations/ the 0ovement of NonAli6ned Countries @NA0A/ the 3r6aniCation of the Islamic Conference @3ICA/ and in man> other fora. In addition to its broad national and $olitical 6oals/ the #23 has dealt with numerous tas=s with re6ard to the life of the #alestinian $eo$le in their main communities and throu6hout the world throu6h the establishment of several institutions in such realms as health/ education/ and social services. As such/ the #23 is more than a national liberation movement strivin6 to achieve the national 6oals of the #alestinian $eo$le/ includin6 the establishment of a #alestinian state with Jerusalem as its ca$ital. The #23&s belli6erent rhetoric was matched b> deeds. Terrorist attac=s

b> the 6rou$ 6rew more frequent. In 1-)'/ ' raids were conducted a6ainst Israel. In 1-))/ the number increased to %1. In (ust the first four months of 1-)*/ * attac=s were launched. The tar6ets were alwa>s civilians. 0ost of the attac=s involved #alestinian 6uerillas infiltratin6 Israel from Jordan/ the 4aCa 8tri$/ and 2ebanon. The orders and lo6istical su$$ort for the attac=s were comin6/ however/ from Cairo and 9amascus. 16>$tian #resident Nasser&s main ob(ective was to harass the Israelis/ but a secondar> one was to undermine Fin6 7ussein&s re6ime in Jordan. Fin6 7ussein viewed the #23 as both a direct and indirect threat to his $ower. 7ussein feared that the #23 mi6ht tr> to de$ose him with Nasser&s hel$ or that the #23&s attac=s on Israel would $rovo=e retaliator> stri=es b> Israeli forces that could wea=en his authorit>. B> the be6innin6 of 1-)*/ 7ussein had closed the #23&s offices in Jerusalem/ arrested man> of the 6rou$&s members/ and withdrew reco6nition of the or6aniCation. Nasser and his friends in the re6ion unleashed a torrent of criticism on 7ussein for betra>in6 the Arab cause. 7ussein would soon have the chance to redeem himself. #olitical 7istor> iA The #23 was established b> the Arab 2ea6ue in 1-)% with Arab su$$ort durin6 a summit in Cairo. At that time/ the #23 was headed b> 0r. Ahmed Al-8hu=air> and/ since then/ has under6one si6nificant chan6es in its com$osition/ leadin6 bodies/ $olitical orientation/ and even the locales of its headquarters. The leadin6 bodies of the #23 are the #alestine National Council @#NCA/ the Central Council/ and the 15ecutive Committee. S In 1-)./ the or6aniCation witnessed the be6innin6 of the en6a6ement of the :eda&i>een or6aniCations @armed stru66le or6aniCationsA/ $articularl> :ateh. In 1-)-/ Hasser Arafat/ leader of :ateh/ became the Chairman of the 15ecutive Committee of the #23 and/ in 1-*1/ he became the 4eneral Commander of the #alestine :orces. 7is name has been s>non>mous with the #alestinian national movement. iiA In the 1-);s/ the #23Bs $rimar> base of o$erations was Jordan. In 1-*;-*1/ fi6htin6 with the Jordanian arm> drove the #23 leadershi$ out of the countr>/ forcin6 it to relocate to 2ebanon. <hen the 2ebanese civil war started in 1-*'/ the #23 became a $art> in the conflict. After the Israeli invasion of 2ebanon in 1-.2/ the #23 leadershi$ was e5$elled from the countr>/ relocatin6 once more to Tunisia. iiiA !ntil 1-- / Israel did not ac=nowled6e #alestinian national ri6hts or reco6niCe the #alestinians as an inde$endent $art> to the conflict. Israel

refused to ne6otiate with the #23/ ar6uin6 that it was nothin6 but a terrorist or6aniCation/ and insisted on dealin6 onl> with Jordan or other Arab states. It re(ected the establishment of a #alestinian state/ insistin6 that #alestinians should be incor$orated into the e5istin6 Arab states. This intransi6ence ended when Israeli re$resentatives entered into secret ne6otiations with the #23/ which led to the 3slo 9eclaration of #rinci$les ivA The Arab defeat in the 1-)* war enabled >oun6er/ more militant #alestinians to ta=e over the #23 and 6ain some inde$endence from the Arab re6imes. vA The #23 was 6ranted observer status b> the !N 4eneral Assembl> on 22nd November 1-*%. In 1-*)/ their status in the !N is further elevated to $artici$atin6 in the 8ecurit> Council debates but without votin6 ri6hts. In numerous +esolutions b> the 4eneral Assembl> the #23 was declared the Esole le6itimate re$resentative of the #alestinian #eo$leE. This was also reco6nised b> Israel in the 3slo Accords from 1-- . Thus/ the #23 $la>s an im$ortant $art in ne6otiations re6ardin6 the #alestinian $eo$le. 8ince the establishment of the #alestinian National Authorit> @#NAA and the convenin6 of 6eneral elections in Januar> 1--) in the 3ccu$ied #alestinian Territor>/ includin6 Jerusalem/ which were $receded b> the return of most #alestinian leaders to their homeland/ the Authorit>&s role and res$onsibilities continue to increase/ in some wa>s at the e5$ense of the #23. The #NA is the 6overnin6 bod> of the #alestinian urban centers in the <est Ban= and 4aCa 8tri$/ while the #23 is the $olitical re$resentative of the #alestinians, those under occu$ation and those in the dias$ora. In the #alestinian territor>/ as well as outside/ Islamic 6rou$s remain outside the #23/ which traditionall> has not mi5ed reli6ion and $olitics. vA In 6eneral/ the current #alestinian situation is constantl> chan6in6 and $ro6ressin6 towards the establishment of a state and the buildin6 of a #alestinian democrac>. These chan6es will affect the #23/ but there is no doubt that/ at least for some time/ the #23 will continue its role as a ver> im$ortant #alestinian structure for the #alestinian $eo$le in the 3ccu$ied Territories/ in the refu6ee cam$s/ and throu6hout the world.N . 15tremist 1lements @N.b. In its earl> >ears/ the #23 was one of theseA :eda>een This 6rou$ is made u$ of >oun6 male #alestinian refu6ees who became 6uerilla fi6hters and raided Israel from bases in 4aCa 8tri$ and Jordan.

:atah This feda>een or6aniCation was founded in the late 1-';s b> a 6rou$ of #alestinian students/ includin6 Hasser Arafat/ in Cairo/ 16>$t. :atah means Rconquest&. It was on friendl> terms with 8>ria/ since it found it a 6ood $lace to launch attac=s on Israel/ doin6 so for the first time in Januar> 1-)'. B> 1-)-/ it o$erated from Jordan. #o$ular :ront for the 2iberation of #alestine @#:2#A 2ed b> 4eor6e 7abbeash/ it was made u$ of 0ar5ists who wanted revolution throu6hout the Arab world and believed in liberatin6 #alestine from Israel throu6h terror acts in 1uro$e and !8. 7amas Created in 1-.* b> 8hai=h Ahmed Hassin of the 4aCa win6 of the 0uslim Brotherhood at the be6innin6 of the :irst Intifada/ 7amas is =nown outside the #alestinian territories for its suicide bombin6s and other attac=s directed a6ainst Israeli civilians/ as well as militar> and securit> forces tar6ets. 7amasB charter calls for the destruction of the 8tate of Israel and its re$lacement with a #alestinian Islamic state in the area that is now Israel/ the <est Ban=/ and the 4aCa 8tri$. 9urin6 the second Intifada/ 7amas/ alon6 with the Islamic Jihad 0ovement/ s$earheaded the violence throu6h the >ears of the #alestinian u$risin6.8ince then/ 7amas has conducted man> attac=s on Israel/ mainl> throu6h its militar> win6 - the ICC ad-9in al-Kassam Bri6ades. These attac=s have included lar6e-scale suicide bombin6s a6ainst Israeli civilian tar6ets/ the most deadl> of which was the bombin6 of a Netan>a hotel on 0arch 2*/ 2;;2/ in which ; $eo$le were =illed and 1%; were wounded. 8ince the death of #23 leader Hasser Arafat/ 7amasBs $olitical win6 has entered and won man> local elections in 4aCa/ Kalqil>a/ and Nablus. In Januar> 2;;)/ 7amas won a sur$rise victor> in the #alestinian $arliamentar> elections/ ta=in6 *) of the 1 2 seats in the chamber/ while the rulin6 :atah $art> too= % . 7eCbollah and Al Kueda @see belowA %. 7ardliners on both sides The Arabs E<e $lan to eliminate the state of Israel and establish a $urel> #alestinian state. <e will ma=e life unbearable for Jews b>

$s>cholo6ical warfare and $o$ulation e5$losion... <e #alestinians will ta=e over ever>thin6/ includin6 all of Jerusalem.E -- Hasser Arafat/ Chairman of the #23 Initiall>/the #23 re$resents the core of the Arab e5tremists. The 1-). #23 Charter endorses the use of violence/ s$ecificall> Earmed stru66leE a6ainst what the> call E?ionist im$erialism.E Article 1; of the #alestinian National Charter states ECommando @:eda>&eeA action constitutes the nucleus of the #alestinian $o$ular liberation war. 7owever/with the a$$roval of the Ten #oint #ro6ram/7amas comes into re$resentin6 the e5tremists in #alestine. The slo6an of 7amas is E4od is its tar6et/ the #ro$het is its model/ the KurBan its constitution, Jihad is its $ath and death for the sa=e of 4od is the loftiest of its wishes.EArticle 1 of the 7amas Covenant states that, EThere is no solution for the #alestinian question e5ce$t throu6h Jihad. Initiatives/ $ro$osals and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain endeavors. The #alestinian $eo$le =now better than to consent to havin6 their future/ ri6hts and fate to>ed with.E Toda>/Arab e5tremism too= in a new form,terrorism. The 8e$tember 11/ 2;;1 attac=s b> Al-Kaeda became the most devastatin6 in American histor>/ with almost /;;; $eo$le =illed. 3ther or6aniCations such as 7eCbollah in 2ebanon/ Jemaah Islami>ah in 8outheast Asia be6an the use of more e5treme measures such as suicide bombin6s/ aircraft hi(ac=in6/ =idna$$in6 and assassinations to reach their 6oals. 3f all their 6oals/ mostl> revolves around M1radication of <estern im$erialismN or Mdestruction of the state of IsraelN. The Jews The Jewish element of e5tremism too= the form of Jewish !nder6round 6rou$s before foundin6 of Israel. After the Arab riots of 1-2; and 1-21/ the Jewish created the 7a6anah to $rotect their farmers and settlements. :ollowin6 the Arab 1-2- 7ebron massacre/ the 7a6anahBs role chan6ed dramaticall>. It became a much lar6er or6aniCation encom$assin6 nearl> all the >outh and adults in the Jewish settlements/ as well as thousands of members from the cities. It also acquired forei6n arms and be6an to develo$ wor=sho$s to create hand 6renades and sim$le militar> equi$ment. It went from bein6 an untrained militia to a ca$able arm>. 7owever/ the 7a6anah was mostl> defensive in nature/ which amon6 other thin6s caused several members to s$lit off and form the militant 6rou$ Ir6un @initiall> =nown as 7a6ana BetA in 1- 1. The Ir6un adhered to a much more active a$$roach/ which included attac=s and initiation of armed actions a6ainst the British/ such as attac=in6 British militar> headquarters/ the Fin6 9avid 7otel/ which =illed -1 $eo$le. 7a6anah/

on the other hand/ often $referred restraint. A further s$lit occurred when Avraham 8tern left the Ir6un to form 2ehi/ @also =nown as the 8tern 4an6A which was much more e5treme in its methods. !nli=e the Ir6un/ the> refused an> co-o$eration with the British durin6 <orld <ar II and even attem$ted to wor= with the NaCis to secure 1uro$ean Jewr>Bs emi6ration to #alestine. After the formation of the 8tate of Israel/ these 6rou$s was formall> dissolved and inte6rated into the Israeli 9efense :orces on 0a> 1/ 1-%./ with its leaders 6ettin6 amnest> from $rosecution or re$risals as $art of the inte6ration.

'. The slow $ace of $eace $rocess Introduction As a result of the Intifada/ which is a wides$read cam$ai6n a6ainst the continuin6 Israeli occu$ation of the 4aCa 8tri$ and <est Ban=/ $ressure 6rew within Israel to broaden the $eace $rocess. The o$$ortunit> to do so was $rovided in 1--1 b> the #ersian 4ulf <ar. In this war/ a multinational coalition of <estern and Arab armies e5$elled Iraq from Fuwait/ which Iraq had invaded in 1--;. 9es$ite accom$lishments towards $eace li=e the 3slo Accords and the $eace a6reement that Jordan and Israel si6ned in 1--%/ some terrorism and bloodshed continued. #alestinians conducted terrorist attac=s on Israeli citiCens/ and on a number of occasions Israeli e5tremists res$onded in =ind. Israeli #rime 0inister HitCha= +abin was assassinated in 1--' b> an Israeli student o$$osed to the $eace $rocess. !nder Israeli #rime 0inister Ben(amin Netan>ahu/ the $eace $rocess stalled in 1--*. In 3ctober 1--. Netan>ahu and Arafat si6ned an accord b> which Israel would withdraw from additional <est Ban= territor> in return for #alestinian securit> measures a6ainst terrorist attac=s on Israel. The #alestinians also a6reed to remove articles that called for IsraelBs destruction in their national charter. In November/ Israel com$leted the first of three scheduled withdrawals/ but froCe the im$lementation of the accord the followin6 month. Israel claimed that the #alestinians had not carried out their $art of the accord and $laced new conditions on further

withdrawals. These develo$ments a6ain stalled the $eace $rocess and dela>ed ne6otiations on the final status of the <est Ban= and 4aCa 8tri$. 8low $ro6ress of $eace is due to the bitterness of losin6 wars and the failure of Israel to behave li=e $art of the re6ion. Their outward arro6ance and failure to assimilate in the re6ion causes them to act li=e the> are su$erior and one of the western nations. :or e5am$le/ >ou 6o into someone else&s house and drive them out/ afterwards/ >ou act li=e it&s >ours and >ou boss ever>one else around and do not even bother to ma=e friends with the owners of the house.

Cam$ 9avid Accords/ 1-*. In 1-* / 4eneva/ there had been meetin6s to ne6otiate about ceasefire lines and while the> mana6ed disen6a6ements/ there was no lastin6 $eace 8>ria declined to come/ leavin6 onl> 16>$t/ Israel and Jordan #alestinians were not re$resented Carter tried to rei6nite the failed ne6otiationsS But nothin6 till 1-**/ when Anwar 8adat visited Jerusalem in Nov/ which was historic In 8e$tember 1-*./ #resident Jimm> Carter invited 8adat and Israeli #rime 0inister 0enachem Be6in to Cam$ 9avid/ a $residential retreat in 0ar>land. The> wor=ed out two a6reements, a framewor= for $eace between 16>$t and Israel/ and a 6eneral framewor= for resolution of the 0iddle 1ast crisis/ i.e. the #alestinian question. The Cam$ 9avid Accords was a $eace a6reement si6ned b> 16>$tian #resident Anwar 8adat and Israeli #rime 0inister 0enachem Be6in on 8e$tember 1*/ 1-*.. The first a6reement formed the basis of the 16>$tian-Israeli $eace treat> si6ned in 1-*-. The second a6reement $ro$osed to 6rant autonom> to the #alestinians in the <est Ban= and the 4aCa 8tri$/ and to install a local administration for a five->ear interim $eriod/ after which the final status of the territories would be ne6otiated. Consequences 3nl> the 16>$tian-Israeli $art of the Cam$ 9avid accords was im$lemented. The #alestinians and other Arab states re(ected the

autonom> conce$t because it did not 6uarantee full Israeli withdrawal from areas ca$tured in 1-)* or the establishment of an inde$endent #alestinian state. In an> case/ Israel sabota6ed ne6otiations b> continuin6 to confiscate #alestinian lands and build new settlements in violation of the commitments 0enachem Be6in made to Jimm> Carter at Cam$ 9avid. The #23 and most of the Arab states denounced it. This was because without 16>$t/ Arab states unable to fi6ht bac=. <ith !8 aid/ able to withstand Arab 2ea6ue 8anctions and 8adat assassination Althou6h both sides 6enerall> abided b> the a6reements since 1-*./ in the followin6 >ears/ a common belief emer6ed in Israel that the $eace with 16>$t is a Ecold $eace.E There is wides$read disa$$ointment with 16>$t/ which is seen as adherin6 onl> to letter and not the s$irit of the a6reement/ $articularl> with the clauses concernin6 normaliCation of relations between the two countries. An additional view is that the #eace a6reement was between the Israeli $eo$le and 16>$tBs $resident Anwar 8adat/ rather than with the 16>$tian $eo$le/ who did not necessaril> su$$ort it in ma(orit>. 1vidence su$$ortin6 this claim is the fact that althou6h Israeli tourists floc=ed to 16>$t/ onl> few 16>$tians return the 6esture.:uthermore/16>$tians visitin6 Israel are often ostraciCed in 16>$t/ sometimes even receivin6 death threats" anti-Israel and anti8emitic incitment can still be found in 16>$tian media. Accordin6 to an 16>$tian 4overnment 2;;) $oll of 1;;; 16>$tians/ -2L of 16>$tians still view Israel as an enem> nation. :ailure of Cam$ 9avid Accords !nder the $eace treat> si6ned in 0arch 1-*-/ 16>$t re6ained the 8inai #eninsula/ which was $artiall> demilitariCed. Israel and 16>$t entered into normal di$lomatic relations as forei6n observers were $laced into $eninsula to maintain the treat>&s $rovisions. :or its $art/ Israel achieved $eace with what had been its lar6est enem> at the cost of evacuatin6 Israeli settlers from the 8inai and losin6 some investment in the area&s infrastructure/ such as roads and housin6. The Cam$ 9avid Accords/ however/ did nothin6 for 8>ria and onl> advanced the #alestinian cause in the va6uest of terms. :or these reasons/ the Arab 2ea6ue e5$elled 16>$t and the rest of the Arab world widel> condemned the accords. In 1-.1 8adat was assassinated b> a 6rou$ of Islamic fundamentalists within the 16>$tian arm>. 16>$t continued to maintain relations with Israel after 8adat&s death. :ollowin6 Cam$ 9avid/ 8>ria maintained its warli=e $osture and

demanded the unconditional surrender of the 4olan 7ei6hts/ and the #23 continued its terrorist assaults on Israel. In 1-.2 Israel tried to wi$e out the #23 b> attac=in6 its bases in 2ebanon/ which had been $lun6ed into its own civil war in 1-*'. The assault on the #23/ which Israel called 3$eration #eace for 4alilee/ quic=l> escalated into 6round battles in 2ebanon and full-scale en6a6ements between the Israeli and 8>rian air forces. After a sie6e on Beirut the #23 leadershi$ evacuated from 2ebanon and relocated to Tunisia. Arabs were frustrated that Israel had occu$ied an Arab ca$ital with little intervention from the rest of the world/ and the #alestinians of the Israeli-occu$ied <est Ban= and 4aCa 8tri$ felt more isolated and abandoned than ever. Israel withdrew from most of 2ebanon b> 1-.'/ thou6h it continued to maintain a selfdeclared securit> Cone inside 2ebanon alon6 the Israeli border.

0adrid This was the first $eace tal=s that included most of the Arab states. <h> now and not at Cam$ 9avid 1. The Cam$ 9avid Accords/ meant that 16>$t seemed to be favourin6 !8 aid/ and the Arab felt isolated. 2. The Iranian +evolution in 1-*-. 8ome Arabs saw 16>$t as a counter$oint to this new fundamentalist movement. . !$risin6s in 4aCa and <est Ban=. It became clear that it was 6rassroots and so $eo$le were unha$$> and the residents in the re6ion were clamourin6 for $eace. 8o even b> 1-../ Jordan 6ave u$ all claims/ and allowed the #23 to be seen as the sole re$resentative of #alestinian $eo$le. %. 1nd of Cold <ar '. 4ulf <ar. 0ost Arab states felt Iraq was wron6 and made some contribution to the fi6ht but some Arab 2ea6uers li=e #23 and Jordan o$$osed sendin6 aid to hel$ fi6ht Iraq. 0an> of these were u$set at !8 mobiliCin6 to remove Iraq @ille6al occu$ationA while nothin6 had been done to remove Israel and enforce +esolution 2%2. 8addam failed however to trul> 6alvanise the Arab states because man> feared and distrusted him. 7e was no Abdul Nasser But si6nificantl> !8 $resti6e in the re6ion did rise/ es$eciall> with the wa> Bush handled it. 8ome Arabs were sus$icious of e5tremism as well. It $roved that the !8 had to wor= with international or6aniCations or other $arties so as to remove the sti6ma of bias. This is es$eciall> im$ortant because since 1-)*/ no ma(or Arab-Israeli deal had been done without !8A. :or the Arabs D the> must increase re6ional coo$eration. :or e5am$le/

some feel that the states that hel$ed !8A were the MhavesN/ the rest were the Mhave notsN 0adrid Tried to 6et all nei6hbours of Israel but also aims to broaden it to all. 3nl> 16>$t is at $eace with Israel. 1s$eciall> with deals about environment/ refu6ees/ arms control. 1s$eciall> when Israel seems hard to ne6otiate with. :or 16>$t this Conference is im$ortant because it would show that it was ri6ht to start $eace even thou6h man> felt it had betra>ed the Arab Cause. :or the other states, Jordan, Fin6 7ussein wants to ma=e $eace with Israel but onl> with others. <ould also want !8 hel$ for the econom> and since man> Jordan citiCens are #alestinian refu6ees/ an> $eace that other Arab states a6ree too will ma=e life easier for him :or the #23, the> seem to be able to acce$t this/ even thou6h the> had re(ected Cam$ 9avid. This is es$eciall> because of the differin6 $olitical realities @see aboveA 8>ria, 1nterin6 into ne6otiations even without the Israeli commitment to return 4olan 7ei6ht. !nli=e some others had never had ne6otiations with Israel D so a chan6e. 8>ria had become increasin6 isolated in re6ion/ es$eciall> sidin6 with Iran @due to ideolo6> and historical reasons. Israel, 7as to acce$t the !8 invite because if it does not/ it loo=s li=e it doesn&t want $eace. But man> are fearful that the> will be forced to 6ive u$ their most $riCed $ossessions. The 3slo Accords/ 1-The wea=ness of the #23 after the 4ulf <ar/ the stalemate in the <ashin6ton tal=s/ and fear of radical Islam brou6ht the +abin 6overnment to reverse the lon6-standin6 Israeli refusal to ne6otiate with the #23. Consequentl>/ Israel initiated secret ne6otiations in 3slo/ Norwa> directl> with #23 re$resentatives who had been e5cluded from the 0adrid and <ashin6ton tal=s. These ne6otiations $roduced the Israel-#23 9eclaration of #rinci$les/ which was si6ned in <ashin6ton in 8e$tember 1-- . The 3slo Accords/ officiall> called the 9eclaration of #rinci$les on Interim 8elf-4overnment Arran6ements or 9eclaration of #rinci$les @93#A/ were finaliCed in 3slo/ Norwa> on Au6ust 2;/ 1-- / and

subsequentl> officiall> si6ned at a $ublic ceremon> in <ashin6ton 9.C. on 8e$tember 1 / 1-- / with Hassir Arafat si6nin6 for the #alestine 2iberation 3r6aniCation and 8himon #eres si6nin6 for the 8tate of Israel. The 9eclaration of #rinci$les was based on mutual reco6nition of Israel and the #23. It established that Israel would withdraw from the 4aCa 8tri$ and Jericho/ with additional withdrawals from further uns$ecified areas of the <est Ban= durin6 a five->ear interim $eriod. 9urin6 this $eriod/ the #23 formed a #alestinian Authorit> @#AA with Eself6overnin6E @i.e. munici$alA $owers in the areas from which Israeli forces were rede$lo>ed. !ltimate $ower/ however/ remained with Israel/ which e5ercised its control b> sealin6 off the #alestinian-6overned areas from the rest of the 3ccu$ied Territories and from Israel for e5tended $eriods of time/ an action that devastated a #alestinian econom> alread> wea=ened b> >ears of occu$ation. In addition/ Israel continued to confiscate land and to build settlements and roads that served to se$arate #alestinian cities/ towns/ and villa6es from each other/ e5acerbatin6 the fra6mentation of the <est Ban= and 4aCa. In Januar> 1--)/ elections were held for a #alestinian 2e6islative Council and for the $residenc> of the #A/ which was won handil> b> Hasir Arafat. The =e> issues such as the e5tent of the territories to be ceded b> Israel/ the nature of the #alestinian entit> to be established/ the future of the Israeli settlements and settlers/ water ri6hts/ the resolution of the refu6ee $roblem and the status of Jerusalem were set aside to be discussed in final status tal=s. 8ubsequent a6reements in 1--% @Cairo A6reementA/ 1--' @3slo IIA/ 1--. @<>e +iver IA/ and 1--- @<>e +iver IIA failed to address the fundamental wea=nesses of the 9o#. The 1% $a6es of the 3slo II a6reement/ for instance/ e5tended #alestinian civilian (urisdiction over ma(or $o$ulation areas/ s$ecified the form that #alestinian elections for a le6islative council and $resident would ta=e/ and set 0a> %/ 1--)/ as the deadline to be6in final status ne6otiations that would deal with outstandin6 issues. It did not/ however/ indicate the consequences of a failure to meet the 0a> deadline. Nor did 3slo II contain $rovisions to halt the creation of new Efacts on the 6roundE that would influence the final form of an> eventual a6reement. The <>e I a6reement/ which too= nineteen months to achieve in $art due to the assassination of Israeli #rime 0inister HitCha= +abin b> a Jewish Israeli/ sim$l> rearticulated how Israel and the #alestinians were to carr> out what the> had alread> a6reed to in 3slo II and were su$$osed to have finished more than a >ear earlier.

Consequences The #23 acce$ted this dee$l> flawed a6reement with Israel because it was wea= and had little di$lomatic su$$ort in the Arab world. Both Islamist radicals and local leaders in the <est Ban= and the 4aCa 8tri$ challen6ed ArafatBs leadershi$. Het onl> Arafat had the $resti6e and national le6itimac> to conclude a ne6otiated a6reement with Israel. The 3slo accords set u$ a ne6otiatin6 $rocess without s$ecif>in6 an outcome. The $rocess was su$$osed to have been com$leted b> 0a> 1---. There were man> dela>s due to IsraelBs reluctance to relinquish control over the occu$ied territories/ unwillin6ness to ma=e the =inds of concessions necessar> to reach a final status a6reement/ and $eriodic outbursts of violence b> #alestinian o$$onents of the 3slo $rocess/ es$eciall> 7A0A8 and Jihad. 9urin6 the 2i=udBs return to $ower in 1--)---/ #rime 0inister Ben(amin Netan>ahu avoided en6a6in6 seriousl> in the 3slo $rocess/ which he distrusted and fundamentall> o$$osed. A 2abor-led coalition 6overnment led b> #rime 0inister 1hud Bara= came to $ower in 1---. Bara= at first concentrated on reachin6 a $eace a6reement with 8>ria. <hen he failed to convince the 8>rians to si6n an a6reement that would restore to them less than all the area of the 4olan 7ei6hts occu$ied b> Israel in 1-)*/ Bara= turned his attention to the #alestinian trac=. 9urin6 the $rotracted interim $eriod of the 3slo $rocess/ IsraelBs 2abor and 2i=ud 6overnments built new settlements in the occu$ied territories/ e5$anded e5istin6 settlements and constructed a networ= of b>$ass roads to enable Israeli settlers to travel from their settlements to Israel $ro$er without $assin6 throu6h #alestinian-inhabited areas. These $ro(ects were understood b> most #alestinians as mar=in6 out territor> that Israel sou6ht to anne5 in the final settlement. The 3slo accords contained no mechanism to bloc= these unilateral actions or IsraelBs violations of #alestinian human and civil ri6hts in areas under its control. :inal status ne6otiations between Israel and the #alestinians were to have be6un in mid-1--)/ but onl> 6ot underwa> in earnest in mid-2;;;. B> then/ a series of $ainfull> ne6otiated Israeli interim withdrawals left the #alestinian Authorit> with direct or $artial control of some %; $ercent of the <est Ban= and )' $ercent of the 4aCa 8tri$. The #alestinian areas were surrounded b> Israeli-controlled territor> with entr> and e5it controlled b> Israel. The #alestiniansB e5$ectations were not accommodated b> the 3slo accords. The 3slo $rocess required the #alestinians to ma=e their

$rinci$al com$romises at the be6innin6/ whereas IsraelBs $rinci$al com$romises be>ond reco6nition of the #23 were to be made in the final status tal=s. The Accords became the first successful attem$t to discuss the necessar> elements and conditions for a future #alestinian state.:or their efforts/ IsraelBs #rime 0inister HitCha= +abin / Arafat and 8himon #eres were awarded the 1--% Nobel #eace #riCe. 7owever/ after the assassination of HitCha= +abin in 1--'/ the $eace $rocess slowed to a 6rindin6 halt. 9ee$ :laws in the 3slo #rocess Nor is it sur$risin6 that #rime 0inister Bara=/ and less directl>/ #resident Clinton blamed #alestinian Authorit> #resident Hasir Arafat for the failure of the summit. In remar=s followin6 the brea=u$ of the tal=s/ Clinton $raised Bara= for movin6 much farther from his initial $ositions than Arafat durin6 the ne6otiations. Clinton a$$arentl> e5$ected that both $arties would meet midwa> between their o$enin6 $ositions at Cam$ 9avid. This is a dee$l> flawed understandin6 of what can $roduce a (ust and stable #alestinian-Israeli $eace a6reement. ClintonBs unreasonable e5$ectations stem directl> from the structure of the 3slo $rocess and the !8 alliance with Israel. All international $arties e5ce$t the !nited 8tates were e5cluded from an active role in the ne6otiations. The 1-- 3slo 9eclaration of #rinci$les onl> nominall> ac=nowled6ed the relevance of !N resolutions 2%2 and . requirin6 Israel to withdraw from the territories it occu$ied in 1-)*. 3ther !N resolutions--reco6niCin6 the #alestinian ri6ht to statehood/ censurin6 IsraelBs anne5ation of 1ast Jerusalem/ affirmin6 the #alestinian refu6eesB ri6ht of return and condemnin6 IsraelBs ille6al actions in the <est Ban= and the 4aCa 8tri$ since 1-)*--were i6nored/ as were the relevant $rinci$les of international law. <ell-established historical facts detailin6 IsraelBs forcible e5$ulsion of man> #alestinian refu6ees in 1-%. and 1-)* were disre6arded. Cam$ 9avid/ 2;;; Between Jul> 11 and 2%/ under the aus$ices of #resident Clinton/ #rime 0inister Bara= and Chairman Arafat met at Cam$ 9avid in an effort to reach an a6reement on $ermanent status. <hile the> were not able to brid6e the 6a$s and reach an a6reement/ their ne6otiations were un$recedented in both sco$e and detail. Buildin6 on the $ro6ress achieved at Cam$ 9avid/ the two leaders a6reed on the followin6 $rinci$les to 6uide their ne6otiations,

1A The two sides a6reed that the aim of their ne6otiations is to $ut an end to decades of conflict and achieve a (ust and lastin6 $eace. 2A The two sides commit themselves to continue their efforts to conclude an a6reement on all $ermanent status issues as soon as $ossible. A Both sides a6ree that ne6otiations based on !N 8ecurit> Council +esolutions 2%2 and . are the onl> wa> to achieve such an a6reement and the> underta=e to create an environment for ne6otiations free from $ressure/ intimidation and threats of violence. %A The two sides understand the im$ortance of avoidin6 unilateral actions that $re(ud6e the outcome of ne6otiations and that their differences will be resolved onl> b> 6ood faith ne6otiations. 'A Both sides a6ree that the !nited 8tates remains a vital $artner in the search for $eace and will continue to consult closel> with #resident Clinton and 8ecretar> Albri6ht in the $eriod ahead. :AI2!+1 3: CA0# 9AII9 II The failure of the #alestinian-Israeli-American summit at Cam$ 9avid did not sur$rise most #alestinians or those who understand #alestinian o$inion on the issues. Israeli #rime 0inister 1hud Bara=Bs well$ubliciCed Ered linesE 6oin6 into the ne6otiations delineated a $osition ver> far from the minimum that the #alestinian national consensus could acce$t as a resolution of the #alestinian-Israeli conflict. Bara= loudl> announced that Israel would not return to its $re-1-)* war borders. 7e sou6ht to anne5 settlement blocs containin6 about .;L of the 1.;/;;; Jewish settlers in the <est Ban= @e5cludin6 JerusalemA to Israel. 2i=e ever> Israeli leader since 1-)*/ Bara= demanded that the #alestinians acce$t all of Jerusalem as IsraelBs Eeternal ca$ital.E And Bara= insisted that Israel would acce$t no moral or le6al res$onsibilit> for the creation of the #alestinian refu6ee $roblem. In essence/ Bara= demanded that the #alestinians 6ive their blessin6 to IsraelBs man> violations of the :ourth 4eneva Convention and doCens of !N resolutions since 1-)*--most notabl> the confiscation of land for civilian $ur$oses/ settlin6 civilians in occu$ied territories/ the unilateral and internationall> unreco6niCed anne5ation of 1ast Jerusalem and the installation of some 1*'/;;; Jewish settlers there. The distance between the two $arties/ es$eciall> on the issues of Jerusalem and refu6ees/ made it im$ossible to reach an a6reement at the Cam$ 9avid summit meetin6 in Jul> 2;;;. Althou6h Bara= offered a far more e5tensive Israeli withdrawal from the <est Ban= than an> other

Israeli leader had $ublicl> considered/ he insisted on maintainin6 Israeli soverei6nt> over 1ast Jerusalem. This was unacce$table to the #alestinians and to most of the 0uslim world. Arafat left Cam$ 9avid with enhanced stature amon6 his constituents because he did not >ield to American and Israeli $ressure. Bara= returned home to face $olitical crisis within his own 6overnment/ includin6 the abandonment of coalitio n $artners who felt he had offered the #alestinians too much. 7owever/ the Israeli taboo on discussin6 the future of Jerusalem was bro=en. 0an> Israelis be6an to realiCe for the first time that the> mi6ht never achieve $eace if the> insisted on im$osin6 their terms on the #alestinians.

). INC+1A81 IN !8Q!88+ IN:2!1NC1 IN T71 +14I3N !nited 8tates In 0arch 1-'*/ the new instrument of American $olic> became the 1isenhower 9octrine. B> its terms/ he $resident was authoriCed to e5tend economic and militar> assistance/ includin6 troo$s to an> 0iddle 1astern nation that requested it a6ainst the threat of international communism. 7owever/ no Arab countr> e5ce$t 2ib>a and 2ebanon was ea6er the embrace the doctrine. The !nited 8tates was seen as attem$tin6 to wea=en Arab unit> b> insistin6 Arab countries line u$ on one side or the other in the Cold <ar. 1ven the Rallied& 8audis did not endorse the doctrine. Nor did Fin6 7ussein/ even thou6h the !nited 8tates rushed the 8i5 :leet to the eastern 0editerranean and e5tended 1; million in financial assistance to Jordon when the =in6 quashed a Nasser-su$$orted communist $lot a6ainst the monarch> in 1-'*. !nited 8tates +elations with Israel and #alestinians #resident 7arr> Truman declared reco6nition of Israel on 0a> 1'/ 1-%./ minutes $rior to Israeli inde$endence was declared. After the 8econd <ar <orld did the !8 $ush for the settlement of the man> Jewish refu6ees. #ast 0iddle 1astern interests of the !8 include containin6 the !88+ e5$ansion into it/ ensurin6 industrialiCed countries access to $etrol sources there/ fosterin6 democrac>&s 6rowth/ maintainin6 communications and trade and ensurin6 Israel&s securit>.

Both !8 and Israel a6reed that !8 should have the $redominant role as a $eace-ma=er/ however/ the bul= of Israelis wanted !8 to su$$ort onl> $ro-Israeli $ositions. #ast !8 arms transfers to Arab nations are also causin6 the friction in Israeli-!8 relations. The !8 have alwa>s re6arded the #alestinians as one of the $roblems to be solved in the Arab-Israeli dis$ute/ rather then $artici$ants of the $eace $ro6ress/ not until recentl> that is. The series of terrorist attac=s added the label Rterrorist& to #alestinian&s Rrefu6ee& ima6e. #resident Jimm> Carter shifted this $erce$tion in 1-** when he mentioned that the #alestinians deserve a homeland. In 1-*'/ 8ecretar> of 8tate to #resident 4erald :ord 7enr> Fissin6er told ensured Israel that the !8 will not ne6otiate with #23 unless the> acce$ted the !N resolutions/ and acce$ted Israel/ re(ectin6 terrorism in the $rocess. 7owever/ #23 head Hasser Arafat a6reed and the !8 o$ened dialo6ues in 1-... The tal=s were maintained until 1--; when #resident Bush 8enior ended it on accounts that #23 did not denounce terror attac=s in Tel Aviv in 1--;.

!nited Nations Throu6hout the twentieth centur>/ various efforts were made to arbitrate the dis$ute between #alestinians and Israelis. The !nited Nations was heavil> involved in the >ears followin6 its vote to $artition #alestine. It created the !nited Nations +elief and <or=s A6enc> to ta=e res$onsibilit> for #alestinian refu6ees/ sent mediators to the re6ion throu6hout the 1-%;s/ 1-';s/ and 1-);s/ and $assed doCens of 4eneral Assembl> and 8ecurit> Council resolutions callin6 for ceasefires/ condemnin6 a66ressive actions b> each of the $arties/ and su66estin6 a$$roaches for conflict resolution. In recent decades/ the !nited 8tates has attem$ted to ta=e a leadin6 role in mana6in6 the conflict and has wor=ed to e5clude the !nited Nations from $artici$ation. The close relationshi$ between Israel and the !nited 8tates has ham$ered the abilit> of the !nited 8tates to serve as a neutral mediator/ however. :urthermore/ for 1 >ears/ the !nited 8tates refused to ac=nowled6e or deal officiall> with the #23 because of a $romise the !nited 8tates made to Israel in 1-*', The !nited 8tates will continue to adhere to its $resent $olic> with res$ect to the #alestine 2iberation 3r6aniCation O#23P/ whereb> it will not reco6niCe or ne6otiate with the #alestine 2iberation 3r6aniCation so

lon6 as the #alestine 2iberation 3r6aniCation does not reco6niCe IsraelBs ri6ht to e5ist and does not acce$t 8ecurit> Council +esolutions 2%2 and .. The two !N 8ecurit> Council resolutions referred to-2%2 and .mar=ed the end of the June 1-)* and 3ctober 1-* Arab-Israeli wars/ res$ectivel>. #alestinians maintained these resolutions were an inadequate basis for ne6otiation because/ amon6 other issues/ the> did not address #alestinian demands for self-determination/ referrin6 instead onl> to a Esettlement of the refu6ee $roblem.E 2ater/ in 1-.%/ Con6ress wrote the 1-*' $led6e into law and added that the #23 had to renounce the use of terrorism before there would be an> formal di$lomatic discussions between the two $arties. In the absence of relations with the #23/ the !nited 8tates was forced to rel> on other Arab states to re$resent #alestinian interests" a tas= these countries did $oorl> and without enthusiasm. After ArafatBs conciliator> statements in 9ecember 1-../ the !nited 8tates o$ened direct contacts with the #23. After the 4ulf <ar in 1--1/ #alestinians were livid/ as=in6 wh> the Iraqi occu$ation was instantl> condemned while IsraelBs occu$ation of #alestinian lands was i6nored and/ in the case of the !nited 8tates/ im$licitl> su$$orted throu6h !.8. economic and militar> assistance to Israel. In order to build a broad coalition a6ainst Iraq-one that included a number of Arab states-the !nited 8tates committed itself to addressin6 the Israeli-#alestinian conflict once the war ended. These concluded with the ma(or brea=throu6h of the 0adrid Conference. !ne5$ectedl>/ at the end of Au6ust 1-- / the Israeli 6overnment and the #23 announced the> had been meetin6 secretl> in Norwa> and had reached an interim a6reement for #alestinian self-6overnment. The 9eclaration of #rinci$les @9o#A/ si6ned in 8e$tember/ outlined a $rocess for transformin6 the nature of the Israeli occu$ation but left numerous issues unresolved/ includin6 the status of Jerusalem/ the ri6ht of return for #alestinian refu6ees/ the dis$osition of Israeli settlements/ securit> arran6ements/ and final borders between Israel and a #alestinian state. <ith #alestinian-Israeli ne6otiations stalled and the final status tal=s not >et be6un/ !.8. #resident Bill Clinton called a summit at Cam$ 9avid in Jul> 2;;;. !88+ Althou6h the !88+ was the second countr> to reco6niCe officiall> Israel&s creation in 1-%./ 0oscow found it e5$edient to side a6ainst

Israel. Callin6 Israel the linch$in of <estern im$erialism in the 0iddle 1ast/ 0oscow lon6 had sou6ht to for6e a unified anti-im$erialist Arab bloc under 8oviet leadershi$. B> sidin6 with the Arab cause/ the 8oviet !nion 6ained entr> into the 0iddle 1ast/ cultivated Arab re6imes of all ideolo6ical stri$es undermined the !.8. $osition in the Arab world b> isolatin6 it as Israel&s chief bac=er/ stren6thened radical anti-<estern forces. It also acquired access to several bases/ namel> the $ort of Tartus in 8>ria and 8outh Hemen&s $orts in Aden and the island of 8ocotra. Indeed/ the 8oviet !nion was the chief beneficiar> of the ArabIsraeli conflict. This interminable stru66le enabled 0oscow to build $atron-client relationshi$s with Arab states that otherwise would have little need for a 8oviet connection/ 6iven the lac=luster a$$eal of 8oviet ideolo6>/ technolo6>/ and economic assistance. B> fuelin6 the ArabIsraeli arms race/ 0oscow was able to ta$ its $rinci$al source of national $ower - militar> stren6th. A watershed event in 8oviet 0iddle 1ast $olic> was the 8e$tember 1-'' 2;; million CCech arms transfer to 16>$t/ orchestrated b> 0oscow. It was 0oscow&s first militar> commitment to an Arab state. 8ubsequent arms deals were arran6ed with 8>ria @1-')A/ Hemen @1-')A/ Af6hanistan @1-')A and Iraq @1-'.A. In e5chan6e for arms the 8oviets 6ained $olitical influence and strate6ic advanta6e throu6h militar> coo$eration and access to Arab militar> facilities. 0oscow si6ned classic lon6-term friendshi$ and coo$eration treaties with 16>$t in 1-*1/ Iraq in 1-*2/ 8omalia in 1-*%/ 1thio$ia in 1-*./ Af6hanistan in 1-*./ 8outh Hemen in 1-*-/ and 8>ria in 1-.;. 15$erts were also sent in to hel$ the Arabs.