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International Journal of Philosophical Studies

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The Bifurcated Subject

Lilian Alweissa a Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland

To cite this Article Alweiss, Lilian(2009) 'The Bifurcated Subject', International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 17: 3, 415

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International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 17(3), 415434

The Bifurcated Subject

Lilian Alweiss
alweissl@tcd.ie International 10.1080/09672550902948944 RIPH_A_395066.sgm 0967-2559 Original Taylor 2009 0 3 17 Dr 000002009 LilianAlweiss & Article Francis (print)/1466-4542 Journal of Philosophical (online) Studies and Francis

Abstract
Michel Henry wishes to salvage Descartess first principle I think, I am by claiming that there is no need to appeal to the world or others to make sense of the self. One of his main targets is Edmund Husserl, who claims that thought is necessarily intentional and thus necessarily about something that is other to thought. To show that this is not so, Henry draws on passages from Descartess texts which emphasize that we should not equate the cogito with thinking but with sensation and imagination. This allows Henry to explore the notion that the self has its own form of manifestation. This paper questions Henrys reading of Descartes and his critique of Husserl on two fronts. First, the passages Henry draws upon, if anything only confirm, rather than question Husserls claim that consciousness is intentional. Second, Henry believes that he can show that the life of the self is infinitely rich without having to appeal to other persons or, indeed, to the world. Yet, I wish to contend that Henry is mistaken: as Husserl has shown convincingly, a life without others and the world is not only impoverished and bereft of meaning, but remains entirely indeterminate. The self only manifests itself with respect to others and the world. Keywords: Michel Henry; Husserl; Descartes; the self; embodiment; first person perspective

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Introduction Hardly any philosopher today would accept Descartess first principle: I think, therefore I am. The general consensus is that Descartes was simply mistaken when he made the metaphysical claim that this I, that is thinking, is an immaterial substance with no bodily elements.1 Modern neuroscience and phenomenology argue that the idea that thinking can take place without embodiment must be wrong. Kant and post-Kantian philosophers question whether it is legitimate to refer to a substance when we look at the nature of thinking. And Heidegger believes that Descartes presupposes an understanding of existence which he leaves unexplored. When I say that there is hardly a philosopher who would accept Descartess first principle, I have one exception in mind: Michel Henry. What singles him out is that his philosophy tries to reverse this trend. He believes that something valuable

International Journal of Philosophical Studies ISSN 09672559 print 14664542 online 2009 Taylor & Francis http://www.informaworld.com DOI: 10.1080/09672550902948944

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can be retrieved from Descartess first principle, and that the flaw lies with those who have accepted the view that man cannot be conceived as a specific autonomous reality;2 a view which resulted in what Henry has termed ontological monism.3 The Bifurcated Self One of Henrys main concerns is that even philosophers who advocate a philosophy of consciousness (Bewutseinsphilosophie) and agree with Descartes that the ego cogito is a first principle fail to do justice to Descartes and, more importantly, to the self. Rather than taking the first-person perspective seriously, they alienate the subject from its self. The self is never investigated as it is in itself; it is only seen as bifurcated or split. The focus is on self-transcendence, namely the fact that the subject is oriented to the world or things that are by definition other to the subject. Kant refers to the I think that needs to accompany all my representations (Kant, 1933: B131); Husserl to the inseparability of the cogitocogitatum (qua cogitatum) (Husserl, 1964: p. 14); and Heidegger to Daseins ecstatic structure (Heidegger, 1962). For Henry this means that the subject has been wrenched from itself, has been broken apart, bifurcated and ruptured. It is always in exile, ecstatic and, indeed, alienated from itself. The subject understands itself only through that which is opposite to it, its object or product. Consequently it manifests itself only in the form of the object, and not at all within itself, not at all as pro-ducing, as manifesting.4 The problem can best be illustrated by looking at Kants depiction of the subject. In the Paralogisms of Reason Kant accuses Descartes of providing a false syllogism when he says I think, therefore I am. The problem is not that Descartes does not logically (syllogistically) deduce the sum from the cogito5 and that the equation between thinking and existence is merely assumed, but that the particle ergo is misplaced since the inference is simply false. The equation between thinking and existence (sum) cannot be substantiated because thought is necessarily reflexive. As soon as I am conscious of an object, including being conscious of myself, there must be a self that implicitly as Kant puts it (using Leibnizian terminology) apperceives my being thus conscious. We need to differentiate between a transcendental self that accompanies all my representations, even the representation of myself, and an empirical self that appears or can be represented in time and space. As Kant says, it must be possible for the I think to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me (Kant, 1933: B131/2). Without the transcendental self, no experience or representation is possible. Representations need to be attributed to a subject that can have these representations. They are only possible 416

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if they appear to someone. In short, every appearance has its dative; it is necessarily an appearance of something for someone. Henry applauds Kant for giving significance to the first-person perspective; however, he deplores the fact that he takes with one hand what he gives with the other. Although Kant assumes the ego cogito in order to make sense of experience, he insists that it has no intrinsic property. It can only be understood in relation to its representation, i.e., as relating to that which is essentially other to itself. To avoid infinite regress, Kant comes to argue that this someone to whom these appearances are attributed can never be rendered into an appearance. This leads him to conclude that only the empirical ego exists to the extent that it can be turned into an object of reflection; however, the ego that is aware of the fact that it is thinking does not exist because it can never be represented. Undoubtedly for Kant, Descartes presents a false syllogism. When Descartes says I think, therefore I am, he fails to draw a distinction between the empirical and the transcendental self. He does not realize that we cannot infer from the formal conditions of thought (which Kant regards as transcendental) to a substance of thought (empirical) (see Kant, 1933: A41 / B399ff.). Kant believes that what can be marked out is the necessity for the I think to accompany all my representations. No further existential claims are legitimate.6 What can be known is only the self as a representation, but not the pure spontaneity of the representing self. Ludwig Wittgenstein illustrates this well when he says: When I look into the mirror, I can see myself (as an object of reflection), however, I cannot see myself looking: But you do not really see the eye.7 Henry is perplexed by this criticism. Not only is the subject treated schizophrenically we are meant to be somehow both a transcendental self and an empirical self at the same time but, more importantly, we are only meant to experience ourselves in this schizophrenic tension and never as a (transcendental) subject as such. There is a paradox here: on the one hand the ego cogito is treated as a first principle; on the other, we are told that nothing pertains to it it can only be thought as a necessary correlate of experience as it is nothing outside, or independent of that experience. Indeed, Kant repeatedly argues that the I think or transcendental unity of apperception has no other meaning than that of being the unifying activity of combination and reflection on the sensible given. Moreover, there is no unity of selfconsciousness aside from its spontaneity, effort or conatus toward judgment. This is why Kant asserts that the transcendental unity of apperception is the highest point (Kant, 1933: B134) (hchste Punkt) an analytic unity, which can only be thought of as a correlate to the synthetic unity of representations (cf. Kant, 1933: B134). It is nothing in itself. It only has a function: it is a vehicle for all concepts of the understanding. It can explain the nature of the appearing and the conditions of possibility for appearances or manifestations without, however, ever appearing itself. As Wittgenstein observes, it allows us to make sense of the claim that the world is my representation cf. 417

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Wittgenstein 1981 5.62; however, it does not allow us to say anything meaningful about it. This leads Wittgenstein to refer to this I as a philosophical self. It is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, which is the subject of psychology, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world not a part of it.8 Kant arrives at an equally paradoxical position when he says that the simple representation I is in itself empty of all content and we cannot even say that this is a concept, but only that it is a bare consciousness which accompanies all concepts (Kant, 1933: A346/B404). It is a simple expression, not even a concept.9 It has no special designation in the list of concepts because it serves only to introduce all our thought. To Henry this proves that Descartess first principle has been denied any significant value. In his view it should not surprise us that post-Kantian thinkers such as Sartre come to equate consciousness with nothingness,10 or Wittgenstein the philosophical self with nonsense.11 To be transcendental is to fail to be one of the things that constitutes all there is. It is to fail to be. Indeed, the justification for the use of the first-person pronoun becomes questionable. Although Kant refers to an I that thinks in that it accompanies all my representations, it is no longer clear how to understand this indexical expression since this I points to nothing specific. Apart from being a facilitator, there is nothing that justifies the use of the first-person pronoun. The I in question is not referring to a personal identity (see Kant 1983: A363) or anything that is indistinguishably mine. It is not surprising that Kant once even refers to this I as an I or he or it (the thing) that thinks (Kant, 1933: A346/B404). Nothing seems to prevent us from taking the next step (which Kant wishes to avoid at all cost) and argue that we cannot infer from the fact that there is thinking to the fact that there is an I that thinks. It turns out to be a linguistic illusion to ascribe states of consciousness at all.12 In view of this Henry asks disparagingly: How can one not be struck by this extraordinary conceptual situation: it is precisely with Kant, who related the Being of all beings to the Subject, that the Subject becomes the object of a radical dispute which denies it all possible Being. Or to put it in another way: it is at the very moment when philosophy sees itself clearly as a philosophy of the subject that the foundation on which it explicitly and thematically bases itself, and which it systematically endeavours to elaborate, escapes it and slipping from its grasp, tips over into the void of inanity.13 In other words, Henry asks how one can accept that the ego cogito is the first principle while at the same time denying its existence. How can the cogito be certain, in such a way that everything rests on it, when one has to admit that it is nothing in itself? cf. Henry 1988: 152. Surely philosophy pulls the rug from under its own feet, because it rests on a foundation which turns out to be none. 418

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The New Descartes Henry turns against this trend in philosophy and seeks to breathe new life back into the subject. He believes that it is possible to do so by returning to the very thinker the tradition of philosophy has dismissed: Descartes. In his opinion, the criticisms raised against Descartess first principle are not only illegitimate but moreover miss something fundamental, namely that the ego cogito does not refer to an empty vessel or a disembodied cognitive ability. It seems obvious to most readers of Descartes that when referring to the ego cogito, he assumes that to think necessarily means to represent to oneself. As Heidegger, for example, observes: In important passages, Descartes substitutes for cogitare the word percipere (per-capio), to take possession of a thing, to seize something, in the sense of presenting-tooneself by way of presenting before one-self, representing.14 Yet Henry believes that a closer look at Descartess texts reveals passages which clearly indicate that the cogito has nothing to do with thought processes nor (sic) with thought itself. Cogito means everything, except I think.15 Henry acknowledges that Descartes himself is responsible for equating the cogito with the I think because his final goal is to found knowledge (connaissance) and through it all theoretical knowledge (science). However, when we look at the phenomenological description of the cogito, nothing becomes more apparent than that for Descartes the cogito has nothing in common with what we call thought and, furthermore, that the cogito itself assumes a form of embodiment. Let us take a look at two interrelated aspects of Descartess work which interest Henry one is that thought is not reflexive or intentional and the other that the cogito should not be confused with an I think. (1) Descartes states clearly that it makes no sense to argue that all thought is reflexive: My critic says that to enable a substance to be superior to matter and wholly spiritual (and he insists on using the term mind only in this restricted sense), it is not sufficient for it to think: it is further required that it should think that it is thinking, by means of a reflexive act, or that it should have awareness of its own thought. This is as deluded as our bricklayers saying that a person who is skilled in architecture must employ a reflexive act to ponder on the fact that he has this skill before he can be an architect. (Descartes, AT VII, 559; CSM II: 382 also cited in Marion, 1999b: p. 104) By cogito Descartes does not mean cogito me cogitare; rather he refers to a thinking prior to reflection. There is an internal awareness which always precedes reflective knowledge (Descartes, AT VII, 422, CSM II: 285 also 419

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cited in Marion, 1999b: 104). Kant is simply mistaken in his criticism: not all my thinking is accompanied by my awareness that I am thinking. Moreover, Descartes claims that it does not make sense to argue that the subject understands itself only through that which is its opposite. In a slighting comment to Gassendi he observes: It is also surprising that you maintain that the idea of a thing cannot be in the mind unless the ideas of an animal, a plant, a stone, and all the universals are there. This is like saying that if I am to recognise myself to be a thinking thing, I must also recognise animals and plants, since I must recognise a thing or the nature of a thing. (Replies to the Fifth Objection, AT VII, 362; CSM II, 250, cited by Henry, 1993: p. 41) Descartes does not believe that the ego cogito deprived of its cogitatum (object of thought) would have no meaning whatsoever. Rather he asserts that we are only by virtue of the fact that we are thinking16 and need not rely on the objects of thought to recognize ourselves as thinking things. Clearly I can think without an other in my thought. (2) Henry now tries to substantiate this claim by showing that it rests on a convincing argument. It is the method of doubt that proves to us that we can arrive at the ego cogito without having to appeal to something that is other to thought. Take the following passages as an example: The fact that it is I who am doubting and understanding and willing is so evident that I see no way of making it any clearer. But it is also the case that the I who imagines is the same I. For even if, as I have supposed, none of the objects of imagination are real, the power of imagination is something which really exists and is part of my thinking. Lastly, it is also the same I who has sensory perceptions (sentiens), or is aware of bodily things as it were through the senses. For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called having a sensory perception is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking. (Descartes AT VII, CSM: 19 29, also cited by Marion 1993: 60, cf. Henry, 1989: 158) Thus often when we sleep, and sometimes even when we are awake, we imagine certain things so forcibly, that we think we see them before us, or feel them in our body, although they do not exist at all; but although we may be asleep or dreaming, we cannot feel sad or moved 420

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by any other passion without its being very true that the soul actually has this passion within it we may be mistaken therein regarding the perceptions which relate to objects which are outside us, or at least those which relate to certain parts of our body, but that we cannot be so deceived regarding the passions, inasmuch as they are so close to, and so entirely within our soul, that it is impossible for it to feel them without their being actually such as it feels them to be. (Descartes: Passions of the Soul, cited by Henry, 1989: p. 158) These citations are of importance to Henry for two reasons: The first is that when Descartes says it seems to me that I am walking or dreaming or being warmed, he is claiming that even if all the appearances (walking, dreaming, the sensation of heat) may be false, what cannot be questioned is the immediacy of videor, it seems to me. I cannot doubt my awareness, though I can doubt that the content of my awareness is real (ontologically in the world). It seems to me remains valid, even when doubt disqualifies everything that we see i.e., all our representations. Even if there is no intentional object, a seeing and, indeed, sensing still takes place. We shall return to this observation later. The second aspect that interests Henry is that these citations clearly show that when we refer to the cogito, we also refer to our sensory awareness. I can see light, hear noise and feel heat even when it turns out that I have been dreaming. This sensory awareness itself is a form of thought. Hence, when Descartes refers to the cogito, he does not only refer to the cognitive faculty of a thinking being or, indeed, to something straightforwardly mental, since it includes imagination and sensation: By the term thought, I understand everything which we are aware of as happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it. Hence, thinking is to be identified here not merely with understanding, willing and imagining, but also with sensory awareness (imaginans quoque et sentiens). (Descartes AT VIIIA, 7) CSM I: 195 Commentators generally believe that through his argument that sensory awareness belongs to thinking Descartess position becomes problematic as he concedes that there are certain states which can no longer be classified as belonging either to thought or to extension. Take the following passage from the Principles as an example: But we also experience within ourselves certain other things which must not be referred either to the mind alone or to the body alone. 421

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These arise, as will be made clear later on, in the appropriate place, from the close and intimate union of our mind with the body. This list includes first, appetites like hunger and thirst, secondly, the emotions or passions of the mind which do not consist of thought alone, such as emotions of anger, joy, sadness and love, and finally, all the sensations, such as those of pain, pleasure, light, colours, sounds, smells, tastes, heat, hardness and the other tactile qualities. (Descartes: AT VIII A, 23; CSM I, 2089) There are certain sensations which require the union of mind and body. Yet this implies that the body belongs to the sphere of the cogito (or, as Henry would put it, the sphere of immanence). Indeed, Descartes suggests as much. When Frans Burman interviewed Descartes in April 1648, asking him what he means when he says that sensation and imagination are faculties for special modes of thinking, he is reported to have responded: When external objects act on my senses, they print on them an idea, or rather a figure of themselves. And when the mind attends to these images imprinted on the gland [i.e., on the pineal gland] in this way it is said to have sense-perceptions (sentire). When, on the other hand, the images on the gland are imprinted not by external objects but by the mind itself, which fashions and shapes them in the brain in the absence of external objects, then we have imagination. The difference between sense-perception and imagination is really just this, that in sense-perception the images are imprinted on the brain by external objects which are actually present, while in the case of imagination the images are imprinted by the mind without any external objects, and with the windows shut, as it were. (Cited by Cottingham, 1985: p. 238. Descartes: AT VI, 1623; see also Cottingham, 1976: pp. 27, 74ff.) Sense-perception, just like imagination, requires physiological activity. The point here is not that we need an eye or a nose to see or smell things or that we need a brain in order to receive information, because this would not distinguish our cognitive faculty from sensation. Rather, Descartess point is more subtle. What is distinct about imagination and sense-perception is that they require a physiological activity or something corporeal, unlike doubting, affirming, denying, willing, which refer to pure actions of the soul and can occur without any physiological intervention. We need to have a body to feel heat or pain. This is why only corporeal beings have sensations.17 As Descartes states in a much-cited passage of the Sixth Meditation: 422

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If this were not so [that is if the I and the body did not form a unit] I who am nothing but a thinking thing would not feel pain when the body was hurt but perceive the damage purely by the intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken. Similarly, when the body needed food or drink, I should have an explicit understanding of the fact, instead of having confused sensations of hunger and thirst. For these sensations of hunger, thirst, pain and so on, are nothing but confused modes of thinking which arise from the union and as it were intermingling of the mind with the body. (Descartes: AT VII, Sixth Meditation, 76, line 9; SCM II, 53; also cited by Cottingham, 1985: p. 240) These passages suggest that there are sensations that require the union of the mind and body. A purely intellectual judgment could never reveal to us what it is like to have sensations of pain and hunger.18 There are various ways of interpreting these passages. As I said above, the standard reading is that Descartes clearly defies his own dualism: it cannot cope with the causal interaction between mind and body. Conversely, John Cottingham argues that these passages prove something quite different. They show that Descartes classifies human attributes in terms not of a dualistic but of a threefold or trialistic pattern (Cottingham, 1985: p. 225). There are faculties that belong strictly neither to a res cogitans nor to a res extensa. Certain phenomena including perceptions, emotions and sensations belong neither to the mind nor to the body alone but to the union of the two. Henry pursues an entirely different line of interpretation. Instead of questioning Descartess dualism, he believes that these special modes confirm that there is a special form of existence that pertains to the subject. They do not suggest a trialism or causal picture but show that what Descartes calls thought, i.e., the cogito, goes far beyond what we call thinking. The point is that thinking is not to be identified merely with understanding, willing and imagining, but also with sensory awareness.19 Sensory awareness is a mode of thinking. These passages clearly suggest that what is distinctive about thinking is not its cognitive activity, but affectivity. In a word, affectivity belongs to the essence of pure thought and not extension.20 Henry advances this view to show what is distinctive about our self. What marks out the self is that it experiences itself as being alive. We experience ourselves as living beings, as beings who have a certain sensory awareness or pathos. When we think, we experience our own living. For Henry this literally means that we sense ourselves breathing, moving, laughing, being anxious or in pain.21 Thought does not happen in a void, but is accompanied by sensory awareness. 423
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We need not go outside ourselves to find this life. Our awareness is not of something other to thought; rather our sensory awareness pertains to thinking or to the subject itself. When we experience pain, are embarrassed, happy or anxious, critical or bored, we cannot draw a distinction between the object of awareness and our awareness. These feelings or moods define our way of being. We have no control over them; rather we are subjected to them. To this extent they are immediate and passive. This is how I am given to myself. Henry calls this auto-affection. In the same way as I think, I am; I feel, I am; I fear, I am or I cry, I am; we are by virtue of the fact that we think, feel and have passions.22 In these affective states we feel ourselves; they manifest our very singularity. Pain is not simply pain but my pain, a pain that no-one can bear with me. It can only be understood from my first-person perspective. It is precisely our sensory awareness that singles us out. Only I sense myself moving, feeling, touching, laughing; and there need be no object for this experience to take place. This insight leads Henry to claim that there is an understanding of selfhood or egoity that precedes any alterity. The cogito needs no other to be itself; I sense, (therefore) I am. In Henrys view, Descartes thereby shows how the self manifests itself without leaving itself. It does not need to appeal to an object to know itself; it is an originary subjectivity which is truly in itself. Initially it is difficult to understand why Henry believes that he has avoided what he has called an ontological monism. Clearly sensory awareness is a bodily awareness. In this case the passages suggest the opposite, namely that a dualism is untenable because embodiment necessarily inheres in thought. Henry realizes as much, but this does not deter him from arguing that there is more than one type of manifestation or phenomenality. There is a type of manifestation that inheres in the subject and another that inheres in the world. He draws on Edmund Husserls distinction between the lived body (Leib) and an objective one (Krper) to articulate the difference.23 The lived body refers to our kinaesthetic sensory awareness.24 For example, our hand touching another hand which is distinct from the hand that is being touched. Our lived body refers to a life or sensing that is prior to and invisible to our bodies. It has its own form of manifestation. It is immediate and cannot be objectified. My sense of touching, breathing, of what it is like to experience fear or happiness or to taste something sour. This sensory awareness is quite distinct from the objective body, the object that is being touched, feared or tasted. Henry believes that the distinction allows him to claim that he can uphold a dualism: that of the lived body and the objective world. He draws on the passages cited above to illustrate what is at issue. There Descartes showed that I can doubt that the content of my awareness is real, but I cannot doubt my awareness. This sensory awareness points to what Henry calls a radical, acosmic and monadic interiority which is totally distinct from any worldly 424

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manifestation and hence distinct from the visibility of objects. This is his dualism. I feel, I am. Henry thinks that Descartes has thereby paved the way for what he calls a material phenomenology:25 the self is no longer understood as an empty vessel or highest point, but as infinitely rich and diverse. When we speak of the unity of the absolute life of the ego, we in no way wish to say that this life is monotonous; actually it is infinitely diverse, the ego is not a pure logical subject enclosed within its tautology; it is the very being of infinite life, which nevertheless remains one in this diversity.26 The self that feels pain is not identical to the self that is happy or the self that thinks abstract thoughts; rather the self is infinitely rich and diverse. There are two issues I should like to address. First, I am not at one with Henrys reading of Descartes. The passages Henry draws upon, if anything, only confirm rather than question Husserls claim that consciousness is intentional. Second, Henry believes that he can show that the life of the self is infinitely rich without having to appeal to other persons or, indeed, to the world. Yet, I wish to contend that Henry is wrong: As Husserl has shown convincingly, a life without others and the world is not only impoverished and bereft of meaning, but remains entirely indeterminate. The Other Descartes When we take a closer look at the passages Henry cites to underpin his position, I believe that they disclose something entirely different. Henry claims that they show that Descartess material phenomenology is distinct from traditional, Husserlian phenomenology insofar as Descartes returns to a subjectivity that is not marred by transcendence.27 Were this the case, Descartess position would clearly be contrary to that of Husserl, who claims that we can only understand the ego cogito with respect to its cogitatum. This claim in itself would reveal nothing new as Husserl has distanced himself from Descartes precisely for this very reason. We only need to recall the following passages from the Cartesian Meditations and the Paris Lectures: The expression ego cogito must be expanded [erweitert] by one term. Every cogito contains a meaning: its cogitatum, as that which it grasps in intentionality [als Vermeintes] the fundamental property of modes of consciousness, in which I live as my own self, is what is known as intentionality. Consciousness is always consciousness of something. (Husserl, 1964: pp. 1213) 425

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The transcendental heading, ego cogito, must therefore be broadened by adding one more member. Each cogito, each conscious process, we may also say, means something or other and bears in itself, in this manner peculiar to the meant, its particular cogitatum. (Husserl, 1960: Sec. 14, p. 33) However, in this critique Husserl does not have Henrys Descartes in mind but Descartes as he is traditionally understood, namely as affirming that the only thing that we can be certain of is that we are a thinking thing. Contrary to this, Husserl wishes to show that we cannot think without thinking of something. Thought is necessarily intentional. It is important to understand how Husserl arrives at this position. It may shed some light on why Henry was perhaps too ready to dismiss the claim that consciousness is necessarily intentional. Husserl argues that we can arrive at this insight by radicalizing Descartess method of doubt. For Descartes, doubt is a form of negation: it negates what we had previously affirmed. However, Husserl believes that doubt reveals that whatever cannot be seen clearly and distinctly cannot be judged: we can neither affirm nor deny its existence since we can see neither its existence nor its non-existence clearly and distinctly. This leads Husserl to argue that doubt should be a moment not of negation but of suspension of judgment. Husserl calls it epoche or bracketing.28 What should be bracketed or questioned is our capacity to judge, since we have no way of asserting or denying the existence of the object. However, what lies beyond doubt is that we see an object even though we do not know whether it actually exists. When we dream of the sea, or imagine what it must be like to walk on Mars, or, indeed, when we think about impossible objects like round squares, or objects which we clearly know do not exist, such as Pegasus, we still dream, imagine or think of something and not of nothing. This is precisely what Henry wishes to deny when he draws on Descartes. Indeed he seems to defend Descartess view that doubt is necessarily a form of negation. When Descartes says I certainly seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed (CSM II, 19), even though it may turn out to be false because I am asleep, Henry believes that what remains after the reduction (doubt) is the at certe videre videor yet I certainly seem to see (cf. Henry 1993: 42). The videor (it seems to me) remains valid and incontestable even when doubt disqualifies the videre and all the other forms of representations. Descartes, so Henry, holds that this vision, however fallacious it may be, at the very least exists29. This leads him to conclude that Descartes is justified in referring to thought as an immediate awareness of itself which excludes the exteriorisation of exteriority.30 In contemporary philosophy of mind this position would be called individualism or internalism: our thoughts do not depend on our relation to the physical or social environment.31 In other words, ones introspectively based judgments about ones mental states 426

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enjoy a range of epistemological privileges that judgments about nonmental reality or, indeed, the mental states of others do not enjoy. They are immune to error, we cannot doubt that we are doubting, but we can doubt the existence of others and the world. However, I believe that quite a different scenario comes to light. Unwittingly Henry draws on citations that in my view substantiate, if anything, rather than question Husserls articulation of the epoche . Henry admits that the passages on which he draws do not present the full picture of Descartes. The truth is that Descartes himself comes to understand the ego cogito as a representing self. As we move from the Second to the Third Meditation, the initial insights are lost. The cogito is dismembered; the first semblance of the videor (it seems to me) is suppressed in favour of the semblance of the videre and all other forms of representations. This leads Henry to conclude that in the final analysis Cartesian thought is no longer the soul and no longer life, but its opposite: it becomes the thought of the moderns, knowledge.32 Yet this thought of the moderns is precisely linked to the view that doubt is a form of negation leading to knowledge which Husserl comes to criticize. It is the stage where the cogito becomes the condition of the cogitatum. The cogito becomes the clear and distinct perception of what is known as the criterion of all possible truths.33 Yet, what is so intriguing about the passages of the First Meditation cited by Henry is that something quite different comes to light. They actually confirm Husserls contention that even if we have reasons to doubt an object, even if we come to realize that the object does not exist, we cannot deny that it, nonetheless, appears in our imagination and dreams. We still sense something and, indeed, have sensations. In my view precisely this proves Husserls insight that thought is intentional. This remains true even though the object of thought does not exist. When we dream, we dream about something; when we think about something impossible or when we imagine an object, our thought and imagination are still about something even when we know that the object we are thinking about does not exist. What cannot be doubted is that I was dreaming. My dreams are not empty: they are clearly about something. When Husserl says that there is no cogito without its cogitatum, he is not so nave as to assume that the cogitatum necessarily exists. In such a case we would not be able to differentiate between illusion and reality. However, the purpose of the reduction is to show that at this stage such an assumption is illegitimate. We can neither affirm nor deny the existence of the object of thought. All we can affirm with certainty is that our thought is necessarily about something even when the question of existence has been bracketed. This reflects exactly what Descartes is saying in the passages that Henry cites. There can be a sensing even if it turns out that there is no object that has caused these sensations in me. We nonetheless sense something. I am still feeling the heat of what turns out to be an imaginary flame; I am 427

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imagining an object; I am thinking of Pegasus. In each instance I am thinking about something despite the fact that I know that none of these objects exist. The passages above, if anything, indicate a proximity between Husserl and Descartes in so far as both realize that the cogito is not free from transcendence or intentionality even when we think about objects that do not exist.34 What cannot be questioned is the intentional structure of consciousness: thought is outside itself even when we are concerned with our affective states. Against Henrys Acosmism As I have said, one of Henrys aims is to show that the subject is not an empty shell, as Kant has come to conceive it, but infinitely rich. It does not simply accompany our representations, but has a life of its own. Yet I believe that Husserl shows convincingly that as long as the self is treated in isolation Henry calls it acosmic it remains nothing more than an empty shell. The ipseity of the self only becomes meaningful in the presence of the world and other selves. Without the other I have no sense of a self; indeed, I have no sense of what makes me distinct. In Husserls opinion, Henry would appear too hasty in attributing a selfhood to this affective awareness. As noted above, Husserl would be in agreement with Henry that experience is necessarily owned and that this ownership is felt and can be felt without ever being represented. The fact that it cannot be represented does not mean that it does not exist. However, Husserl holds that this alone is not sufficient to single out a notion of selfhood. Although Husserl constantly refers to a self, ego and, indeed, I, he comes to realize that he has not taken account of its manifestation. By simply attributing a life, existence and kinaesthesia to this unsubstitutable viewpoint, he has failed to mark out what is unique about our perspective or sense of mineness.35,36 It should be possible to specify criteria of singularity and identity of the self. My sense of mineness cannot emerge in isolation; it requires the presence of others. As Husserl points out: The I has its peculiar ownness in the thou and is only constituted in contrast to it (Husserl, 1973: p. 247). To recognize experience as mine, to apprehend itself as an I or self, the ego requires a thou. As long as the self is treated in abstraction from the world or any hetero-affection, there is nothing that can possibly single out my self from others. The indexical ascription only becomes meaningful in the presence of others and the world and is empty and meaningless without them. Husserl realizes that we cannot make sense of our perspective as a perspective if no other perspective is available. I only recognize that I have a particular point of view or take on the world when I realize that it refers to one of many possible points of view. For Husserl this has an important implication. It leads him to affirm the existence of an objective, i.e., intersubjective world. We only recognize the point of view of the other if it 428

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is a point of view of one and the same object. Were the other ego to perceive a world that is radically distinct from mine, I would never be able to draw a comparison between my perspective and that of the other; indeed, the other would simply fail to manifest herself as other.37 Talk about perspectives only makes sense when we refer to different points of access to one and the same object/world. In short, we recognize our take on the world to be perspectival only because we realize that there is a shared (intersubjective) world, i.e., that there are other points of view. As Husserl says in Cartesian Meditations: A priori, my ego, given to me apodictically the only thing I can posit in absolute apodicticity as existing can be a world-experiencing ego only by being in communion with others like himself: a member of a community of monads, which is given orientedly, starting from himself. I cannot conceive a plurality of monads otherwise than as explicitly or implicitly in communion. This involves being a plurality of monads that constitutes itself an Objective world. (Husserl, 1960: Sec. 60, p. 139) I can only experience the world by being in communion with others, and I only experience the alter ego if we share a common ground.38 In view of this, Husserl argues that I can only make sense of my perspective as a perspective if other viewpoints are available to me. Reference to mineness without a contrasting viewpoint is simply non-sensical. Husserl suggests as much in the following passage: The absolute I which in utterly unbroken constancy is prior to every existent and bears every existent within itself, which in its own concretion is prior to all concretions this absolute I bearing each and every conceivable existent within itself is the first ego of the reduction an ego that is wrongly so called, since for it an alter ego makes no sense. (Husserl, 1973: p. 586) Here Husserl makes clear that we cannot refer meaningfully to an ego if there is no alter ego. Without a thou we cannot truly refer to an I. Without reference to an alter ego, there is no objective world for the subject, and without world, there is no I.39 This, I believe, points to something important. If Henry does not wish to understand the self as an empty vessel but as infinitely rich, then he has to realize that this richness only manifests itself with reference to the world and others. Without the world and without others, the I remains indistinguishable and can only be called I by equivocation (Husserl, 1970: p. 185). Husserl compares the I without community with a dreamless 429

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sleep40 because it would be an I that could not function as an I. In many ways it would be truly mad (verrckt):41 it could not make sense of its viewpoint as a viewpoint. Henry can only refer to an acosmic interiority when he is able to justify the claim that it is radically distinct and indeed unsubstitutable from any other perspective. Yet, as I have shown via Husserl, we can only recognize our perspective as a perspective if another perspective is available to us. Hence, otherness is thus paramount to the ipseity of the self. It does not, as Henry believes, undermine our fundamental subjectivity; rather it allows for its manifestation. That is why without the world there is no subject. This analysis should demonstrate that Henry presents us with a false alternative. He believes that either the subject is alienated from itself and the subject turns out to be not anything but the objectivity of the object,42 or there is an acosmic interiority, a subjectivity which need not pass through the world. Yet Husserl shows convincingly that we need not opt for either alternative. The subject is not an empty shell, nor is it self-enclosed. Rather, the subject is necessarily bifurcated. This does not mean that it is alienated, but that it has a dual nature. It is something in itself namely a sensing bodily consciousness and, at the same time, it is necessarily outside itself toward the world, for without the world and others the self can be called a self only by equivocation. Trinity College Dublin, Ireland Abbreviations AT Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (eds) uvres de Descartes, new edition, 11 vols, Paris: CNRS and Vrin, 196476 (cited by volume, page and sometimes line number) John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (trans.) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 2 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19856 John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch and Anthony Kenny (trans.) The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. 3, The Correspondence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 Notes
1 Descartes: Letter to Mersenne, 25 May 1637. AT I, 376 (not included in the English translation), cited by Marion, 1999a: p. 131. 2 Henry, 1988: p. 147. 3 Henry, 1973: p. 74. 4 Henry, 1989: p. 154.

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5 It is worth noting Descartess response: When someone says I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist, he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind. This is clear from the fact that if he were deducing it by means of a syllogism, he would have to have had previous knowledge of the major premise: Everything which thinks is, or exists; yet in fact he learns it from experiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he should think without existing. It is in the nature of our mind to construct general propositions on the basis of our knowledge of particular ones (AT VII, 140/1; CSM II). 6 To follow Kant: The proposition I am simple must be regarded as an immediate expression of apperception, just as what is referred to as the Cartesian inference, cogito, ergo sum, is really a tautology, since the cogito (sum cogitans) asserts my immediate existence. I am simple means nothing more than that this representation, I, does not contain in itself the least manifoldness and that it is absolute (although merely logical) unity (Kant, 1933: A355). 7 Wittgenstein, 1981: pp. 11617, 5.633. A similar objection was already raised by Gassendi when he said: And why, do you think, does the eye, though incapable of seeing itself in itself, yet see itself in the mirror? (Objection Against the Meditations of Descartes, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes II, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 1623), cited by Henry, 1973: p. 376. Descartess response to this is discussed below. 8 Wittgenstein, 1981: 5.641. 9 Henry, 1988: p. 149. 10 J.-P. Sartre, 1979. 11 Wittgenstein, 1981: p. 27. 12 Strawson calls such a view a non-ownership theory (see Strawson, 1959: p. 106). It is ascribed to Nietzsche and Lichtenberg. 13 Henry, 1988: p. 148. 14 Cited in Henry, 1989: p. 152. 15 Henry, 1988: pp. 1523, my italics. 16 CSM I, 195; AT VII, 362. 17 For Descartes such a being is clearly a human being. He holds that God has no body and animals do not see as we do when we are aware that we see (CSMK 612; AT I, 413; II, 1420). They are like automata. They do not think or sense what they mechanically perceive. 18 Descartes explicitly states that a non-corporeal being (e.g. God) does not have sensory experience. See Principles I, 23 (CSM I, 200f.; AT VIII, 13). 19 The point is to show that imagination, sensation and will are intelligible only in a thinking thing (CSM I, 211; AT VIIIA, 25). 20 Henry (1975: 141). It is important to note that Henry does not wish to reinstantiate Descartess dualism of res cogitans and res extensa as such; rather he draws on Descartes to show what is unique about the subject, a uniqueness that precedes any worldly manifestation. 21 There is the knowing-how-to-move ones-hands, the knowing-how-to-move ones-lips, the knowing-how-to-move ones-eyes. Henry, 1989: p. 164. 22 We are only by virtue of the fact that we think (Principles: CSM I, 194; AT IX2, 28). 23 Although Henry draws on Husserl, he insists that he nonetheless departs from him. According to Henry, the problem is that Husserl seeks to account for the self-manifestation of the self by insisting that it has its own form of temporalization. This leads Henry to conclude that Husserl still regards the self as ecstatic,

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24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36

37

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bifurcated or mediated. Henry here adopts Derridas criticism of Husserl. Derrida understands this self-temporalization of the self as a loss of presence (Derrida, 1973). However, as I have shown elsewhere, Husserl widens the notion of presence rather than questioning whether the self can ever be truly present to itself. He thus equally argues that the self is fully present to itself. See Alweiss, (1999a, 1999b and 2003: Ch. 2). When Descartes refers to our sensory perception, he has various kinds of movements in mind (see CSM I, 280; AT VIIIA, 316). Henry, 1993: p. 45. Henry, 1975: p. 92. A phenomenological elucidation of Descartes gives the idea of phenomenology a radical meaning still unnoticed today (Henry, 1993: p. 40). See Held, 2000: pp. 43ff. Henry, 1993: p. 42. Ibid., p. 44. Tyler Burge claims that individualism is a theory of mind derive[d] from Descartes (1986: p. 117), more specifically Descartess First Meditation which reveals that the individuation of thoughts is unaffected by possible different environments (p. 122). Henry, 1993: p. 48. Ibid. For a detailed discussion of how we can make sense of non-existent objects see Alweiss, 2009. Although in Ideen I he constantly refers to the self, he acknowledges that he has not yet shown how he arrives at this notion of mineness (see Husserl, 1982: pp. 61, 85). Husserl does not merely wish to argue that we live in our experiences but, moreover, that all our experiences are unified by an Ego-pole which stands apart from the experiences. There is as Husserl put it famously a transcendence in immanence. This comes to light when we concern ourselves with recollection and acts of presentification. In such cases self-awareness is act-transcendent. I can remember my childhood and think of myself now and I can compare myself with the way I was when I was 13. I do not merely live in these experiences; rather I experience a fissure or gap. I experience myself both as remembering the past and experiencing my self sitting at home remembering the past. As Eduard Marbach has shown, it is only at these moments when the subject displaces itself from its present situation that the pure ego emerges. Yet this would imply (and indeed Marbach suggests as much) that experience is not necessarily egological but merely becomes so in such acts of self-division. Marbach believes that this has led Husserl to argue that only humans have a true sense of self precisely because they have the ability to make themselves present through acts of imagination, reflection and recollection (Marbach, 1974: Ch. 9). Husserl seems to anticipate Donald Davidson, who convincingly shows that radical perspectivism is incoherent. Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them; yet the existence of a common system belies the claim of dramatic incomparability (Davidson, 1984: p. 184. There is a fundamental asymmetry between the first-person and the secondperson perspective. They are asymmetrical not because we can never have access to another persons mental life but because I necessarily have a different viewpoint and thus type of access to that of another person. I can only see the others perspective from my point of view. I believe that Husserl would argue just like

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Wittgenstein that my thoughts are not hidden from [the other] but are open to him in a different way than they are to me (Wittgenstein, 1982: pp. 345). That is, the problem is not one of introspection but of points of view or types of access. I can never occupy an alter egos first-person perspective. As Wittgenstein would say, when you see the eye you see something going out from it. You see the look in the eye (Wittgenstein, 1967): Sec. 222). When I experience a persons perspective or ray of regard (Blickstrahl) I can only experience it from my perspective. I can draw analogies between my perspective and the perspective of the alter ego; however, this analogy is never complete, and I can never take over another persons perspective. The other is never really present but made present (Husserl, 1960: Sec. 51) from my perspective. There is no pure third persons perspective. Whatever is experienced as given necessarily involves a first-person perspective. Cited by Marbach, 1974: p. 330 from an unpublished manuscript: K IV 3, 57. Cited by Smith, 2008 and Zahavi, 2001: p. 112. Marbach, 1974: p. 331. Henry, 1993: p. 49.

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