In the Florida Supreme Court Voeltz v. Obama et al Petitioner, Michael C. Voeltz, pursuant to Fla. App. R. 9.

100 B, files this Petition for Writ of Mandamus to compel the District Court of Appeal, First District ("Court of Appeal"), to reinstate the appeal of Voeltz v. Obama, et al, case no. 2012CA03857, 1D13-83, which was improperly dismissed by court order on March 13, 2014. Florida statutes 102.168(5), and 102.168(7) mandate that petitioners case cannot be dismissed without a hearing, upon the correct filing of a case contesting the eligibility of any person nominated or elected to office, and having clearly informed the defendants of the grounds upon which Barack Hussein Obamas eligibility for office of President of the United States is being contested. In the alternative, Petitioner files this Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to direct Florida Secretary of State, Ken Detzner, to comply with Florida Statute 97.012(14), and direct the Court of Appeal to afford petitioner Voeltz a hearing of case 2012CA03857, as required by Florida statute 102.168(7) in Leon Co. Circuit Court. Jurisdiction of Supreme Court of Florida This Court has jurisdiction to reinstate a dismissed appeal. See Art. V, 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.; Sky Lake Garden Rec. v. Dist. Ct. of App., 511 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1987); In Re. Estate of Lafin, 569 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 1990); McFadden v. Fourth Dist. Court of Appeal, 682 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 1996); Beatty v. Beuttenmuller, 654 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1995). Petitioner also invokes Florida Supreme Court original jurisdiction (Rule 9.030(3)) to issue all writs. This Court has the authority to force public officers to perform a duty that is a clear right of the Petitioner. [M]andamus may be used only to enforce a clear and certain right; it may not be used to establish such a right, but only to enforce a right already clearly and certainly established in the law. Milanick v. Town of Beverly Beach, 820 So.2d 317, 320 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (citing Fla. League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So.2d 397, 400-01 (Fla.1992)). STATEMENT OF FACTS Petitioner Michael Voeltz, registered member of the Democratic Party of Florida, having sworn an oath to "protect and defend" the U.S. and Florida Constitutions as a Florida voter, correctly filed a contest of election within 10 days after the Florida Election Canvassing Commission certified that Barack Obama

and Joe Biden was elected President of the United States on November 20th, 2012. Petitioner filed based on a clear legal right to challenge the nomination or election of any person to office. (Fl SS 102.168(1)(3)(b)) This court has held explicitly that all of Floridas election statutes apply to Presidential elections , (See Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris, Nos. SC00-2346, SC00-2348 and SC00-2349,(2000), footnote 20.). This court has also held that eligibility for office is a judicial determination, made upon the correct challenge of eligibility made in accordance with Florida law. Shevin v. Stone, 279 So. 2d. 17, 22 (Fla. 1972). Hon. Judge Kevin Carroll dismissed petitioners case with prejudice, without hearing, stating that the Government says Mr. Obama is eligible then he is. If the United States Government says that this man is the President then he is, and I will not dispute it, case dismissed. 2012CA03857 @ 2. The actions of Judge Carroll have violated the due process and equal protection rights of petitioner, as a registered voter, eligible to vote in an election to challenge the winner of that election on the basis of eligibility for office Standing to challenge eligibility of Presidential candidates in state courts Recently the Alabama Supreme Court, in McInnish and Goode v. Chapman, No. 1120465, has ruled that state courts indeed are the correct venue for adjudicating contests of eligibility of Presidential candidates, citing extensively from Daniel P. Tokaji, Commentary, The Justiciability of Eligibility: May Courts Decide Who Can Be President?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 31 (2008). As called for above, the only real alternative to a judicial challenge to the eligibility, or the disqualification, of a presidential candidate in federal court is a pre-election challenge to the candidate's qualifications or disqualification brought in state court pursuant to state laws. Chapman, Al. Sup. Ct No. 1120465 @19, 20. And also, It is also conceivable that a state-court case challenging a presidential candidate's eligibility could be brought after an election. State law might allow a post-election contest of primary or general election results on the ground that the candidate who gained the most votes does not meet the qualifications for office. Id @21 Unlike Alabama, Florida does have a very clear post election procedure in statutory framework that was admired by the US Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore.

Acting pursuant to its constitutional grant of authority, the Florida Legislature has created a detailed, if not perfectly crafted, statutory scheme that provides for appointment of Presidential electors by direct election. Bush v. Gore, 531 US 98, 116 (2000), Rehnquist concurring. While Justice Bolin in Chapman lamented the fact that Alabamas statutory framework provides no process for challenging the eligibility of a Presidential candidate, Floridas election contest statute is well aligned with Federal Statute 3 US Code 5 (Determination of controversy as to appointment of electors), and provides a cause of action brought by another candidate or a voter to challenge the eligibility of any person nominated or elected to office (Fl SS. 102.168(1)(3)(b)) The actions of the officers of the state of Florida, in subverting the due process and equal protection of petitioner Voeltz, cannot make his complaint moot. The self executing provisions of the qualifications for President, 3 US Code 5, Fl. SS 102.168(5), Fl. Statute 102.168(7), and Article 2 of the US constitution have all been violated by the State of Florida by not giving a hearing or adjudicating Petitioners case by December 11, 2012. "[J]urisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events." Mullen v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824). Presidential eligibility is not a political question The Supreme Court has defined a political question as, A controversy is nonjusticiable where there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it . . . ." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 There is a judicially discoverable way of resolving the issue of Mr. Obamas eligibility in the Florida statutes, but Judge Carroll refused to fulfill his duty to provide that remedy given by law. The District Court, and Judge Carroll refused to afford a hearing before December 11, 2012, as required by state and federal law, and now use their own actions as a barrier to standing, as Carroll issued his ruling on December 20, 2012, nine days after the section 2 window closed. The right of the plaintiff to sue cannot depend on the defence which the defendant may choose to set up. His right to sue is anterior to that defence, and must depend on the state

of things when the action is brought. The questions which the case involves, then, must determine its character, whether those questions be made in the cause or not. Osborne Bank 22 US 738, 824 (1824) Supposedly, according to Judge Carroll, the question of eligibility is a judicial question due to a phrase in 3 US Code 15 that allows objections, and a phrase in the 20th Amendment (if the president elect shall have failed to qualify). (2012CA0357 @2, 3) Neither of those phrases textually demonstrates that Congress is charged with the task of vetting the qualifications of a President elect, but there is a phrase that directly informs us as to the responsibility of Congress in Article 1 Section 5, U.S. Constitution, Congress is responsible for the qualifications and elections of its own members. Therefore a plaintiff would have no standing to challenge the eligibility of a Representative or Senator, since that task is already assigned to Congress, but there is not one clause in the Constitution which textually assigns the vetting of eligibility to a political body. In fact, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) wrote an explanation of 3 US Code 15, which makes no mention of any objection because of the presidential qualifications of art.2 s.1 c.4 (Bach, Maskell, Overview of Electoral College Procedure and the Role of Congress, Nov. 17, 2000). Basis for Objections. The general grounds for an objection to the counting of an electoral vote or votes would appear from the federal statute and from historical sources to be that such vote was not "regularly given" by an elector, and/or that the elector was not "lawfully certified" according to state statutory procedures. The statutory provision first states in the negative that "no electoral vote ... regularly given by electors whose appointment has been lawfully certified ... from which but one return has been received shall be rejected" (3 U.S.C. 15), and then reiterates for clarity (see Conference Report on 1887 legislation, 18 Congressional Record 668, 49th Cong., 2d Sess., January 14, 1887) that both houses concurrently may reject a vote when not "so regularly given" by electors "so certified." 3 U.S.C. 15. It should be noted that the word "lawfully" was expressly inserted by the House in the Senate legislation (S. 9, 49th Cong.) before the word "certified" ( Conference Report, supra, 18 Congressional Record at 668). Such addition arguably provides an indication that Congress thought it might, as a grounds for an objection, question and look into the lawfulness of the certification under state law. While the first objection of "regularly given" may, in practice, subsume the latter (as a vote

may arguably be other than "regularly given" if it were given by one who was not "lawfully certified"), the two objections are not necessarily the same. In the case of the socalled "faithless elector" in 1969, described above, the elector was apparently "lawfully certified" by the state, but the objection raised was that the vote was not "regularly given" by such elector. Overview, Bach, Maskell, 11, 2000 It is doubtful, in light of art. 1 s.5, that the framers would have specifically given that task of vetting Presidential candidates to Congress and not specifically said so. That there is no textual demonstration of that duty is reflected by the CRS research paper. There is a reason that Representatives, Senators and those holding trust or profit in the government are forbidden to be Electors (art. 2 s.1 c.3), and that is that they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Federalist 68, A. Hamilton, March 12, 1788. Hamilton, who was there at the framing also said, Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves. Looking at the 20th Amendment, again there is no textual demonstration of a duty performed by Congress in vetting a Presidential candidate. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified. (20th Amendment, s.3) Again, no textually demonstrable duty is described. It does not say if Congress determines that the president elect fails to qualify. The Amendment uses future perfect tense, meaning an action that happens in the future after another event has happened, meaning that the event of determining disqualification comes before the event of replacement by the Vice President elect, and before the joint session meets. This view of the procedure aligns perfectly with 3 US Code 5, and described by Professor Tokaji, where state courts are the proper venue to contest

the eligibility of a President elect, bound by the section 2 window of 3 US Code 5. Florida never gave plaintiff the opportunity to contest as required by law. The fact that the Joint Session gave Section 2 certification to every state, and no objections were made as to eligibility of Barack Hussein Obama at the Electoral College (3 US Code 15) means that Congress has made no discretion as to his eligibility. If there is no textual demonstration in statute that Congress vets Presidential candidates then it is not a political question, but judicial. The President can be removed due to Constitutional disability The Constitution clearly contemplates a situation where the President is removed due to ineligibility. Facts could be uncovered after he takes office that he is not old enough, not a US resident long enough, or not a natural born Citizen. In that case he would have a cconstitutional disability and be replaced by the Vice President."Constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing." 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law 89 (2005). "[U]sually no legislation is required to effectuate a constitutional provision that isprohibitory in its language ...." 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law 101 (2009). Article 2 clause 1 section 6 uses the term inability (lack of legal, mental or physical capacity) to describe a case where the Vice president shall assume the Presidency. Amendment 12 uses the term Constitutional disability (that the Vice President shall assume the office, as in the case of the constitutional disability of the President). No trial of facts or vetting is described, and textually it appears that the determination of ineligibility would come from outside of Congress (by the judiciary). 3 US Code 19 and the 25th Amendment expanded upon the removal of the President, and also describes a case of inability of the person acting as President, with the caveat that any replacement shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution. (3 US Code 19(e)) Remedy Petitioner asks the court to restore justice, and the due process rights of petitioner Voeltz, by issuing a Writ of Mandamus instructing the Appeals Court to remand 2012CA0385 back to the Circuit court for a hearing as required by Fl. Statute 102.168(7) or the same writ instructing the Secretary of State to fulfill his

duty of Fl. SS. 97.012(14), and instruct the circuit to hear petitioners case. In the alternative, the exposition of this case may be made here at the Supreme Court of Fla., with full discovery.