You are on page 1of 17

This article was downloaded by: [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] On: 08 July 2013, At: 19:25

Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Accounting History Review


Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rabf21

Budgetary and financial discontinuities: Iraq 192032


Geoff Burrows & Phillip E. Cobbin
a a a

The University of Melbourne, Australia Published online: 13 Oct 2011.

To cite this article: Geoff Burrows & Phillip E. Cobbin (2011) Budgetary and financial discontinuities: Iraq 192032, Accounting History Review, 21:3, 247-262, DOI: 10.1080/21552851.2011.616716 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21552851.2011.616716

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/termsand-conditions

Accounting History Review Vol. 21, No. 3, November 2011, 247262

Budgetary and nancial discontinuities: Iraq 192032


Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

Geoff Burrows and Phillip E. Cobbin


The University of Melbourne, Australia

At national level, arguably the most severe budgetary and nancial discontinuities occur when states are created or recreated. The challenge then is to create viable nancial systems which reduce the danger of state failure. Despite their importance, these processes are under-researched in the accounting and nance literatures. We examine these processes in relation to Iraq, the former Mesopotamia, which emerged as a edgling state only after World War I, a process, occurring under British suzerainty, and complicated by existing and proposed nancial obligations. Iraqs early history provides a case study of the role of nancial management in state-creation.

Keywords:

government budgeting; currency boards; Iraq; nation-creation

Introduction At the macro or national-government level, it is difcult to envisage any budgetary and nancial discontinuities more radical and challenging than those which occur when states are created, or recreated, particularly as a consequence of war. Such events are not rare. World War I gave rise to several new states in the near-East through the nal break-up of the Ottoman Empire, while facilitating the re-emergence of Poland. Similarly, the post-World War II decolonisation processes, and strengthening nationalist and anti-imperialist sentiments led to a host of newly independent states inAfrica and the Indian sub-continent. More recent state creations accompanied the disintegration of both the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In such cases autonomous nancial systems have to be developed and new currencies introduced. In relation to nancial systems, budgetary processes as devices for allocating resources and reconciling ends and means, play potentially key roles in successful transitions. Yet, despite their obvious importance, budgetary aspects of state creation remain underexplored in the accounting literature. The specialist accounting history literature contains no relevant works at the national level, although at the regional and enterprise level the examination by Fernandez-Revuelta, Gomez, and Robson (2002) of the impact of the Spanish Civil War on the accounting systems and reporting practices of power utility Fuerzas Motrice del Valle de Lecrin deserve to be acknowledged,

Corresponding

author. Email: ghb@unimelb.edu.au

ISSN 2155-2851 print/ISSN 2155-286X online 2011 Taylor & Francis http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21552851.2011.616716 http://www.tandfonline.com

248 G. Burrows and P.E. Cobbin particularly their assertion that:


Accounting and war have perhaps not received the attention that should be accorded them by accounting researchers. The study of such times provides almost unequalled opportunities to study periods of organizational and social crises, and how accounting practices may be inuenced and changed by such crises. (Fernandez-Revuelta, Gomez, and Robson 2002, 363)

Although the more general accounting literature does possess examinations of budgetary and accounting discontinuities at national level, these accounts differ from the discontinuity we study by being variously less severe, in a different direction (state dissolution rather than creation), or based on a different analytical perspective. Analyses of Polands transition from a centrally planned to a market economy (Jaruga and Nowak 1995; Jaruga, Nowak, and Lisiecka-Zajac 1998), Nepals advance from feudalism (Adhikari and Mellemvik 2009), and Thailands responses to mid nineteenth-century mercantile inuences (Constable and Kuasirikun 2007), deal with softer discontinuities than the one we study, they are highly conceptualised and provide little in the way of taxation and expenditure data. In contrast, Spences (2010) account of nancial aspects of the dissolution of Scotland under the Treaty of Union of 1707, is rich in nancial detail and calculation but deals with a discontinuity in the opposite direction to the one considered herein. While the study of the action of the US-dominated Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq during 20036 by Cooper and Catchpowle (2009) deals, like our work, with discontinuities in Iraq in the aftermath of conict, their focus was on the morality of the occupation as judged by decisions in relation to political economy, assurance and governance, rather than budgetary processes and outcomes. The broader political-economy literature similarly lacks comprehensive studies of how edgling nations have dealt with immediate and ongoing budgetary pressures. Probably the best source of information lies in unpublished presentations by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff at various international forums. Examples include the overview of macroeconomic conditions in East Timor one year after independence (Valdivieso 2000), and analyses of attempts to restore or transform East Timors, Kosovos and Afghanistans nancial systems (Lonnberg 2001, 2003). However, even these accounts provide only partial budgetary data and cover just the initial periods of what are obviously longer-term processes. To help ll this gap in the accounting-history literature we analyse the budgetary and nancial history of Iraq during 192032. State creation in this case was conducted under British suzerainty following a League of Nations mandate that involved attempts to create a viable nancial system and, nally, the introduction of a national currency. A complicating factor was that Iraq, almost from its inception, was encumbered by Ottoman-era nancial obligations and a military agreement negotiated with its contemporary occupier: Britain. Unsurprisingly, nancial difculties arose, necessitating the despatch of British nancial missions in 1925 and 1930. As the subject of a report to the British Parliament (YoungVernon 1925), the earlier mission is particularly welldocumented. Follow-up information about this mission and limited information about the 1930 initiative are contained in a Special Report by His Majestys Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Progress of Iraq During the Period 19201931 (Report to the League of Nations 1931). In addition, a range of other records relate to these missions, including the annual reports of the Iraq Currency Board and the private papers of E. Hilton Young a key participant in both missions. Against this background, our focus is on how Iraqs budgetary and nancial discontinuities were managed, particularly with respect to: the objectives of the relevant missions and the factors which

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

Accounting History Review

249

led to their despatch; the budgetary and currency measures prescribed and implemented, and; the achievements of these missions. To this end, the next section of the article provides background information about the creation of Iraq after World War I, the initiation of the 1925 mission, and the associated budgetary measures and outcomes. Then follows an analysis of the national-currency element of the 1930 mission, a matter with strong accounting features because the particular vehicle chosen a currency board embodied mark-to-market and control concepts. In the penultimate section, the success of the mission is assessed using criteria developed more recently by the IMF. The nal section summarises the main ndings and provides suggestions for further research.

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

The 1925 mission Background The following chronology of key political and economic developments in Iraq has been compiled from the Report to the League of Nations (1931), Longrigg (1953) and MacMillan (2003) to provide the context for the mission to Iraq in 1925: 1914: Basra occupied by a British-Indian expeditionary force on 23 November as the rst step in the gradual expulsion of Ottoman forces from Mesopotamia, the former Ottoman administrative provinces of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, achieved by November 1918. 1916: Proclamation by the expeditionary force on 22 December, banning the use of Ottoman paper money, leading to the introduction of the Indian rupee (backed by sterling) as an interim national currency. 1920: The Principal Allied Powers conferred a mandate for Iraq upon Great Britain in April. 1920: Widespread rebellions against British occupation during JuneOctober, with order gradually restored, partly through the use of the new medium of air power. 1920: The creation of a Council of Ministers effectively an Iraqi Government in November with each minister aided by a British advisor. 1921: The transformation of Iraqs constitutional status to that of a kingdom through the enthronement of King Faisal on 23 August, following agreement by the Iraqi cabinet and the endorsement of a national referendum. 1921: A nancial crisis in Britain, prompting the appointment of the Geddes Committee in August whose subsequent report (Geddes Report 1922) recommended inter alia major retrenchments in the armed forces and the transfer of overseas defence responsibilities (and expenditure) as far as possible to locals. 1922: Formalisation of the BritishIraqi relations through the completion of a Treaty in October, giving Britain primary responsibility for nancial matters. However, while these developments were suggestive of statehood, it is questionable whether there was the necessary substance in the sense of Iraqis possessing the required political cohesion and feeling of national identity. Longrigg and Stoakes (1958, 90), doubtless drawing on the formers experience in the Iraqi administration during 192330, pointed to:
deep divisions within Iraqi society (urban-tribal, Kurd-Arab, Sunni-Shia) and the widely various stages of evolution reached by different elements in the population an uncompromising national character, uncorrected by previous experience in public life, and by its extreme individualism ill-adapted for the workings of any real democracy, yet intolerant of other forms of government.

250 G. Burrows and P.E. Cobbin


Table 1. Iraq, revenue and expenditure 19214 (000 equivalents). 19212 Revenue Land, crop and livestock taxation Customs and excise duties Post and telegraph receipts Other revenues Total revenue Total expenditure Surplus (decit) 19223 19234

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

1,313 1,502 405 712 3,932 4,260 (328)

1,045 1,532 210 751 3,538 3,568 (30)

1,078 1,766 247 693 3,784 3,113 671

Sources: YoungVernon Report (1925, 3); Report to the League of Nations (1931, 956).

A complementary perspective is that of MacMillan (2003, 397) who averred that In 1919 there was no Iraqi people; history, religion, geography pulled the people apart, not together. Basra looked south, towards India and the Gulf; Baghdad had strong links with Persia [Iran]; and Mosul had closer ties with Syria. Other than the introduction of the Indian rupee during World War I, the Ottoman taxation and budgetary-control systems were largely retained. The new AngloIraqi administration experienced a large budget decit in 19212, which it turned into surpluses during the two following years, as shown in Table 1. On the revenue side, Table 1 illustrates the dependence on agricultural and livestock taxation, and customs and excise duties, which together accounted for almost 75% of total revenue in this triennium. While this overall proportion is almost identical to that calculated for 1911 by Himadeh (1966), its composition differed markedly. In 1911 agricultural taxes represented 42.7% of total revenue while customs and excise duties accounted for 23%; in 19234 the comparable shares were 28.5 and 47.7%. Table 1 shows that the budget surpluses for 19224 were largely achieved through expenditure reductions which averaged 27% for this period. The Report to the League of Nations (1931, 1289) detailed how an Economies Committee had been established in 1922 in response to the 19212 decit and which had, inter alia, recommended graduated cuts in public sector salaries ranging from 2.5 to 25%. These reductions, combined with severe cutbacks in public works programmes and posts and telegraphs activities and stafng, had produced the large 19234 surplus. However, this apparently strong nancial position was about to deteriorate due to the conjunction of two events which appeared likely to generate unsustainable decits. The rst was the UKIraq Military Agreement, concluded in March 1924, obliging Iraq within four years to accept full responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and for the defence of Iraq from external aggression (YoungVernon 1925, 4). The latter provision reected ongoing incursions by Turkey in the countrys north and Britains desire to withdraw its armed forces from Iraq.The second event was the nal arbitration of the nancial provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne, 1923 under which the public-debt burden of the former Ottoman Empire was divided among the successor states according to the ratio of the revenue collected in each state to the total revenue of the Ottoman Empire in the scal years 191011 and 191112 (Suvla 1966, 94). Iraqs share of this debt, 5.5% of the total, was likely to exceed 2 million, with repayments spread over at least two decades.1 The estimated repayments during the rst seven years of this arrangement are shown in Table 2. Thereafter, the payments would gradually reduce but continue into the 1940s.

Accounting History Review


Table 2. Estimated Ottoman debt repayments 192431 (000 equivalents). Year 19245 19256 19267 19278 19289 192930 19301 Repayment 173,000 425,000 370,000 351,000 272,000 272,000 271,000

251

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

Source: YoungVernon Report (1925, 49).

So serious was the expected impact of these new charges on Iraqs nances that the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Dobbs, advised London on 25 February 1925 that Iraq was threatening to breach its Lausanne obligations by refusing to pay the Ottoman debt instalment then due on the grounds that payment would entail the suspension of the payment of salaries and bring the machinery of administration to a standstill. Mission initiation On 3 March 1925, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Rt Hon. L.S. (Leo) Amery, appointed a nancial mission comprising the Member of Parliament, E. Hilton Young, and the civil servant, Roland V. Vernon. Their terms of reference, were as follows:
To enquire and report to His Majestys Government and to the Iraq Government what steps should be taken to ensure that it shall be possible to balance the Iraq Budget during the treaty period and afterwards, having regard to the requirements of the country for defence and security, administration and development, the provisions of the Financial Agreement and the obligations in respect of the Ottoman Public Debt imposed by the Treaty of Lausanne. (YoungVernon 1925, 3)

The duo represented Westminsters political and bureaucratic arms. Biographical sources, particularlyYoung (1971), Burrows and Syme (2000) and Hall (2006), reveal thatYoung (18791960) was the youngest son of a baronet, whose family had long been prominent in the navy and administration. A sometime president of the Cambridge Union, he became deputy editor of the Economist then city editor of the Morning Post. An early participant in Bloomsbury gatherings, he was a friend of economists John Maynard Keynes and Ralph Hawtrey, and suitor (unsuccessful) to Virginia Stephen (later Woolf). While serving in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve during 191418, he became Liberal MP for Norwich, published the rst edition of his System of National Finance (which through two further editions became the standard work on Westminsters nancial system). In Lloyd Georges Coalition Government he was Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 19212 and liaised with the Geddes Committee which advised on the restoration of Britains nances. At the time of the Iraq mission he was a backbencher following the advent of Bonar Laws Conservative Government in October 1922, the year in which he married Kathleen (Lady) Scott, widow of the Antarctic explorer, Captain R.F. Scott. Party-political cronyism can have played no part in Amery, a Tory, appointing Young, a Liberal, to the Iraq mission. In the Lloyd George coalition, Amery, as First Lord of the Admiralty, had

252 G. Burrows and P.E. Cobbin opposed the retrenchments that the Geddes Committee, with which Young was associated, had proposed for the navy. However, the two did have experiences in common which must have engendered mutual respect. Both had been journalists before World War I and both had served in the Balkans during the conict. While Vernons (c. 18781942) Whos Who entry indicates a family background more modest than Youngs, his Oxford rst was a prelude to an impressive civil-service career. At the Colonial Ofce his early postings included a stint in Australia as private secretary to Governor-General, Lord Denman. In 1914 he transferred to the Treasury and held a senior nancial post in the Ministry of Munitions during World War I. Post-war, he was a British representative at the Treaty of Lausanne negotiations in 1922. Revenue and expenditure estimates and recommendations Young and Vernon reached Baghdad on 14 March 1925 after travelling by ferry and train to Marseilles thence by the S.S. Macedonia to Port Said, from where their nine-man party was conveyed overland with the nal 550-mile desert crossing from Damascus to Baghdad taking 36 hours in a modern caravan of four open-top Buicks (KP107/2 1925). The task they confronted is illustrated by the rst two columns of Table 3, showing revised estimates for 19245 (of which eight months had already elapsed) and proposed expenditure for 19256, the latter incorporating the Iraqi Ministry of Defences estimate of the expenditure required to full the Military Agreement, and the rst repayment of the Ottoman public-debt liability as estimated by Young and Vernon. Commencing their investigations into how to reduce this forecast 19256 decit, which represented almost 40% of revenue, to a more-sustainable gure, YoungVernon (1925, 3) articulated the conict between the desirable and the possible. They recognised that Iraq:
lacks much of the apparatus essential for a developed State As an independent State it has to support an administration which is necessarily far more expensive than its former one, with all the institutions of selfgovernment, and those higher standards in the discharge of State service which are inevitably required of a progressive Government Under these circumstances, the present scale of expenditure is not more in general than the country requires. It may be more than is possible but it is not more than is desirable.

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

This dilemma was particularly acute in relation to public works for whichYoungVernon (1925, 39) observed that in countries such as Iraq, often an investment would give a good return in
Table 3. Iraq, budget summary 19246 (000 equivalents) 19256 (YoungVernon recommendations) 3,895 2,659 1,005 598 4,262 (367)

19245 (revised estimates) Revenue Expenditure: Non-defence Defence Ottoman debt Total expenditure Surplus (decit) 3,873 2,674 752 3,426 447

19256 (initial Iraqi proposals) 3,605 3,113 1,326 598 5,037 (1,432)

Source: YoungVernon Report (1925, 3, 47, 51).

Accounting History Review

253

better services and more economical administration. But in the present state funds cannot be spared from revenue for the investment. Nor in the present state can the funds be borrowed. Commenting on the reliability of the Iraqi estimates, YoungVernon (1925, 50) referred to the practice of biasing the budget, specically to:
intentional over-estimating by the spending departments, to make things comfortable, and under the mistaken impression that there is virtue in a substantial under-spending on a vote. That impression should be corrected. The best service that a department can render to economy is to make its estimates accord as closely as possible with the facts of the case. Habitual over-estimation of expenditure is the worst of all nuisances to those responsible for general nancial policy.

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

Over four decades later, commencing with Lowe and Shaw (1968) and Hofstede (1968), the problem of budgetary biasing, and how it should be countered, would generate a continuing stream of empirical research in the management accounting literature. YoungVernons (1925, 50) solution was to reduce spending proposals by 4% globally and increase revenue estimates by 1%. Their revised budget, which largely embodied expenditure reductions rather than revenue increases, is shown as the nal column in Table 3, and can be compared with the initial Iraqi estimates in the previous column. On the revenue side, some 223,000 of the total 290,000 recommended increase was to come from customs and excise duties, seen byYoungVernon (1925, 1516) as having the advantage that the machinery for their collection is simple and efcient. Land and agricultural taxes, which YoungVernon (1925, 10) recognised is a matter which enters closely into the whole social structure of the country, which affects tribal organisation and the position of the sheikhs, and which cannot be dissociated from general questions of policy in internal affairs, were seen as more problematic, capable of enhancing revenue in the future with better collection systems and land-tenure information, but offering little immediate prospect of higher revenue. These comments probably explain the major shift towards customs and excise duties which had occurred since 1911, with the discontinuities associated with regime change and state-creation impacting more on the local mechanisms needed to levy and collect agricultural taxes than on the more-centralised systems associated with excise and customs duties. Discussing prospective yields from taxes on businesses and professional incomes and employee salaries, YoungVernon (1925, 1822) cautioned that the rened calculations associated with prots-based taxes were problematic in Iraq due to data unavailability and administrative complexities. A predecessor Ottoman Temettu tax, levied on public-utility prots, signs of business wealth such as location and employee numbers, and wages and salaries, had been a conspicuous failure and fallen into abeyance. While data-collection systems were being improved, as an interim device YoungVernon suggested the imposition of a turnover tax on corporations and the professions, and an income tax on all salaries exceeding 20 per month. The combined yield from these sources was estimated at only 15,000 for 19256. However, even this small sum depended on the appropriate mechanisms being introduced quickly and, ultimately, implementation was delayed until 1927. The sale of government land seen as a one off event rather than a general policy, would also generate 15,000 in 19256. In their recommended 454,000 cuts in non-defence expenditure, only health services escaped the YoungVernon axe. Government administration, education, police, and posts and telegraphs, were all to be reduced by small cuts, most of which related to the workforce. However, even modest reductions in monetary terms often implied substantial retrenchments. For example, to save 45,000 annually in ministries and departments considered by YoungVernon (1925, 27) to

254 G. Burrows and P.E. Cobbin


Table 4. Iraq, revenue and expenditure 192430 (000 equivalents). 19245 Revenue Land, crop and livestock taxation Customs and excise duties Post and telegraph receipts Income tax Oil royalties Other revenues1 Total revenue Expenditure Defence Police Health services Ministry of Education Capital works Other expenditure Total expenditure Surplus (decit) 19256 19267 19278 19289 192930

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

1,096 1,829 244 759 3,928 653 525 144 165 1,975 3,462 466

1,323 1,861 223 920 4,327 1,058 571 145 175 1,875 3,824 503

1,256 1,852 203 912 4,223 1,012 595 171 201 2,018 3,997 226

1,333 1,972 203 13 8 873 4,402 1,096 575 179 204 124 2,067 4,245 157

1,353 2,014 201 28 12 819 4,427 1,046 621 191 238 96 2,269 4,461 (34)

1,183 2,010 201 43 14 829 4,280 897 603 211 277 93 2,214 4,295 (15)

Note: 1 Comprising myriad small items plus several larger items which were not subject to specic recommendations. Source: Report to the League of Nations (1931, 906).

be extravagantly staffed with menials, messengers and armed messengers, would involve the abolition of approximately 1,000 positions. With expenditures on irrigation and other public works, economies were to be achieved principally by postponing construction programs and retrenching staff. In the longer term, a suggested review of salary levels could lead to additional savings given the falling cost-of-living. YoungVernon (1925, 46) devoted special attention to defence, the largest single expenditure item proposed for 19256. Table 3 shows that the initial budget proposal was 1,326,000, a 76% increase on the previous years estimate (and double the eventual 19245 actual gure shown in Table 4). In their analysis, YoungVernon (1925, 47) had the benet of a defence programme agreed between the UK and Iraq and they sought to discover what it will cost Iraq to conform to the programme. It appears that their search was extremely thorough. As Financial Secretary to the Treasury in 19212, and the link between the Treasury and the Geddes Axe, Young had observed rst-hand how thoroughly that committee charged with nding 100 million of budget savings had scrutinised spending proposals by the ghting services (Burrows and Cobbin 2009). For Iraq, YoungVernons investigations, which encompassed matters such as the start-up compared with regular running costs of the three new infantry battalions that Iraq required, resulted in a revised defence estimate of just over 1 million, 24% below the original Iraqi proposal. Conscription was also suggested by YoungVernon as a possible economy strategy in this connection. Although these proposals would reduce the projected 19256 budget decit from 1,432,000 (39.7% of revenue) to a more sustainable 367,000 (9.4% of revised revenue), the latter gure was still huge relative to total revenue. The implication, as YoungVernon (1925, 7) observed, was that part of the Ottoman debt-charge must be left unpaid, the military programme must be substantially reduced, or further wholesale reductions in the services performed by the State [must occur]. The last possibility was dismissed on the grounds that the proposed

Accounting History Review

255

reductions were the utmost that can be effected if the Government is to continue to discharge its essential functions (YoungVernon 1925, 78). However, while they saw the military programme as virtually sacrosanct, there were prospects for renegotiating the Ottoman Debt repayments. They also predicted that, providing military spending was not increased, the budgetary situation would gradually improve due to eventual reductions in the Ottoman Debt repayments, and the prospect of higher revenues as collection systems improved. Currency Separate from the budgetary position was currency. This remained the Indian rupee despite an Iraqi request in 1922 and a provision in the nations constitution of 1924 relating to a national currency and issuing authority (Symes, Hanewich, and Al-Muderis 2001). On this matter, YoungVernon (1925, 25) declared that:
The establishment of a national Bank of Issue would be premature ... the only sort of national currency which it would be prudent to contemplate would be an Iraqi rupee supplied in effect by the Indian Government, or an Iraqi sterling-rupee supplied in effect by the British Government. Either must be costly and might be inconvenient. The change to either ... would, from the point of view of the gratication of national sentiment, be rather nominal than real ... [and would have] the great disadvantage of unsettling the population in a manner in which so much depends on habit and on the condence which is born of habit.

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

The YoungVernon Report (1925, 57) was signed Baghdad, 25th April 1925, indicating that the pair had drafted their report before departing for London where they arrived on 8 May. Amery tabled the report in Parliament the following month. Aftermath The budgetary aftermath of the YoungVernon mission is shown in Table 4, which details actual revenue and expenditure for the subsequent six years, with 19245 (shown in italics) included for purposes of comparison. On the revenue side, the key features are: The ongoing dependence on customs and excise duties and agricultural taxes which, collectively provided approximately 75% of total revenue throughout this period. However, within these categories it appears thatYoungVernon were unduly pessimistic about the immediate prospects of increased land and agricultural taxes which jumped by over 20% in 19256 and remained mostly at this elevated level until the slump of 192930. In contrast, higher customs duties took longer to implement but ultimately increased by 10% between 19245 and 19289. The introduction of income tax in 1927 a year later than YoungVernon had recommended described in the Report to the League of Nations (1931, 89) as being based on the British law and initially levied at the rate of 3.63% on all non-farm and nonproperty incomes (which were already subject to taxation) above 298. The Report indicates that although this tax raised only 1% of total revenue in 192930, it was regarded as controversial and would undoubtedly become more so with a projected increase to 9% for 1931. Negligible oil revenues despite, in Mejchers (1976) view, oil shaping Britains early involvement in Mesopotamia/Iraq. Signicant production commenced only in 1927 and Iraq did not receive substantial oil revenues until the 1950s.

256 G. Burrows and P.E. Cobbin On the expenditure side, the noteworthy elements are: The dominance of expenditure on the defence and police forces, which collectively always exceeded 31% of total expenditure, and, with the large increase in defence expenditure following the implementation of the military agreement, increased to over 40%. Increases in education and health expenditures, respectively of 36 and 105% during this period. Negligible initial spending on capital works, consistent with the earlierYoungVernon strictures on this point, but with some expenditure from 19278. The absence of any repayment of Ottoman Debt obligations which had been expected to total almost 1.9 million during this period. Overall, the aggregate net surplus for 192130 was 1.53 million. The Report to the League of Nations (1931, 92) recorded that this amount, together with other oating balances held by the Iraqi government, was used to extinguish Iraqs share of the Ottoman Public Debt liabilities, 1.43 million; and invest in loans for railway development and reconstruction, 0.34 million. In elaborating on the Ottoman Debt repayments, the Report to the League of Nations (1931, 127) explained that:
In 1927 the Minister of Finance in consultation with the British Government took the responsibility of purchasing, in the market, Ottoman Debt securities with a view to handing them over in settlement of Iraqs liability. These operations were nally concluded at a cost of 1,228,000 sterling. The cash value of the bonds and coupons which could not be bought and certain other liabilities which could not be extinguished by the delivery of bonds and coupons was found to be about 383,000. The Debt Council has agreed to this sum being paid in seven equal yearly instalments of about 63,000 each, including interest, of which four remain to be paid at the end of the period under review.

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

Files CO732/28/18 and T161/247 in the UK National Archives contain details of the negotiations leading to these transactions. Modelled on an earlier scheme used in Italy to discharge its Ottoman Debt obligations arising from the takeover of Tripoli, merchant banker N.M. Rothschild & Co., acting for the Crown Agents, purchased on-market heavily-discounted Ottoman securities which were then handed to the Debt Council in settlement of the majority of the debt. The outstanding balance was to be paid in cash in seven annual instalments. Although they proposed no specic remedies, YoungVernon (1925, 24) identied Iraqs trade decit of almost 3.5m in 19245 as a matter of concern, with this gure only partly covered by expenditure by imperial forces in Iraqan invisible exportof approximately 2m, the balance being covered by the export of currency and drawing on whatever cash or credit [Iraq] has abroad. Despite the YoungVernon opposition to a separate Iraq currency, in 1926 Britain:
proposed a Currency Board based in London as an authority that could issue a distinctly Iraqi currency. However, this proposal was roundly rejected by the Iraqi authorities because it would not be based in Iraq. In 1927, Iraq resolved to establish a National Bank, but debate over the basis on which the currency would be issued caused the idea to founder. (Symes, Hanewich, and Al-Muderis 2001, 29)

While these developments were occurring, Young switched parties from Liberal to Conservative over what he considered Lloyd Georges socialistic farm-acquisition policies and pro-miner sympathies during the General Strike, 1926 (KP78/5a). Knighted in 1927, Young became editorin-chief of the Financial News, rival to the Financial Times for daily nance and business coverage. A director of the Southern Railways, English Electric, and Hudsons Bay companies, he also chaired

Accounting History Review

257

several parliamentary enquiries, and commissions, including the 19256 Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance (at which his friend, Maynard Keynes, was a key witness). The 1930 mission During MayJuly 1930, Young conducted a second this time solo nancial mission to Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government. Although the Report to the League of Nations (1931, 97) emphasised that this mission was due to budgetary difculties connected with the world-wide slump in agricultural prices, a phenomenon bound to impact severely on Iraq, no analysis of the impact of the proposed budgetary measures is possible due to the lack of any English-language information on the detailed measures proposed and the ensuing revenue and expense data. This information gap is possibly associated with another discontinuity: Iraqs independence in 1932. Another reason is that while budgetary problems were one cause of the 1930 mission, a more important factor was an Iraqi rethink concerning the concept of a London-based currency board. Evidence that currency matters had primacy on this mission isYoungs (1930) letter from Baghdad to his wife, Kathleen, stating that he had arranged with the P.M. [prime minister, Nuri al Said] to advise on 1. Currency, 2. Budget, 3. The slump, 4. Loans, in that order (KP107/3). When Young returned to London in mid-July 1930, it was after amending the Iraqi proposals which were presented to the Iraqi parliament that October, and passed into law on 19 April 1931 following a few minor modications (Symes, Hanewich, and Al-Muderis 2001). The rst report of the Iraq Currency Board (1933, 2) in connection with the introduction of a national currency, recorded that Young proposed a scheme for a new currency linked to sterling and managed by an independent Currency Board. The Government approved this scheme. Subsequently, Lainela (1993, 430) described the currency-board concept as an:
arrangement whereby the introduction of the currency is the responsibility of a monetary authority separate from the central bank or the central banks other activities the domestic currency in circulation is fully backed by foreign exchange and the amount of currency in circulation can only change according to changes in the foreign exchange reserves.

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

Hanke (2002), who dated the rst application of the currency-board idea to the British colony of Mauritius in 1849, also viewed currency boards as alternatives to central banks and outlined 20 points of difference between the two types of institution, mostly arising from the currency-only role of currency boards compared with the much broader economic and regulatory functions of central banks. As outlined by the Iraq Currency Board (1933, 2), the major features of the Iraqi scheme were the following: the basic currency unit was the Iraqi dinar, to be equal in value to the pound sterling; dinars were to replace rupees which were to be converted at the prevailing exchange rate with sterling; the Currency Board was to invest in the securities of States whose currencies were convertible into gold, and; Currency Board assets were to provide coverage of 100 per cent of currency issued. The Iraq Currency Board (1933, 7) also detailed the structure of the ve-man board to which Young was appointed chairman on 11 June 1931. Two members were to be nominated by the Iraqi government; two members would be nominated on rotation by the three major foreign banks operating in Iraq; the nal member would be nominated on the invitation of the Government of Iraq by the Governor of the Bank of England or by the Finance Committee of the League of Nations. Youngs appointment was under the rst of these categories.

258 G. Burrows and P.E. Cobbin

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

Figure 1. Iraq Currency Board, Statement of Estimated General Position as at 31 March 1933. Source: Iraq Currency Board (1933, 13).

The exchange of Indian for Iraqi currency occurred during April-June 1932, with the rupees being repatriated to India and their sterling equivalent being received by the Board (Iraq Currency Board 1933, 3). Currency-board accounts when currency redemptions occur are complicated creatures with, in addition to balance sheets and prot and loss accounts, separate accounts inter alia for costs of notes and coins manufactured, issues and redemptions, and currency reserve funds. Perhaps most informative is the Boards inaugural statement of estimated general position, based largely on the mark-to-market concept, shown as Figure 1. Consistent with the strictures of Lainela (1993) and Hanke (2002) about the operations of currency boards, all the Iraq Currency Boards investments in 1933 were in sterling-denominated British Government or British colonial loans. Youngs rst period as chairman of the Iraq Currency Board ended in January 1932 when he became Minister for Health in Ramsay McDonalds National Government.2 He was then replaced by his former patron, Leo Amery, who maintained the chairmanship until May 1940 when he resigned after being appointed Secretary of State for India. Amery was, in turn, replaced by Young, now elevated to the peerage as Baron Kennet following his retirement from politics in June 1935. He had become a major gure in the City, holding multiple directorships as well as chairing the Capital Issues Committee which regulated all signicant corporate capital-raisings in the UK. Young continued as chairman until 30 June 1949 when the Board ceased operations upon responsibility for the note issue being transferred to the National Bank of Iraq. As Lord Kennet, Youngs second term as chair of the Iraq Currency Board, in which capacity he signed all post-1941 issues of banknotes, gave rise to a unique phenomenon. In the style of the peerage, he signed simply as Kennet. In his earlier stint as chairman he had signed the 1932 issue of banknotes as E. Hilton Young, giving him, as Symes (2003) observed, a strangely unique position as a signatory of world banknotes. He is the only man to have signed the banknotes of an issuing authority with two different names.

Stewardship evaluated As to the success of the 1925 YoungVernon mission, Longrigg (1953, 164) summarised the position thus: A large part of its suggestions, especially as regards new taxation and reorganisation, was not adopted. The Iraq Government was destined, indeed, to remain solvent but impecunious for years to come. Similarly, Britains later Report to the League of Nations (1931, 97) commented in relation to the YoungVernon Report that: Reasons of local policy prevented a large part of their proposals from being carried out, in particular, their suggestions for increased taxation.

Accounting History Review

259

Nevertheless, the year 192526 resulted in a surplus of [503,000] for 192526, and the following years brought a surplus of [226,000]. However, these are merely general impressions, not apparently based on any obvious accounting and budgetary expertise, and it is desirable to evaluate both the 1925 and 1930 (as it relates to currency) missions more objectively. The terms of reference for the 1925 mission are an obvious starting point, requiring YoungVernon to advise on steps to balance the budget given the constraints of the defence agreement and Ottoman debt obligations. Alternative benchmarks reside in the ve-element transition strategy developed by the IMF in the 1990s to build the nancial, regulatory, and information-systems structures required to ensure the nancial viability of nations in post-conict situations. These elements or criteria comprise the following: credible means of payment and capabilities for external payments; reasonably stable prices, calling for convincingly rm monetary control; efcient utilisation of foreign aid and foreign exchange resources; efcient mobilisation and allocation of savings (credit); and effective nancial services to execute the government budget (means to collect revenue, make payments, nance decits, etc.) (Lonnberg 2003, 9). Qualications to the use of these criteria are that they were fashioned in an era of more-complex nancial systems and institutions than existed during the 1925 and 1930 Iraqi nancial missions. These occurred when currency rather than credit transfers was the predominant medium of internal payment, exchange rates were xed, and institutions such as the IMF and World Bank did not exist. As to success in relation to their terms of reference, while YoungVernons suggested measures would not have produced a balanced budget, their implementation would have substantially reduced the 19256 decit from almost 40% of revenue to less than 10%. They were activist in relation to one of the constraints defence spending under the military agreement advising that expenditure of just over 1 million, almost 25% below the original Iraqi proposal, would satisfy the agreement. Actual defence expenditures during 19259 were less than 5% above the YoungVernon recommendation. Similarly, pace the comments of Longrigg (1953) and Report to the League of Nations (1931), most of the revenue and expense measures suggested by Young Vernon were implemented. However, the budget surpluses that eventually ensued were also due to the removal of the other major constraintannual Ottoman Debt repaymentsfacilitated by the on-market purchases of the relevant securities which occurred independently of YoungVernon. In relation to its terms of reference, the 1925 mission appears to have been moderately successful. Regarding the rst IMF criterion of the means and capability of undertaking external payments, capability is best judged in relation to the balance of payments in the sense that the greater the surplus, the greater the capacity to pay for imports. While Iraqs trade decit on visible items had been reduced only marginally from 3.5m in 19245 to 3.1m in 192930, the nations overall external imbalance, a matter of concern to YoungVernon in 1925, had been largely overcome due primarily to increased invisible exports, namely disbursements by foreign governments, businesses and individuals in Iraq (Report to the League of Nations 1931, 214). While it is difcult to relate this improved external position to the 1925 YoungVernon mission, improvements in nancial stability arising from the mission may have indirectly encouraged foreign investments and visits. Although no price-indices for Iraqs mandatory period can be located, overall it was a time of deation due to both external and internal factors. The Report to the League of Nations (1931, 129) referred to post-1921 reductions in agricultural prices and falls in the cost of living, together with a policy of reducing public-sector salaries to levels affordable in times of budget stringency. Public servants incomes were reduced marginally in 1926 and by between 5 and 8% from November

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

260 G. Burrows and P.E. Cobbin 1930, with those on higher salaries suffering the greatest reductions. Thus price stability mostly occurred independently of British policies. However, these salary reductions, which aided the budgetary position, followed the advice offered by YoungVernon. Placing the nations currency under the control of an independent currency board a device described by Lainela (1993, 430) as the most simple, credible and pressure-resistant way to introduce a national currency in underdeveloped monetary conditions doubtless facilitated price stability. Iraqs currency issues were restricted to the market value of the sterling instruments held by its Currency Board, which, in effect, represented an ination- and currency-control device. Although delaying the introduction of an Iraqi currency until 1932 offended nationalist sentiments, the YoungVernon (1925) objections to the earlier introduction of a national currency in the mid1920s, when the new Iraqi administration was facing potentially serious budgetary decits, were defensible. That, post-1931, an independent Iraq retained the ve-member currency board with Young as chairman until 1949 implies that domestic and international condence in the nations currency was enhanced by this arrangement. In relation to mobilisation and allocation of savings, the IMF doubtless envisaged capital accumulation in both private and public sectors to enable investment in business and publicinfrastructure assets. Judgement is difcult on this point because of Iraqs obligation to contribute to past investments made by the Ottoman Empire. However, it seems that Britain did act expeditiously to extinguish this liability at minimum cost to Iraq, although self-interest was obviously present if the alternative was Britain itself assuming this liability. British self-interest was similarly present in relation to Iraqi defence spending. The Report to the League of Nations (1931, 478) disclosed that the British garrison in Iraq was reduced from 33 infantry battalions in 1921 to one battalion in 1928, with major reductions also in RAF squadrons and armoured car companies. Undoubtedly, some of the large increases in Iraqi defence expenditure shown in Table 4 could have been avoided and diverted to public services and infrastructure had Britain retained a larger presence. However, given that the mandatory period was intended to prepare for full independence, and the UK-Iraq Military Agreement required Iraq to develop its own defence capabilities, YoungVernons analysis of the resources required to comply with the Agreement, which resulted in reductions of 321,000 to 19256 spending proposals, produced savings which were largely achieved and continued over the next four years, thus removing substantial pressure from the budget. Regarding the effectiveness of budgetary systems for revenue and expenditure, it appears that Britain inherited reasonably workable systems from the Ottomans which it was slowly upgrading, and re-orientating away from agricultural taxes by increasing collections from indirect taxes and customs and excise duties and expanding the tax base to incorporate turnover and income taxes. Overall, given that data limitations prevent denitive judgement, it appears that YoungVernon did contribute to stable prices and monetary control, the latter enhanced by Youngs 1930 mission and the ensuing Iraq Currency Board. Furthermore, Iraqi budgetary systems were signicantly improved by the 1925 mission, which also brought about reductions in defence expenditure, the largest single budget item. In terms of those of the IMF criteria relevant to the period, the 1925 and 1930 nancial missions can be considered as at least qualied successes. Conclusion Nation-creation is invariably associated with profound budgetary and nancial discontinuities which require careful management if state-failure is to be avoided. It is instructive to examine how these nancial-management processes occurred in Iraq and the degree to which they were

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

Accounting History Review

261

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

successful. Iraqs experience indicates that these processes never occur in a vacuum but are likely to reect the interposition of external powers and supranational institutions. Vestiges of previous systems continuities - are likely still to be operating and it is sensible to continue these in the rst instance. Iraqs experience also demonstrates that the state-creation process itself may cause new budgetary problems, further complicating and prolonging the adjustment processes. Iraqs experience provides a useful benchmark to assess progress in other nations that have been (re)created in modern times, notably East Timor and the post-1990 liberated member-states of the former Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia. For these edgling states, new nancial systems and currencies have had to be created. Invariably the IMF has been involved on an advisory basis and it is not too fanciful to view the YoungVernon 1925 mission to Iraq as a forerunner to the nancial-reconstruction work of the IMF. Perhaps the closest contemporary parallel to Iraq is Poland which ceased to exist as an independent political entity in the late eighteenth century and only re-emerged after World War I, a link strengthened by the role that Britain played in Polands reconstruction, which involved a nancial mission albeit unofcial by Young on Britains behalf in 1923 and a subsequent report (Young 1924). Iraqs post-1931 nancial history also deserves attention to assess the longer-term budgetary impacts of how Britain discharged its responsibilities under the League of Nations mandate, while a counterpart examination of Iraqs post-2002 budgetary changes could fruitfully complement the assurance and governance perspectives utilised by Cooper and Catchpowle (2009). Comparisons of Ottoman-era and post-Ottoman budgetary systems in other nations such as Syria are also warranted. In another thread, the problem of budgetary biasing, identied by YoungVernon, suggests that the largely post-1960 literature on this topic could be enriched by historical examples and perspectives. Finally, the highly-specialised accounts of note-issuing entities appear to lack comprehensive treatments in the accounting literature and represent a void waiting to be lled. Acknowledgements
The authors thank Peter Symes, Ian McDonald, Robert Dixon, Marianne Pitts, Jane Hronsky, the editor and reviewers, participants at the Accounting, Business & Financial History Conference, Cardiff, September 2007, for providing helpful comments, and the late Wayland Young (2nd Baron Kennet) for permitting access to his familys papers.

Notes
1. In contrast to the Treaty of Versailles, which was concerned with German reparations payable largely to France and Belgium, the nancial provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne divided the debt obligations of the former Ottoman Empire between Turkey and all the states detached from the former Empire. Turkey paid no reparations as such. 2. This was also the year in which Britains League of Nations Mandate concluded with Iraq joining the League as an independent nation.

References
Adhikari, P., and F. Mellemvik. 2009. Nepalese governmental accounting development in the 1950s and early 1960s: an attempt to institutionalize expenditure accounting. Accounting Historians Journal 36, no. 1: 11333. Burrows, G., and P. Cobbin. 2009. Controlling government expenditure by external review: the 19212 Geddes Axe. Accounting History 14, no. 3: 199220. Burrows, G., and B. Syme. 2000. Zero-base budgeting: origins and pioneers. Abacus 36, no. 2: 22641. CO732/28/18. Ottoman public debt: statement and suggested methods of off-setting debt, National Archives, Kew. Constable, P., and N. Kuasirikun. 2007. Accounting for the nation-state in mid nineteenth-century Thailand. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 20, no. 4: 574619.

262 G. Burrows and P.E. Cobbin


Cooper, C., and L. Catchpowle. 2009. An audit-based appraisal of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Critical Perspectives on Accounting 20, no. 6: 71634. Fernandez-Revuelta, L., D. Gomez, and K. Robson. 2002. Fuerzas Motrice del Valle de Lecrin, 19369: accounting reports and ideological struggles in time of civil war. Accounting, Business & Financial History 12, no. 2: 34768. Geddes Report. 1922. Committee on National Expenditure. First Interim Report (Cmnd. 1581): Second Interim Report (Cmnd. 1582); Third Interim Report (Cmd. 1589); Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 1922 Session 1, Vol. 9: 1456. Hall, S.M. 2006. Before Leonard: The early suitors of Virginia Woolf. London: Peter Owen. Hanke, S.H. 2002. Currency boards. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 579 (January): 87105. Himadeh, S. 1966. Iraq: taxation in the 1900s. In The economic history of the Middle-East, 18001914, ed. C. Issawi, 95106. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hofstede, G.H. 1968. The game of budget control. London: Tavistock. Iraq Currency Board. 193349. Reports of the Iraq Currency Board. London: Waterlow. Jaruga, A., and W.A. Nowak. 1995. Governmental accounting in transition: the Polish experience. Financial Accountability & Management 11, no. 1: 7594. Jaruga, A., W.A. Nowak, and B. Lisiecka-Zajac. 1998. Polish public sector accounting in transition: evidence from the mid 1990s. Financial Accountability & Management 14, no. 2: 10521. KP107/2. E.H.Young to K.Young. 14 March 1295 (Kennet Papers, Cambridge University Library, Manuscripts Collection). KP78/5a. E.H. Young to Lord Asquith and Oxford. 19 February 1926 (Kennet Papers, Cambridge University Library, Manuscripts Collection). KP107/3. E.H. Young to K. Young. 20 May 1930 (Kennet Papers, Cambridge University Library, Manuscripts Collection). Lainela, S. 1993. Currency reforms in the Baltic states. Communist Economies & Economic Transformation 5, no. 3: 42743. Longrigg. S.H. 1953. Iraq, 1900 to 1950: a political, social, and economic history. London: Oxford University Press. Longrigg. S.H., and F. Stoakes. 1958. Iraq. London: Benn. Lonnberg, A. 2001. Post-conict economies: lessons from restoring and transforming payments and banking systems in Kosovo and East Timor. Unpublished working paper, Washington: IMF. Lonnberg, A. 2003. Building a nancial system in Afghanistan. Paper presented at Symposium on State Reconstruction and International Engagement in Afghanistan, Bonn, May 31. Lowe, E.A., and R.W. Shaw. 1968. An analysis of managerial biasing: evidence from a rms budgeting process. Journal of Management Studies 5, no. 3: 30415. MacMillan, M. 2003. Paris 1919: Six months that changed the world. New York: Random House. Mejcher, H. 1976. Imperial quest for oil: Iraq 19101928. London: Ithaca Press. Report to the League of Nations. 1931. Special report by His Majestys Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the progress of Iraq during the period 19201931. Colonial No. 58, London: HMSO. Spence, C. 2010. Accounting for the dissolution of a nation state: Scotland and the Treaty of Union. Accounting, Organizations and Society 35, no. 3: 37792. Suvla, R.-S. 1966. The Ottoman debt, 18501939. In The economic history of the Middle-East, 18001914, ed. C. Issawi, 95106. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Symes, P.J. 2003. Sir E. Hilton Young. http://www.pjsymes.com.au/articles/HiltonYoung.htm (accessed May 30 2011). Symes, P., M. Hanewich, and L. Al-Muderis. 2001. The bank notes of the Iraq Currency Board. International Bank Note Society Journal 40, no. 3: 2938. T161/247. Dobbs to Amery, 25/2/1925, National Archives, Kew. Valdivieso, L. 2000. East Timor: recent developments and macroeconomic assessment. Paper presented at IMF Donors Conference for East Timor, Brussels, 6 December. Young, E.H. 1915. The system of national nance. London: Smith, Elder. Young, E.H. 1924. Report on nancial conditions in Poland. London: Waterlow. Young, W. 1971. Young, Edward Hilton. In Dictionary of national biography, 19511960, ed. E.T. Williams and H.M. Palmer, 108890. London: Oxford University Press. YoungVernon Report. 1925. Report of the nancial mission appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to enquire into the nancial position and prospects of the Government of Iraq, 1925 HMSO (Cmnd 2438).

Downloaded by [Perpustakaan Nasional Republik Indonesia (PNRI)] at 19:25 08 July 2013

You might also like