02 Willows

International Review of Public Administration 2008, Vol. 13, No.
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INTEGRATING LABOR RELATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: IMPACTS ON STATE WORKFORCES
WILLOW S. JACOBSON
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
& ELLEN V. RUBIN

SUNY at Albany, USA
& AMY K. DONAHUE

University of Connecticut, USA
What is the combined effect of labor relations and human resources management on results that are important to managers? This article provides a preliminary answer to this question using data from the 50 state governments. Research considering the influence of public sector unions on public sector outcomes typically operationalizes unionization as bivariate, which greatly understates the complexity of the relationships. Furthermore, labor relations research often fails to consider the human resources management systems in which labor relations operates. Considering the effects of labor relations and human resource management policies together on intermediate outcomes such as quality of hires, turnover, and tenure begins to provide a more complete picture of the workforce management system, and provides a roadmap for future research which can be informative for both the public and private sectors. Key Words: Labor relations, Human resource management, performance
INTRODUCTION
The vast literatures on labor relations and human resources management rarely overlap. This is unfortunate because, at a fundamental level, both are necessary to assure healthy, effective workforces. Scholars have noted this disconnect and called for empirical integration (Kearney and Carnevale 2001, Ban and Riccucci 1993). Likewise, the academic literature reflects a growing concern with the complexities of labor relations writ large. As Lewin et al. attest, ...it is crucial for researchers to analyze the environment, structures, processes and
outcomes that characterize collective bargaining if greater understanding of such bargaining is to be achieved ... [we need] the development of better theoretical and empirical studies (1988, 591). Our objective in this article is to begin to unify labor relations and human resources management (HRM) analyses. Studies of the determinants of wage effects and degree of unionization are relatively common, and there is limited work that examines the impact of unionization on HRM policies. For example, studies consider the relationship between unionization and benefits levels (McCurdy, Newman and Lovrich 2002; Roberts 2003;
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Integrating Labor Relations and Human Resource Management: Impacts on State Workforces
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Kearney 2003), unionization and workplace diversity (Riccucci 1990, and Goode and Baldwin 2005) and unionization and HRM reforms (Kellough and Selden 2003, Ellig and Thompson 2006). Recently, Verma (2005) examined the relationship between unionization and HRM broadly. This study showed that unions can have a positive impact on HRM policies, but noted that these effects can erode over time, and can limit management flexibility in certain areas. Despite this emerging work, a survey of the literature reveals that the relationships between traditional personnel functions, labor-management interactions, and workforce outcomes are not yet well understood. Thus, this article aims to fill three gaps. First, the analysis presented here extends Vermas work (2005) by examining the effects of both labor relations and HRM practices together. Second, rather than measuring union performance traditionally (for example, in terms of variables like wages), we focus on intermediate workforce outcomes such as quality, turnover, and tenure, which are workforce system performance indicators that are more relevant to managers trying to understand how to be effective. Our approach is descriptive. We consolidate a common set of independent variables through review of these diverse literatures, and explore the impact of some of these variables on workforce results. Our findings on the effects of labor relations and HRM practices generally demonstrate influences postulated in the literature, as well as some new insights. Third, labor relations literature is over-burdened with case studies that are not generalizable and do not synthesize findings into an actionable set of consistent measures. One major goal of this paper is to collect frequently-used measures from across the disparate case study literature and test relationships across multiple organizations. Few researchers attempt to do this because of the difficulty of data gathering. This is a primary contribution of the study. Data from the U.S. states, gathered in 2000, is used to empirically assess the relationships between the variables identified in the labor relations and HRM literature. Taking a state government perspective is particularly useful at this juncture in the history of the labor movement. State governments remain concerned with labor relations. Unionization of the public sector is growing despite decreases in the private sector (Kearney and Carnevale 2001). Collaboration initiatives in Wisconsin state government, the impact of unions on civil service reform efforts in Florida, the 2001 state employee strike in Minnesota, and gubernatorial actions to erode bar-
gaining rights of state employees in Indiana, Kentucky, and Missouri highlight the importance of understanding how unions influence the management of public employees. The article proceeds as follows. First, we synthesize key themes from the labor relations and HRM literatures. These themes are then used to identify variables for exploration using state government data. We present a descriptive analysis that highlights the merits of considering these variables together and suggests that they matter for sound workforce management. The article concludes with prospects for future research.
LITERATURE ON LABOR RELATIONS

The historical development of unions has been thoroughly documented across a variety of disciplines, including economics, political science, public administration, and industrial relations (Wachter 2003; Kearney and Carnevale 2001; Spengler 1999, Zeiger and Gall 2002). Nonetheless, Ban and Riccucci have noted the lack of good empirical research on personnel and labor relations ... [and] what little research is available is often quite narrow (1993, 72). The literature fails to present a nuanced understanding of the nature and influence of labor-management relations, especially in the larger context of strategic human resources management. A challenge to any empirical study of labor relations is that the literature is extensive and the list of potential variables identified as relevant is daunting. Terminology is inconsistent, and many variables have been considered as both independent and dependent, creating conceptual confusion. A thorough review reveals recurrent constructs, however. Five common concepts are consistently present throughout the labor literature: density, scope of bargaining, centralization, collaboration, and context. We describe these dimensions in turn, recognizing that they often overlap and interact. Density. Typically density is used as an indicator of the presence or degree of unionization, and is arguably the most frequently used variable in studies of unionization (Spengler 1999). Many analysts rely on density as their sole measure of unionization, even though this ignores other complexities (Riccucci 1990). Despite the extensive use of measures of density, a consensus about how best to operationalize the concept is lacking. Many simply identify presence or absence of unions, or calculate the percentage of the workforce
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covered by a labor agreement (Asher and DeFina 1997; Hirsch, MacPherson and Vrooman 2001; Wagar 1997; Lipset and Katchanovski 2002). Others measure the number of dues-paying members (Cohen, et al. 2003; Jermier, Cohen and Gaines, 1988). The number of bargaining units or agreements, rather than coverage of individuals is yet another density measure (Lipset and Katchanovski 2002; Delaney, Fiorito and Jarley 1999; Hirsch and Schumacher 2002). In some cases, multiple measures of density are used to balance the limitations of single or narrowly defined measures of density (Dastmalchian, Blyton and Adamson 1991). Density is commonly treated as a determinant of union strength, personnel outcomes, or industry wages. For example, Jacobson, Selden and Rubin (2002) find that density (characterized as a union-nonunion dummy variable) is related to increased training opportunities in local governments. Especially in economics and industrial relations literatures, researchers have examined the influence of union density on compensation levels and wage structure (Arbache 1999; Ashley and Jones 1996; Booth, Francesconi and Zoega 2003; Ashraf 1997; Hirsh and Schumacher 2002; Klaff and Ehrenberg 2003; Rees 1993; Renaud 1998; Reilly, Schoener and Bolin 2007; Kearney 2003). The most extensively studied group of public sector unions are public safety employees, for whom most studies have found that union representation has moderate positive wage effects of about 5-10 percent (Freeman 1986; Bartel and Lewin 1981). Riccucci (2007) notes that the private sector unions have had an excellent track record in winning wage increases and improved benefits and working conditions for their members. There is additional evidence that public sector collective bargaining is more likely to improve fringe benefits and working conditions in addition to wages (Methe and Perry 1980; Ashraf 1994; Kearney 2003). Some scholars have also examined reasons for changes in density levels across and within the private and public sectors (Kearney and Carnevale 2001; Riccucci 2007; Adler 2006). Scope of Bargaining. Scope of bargaining is commonly understood to be the range of issues subject to negotiation between employers and employee representatives (Gershenfeld and Gershenfeld 1994, 51), and most research adopts this definition. (See, for example, Swimmer and Bartkiw 2003; Kearney 2001; Bennet and Taylor 2001; Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Power and McCabePower 1996; and Pynes 1993.) Select studies have focused on a particular substantive issue covered in the
bargaining process, such as contract language on collaborative activities (Rubinstein 2001) or outsourcing limitations (Naff 1991). Scope is important to consider because it varies across sectors and jurisdictions (Horowitz 1994). Although scope is broadly defined in statute and court decisions, within contracts the level of detail on negotiable topics varies. For example, Slither, Healy and Livernash (1960) note that most unionmanagement relationships initially rest on a simple, brief document, but over time agreements become more comprehensive and complex. Since most state level union relationships are well established, scope is therefore an important dimension to consider. Centralization. Generally centralization refers to the extent to which authority is retained at the top of a hierarchy versus being distributed to multiple sub-units. The locus of decision-making authority is often studied yet not uniformly defined or measured. In both public and private contexts, centralization has concerned the institutional mechanisms used to administer relations with unions (Lyons and Vivenzio 1998; Veglahn and Hayford 1976), and whether authority is decentralized to departments for bargaining (Gill 1994). One study found that a city is more likely to use a centralized labor relations professional to lead bargaining if the tax base is large, if state law structures the labor environment, and if a mayor-council form of government is present (Gely and Chandler 1993). In a study of 40 cities, management structure for collective bargaining changed as the bargaining relationship matured (Burton 1982). Researchers have also considered centralization from labors perspective, examining how unions organize themselves to engage in the bargaining process (Craft 2003) or the degree to which decision-making within the union is hierarchical or distributed (Jarley, Fiorito and Delaney 2000; Warner 1975). Mellor and Mathieu (1999) found more centralized union hierarchies present in organizations with lower levels of innovation. And decentralized union structures seem to facilitate greater organizing success, potentially by increasing levels of commitment to the union (Fiorito, Jarley and Delaney 1995). Collaboration. Collaboration concerns the degree to which the relationship between managers and labor representatives is harmonious or divisive, including vehicles that specifically enable and foster cooperation and partnering once a contract is in place. Rubin and Rubin (2006) define collaboration as a joint process where both employees and their employer share in
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decision-making, and note that [it] has become a major topic of discussion among organizational reformers (283-284). Masters and Albright (2005) point out that labor-management cooperation has yielded its own literature, primarily among industrial relations scholars (354). This topic has recently become a prominent theme as organizations have tried to change what has historically been a contentious, litigious, and process-driven relationship (Dubin 1949; Deutsch 1973; Gerhart 1994; Wagar 1997). Likewise, many authors have undertaken organizational-level case studies of partnership efforts (Craft 2003; Savolainen 2002; Lyons and Vivenzio 1998; Fretz and Walsh 1998; Rubinstein 2001; Rubin and Rubin 2006). Few studies have systematically examined the activities and effects of labor-management partnerships in the public sector. Although there have been claims that more cooperation and participative modes of labormanagement relations promote organizational interests, the research is limited. In a detailed study of the effective-ness of federal efforts to foster partnerships under the Clinton administration, it was reported that partnerships moderately improved working relationships between labor and management, improved communication, helped facilitate organizational change, and coincided with a decrease in unfair labor practice charges (Masters and Albright 2003). Additionally, council representatives, those closest to partnership activities, perceived that their councils had a positive effect on selected dimensions of organizational performance (Masters and Albright 2005). Context. Context refers to the legal and political environment in which unions operate. Historical research outlines the development of legal recognition and statutory support that influence the development of unionization (Kearney and Carnevale 2001; Freeman 1986; Ichniowski 1988, Freeman and Valletta 1988; Dickerson and Cayer 1994). The ability to form unions, specification of which employees can be covered by bargaining agreements, and the extent of bargaining is largely determined in statute and case law (Kearney 2001; Gershenfeld and Gershenfeld 1994; Horowitz 1994; Pynes and Lafferty 1993). Legal aspects of labor relations both depend on union behavior and drive performance. As Waters and Hill explain, the extent of public sector unionization has a significant positive influence on the passage of pro-labor bargaining legislation and bargaining legislation has strong, independent effects on the extent of public sector
unionization (1994, 355). Progressive state labor laws and mandatory bargaining laws increase union density (Reid and Kurth 1984; Dalton 1982; Moore 1998; Ichniowski 1984). Additionally, in the private sector, right-to-work laws significantly affect union density (Davis and Houston 1995). And, the legal environment is often included as an influence on union organizational effectiveness (Hammer and Wazeter 1993) and both union and nonunion wages (Freeman and Ichniowski 1988). Apart from statutes and case law, institutional rules also shape labor-management interactions (Wagar 1997). A survey of union leaders in the U.S. revealed that local formalization was positively related to local innovation (Mellor and Mathieu 1999). Routine practices that may not be codified also influence labor relations, but are typically less enduring, susceptible to change as a result of turnover or organizational reforms. Finally, labor relations systems operate within a political environment. Unions are political actors they mobilize members (Masters 2004) and operate as pressure groups (Pencavel 2005). But, as Masters and Delaney note, Political action has arguably become more salient to organized labor as union membership and bargaining power have declined (2005, 365). For example, police and firefighter political activity aside from bargaining power positively affects departmental expenditures (Gely and Chandler 1995). Unions have also been seen to affect who wins elections, at a level at least as powerful as incumbency (Moe 2006). Overall, scholars consistently identify five concepts that are important to understanding the relationship between unionization and HRM policies. Density, a concept that is used frequently but operationalized in multiple ways, consistently exhibits an upward effect on wage and benefit levels, although the magnitude of that impact seems to vary between the public and private sectors. Scope of bargaining is typically considered in a descriptive manner and thus it is difficult to predict the type of relationship it may exhibit empirically. Like density, centralization is frequently considered but inconsistently conceptualized. Broadly, centralization in government of the labor relations responsibilities seems to increase as professionalization and experience increase, and coincides with a decrease in management innovation. The limited research on the empirical effects of collaborative efforts, a growing topic of interest in labor relations research, suggests a positive relationship with organizational change and communication. Finally,
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context, which structures the legal environment in which unions operate, appears to influence density and wage outcomes. As can be seen across this review, the literature on labor relations has treated unions as both the dependent and independent variable for investigation. Despite the different approaches, all have been found to be critical to better understanding union relations and their impact on HRM, and thus warrant further investigation. A better understanding of how these elements impact the workforce and performance of organizations remains an important gap.
LITERATURE ON HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Successful implementation of public programs depends on a capable, motivated, and dedicated workforce that is marshaled through workforce management policies and practices. It is therefore important to consider the combined effects of HRM and labor relations in a holistic way. Studies of unions occasionally examine the interaction between labor and human resources management. Vermas 2005 meta-analysis, for instance, examines union effects on management and human resource management policies, and identifies a consistent positive effect of unions on management, due in part to the fact that management tends to develop formal systems and procedures that contribute to efficiency and organizational effectiveness in response to union pressures (444). A review of the table of contents of any personnel management text will reveal that key HRM functions include elements like classification, compensation, recruitment, selection, training, evaluation, rewarding, and a lengthy list of others. To organize these activities, we follow the approach of the Government Performance Project, which grouped HRM functions into four areas: obtaining, maintaining, motivating, and civil service structure (Selden and Jacobson 2007; Selden, Ingraham and Jacobson 2001; Ingraham and Selden 2001).1 Obtain Employees. The extent to which an organization is able to recruit and hire the employees it needs is essential to all sectors. To accomplish this, an organization must be able to attract and acquire appropriately skilled and qualified employees in a timely manner. Recruiting has received some empirical attention in both the labor management and HRM literatures. For example, Verma finds that, on average, union firms were more likely to employ fewer but more formal methods of recruitment
(2005, 436). In government agencies in particular, union and nonunion agencies used similar methods (Koch and Hundley 1997). Unions also appear to influence state efforts to move away from the use of pre-employment examinations (Ban and Riccucci 1993) and the rule-ofthree in hiring (a rule which permits the appointing official to choose only among the top three individuals certified), and to reform civil service rules more generally (Kellough and Selden 2003). Maintain Employees. An organizations ability to preserve a suitably skilled workforce by providing training to develop employee skills, retain experienced employees, discipline poor performers, and terminate employees who cannot or will not meet performance standards is an essential function of any HRM system. The relationship between unions, training, retention and turnover is considered in the literature. For example, a recent study examined the relationship between unionization, job satisfaction, turnover intention, and tenure and found no significant relationship between union membership and intention to quit once wages and satisfaction were held constant (Hammer and Avgar 2005, 250). In labor research, the literature suggests that unions increase the likelihood of employees receiving formal training and professional development, and that unionized organizations have a greater diversity of training opportunities (Osterman 1995; Arulampalam and Booth 1998; Kennedy, Drago, Sloan and Wooden 1994; Jacobson, Rubin and Selden 2002; Heyes and Stuart 1998; Betcherman, McMullen, Leckie and Caron 1994; Ng and Maki 1994). Motivate Employees. Motivating is an organizations ability to encourage employees to perform effectively in support of the organizations goals. Successful motivation efforts typically rest on the use of monetary and nonmonetary incentives, performance appraisal, and solicitation of employee feedback. Additionally, unions appear to have a negative effect on the use of formal appraisal systems (Ng and Maki 1994). Research shows that unions appear to decrease the use of individual incentive plans (Betcherman, McMullen, Leckie and Caron 1994; Gunnigle, Turner and DArt 1998; Ng and Maki 1994; Cohen-Rosenthal and Burton 1993). Structure. An organizations personnel system structure defines and organizes its positions; in a government this is defined by the civil service structure (Shafritz et al. 2001). The constraints imposed and flexibilities allowed by the personnel system structure are therefore of fundamental concern to unions. States that have
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undertaken large scale civil service structural changes have primarily been in low union density states (Kellough and Selden 2003). To summarize, the key tasks of a personnel system are to attract employees with appropriate skills and abilities to the organization, maintain the capabilities to accomplish organizational goals through retention and training efforts, motivate employees by intrinsic and extrinsic means, and to do so within a formalized structure. Research examining the association between labor relations and these other HRM activities is limited, but does suggest the direction these relationships may take. For example, unions appear to have a dampening effect on efforts to reform hiring methods, but a positive impact on the diversity of professional development opportunities available to employees. Likewise, as unionization increases, the likelihood of incentive and performance appraisal system usage decreases, as does implementation of overall personnel system reforms. Looking across the research that considers the impact of unionizations generally, and the impact of unionization on HRM in particular, a number of themes emerge, as do issues requiring further study. First, measuring the influence of unions is done in a myriad of ways, including focusing on the density of the union presence, the scope of bargaining, the degree to which activities are coordinated in a centralized way, collaborative efforts, and the legal context in which unions operate. These variables are used as both predictors and criterion variables and considered in an expository fashion in case studies. Much of the research focuses on private sector labor relations, despite the interesting diversity available for study in the public sector, and centers on single organizations. The findings of this body of scholarship indicate that a unionized environment exhibits both positive and negative effects on HRM policies, sometimes simultaneously. Furthermore, single, overlysimplified measures do not reveal the complexity of the relationships. Ultimately, though, this overview makes clear that labor relations and HRM are not examined in combination for their unified effect on HRM outcomes. The remainder of this article aims to take a first step in that direction.
DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS

Our aim is exploratory: We examine the influence of human resources management and labor relations
practices on managerial outcomes, as defined below. And we take a more comprehensive view by considering the influences of both human resources management and labor relations factors in concert, so that we can get some sense of their independent effects while controlling for a broader array of relevant influences than do most studies. While we do not test formal hypotheses in this paper, our literature review does yield some expectations about the relationships between these variables, and we reflect on these when we discuss our findings, below. We explore labor relations in state governments using data from Syracuse Universitys Government Performance Project (GPP), a multi-year effort, funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, to rate management capacity in state and local governments and selected federal agencies in the five areas of financial management, human resources management, capital management, managing for results, and information technology management. In March, 2000, the GPP administered a written survey to state governments that included 104 multi-part closed and open-ended questions about a broad array of human resources management policies, procedures, activities, and results. Typically the state human resources office completed this section of the survey. All fifty states returned these surveys, though not all were complete. The GPPs surveys were designed to support its criteriabased assessment of management capacity; they were not designed to examine labor relations alone. They do offer measures that are consistent with the body of labor relations research, however. We use the broad labor relations and human resources management literatures to help us select measures that are available in the GPPs data. For reference, the variable names are included parenthetically in the text in bold. The measures we chose, their definitions, and their descriptive statistics, are shown in Table 1. Intermediate Management Outcomes. Many scholars have called for additional empirical investigation of the impact of unions (Lewin at al. 1988), some specifically identifying the area of HRM as a much overlooked and needed area for further investigation (Kearney and Carnevale 2001). This analysis responds to that call by examining the coincident influences of labor relations and HRM policies on intermediate workforce outcomes that are important to managers. Finding performance measures that can be used for both public and private sector organizations may seem difficult, given the lack of profit motive to drive government activities. However, interest in metrics such as those provided by total quality
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Table 1. Variables.
n Intermediate outcomes tenure average number of years of service turnover Percent of total employees that left the workforce voluntarily in 1999 quality Reported quality of hires in 1999 fired Percent of total probationary employees fired during probation Labor relations plancov Number of different topics covered by workforce plan laborcen Whether the locus of authority for labor issues is the central HR staff involve Whether labor unions are involved in developing the workforce plan survcov Number of kinds of topics covered by employee surveys workcov The percent of workers covered by labor contracts agree The number of separate labor agreements Human resources management recruit Number of different types of recruiting techniques used trainneed Whether training needs assessments are conducted traincen Number of kinds of training provided centrally payinnov Number of kinds of pay innovations in use classtitl Number of classification titles trainage Number of kinds of training provided by agencies skilbase Whether skill-based pay is in use External environment unempl 1999 unemployment rate pereduc Percent of state population that has completed a bachelors degree Min Max Mean SD
50 50 50 38
4.50 1.56 4.00 0.00
15.00 19.64 10.00 25.80
10.97 8.09 7.78 5.33
1.97 3.52 1.12 5.45
50 50 50 50 45 40
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
19.00 1.00 1.00 10.00 95.00 75.00
11.38 0.46 0.14 3.00 46.29 13.00
6.07 0.50 0.351 3.89 38.87 17.01
50 50 50 50 50 50 49
7.00 0.00 2.00 1.00 380 4.00 0.00
26.00 1.00 28.00 8.00 8500 29.00 1.00
17.10 0.88 21.06 4.34 1738 19.62 0.22
5.03 0.33 5.27 1.70 1309 7.75 0.42
50 50
2.50 14.80
6.60 33.20
4.11 23.78
1.01 4.28
management activities, balanced score card initiatives, social responsibility indices, and recognition like the Baldridge Award, have crossed the sectors, providing a common set of performance measures linking human resources management (HRM) activities, including labor relations, to outcomes of interest to managers. The lions share of labor relations studies have focused on wages and benefits (see, for example, Johansson and Coggins 2002; Kaufman 2002; Renaud 1998) or other economic effects (Vedder and Gallaway 2002; Reynolds 1983). A handful of authors have examined the relationship between unionization and productivity, using a variety of measures such as the output of specific groups (Babcock and Engberg 1997) or quality of service (Brock 1998). We take a different approach, focusing instead on a set of what have been termed intermediate outcomes not programmatic results, but results that
pertain to workforce character and capacity and that are therefore important to managers (Campbell 1977; Cummings 1977; Donahue, Jacobson, Robbins, Rubin and Selden 2004). This choice is based on growing evidence that improved human resources management systems can have significant consequences for management capacity in the public sector (Donahue, Selden and Ingraham 2000; Ingraham, Selden and Jacobson 2001; Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue 2003; Selden and Jacobson 2007). Following this literature, we believe that labor relations influences the character and success of policy through its effects on the capability of the workforce. For our analysis, we assess four dependent variables that capture satisfaction, stability, and quality of the workforce. Scholars have found that employees that are more satisfied with their employment are likely to be
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better, more productive workers (Rainey 2003). Kellough and Nigro (2002) link employee satisfaction with public personnel systems to trust in management. Likewise, stability, including absenteeism and turnover rates, is a common workforce indicator (Freeman and Ichniowski 1988; Brock and Lipsky 2003; Wagar 1997; Babcock and Engberg 1997; Dastmalchian et al. 1991). Low voluntary turnover is seen as an indicator of successful human resource management (Tsui and Gomez-Mejia 1988). Employee turnover is costly to organizations, where it can cost up to 150% of a persons annual salary to replace them if they leave.2 Given this, turnover is a significant issue for organizations, especially as competition for a shrinking supply of qualified labor becomes more pressing. Involuntary turnover results from action by the organization to separate from poorly performing employees or employees with conduct issues. Voluntary turnover, on the other hand, typically involves employees that the organization wants to retain, and whose withdrawal reduces the skill-base of the workforce. To assess the combined effects of labor relations and HRM policies on important intermediate outcomes, the GPP provides both direct and approximate measures of satisfaction, stability, and quality. First, the average tenure of state employees (tenure) is used as an approximate measure of satisfaction3. Mean length of tenure in the states is 11 years, ranging from less than eight years in three states to 13 or more years in six states. Voluntary turnover, which refers to employees that left the workforce of their own accord, is used as a measure of stability (Freeman and Ichniowski 1988; Wagar 1997; Babcock and Engberg 1997; Wagar 1997; Dastmalchian et al. 1991; Huselid 1995). The percent of employees who left the workforce voluntarily (turnover), excluding those who retired, is used for this analysis. The mean percent of employees leaving voluntarily in 1999 was 8.09. Voluntary turnover ranged from less than four percent in four states to more than 15 percent in three states. The GPPs survey asked human resources directors to assess subjectively the quality of the employees they hired in 1999 on a scale of one to ten, where ten is highest quality, and we include this assessment (quality). The mean quality of hires was 7.78, with the lowest reported quality ranking being four, and with ten states designating their new hires as a 10 in terms of quality (See Table 1). Thirty states reported the quality of new hires at eight or above. Finally, states reported the percent of employees fired during the probationary
period (fired), an indicator of the ability and willingness of governments to dismiss poor performers before they become permanent members of the workforce. The mean percent of employees fired was 5.33. Percent of probationary fires ranged from less than one percent in four states to 10 percent or more in five states. Labor Relations. We operationalize measures of density, scope of bargaining, centralization, collaboration, and context. Density is measured as the number of labor agreements (agree)4 and the extent of coverage of labor contracts (workcov), consistent with previous research (Bennett and Masters 2003; Hirsch, MacPherson and Vroman 2001; Pantuosco, Parker and Stone 2001; Turner 1994; Ashley and Jones 1996; Koeller 1996; Fosu 1993; Hirsch and Macpherson 1993; Wagar 1997; Lipset and Katchanovski 2002; Troy 2001). An average of 13 labor agreements exist in each state, with ten states reporting no labor agreements and four states reporting more than 30 agreements. Additionally, an average of 45% of state employees are covered by labor agreements, with 10 states reporting no employees covered by labor agreements, and five states reporting that more than 90% of employees are covered by labor agreements. To measure centralization, the GPP asked states to indicate the locus of authority within the state government for various HR functions and practices, which is in line with previous authors who also measure centralization as the locus of decision-making authority (see, for example, Fiorito, Jarley and Delaney 1995; Jarley, Fiorito and Delaney 2000; Warner 1975; and Fiorito et al. 1997). One of these questions asked was if the authority for labor relations in the state is housed in a centralized office, such as an office of labor relations. The presence of a professionalized office of labor relations or an equivalent (laborcen) is a dummy variable. Twenty-eight states reported having something like an office of labor relations. The GPP lacked usable data on scope of bargaining and traditional measures of collaboration. However, the data do present useful proxy measures, which are employed to minimize omitted variable bias. The number of topics covered in workforce planning efforts (plancov) is used as a proxy for scope of bargaining. Twenty states cover 15 or more of the potential workforce planning topics, while 10 states cover five or fewer topics, with an average of 11 topics. To assess efforts to collaborate, we use an additional proxy, which considers whether labor is involved in the workforce planning process (involve) to indicate a propensity
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toward partnering. Seven states reported involving unions in the development of workforce plans. We also include the breadth of employee surveys (survcov), as an indicator of efforts to garner inputs into decision-making. States were asked to indicate if employee surveys addressed any of ten different topics; on average states included three of these topics. Human Resources Management. In addition to the labor relations variables, we operationalize measures of efforts to obtain, maintain, and motivate employees, in addition to measures of civil service structure. Obtaining is measured according to the number of different types of recruiting techniques used (recruit). States varied in the number of recruitment techniques employed, with a minimum of seven and a high of 26, and an average of 17. We measure maintaining in terms of training, following Jacobson, Selden and Rubin (2002), and capture the variety of training provided at various organizational levels. The number of kinds of training provided by the central Human Resources office (traincen) varied across states from two to 28 with an average of 21; while the types of training offered by agencies (trainage) varied from four to 29 with an average of 20. We also measure whether training needs assessments are conducted (trainneed), with 88 percent of states reporting that they are. Efforts to motive employees are measured according to the number of different kinds of pay innovations the states use (payinnov), such as performance bonuses (Eaton 1994; Kim and Voos 1997), whether skill-based pay in particular is available (skilbase). States were surveyed about eight types of possible compensation techniques; on average four techniques are used in each state. Fifty-four percent of states reported using skill based pay. Structure is measured as the number of classification titles (classtitl). The number of classification titles within the states ranged from 380 to 8,500 with an average of 1,738. External Environment. Finally, it is important to account for characteristics of the governments external environment that may affect intermediate outcomes. We include an economic measure, the unemployment rate in the jurisdiction (unempl), and a demographic measure, the education level in the jurisdiction (pereduc), both of which we expect could bear on the availability and quality of the labor force. These measures are consistent with other studies that consider stability and mobility in the labor market (for example, Andrews and Naylor 1994; Ashley and Jones 1996; Christofides and Stengos
2003; Pantuosco, Parker and Stone 2001). Methods. For this analysis, our conceptualization is represented by the following function Oi =
0
+ 1D1 + 2D2 + 3E +
[1]
where O i is one of the intermediate management outcome variables specified above (tenure, turnover, quality, or fired), 0 is a constant, D1 is a vector of measures of the labor relations component, D2 is a vector of measures of the human resources management component, E is a vector of environmental factors, and E is an error term. To assess the effects of labor relations and HRM policies on satisfaction, stability, and quality of the workforce, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression as a tool for exploratory, descriptive multivariate analysis. OLS is appropriate when sample size is sufficiently large (at least 30 observations) and dependent variables are continuous in nature. The population of states meets the former criterion, but we recognize that this is nonetheless a small number of observations. While OLS does provide the most robust estimators, our standard errors are likely to be too large and multi-collinearity could be a concern. Diagnostics suggest that the variables we include are not collinear.5 The dependent variables of tenure, turnover, and fired are continuous. The dependent variable quality is ordinal. For large-n samples, an ordinal dependent variable would normally call for the use of maximum likelihood models, such as an ordered logit or ordered probit. Maximum likelihood models require larger sample sizes or populations than OLS to achieve normality, consistency, and efficiency. Long (1997) suggests that a minimum sample of 100 observations is needed for maximum likelihood to produce efficient estimators, a size which he suggests should increase depending on the number of parameters. Because our data come from the population of the 50 states, it is not possible to expand the sample to meet the requirements needed for maximum likelihood to produce unbiased estimators.6
FINDINGS
The four models illustrate moderate support for the claim that labor relations and HRM policies together affect intermediate outcomes such as satisfaction,
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Table 2. Explaining state human resources outcomes.

tenure constant 12.453 ** (4.594) turnover 18.203 ** (7.479) quality 10.216 *** (2.273) fired 40.624 *** (11.487)
Labor relations plancov laborcen involve survcov workcov agree
.035 (.087) -1.107 (1.087) -2.102 * (1.191) -.247 * (.126) .032 * (.016) .006 (.025)
.091 (.142) .582 (1.770) -.459 (1.939) -.032 (.205) -.026 (.027) -.025 (.040)
.077 * (.043) -1.031 * (.538) .135 (.590) -.098 (.062) .021 ** (.008) -.007 (.012)
-.424 ** (.198) -4.120 (2.670) 6.457* (3.175) .087 (.314) -.017 (.041) .021 (.051)
Human resources management recruit trainneed traincen payinnov classtitl trainage skilbase
.062 (.094) -.573 (1.192) -.017 (.080) .371 (.268) -.00001 (.000) .012 (.068) .486 (1.136)
-.160 (.153) 3.066 (1.940) -.152 (.130) -1.529 *** (.436) .000 (.000) .130 (.111) 6.683 *** (2.143)
-.085 * (.047) 1.617 ** (.590) -.051 (.039) -.030 (.132) .000 (.000) .040 (.034) .680 (.651)
-.428 * (0.114) -3.675 (4.234) -.590 ** (.237) -.493 (.616) .000 (.001) .304 * (.148) 4.143 (3.212)
External environment unempl Pereduc
-1.017 ** (.474) .002 (.112) 0.672 0.093 1.260 39
.527 (.771) -.238 (.183) 0.551 0.259 1.884 * 39
-.481 * (.234) -.043 (.056) 0.553 0.261 1.896 * 39
-2.489 ** (1.240) .058 (.276) 0.764 0.527 3.229 ** 31
R2 R2 (adj.) F n
* p < .10 ** p< .05 ***p < .01Standard errors are in parentheses
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stability, and quality of the workforce. Each of the models will be discussed briefly in turn. Overall, the results highlight both relationships that are consistent with previous research as well as others that offer new insights. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 2. Tenure. Average tenure with the state government is used as a proxy for satisfaction. Individuals that are more satisfied are more likely to stay with an organization (Tett and Meyer 1993; Hellman 1997; and Hom, Caranikas-Walker, Prussia and Griffeth 1992). Of the union variables in the tenure model, both the percentage of the workforce covered by union agreements and whether labor unions are involved in developing the workforce plan are significant. As the percentage of the workforce covered by union agreements increases, average tenure increases. This oft-used measure of density is positively related to length of service. Previous research that suggests that unions have a moderately positive impact on wages and benefits, and favor seniority-based systems, is consistent with this finding. The negative sign on the coefficients for collaboration (involve and survcov) indicate that average tenure, or satisfaction, is lower in states that seek feedback from employees and involve their unions in workforce planning activities. Collaboration and inclusive decisionmaking are typically seen as having a positive impact in organizations (Rainey 2003). A possible explanation for our findings may be that collaboration is not easy. It increases opportunities for conflict, which may create a disincentive to extending ones tenure with the employer. Workforce planning often involves strategies and practices (such as high performing pools and accelerated advancement), some of which are not consistent with traditional union interests, such as seniority. Further, planning may entail strategies like early retirement, which would reduce average tenure. With respect to the survey variable, this result may indicate that employees dont find organizations responsive to the feedback they provide, which frustrates them and drives them to leave. Turnover. None of the union measures demonstrated a statistically significant effect on voluntary turnover, consistent with the findings of Hammer and Avgar (2005). This is reasonable considering the long history of turnover literature which indicates that actual separation from an organization is the culmination of multiple individual decisions and assessments based on both the internal work environment and the external labor market. For example, intent to turnover is a consistently used
antecedent in turnover studies, as are job satisfaction and the availability of alternatives (Tett and Meyer 1993; Hellman 1997; and Hom, Caranikas-Walker, Prussia and Griffeth 1992). While we include a control for the unemployment rate, we do not have data on intent to quit. A select number of human resources management measures did offer some insight into the relationship with turnover levels. For example, as the number of pay innovations used increases, voluntary turnover decreases. This is consistent with claims that pay innovation assists in retention. However, when considering skill-based pay specifically, its relationship with turnover is negative. States offering skill-based pay may have implemented this innovation recently, meaning that the policy has not yet had an effect on stemming turnover rates, or the direction of this relationship could be due to factors we are not controlling for in the models. Quality. The union variables in this model had mixed results on the quality of hires. The percent of employees covered by labor contracts is associated with greater quality of hires. This may indicate that hiring officials are more careful in their initial selection of applicants so as to avoid the grievance and appeal procedures, used in the process of removing employees or revising performance appraisals that are typically more detailed and formalized in unionized environments. We also find that when authority for labor relations is held by the central Human Resources Office, the quality of hires decreases. This finding may be related to arguments against bureaucratic procedure (red-tape) in government. Formalization in personnel management is consistently found to be a greater burden in the public sector than in the private sector (Rainey and Bozeman 2000). Scope of bargaining, as measured by the proxy of the breadth of workforce planning efforts, had a positive effect on quality of new hires. A broader and more sophisticated workforce planning effort would likely be associated with greater clarity of hiring needs, enabling governments to hire employees with the competencies and skills identified through workforce planning efforts. The relationship between the variety of recruiting strategies used and quality of hires is negative, implying that governments are not targeting appropriately qualified candidates and should reassess the return-on-investment of their recruiting dollars, or the direction of this relationship could be due to factors we are not controlling for in the models. Fired. Firing employees during the probationary period is one indicator of the governments flexibility
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and willingness to remove problem employees before they become permanent and covered by civil service protections. Alternatively, firing employees during the probationary period may be considered an indication that a government has not done an adequate job of screening applicants or determining its needs prior to hiring. Labor relations appears related to probationary firing. As unions are more involved in workforce planning, firing increases. If the union is involved in the planning process it is likely an indicator of its strength within the organization, and as such its protection of employees once they are permanent may be perceived by managers to be stronger. As a result, managers are more proactive in using the probationary firing in order to ensure that they remove problem employees while they retain greater termination flexibility and control. An increase in the scope of bargaining, measured using a proxy of topics covered in workforce planning, however, results in a decrease in those fired during the probationary period. This is consistent with the quality model which indicated that an expansion in the scope of bargaining results in increased quality of new hires. In most cases, the HRM factors generally act to decrease the percentage of probationary fires. This makes sense when we think about the fact that human resources management systems are designed, in part, to improve the hiring process. Effective hiring procedures minimize the need to remove individuals during the probationary period. Even so, it is important that human resources management systems allow for separation when a candidate is not the ideal fit. As more training is offered centrally, the amount of probationary fires decreases, likely because managers see a means to improve performance through training rather than simply resorting to separation. Interestingly, as training offered at the agency level increases, the number of probationary fires also increases. This may seem inconsistent with the finding on centralized training, but it could be that the agency does not want to incur the cost of an employee that would need agency-based training. Agency training budgets are often lean and the need to provide that training for a nonperforming employee can be a significant expense.
CONCLUSION
Across the models, there is preliminary empirical support that labor relations and HRM policies together
affect the intermediate outcomes examined, though the factors that are relevant to each outcome vary noticeably. This is important for a number of reasons. First, labor research does not typically assess the relationship between union measures and these kinds of outcomes, yet these results are of particular interest to managers and to scholars because they are assumed to be correlated with programmatic performance and policy outcomes. Second, it provides initial support that our exploration of the relationship between labor relations, HRM policies, and these outcomes is heading in the right direction and encourages researchers to examine this more systematically. Our initial findings suggest numerous opportunities for future work in three broad areas. First, there are elements of labor relations that have not received close empirical scrutiny, or that lack satisfactory measures. Issues such as trust, dispute resolution mechanisms, stability, professionalization, and the role of oversight boards such as the National Labor Relations Board or its relevant equivalent, may further influence the effects of labor relations and HRM policies on important outcomes. Research would further benefit from better measures of the scope of bargaining and collaborative efforts than were available for this analysis. It would be a benefit to scholars to operationalize empirical measures for both the scope of bargaining and collaborative efforts because much scholarship typically focuses on legal history and case studies. Second, we have asserted that the components of labor relations we identify are likely to interact in complex ways. This follows from research cited above that uses many of the independent variables in this study as dependent variables. To recognize this complexity adequately, larger data sets are needed that contain more robust measures, which can allow for more sophisticated empirical models and a more thorough examination of the relationships. Finally, performance is a cumulative result, suggesting that analyses should be longitudinal, to account for the coincident affects of labor relations and HRM policies over time. Furthermore, new policies take time to implement, especially in large organizations, and the impact of those policies may not be realized for years, depending on the breadth of the changes. The identification of common elements in the labor relations and HRM literatures also suggests that it may be possible to develop a theoretical model of the relationship between these variables and measures of performance that are important to managers. As
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researchers, we should ask ourselves if density, scope of bargaining, centralization, collaboration, and measures of context adequately describe labor relations in an organization, and if measures of how organizations obtain, maintain, motivate, and structure HRM adequately describe the personnel system. Additionally, are the definitions presented here and their operationalization something that we can agree on or are there better alternatives? Scholars can further identify what else should be included and identify a consistent measure of those concepts. Beyond this, it will be revealing to test these key relationships in other contexts. Some of the following seem most interesting: different sizes of private sector organizations, federal agencies, municipal governments, and particular professions where union power is seen as substantial, such as public safety, education, and the airline industry. Recent debates at the federal level regarding the appropriateness of unions in defense and homeland security lend urgency to this agenda. A systematic examination of the relationship between unions and programmatic outcomes may indicate a positive or negative interaction that anecdotal evidence and case studies cannot fully explore. The associations found in this preliminary assessment indicate that the relationship is likely complex positive in some instances and negative in others challenging the efficacy of sweeping generalizations. Although the empirical analysis used in this research employed data from American states, the measures can be used in non-U.S. contexts. For example, laws in different countries will influence the percent of the workforce allowed to unionize, the topics that can be bargained upon with management, and the number of separate labor agreements in place. The measures used here are generic, such that the context of each country can be respected. Specifically, the measure of the scope of bargaining can account for a more limited list of negotiable issues, the measure of density can accommodate smaller spans of eligibility. Broad measures such as these may be useful as countries new to managing public sector labor relations, like Korea, grapple with the challenge of how to measure success and how to develop constructive relationships. Likewise, the field of labor relations would benefit from testing the impact of unionization on the performance of other management systems, such as financial management and information management. If such a relationship exists, it would help managers better understand the nature and significance of labor relations. Additionally, the field would benefit
from further qualitative research examining these dimensions, to add to the understanding of the nuances of these concepts and inform future large scale survey research. Ultimately, a full analysis would consider the dependent variables of greatest concern: the outcomes of policies and programs.
NOTES
1. The Government Performance Project, conducted at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, was a criteria-based assessment of management systems in federal agencies and state and local governments. The projects website presents details of the GPP, its data collection, analytic methods, results: www.maxwell.syr.edu/gpp. 2. As estimated by the Saratoga Institute, and independently by Hewitt Associates. See Lermusiaux, Yves, Calculating the High Cost of Employee Turnover. On the Web at http://www.ilogos.com/en/expertviews/articles/strategic/ 20031007_YL.html. 3. Due to the limitation of data available through the GPP survey, tenure is the closest approximation to a measure of satisfaction available. Tenure and turnover are complex phenomena, but meta-analyses find that satisfaction is a key determinant of turnover (Tett and Meyer 1993; Hellman 1997; and Hom, Caranikas-Walker, Prussia and Griffeth 1992). To control for the possibility that opportunities in the labor market play a role in tenure decisions, the model controls for the unemployment rate in states at the time of the survey. Future studies on the relationship between labor relations, satisfaction, and turnover should include better, more commonly used measures of these variables. 4. We also examined the number of bargaining units, which is distinct from, but highly correlated with, the number of labor agreements. 5. We examined the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the variables in our models. While there is no formal criterion for determining how large a VIF indicates that the independent variables are so highly correlated that their corresponding significance tests cannot be trusted, a common rule of thumb is VIF greater than four. The VIFs for the variables in our models are below this threshold, generally in the range 1.5-2.5. 6. Since one of our outcomes measures, quality, is constrained to a scale of 1-10, we also estimated these models using double-censored Tobit. The coefficients are not identical to the OLS coefficients, but the signs and magnitudes are the same, and the values are very similar.
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The significance improves. The results reported are OLS results.
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Willow S. Jacobson is an Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Government at the School of Government at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Her teaching, research, and service activities focus on human resource management, organizational theory, and public management questions. Her current work focuses on local government workforce planning efforts. Ellen V. Rubin is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Public Administration and Policy at SUNY Albany. Her research interests include procedural justice, public sector labor relations, and civil service reform. Amy K. Donahue is Head of the Department of Public Policy at the University of Connecticut. Her research focuses on the management of public organizations and on the nature of citizen demand for public services. She is especially concerned with emergency services and disaster policy, and she serves as a technical advisor to the U. S. Department of Homeland Securitys Science and Technology Directorate, helping to develop research and development programs to meet the technological needs of emergency responders.
Received: May 17, 2008 Accepted with one revision: September 12, 2008

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International Review of Public Administration 2008, Vol. 13, No.

& ELLEN V. RUBIN

& AMY K. DONAHUE

Vol. 13, No. 2

LITERATURE ON LABOR RELATIONS

Willow S. Jacobson & Ellen V. Rubin & Amy K. Donahue

Vol. 13, No. 2

Willow S. Jacobson & Ellen V. Rubin & Amy K. Donahue

LITERATURE ON HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

Vol. 13, No. 2

DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS

Willow S. Jacobson & Ellen V. Rubin & Amy K. Donahue

4.50 1.56 4.00 0.00

15.00 19.64 10.00 25.80

10.97 8.09 7.78 5.33

1.97 3.52 1.12 5.45

0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

19.00 1.00 1.00 10.00 95.00 75.00

11.38 0.46 0.14 3.00 46.29 13.00

6.07 0.50 0.351 3.89 38.87 17.01

7.00 0.00 2.00 1.00 380 4.00 0.00

26.00 1.00 28.00 8.00 8500 29.00 1.00

17.10 0.88 21.06 4.34 1738 19.62 0.22

5.03 0.33 5.27 1.70 1309 7.75 0.42

Vol. 13, No. 2

Willow S. Jacobson & Ellen V. Rubin & Amy K. Donahue

Vol. 13, No. 2

Table 2. Explaining state human resources outcomes.

Labor relations plancov laborcen involve survcov workcov agree

External environment unempl Pereduc

-1.017 ** (.474) .002 (.112) 0.672 0.093 1.260 39

.527 (.771) -.238 (.183) 0.551 0.259 1.884 * 39

-.481 * (.234) -.043 (.056) 0.553 0.261 1.896 * 39

-2.489 ** (1.240) .058 (.276) 0.764 0.527 3.229 ** 31

Willow S. Jacobson & Ellen V. Rubin & Amy K. Donahue

Vol. 13, No. 2

Willow S. Jacobson & Ellen V. Rubin & Amy K. Donahue

Vol. 13, No. 2

The significance improves. The results reported are OLS results.

Willow S. Jacobson & Ellen V. Rubin & Amy K. Donahue

Vol. 13, No. 2

Willow S. Jacobson & Ellen V. Rubin & Amy K. Donahue

Vol. 13, No. 2

Willow S. Jacobson & Ellen V. Rubin & Amy K. Donahue

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-2.489 (1.240) .058 (.276) 0.764 0.527 3.229 31