Minorities in Contemporary Islamist Discourse Author(s): Uriah Furman Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Oct.

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Minoritiesin Contemporary Islamist Discourse

URIAH FURMAN

Contemporary Islamists (al-Islamiyyun)' deal very little with Islam's attitudetoward minorities and even less with the status that minorities can anticipatein the state the Islamists long for.2Scrutiny of Islamist discourse reveals that the issue of the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in the past or in the longed-for Islamic state receives less attentionthan other social and political issues; as a matter of fact, it appears to be fairly neglected. Fewer papers are written on the minorities issue than on other subjects. Whereas thought, struggle, and efforts at renewal are devoted to the issues on which Islamists prefer to focus, such as the arena of political struggle, the da 'wa (Islamic indoctrination),Islamic social justice, and ways to shape the ideal Muslim, for some reason attentionto their attitudetoward minorities puts them on the defensive, where they resort to apologetics to try to defend the good name of Islam. Except for a few preliminary attempts,there have been no perceptible efforts to construct a new concept that deals with the challenges posed by contemporaryreality and with the difficult questions involved in applying the classical model of relations with non-Muslim 'protectedpeople' in the modernIslamic state to be established in our days. However, the harshattacksby Islamists on minorities in Islamic countries today, and the call to frustratetheir 'plots' against Islam, reveal that they certainly do not dismiss the issue. As is their wont, the Islamists groundtheir concept of the attitudetoward minorities, and their efforts to refute the 'lies', 'doubts', and 'misgivings' about this question spread by the 'enemies of Islam' on large doses of prooftexts taken from the scriptures(the Qur'an and Hadith,or traditionsof the Prophet),on an 'objective and authentic'study of history,and on Western scholarswhose researchfindings supporttheirversion of history.The present discussion of the Islamists' world view and their attitudetowards minorities under Islamic rule is based on a sampling of their comments; its boundaries are largely influenced by the availability and natureof these remarks.Some of the leading scholars from the middle of twentiethcenturyare represented, including Maududiof Pakistan,Sayyid Qutb of Egypt, and the IranianShi'i
Middle EasternStudies, Vol.36, No.4, October2000, pp.1-20
PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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Sayyid MahmudTaleqani,as well as those who have expressed theiropinion on this issue since the 1970s, such as Yusuf al-Qardawiof Egypt, Hasan alTurabiof Sudan, Syrian Islamists, and several others who are known to us only because of the publicationof their ideas. Their concept is not examined here with reference to what is sometimes called 'normative' or 'establishment' Islam, although, basically, it expresses the traditional approachin this issue.3 However, an attemptis made to delve into its roots and to understand the strong feelings and discomfort that the issue of minorities causes them, as well as the reason for its relative neglect comparedto other subjects on the currentagenda of Islamist discourse.

Minorities, in the Islamist concept, are 'non-Muslims' who continue to live underIslamic rule on the basis of an agreementthat allows them to continue to adhere to their faith and regulates their rights and obligations and other aspects of their relations with the Muslim community and Islamic government. The terms commonly used by Islamists to refer to minorities are ghayr al-muslimin ('non-Muslims'), al-mukhalifinfi al-din ('the others in religion'), and ahl al-dhimma ('protected people'), the last-mentioned a status awarded them by virtue of their acceptance of Islamic rule and protection. From this definition, which is reflected in Islamist doctrine and in its intrinsic model of relations with the 'protectedpeople', the criteriafor distinguishing between 'minority' and 'majority' are not quantitative, but rathercultural and political, that is, determined by religion and control of the government. The minorities, according to this doctrine, are almost exclusively ahl al-kitab (monotheists, 'the Peoples of the Book'): Christians and Jews. This basic Islamist concept does not stipulate a position in principle with regard to the status of non-Muslims who are neither Christians nor Jews, or on the significance of the quantitative 'balance of power' among the various communities. The status of other groups is rarelyconsidered in any comprehensiveand organized fashion.4 Islamists generally devote separate treatment to the status of different types of minorities who live in their countries:legitimate Islamic sects that are not part of the majority ruling group (for example, a Shi'i minority under Sunni rule, or vice-versa, as in Iran); sects whose legitimacy is a matterof debate, such as the Alawis in Syria; and adherents of non-monotheisticand pagan faiths. As for the quantitativedimension, the accession of Muslims to power makes the other groups a minority even if they constitute the numerical majority of the population; significantly, Islamists rarely use the term aqalliyya , which means 'minority' in the quantitativesense. Nevertheless, they do adopt a position on the numerical issue outside the frameworkof this doctrine.

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MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIST DISCOURSE

In the manifesto of the Islamic Revolution in Syria (1980), directed, inter alia, at the Alawi community,it was stated that 'nine or ten percent of the people in this country cannot extend their rule over the entire population, because this goes against logic...' In an article praising the achievements of the Iranianrevolution, its supportersin Lebanon describe the regime's approach toward ethnic minorities, most of them Sunni, in a manner highly reminiscent of the Islamic state's treatment of 'protected people', albeit under the guise of the aspiration for Muslim unity and minimization of the importance of the distinction between Shi'is and Sunnis.5 These comments indicate that conceptual theories aside, the Islamists deal with the reality that not all 'minorities' are non-Muslim and that in distinguishing between majorityand minority,the quantitativefactor is of importance.Moreover, it would appear that the Islamists have indeed internalized the value of majority rule, as well as the need to deal with a variety of minorities, but the task of finding an appropriateplace for them in a doctrine whose basis is so strongly scripturalis evidently difficult.6 This doctrine is anchored, first and foremost, in the scriptures and in early Islamic history, which focus almost exclusively on the ahl al-kitab (although they leave room for others, without mentioning them explicitly); moreover, the 'People of the Book' have a special status because their religion is based on Divine revelation and a monotheistic faith in the same deity who is also the God of the Muslims. As for the quantitativedimension, the historical context is the initial period of expansion, when the Muslim conquerorsoften found themselves in a numericalminority in the state they had founded. However, as noted, the main criterion that determined the 'balance of power' between majorityand minorityin thatperiod should also be determinative in the present day. That is to say, Muslims may be a numerical minority of the population, but they are always the 'majority' because of their religious and culturalsuperiorityand the Divine law which determines that Islam and the Muslims must rule. Ethnic differences in race, language, or local culture are not usually discussed, whether the subject be, for example, the Kurds (who are nonArab Sunni Muslims) or ChristianArabs. Islamists determine the status of differentgroups by their religion. Nevertheless, one may occasionally sense discomfort with the fact that Arabs can be non-Muslims, and there are signs of an impending debate about the attitudeto such Arabs.7 The Islamic state's policy vis-a-vis minorities is based on a system of values that the Islamists regardas unique and partof a more comprehensive Islamic ethos. Therefore it should come as no surprise, they argue, that humanity has never known such an exemplary model of relations between the majority - or the ruling class - and the minority that is under its protection.These values, which underliethe 'spiritof tolerance' and Islamic

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generosity (samaha), include lack of religious coercion, equality,humanism and human dignity, mutual responsibility, unity, and even friendship. Expression of these values is conditional. They can and must be expressed only if the minorities accept a situation in which the Divine will is realized and the sole, eternalregime grantedto man prevails. They do not apply and must not be exercised with respect to non-Muslims who object to Islamic rule, fight against it, or persecute its believers. Essentially, non-Muslims who are faced with jihad have three choices: they may convert to Islam, accept the status of 'protected people' under Islamic rule (in which case they are permittedto retain their faith and rituals), or fight in an attemptto halt and repel it.8The ability of non-Muslims to resist jihad may force the Muslims to conclude sulh agreements - temporaryceasefires - with them, becausejihad is a state of perpetualstruggle until the word of Allah prevails worldwide. Receiving the status of 'protectedpeople' is contingent on an agreement drawn up by the Muslim ruler with the non-Muslims who are preparedto accept Islamic rule. They are given 'citizenship', protectionof life, dignity, and property,and freedom of worship, and in returnthey are obligated to pay special taxes, accept Islamic civil law, and respect the sensibilities and beliefs of their Muslim protectors.Some Islamists have gone so far, and into such detail, as to create an organized, detailed doctrine.9 With a few exceptions, they argue, the rights grantedto 'protectedpeople' are equal to those of Muslims. The right to protection,which is the ruler's responsibility, is comprehensive and absolute, and severe admonitions are issued because of the perception that the dhimmi is a priori in an inferior situation. As a citizen of the Islamic state, the dhimmi is entitled not only to physical protection or protection from wrongdoing and abuse, but also to societal guarantees and assistance in states of hardship. Freedom of belief grants immunity to places of worship and the conduct of non-Muslim religious ceremonies, although the non-Muslims must be considerate of the sensibilities of their Muslim neighbours in public, so as to prevent internal tension between the communities (fitna). New places of worship (churches and synagogues) may be rehabilitatedor built if circumstances or interests warrantit; this is, of course, possible in places where non-Muslims form the majority of the population. Non-Muslims have the right and freedom to work and earn a living just like Muslim subjects, and may hold public office in accordancewith their abilities. Nevertheless, the rights and freedoms of non-Muslims are not unlimited and are not entirely equal to those of Muslims. Whilst the Islamists require that 'protected-people' do not offend Muslims' sensitivities, they do not offer a reciprocal undertaking. Islamists will not pledge to refrain from rehabilitatinga destroyed mosque or building a new one merely to avoid

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MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIST DISCOURSE

Christian antagonism. The range of public offices that they may hold is limited to those that do not involve religion and commandments;in effect, this deprives them of political rights and important channels of social mobility. Non-Muslims cannot serve in key decision-making positions, as rulers of the state, as army commanders,or as judges. The institutionof the caliphate, top army jobs during a jihad, and implementationof the Shari'a cannot be detached from their intrinsic aspect of worship and religious commandment. What guarantees can Muslims give the protected minorities to assure them that their rights will be preserved? According to Qardawi, the guarantees are the sanctity of Islamic instructions and profound faith that they must be obeyed. These guarantees are more reliable than man-made law, which can remain a dead letter if fanaticism increases. Moreover, a religious Islamic society has a mechanism for correctinginjustices. Because of the collective responsibility for implementing Shari'a, if one person violates its rules there is always someone who will be responsible for correctingthe wrongdoer's ways and rescuing the victim, whetheror not he is a Muslim, and even if he does not complain. A non-Muslim who has been wrongly harmed can complain to any echelon of the government, the authorities,and the powers that be. If he is not satisfied with the response of a certain authorityor ruling echelon, or if the source of the infringementis such an authority figure, he can turn to a higher echelon or to other authorities;all are required to deal with the problem even if they became aware of it without a complaint having been made. Qardawi sketches flow charts for dealing with injury to a dhimmi, to prove that the victim's problem is ultimately solved. If the available authorities fail to fulfil their obligation, there are two further aids to the dhimmi victim: the judicial system, which is autonomousand has authorityeven vis-a?-vis the ruler;and public opinion and the sages of religious law, who always come out strongly against acts that violate Islamic precepts, especially if the case involves unjust harm to a person. As stated above, in returnfor the rights the protected people also have obligations. First and foremost, they must pay a few taxes, the most prominentbeing thejizya and the kharaj.' Thejizya - a head tax - is levied, on a sliding scale, on adultmen who are physically and mentally fit for army service. People in need of support, those who are unable to work for a living, the elderly, the disabled, the mentally deficient, juveniles, women, slaves, and even monastics who devote themselves to religious worship are exempt from paying the tax. The Islamists freely admit that the tax is a sign of submission and subjection to Islamic rule, but they also present a rationale for its existence. It represents the non-Muslims' participationin the costs of defending the state, and is a substitute for military service by

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adults who are physically and intellectually fit for it, because they are not required to fulfil the precepts of a different religion, in this instance, participationin jihad. Payment of the jizya also representsparticipationin the funding of public services and assuranceof the mutualguaranteeand aid for the needy. Non-Muslims thereby fulfil their obligation to the Islamic state alongside the Muslim subjects, who are requiredto perform military service and pay the zakat (a charitytax). The head tax is not levied when the state is unable to protect its subjects, when a dhimmi takes part in a war alongside the Muslims, or when a dhimmi converts to Islam. The dhimmi must pay other taxes, too: the kharaj, which is imposed on the right to use land, and a yearly tax on commercial activities. The second main obligation of protected people is subordination to Islamic law in civil mattersthat do not infringe upon their beliefs and their freedom of religion. They are treated the same as Muslims in financial matters, business deals, criminal cases, and so on. As stated, non-Muslims must also respect the sensibilities of Muslims and the state that protects them. Although they are not necessarily forbiddento do what Islam forbids its believers - and certainly not when their own religion requires them to perform the prohibited act - they are also not obliged to abide by Islamic prohibitions with regard to acts that, according to their faith, are merely permissible. Where non-Muslims live far from Muslims, they may hold their ceremonies in public, raise their voices in prayer,ring churchbells, and even trade in wine and pork (among themselves and absolutely not with Muslims). If they live near Muslims they must do all of these privately so as not to offend the Muslims' sensibilities.

Most of the intellectual energy exerted by Islamists in their discourse on the question of minorities is invested in repelling the argumentsagainst Islamic theory and practice in the past and present. The Islamists have striven to construct a systematic, diverse argumentto refute the allegations, 'expose the forgeries of history', and correct 'perceptualdistortions' regardingthe understandingof Islam's approach.They rarely cite those 'Orientalistsand missionaries' who disparage Islam, but they quote extensively from Western research literature when it corroborates their version of events. They sketch a vague outline of the accusations and allegations which become clear in their counterarguments. The main allegations that upset the Islamists are as follows: Islamic rule means intolerance, deprivation of freedom of belief, and forcing Islamic religious law on non-Muslims (and therefore,in countries in which different religious groups coexist, there should be a civil and national society, and religion should be separatedfrom state, even if one religious group forms

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MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIST DISCOURSE

an absolute majority of the population). Non-Muslims were oppressed by the special taxes imposed upon them as 'protected-people', which were designed to force them to convert to Islam. These taxes, along with other identifying marks that they were forced to wear or to assimilate in their behaviour, served as signs of abasement, submission and subordination. Islamic history is rife with discriminatorypolicies, deprivation of rights, enslavement, and persecution of non-Muslims, who lived in fear, financial hardship,and social oppression. One fairly new essay that has significant provocative potential from the Islamists' perspective is The Dhimmi, by Bat Ye'or (1985). Bat Ye'or's goal was to extricate the dhimmi from 'imprisonment in the silence of his centuries-old shrine' and let him speak for himself, through an abundance of documents and testimonies. She helps him sketch a gloomy pictureof his status as a conquered people or as a persecuted, abased religious minority under Islamic rule. She promises to try to distinguish between the conquerors' religious doctrine and any universal ethos of conquest, and she understandsthe Muslim conquerorswho saw the submission and abasement of non-Muslims and their own power and rule as proof of the truthof their faith; nevertheless, a methodology that focuses on one side's perspective inevitably sows the seeds of rage on the other side. These seeds can be found not only in the detailed descriptions of discrimination, abasement, and inferiority in the lives of the 'protected- people', but also in such assertions as the following: Thus the dhimma, losing its original character of an agreement binding the parties concerned, became the formal expression of a legalized persecution.It was the dhimmathat was largely instrumental in the success of the policies of Arabizationand Islamization of vast regions outside Arabia and the progressive disappearance of indigenous people and cultures. Or, 'The dhimma required the humiliation of the Dhimmis, who were accused of perpetuatingfalse versions of the Old and New Testaments...' Bat Ye'or also reveals the 'dhimmi syndrome' - a 'common form of alienation' produced in the private and collective emotional world of the oppressed groups by 1,200 years of abasement.On the individual level, she asserts, 'It was characterized by a profound dehumanization... the consequence of a condition of permanent insecurity, servility, and ignorance... This type of alienation may still today be observed in an acute form among the marginalminorities of the umma."' I have not come across any reactions by Islamists to this particular essay, but it can undoubtedlyserve as a good example of what outrages them and prompts them to defend themselves and contend with the issue. From the

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Islamists' perspective, this is a conspiracy.As they explain it, when there is no longer any pretextto sustain imperialismand foreign influence in Islamic countries, another pretext is found: the non-Muslim minorities, who are ostensibly in danger of discrimination or loss of identity because of the phenomenon of the return to Islam in countries that have gained independence. At the very least, this is a malicious act intended to impugn the values of Islamic tolerance, or an act of fraud by scholars who try to substantiateflimsy theories through the selective use of events, facts, and eras. This is done by Orientalistsand missionaries, who form the spearhead in slandering Islam. In reaction, the popular Egyptian preacher 'Abd alHamid Kishk promises that 'the sun of truthwill certainly yet shine and the darknessof lies will vanish.'2 '.. .Fear of Islamic rule over ethnic minorities in its land', argues Sayyid Qutb, 'is a way of casting in appropriate blame, since no religion in the world, and no regime on earth guarantees the freedoms, dignity, and ethnic rights of these minorities the way Islam has done in its long history.' In a similar vein, Maududi responds to those opposed to applying Islamic law in Pakistan, who voiced the argumentthat there must be considerationfor the non-Muslim minorities: The law with which we have been and are concerned here is the 'law of land' and not the personal law of a community.In personal matters, every community is welcome to adopt its own personal law. Indeed it is only Islam which guaranteesthis right in the most liberal mannerto all the minorities living in the Islamic State. It was Islam, asserts Maududi, that taught the modern world the true difference between these two legal systems."3 The detailed argumentsthat focus on Islam's magnanimity towards the 'protected-people' or compare it with other civilizations' attitudes toward minorities make up the front ranks repelling the charges against it. The Islamists discuss extensively and in detail the extraordinary Islamic tolerance, the lack of coercion to convert to Islam, the extreme care to preserve the rights and security of the 'protected-people',and partnership of the protected people, along with their Muslim neighbours, in the regime of justice and equality.Preferencefor this apologetic approachunderscoresthe fact that the Islamists are on the defensive. Between the lines one can sense the storm of emotion that torments them when they hear the criticism and allegations levied against Islam. Ghazali and Maududi insist that the majority has the right to determine the nature of the state and the regime without having to relinquish its faith and betray the commandmentsmerely to reassurethe minority.The Islamic majorityhas the rightto live by Islamic law, they argue, and this right does not run counter to the value and commandmentof respecting and ensuring the rights of the minority."'

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MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY

ISLAMIST DISCOURSE

The apologetic argumentationtakes other forms, too.'5 One method is the 'spreadersof lies' with the weapons comparative,meant to counterattack they themselves use against Islam, to depict them as sanctimonious pretenderswho serve as a mouthpiece for murky ideologies and oppressive regimes, and to put the Islamic attitudetowards minoritiesin an appropriate perspective. According to Qardawi, 'Anyone who wants to understandthe merit of Islamic toleranceand the toleranceof the Muslims uprightly,should read about what [the adherentsof the] other religions and faiths have done throughouthistory to those who disagreedwith them... Moreover,he should read about the stance of adherents of the modem non-religious faiths and ideological revolutionarypropagandistsin the twentieth century to see how they have treatedtheir rivals...' They have all regardedpersecution,terror, and mass annihilation of their opponents as a revolutionary obligation, a condition for achieving their goals and creating the world that they desire. Qardawipoints to the brutalityof the Christianchurchrule that tried to force its religious faith on others and obliterated its opponents in a war of annihilation; the bloody struggles waged between Christian sects over theological issues; and the paths of Communism,Stalin, and the Nazis. What the Muslims get in returnfor their Islamic toleranceis oppressionof Muslim minorities(who sometimes form the majorityof the population)in countries subject to non-Muslim rule. The Islamists present a long list of countries aroundthe world where Muslims are persecuted and deprived of the basic right to observe the commandmentsof their religion. Using a differentmethod of argumentation,the Islamists present an alibi for the allegations regardingcertain forms of discriminationor abasement. For example, the Islamists are outraged by the claim that the Muslims invented the practice of imprintingthe skin of 'protected people', that this practice was in effect for a very long time, and that it was marked by abasement. According to the Islamists, they merely mimicked a Byzantine practice that predated the Muslim conquest. Furthermore,they say, the system was in effect only when the jizya was collected, and it served as confirmationof payment;the mark vanished after a while. A similar system is used today, too, they argue, in several African and Asian countries at election time: to prevent double voting, voters' hands are stamped with a kind of ink that wears off after a few days. The latter argumentis typical of a third method of argumentation- an attempt to draw parallels between aspects of the Islamic regime's treatment of minorities and standard contemporarypractices in the non-Muslim world. Qardawi sees a parallel between the jizya and taxes levied to fund public services and ensure everyone a livelihood (the Muslims, he says, participateby means of the zakat); between the kharaj and a property tax on real estate; and between the commercial tax and payment of customs duty today.

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A fourthmethod of argumentation is based on the assertionthat Muslims have been far morebeneficenttowardminoritiesthanthey were required to be. Islamictolerancehas gone so far as to allow the 'protected-people' not only to fulfil theirown religiousobligationsand refrainfrom what they are prohibited to do, but even to do what their faith merely permits (and does not require) when Islam forbids it. They retainedtheir right to general protectioneven if they failed to fulfil their obligations to the state and to the Muslims. The Muslims were so good to the 'protected-people',argue the Islamists, that protectedpeople could hold high governmentoffices, attainclose relationsand friendshipwith rulers,wield economic and financialpower in the state,amass extreme riches, make their mark in the arts and sciences, and enjoy friendly relationswith Muslims, who sometimeseven showed interestin theirculture. The fifth method of argumentationis based on providing a rational explanation for the various allegations of discrimination.The special taxes imposed on the protectedpeople are depicted as 'correctivediscrimination', as the Muslims are bound by the jihad and zakat (in addition to various taxes imposed from time to time on all citizens), from which the protected people are exempt. A protected person who took part in the war effort was exempt from paying the jizya tax, and if he helped the Muslims - whether on the battlefield or elsewhere - he was exempt from paying other taxes. In contrast,Muslims who were exempt from army service had to pay the head tax. The external identifying marks and dress to distinguish between Muslims and non-Muslims were essential in certain periods because of the lack of modernidentity cards in which one's religion is recordedalong with one's name. Today such means of distinction are no longer necessary,just as they were not needed during the period of conquest, when the nonMuslims dressed differently from the Muslims anyway. The problem arose when the conquered populations had reason to mimic the Muslims' dress. In any case, the Islamists argue, Islamic rulers generally preferrednot to impose this rule. The Islamists do not deny that there have been cases of incitement and abuse of non-Muslims, but they reject the claim that this was a frequent characteristicof life in the Islamic state. They sympathize with their ancient brethrenwho sometimes deviated from the norm of 'Islamic tolerance' and lost their tempers when protected people who had attained positions of power and administrative and economic influence abused Muslims instead of being good to them; when the great wealth they amassed evoked protest (class-based more than religious); or when they expressed satisfaction when Muslims were trouncedby their non-Muslim enemies.

In marked contrast to the 'tolerance' displayed toward minorities in discourse and doctrine, minorities are today the target of vicious attacks,

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especially but not exclusively in countries in which there is intercommunity tension. We are dealing here mainly with a perception, but it should be rememberedthat this tension from time to time culminates in real violence. In one sphere, this attackis intended to open Muslims' eyes to the plots that the Islamists attribute to the 'protected people' and their patrons in the Christian and Jewish world. Below are a few examples that illustrate the severity of the attack. The perception of a Coptic plot has disturbed the Egyptian Islamists' peace for many years. The same suspicions can be found in MuhammadalGhazali's writings in the 1950s and in those of other Islamists four or five decades later.'6The Copts' scheme, they believe, is to eradicate Islam in Egypt, take over the country,and turn it into a Christianstate. Because the Copts lack the power to do this in one step, they are drawing up long-term plans based on actions aimed at bringing about a demographicchange and equalizing the number of Christians and Muslims, intensifying the propagation of Christianity among Muslims to undermine their faith and weaken them, and controlling the country's land and wealth.'7For now, they outwardly preach national unity, separation of religion and state, and secularism, and speak out against the Islamists and every attempt to apply Islamic law on the pretextthat it is a direct threatto non-Muslim minorities. They spreadlies about discrimination,while successfully striving to obtain senior offices and positions of influence in administration, the security forces, academia,the economy, and even the top decision-making echelons. They do all this whilst enjoying full freedom of expression and worship, as well as privileges that the Islamists can only dream of. The platformof the Islamic Revolution in Syria, which purportsto offer the entire population a general alternativeof life in Islamic Syria, sends the Alawis a threatening message couched in pleasant terms. The Syrian Islamists call on the Alawis to cooperate with them in terminatingAssad's regime because, one way or another, the nation (in effect, the Sunni majority) will act to liberate itself from the yoke of this minority regime, and it would be better if this were done by means of dialogue (between communities) than by violence. In exchange, they promise the minorities the Islamic model of relations between them and the future Syrian Islamic state.18 Jordan is not known as a country that suffers particularly from intercommunitytension. Nevertheless, the claim that there is a conspiracy against Islam and the Muslims is heardfrom the JordanianIslamists, too. A manifesto circulated by one of their organizationsdescribes the conspiracy of the JordanianChristians to turn Jordan into a Christian state; together with Lebanon and Egypt - when it, too, becomes Christian- they allegedly intend to form an anti-Islamic, pro-Israeli front. The preparationshave

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already begun, insist the Islamists. In the 1950s, they say, a supreme Christiancouncil was founded in Jordan,directedby the churchin Lebanon; through the Lebanese church, the council is really being run by the Vatican with assistance from Christian countries. This council has already completed a plan for preparationsfor taking over Jordan.The plan includes the erection of military fortresses at the entrances to cities in the guise of religious, medical, and educational establishments; the establishment of fortified villages on the main roads linking Jordan with Arab countries; domination of more than half of the importantand sensitive positions in the government and army; and the establishment of a secret militia led by subversive Christianofficers.'9 In a 1962 sermon (delivered at the height of a tense period in the Shah's relations with the opposition to his regime), the Iranianthinkerand preacher Sayyid Mahmud Taleqani bitterly attacked the Jews and the Baha'is in his country as partof his criticism of the regime. Basing himself on Islamic law (and quoting Shi'i sources), Taleqani stated that protected people are forbidden,for example, to constructbuildings higher than those of Muslims, to help the enemies of Islam at home or abroad, and to seduce Muslim women. In pointing out violators of these prohibitions, he alluded to local Jewish capitalists and openly accused the Baha'is. According to Taleqani, these minorities were working in the service of Israel and world Zionism. Taleqanidenied the legitimacy of the regime (and incited the people against it) because of its questionableties with membersof these minorities.For our purposes, however, what is more important is his conclusion regarding treatment of them: if religious minorities subject to Islamic rule rebel against the restrictionsplaced on them as 'protected-people',they lose their status and become 'people of war.' The Muslims must wage war against them until they once again accept the regime imposed on them by Islam. This is one form of jihad within Islam, Taleqaniasserts.20 The attack on the minorities is also being perpetratedin another, less trodden sphere, reviving the old theological debate between religions. In a book on 'the truth about Christianity and evangelism', the author, alJabahan,assails the tenets of the Christianfaith. He attemptsto prove that the authentic Christian faith has long since disappeared owing to the initiative of certain Jews, and that the Christianityof today is a perversion and a fraud;this, too, he says, is part of the conspiracy against Islam.2'The multiplicity of opinions among Christiansregardingthe natureof Jesus, like the multiplicity of versions of the New Testament, he argues, is obvious proof of this. The issue on which al-Jabahan focuses in his polemic against Christianityis the Trinity and the tendency to attributedivine qualities to Jesus. He lambasts this belief, pointing out the similarity between it and

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ancient Eastern religions, and asserts that by adopting this belief Christianityturneditself from a heavenly religion into idolatry: The root [of the truth] about Jesus is that he was a member of the human race to whom Allah gave a mission. He called [on people] to serve God alone, and did not tell anyone to serve himself... In brief, he was indeed a man who ate and drank,slept and awoke, walked and became tired... There is not a shred of evidence that he was worthy of deification, and there are millions of proofs that destroy the arguments of those that deify him. Clearly, what enrages al-Jabahanis what he perceives as shirk - a deviation from pure monotheism. He cannot agree with a theology that believes that God has partners. Al-Jabahan also addresses what he views as the corruption that characterizes the Christian religious establishment and the peculiarity of monasticism, and states that Christianityfailed at defining a frameworkof values, goals, and guidelines for believers. He devotes the last part of his book to attacking the Christian Mission, which, with the help of 'Orientalists', is designed to undermine the faith of Muslims, not necessarily converting them to Christianity,but turning them into faithless creatureslacking the morals necessary to guide the lives of nations: 'Is this not the job of Satan?' he asks.

The Islamist doctrineregardingrelations with non-Muslim minorities draws exclusively on the classical sources. Therefore, it essentially presents a model of relations whose foundations were shaped in the days of the Prophet, and which began with the 'protected-people' regime imposed on the Christian and Jewish tribes in the Arabian peninsula (for instance, in Khaybarin the year 628). Under this doctrine, there is, of course, no place for the oppressive and discriminatorymeasures that came together in the regulations promulgatedby the Ummayad caliph 'Umar 11(717-20), those adopted at the initiative of Abbasid rulers such as al-Mutawakkil(847-61), or the opinions of extremist mediaeval sages of religious law andjudicature. The doctrine does not even state explicitly that this is the model proposed for relations with minorities and their status in the Islamic state to be established in our days. This is one way of contending with the problems inherent in the protected-people regime, as reflected in the arguments against it by the non-Muslim minorities. However, it is not sufficient to allay their fears or erase from their collective memory harsh periods of persecution and discrimination;to this day such periods form a major part of their identity.

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Here and there, the Islamist discourse of recent years shows signs of a new way of thinking, one that strives to smooth relations with the nonMuslim minorities and to present them with an alternativeby which they can integrateinto the modernIslamic state. The Sudanese thinkerand leader Hasan 'Abdallah al-Turabisuggests that the pagan and Christianminorities in southernSudan form a federationwith the Islamic regime in the north;in such a federationthey would enjoy autonomy in their region and would not be subject to Islamic law. In anothercontext he argues that peace between a Jewish state and the Muslims does not run counter to Islam: 'The first Islamic state itself had a constitutional document between the prophet and the Jews of Medina. He made a constitutional document with them to establish the state. They were constituent members of the state, with their own federal independence. So there is nothing (against it) in principle.' On another occasion, Turabi says he does not object to Jewish existence, but ratherto the existence of Israel (taken in the context of his statementsabove, he objects to its existence as it is today, without any guise of Islamic
superiority).22

As Turabisees it, there is no fundamentaldifference between the pagans or Christians of southern Sudan and the Jews living in the State of Israel. Both are non-Muslim minorities who, according to the new model that he proposes, should live on the basis of an autonomy agreement under the sovereignty of a federative political entity headed by Muslims. Turabi's model is the political entity (umma) established by Muhammadin Medina, the foundations for which were formulated in a document known as 'Ahd al-Umma (the agreementor pact of the umma).This entity encompassed the Muslims who migrated with the Prophet from Mecca, converts to Islam from Medina, and the non-Muslims - Jews and others - who lived there. It was a federationof tribal-religiousautonomousentities underthe rule of the Prophet as arbitrator, judge, and leader in domestic, foreign and military matters. Turabi's concept expresses recognition that the 'protected-people' regime cannot be applied under present conditions. Does this mean that it will not be feasible? Not necessarily. The constraintsof reality now prevail, and this is anotherexample (one of many) of the power of reality, the way it impels Islamists to work towards renewal and towards finding ways of making it fit in with their world view, and the possibilities that the Islamic traditionprovides for this adaptation. In orderto overcome anotherobstacle to the establishmentof the modern Islamic state, Turabiproposes a model taken from the embryonic period in the development of the Islamic state; despite this, no one denies its legitimacy. This was a time when the Prophet demonstratedhis political skills, outlined the path to power and influence, and built the foundationsfor

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the grand period of conquest, in which the infidels were turned into 'protected-people'.Turabi'sconcept implies a parallel between the situation and power of Muslims today and the situationof the believers and converts to Islam in Medina in the early days of Islam. Abandoningexpectations for the speedy establishmentof a 'protected-people'regime in favor of the 'Ahd al-Umma model is therefore not a retreatand surrender,but rathera more straightforward view of reality that contains great hope. Islam is presentlyin 'Medina', a temporarystate of inferiorityin the balance of power with the infidels, but the inherentpotential will one day restore the days of Khaybar and the dhimma.In the meantime,one should take a good look at the strategy of the Prophetand his companions, study it, and adopt it. It is no wonder that such a way of thinking has arisen in a 'Minority State' in which there is a Muslim majority,but the size of the non-Muslim 'minority' challenges its minority status. A large, important non-Muslim population is a factor that cannot be ignored when calculating the probability of establishing the Islamic state in the land in which they live. This is presumably one of the motives for creative thinking (if not hopelessness). Munir Shafiq seeks a way into the hearts of a specific segment of the non-Muslim 'protected-people' - the Arab Christians. In his writings between 1979 and 1992 he addresses the issue from two different angles: first, he deals with the arousal of the question of identity among Christian minorities against the backdrop of the Islamic revolution in Iran; and second, he calls on all the forces in the Islamic world to unite to face the challenges of the 'New World Order'. Shafiq does not reject the traditionaldhimmaregime; he even comes out in its defence.23However, the essence of the relationship between the Muslims and the Arab Christians,he believes, is the 'uruba- the historical, cultural,and essentially nationalpoint of encounter- between Arabism and Islam. Shafiq recommends that Arab Christians understandthat they have no collective identity other than the Arab-Islamicone. He calls on them not to go along with the attempts of Western imperialism and Christianityto scare them about Islam and to convince them that their future is assured only in regimes that are the productof Westernculture. He warns the Arab Christiansagainst cutting themselves off from their roots and from their sole true identity to search for an alternative framework, because this would leave them disconnected - with no culture, no history, no path, and no future. Shafiq states: The Arab Christiansare embedded in Islamic Arab culture. They are part of the Islamic Arab umma... Its features are theirs in terms of history, present, and future. It can even be said that the Arab

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Christians are 'Muslims' (from the perspectives of culture, heritage, law, and history) who go to church, in the sense that they are a fundamentalpart of the dar al-Islam and have no independentculture or separatehistory... If they are distinct, the distinction is in their faith and place of prayer... This difference is part of the Islamic Arab culture, which is a multifaceted one... The presence of the Arab Christian on the same ground as the Arab Muslim is the path to the establishment of healthy, just relations between them... These relations must reflect the single culture, the single heritage, the single history, the single umma, the single land...24 Shafiq asks Islamists to realize that their role is not merely to serve the da'wa, but to take responsibility for the general unification of forces in the Islamic world and to struggle to meet the challenges it faces. He also calls on them to study and strive to understandthe circumstances and needs compelled by present reality, and to learn from the ways of the Prophetand his companions, including the 'Medina document', in their attitudetoward the dhimmis, who are part of the Islamic Arab identity umma, and among those that should be rallied to the struggle.25

The combination of the two commandments- establishing the rule of Allah on earth and lack of religious coercion - poses another social and politicalcultural challenge to contemporaryIslamists, one of a series of challenges inherent in the attempt to suit 'Islam and the times'. Even before the worldwide Islamic state is re-established and Islamic law is imposed throughout the world, when it is clear that the state will contain large concentrationsof non-Muslim minorities, it can be seen that it is not easy to adopt a position and formulate a conception of the issue that will allay the fears of the non-Muslims, who are quick to see 'danger' and who assail Islam's attitude toward minorities. The Islamists give expression to their discomfort in addressing this issue. They rarely discuss it, but some have done so, perhaps out of awareness that sociopolitical thinking which pretendsto be all-embracingand to propose a total way of life cannot claim the privilege of evading problematic issues. As with many other issues in Islamist discourse, the discussion on the subject of minorities reflect the collective thinking of contemporary thinkers from Iran, the Gulf, or the Fertile Crescent, both Shi'is and Sunnis. The tumult that plagues the Islamists when they address the minorities issue has two sources. One propels them to take the defensive, whereas the second spurs them to the offensive. One source of discomfort is the debate over the values behind the 'protected-people' regime in Islam, both as

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implemented in the past and in the context of the model proposed by the Islamists for implementation today (which is itself based on historical experience and ancient scriptural commandments). The emotional dimension in this debate is evident on both sides. Among the non-Muslims it is evoked by fear for their fate if and when the Islamic state arises; among the Islamists it is caused by the need to contend with the attempt to undermine the 'true', the 'right', and the 'perfect', and to defend it. The Islamists come to its defence with apologetics that is mainly past-oriented and is done largely for the sake of the future. They do not have to justify themselves for the present. Islamic law is not in force, relations with minorities are completely distorted,and the Islamists bear no responsibility for the present situation, as they play no part in and have no influence over fashioning ways of life in their countries. The challenge that the Islamists face when they try to defend the Islamic state's attitude towards minorities in the period of conquest may be considered simpler than the challenge of trying to allay the fears of applying this model today. A comparison of the actual relations, values and norms that guided the Muslims in various eras with the correspondingsituation in non-Muslim civilizations in the same periods does not necessarily show the Islamic 'protected-people'regime in a negative light. Some Islamists make such comparisons and even note that the norms and customs of conquered areas were adopted and merely restructuredto conform to the Islamic regime. It is harder to elicit understanding and acceptance among nonMuslims for applicationof this regime today because of the gap between the values and norms that underlay its consolidation in the distant past and the values and norms of contemporary civilization. The 'protected-people' regime allows for culturaland religious pluralismbut not fully equal rights, as, for example, in the political sphere. Majorcomponents of this regime are deeply etched with what the Westernvalue and normativecode perceives as discrimination and abasement. Non-Muslims also have difficulty in understandingand digesting the unique Islamic concept of 'majority' and 'minority', which dismisses the quantitativecriterion. The majority-minority relations intrinsic in the Islamic model cannot appeal to non-Muslims and contemporary Western civilization, whose guiding lights are internationalcovenants for the protectionof humanrights, the value of full equal rights, and the importance of the majority. Other kinds of relationships that prevail in the non-Muslim world today are unacceptableto the Islamists because they deny the importanceof religion in a person's identity and are based on non-Islamic law. For this reason Islam rejects the idea of 'melting' the members of the various communities together to form a single civil and national society, or the possibility of establishing relations of cooperation and full equality between the members

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of the various communities on the basis of an overarchingfederal law, with each community preserving its cultural and religious identity. Certainly, Islam cannot accept any system that rejects the existence of a minority (by deportation,secession to form its own sovereign state, or annihilation). Islamists are aware of this gap, and they evidently have difficulty bridging it. With the exception of a few sparks of new thinking, such as Shafiq's or Turabi's,they do not seem to have committed themselves yet to the task of constructing a regime of majority-minorityrelations for the future Islamic state that takes account of contemporaryvalues and norms and bridges the gap between them and those of Islam. In the meantime, all they can do is defend themselves, defend the protected-peopleregime, blur problematic components of it by trying to describe them in terms drawn from the modern value culture (such as 'tolerance' and 'equal rights'), and try to obscure the memories of periods of persecutionand harshoppression. The second source of discomfortis the Islamists' cognitive-cultural crisis. This crisis is the product of the contradiction between reality as they experience it (and as they see it, this is a new jahiliyya - a time of ignorance, chaos, and idolatry,like that which prevailed in the pre-Islamicperiod), and the reality that their world view dictates should prevail. This dissonance disturbsthem and motivates them to work to change reality, including the reality of the presentrelationsbetween Muslims and non-Muslims.It is clear to the Islamists that the Islamic regime of relations with minorities can be realized only againstthe backdropof an overall reversalof realitythat would include the establishmentof an Islamic society and state. In the meantime, they can regardthe Alawi regime in Syria,the existence of a sovereignJewish state on land once reachedby jihad, and the statusand influence of the Copts in Egypt not only as a historicaltragedy,but also, and most importantly, as an anomaly - a blatantviolation of the natureof the universe and the laws of creation as reflected in Islamic cosmology, the truth of which is currently being put to the test. The impossible and unbearablestatus of minorities in countriesin which, at least in theory,Islamic law is currentlyin force clashes powerfully with the 'truth'of the faith (i.e., the economic, technological,and militarysuperiorityof the 'infidel' West over the power of the Islamic world today). In the meantime, the distorted system of relations with the nonMuslim minorities enables them to act to perpetuatethis system, to place obstacles in the path of Islam and the Islamists, to bolster the secular and nationaldimension of the living ethos of society, and even to try to take over the country.All this is being done in concert with the 'plots' being hatched against Islam by the forces of heresy at home and abroad. In this state of affairs, the non-Muslims have the status of 'people of war', and they are a target for jihad, which will restore their rightful status as protectedpeople. The tremendous amount of pent-up emotional energy contained in the

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as well as fear evoked by the statusand actions of dissonanceand frustration, the non-Muslimminorities,tends to eruptamong the Islamists in the form of accusing them of plots and sometimes also reviving the religious-theological polemic between Islam and Christianity. To sum up, contemporary Islamists continue to regard the classic dhimma regime as the basis for relations between Muslims and nonMuslims in the Islamic state. In any case, their doctrine basically expresses the traditional approach in this matter. However, in terms of practical thinking, which is increasingly significant in contemporary Islamist discourse, here and there one finds awareness of the need to escape the frozen doctrinaireframework and to try to refresh it without contradicting it, whether by expanding it and adding elements to which the attention of the dhimmis may be focused, or by finding temporaryalternatives. In any case, new ideas will be based on legitimizing precedents from the past and will themselves provide a new interpretation of the situationof Islam today.
NOTES 1. They refer to themselves as al-Islamiyyun - 'those faithful to Islam' (as distinct from Muslimun[Muslims], who are the other members of the religion). See for example: Sa'id Hawwa, al-Madkhal ila Da'wat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (2nd ed., Aman: Dar al-Arqam, n.d.),p.78, JundAllah Thaqafatanwa-Akhlaqan(2nd ed., n.p. n.d.), I, p.9; MuhammadBaqr al-Sadr,Iqtisaduna(2nd ed., Beirut:Dar al-Kitabal-Lubnani,1977 [1960], p.171; al-Bayan al-Ta'sisili-Harakatal-lttijah al-Islami, Tunis, 6 June 1981, in Rashidal-Ghanushi, Maqalat (Paris:Dar al-Karawan,1984), p.6; al-Mukhtaral-Islami (Cairo), May 1987, pp.11,41. The term commonly used in the West - fundamentalists- is regardedas derogatoryand a style of culturalimperialism;see Liwa al-Islam (Cairo), 1 Nov. 1989, pp.48-9. 2. Typically, Islamists respond laconically when asked about the issue. See, for example, interviews with the Egyptian shaykh Hafiz Salama in al-Musawwar,28 June 1985, and in Majalis (Kuwait),6 July 1985. Salamapromises that what existed for '14 centuries' is what will be. See also the very brief mentionby 'Abd al-HamidKishk in Fatawa al-ShaykhKishk: Humumal-Muslimal-Yawmiyya (Cairo:Al-Mukhtaral-Islami, 1988), pp.30-3. 3. On Islam's attitude toward non-Muslim minorities, see the exhaustive surveys, with comprehensivebibliographies,in Claude Cahen, 'Dhimma', EI2 II (1965), pp.227-3 1; Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi - Jews and Christians under Islam (London and Toronto:Associated University Presses, 1985). On the attitudes of Muslim rulers, sages, and thinkers in the Middle Ages, see E. Strauss [Ashtor], 'The Social Isolation of Ahl Adh-Dhimma', in P. Hirschler MemorialBook (Budapest, 1949), pp.73-94. These works reflect the researchers' variousevaluationsof the Muslim attitudetowardsminoritiesundertheirrule; some of them also comparethe attitudetowardsminoritiesin Islamic states with that in Christianstates at varioustimes duringthe Middle Ages. 4. Hasan Ayyub addresses this question somewhat in his book Al-Jihad wal-Fida'ivvya fi alIslam (Kuwait, 1977), pp.278-8 1. The Lebanese Ayatollah MuhammadHusayn Fadlalla distinguishesbetween the monotheisticahl al-kitab, who are entitled to the dhimmaregime, and idolators and other non-monotheists, to whom he would give only two choices: annihilationor acceptance- at least outwardly- of Islam. By no means may they express non-monotheistic faiths. On this, see his book al-Islam wa-Mantiq al-Quwwa (3rd ed., Beirut, 1985), pp.214-18. 5. See Bavanal-Thawraal-IslamiyyafiSuriyawa-Minhajuha, by Sa'id Hawwa, 'Ali al-Bayanuni, and 'AdnanSa'd al-Din,Damascus,9 Nov. 1980, p.1 1;al-'Ahd(Beirut),20 Feb. 1986.

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6. For example, some issues have been discussed and debated for generations without a uniformlyaccepted stance being formulated;these include the attitudetowardsZoroastrians and other non-monotheists.In addition,there is still no supportunderIslamic law that can get broadconsensus regardingthe economic and political considerationsthat motivatedthe Muslim conquerors'decision to impose the dhimmaregime on those who may or may not have deserved it. As for the value of majorityrule, no way has yet been found to adopt it when it is liable to conflict with the value of Muslim superiority,as occurredduring the period of conquest. In the meantime,the Islamists are quite content to use it as an argument in their defence against the non-Muslims. Similar to the argumentof the Syrian Islamists mentionedabove, see the attackon the Copts by the EgyptianMuhammadal-Ghazaliin his book Min Huna Na'lam (5th ed., Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-Haditha,n.d.), p.151. Inter alia, Ghazali states that assuringthe rights of the variousreligious groupsin the countrydoes not run counter to the right of the majority to rule, and he mentions that 'the principles of democracyare based on this'. 7. Ayyub,Al-Jihad, pp.278-81. 8. For more on the ethical aspect of the attitudetowardnon-Muslimsin generaland 'protected people' in particular, see Ghazali, Mina Huna Na 'lam, pp.145-70; Ayyub, Al-Jihad, pp.275-83; Sayyid Qutb,al- 'Adalaal-Ijtima'iyyafi al-Islam (3rded., Cairo:Dar al-Kitabal'Arabi, 1952 [1949]), pp.52, 93-5, 171-2; Yusuf al-Qardawi, Ghayr al-Musliminfi alMujtama'al-Islami (Cairo:Dar Ghariblil-Tiba'a, 1977), pp.5-6, 18-20, 45-52. 9. Qardawi, Ghavr, pp.6-43. See also Qutb, al-'Adala, pp.94, 141, 221; Ayyub, Al-Jihad, pp.281-6. 10. On the appearance, ramifications,and methodsof computationand collection of these taxes, see Claude Cahen, L'Islam: des origines au debut de l'empire ottoman (Fischer Biicherei am Main, 1968), pp.39-42, 79-80, 82-3, 107-9. GmbH, Frankfurt 11. Bat Ye'or, The Dhimmi,pp.48-9, 62, 143. 12. Qardawi, Ghayr, pp.3-4, 57, 65; Kishk, Fatawa, pp.31, 33; Hasan al-Zayn, 'Nizam alDhimma:Huquqwa-Imtiyazatwa-Hadara',al-'Irfan (Beirut),LXXIII (March-April 1985), p.72. 13. Sayyid Qutb,Ma'rakat al-Islam wal-Rasmaliyya(2nd ed., Cairo;Dar al-Ikhwanlil-sahafa wal-Tiba'a, 1952), p.114; S. Abul A'la Maududi, The Islamic Law and its Introductionin Pakistan (Lahore:Islamic Publications, 1960), pp.39-40. This book, edited by Khurshid Ahmad, is an adaptationof lectures deliveredby Maududiin 1948. 14. Ghazali,Min Huna, p.151; Maududi,The Islamic Law, p.40-41. 15. Below, according to Qardawi, Ghayr, pp.l4-15, 32-6, 45-6, 53-80; Qutb, Ma'rakat alIslam, pp.116-17; Zayn, 'Nizam', pp.68-70. 16. Cf. Ghazali, Min Huna, pp.145-70, and Muhammadal-Misri al-Sadik, 'Madhayurid aqbat Misr?', al-Ghuraba(Leeds) Dec. 1980. 17. Ibrahimal-Sulaymanal-Jabahan arguesthatsuch a detailedplan exists, datingfrom February 1973. See Ma Yajiban Ya'rifal-MuslimMin Haqa'iq 'an al-Nasraniyyawal-Tabshir(n.p., n.d.), pp.13-30, 90-97. 18. Bayan al-Thawra,pp.10-12, 18-19. 19. The main points of the manifesto are quoted in al-Jabahan, Ma Yajib,pp.20-25. 20. H. Algar (ed.), Society and Economics in Islam: Writingsand Declarations of Ayatullah SayyidMahmudTaleghani(Berkeley,CA: Mizan Press, 1982), pp.88-91. 21. Al-Jabahan,Ma Yajib,pp.2-6, 30ff. The following two quotes from al-Jabahanare from pages 64 and 95 (note 3), respectively. 22. J. Miller, 'Faces of Fundamentalism: Hassan al-Turabiand MuhammedFadlallah',Foreign Affairs (Nov.-Dec. 1994), pp.138-9. 23. Munir Shafiq, al-Fikr al-Islami al-Mu'asir wal-Tahaddiyat (3rd ed., Tunis: Dar al-Buraq, 1991 [1986]), pp.120-26. 24. Munir Shafiq, Rudud 'ala Utruhat 'Almaniyya (3rd ed., Tunis: Dar al-Buraq, 1992), pp.54-61. This is a collection of articlesby the authorwrittenbetween 1979 and 1982. The excerptquoted is from pages 58-60. 25. Munir Shafiq, al-Nizam al-Duwali al-Jadid wa-Khiyaral-Muwajaha(Tunis:Dar al-Buraq, 1992), pp.106-18.

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