Pinote v.

Ayco Facts: Judge Ayco allowed the defense in People vs Vice MayorSalvador to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses even in the absence of State Prosecutor Pinote who was prosecuting the case. Pinote was undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center hence his absence. On the subsequent hearings, he refused to cross -examine the two defense witnesses despite being ordered by the judge, he maintaining that the proceedings conducted in his a bsence were void. Judge considered the prosecution to have waived it right to cross examine. Hence, an administrative complaint was lodged by Pinote against Ayco. Ruling: Considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence, respondent justifies the same on complainants failure to formally offer the evidence for the prosecution despite several extensions of time granted for the purpose. No substantial prejudice was suffered by the prosecution for complainant was permitted to cross examine the two defense witnesses but he refused to do so. Office of the Court Administrator finds respondent to have breached section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure and accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded therefor, with warning that a r epetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public prosecutor. Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of th e Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people. Respondents act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated f or the purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross- examine the witnesses. Respondents intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.

Leviste v. Alameda Facts: The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 2007 deferring petitioners arraignment and allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a recommendation within 30 days from its inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of January 31, 2007 denying reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the

trial court to defer acting on the public prosecutors recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court resolves his application for injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the prosecutors recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause. Petitioner also separately moved for the inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action on the admission of the Amended Information. The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, viz: (1) Order of February 7, 2007 that admitted the Amended Information for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and (2) Order of February 8, 2007 which set the arraignment on February 13, 2007. Petitioner questioned these two orders via supplemental petition before the appellate court. The appellate court dismissed petitioners petition, hence, his present petition. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO CAUSE THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL CASE BELOW WHEN THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THE LOWER COURT. HENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING SUCH REINVESTIGATION DESPITE HAVING NO BASIS IN THE RULES OF COURT. Ruling: The contention lacks merit. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads: When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person. Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigationwith the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule. (underscoring supplied)

A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to fine. As an exception, the rules provide that there is no need for a preliminary

investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without a warrant involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has been conducted. Once the trial court grants the prosecutions motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion wide and far reaching regarding the disposition thereof, subject to the trial courts approval of the resulting proposed course of action. Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal information as what happened in the present case, the Courts holding is bolstered by the rule on am endment of an information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court: A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea . After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party. If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. (emphasis supplied) In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.

Pacoy v. Cajigal Facts: On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner. Upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide. However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another order directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the information which

public respondent registered as having qualified to the crime of murder. Acting upon such order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word homicide and instead wrote the word murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original information for homicide. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion and exceeds his jurisdiction in ordering the amendment of the information from homicide to murder. Ruling: The petition is not meritorious. The change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution. There was no real change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged as alleged in the body of the Information, as the allegations of qualifying circumstances were already clearly embedded in the original Information. The averments in the amended Information for murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Information for homicide.

Alva v. CA Facts: The present petition stemmed from an Information3 charging petitioner with having committed the crime of estafa defined under Article 315, Paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, alleging as follows: The undersigned accuses ARNOLD ALVA of the crime of ESTAFA, committed as follows: That in or about and during the period covered between October 18, 1993 up to December 18, 1993, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously defraud YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestation and fraudulent representation which he made to said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to the effect that he could process the latters application for U.S. Visa provided she would give the amount of P120,000.00, and by means of other similar deceit, induced and succeeded in inducing said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA to give and deliver, as in fact she gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P120,000.00 on the strength of said manifestation and representation said accused well knowing that the same were false and untrue for the reason that the U.S. Visa is not genuine and were made solely to obtain, as in fact he did obtain the amount ofP120,000.00 which amount once in his possession with intent to defraud, he wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said YUMI VERANGA y HERVERA in the aforesaid amount of P120,000.00, Philippine Currency. CONTRARY TO LAW. In its decision dated 25 March 1999, the RTC found petitioner guilty of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. In a Resolution dated 18 October 2002, the Court of Appeals, nonetheless dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner for "appellants failure to post a new bond for his provisional liberty on appeal despite our directive as contained in our

Resolution dated October 16, 2001, and in view of the fact that his personal bail bond posted in the lower court had already expired, x x x." Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER AS SUBSTANTIAL, THE COMPLAINCE FILED BY THE PETITIONER WHICH SHOWED THE FACT THAT INDEED THERE WAS A BAIL BOND FILED FOR THE PROVISIONAL LIBERTY OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL. Ruling: We disagree in petitioners assertions; hence, the petition must fail. A definitive disposition of the issue relating to the existence and validity of petitioners bail bond on appeal presupposes that the latter was allowed by law to post bail notwithstanding the RTCs judgment of conviction and the imposition of the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal. Section 5 of Rule 114 of the 1994 Rules of Court, as amended, intrinsically addresses the foregoing prefatory matter viz: SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail. The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman. If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstances of reiteration; (b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime.

The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party. [Emphasis supplied.] From the preceding quoted provision, the RTC is given the discretion to admit to bail an accused even after the latter has been convicted to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of more than six (6) years but less than twenty (20) years. However, the same also provides for the cancellation of bail bonds already granted or the denial of a bail bond application upon the concurrence of two points: 1) if the judgment of the Regional Trial Court exceeds six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years; and 2) upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the presence of any of the five circumstances therein enumerated or other similar circumstances. In the case at bar, petitioner was convicted by the RTC to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate term of nine (9) years and one (1) day as minimum of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years as maximum of reclusion temporal. Quite clearly, the approval of petitioners application for bail was discretionary upon the RTC. It is incongruous, to say the least, that the posting of a bail presupposes that the accused and/ or accused-appellant is detained or in the custody of the law. In the case at bar, the bench warrant issued by the RTC on 19 May 1999 still remains unserved. Nothing in the records of the case, neither in the RTC nor the Court of Appeals, demonstrates that petitioner was ever arrested, as there has been no related Order of Release issued by any court, or that he voluntarily surrendered or at the very least placed himself under the custody of the law. Basic is the principle that that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, x x x, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed. All told, no bail should have been granted petitioner. It is beyond dispute that the subject bail bond issued by Mega Pacific Insurance Corporation was irregularly approved. Worth noting is the fact that nowhere in the records of the case is it shown that petitioner applied for bail through a motion duly filed for such purpose nor is there showing that the RTC issued an Order of Approval or any other court process acknowledging such document. Be that as it may, even granting for the sake of argument that it was indeed approved by Judge Muro, such approval did not render the subject bail bond valid and binding for it has been established that petitioner was not entitled to bail on appeal.

Chua-Burce v. CA Facts: Ramon Rocamora, manager of Metrobank, requested FructuosoPenaflor, Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of cash inside the vault, which should total to P4 million. They found out that there was a shortage of P150,000. After 4 investigations conducted by the bank and NBI, the reports concluded that Cristeta Chua-Burce, Cash Custodian, was primary responsible for the shortage. Unable to explain the shortage, the services of the accused was terminated. Chua-Burce, together with her husband Antonio Burce, were charged with the crime of estafa. A civil case was also instituted. The accused prayed for suspension of criminal case due to a prejudicial question. It was first granted but denied by the CA. The CRIMINAL and CIVIL cases continued. The CRIMINAL CASE ruled that she was guilty of estafa. CIVIL CASE also found her liable for the shortage of P150,000. She appealed both rulings to the CA but the court affirmed the two TC rulings. Hence this case.

Issue: 1. Whether or not there was a valid trial; 2. Whether or not the elements of estafa were proven beyond reasonable doubt. Ruling: 1. Yes, there was a valid trial. The accused allege that the public prosecutor did not intervene with the case (violation of Sec 5 RULE 110 ) and did not present evidence for the criminal case (no evidence for the accused to be convicted). But the fact showed that the public prosecutor actively participated with the criminal case. And both parties, during the pre-trial, agreed to adopt their respective evidences in the CIVIL CASE to the CRIMINAL CASE. The agreement was reduced into writing, inconformity with the Rules of Court. Being bound by the pre-trial agreement, it is now too late in the day to challenge its contents. 2. No, the crime of estafa was not proven. The elements of Estafa, ART. 315 (1) (b), are the following: a) The personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration, or any other circumstances, with the duty return. b) There is a conversion/diversion of such property or denial that he received it. c) Such conversion/diversion is to the injury of another d) There is demand for such property The 1st element is absent. The 1st element gives the transferee both material and juridical possession of the personal property. Juridical possession means the transferee has a right over the thing which he may even set up against the owner. The possession of the accused of the money had no juridical possession. Being a cash custodian, her possession is akin to that of a bank teller. And possession of a bank teller is possession of the bank. She was a mere custodian.