1
Integrity Assessment Scheme for Situational
Awareness in Utility Automation Systems
Salman Mohagheghi, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Today’s more reliable communication technology,
together with the availability of higher computational power,
have paved the way for introduction of more advanced
automation systems based on distributed intelligence and multi-
agent technology. However, abundance of data, while making
these systems more powerful, can at the same time act as their
biggest vulnerability. In a web of interconnected devices and
components functioning within an automation framework,
potential impact of malfunction in a single device, either through
internal failure or external damage/intrusion, may lead to
detrimental side-effects spread across the whole underlying
system. The potentially large number of devices, along with their
inherent interrelations and interdependencies, may hinder the
ability of human operators to interpret events, identify their scope
of impact and take remedial actions if necessary. Through
utilization of the concepts of graph-theoretic fuzzy cognitive maps
(FCM) and expert systems, this paper puts forth a solution that is
able to reveal weak links and vulnerabilities of an automation
system, should it become exposed to partial internal failure or
external damage. A case study has been performed on the IEEE
34-bus test distribution system to show the efficiency of the
proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Automation system; event analysis; fuzzy
cognitive map; monitoring; situational awareness.
I. INTRODUCTION
M ODERN utility automation systems are equipped with
multitude of intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) –
sensors and actuators that can be remotely accessed, monitored
or controlled. These various components within the system
form an interrelated network of elements. From a layered
architecture standpoint, each device/application/sub-system
(hereafter referred to as element) provides data/services to
another group of elements, while receiving data/services from
some others. These elements are all prone to malfunction
(hereafter referred to as event), either internally due to natural
failures, or externally due to accidents or cyber-intrusion.
Naturally, in a web of interconnected elements, failure or
degradation of each one can affect the performance of those
utilizing its data, and ultimately impact the accuracy and
integrity of the underlying application.
For efficient operation of an automation system one has to
ensure that the impact of an element’s degradation or failure
on the rest of the system is identified as quickly as possible, so
the operator knows what part(s) of the system can continue
operating as is, what parts are conditionally operational and
S. Mohagheghi is with the Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Department, Colorado School of Mines, Golden, CO 80401 USA (phone:
303-273-3501; email: smohaghe@mines.edu)
what others cannot continue operating reliably, and should be
terminated. In small systems with few interdependent elements
this task is rather trivial. However, an increase in the number
of system elements or the dimensionality of interdependencies
among them can exponentially complicate matters. It should
come as no surprise that this is the situation facing most
automation systems today. Identifying how each failure may
affect each application is a task on the shoulders of the system
operator. Although experienced operators and/or automated
failsafe mechanisms exist that can handle individual
applications, a uniform solution that can collectively analyze
the aftermath and range of impact of an event does not exist.
This calls for a system-wide situational awareness that
provides knowledge of range and severity of the impact of any
event on the performance of the system.
In this paper, an intelligent scheme is proposed based on
graph-theoretic fuzzy cognitive maps (FCM) that, in the event
of internal or external failures and degradations in one or more
elements in the system, is able to identify the weak links and
indicate what applications have been affected by the event
most. The proposed scheme has been designed based on a
combination of heuristic rules governing the FCM graph itself
as well as unsupervised learning algorithms. Relying too much
on expert knowledge for forming the graph makes the FCM
biased and problem-dependent. In order to avoid this, the main
objective in this paper has been to make the solution scalable
and feasible to implement with the least amount of interaction
with human experts.
II. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IN POWER SYSTEMS – STATE OF
THE ART
Situational awareness in a system may relate to different
aspects such as spatial, mission, system, resource or crew
awareness [1]. Whenever the system needs to process and
interpret a large number of data points, situational awareness
becomes more vital. In fact, solutions have been reported in
the literature for a wide range of space, military and
emergency response applications [2]-[7]. In power systems,
the size and complexity of the grid poses its own unique
challenges. While during normal conditions, operators may
show relatively high situational awareness, their awareness
level drops following disturbance onset [8], which is when
responsiveness and effective decision making is needed most.
This has been attributed to elements such as attention
narrowing, memory trap, workload fatigue, misplaced visual
features, data overload and complexity creep [9].
Traditionally, the notion of situational awareness in the

power system has tied in closely with the concept of state
estimation (SE). Using the measurements available from
across the power system, SE algorithm tries to find the set of
system states (voltages at various nodes) that statistically fits
this set of measurements best [10], [11]. In order to complete
the picture of the system operating condition, extensive
research was conducted on estimating the topology of the
network through identification of topology errors [12]-[14]
and modeling zero-impedance branches and circuit breakers
[15], [16]. This led to the introduction of the concept of
generalized state estimation in 1998 [17] that presented a
unified solution for state estimation using both network analog
measurements and system topology data. While the problem of
state estimation has traditionally been formulated as a
centralized problem, recently, research has been conducted on
developing distributed state estimation solutions suitable for
multi-area power systems, for instance in [18]-[21].
In conjunction with SE techniques, situational awareness
solutions have also been developed making use of alarms and
signals. As technology advanced, more devices became
equipped with alarms that could indicate their statuses.
However, even the simplest failures could lead to tens to
hundreds of alarms brought to the attention of the system
operator [22], which echoed the need to convert this raw data
to easily-interpretable information for the human operator. The
early approaches for this purpose were in the form of
organizing and prioritizing alarm messages [23]. Some authors
suggested techniques for filtering mechanisms, priority and
grouping schemes as well as message routing procedures [24],
which was later improved by using Boolean algorithmic and
rule-based expert system techniques [25], [26]. However, these
modified approaches were still difficult to implement for large
systems, and lacked adaptability and flexibility. The trend
therefore took a turn towards more powerful intelligent
techniques such as neural networks [25], [27], fuzzy systems
[28]-[31], neuro-fuzzy systems [32], genetic algorithm [33]
and Tabu search [34] among others.
In parallel to these efforts, many researchers have focused
on developing awareness solutions by improving system
observability; for example, by adopting additional wide-area
measurements available from Phasor Measurement Units
(PMU) [35], [36], which can then be used for disturbance
event detection and analysis [37]-[40]. Also, in an attempt to
assist the system operators with taking preventive and/or
corrective control actions in response to power system
contingencies, some researchers have proposed power grid
dynamic security assessment tools through utilization of data
mining techniques [41], pattern discovery methods [42] or
decision trees [43]. In a different approach, intelligent
waveform analysis techniques have been developed to predict
and diagnose faults at the distribution system [44]. Also,
decision support systems and data visualization tools have
been proposed to assist system operators with emergency
situations [45]-[49].
With the advent and large-scale deployment of advanced
2
sensors, the focal point of some researchers shifted towards
developing methodologies for sensor data fusion, sensor data
interpretation and knowledge extraction, and linking them to
operator situational awareness [50]-[55].
Although many of the solutions proposed in the literature
succeed in providing situational awareness and vigilance for
the system operator, some aspects are missing and require
more research: (a) many of these techniques assist the operator
in narrowing down and interpreting events, but are unable to
provide information on the breadth (range of impact) and
depth (how severely other system components are affected) of
the event, (b) event detection and identification is the first step
in awareness, but post-event mitigation requires a measure of
“trustworthiness” of the rest of the system, (c) many of the
methodologies proposed in the literature are application-
specific, while solutions are needed that are general and
scalable, and (d) most approaches for sensor data integration
and fusion treat the data points at the same level of
importance, whereas in power systems different data from
different devices may have dissimilar importance for the
overall performance of the system or underlying application.
III. FUZZY COGNITIVE MAPS FOR CAUSAL RELATION
ASSESSMENT
A. Basic Idea
Political scientist Robert Axelrod introduced cognitive maps
in the 1970s for representing social scientific knowledge [56].
These were signed directional graphs (digraphs) where a
positive link from vertex j to vertex i would indicate that j
causally increases i, whereas a negative link would mean that
should j happen, the chances of i happening are reduced (Fig.
1). In this context, the indirect effect of j on i over a path Pk is
negative if the number of negative signs (of the edges of Pk) is
odd, and positive otherwise. The total effect of j on i would
then be negative if all the indirect effects are negative, positive
if all indirect effects are positive, and indeterminate otherwise
[57]. It is safe to assume that in most real-world applications
beyond a trivial level of complexity, the indeterminate case
happens more frequently. To solve this problem, Kosko [57]
introduced fuzzy cognitive maps which allowed for more
efficient usage of expert knowledge and logical reasoning in
defining the causalities between different use cases. He
defined the impact of vertices on one another based on the
concepts of general fuzzy minimum and maximum operators
(or the t-norm and t-conorm operators [58]). Later versions of
FCM used algebraic equations to determine the value of each
vertex based on the influence of the interconnected vertices
[59]. This way, the state (value) xi of vertex ei at any point in
time is defined as (Fig. 1):
n
u i (t ) = ∑ w x (t ) ⇒ x (t + 1) = f (u (t )) ,
j =1, ≠i
ij j i i (1)
where ui represents the excitation level of vertex i, and f is the
threshold function defined, common choices being sigmoid or
hyperbolic tangent.

Fig. 1. Schematic diagram of FCM with generic vertices and edges.
In matrix form, the state vector X of the FCM can be
expressed as:
X(t + 1) = f [W × X(t)], (2)
where W is the weight matrix. This way, the indirect effect of j
on i over a path Pk can be derived as:
wij , Pk = f [L f [ w j 2 , j1 ⋅ ( f [ w j1, j ⋅ x j ])]L] , (3)
where j1, j2,... are the intermediate vertices on path Pk
connecting j to i. The summation of these indirect effect values
would then indicate the total (causal) effect of j on i.
In a prior work, the author developed fuzzy cognitive maps
to model and analyze the interdependencies of complicated
networks and assess the impact of non-idealities in data quality
or component health on the overall performance of the system
[60], [61]. However, the maps were built manually based on
expert knowledge, and as it was shown in [60], even for a
simple system, the resultant FCM could become rather
complex, which makes its manual derivation less feasible.
B. Developing FCM – Challenges and Opportunities
The first step for developing the FCM is to determine the
number of vertices (elements) and the direction/sign of the
links between them. This can be achieved from questionnaires,
from data that shows causal relationships, and/or through
direct interviews with experts [62], [63]. However, even when
the general structure of the FCM is developed, the challenge
remains as of how to assign weights to the edges.
Traditionally, this has been done through expert knowledge;
although, the approach would be clearly subjective. Some have
proposed that if the weight matrix is provided by m experts,
the overall matrix can be achieved by combining them together
as a weighted sum [63]:
m systems, the following definitions have been adopted for
W = ∑ ckWk ,
k =1
where ck is the credibility weight of expert k. Others have
suggested the concept of “neighborhood of weights” in order
to measure the agreement between the weights proposed by
different experts [59], or assigning weights based on majority
vote among experts [64].
However, it is clear that, to avoid having a biased FCM, the
process of assigning weights to the edges needs to become at
least partly automated. For this purpose, and to indicate the
importance level of the vertices in a cognitive map, some
researchers have used the notions of in-degree and out-degree
3
of a vertex [65], the centrality (total degree) of the vertices
[57], or concepts such as the key vertex [66] and the closeness
(similarity) of relations between the states of two vertices i and
j [63]. Alternatively, some other researchers have focused on
methodologies for training the FCM, and updating its weights
[67]. These training methods are either based on supervised
learning (that assumes the desired output and error signals are
available and can be used for the purpose of training), or the
unsupervised learning that is rooted in the modified Hebbian
learning approach first proposed by Oja [68].
IV. PROPOSED METHODOLOGY FOR FCM DESIGN
The methodology proposed in this paper recognizes the fact
that (a) comprehensive system integrity data related to past
incidents may not always be available, (b) even if available,
this data is not necessarily quantified and is likely to be
qualitative, (c) it is easy for human experts to identify local
interrelations and interdependencies, but for large systems, a
manual global system-wide analysis is difficult, if not
impractical, and (d) in practice, an expert might be very
knowledgeable in certain parts of the FCM, but not necessarily
in all parts.
Accordingly, the approach put forth in this paper seeks a
solution in between. The FCM is first formed based on the
flow of communication data/services that exist between
different elements. The weights are then developed in a semi-
automated fashion through three steps: (1) using an expert
system to determine the initial weights of the edges based on
the short range (1-step ahead) impacts of elements, (2)
adjusting the initial weights using the centrality of the vertices,
and (3) further tuning the weights using the historical data and
an unsupervised Hebbian learning algorithm.
A. Weight Initialization using Expert Knowledge
In the first step, knowledge from human experts (modeled as
an expert system) is used to determine the initial weights. The
weights derived this way would be short-sighted, i.e., the
impact of each element on the very next one can be quantified
relatively accurately, but the precision declines as the depth of
impact of the element increases. In other words, the expert
knowledge would view the local (1-step ahead) impacts but
fails to accurately portray the global system-wide impact of
elements. For this purpose, and in the context of automation
(4) critical, semi-critical and noncritical relations between vertices
(Table I). Without the loss of generality, weights 1.0, 0.7 and
0.3 have been chosen to indicate critical, semi-critical and
non-critical edges respectively. The reader should note how
the definition proposed here is purely local, with no system-
wide information in mind.
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF EDGE RELATIONS A → B
Criticality
Definition
Classification
Critical (high) If A fails B will fail
Semi-critical If A fails B can continue operation, but its accuracy

(medium) will be compromised
Noncritical If A fails B can continue operation safely and reliably
(low) using the data/services from other vertices
Although not adopted in this paper, it is possible to
automatically assign criticality levels to different vertices
based on their functionalities within the automated system. For
instance, within the context of utility automation systems, one
can group vertices as highly critical action nodes (providing
actuation services, e.g., relays, switch controllers), critical
measurement nodes (providing metering services to be used by
action nodes, e.g., current/voltage meters used by a relay or
breaker), and non-critical measurement nodes (providing
metering services to be used by non-action nodes), etc. This
would avoid the manual derivation of weights as indicated in
Table I.
B. Weight Adjustment based on Centrality of Vertices
Centrality of a vertex indicates how connected it is to the
rest of the graph. This could be used as a measure of
importance, since it shows the number of elements that are
related to this vertex. Centrality C of a vertex is defined based
on the notions of its in-degree and out-degree. For a vertex ei
[65]:
n n
od (ei ) = ∑ | w ji |, id (ei ) = ∑ | wij |
j =1 j =1
C(ei ) = od (ei ) + id (ei ) (6)
However, in this paper in order to decouple the human
expert based weight derivation in the previous step (which can
be subjective) from weight modification in the current step, the
notion of abstract centrality is defined and used instead. Here,
the importance (centrality) of vertices will be derived based on
abstract in-degree and out-degree as proposed in (7):
aod(ei ) = ∑ h( wsi ), aid(ei ) = ∑ h( wis )
s , s ≠i s , s ≠i
0 u = 0 (7)
where h(u ) = 
1 u ≠ 0
∗
C (ei ) = aod(ei ) + aid(ei ) (8)
The previously derived weights will therefore be adjusted
based on the abstract centrality C*(ei) of each vertex ei, in such
a way that outgoing edges from vertices with high centralities
will be further strengthened:
w*ji = w ji (1 + β ⋅ Ĉ(ei )) (9)
where β is a learning rate parameter (heuristically chosen to be
0.50) and Ĉ represents the normalized abstract centrality based
on the min and max values of all abstract centralities:
∀i ∈ {1, K , n} : C∗ (ei ) ∈ [C min , Cmax ]
µ (Cmin ) = 0 C∗ (ei ) − Cmin
⇒ ⇒ Ĉ(ei ) =
 µ (C max ) = 1 Cmax − C min
C. Weight Adjustment based on Unsupervised Learning
A simplified Hebbian learning approach will then be used to
update the previously adjusted weights. For this purpose, the
state of each element must be defined, which for example can
4
be the data integrity, confidence level, or data quality of the
element. The state can be quantified by transforming a
linguistic term set to numeric values. The weights can then be
modified as:
∆wij = η ⋅ xi ⋅ ( x j − wij xi ) , (11)
where η is a learning rate parameter heuristically chosen to be
0.05 in this paper. Equation (11) indicates that the
interrelations between elements that vary in the same direction
will be reinforced, whereas that of elements moving in
opposite direction will be weakened. The training data for this
part can be obtained from expert knowledge, and need not be
detailed. Rather, it can be derived from the basic operational
interdependencies of the system, as the algorithm only works
based on causation, and not its degree. In most connectionist
learning systems, selecting the right value for the learning rate
parameter is not straightforward and hence often times the
parameter is chosen based on trial and error. Here, the learning
rate parameter is selected in such a way that the changes in the
weight values are limited to ±25% of their original values. The
overall objective is to avoid drastic changes (and hence
possible instability) in the weight values as a result of a sudden
large input.
For more details, the reader is referred to section V.C.
(5)
These weight values will be calculated for all edges, to be then
normalized:
∀i, j ∈ {1, K , n} : wij ∈ [ wmin , wmax ]
µ ( wmin ) = 0 wij − wmin (12)
⇒ ⇒ wˆ ij =
 µ ( wmax ) = 1 wmax − wmin
V. CASE STUDY
A. System Description
The system studied in this paper is a modified version of the
IEEE 34-bus test distribution system [69]. Without the loss of
generality, the system has been expanded by adding fixed and
switched capacitors, reclosing switches, Distributed
Generation (DG) units, On-Load Tap Changer (OLTC) with
Line Drop Compensation (LDC), and various metering IEDs
across the feeder and the laterals (Fig. 2). Also, without the
loss of generality, it is assumed that the system under study is
equipped with an advanced distribution automation (DA)
system that consists of different functions for Conservation
Voltage Reduction (CVR), Voltage and Var Control (VVC),
Electric Service Restoration (RES), and DG Dispatch (Fig. 3).
As explained before, these functions share data points from
different devices, making them interrelated (albeit to different
degrees):
(10) • CVR: This function receives voltages from end-of-lateral
meters (V6 and V7 in this example) and based on the
current through the OLTC I1 and the substation voltage V1
regulates the LDC settings so that no voltage across the
system drops below ANSI low. The function also receives
the relevant data from VVC.
• VVC: This function controls the settings of the tap

changers T2, T3 and switched capacitors CS1, CS2 in order
to minimize the losses. The capacitor switches are
equipped with Point-on-Wave switching scheme. The
function consults the network configuration, itself being
updated based on the statuses of the reclosing switches
among other things.
• RES: This function manages the reclosing switches R1, R2
and R3 across the system in the event of a disturbance. For
proper performance, the function is updated based on the
output of the DG units DG1 and DG2, and the power flow
meters at certain locations of the feeder, i.e., I1, I2, I3 and
I4 in this example.
• DG Dispatch: This function regulates and manages the
power generated by the DG units DG1 and DG2 based on
economic and environmental considerations, as well as
requirements from the RES function.
Fig. 2. Modified 34-bus test distribution system.
It can be seen that even this simple example portrays
various levels of interdependencies between different DA
applications, to an extent that they make visual assessment of
system integrity very difficult, if not impractical.
5
Fig. 3. Schematic diagram of the control and communication flow of the
example distribution automation system in Fig. 2. The arrows show the
directions in which data is exchanged.
B. Initial FCM Structure
The initial structure of the FCM for the system in Fig. 2
with control functions denoted in Fig. 3 has been developed
based on the presumed interrelations (flow of data and
communication services) between different components and
modules (Fig. 4). The arrows shown in the diagram denote the
direction of impact/dependence; in other words, A → B
indicates that action of A has an impact on B, or state of B is
affected by the action/state of A. Each element in the FCM is
assumed to have a linguistic state space of {failed (not
trustable), questionable, low confidence, not verified, healthy},
which without the loss of generality has been quantified as
{1.0, 0.7, 0.4, 0.2, 0.0}. The choice of numbers might sound
counter-intuitive to the reader, but it is necessary here, since
the proposed FCM models the chain of “failures” in
components.
C. FCM Training
1) FCM Weight Initialization
The weights of the FCM are first initialized based on the
logic in Table I. Expert knowledge is used to determine the
local interdependencies.
2) Weight Adjustment based on Vertex Centrality
The weights are then adjusted based on the abstract
centrality of the vertices according to (9).
3) Unsupervised Learning
The unsupervised learning stage of the FCM is then
performed based on the historical data available on the
integrity of the underlying system. Past events that have led to
complete or partial failure of one or more components in the
system can be retrieved from historical data, and be used to
update a subset of weights according to (11). For the sake of
this case study, and without the loss of generality, it has been
assumed here that the following scenarios have happened to
the system in the past:
• Event 1: R1 status read failure (questionable status) –
system model has partially failed, as a result VVC has
failed partially (reverted to manual mode), and RES stops

working until the status of R1 can be verified.
• Event 2: meter V1 fails – LDC and as a result OLTC
change to “questionable” mode (still using I1), while due
to the less critical dependence on V1, VVC changes to
“not verified” mode.
• Event 3: VVC module fails – CVR changes state to
“questionable” mode.
• Event 4: DG2 loses communication – DG dispatch goes to
“failed” mode, while VVC and RES modules change state
to “not verified” and “questionable” modes respectively.
The states of the affected vertices in the above chain of
events are determined based on the linguistic term-set defined
above and the corresponding weights are adjusted according to
(11). Obviously, an increase in the number of available past
events can add to the granularity of the weight adjustment. The
four events used in this case study are used for demonstration
purposes only.
Figure 5 illustrates the final FCM. It should be noted that
the weights are developed based on the impact of the
corresponding vertices on the overall performance of the
system, and not just those connected locally with them.
Fig. 4. Initial FCM developed for system in Fig. 2. Abbreviations: TCC – tap
changer controller, CF – fixed capacitor, CS – switched capacitor, SW –
capacitor switch, POV – point on voltage waveform. It is assumed that the
DG sends all the relevant information to the control center, such as output
active and reactive power, terminal voltage, injected current, and connection
status. The relationship between reclosers R and function RES is in the form
of “send recloser status” and “receive control command”. TCC ensures that
the upper or lower tap positions for each tap changer are not violated. In a
more detailed view (not adopted here), TCC may also send updates to the
VVC function.
6
D. Test Cases
A few examples have been provided in this section to
indicate the effectiveness of the proposed methodology. For all
use cases, matrix W is developed based on the weights
denoted in Fig. 5. Simulations have been performed in Matlab
environment. The system starts from healthy state (all zeros)
except for the vertices that are considered to experience lack
of data integrity. The state update equation (2) is repeated in a
loop until the impact of the unhealthy vertices propagates
across the whole system, i.e., the loop is iterated as many
number of times as the length of the longest path originated
from the unhealthy vertex.
1) Case Study 1: Impact of Failures on Major Functions
The following case studies have been analyzed:
• Non-Verified Voltage Measurement V1 – voltage meter
V1 at the distribution substation indicates a value that has
not been updated (not verified).
• Questionable Recloser Status R1 – the status of recloser
R1 is indicated to have a questionable data quality as it
has been oscillatory with relatively fast changes.
• Outdated Tap Position T2 – the tap position of T2
indicates that the upper threshold is reached, which does
not match the expected operation based on engineering
judgment (low confidence).
• Failed Switch SW1 – the switch responsible for
controlling capacitor CS1 is failed due to having stuck
blades.
Table II shows the impact of each case study on some of the
main applications within the Distribution Management System
(DMS). The state of each application indicates where it lies in
the range of healthy (0) to failure (1). It should be noted that
the interpretation of values between 0 and 1 would be
subjective; nonetheless, it would provide a qualitative measure
of integrity for the application of interest.
TABLE II
IMPACT OF CASE STUDIES ON MAJOR DMS APPLICATIONS
DG
Case Study VVC RES Model CVR
Dispatch
V1 not verified 0.29 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.16
R1 questionable 0.48 0.59 1.00 1.00 0.20
T2 low confidence 0.47 0.17 0.14 0.19 0.20
SW1 failed 0.76 0.14 0.05 0.11 0.19
It can be seen that while some of the conclusions provided
in Table II are easy to draw based on expert knowledge (e.g.,
RES would fail if R1 is questionable), others are not easy to
infer from the map of interrelations. This is an added value
that the proposed FCM-based solution provides. The outcome
of the FCM can be validated either based on expert knowledge
or by referring to the events listed in section V.C.3.
2) Case Study 2: Range of Impact of a Failure
One of the applications of the proposed scheme in providing
situational awareness for the system operator lies in its ability
in identifying the range of impact of a failure in the underlying
system. To conceptually illustrate this, it is assumed in this
case study that switch SW1 has failed. Fig. 5 shows the range

of impact of the failure. It can be seen that the proposed FCM-
based solution assists the human operator in detecting what
functions/components have been affected by the failure and to
what extent. For example, this case study indicates that as a
result of failure in SW1, operation of VVC cannot be trusted,
which in turn causes the information provided at the HMI to
have low confidence or to be questionable.
Fig. 5. Final FCM developed for system in Fig. 2. Color-coded vertices are
associated with case study 2.
VI. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Scope and Implementation
The proposed algorithm can be utilized for both system-
wide analysis, or a partial (local) study. The only practical
limitation to the scope of the application would be posed by
how broad of an FCM model has been developed for the
underlying system. Moreover, the proposed scheme can be
adopted for analyzing different types of failures (external or
internal). For example, upon availability of the relevant status
data, the system can be used to monitor health-related, data-
integrity related or cyber-intrusion related failures.
In practice, the proposed system would receive data points
on the health and data quality of the devices out in the field.
This can be easily achieved through information models
provided in utility automation protocols such as IEC 61850
and DNP3. Ideally, it could also receive reliability related
information/indices associated with various DMS application
7
software indicating the confidence levels of the modules. This
combined information can then be utilized by the proposed
situational awareness system in order to provide system
integrity information to the operator. This can be updated on a
continuous basis, or as new status information arrives. Figure 6
conceptually illustrates one possible realization of the
proposed system at a utility control center.
Fig. 6. Conceptual implementation of the proposed system at the utility
control center.
B. Performance Overhead
Once the FCM is developed, the computational overhead of
the proposed system on the DMS platform is minimal. In fact,
one of the advantages of the FCM-based solutions lies in their
inherent computational simplicity (governed by equation (2)),
that leads to almost instantaneous response time. The need for
more elaborate computational effort arises only when a
structural change occurs in the underlying distribution system
(e.g., addition or removal of a device, component or
subsystem). Here, steps A–C in section IV need to be repeated
in order to modify/update the FCM structure (see section
VI.F). With today’s technological advances in computational
power, no challenges are foreseen as far as CPU or memory
overload are concerned. Moreover, in most cases, addition or
removal of a module will only partially affect the FCM and
does not alter the whole configuration. Even then, such
changes are often infrequent.
Although the proposed solution would depend on the

existence of a communication infrastructure to transmit status
and other data from the field devices back to the control room,
it would not need any mechanism in addition to the
information already polled from the field devices for
monitoring purposes. In fact, most communication protocols
used in modern automation systems allow for health and
quality data to be transmitted to the utility on a regular basis or
in a report-by-exception (RBE) fashion, for example the IEC
61850 standard [70].
C. Use of Expert Knowledge for Initialization
Initialization of the FCM (deriving the structure and initial
weights) requires access to expert knowledge. This should not
be viewed as weakening the automated nature of the solution
because (a) expert knowledge is used in terms of local (1-step
ahead) relationships and impacts between components, which
is for the most part reliable and non-subjective, and (b) in the
lack of comprehensive training data, this would provide a
reliable initial structure to be modified at later stages.
Therefore, use of expert knowledge would be limited to
deriving local relationships only, whereas global relationships
and fine-tuning of the weights would be achieved using rules
of connectionist learning systems. This would lessen the
weight of limited-scope and perhaps subjective expert
knowledge in favor of mathematically proven learning
approaches.
Ideally, if a wealth of training data was available covering
all possible aspects of interrelations between multiple
components in an interconnected system, then moving to a
fully-automated solution (independent of expert knowledge)
could have been a possibility. But this is not a realistic
assumption, since in real-life systems it might take many years
before one can collect a reasonable amount of historical data
for training purposes. Even then, this data is likely to be far
from comprehensive and inclusive.
D. Validation
Validation of the FCM output can be done using the
historical data. Like many techniques for training connectionist
learning systems, the available historical training data can be
divided into independent training and testing batches to
evaluate the performance of the developed network.
E. Scalability
The scalability introduced by the proposed method lies in
the fact that (a) it takes a locally developed solution based on
expert knowledge and turns it into a global system-wide
solution, and (b) it allows for incorporating mathematical
relationships for training the network where expert knowledge
may be unavailable or lacking.
In theory, there is no practical limit for the size of the
system to be modeled. However, in extreme cases and for a
better white-box approach, it is possible to develop a
hierarchical FCM where each vertex could in principle
represent another FCM at the lower level. An example was
proposed by Zhang et al. [71] where –based on equivalence
8
relation– the set of vertices were partitioned into blocks, each
block containing a section of the original FCM (referred to as
sectional FCM). This way, the authors decomposed the
original FCM (which could be a very large system) into one
quotient FCM and multiple sectional FCMs. Quotient FCM
will provide global information about the original FCM, but
will not contain local information about interactions between
all the vertices. That information will be included in the
sectional FCMs. The same concepts proposed here for
developing the FCM can be applied first to the upper layer
model, and then to the individual lower layer ones.
F. Adaptability
Two scenarios may occur in the system that could call for
adaptation of the FCM: need for change in the FCM structure,
or need for change in the weights of the edges.
1) Structural Changes to the FCM
Upon topological changes to the power system (added or
removed components or control/monitoring devices) it might
be necessary to revisit the structure of the FCM. Removal of
devices/components could be modeled in an automated way,
by removing the corresponding entries of vector X and the
associated rows/columns of matrix W. Addition of new
components (vertices) or relationships (edges) could be
addressed by manually modifying the FCM structure, and then
undergoing the training stage in section IV. A new component
would introduce a new row and column to W, whereas a new
relationship would change a previously zero entry in W to a
non-zero one.
2) Changes to the FCM Weights
Upon availability of additional training data from the past
historical events in the automation system, the unsupervised
learning stage (section IV.C) can be automatically repeated to
adjust the weights of the edges accordingly.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
A typical automation system can consist of multitude of
interrelated and interdependent components and modules.
Providing situational awareness and assessing the integrity of
such a system is not a trivial task. What makes this even more
challenging is the increasing trend towards incorporating more
intelligent sensors and actuators in modern automation
systems. With the goal of platform-independence and
scalability, a solution was proposed in this paper for situational
awareness of interconnected automation systems based on the
graph-theoretic concept of fuzzy cognitive maps. A
combination of unsupervised learning and heuristics was
proposed to make the solution as little subjective and expert-
dependent as possible. A case study was presented based on a
modified version of the IEEE 34-bus test distribution system
that indicated the efficiency of the proposed method.
REFERENCES
[1] R.W. Pew, “The State of Situation Awareness Measurement: Circa
1995,” in Proc. Intl. Conf. on Experimental Analysis and Measurement
of Situation Awareness, Daytona Beach, FL, USA, Nov. 1995, pp. 7-16.

[2] M. Ulieru, P. Relf and M. Matson, “ARM – Adaptive Risk Management
Platform for Emergency Response Operations,” in Proc. Annual Conf.
on Industrial Electronics, Paris, France, Nov. 2006, pp. 3709-3714.
[3] K. Adams, A. Wassell, M.G. Ceruti, E. Castro, S.F. Lehan and J.W.
Mitchell, “Emergency- Management Situational Awareness Prototype
(EMSAP),” in Proc. IEEE Intl. Multi-Disciplinary Conf. on Cognitive
Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision Support, Miami Beach,
FL, USA, Feb. 2011, pp. 110-114.
[4] F. Maymí, M. Rodríguez-Martínez, Y. Qian and P.C. Manz, “Ancile:
Pervasively Shared Situational Awareness,” IEEE Internet Computing,
pp. 48-50, Jan./Feb. 2008.
[5] R. Dearden, T. Willeke, F. Hutter, R. Simmons, V. Verma and S. Thrun,
“Real-Time Fault Detection and Situational Awareness for Rovers:
Report on the Mars Technology Program Task,” in Proc. IEEE
Aerospace Conference, Mar. 2004, pp. 826-840.
[6] T.M. Carrico and B. Chin, “Agent-Based Situational Reasoning for In-
theater Distribution,” in Proc. IEEE Military Communications
Conference, Washington, DC, USA, Oct. 2006.
[7] F. Hinchion, P. Mulgaonkar, D. Wilkins and S. Galuga, “Peer to Peer
Information Management for Tactical Situation Awareness Systems,” in
Proc. IEEE Military Communications Conf., Oct. 2003, pp. 179-185.
[8] B.P. Hallbert, “Situation Awareness and Operator Performance: Results
from Simulater-Based Studies,” in Proc. IEEE Annual Human Factors
Meeting, Orlando, FL, USA, Jun. 1997.
[9] M.R. Endsley and E.S. Connors, “Situation Awareness: State of the
Art,” in Proc. IEEE PES GM, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, Jul. 2008.
[10] A. Monticelli, “Electric Power System State Estimation,” Proceedings
of the IEEE, vol. 88, no. 2, pp. 262-282, Feb. 2000.
[11] A. Abur and A.G. Exposito, Power System State Estimation – Theory
and Implementation, New York, NY: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 2004.
[12] F.F. Wu and W.H.E. Liu, “Detection of Topology Errors by State
Estimation,” IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 4, no 1, pp. 176-183,
Feb. 1989.
[13] I.S. Costa and J.A. Leao, “Identification of Topology Errors in Power
System State Estimation,” IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 8, no 4, pp.
1531-1538, Nov. 1993.
[14] H. Singh and F.L. Alvarado, “Network Topology Determination Using
Least Absolute Value State Estimation,” IEEE Trans. Power Systems,
vol. 10, no 3, pp. 1159-1165, Aug. 1995.
[15] A. Monticelli and A. Garcia, “Modeling Zero Impedance Branches in
Power System State Estimation,” IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 6, no
4, pp. 1561-1570, Nov. 1991.
[16] A. Monticelli, “Modeling Circuit Breakers in Weighted Least Squares
State Estimation,” IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 8, no 3, pp. 1143-
1149, Aug. 1993.
[17] O. Alsac, N. Vempati, B. Stott and A. Monticelli, “Generalized State
Estimation,” IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 13, no 3, pp. 1069-1075,
Aug. 1998.
[18] Z. Liang and A. Abur, “Multi Area State Estimation Using
Synchronized Phasor Measurements,” IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol.
20, no 2, pp. 611-617, May 2005.
[19] M.M. Nordman and M. Lehtonen, “Distributed Agent-Based State
Estimation for Electrical Distribution Networks,” IEEE Trans. Power
Systems, vol. 20, no 2, pp. 652-658, May 2005.
[20] Y. Li, X. Zhou and J. Zhou, “A New Algorithm for Distributed Power
System State Estimation based on PMUs,” in Proc. Intl. Conf. on Power
System Technology (PowerCon), Oct. 2006.
[21] A.P. Sakis Meliopoulos, G.J. Cokkinides, F. Galvan, B. Fardanesh and
P. Myrda, “Delivering Accurate and Timely Data to All,” IEEE Power
and Energy Magazine, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 74-86, May/Jun. 2007.
[22] D. Droucher, “Langage: An Expert System for Alarm Processing”,
presented at the 11th Biennial IEEE Workshop on Power Systems
Control Centers, Montréal, BC, Canada, Sept. 1990.
[23] D.S. Kirschen and B. Woolenberg, “Intelligent Alarm Processing in
Power Systems”, Proc. IEEE, vol. 80, no. 5, pp. 663-672, May 1992.
[24] H. Amelink, A.M. Forte and R.P. Guberman, “Dispatcher Alarm and
Message Processing”, IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. PWRS-1, pp.
188-194, Aug. 1986.
[25] E.H.P. Chan, “Application of Neural Network Computing in Intelligent
Alarm Processing”, in Proc. Power Industry Computer Application
Conference, San Jose, CA, USA, May 1989, pp. 246-251.
9
[26] C.A. Protopepes, K.P. Psaltiras and A.V. Machias, “An Expert System
for Substation Fault Diagnosis and Alarm Processing”, IEEE Trans.
Power Delivery, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 648-655, Apr. 1991.
[27] R. Khosla and T. Dillon, “Learning Knowledge and Strategy of a Neuro-
Expert System Architecture in Alarm Processing”, IEEE Transactions
on Power Systems, vol.12, no. 4, pp. 1610-1618, Nov. 1997.
[28] S.S. Choi, K.S. Kang, H.G. Kim and S.H. Chang, “Development of an
On-Line Fuzzy Expert System for Integrated Alarm Processing in
Nuclear Power Plants”, IEEE Trans. Nuclear Science, vol. 42, no. 4, pp.
1406-1418, Aug. 1995.
[29] C.L. Nelson and D.S. Fitzgerald, “Sensor Fusion for Intelligent Alarm
Analysis”, IEEE AES Systems Magazine, pp 18-23, Sept. 1997.
[30] E.M. Meza, J.S.S. de Souza, M.T. Schilling and M.B.D.C. Filho,
“Exploring Fuzzy Relations for Alarm Processing and Fault Location in
Electrical Power Systems”, in Proc. IEEE Power Tech Conference,
Porto, Portugal, Sept. 2001.
[31] H.J. Cho and J.K. Park, “An Expert System for Fault Section Diagnosis
of Power Systems Using Fuzzy Relations”, IEEE Transactions on
Power Systems, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 342-348, Feb. 1997.
[32] E.M. Meza, J.S.S. de Souza, M.T. Schilling and M.B.D.C. Filho,
“Alarm Processing in Electrical Power Systems Through a Neuro-Fuzzy
Approach”, IEEE Trans. Power Delivery, vol. 19, no. 2, pp 537-544,
Apr. 2004.
[33] F. Wen, C.S. Chang and D. Srinivasan, “Alarm Processing in Power
Systems Using a Genetic Algorithm”, in Proc. Intl. Conf. on
Evolutionary Computation, Perth, WA, Nov./Dec. 1996.
[34] F.S. Wen and C.S. Chang, “Tabu Search Approach to Alarm Processing
in Power Systems”, IEE Proceeding – Generation, Transmission and
Distribution, vol. 144, no. 1, pp. 31-38, Jan. 1997.
[35] R.B. Bobba, J. Dagle, E. Heine, H. Khurana, W.H. Sanders, P. Sauer
and T. Yardley, “Enhancing Grid Measurements,” IEEE Power &
Energy Magazine, pp. 67-73, Jan./Feb. 2012.
[36] S.E. Widergren, Z. Huang and J.E. Dagle, “Electric System-Wide
Measurements: North American Directions,” in Proc. 40th Hawaii Intl.
Conf. on System Sciences, Waikoloa, HI, USA, Jan. 2007.
[37] G. Zhang, K. Sun, H. Chen, R. Carroll and Y. Liu, “Application of
Synchrophasor Measurements for Improving Operator Situational
Awareness,” in Proc. IEEE PES GM, Detroit, MI, USA, Jul. 2011.
[38] Y. Ye, J. Dong and Y. Liu, “Analysis of Power System Disturbances
Based on Distribution-Level Phasor Measurements,” in Proc. IEEE PES
GM, Detroit, MI, USA, Jul. 2011.
[39] J. Dong, T. Xia, Y. Zhang, T. Weekes, J.S. Thorp and Y. Liu,
“Monitoring Power System Disturbances at the Distribution Level,” in
Proc. IEEE PES GM, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, Jul. 2008.
[40] H. Qi, Y. Liu, F. Li, J. Luo, L. He, K. Tomsovic, L. Tolbert and Q. Cao,
“Increasing the Resolution of Wide-Area Situational Awareness of the
Power Grid through Event Unmixing,” in Proc. 44th Hawaii Intl. Conf.
on System Sciences, Kauai, HI, USA, Jan. 2011.
[41] M. He, J. Zhang and V. Vittal, “A Data Mining Framework for Online
Dynamics Security Assessment: Decision Trees, Boosting and
Complexity Analysis,” in Proc. IEEE Innovative Smart Grid
Technologies, Washington, DC, USA, Jan. 2012.
[42] Y. Xu, Z.Y. Dong, L. Guan, R. Zhang, K.P. Wong and F. Luo,
“Preventive Dynamic Security Control of Power Systems Based on
Pattern Discovery Technique,” IEEE Trans. Power Systems, to Appear.
[43] R. Diao, V. Vittal and N. Logic, “Design of a Real-Time Security
Assessment Tool for Situational Awareness Enhancement in Modern
Power Systems,” IEEE Trans. Power Systems, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 957-
965, May 2010.
[44] B.D. Russell and C.L. Benner, “Intelligent Systems for Improved
Reliability and Failure Diagnosis in Distribution Systems,” IEEE Trans.
Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 48-56, Jun. 2010.
[45] V.K. Pendurthi, N.N. Schulz, S. Doane and A.K. Srivastava, “Cognitive
Engineering Studies of DSS Dealing with Uncertainty in Load for Real-
Time Adaptive Power System Reconfiguration,” in Proc. IEEE Electric
Ship Technologies Symp., Baltimore, MD, USA, Apr. 2009, pp. 79-85.
[46] G. Gelston, A. Dalton and L. Tate, “Multi-Organizational Distributed
Decision Making in the Power Grid Industry,” in Proc. IEEE Conf. on
Cognitive Methods in Situation Awareness and Decision Support, New
Orleans, LA, USA, Mar. 2012, pp. 158-161.
 10

[47] T.J. Overbye, “Visualization Enhancements for Power System [71] J.Y. Zhang, Z.Q. Liu and S. Zhou, “Quotient FCMs – A Decomposition
Situational Assessment,” in Proc. IEEE PES GM, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, Theory for Fuzzy Cognitive Maps,” IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy
Jul. 2008. Systems, vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 593–604, Oct. 2003.
[48] J. Wang, Y. Hu, A. Johnson, H. Tram and R. Nasri, “System
Requirements of Visualization Platform for Wide Area Situation Salman Mohagheghi (S’99, M’07) received the B.Eng. from University of
Awareness System,” in Proc. IEEE PES GM, Minneapolis, MN, USA, Tehran, Iran, M.Sc. from Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran and
Jul. 2010. PhD from Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA all in Electrical
[49] C. Zheng, Y. Dong. O. Gonen and M. Kezunovic, “Data Integration Engineering. Currently, he is an Assistant Professor at the Electrical
Used in New Applications and Control Center Visualization Tools,” in Engineering and Computer Science Department at Colorado School of Mines,
Proc. IEEE PES GM, Minneapolis, MN, USA, Jul. 2010. Golden, CO, USA. Prior to that, he was a Senior R&D Engineer at ABB
[50] R. Laughery, L. Laux, J.M. O’Hara, W.S. Brown, J.C. Higgins, J.J. Corporate Research Center, Raleigh, NC, USA. His research focuses on
Persensky, P.M. Lewis and J. Bongarra, “Decision-Centered Design as situational awareness, distributed energy resources, communication networks
the Basis of Defining the Human Role in Systems,” in Proc. IEEE in power systems, and distribution automation systems.
Human Factors Meeting, Scottsdale, AZ, USA, Dec. 2002.
[51] B.J. Rhodes, “Biologically-Inspired Approaches to Higher-Level
Information Fusion,” in Proc. Intl. Conf. on Information Fusion,
Quebec, Canada, Jul. 2007.
[52] Y. Liang, H.Q. Wang, H.B. Cai and Y.J. He, “A Novel Stochastic
Modeling Method for Network Security Situational Awareness,” in
Proc. IEEE Conf. on Industrial Electronics and Applications,
Singapore, Jun. 2008, pp. 2422-2426.
[53] Y. Sun, G. Chen, D. Li and F. Li, “A Data Fusion Multi-Agent System
or Sensor Network Based on Data Fields,” in Proc. Conf. on
Computational Engineering in System App., Beijing, China, Oct. 2006,
pp. 2132-2136.
[54] S. Natkunanathan, J. Pham, W.J. Kaiser and G. Pottie, “Embedded
Networked Sensors: Signal Search Engine for Signal Classification,” in
Proc. IEEE Conf. on Sensor and Ad Hoc Communications and
Networks, Oct. 2004, pp. 139-144.
[55] D. Shen, G. Chen, L. Haynes and E. Blasch, “Strategies Comparison for
Game Theoretic Cyber Situational Awareness and Impact Assessment,”
in Proc. Intl. Conf. on Information Fusion, Quebec, Canada, Jul. 2007.
[56] R. Axelrod, Structure of Decision: the Cognitive Maps of Political
Elites, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
[57] B. Kosko, “Fuzzy Cognitive Maps,” International Journal Man-
Machine Studies, vol. 4, pp. 65-75, 1986.
[58] C.C. Lee, “Fuzzy Logic in Control Systems: Fuzzy Logic Controller,
Part II”, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, vol. 20,
no. 2, pp 419-435, March/April 1990.
[59] C.D. Stylios and P.P. Groumpos, “Modeling Complex Systems using
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps,” IEEE Trans. on Systems, Man and Cybernetics
– Part A: Systems and Humans, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 155-162, Jan. 2004.
[60] S. Mohagheghi, “A Fuzzy Cognitive Map for Data Integrity Assessment
in a IEC 61850 Based Substation,” in Proc. IEEE PES GM,
Minneapolis, MN, USA, Jul. 2010.
[61] S. Mohagheghi, “A Fuzzy Cognitive Map for Health Assessment of IEC
61850 Based Devices and Functions,” in Proc. Georgia Tech Fault and
Disturbance Analysis Conference, Atlanta, GA, USA, May 2010.
[62] U. Ozesmi and S.L. Ozesmi, “Ecological Model Based on People’s
Knowledge: A Multi-Step Cognitive Mapping Approach,” Ecological
Modeling, vol. 176, no. 1, pp. 43-64, Aug. 2004.
[63] M. Schneider, E. Shnaider, A. Kandel and G. Chew, “Automatic
Construction of FCMs,” Fuzzy Sets and Systems, vol. 93, pp. 161–172,
Jan. 1998.
[64] B. Lazzerini and L. Mkrtchyan, “Analyzing Risk Impact Factors Using
Extended Fuzzy Cognitive Maps,” IEEE Systems Journal, vol. 5, no. 2,
pp. 288–297, Jun. 2011.
[65] D.B. West, Introduction to Graph Theory, Prentice Hall, 2001.
[66] Y. Miao and Z.Q. Liu, “On Causal Inference in Fuzzy Cognitive Maps,”
IEEE Trans. Fuzzy Systems, vol. 8. no. 1, pp. 107–119, Jan. 2000.
[67] E.I. Papageorgiou, “Learning Algorithms for Fuzzy Cognitive Maps – A
Review Study,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics:
Part C, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 150–163, Mar. 2012.
[68] E. Oja, “Neural Networks, Principal Components and Subspaces,”
International Journal of Neural Systems, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 61–68, 1989.
[69] IEEE Distribution Planning Working Group, “Radial Distribution Test
Feeders,” IEEE Trans. Power System, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 975–985, Aug.
1991.
[70] Communication Networks and Systems in Substations, IEC Standard
61850 (parts 1-10), 2003.