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European Integration, 2003, Vol. 25, pp.

116

EU ENLARGEMENT AND CFSP/ESDP


ANTONIO MISSIROLI
EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
(Received 7 October 2002; In final form 26 November 2002) The successive enlargements of the EC/EU have been, and still are, quintessential security policy. Focusing on the Central/Middle European candidates for accession, this article aims to evaluate their impact in the broader context of the Unions CFSP/ESDP (and European security at large) in the wake of the parallel enlargements of NATO and the EU decided in the autumn of 2002. CFSP and ESDP will be affected by the presence and input of the acceding countries in various ways, although the overall spectrum of sensitivities and inclinations will change only marginally. While the issue of the foreseeable/desirable future borders of the Union will become ever more important, a viable compromise will have to be struck between the rights and interests of all member States, the means of some, and the overarching imperative of effectiveness and credibility on the regional and international scene. Keywords: EU; Enlargement; security; Central Europe; ESDP; CFSP

INTRODUCTION The enlargement of the European Community/Union has been for decades, and still is, a quintessential security policy: a security policy by other means, so to speak, and a security policy in its own right. By other means, because extending the Unions norms, rules, opportunities and constraints to the applicants has made and will make instability and conflict in the wider region much less likely, however challenging such an extension may be. And it is a security policy in its own right, too, because the entrants have brought and will bring in interests and skills that broaden the scope of the common external policies.1 This was the case with the first enlargement of the European Community, which incorporated British (and partially also Danish) outreach overseas and gradual AngloIrish d etente via Brussels. All the more so with the Southern enlargements of the 1980s, that paved the way to the successful completion of postauthoritarian transitions to democracy, a significant reinforcement of the Communitys presence in the Mediterranean basin, and an equally significant extension of European influence in the Americas. Finally, the 1995 enlargement of the newlycreated EU brought more stability to the Baltic Rim and strengthened the Unions drive to cooperate with the UN and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It marginally altered the internal balance between allied and nonallied member States (until
Corresponding author: EU Institute for Security Studies, 43 avenue du Pr esident Wilson 75775 Paris cedex 16 France. Email: a.missiroli@iss-eu.org ISSN 0703-6337 print: ISSN 1477-2280 online 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltd DOI: 10.1080/0703633031000077190

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then, only Ireland was not a NATO member), but it also favoured albeit indirectly, as a sort of compensation for those EU members who felt penalised by the Central and Northern drift of the Union the launch of the so called Barcelona Process, i.e. the Euro Mediterranean Conference.2 The current enlargement, however, is nothing like the previous ones. It is fundamentally different in size, scope, and character: going from an EU of 15 member states to one of, 25 will mean an increase of population of 20 per cent but an increase in GDP of only a few points, coupled with an increase of small members from the current 10 to 19 (including 11 with a population of 5 million or less). It is therefore likely to quite radically change the institutions, the policies, even the nature of the Union.3 The internal (especially institutional and budgetary) implications of all that are already at the centre of the present debate. To what extent and exactly how will this enlargement affect the way in which the EU projects itself externally? In other words, what common foreign, security and defence policy (normally referred to as CFSP/ESDP) will the enlarged Union end up with? These questions are all the more legitimate because, at least to date, they have not been raised, even less tackled explicitly: in fact, separate policy and scientific communities have dealt with either enlargement or CFSP/ESDP, without ever focusing on the possible interplay and mutual influences between the two processes and dynamics. Yet, answering such questions entails a strong element of guesswork, because actual membership per se may alter the expectations, priorities and, ultimately, the behaviour of the former applicants. To a certain extent, the fact that membership is much closer now than it was a few years ago has already altered their attitude and influenced their foreign policy decisions. Moreover, in a Union of more than 20 members, alliances and coalitions may easily shift according to the contingencies and the issues at stake. What can be assessed at this stage, therefore, is only what priorities, preferences, general attitudes and specific interests the current applicants are likely to bring into the present Union of 15. What will happen from day one after accession is bound to remain a guessing game. In this respect, the Mediterranean candidates (Cyprus and Malta, not to mention Turkey) raise issues that are markedly different4 from those concerning the ten Central/Middle European5 ones, namely Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Among the former, the main security issue is a bi/ multilateral one Greek Turkish relations and their reverberations over and from Cyprus accession coupled with the long term and strategic implications of Ankaras EU membership. Among the latter, which this paper will exclusively focus on, nuances still persist (due also to their different historical experience, geopolitical position, sheer size, and available resources), but some discernible common features also seem to emerge. This article aims to illustrate these, analyse their possible implications, and evaluate them in the broader context of the Unions (still fledgling) CFSP/ESDP and European security at large.6

1. NEGOTIATING CFSP/ESDP To start with, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as developed since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty constitutes part of the so called acquis communautaire, namely the legal patrimony of the Union that all candidates, in principle, have to incorporate into their national legislation prior to becoming full members. As such, it is also part of the bilateral negotiations (the Fifteen v. each applicant) that characterise and shape the enlargement process. In the case of the ten candidates considered here, the negotiations on the

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CFSP relevant chapters of the acquis (n 26 for external relations, including trade, and n 27 for CFSP proper) went rather smoothly and quickly reached an end for all candidates in late 2000. The only issues that stirred some controversy be it through requests for transitional periods (chapter 26) or through non alignment with CFSP common positions or d emarches (chapter 27) were those that involved relations with fellow applicants (e.g. Slovakia) and/or immediate neighbours (e.g. Belarus). As long as the enlargement process appeared to proceed at different speeds for the two main groups invited to the negotiating table the Luxembourg Six (1997) and the Helsinki Six (1999)7 the most advanced candidates in particular were afraid of dismantling bilateral or sub regional arrangements that had proved effective in improving relations and security at all levels. This applies e.g. to the free trade agreement on agricultural products among the three Baltic States, the bilateral trade agreements and/or visa regimes that Poland, Lithuania and Romania have with Ukraine, Hungary with Romania, and Romania with Moldova. However, once it recently became clear that almost all of the ten countries under consideration accede to the Union at roughly the same time as eventually agreed in Copenhagen in December 2002 that worry disappeared. Similar fears were aired with respect to domestic developments in such countries as Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Belarus. Conversely, the still pending bilateral border issues between, respectively, Estonia and Russia, Latvia and Belarus, and Slovenia and Croatia do not seem to have played any significant role in the process. Insofar as these are still on the table, they will be dealt with either in the final round of negotiations on the individual Accession Treaties or in the broader EU framework after enlargement. By the same token, all the issues related to sub regional economic integration and multilateral relations, which played quite a significant role in the past decade (be it in the Visegrad framework, in the Nordic Baltic area or, more recently, in the South Eastern European context)8 seem to have been already, if gradually, absorbed by the Union and its policies. This applies also, at least in part, to the issue of the Kaliningrad enclave (or exclave, if seen from Moscow), which was eventually resolved in November 2002 through a bilateral EU Russia deal that has taken some Polish, Lithuanian and also Belarusian interests into account although not (or not yet) that of Moldova.9 On the whole, however, it can be argued that enlarging the CFSP acquis has hardly raised any problems, primarily as a consequence of its declaratory nature, the limited domestic adjustments it has required, and the substantial lack of budgetary burdens for either side. In other words, the conditionality that the EU applies with remarkable success to other policy areas has played no significant direct role in this field, although it has certainly played one already since the Balladur Pact of 1994 (the first Stability Pact proper, and a CFSP joint action in its own right) on issues related to the treatment of national minorities, that were also bilateral issues between candidates. In this respect, not surprisingly, negotiating Schengen (chapter 24) has proved slightly trickier than negotiating CFSP.10 The good news, therefore, is that the process of legal adaptation and policy convergence is already well advanced in the foreign policy domain, thanks also to a certain measure of silent assumptions. The possibly less good news is that the real negotiations between old and new partners over what the Commission officials in charge call the future us have not taken place at all on CFSP elsewhere: on agriculture, structural funds, taxation, and budgetary issues in general. As for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which basically covers civilian and military crisis management, is founded on the so called Petersberg tasks now enshrined in art.17 of the EU Treaty, but does not entail any legal acquis to incorporate into national legislation all applicants from Central/Middle Europe reacted late and defensively to its launch in 1999. They hardly understood its rationale and, above all, feared that it could undermine NATOs internal cohesion and, more generally, drive the Americans out of

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Europe. Some of the applicants also suspected that involvement in ESDP might come as an alternative to future NATO membership or, worse, as a consolation prize for not being admitted into the Alliance which instead was their main security policy goal. Conversely, for those candidates who were already NATO members, the key issue was notably the establishment of a clearly defined relationship with the Alliance whereby all relevant decisions would be taken at 15 + 6 (EU members plus other European allies). In many ways and with varying emphasis, Budapest, Prague and above all Warsaw in February 2000 Poland issued a non paper (later withdrawn) demanding that all main decisions be taken at 21 considered ESDP acceptable only as European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within (or under the supervision of) NATO. Furthermore, they did not appreciate the EUs initial approach, whereby they were simply included in the broader category of third countries, together with fellow non allied candidates and such countries as Russia or Ukraine. Only since the spring of 2000 did a more differentiated approach prevail within the EU, although that did not entirely dispel the lingering fears of the Central/Middle European allies. Over time, however, their attitudes have evolved towards a warmer acceptance of the ESDP blueprint as eventually spelt out at the Nice European Council in late 2000, on the condition that its implementation turn into a positive sum (rather than zero sum) game between the Union and the Alliance. Previous Atlanticist reservations such as Polands have been toned down in order to mark some distance vis a ` vis Turkeys much more rigid position and, also, in order not to endanger the candidates negotiating position vis a ` vis the EU. In other words, the fear of potentially even higher hurdles to overcome on the road to accession the Headline Goal for the European Rapid Reaction Force set in December 1999 in Helsinki having been initially seen as just another one prompted a more constructive attitude on the applicants side. Some residual ambivalence over the implications of ESDP is still present, however, and may resurface dramatically in the presence of unexpected developments in the region and/or in transatlantic relations.11 A good example has been offered recently by the pressure that the US administration has put on the candidates (and on some of the Fifteen) to sign separate bilateral deals with Washington exempting American forces from the jurisdiction of the newly constituted International Criminal Court (ICC): a pressure that initially only Romania gave in to, but to which others were tempted to bow, until the EU, in late September 2002, agreed on a set of guidelines to be adopted and respected by all present and future members in their negotiations with Washington.12

2. THE MILITARY DIMENSION: MISSIONS AND RESOURCES In spite of their relatively short record of freedom of action (and, for some, sheer independence) on the international scene, over the past few years all ten Central/Middle European applicants have been increasingly engaged in peace support operations, mostly but not exclusively in the Western Balkans. That applies to IFOR/SFOR13 since 1996 (all involved), Operation Alba in 1997 (Romania and Slovenia), and KFOR14 since 1999 (all but Latvia and Romania). As a rule, they have done so as modular components of bigger multinational units and under foreign command. Much as the contributions have been limited in absolute numbers and restricted in their functions, they have proved the willingness and ability of the applicants to participate and perform in art.17-type peace support operations. Moreover, in late November 2000 the candidates committed forces and capabilities to the so called Headline Goal plus, adding a few more at the Capabilities Improvement Conference held in November 2001. The pledges they have made do not significantly widen the overall

EU ENLARGEMENT AND CFSP/ESDP TABLE I Voluntary contributions to Headline Goal-plus (November 2001) Country Estonia Military 1 light infantry battalion [from 2005] 1 military police unit 1 mine-clearing platoon 2 naval vessels 1 infantry battalion 1 military police unit 1 explosive ordnance disposal unit 1 military medical unit 2 mine-sweepers 1 fast patrol boat 2 training grounds 3 mechanized battalions 1 engineering unit 1 medical support unit 2 mine-sweepers 2 helicopters 2 military cargo aircraft 1 framework brigade (rapid reaction + air cavalry battalion) 1 brigade of highland riflemen [might include Ukrainian battalion] 1 military police section 1 naval support group 1 airborne search & rescue group 1 mechanised infantry battalion 1 special force company 1 centre for humanitarian & rescue operations 1 field hospital/medical battalion 1 chemical/radioactive recon company 1 helicopter unit 1 mechanised company ( + support) 1 military police unit 1 multi-purpose field hospital 1 engineering mine-clearance unit 4 transport helicopters 1 mechanised infantry battalion 1 air-defence unit officers/NCOs for command structures 1 infantry company 1 military police squad 1 medical unit 1 transport helicopter/air force unit 5 infantry battalions 1 infantry company 1 engineering company 1 paratroop company 1 mountain-troop company 1 military police company 1 mine-clearing detachment 1 reconnaissance platoon 1 transport platoon 6 naval vessels (incl. 2 rescue tugs, 1 minesweeper, 1 frigate) 4 combat aircraft 1 air carrier 1 mechanised infantry battalion 1 engineering battalion 1 chemical/radioactivity recon brigade 1 sea-based rocket launcher 2 cargo helicopters 4 combat helicopters

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Czech Republic

Slovakia

Hungary Slovenia

Romania

Bulgaria

Source: see endnote 15.

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spectrum, even less help addressing the main shortfalls of the Headline Goal exercise. Moreover, the forces earmarked for the HG plus not unlike what has happened with many EU members are mostly double hatted (i.e. answerable to both NATO and now the EU), which makes them less ready and available in reality than on paper. Modest as they are, however, the voluntary contributions of the EU applicants15 as they are officially named, so as to underline their optional nature display a remarkable degree of political goodwill that is not always matched by an equal interest on the EU side. What is worth noting is that in most candidate countries participation in NATO led or EU led missions is seen as a driving factor towards some sort of role specialisation. Such specialisation, of course, is about making virtue out of necessity: financial, technical and human resources are scarce and have to be channelled and focused on viable objectives. This is all the more important since all the countries under consideration are in the process of overhauling and modernising their military forces: some have to get rid of over manned force structures inherited from Warsaw Pact times (Bulgaria, Romania, and to a lesser extent Slovakia) while some others, with a more recent record of national independence, have to set up credible forces almost from scratch (Slovenia and the Baltic states). Of the ten Central/ Middle European applicants, only the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania presently meet the target (set by NATO as an indicative benchmark) of 2 per cent of GDP for expenditure on defence, while Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia almost attain it and Hungary and Slovenia are the laggards, but all have pledged to increase spending in the years to come: yet here, too, the picture is no different among the current EU member States.16 Moreover, the ways in which notably the Czechs have focused on developing Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) decontamination units, the Hunga n ` aus on engineering squads, or the Romanians on mountain light infantry, represent important success stories: in other words, functional role specialisation (military as well as civilian) is a path that could soon prove unavoidable for the current EU members too,17 as is the almost generalised creation of multinational units on a sub regional basis which seems to have become more substantial and less symbolic than before or the joint leasing or pooling of certain capabilities (aircraft and logistics). Finally, similar constraints (and opportunities) apply to the ten candidates defence procurement policy proper. While most countries are still substituting or upgrading old equipment from the Soviet era, the need to become more interoperable with NATO allies and, in perspective, EU partners is putting additional pressure on public budgets and decision makers.18 What is worth noting here, too, is that some evolution has occurred throughout Central/Middle Europe. Whilst in the late 1990s, tenders were almost regularly won by American firms (partly as a side effect of the candidates willingness to gain Washingtons support in their bids for NATO membership), lately officials seem to have adopted a slightly more balanced attitude. As a result, European companies seem to have more chances now, partly due to the prospect of EU membership but in part, also, due to the more credible offset programmes they may be able to offer. This is especially the case with Swedish manufacturers, mostly in conjunction with British Aerospace (Latvia, Czech Republic and Hungary), and to a much lesser extent with EADS, the European Aerospace Defence and Space company (Lithuania, Poland through Spanish airspace company CASA). Procurement policy, in other words, remains largely driven by political considerations (for both the candidate groups) but increasingly takes into account the added value of domestic job creation in high tech sectors that may prove crucial in the future. The final word has not been said though, and US firms starting with Lockheed Martin are striking back with comparable offers and assertive political lobbying, as recently and dramatically shown by the eventual Polish decision, in December 2002, to acquire F-16s rather than Grifens for the national Air Force. On top of that,

EU ENLARGEMENT AND CFSP/ESDP

the recent floods in Central/Middle Europe have hijacked budgetary resources initially destined to military purchases. Once again, this is not happening only in candidate countries (Czech Republic) but also in current member States (Austria and Germany), yet the relative impact is stronger in the former. This said, the limited resources and relative backwardness of the Central/Middle European candidates may indirectly show the current members how to make substantial progress on ESDP: the development of niche capabilities and Combined Joint Forces packages/modules to be grafted onto larger command structures does increase both effectiveness and inclusion without prejudging the eventual format (NATO and/or EU, UN, ad hoc ) of any future common operation. For their part, EU members should encourage the candidates to adopt a joint approach to large procurement projects while improving their own record.

3. APPROACHES TO EUROPEAN SECURITY At the present stage, the main issue for most Central/Middle European candidates still seems to be that of participation. This is apparent at different levels. They want to be adequately consulted and involved in decision shaping via both the official formats envisaged since the Nice European Council (15 + 6, as already mentioned, and 15 + 15, which encompasses all EU applicants and all European allies) and the more informal ones. They also want to be considered partners in the making and therefore listened to as soon to be subjects, rather than still objects, of the Unions common foreign policy. This is particularly true of the process of institutional reform, starting with the European Convention which will be followed by another Treaty review to be completed by 2004 in which they have insisted on being involved to an extent well beyond that foreseen in the initial blueprint.19 Yet it could also specifically be applied to CFSP and ESDP.20 In prospect, participation also means being on an equal footing with the current members in an enlarged Union in which decision making could become increasingly (even exponentially) complicated. This may help explain the apparently strange dichotomy that is discernible across all ten applicants: on the one hand, in fact, they instinctively oppose resorting to majority voting and extending enhanced cooperation in CFSP/ESDP because either (or both) may render them less relevant or even marginal in decision making. On the other hand, they seem quite open vis a ` vis the use of constructive abstention whereby a country can abstain without blocking the adoption of a decision and without being bound to participating in and paying for any subsequent action or operation (art.23 of the Treaty of the European Union, TEU) which would instead preserve their formal status but not confront them with responsibilities that may challenge their resources or internal cohesion. More generally, they all seem to realise that a more effective Union will be in their best interest and may require, at least in security and defence policy, a more streamlined, efficient and selective structure yet hesitate before the possible institutional implications. This attitude, too, is also largely present among the current EU members, yet with the crucial difference that most of the Central/Middle European candidates have (re) gained their full national sovereignty only lately and, therefore, may feel slightly uncomfortable with the prospect of pooling it right away. More generally, there seems to be a potential tension between what most candidates see as a much desired and well deserved return to Europe and what they feel as a reaffirmation of their national identity. On the one hand, a strong dose of supranational integration is considered as a safeguard against the predominance of the bigger members all candidates bar Poland and to a lesser extent Romania are small countries by EU standards while the cultivation of a European identity is considered as a

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means to differentiate themselves from their Communist past and to overcome their self perception as outsiders. On the other hand, the rather sophisticated notion of shared sovereignty and its institutional spin offs are not entirely familiar to (nor always to the liking of) local political leaders, although the overall balance sheet of the pros and cons of joining the Union remains as a targeted opinion poll conducted by Eurobarometer also shows largely positive.21 Another important issue is the scope and outreach of CFSP/ESDP. For historical as well as geographical reasons, none of the countries under consideration has significant overseas interests or extensions with the exception of sizeable, often vocal ethnic/national communities in the United States let alone a colonial past. As opposed to previous enlargements, therefore, the forthcoming one will not entail a significant widening of the horizons of the Unions external policies (although the Poles and the Baltic populations in particular are likely to cultivate their special relationship with the US). All current applicants, however, have a strong interest in the formulation of those external policies of the enlarged Union that might affect their immediate vicinity. After all, most of them will become the new external frontier (if not the ultimate limes ) of the EU. The permeability and safety of the Eastern borders and all common direct neighbourhood policies22 will become vital interests and presumably shape their behaviour on CFSP and other issues. The condition of national minorities, cross border trade and visa regulations, energy and environmental issues, Balkan stability, relations with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and, of course, Russia will be cases in point as they have already been, albeit marginally and indirectly, in the accession negotiations. In this sense, the applicants impact on CFSP and ESDP will be geographically limited but intensely focused. For further evidence one only has to look at the speech made by Czech President Vaclav Havel in Bratislava in May 2001, so keen on drawing lines vis a ` vis Russia,23 or to the suspicious reactions initially recorded in most Central/Middle European countries to the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11 and to the prospect of a special relationship with NATO (the 19 + 1 format). Similarly, in the framework of CFSP/ESDP proper, the EUs decision to upgrade its dialogue with Russia24 and hold monthly bilateral meetings i.e. more frequent, though much less substantial, ones than those with the applicants has raised several eyebrows in Central/Middle Europe. Yet again, this may not necessarily mean that there will be a sort of newcomers bloc on, say, relations with Russia (or Belarus). Countries like Slovakia or Bulgaria have different historical and cultural sensitivities from the Baltic States or Poland, while geographical proximity, cross border trade or minority issues may affect their approach to Russia, Ukraine or former Yugoslavia in several and diverse ways. For instance, it is no secret that Polands attitude vis a ` vis Russia has significantly changed (for the better) since its NATO membership. At any rate, it can be expected that the new partners will have a rather passive attitude vis a ` vis CFSP/ ESDP issues, at least initially, unless they feel that their immediate interests are involved or that they can increase their negotiating power inside the Union. Over time, however, it cannot be ruled out that some, or possibly all, of them may become less lukewarm and develop a keener interest in deepening integration for their own good. Last but not least is the issue of NATO and transatlantic relations. As already mentioned above, all ten candidates from Central/Middle Europe push for a clear understanding between the Alliance and the Union: whether already NATO members or just future ones, they do not want to be forced to choose between Washington and Brussels on security matters. This explains why they welcomed with warmth and also relief the so-called Berlin-plus agreement sealed by the EU and NATO in mid-December 2002, after almost three years of

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difficult negotiations.25 And while their markedly Atlanticist orientation as abundantly proved also by the opinion polls will add next to nothing to the overall spectrum of existing positions among the current EU members. After accession, however, it may slightly tip the internal balance of the Union in that direction, although, once again, actual membership may change the perception of national interests and shape new loyalties. Of course, the decision, adopted by the Alliance at its recent Prague summit in November 2002, to invite the seven Central/Middle European countries still outside of it to join NATO by May 2004 (with the accession papers to be signed by April 2003) is likely to reinforce their NATO first approach, at least in the short term. Once in and the realities of membership apparent, however, their attitude may shift towards a more balanced assessment of priorities and goals, as has partially happened with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In other words, there may not be a Central/Middle European cavars on CFSP/ESDP in general either, although it would be quite normal for them to try and prevent any competition between the Alliance and the Union and any major clash between Americans and Europeans. What is likely, at any rate, is that Bulgaria and Romania try to make the most of their NATO only membership (at least as long as that will be the case) also as regards ESDP and its cooperation with the Alliance. This said, it is worth noting that the terrorist actions of September 11 have had an impact on the applicants perception of security and vulnerability, which has become broader and more sophisticated. Like the current member States, they have all sided with the US and participated, to varying degrees, in the international coalition and Operation Enduring Freedom proper, either on a bilateral basis or through NATO and the UN. However, they have hardly altered their perception of the Alliances role, which they tend to see in rather traditional terms, while among the current EU + NATO members the sudden activation of art.5 of the Washington Treaty on September 12, followed by its modest implementation, sent shockwaves and raised questions over the nature and future of the Alliance that even the Prague summit has not answered convincingly. No such questioning, to date, in Central/Middle Europe: those who are already in may not be willing to consider the implications, and those who are almost in may not want to discuss them openly. All, however, seem to be happy with the new global outreach that the Alliance may soon acquire in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

4. THE TWO ENLARGEMENTS: DYNAMICS AND IMPLICATIONS In the early 1990s, the general expectation was that Europe would eventually be reunited under the joint aegis of the Union and the Alliance. The process would have taken some time, perhaps, due also to the fundamentally different entry requirements of the two organisations, but it would have been completed Russia permitting within a decade or so. In 1997, however, the two enlargement processes seemed to take divergent paths: a relatively quick but selective enlargement of the Alliance was followed by a slower and still only planned, although almost equally selective, enlargement of the Union.26 For the former, the driving factors were of a quintessentially geopolitical/strategic nature, for the latter of a typically functional/administrative character. Yet the fact that NATO and the Americans delivered while the EU and the Europeans did not, or not yet has played an important role in the perceptions of the Central/Middle European public. In addition, the Alliance has quite successfully managed to blur the difference between partnership and membership thus indirectly projecting security onto the countries involved in the Partnership for Peace

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programme while the Union simply cannot. As a result, the former is still more popular than the latter in both current and soon to be allied EU applicants (with the possible exception of Slovenia), perhaps also because the domestic costs and administrative hurdles of preparing for NATO membership have been (and still are) disproportionately lower than those of preparing for the EU. More recently, however, the two processes appear to have become more similar, if not entirely parallel and overlapping. The further expansion of the Alliance has followed more stringent functional criteria (as laid down in the Membership Action Plan), also as a consequence of the technical problems caused by the limited preparedness of especially the Czech Republic and Hungary on accession.27 By contrast, the Union has started thinking strategically and weighing the geopolitical and security implications of successive waves of entrants.28 For a moment however, roughly between 1999 and 2001, both processes seemed to lose momentum, due perhaps also to the lukewarm support in Western public opinion. On top of that, the candidates for NATO enlargement went further than those for the EU, thus potentially increasing, rather than decreasing, the geographical mismatch between the two organisations: in fact, NATOs Washington Communique of April 1999 issued in the midst of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo listed Albania and Macedonia alongside the seven Central/Middle Europeans. More recently, Croatia has become the tenth official candidate, and the list is likely to grow further in the direction of various former Soviet Republics such as Ukraine, Georgia or Azerbaijan already associated in NATOs Euro Atlantic Partnership Council, that encompasses up to 46 countries (19 + 27). September 11 has changed all that because it has dramatically shown the importance of stabilising the peripheries of Western homelands and forging wide coalitions against new potential threats posed by non state actors. What has changed, however, is mainly the pace of the two processes, not their similarity, or at least not much. In fact, a few weeks after Prague, the Copenhagen European Council of December 2002 set the accession dates for a much higher number of Central/Middle European candidates than imaginable only a few months before: all but Bulgaria and Romania (for which another rendezvous will be arranged later this decade), in addition to Malta and Cyprus, are expected to join the Union by May 2004. The two enlargements, in other words, will be completed exactly at the same time.29 This means that in a couple of years NATO will count 26 members and the EU 25, 19 of which will be in common. In organisational terms, the most obvious benefit will be the return to a situation of almost overlapping memberships lost since the mid-1990s but on a larger scale than ever before. The most obvious cost will be the increasing complexity of consensual decision making within each organisation. The two Western security communities will soon cover almost the whole continent but will be internally ever less manageable a situation that does not seem to worry the current applicants but may become a serious problem for all later on. A strategic gain, in other words, may be offset by a functional loss. It is not by accident that both organisations are seriously thinking of making their decision-making procedures and operational structures more flexible whatever that may mean. For the scope of this article, however, the most immediate implication of a double Big Bang in late 2002 will be that Bulgaria and Romania stay out of the Union (but not of the Alliance) for a few years, possibly until 2007 or shortly afterwards. The two countries are not considered ready, in fact, for the present wave of accessions, and after such a robust intake of new members the Union may still wait some time before reopening its doors all the more so because of the size and population of Bulgaria and especially Romania. Such a gap may not create major difficulties, especially since the recent invitation to join NATO will stabilise both Sophia and Bucharest domestically. At its root, the gap has much to do with the different

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pace and depth of democratic transition in Bulgaria and Romania: it began later, from a more backward point of departure, with less momentum and more reservations. The legacy of the Communist past is heavier and more resistant there, and the two political systems still look more volatile and unstable than that of the other candidates.30 This contributes to explaining why the two countries are also the only EU applicants involved as recipients in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, which is meant for countries that are considered only as potential candidates. At any rate, however big the gap, the eventual accession of Bulgaria and Romania does not seem in doubt. Yet it makes all the more evident that the next possible wave of expansion of the Union (and the Alliance, for that matter) is likely to concern South Eastern Europe and the Balkans while demanding a reassessment of direct neighbourhood policies of the enlarged EU, especially vis a ` vis Eastern Europe proper.31 The second major implication of the double Big Bang of late 2002 is that the extended format for the involvement of third European countries in ESDP operations is going to change from 15 + 15 to 23 + 5, following the special provisions applied to (and accepted by) Malta and Cyprus. It is not just a shift in numbers but also in substance: in fact, the 5 will all be NATO members (contrarily to the previous non EU 15), and ones with significant military capabilities and/or infrastructures: namely, Norway, Iceland, Turkey, Romania, and Bulgaria. This may well have repercussions on both the scope of the format itself and the nature of EU NATO cooperation in crisis management. Moreover, EU + NATO members taken together will come to constitute an absolute majority within the OSCE: this, in turn, may not have a direct impact on OSCE decision making which is strictly consensual but will certainly have a functional and psychological one. Finally, a larger EU + NATO membership may also have some influence on the member states behaviour inside the UN: here, however, the specific constraints and guarantees enshrined in art.19.1 TEU still apply. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the EU and NATO that the Central/Middle European candidates soon end up joining will will be very different organisations from those they set out to join a decade earlier. Over the past years, in fact, they have both become moving targets. The Union has acquired a more ambitious foreign and security policy including a specific defence dimension and is gradually becoming a single currency area: in fact, diplomacies, armies and currencies (however pooled) are quintessential features of sovereignty, well beyond the constraints and opportunities of a protected free trade area and a single market. For its part, the Alliance has first gone to (limited) war in Kosovo, then refrained from making serious use of those art.5 guarantees that have long been seen as its main raison d etre, and is now planning to take over a more global role. Instead of serving two distinct and separate (albeit mutually compatible and even reinforcing) purposes economic prosperity vs. hard security the EU and NATO have increasingly covered the same tasks in the same geographical area. CFSP/ ESDP lies exactly at the functional juncture of the two organisations, as also the recent debate over the compatibility/competition between the fledgling European Rapid Response Force and the newly launched NATO Response Force (and their respective niche components) showed. This is why there is ample scope for cooperation and synergy, of course, but also for a fundamental redefinition of their respective goals and roles across Western and Central/ Middle Europe as much as across the Atlantic.

5. WHAT NEXT? A few years from now the current EU enlargement process will be completed. By then, enlarging the Union further will have become a completely different ball game. As a

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security policy, in fact, enlargement has been effective only inasmuch as it could exercise some strict conditionality: if EU eventual membership is not in play, managing relations with neighbouring countries may become much more complicated. On the one hand, shutting the door of the Union once and for all may foster feelings of exclusion on its immediate periphery and trigger instability across the border. On the other hand, keeping the door permanently open to possible new entrants makes a definition of a common security and especially foreign policy a bit elusive. Even leaving aside the issue of Turkish accession, will policy towards, say, Ukraine, Russia, Israel or Morocco be determined primarily by a perspective of membership (however far) or by more normal bilateral relations (however friendly)? European integration has often proceeded by virtue of open ended commitments and ambivalent formulations, constructive ambiguity being the unspoken name of the game. Even the current enlargement has started out in a similar way and is now coming to a relatively happy end. From now on, however, addressing the issue of the foreseeable borders of the enlarged Union may prove crucial for the credibility and effectiveness of its external action as well as for its own future security.32 In the meantime, CFSP and ESDP will be increasingly affected by the presence and input of the ten acceding countries (as distinct from the three remaining candidates Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey). Their impact will start to be felt in Brussels already from the spring of 2003, when their representatives take their seats in all relevant EU bodies: COREPER, PSC, EUMC and EUMS.33 This will further increase the degree of Brusselsisation of national foreign policies but also raise a number of practical problems linguistic (official languages are set to rise from 11 to 20, and proficiency in both working languages is likely to be limited among the newcomers), logistical (properly equipped rooms and office space) and procedural that may eventually bring about a little revolution in European daily affairs. Even the traditional tour de table of Brussels meetings, already challenging at Fifteen, is likely to become unmanageable if every national delegation takes the floor on every single item on the agenda. This will at least require a strong and resolute presidency, capable not only of chairing but also of leading, by involving all partners in decision shaping but also pushing for decisions even when consensus on all details is not yet in sight. In turn, such a more forceful presidency has to be coupled with more flexible procedures and also policies, permitting varying degrees of acceptance and participation by member states. This, in turn, raises more substantial problems related to decision making proper and policy implementation. Most of them are to be tackled by the European Convention and the ensuing Intergovernmental Conference. What can be assessed at this stage, however, is the following:

The ten new partners will not significantly change (or add to) the overall spectrum of sensitivities that already exists among the Fifteen in CFSP/ESDP matters. They are likely to pay more attention to the US and NATO (although Malta and Cyprus may play a marginally rebalancing role in this respect), to focus intensely on Russia and neighbourhood issues, and less on other geographical areas but this does not necessarily mean that the radius and range of external EU policies will become narrower; They will be very keen on being considered and treated on an equal footing (symbolically as well as substantially) with the older member states. They may not team up or caucus among themselves, but they could contribute to making the already existing tension between bigger and smaller partners more acute;

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In CFSP and ESDP (where relevant capabilities/resources and willingness to act are unevenly distributed among old and new members), this means that a viable compromise will have to be struck between the rights and interests of all, the means of some, and the overarching imperatives of effectiveness and credibility on the regional and international scene.

The future of the enlarged Unions common foreign policy (or the lack thereof) will largely depend on the terms, contents and boundaries of such compromise.

Notes
1. See my introduction to A. Missiroli (ed.) 2001, especially pp. 6 7. On enlargement as risk management cf. P. Cecchini, E. Jones and J. Lorentzen (2001, pp. 155 165). See also P. Mair and J. Zielonka (eds), (2002). 2. J. Redmond (1997). 3. For an overview cf. G. Avery and F. Cameron (1998). On the specific procedures and the use of conditionality see K.E. Smith (1999). Cf. also F. Draus (2000); U. Sedelmeyer and H.Wallace (2000). 4. See M. Maresceau and E. Lannon (2001); and F. Tanner (2001). 5. The notion of Central Europe as applied to the countries considered in this article is still controversial. In fact, they amount to what during the Cold War was called Eastern and later on East Central or Central Eastern Europe. The Western European Union (WEU) adopted the term Central officially in the mid-1990s but the EU has not, preferring not to label the candidates geographically. Even among the ten, the scope of the term varies considerably all the more so when it hints at past historical experiences (e.g. Mitteleuropa ). Middle Europe, for instance, covers best the old German idea of a Zwischeneuropa lying between Western Europe proper (Germany included) and Russia but is much less current. In turn, Central proper would apply best only to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (possibly Slovakia too, i.e. the original Visegrad Four ), but is used with a more generic meaning. For a broader discussion cf. J. Rupnik (1988); G. Scho pflin, N. Wood and J. Le Rider, (1994); P. Katzenstein (1997); S. Medvedev (1998); K. Henderson (1999); and C. Lord (2000). 6. Most of the following remarks stem from a collective research project launched by the Institute for Security Studies of the WEU in 2001/02 that entailed extensive interviews of officials in the candidate countries. While national position papers have been taken into consideration, the amount of published sources is minimal (if one excludes domestic media that are hardly accessible, mainly for linguistic reasons): for evidence see A. Missiroli (April 2002). Cf. also P. Luif (2001), and M. Quinlan (2002). 7. Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Cyprus belonged to the former group. Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Malta to the latter. Separate invitations were issued at the relevant European Council meetings. See also G. Avery (2002). 8. For an overview see A. Hyde Price (1996), and A. Cottey (1999). See also below: fn. 10 and 19. 9. On Moldova cf. D. Lynch (2002). On Belarus A. Lewis (2002). 10. The applicants attitude is well described in P. Dunay (2001). The extent to which the issues related to cross border minorities (past, present and future) matter in Central/Middle Europe is further proved by the recent controversies over the Hungarian law (2001) on the status of Hungarian speakers in surrounding countries, and especially over the so called Benes decrees of the immediate post WW2 years, that have involved the Czech Republic, Hungary, Austria and Germany. cf. H. Grabbe (2002). 11. See e.g. J.Sedivy, P.Dunay and J. Saryusz Wolski (2002). 12. Cf. J. Dempsey, 2002a; J.Dempsey, 2002b. On the compromise reached inside the Union see J. Dempsey (2002c). The ICC was set up in 1998 and started operating in the summer of 2002. 13. IFOR: Implementation Force, SFOR: Stabilisation Force. 14. Kosovo Force. 15. There are no official figures available on the voluntary contributions to the HG plus because they fall into the basket of newly classified EU data. Those given in Table 1 were collected individually and unofficially by country (see above: endnote 6), although they convey a reliable overall picture. At the Capabilities Improvement Conference of November 2001 six of the 15 non EU countries most notably Romania further increased their initial pledge to the European Rapid Response Force, and most of them offered also forces to the Police Headline Goal. The final assessment of the Helsinki Headline Goal, prior to declaring the ERRF fully operational, is set for April/May 2003. 16. Cf. The Military Balance 2002 03, 2002. See also S. Wagstyl (2002), and J. Fitchett (2002). Among the Fifteen, only Britain, France and Greece fulfil the 2 per cent requirement, with Portugal and Sweden closing in after the 2001 budget. 17. Cf. the editorial in the Financial Times [Ed., 2003] and especially the discussion paper by Kings College Centre for Defence Studies, Making Sense of the Helsinki Headline Goal, London, November 2001. 18. For a comprehensive overview cf. H.J. Giessmann, G.E. Gustenau (2001).

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19. Representatives of the governments (one each) and parliaments (two each) of the 13 candidate countries have been appointed to the Convention with observer status, i.e. without formal voting rights. In addition but only after the candidates voiced their disappointment in the wake of the inaugural session of 28 February 2002 a junior official from Poland has been appointed in the Secretariat and the former Slovenian Prime Minister Alojz Peterle in the Presidium, both with observer status (on the still fledgling discussion in the applicant countries cf. the paper by the Villa Faber Group, 2001). Most importantly, following the decisions adopted in Copenhagen, the ten candidates acceding in 2004 will be involved as full members in the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference, Romania and Bulgaria as observers. For an overall evaluation see Grabbe (2002b). The only precedent in this domain is that of Spain and Portugal in 1985 86: both attended the proceedings of the Intergovernmental Conference that led to the Single European Act (without voting rights), which occurred a few months after the end of their accession negotiations and before their actual entry. 20. The main precedent in the CFSP domain is that of Austria, Finland, Norway and Finland: in early 1994 all four countries finalised their Accession Treaties and were to join the Union from January 1995. In anticipation of that, they were invited to participate in CFSP activities from the spring of 1994 already, i.e., before the ratification referendums of the following months. Norway, therefore, was a partner in the CFSP framework for a few months although it has not eventually become a full EU member: in November 1994, in fact, the No to adhesion prevailed (as it had already done in 1972). 21. For an excellent comparative overview of the identity issue and its ramifications cf. P. Drulak, 2001. See also M.Mann (2002); N.Bourcier (2002). EU citizens (at least those interviewed by Eurobarometer) are also mostly in favour of enlargement, although some tend to be rather selective in terms of acceding countries and the share of the uninformed is still high. The only member State in which a majority is against enlargement is France: cf. Eurobarometer, n.56, April 2002, in www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion 22. On all these issues see G.Amato and J. Batt (1999); H.Grabbe (2000); J. Monar (2001); and I. Kempe (2001), esp. pp. 129 ff. 23. Cf. http://hwww.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/2001/1105_uk.html 24. On EU Russia relations in this field cf. M. Webber (2001). It is worth reminding that the EU Common Strategy on Russia (the first ever to be agreed upon by the Fifteen) was adopted at the Cologne European Council of June 1999, the same one that launched ESDP. However, the potential role of Russia in the new policy has never been systematically addressed: see H. Haukkala and S. Medvedev (2001). 25. According to the EU-NATO agreement, the Union will have access the Alliances planning capabilities (in essence, SHAPEs military headquarters in Mons), logistics, information and possibly other assets for operations where NATO as a whole is not involved. The Berlin-plus deal will allow the EU to take over from NATO by devolution, so to speak some missions in the Balkans, starting with Macedonia and Bosnia. Malta and Cyprus, however, will be excluded from such cooperation as they have no relationship whatsoever with the Atlantic Alliance. On the history of Berlin-plus and the role of Turkey see Missiroli (2002). 26. Among the few studies that have tried to compare the two dynamics cf. S. Croft et al. (1999); M.A. Smith and G. Timmins (2000); A. Hyde Price (2000). 27. See especially the study by T.S. Szayna (2001). For a Western European viewpoint cf. F. Pflu gler (2000). For a Central European one, see the analysis made by J. Sedivy (2001). 28. Curiously enough, the case for a more coordinated and parallel expansion of the two organisations was first made by the father of the geopolitical approach, namely Zbigniew (2001). 29. The ten new EU members will thus participate in the elections for the European Parliament of June 2004, but will start taking part in the proceedings of the EU (albeit without full voting rights) from day one after actually signing the Accession Treaty, i.e. predictably from May 2003. For Bulgaria and Romania, the official objective is to have them in by 2007, but no decision has been finalised. 30. In the light of the academic literature on transitology, Romania and Bulgaria (let alone most of the Balkan States that have not applied for EU membership) are still in the phase of transition to democracy, whereas the other eight are already in the phase of consolidation. Cf. J.J. Linz and A. Stepan (1996); K. von Beyme (1996); and G. Pridham and A. Agh (2001). 31. On the future new neighbours of the EU see e.g. S. White, I. McAllister and M. Light (2002); and C. Guicherd (2002). In November 2002, shortly before Copenhagen, The Council and the Commission launched a New Neighbours Initiative to be developed alongside the forthcoming accession process, see www.europa.eu.int/ comm/external-relations/cieca/gcc.htm. 32. On these issues see A. Missiroli (August 2002). 33. COREPER: Committee of Permanent Representatives to the EU (universally accepted French acronym); PSC: Political and Security Committee; EUMC: EU Military Committee; EUMS: EU Military staff.

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