STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE The National Crime Victim Law Institute (NCVLI) is a nonprofit educational and advocacy

organization located at Lewis & Clark Law School in Portland, Oregon. NCVLIs mission is to actively promote balance and fairness in the justice system through crime victimcentered legal advocacy, education, and resource sharing. NCVLI accomplishes its mission through education and training; technical assistance to attorneys; promotion of the National Alliance of Victims Rights Attorneys; research and analysis of developments in crime victim law; and provision of information on crime victim law to crime victims and other members of the public. NCVLI actively participates as amicus curiae in cases involving victims rights

nationwide. This case involves issues that are fundamental to the rights and interests of all crime victims, including victims rights to full restitution. NCVLI seeks to highlight the difficulties that children who have been sexually exploited and filmed face in procuring restitution and to explain the remedies that the legislature has crafted to help them overcome these hurdles. NCVLI submits this brief in aid of the courts task of analyzing and determining the correct rule of law in this matter. QUESTION PRESENTED ON APPEAL May a defendant who pleaded guilty to six counts of encouraging child sexual abuse based on his admission that he knowingly duplicated, possessed, and viewed images of child sexual abuse avoid paying restitution to his victim on the grounds that the proof of restitution submitted did not establish the precise amount of the victims losses that were caused by his conduct?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE Amicus adopts Plaintiff-Respondents statement of the case, supplementing its arguments where applicable. Summary of Arguments The unique and acute nature of the trauma experienced by child-victims of sexual abuse1 when images of their victimization are preserved and viewed by others is well-documented. The tremendous challenges faced by these victims in being awarded full restitution for the costs associated with treating their trauma are also well-documented, and would be compounded if this court were to adopt defendants erroneous causation analysis. Defendant pleaded guilty to multiple counts of encouraging child sexual abuse based on his admission that he knowingly downloaded images of child sexual abuse. (PlaintiffRespondents SER 3). The sentencing memorandum submitted by Vicky to the trial court described the images in defendants possession as including those of her being bound, raped, tortured, and sodomized as [a] young girl when she was 10 or 11 years old. 2 (Plaintiff-

While the legal term child pornography is commonly used to describe an image that depicts a child being raped or otherwise sexually abused, its use dilutes the reality of the victimization depicted. In the context of children . . . there can be no question of consent, and use of the word pornography may effectively allow us to distance ourselves from the materials true nature. A preferred term is abuse images and this term is increasingly gaining acceptance among professionals working in this area. Using the term abuse images accurately describes the process and product of taking indecent and sexualized pictures of children, and its use is, on the whole, to be supported. Sharon W. Cooper et al., Medical, Legal, & Social Science Aspects of Child Sexual Exploitation 258 (2005) (internal quotation marks added). Thus, this brief uses terms such as images of child abuse, and images of children being sexually exploited instead of child pornography.
2

Vicky is a pseudonym used by the victim who has been identified as the child depicted in some of the child-abuse images in defendants possession. Images of Vickys repeated rape by her biological father now constitute one of the most frequently downloaded series of child abuse images. See United States v. Hicks, No. 1:09-cr-150, 2009 WL 4110260 at *1 (ED Va Nov. 24,

Respondents SER 5). The trial court ordered defendant to pay $2,000 in restitution and an $8,000 compensatory fine to Vicky, amounts that together total approximately 2% of the costs of the victims well-documented continuing rehabilitative, vocational, and psychological treatment made necessary by the victims initial abuse and the subsequent trafficking and viewing [of] [ ] images of that abuse. (Plaintiff-Respondents SER 5-7). Under Oregon law, these costs are rightly borne by defendant, who admitted to knowingly duplicating and possessing the abuse images.3 Defendants challenge of the trial courts restitution order rests on his assertion that he should not be held responsible for any portion of Vickys costs associated with treating her trauma because the record does not reflect a sufficient causal connection between his criminal conduct and these costs, and because Vicky is not a legal victim of his crime under Oregon law.4 Both arguments fail for numerous reasons, not the least of which are that this court has

2009) (explaining that although Vickys father has since been arrested and sentenced to a term in prison, the widespread proliferation of the Vicky series continues today.).
3

Notably, Amicus believes Vicky could have challenged the trial courts award of only 2% of her losses as violating her right under Oregon law to full restitution due to the nature of the criminal conduct at issue, the inherent harm suffered by victims when images of their sexual exploitation as children are possessed and viewed by others, and the strong public policy supporting full compensation for the victim in each case. Courts should ensure the financial burden of a crime is placed on those who cause the victimization by engaging in the prohibited conduct. Because Vicky has not challenged the award as too low, however, Amicus focuses on the propriety of the trial courts modest award.
4

Defendant makes an additional argument on appeal that the state failed to establish that the victim suffered damages that are compensable under the economic damages statute, ORS 137.103. Plaintiff-Respondent argues in its brief that this argument was unpreserved. (PlaintiffRespondents Answering Brief 18). Even if reviewable, Amicus concurs with PlaintiffRespondent that this argument fails on the merits as the monetary losses claimed by the victim are more than adequately supported by the record and are the types of objectively verifiable monetary losses contemplated by Oregon law. See ORS 137.103(2)(a) (providing that, with the exception of future earning capacity, economic damages has the meaning given in ORS 31.710); ORS 31.710(2)(a) (Economic damages means objectively verifiable monetary losses including

clearly held that children depicted in child abuse images are victims of the criminal offense of encouraging child abuse, State v. Reeves, 250 Or App 294, 280 P3d 994, rev den, 352 Or 565 (2012), and that Oregon law mandates full restitution for victims, which includes requiring a defendant to pay restitution in the full amount of a victims losses even when other criminal actors contribute to those losses. See ORS 137.106 (requiring that the court order restitution in an amount equaling the full amount of the victims economic damages); State v. Hazlitt, 77 Or App 344, 349, 713 P2d 617 (1986) (affirming the trial courts order of restitution for the full value of a stolen diamond because even though there were other actors whose criminal conduct contributed to the victims loss, defendants criminal conduct was part of a chain of criminal events which resulted in that loss and thus it was appropriate to hold him fully liable). As this court has recognized, defendants crimes are serious crimes, perpetrated against real victims at great personal cost to those victims. See Reeves, 250 Or App at 310-11 (We agree with the trial court that each duplication of the visual recording constitute[s] a revictimization of the child depicted.). The victim must be compensated and defendant must be required to pay the financial costs associated with his crimes, as only this outcome is consistent with the purposes of Oregons restitution laws to fully compensate the victim and to serve rehabilitative and deterrent purposes by causing a defendant to appreciate the relationship between his criminal activity and the damage suffered by the victim. State v. Dillon, 292 Or 172, 179, 637 P2d 602 (1981).

but not limited to reasonable charges necessarily incurred for medical, hospital, nursing and rehabilitative services and other health care services[.]); State v. Donahue, 165 Or App 143, 146, 995 P2d 1202 (2000) (explaining that reasonably predictable and easily measurable future treatment expenses can be recovered under the compensatory fine statute); State v Bullock, 135 Or App 303, 307, 899 P2d 709 (1995) (treatment costs for the victims emotional and psychological problems were a natural consequence of defendants sexual abuse and were compensable in a restitution award).

ARGUMENT I. Victims in Child-Abuse Images Face Many Obstacles to Securing Restitution Awards and Collecting Restitution for Their Harm. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of children who are sexually exploited and filmed; the number of child exploitation images traded on the Internet has also increased dramatically.5 In addition, there has been a rise in the number of images depicting sadistic and violent abuse, particularly of infants and toddlers.6 The anonymity of the Internet has helped these perpetrators avoid detection and prosecution, and in so doing has encouraged more perpetrators to download and share the images.7 These growing numbers of victims whose child abuse images are shared with and viewed by others endure very real and significant harms,8
5

U.S. Dept of Justice, National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and Interdiction: A Report to Congress 9 (Aug. 2010) [hereinafter National Strategy Report], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/downloads/natstrategyreport.pdf; see also Mark Motivans & Tracey Kyckelhahn, U.S. Dept of Justice, Federal Prosecution of Child Sex Exploitation Offenders, 2006, at 1 (Dec. 2007) (NCJ 219412), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content /pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf; Wendy Walsh, Janis Wolak, & David Finkelhor, Crimes Against Children Research Center, Prosecution Dilemmas and Challenges for Child Pornography Crimes: The Third National Juvenile Online Victimization Study (NJOV-3), at 1 (Jan. 2013), available at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV266_Walsh_Prosecution%20Dilemmas% 20for%20CP%20Crimes_FINAL_1-22-13.pdf.
6 7 8

National Strategy Report, supra note 5, at 9. See National Strategy Report, supra note 5, at 11-17, 23-25.

Courts routinely recognize a variety of interrelated harms caused to victims by the viewing, possession, and distribution of images of their child abuse, including that: (1) the materials produced are a permanent record of the childrens participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation[,] New York v. Ferber, 458 US 747, 759, 102 S Ct 3348, 73 L Ed 2d 1113 (1982); (2) the mere existence of child pornography represents an invasion of the privacy of the child depicted[,] United States v. Norris, 159 F3d 926, 930 (5th Cir 1998); and (3) the consumer of child pornography instigates the original production of child pornography by providing an economic motive for creating and distributing the materials. Id; see also State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 546, 920 P2d 535 (1996) (emphasis in original) (explaining that statute prohibited the purchase of visual reproduction[s] of sexually explicit conduct by a child under 18 years of age, not in terms of the content of those reproductions, but because they owe their very existence to the commission of sexual abuse of a child and are, consequently, an extension

as the knowledge that images of their sexual abuse are being viewed by others is a form of psychological acid drip, (Plaintiff-Respondents SER 7), which continually compromises their well-being, and which comes with a real and calculable financial impact. Yet victims of these heinous crimes face tremendous hurdles in securing restitution. First, even when perpetrators are identified, prosecuted, and convicted, few courts order restitution because victims of these crimes often go unidentified. The globalization of the childabuse-image market through the Internet has made it particularly difficult to identify victims.9 In fact, one study found that law enforcement could not identify the victim in 92% of cases involving the possession or distribution of images of children being sexually exploited.10 Second, although victims may retain counsel to seek restitution, in practice they need the cooperation of prosecutors to secure restitution. Yet prosecutors do not always pursue, or pursue fully, restitution.11 Indicative of this challenge, one of the findings of a 2002 crime victims

of that harmful actone that may, in many instances, provide an economic incentive to abuse the child.).
9

National Strategy Report, supra note 5, at 11-17, 23-25.

10

David Finkelhor & Richard Ormrod, U.S. Dept of Justice, Child Pornography: Patterns from NIBRS 7 (Dec. 2004), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/204911.pdf. This court has recognized the difficulties inherent in identifying victims depicted in child abuse images. See Reeves, 250 Or App at 311(explaining that for purposes of establishing a defendants guilt for encouraging child sexual abuse the state is not required to prove the identity of the victim, and observing that the circumstances surrounding the recording and distribution of depictions of child sexual abuse frequently make it difficult to ascertain the identity of each child depicted[,] however, the childs anonymity does not make him or her any less the victim of the recorded act of abuse and the subsequent duplication of the recording.).
11

For more information on this dynamic within the federal system, compare 18 U.S.C. 3664(d)(1) (requiring prosecutors to promptly provide lists of amounts of restitution to which victims are entitled), with John Schwartz, Child Pornography, and an Issue of Restitution, N.Y. Times, Feb 3, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/03/us/ 03offender.html?_r=0 (noting that some federal prosecutors decline to pursue restitution). See also United States v. Buchanan, No. 09-CR-0045 (PJS/RLE), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165 at *3

needs assessment study commissioned by the Oregon Department of Justice Crime Victims Assistance Section, was that [t]he right to receive prompt restitution was the right most often not enforced according to victims and service providers. A variety of problems within the criminal justice system surfaced as barriers to victims exercising their rights, including no or incorrect information, system failures, judicial issues, offender-related issues and victim-related issues.12 Third, collection of restitution is often frustrated as many defendants are partially or wholly judgment-proof. A majority of suspects arrested for possessing images of children being sexually exploited have incomes below $50,000 per year.13 As such, a single defendants assets are often inadequate to compensate victims for their significant losses. Lastly, given the nature of this crime whereby victims are harmed by multiple criminal actors, victims find it difficult or impossible to prove that a particular defendant caused a particular share or component of their total harm. That problem is especially severe for victims,

(D Minn Jan. 4, 2010) (admonishing the government that [g]iven the clear Congressional mandate that those convicted of child pornography offenses pay restitution to their victims, the Court will no longer accept silence from the government when an identified victim of a childpornography offense seeks restitution. If the government declines to seek restitution, the government will have to give the Court some explanation for its decision.).
12

Oregon Dept. of Justice, Crime Victims Assistance Section, Crime Victims Needs Assessment, Final Report, at 3-4, available at https://www.rri.pdx.edu/files/616/crimevictims_ final_report.pdf. The Final Report described some of the challenges victims in Oregon face when attempting to secure restitution, including that: [i]n some cases, victims were not advised of restitution hearings. Not only does this make it difficult for judges to order restitution, but it also impacts the amount of restitution victims receive[.] Id. at 72. Also identified as challenges were insufficient enforcement, low priority for parole and probation officers, and lack of a system to enforce payments. Id.
13

Janis Wolak, David Finkelhor, & Kimberly J. Mitchell, Natl Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Child-Pornography Possessors Arrested in Internet-Related Crimes: Findings from the National Online Juvenile Victimization Study 3 (2005), available at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/ pdf/jvq/CV81.pdf.

like Vicky, who have suffered at the hands of many different possessors, distributors, and viewers of their images. Precisely because so many different people have victimized them, tracing losses to particular actors is all but impossible. In short, victims face many difficulties in tying specific losses to a specific defendant, procuring restitution awards, and collecting full restitution from perpetrators despite the welldocumented and well-accepted harms they endure. To ensure that the risks created by these difficulties fall on perpetrators, not victims, Oregon law mandates full restitution for all victims in both constitution and statute, including full restitution for victims in child-abuse images. Importantly, the requirement that defendants guilty of encouraging child sexual abuse pay full restitution to their victims is consistent with Oregon courts articulation of the but for causation standard, which permits victims full financial recovery without having to clear the virtually insurmountable hurdle of tracing their proven losses to a particular perpetrator. II. The Victims Right to Restitution in the Full Amount of Her Economic Damages is Well-Established in Oregon. A crime victims right to restitution in Oregon is guaranteed by state constitution and statute. Or Const Art 1, 42(1)(d) (guaranteeing a crime victim [t]he right to receive prompt restitution from the convicted criminal who caused the victims loss or injury); ORS 137.106 (requiring that the court order restitution in an amount equaling the full amount of the victims economic damages).14 Importantly, and with only one narrow exception that does not apply

14

ORS 137.103 was amended by the Oregon legislature, effective June 13, 2013. Or Laws 2013, ch 388, 1. Because the amended version of the relevant portion of the statute applies only to sentencings occurring on or after the effective date of this 2013 Act[,] Amicus cites to the prior version of this statute. Or Laws 2013, ch 388, 2. Regardless, the revisions have no effect on the substantive analysis in this case.

here,15 the restitution statute mandates that [i]f the court finds from the evidence presented that a victim suffered economic damages, in addition to any other sanctions it may impose, the court shall require the defendant to pay the victim restitution in the full amount of the victims economic damages. ORS 137.106(1)(a) (emphases added).16 Oregons restitution laws, like those of other states, have emerged from a historical framework embodying the penological aims of compensation, rehabilitation, deterrence, and punishment. When interpreting an earlier version of Oregons restitution statute, Oregon courts described the sentencing courts primary focus in awarding restitution as the rehabilitative or deterrent effect the sentence will have on defendant, and not the extent to which the victim will be compensated.17 But since the date these cases were decided, Oregon voters have ratified two

15

Oregons restitution statute permits a court to order defendant to pay the victim in an amount that is less than the full amount of the victims economic damages only with the written consent of the victim. ORS 137.106(1)(c)(A-B). Amicus is aware of no evidence that the victim consented in writing to a restitution order of less than the full amount of her economic damages.
16

The compensatory-fine statute authorizes a trial court to impose a finein addition to any amount of restitution orderedas a penalty for the commission of a crime resulting in injury[.] ORS 137.101(1). Because Oregon law is clear that court-ordered restitution and compensatory fines require the same prerequisites, the arguments in this brief support the trial courts award of restitution and a compensatory fine to the victim. See State v. Jordan, 249 Or App 93, 95, 274 P3d 289 (2012) (quoting State v. Edson, 329 Or 127, 132, 985 P2d 1253 (1999)) (explaining that [r]estitution is awarded under ORS 137.106 when the state establishes evidence of (1) criminal activities, (2) pecuniary damages, and (3) a causal relationship between the two.)); State v. Donahue, 165 Or App 143, 146, 995 P2d 1202 (2000) (explaining that the same prerequisites apply when imposing a compensatory fine under ORS 137.101). The legislature has emphasized that the compensatory-fine statute shall be liberally construed in favor of victims. ORS 137.101(1).
17

See, e.g., State v. Hart, 299 Or 128, 138, 699 P2d 1113 (1985) (describing the purpose of ordering restitution as a step to accomplishing the traditional goals of sentencing, such as rehabilitation of the defendant and deterrence to impress upon the defendant the seriousness and cost of his offense, not to provide full compensation to victims of crime); Dillon, 292 Or at 179 (The theory of restitution is penological: It is intended to serve rehabilitative and deterrent

amendments to the state constitution to enforce the states victims rightsincluding a victims right to restitution from the convicted criminal who caused the victims loss or injury. Or Const Art 1, 42(1)(d). Also, since the date of these earlier restitution decisions, ORS 137.106 has undergone significant revisions that make clear that full compensation of the victim is now a primary objective of restitution awards. For example, the former version of ORS 137.106 provided that when a defendant was convicted of criminal activities that resulted in damages, the court may order that the defendant make restitution to the victim. See Dillon, 292 Or at 177. In contrast, in the relevant version of ORS 137.106 in effect at the time of defendants sentencing, may has been replaced with shallrequiring courts to order full compensation to the victim for her economic damages. ORS 137.106(1)(a), (b). Thus, it is abundantly clear that the trial courts award is consistent with the requirements and purposes of Oregons restitution laws to compensate the victim and to hold defendant responsible for his criminal activity, as well as with the purposes of the compensatory fine statute. III. The Determination of Defendants Guilt, Without More, is Sufficient to Sustain the Award of Restitution in this Case. Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree and four counts of second-degree encouraging child sexual abuse based on his admission that he downloaded images of child sexual abuse, and that he did so for the purpose of self-arousal sexually knowing they depicted child abuse. (Plaintiff-Respondents SER 3). Before sentencing, Vicky submitted a sentencing memorandum requesting restitution and a compensatory fine in the amount of $462,316the purposes by causing a defendant to appreciate the relationship between his criminal activity and the damage suffered by the victim.).

victims losses associated with her on-going and serious psychological trauma because of child pornography crimes committed by Culbertson and others. (Plaintiff-Respondents SER 5-14). The sentencing memorandum described the images of Vicky in defendants possession as including those of her being bound, raped, tortured, and sodomized as [a] young girl when she was 10 or 11 years old. (Plaintiff-Respondents SER 5). The victims sentencing memorandum also referenced reports by a clinical psychologist, who described that Vicky has been substantially re-traumatized, and further injured by the knowledge of the continuing distribution and viewing of the images of her physical abuse. (Plaintiff-Respondents SER 7). The

psychologist further described Vickys ongoing trauma as follows: The knowledge of the dissemination and proliferation of the images of her at her times of greatest humiliation and degradation constitutes a Type II trauma . . . which represents a chronic, toxic condition, the knowledge of which continuously works like a corrosive acid on the psyche of the individual. Examples of other Type II stressors include the challenges endured by those who live near Chernobyl, Three Mile Island or the Love Canal or a war zone. (Plaintiff-Respondents SER 10). Defendant does not appear to argue with the extent of Vickys damages, but instead makes two interrelated arguments: that the trial court erred in awarding even a small proportion of Vickys damagesrepresenting only 2% of her total ongoing lossesbecause she is not a victim for purposes of the encouraging sexual abuse statute, and because the state failed to demonstrate a causal relationship between defendants criminal conduct and the victims losses. In light of Oregons restitution laws requiring full restitution for a victims losses, the nature of the prohibited criminal conduct at issue, and the inherent harm suffered by victims when images

of their sexual exploitation as children are possessed and viewed by others, these arguments fail.18 This court and many others have found that victims of child abuse images are harmed not only by the original production of the images, but also by their subsequent possession. Reeves, 250 Or App at 310-11 (We agree with the trial court that each duplication of the visual recording constitute[s] a revictimization of the child depicted.).19 In fact, as noted above, courts routinely recognize a variety of interrelated harms caused to victims by the viewing, possession, and distribution of images of their child abuse, including that: (1) the materials produced are a permanent record of the childrens participation and the harm to the child is

18

As previously noted, this court has held that children depicted in child abuse images are victims of the criminal offense of encouraging child sexual abuse, effectively discharging defendants argument in that regard. Reeves, 250 Or App at 308-12. The court correctly decided this issue. Nevertheless, as Plaintiff-Respondent argues in its brief, even if Reeves were wrongly decided, Vicky would still be entitled to restitution as a person who has suffered economic damages as a result of the defendants criminal activities. See ORS 137.103(4)(b).
19

See also, e.g., United States v. Goff, 501 F3d 250, 259 (3d Cir 2007) (stating, in possession case, that [h]aving paid others to act out for him, the victims are no less damaged for his having remained safely at home, and his voyeurism has actively contributed to a tide of depravity that Congress, expressing the will of our nation, has condemned in the strongest terms); United States v. Tillmon, 195 F3d 640, 644 (11th Cir 1999) (finding that children depicted in child abuse images remain victims not only when the pictures are taken or purchased, but also when they are transported or distributed); Norris, 159 F3d at 929 (internal citation omitted) (finding, in receipt of child pornography case, that the pornographys continued existence causes the child victims of sexual abuse continuing harm by haunting those children in future years); United States v. Boos, 127 F3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir 1997) (finding it scarcely debatable that children depicted in child abuse images were victims in case trying defendant of conspiracy to distribute or receive child pornography and distribution of child pornography); United States v. Brunner, No. 5:08cr16, 2010 WL 148433 at *2 (WDNC Jan. 12, 2010) (finding that by both legislative intent and judicial construction, the law is clear that the children depicted in child pornography are victims not only of the makers of the pornography but also of its possessors); United States v. Staples, No. 09-14017-CR, 2009 WL 2827204 at *3 (SD Fla Sept. 2, 2009) (finding the victim depicted in the child abuse images to be a victim under 18 USC 2259 due to the harm she suffered and continues to suffer as a result of [defendants] possession of images depicting her sexual abuse as a child).

exacerbated by their circulation[,] New York v. Ferber, 458 US 747, 759, 102 S Ct 3348, 73 L Ed 2d 1113 (1982); (2) the mere existence of child pornography represents an invasion of the privacy of the child depicted[,] United States v. Norris, 159 F3d 926, 930 (5th Cir 1998); and (3) the consumer of child pornography instigates the original production of child pornography by providing an economic motive for creating and distributing the materials. Id; see also State v. Stoneman, 323 Or 536, 546, 920 P2d 535 (1996) (emphasis in original) (explaining that statute prohibited the purchase of visual reproduction[s] of sexually explicit conduct by a child under 18 years of age, not in terms of the content of those reproductions, but because they owe their very existence to the commission of sexual abuse of a child and are, consequently, an extension of that harmful actone that may, in many instances, provide an economic incentive to abuse the child.). Thus, this court and many others have recognized the inherent nature of victims harm when a defendant downloads and views images of their child sexual abuse. In light of this, awarding full compensation for Vickys losses in this case is consistent with Oregons but for causation standard for determining restitution. See State v. Bullock, 135 Or App 303, 307, 899 P2d 709 (1995) (For purposes of restitution, causation is met by applying a but for standard.); State v. Doty, 60 Or App 297, 300, 653 P2d 276 (1982) (requiring that victims losses resulted in a but for sense, from defendants criminal activities). This courts decision in State v. Hazlitt, 77 Or App 344, 713 P2d 617 (1986), is instructive on the proper application of the but for standard in cases such as this where multiple criminal actors are responsible for the victims losses. In Hazlitt, the defendant was convicted of theft in the first degree in connection with his sale of a stolen diamond, and argued on appeal, inter alia, that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay restitution for the full value of the stolen diamond because the victims loss resulted

from the original theft of the diamond, not his subsequent sale. Id. at 346, 349. This court rejected defendants challenge to the trial courts award of full restitution because even though there were other actors whose criminal conduct contributed to the victims loss, defendants sale of the diamond was part of a chain of criminal events which resulted in the disappearance of the diamond, for which [the victim] incurred an $8,000 loss[.] Id. at 349. See also State ex rel. Juvenile Dept. of Josephine County v. Dickerson, 100 Or App 95, 98 & 98 n 4, 784 P2d 1121 (1989) (holding that juvenile court did not err in awarding restitution to burglary victim for value of stolen jewelry where delinquent youth admitted to breaking into the house and to stealing other items, but denied stealing jewelry and the juvenile court did not adjudicate that issue, as it is not a prerequisite for an order of restitution that it be proven that she stole the jewelry, if her activities contributed to the loss.); Doty, 60 Or App at 300 (holding that a defendant who kicked in the door of a home and exposed the victim to an additional theft caused a loss in a but for sense and could be held responsible for that loss in restitution). Defendants argument in this case that he should not be held responsible for the victims losses because other criminal actors contributed to her losses is analogous to the argument posited by the defendant in Hazlitt and should be similarly rejected. Awarding restitution to victims for the well-recognized inherent nature of victims harm when a defendant downloads and views images of their child sexual abuse, even when there are other criminal actors, fully comports with Oregons law and policy. CONCLUSION Victims face many difficulties in proving causation, procuring restitution awards, and collecting full restitution from defendants. By mandating full restitution for victims, including

victims in child-abuse images, Oregon law makes clear that the financial burden of crime should be placed on the perpetrators not the victims. This court and many others have concluded that victims of child abuse images are harmed not only by the original production of the images, but also by their subsequent possession. See Reeves, 250 Or App at 310-11. Without question, the victim in this case has endured significant harm as a result of this and other defendants criminal conduct, and as this court has aptly recognized in another restitution decision: Simply put, defendant committed a crime and should pay restitution for that crime. State v. Plumb, 192 Or App 623, 628, 87 P3d 676 (2004). This court should affirm.