MULLER v.

MULLER
Supreme Court : First Division

Petitioners: ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER
Respondents: HELMUT MULLER

G.R No. 149615, Date: August 29, 2006
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FC 91
CASE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari assails the February 26, 2001 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute community of property between petitioner
and respondent, as well as the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.

FACTS: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22,
1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in
the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house
amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually
separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of property
between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal
partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With
regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled
that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution.

Thus However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse during the
marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property, therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is
excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property
as well as the personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance
used by the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a
violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands
shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain." The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a voluntary partition by the parties of
the said real property.

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial courts Decision. It held that
respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership
to him. It also considered petitioners ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of
Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.

ISSUE: Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the amount used to purchase the land as well as the costs for the
construction of the house?

HELD: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller
the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in
Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the
regime of absolute community between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and
ordering the partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.

DISCUSSION: Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national
patrimony.

In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held: Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their
alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino
citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is
partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:

"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines."

This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands. It
would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated
upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result
would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions,
and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories,
industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host
of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellants words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor Generals Brief, p. 6.) That this is
obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.

Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He
declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at
subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of
petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondents
disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the
purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party
who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.

Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been
held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot
be done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Thus, in the
instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on
respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not
allowed to own.

G.R. No. L-44493 November 3, 1938
MARIANO ANGELES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELENA SAMIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose Gutierrez David for appellant.
Filemon Cajator for appellee.

DIAZ, J.:
The question involved herein refers to the ownership of a parcel of land having an area of 7 hectares, 13 ares and 81 centiares,
situated in the municipality of Bacolor of the Province of Pampanga, included in lot No. 3679 described in cadastral record No. 11 of
the said municipality, G. L. R. O. Cadastral Record No. 148 of Pampanga, and now covered by original certificate of title No. 8995 of
the registry of deeds of Pampanga, registered and issued on December 15, 1921, in the name of Macaria Angeles, Petra Angeles,
Felisberto Samia, and Elena Samia as their common undivided property, in the following proportion: One third to Macaria Angeles,
1/6 to Petra Angeles, to Felisberto Samia, and to Elena Samia.
The plaintiff claims to be the exclusive owner of the property in question, and the defendant alleges the same thing saying: (1) That
said property was allotted to her when her co-owners made a partition of all the properties owned by them in common, and 2 that
if the plaintiff ever had any right thereto prior to the issuance of said original certificate of title, such right prescribed a longtime
ago.
The lower court decided the question in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to execute the necessary deed of
conveyance to the plaintiff of the land described in the complaint, which constitutes the northern portion of 7 hectares, 13 ares and
81 centiares of said lot No. 3679, the sketch of which appears in the plan Exhibit P as lot No. 3679-A, and to pay the costs of the
trial. From this judgment the defendant appealed, assigning in her brief the following alleged errors as committed by the lower
court to wit.
1. The lower court erred in not sustaining and holding that the plaintiff's action has prescribed.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that the plain- tiff has neither alleged nor proven facts constituting a cause of
action.
3. The lower court erred in not holding that the plain- tiff's claim is contrary to the principal objective of the Torrens
System established in the country. lawphi1.net
4. The lower court erred in concluding and holding that a constructive or implicit trust exists in the present case, as
claimed by the plaintiff.
5. The lower court erred in not holding that the case of "Villarosa vs. Sarmiento" (46 Phil., 814), is applicable to and
decides the present case, and in holding that the case of "Dizon vs. Datu", decided by the Supreme Court as case G.R.
No. 30517, applies to the case at bar.
6. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint in this case with costs to the plaintiff.
7. The lower court erred in denying the defendant- appellant's motion for new trial.
It is not disputed by the parties that the land in question was inherited by the plaintiff from his father Antonio Angeles some time
before the year 1896; that thereafter the plaintiff possessed and occupied the land in question under claim of ownership up to the
present that about the year 1909, he attempted to register his title to said property in the registry of deeds, pursuant to the Land
Registration Act but his application was denied due to errors to and in his plan; that, this notwithstanding, he continued to exercise
acts of ownership over the land in question openly, uninterruptedly and peacefully at least until March, 1933; that on December 15,
1921, without the plaintiff's knowledge and without having been purposely applied for by the defendant and her coparticipants
Macaria, Petra, and Felisberto, said original certificate of title No. 8995 was issued in the name of the latter four co-owners; that the
said co-owners having decided to partition among themselves the properties held by them in common, the land in question was
allotted to the defendant; that the defendant, desiring to know the area of said land, had it relocated about the end of February of
the beginning of March, 1993, and, as soon as it had been done, although she was then aware that neither she nor any of her
former coparticipants ever occupied it before, because it had always been occupied by the plaintiff long before 1896, she entered
upon said land to exercise acts of ownership, for which purpose she cut and availed herself of the leaves of nipa palms found
therein, notwithstanding the protests and objections of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff, for the purpose of avoiding frictions,
requested the defendant, inasmuch as it was through error that the land in question had been adjudicated to her and her co-
owners, to deign to execute the corresponding deed of transfer thereof in his favor, the land being lawfully his; that the defendant
refused todo so claiming that her title was already indefeasible; and that, in view of such attitude of said defendant, the plaintiff
brought this action one or two days later.
The defense of prescription which the defendant-appellant seeks to avail of to support the irrevocability of her title and to
counteract the action of the plaintiff-appellee, is untenable because, aside from the fact that neither she nor her co-owners ever
possessed the land in question in any capacity, they never claimed to be the owners thereof, and if she has done so after the lapse
of more than eleven years from the issuance of the title in their favor, it was due to the fact that they were declared owners thereof
through error. The purpose of the Land Registration Act, as this court has had occasion to so state more than once, is not to create
or vest title, but to confirm and register title already created and already vested, and of course, said original certificate of title No.
8995 could not have vested in the defendant more title than what was rightfully due her and her co-owners. It appearing that said
certificate granted her much more than she expected, naturally to the prejudice of another, it is but just that the error, which gave
rise to said anomaly, be corrected (City of Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil., 324). The defendant and her co-owners knew or, at least, came
to know that it was through error that. the original certificate of title in question was issued by the court which heard cadastral case
No. 11 of Bacolor, not only in or prior to March, 1933, but from the time said certificate was issued in their favor, that is, from
December 15, 1921. This is evidenced by the fact that, ever since, They remained passive without even attempting to make the
least showing of ownership over the land in question until after the lapse of more than eleven years. The land Registration Act as
well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for
the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich himself at the expense of another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442;
Angelo vs. Director of Lands, 49 Phil., 838). The above-stated Acts do not give anybody, who resorts to the provisions thereof, a
better title than he really and lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to secure, to the prejudice of his neighbor,
more land than he really owns, with or without bad faith on his part, the certificate of title, which may have been issued to him
under the circumstances, may and should be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590). This is
permitted by section 112 of Act No. 496, which is applicable to the Cadastral Act because it is so provided expressly by the
provisions of section 11 of the latter Act. It cannot be otherwise because, as stated in the case of Domingo vs. Santos, Ongsiako,
Lim y Cia. (55 Phil., 361), errors in the plans of lands sought to be registered in the registry and reproduced in the certificate of title
issued later, do not annul the decree of registration on the ground that it is not the plan but the land itself which is registered in the
registry. In other words, if the plan of an applicant for registration or claimant in a cadastral case alleges that the land referred to in
said plan is 100 or 1,000 hectares, and the land which he really owns and desires to register in the registry is only 80 ares, he
cannot claim to be the owner of the existing difference if afterwards he is issued a certificate of title granting him said area of 100
or 1,000 hectares.
Let it not be said that, as the decree of registration which gave rise to original certificate of title No. 8995 was on December 15,
1921, and the plaintiff failed to ask for the review of said decree within one year, in accordance with section 38 of Act No. 496, he
still has the right to question the legality or validity of the decree in question, because the action brought by him in this case is not
for said purpose but merely to ask that the land in dispute, which was erroneously included in original certificate of title No. 8995,
be transferred to him by the defendant, he being the owner thereof. This is possible and it is authorized by law, upon the
amendment of the plan which must be approved by the competent court, for which purpose there is no necessity of altering or
modifying in the least the decree already issued. For the foregoing reasons and for those taken into consideration in the cases
of Dizon vs. Datu (G.R. No. 30517, promulgated on June 3, 1929, not reported); Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija (49 Phil., 433); and Palet vs. Tejedor (55 Phil., 790), which are not repeated herein, for the sake of
brevity, this court holds that the errors attributed to the lower court are unfounded; that the appeal is unwarranted, and that the
appealed judgment is in accordance with the law.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment in question is affirmed in toto, and it is ordered that, upon the amendment of the plan of parcel
No. 3679 of cadastral survey No. 11 of Bacolor, G. L. R. O. Cadastral Record No. 148 of Pampanga, the corresponding writ for the
execution of said judgment be issued by the lower court, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals
131 SCRA 532 (1984)

FACTS: The subject land in this case is situated 20 meters away from the shores of Laguna de Bay. Said land was owned by
Benedicto del Rio. After the death of Benedicto, the land was acquired by his son Santos Del Rio. The private oppositors in this case
sought and obtained permission from Santos Del Rio to construct duck houses on said land. The private oppositors, however,
violated their agreement and instead constructed residential houses thereon. Santos then filed an ejectment suit against the private
oppositors and later on sought to register the land. Meanwhile, private oppositors simultaneously filed their respective sales
applications with Bureau of Lands, and they opposed Santos del Rios application for registration.

The CFI of Laguna dismissed the application for registration. Applicant appealed and obtained a favourable judgment from the
Court of Appeals. The Director of Lands and the private oppositors filed their respective petitions for review on said decision to the
Supreme Court.

The Director of Lands contends that since a portion of the land is covered with water four to five months a year, the same is part of
the lake bed of Laguna de Bay and therefore it cannot be the subject of registration.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the parcel of land in question is public land; and
2. Whether or not applicant private respondent has registerable title to the land.

HELD: The inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides." It cannot be considered a foreshore land,
hence it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has
a registerable title. The purpose of land registration under the Torrens System is not the acquisition of lands but only the
registration of title which applicant already possesses over the land.
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by
proof of actual possession of the property. Applicant by himself and
through his father before him, has been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, exclusive and adverse possession of the disputed
land for more than thirty (30) years and has presented tax declarations and tax receipts.
Applicant has more than satisfied the legal requirements. Thus, he is clearly entitled to the registration in his favor of said
land.

G.R. No. L-66807 January 26, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
MELITONA ALAGAD, SPOUSES CARMEN ALAGAD AND ESPIRIDION KOLIMLIM, JUSTO ALAGAD, CARLOS ALAGAD,
SPOUSES LIBRADA ALAGAD AND EMERSON ABANO, DEMETRIO ALAGAD, ANTONIO ALAGAD, REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF LAGUNA, and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Civil Cases Division), respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Alberto, Salazar & Associates for private respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The Republic appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals
1
affirming two orders of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Laguna
2
dismissing its petition for "annulment of title and reversion.
3
The facts appear in the decision appealed from:
On or about October 11, 1951, defendants filed an application for registration of their title over a parcel of land
situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-116971, which
was amended after the land was divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1 with an area of 5.2476 hectares and
Lot 2 with an area of 2.8421 hectares, reflected in survey plan Psu-226971, amd. 2.
The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed ground that applicants and their predecessors have
not been in possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly and adversely under a bona fide claim of
ownership since July 26, 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of the public domain. It appears that
barrio folk also opposed the application. (LRC Case No. 189. G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 4922 of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna).
By virtue of a final judgment in said case, promulgated January 16, 1956, supplemented by orders issued on
March 21, 1956 and August 13, 1956, defendants were declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining portion, or
Lot 2, was declared public land. Decree No. N-51479 was entered and Original Certificate of Title No. 0- 40 1,
dated October 18, 1956, was issued in the names of defendants.
In August, 1966, Civil Case No. 52 of the Municipal Court of Pila, Laguna, was filed by defendants to evict the
barrio folk occupying portions of Lot 1. On August 8, 1968, judgment was rendered in the eviction case
ordering the defendants therein to return possession of the premises to herein defendants, as plaintiffs therein.
The defendants therein did not appeal.
The foregoing anterior proceedings triggered the filing of the instant case. On October 6, 1970, as prayed for in
the complaint, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna or his
deputies from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 52, and the defendants from selling,
mortgaging, disposing or otherwise entering into any transaction affecting the area.
This case was set for pre-trial on July 6, 1971. Despite notice of the pre-trial, Atty. Alejandro A. Ponferada, Special Attorney, Bureau
of Lands, representing plaintiff Republic, did not appear. On July 16, 1971, the court a quodismissed the complaint. The Republic
filed a motion for reconsideration, was set for hearing, and finally denied by the court a quo, hence, this appeal.
Plaintiff filed its record on appeal on March 13, 1972. It appears that the appeal was dismissed by this Court for failure to show in
the record on appeal that the appeal was perfected on time. Plaintiff went to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on the
action of this Court. On November 19, 1982, the Supreme Court set aside the dismissal resolution of this Court and ordered Us to
reinstate and give due course to plaintiffs appeal.
4

In commencing proceedings below, the Republic claims that the decree and title [rendered and issued in LRC Case No. 189,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. L-4922] insofar as the 1.42 hectare northwestern portion on end of Lot 1, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, is concerned, are
void ab initio,
5
for the following reasons:
(a) That said l.42 hectare northwestern portion or end of Lot l, Psu-116971, Amd. 2, like the adjoining Lot 2 of
the same survey plan containing 2.8421 hectares, had since time immemorial, been foreshore land reached and
covered by the waters of the Laguna de Bay (Republic vs. Ayala y Cia, L-20950, May 31, 1965; Antonio Dizon,
et al., vs. Juan de G. Rodriguez, et al., L-20355- 56, April 30, 1965);
(b) That moreover said 1.42 hectare portion is actually now the site of Barrio Aplaya, formerly a sitio of Linga,
Pila, Laguna, having been occupied by the barrio people since the American occupation of the country in the
early 1900's where they established their houses;
(c) That the barrio people of Aplaya thru the years since the early 1900's have filled up and elevated the land
to its present condition of being some feet above the level of the adjoining Lot 2 of plan Psu-116971 and the
rest of Lot 1 of the same survey plan so much so that this barrio site of Aplaya where there are now sixty-eight
(68) houses occupied by more than one hundred (100) families is no longer reached and covered by the waters
of the Laguna de Bay; and
(d) That were it not for the fillings made by the barrio people, the land in question would not have been fit for
human habitation, so much so that defendants and their predecessors-in-interest could not have acquired an
imperfect title to the property which could be judicially confirmed in a registration case, as in fact said
defendants and their predecessors-in-interest have never been in actual possession of the land in question, the
actual occupants thereof being the barrio people of Aplaya;
6

In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that under Section 20, of Rule 20, of the Rules of Court, dismissal was proper
upon failure of the Republic to appear for pre-trial. It likewise ruled that the judgment, dated January 16, 1956, in the said LRC No.
189 has long become final, titles to the properties had been issued (in favor of the private respondents), and that res
judicata, consequently, was a bar.
In its petition, the Republic assails the decision insofar as it sustained the lower court: (1) in dismissing the petition for failure of the
Republic to appear for pre-trial; and (2) in holding that res judicata is an obstacle to the suit.
I.
With respect to the first question, we hold that the Court of Appeals has been guilty of grave abuse of discretion. It is well-
established that the State cannot be bound by, or estopped from, the mistakes or negligent acts of its official or agents,
7
much
more, non-suited as a result thereof.
This is so because:
... [T]he state as a persona in law is the judicial entity, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership
in land under the basic doctrine embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as the present charter. It is charged
moreover with the conservation of such patrimony. There is need therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny before
private claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded recognition, especially so where the matter is sought
to be raked up anew after almost fifty years. Such primordial consideration, not the apparent carelessness,
much less the acquiescense of public officials, is the controlling norm . . .
8

The cases of Ramos v. Centra l Bank of the Philippines
9
and Nilo v. Romero,
10
cited by the Court of Appeals in support of its
decision, are not applicable. In Ramos, we applied estoppel upon finding of bad faith on the part of the State (the Central Bank) in
deliberately reneging on its promises. In Nilo, we denied efforts to impugn the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the
defendant had been "erroneously' represented in the complaint by the City Attorney when it should have been the City Mayor, on a
holding that the City Attorney, in any event, could have ably defended the City (Davao City). In both cases, it is seen that the acts
that gave rise to estoppel were voluntary and intentional in character, in which cases, it could not be said that the Government had
been prejudiced by some negligent act or omission.
There is no merit either, in claims that res judicata is an impediment to reversion of property. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals,
11
this Court stated:
... [a] certificate of title may be ordered cancelled (Republic v Animas, et al., . supra), and the cancellation may
be pursued through an ordinary action therefor. This action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land
registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. And if there was no such
jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not apply. For it is a well-settled rule that for a prior
judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur; (1) it must be a final
judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of cause of action (Municipality of Daet vs. CA, 93
SCRA 503; Mendoza vs. Arrieta, et al., 91 SCRA 113)...
12

In the case at bar, if the parcel registered in the names of the private respondents were foreshore land, the land registration court
could not have validly awarded title thereto. It would have been without the authority to do so. The fact that the Bureau of Lands
had failed to appeal from the decree of registration could not have validated the court's decision, rendered without jurisdiction.
II.
"Property, according to the Civil Code, is either of public dominion or of private ownership ."
13
Property is of public dominion if it is:
(1) ... intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar character;
14
or if it:
(2) . . . belong[s] to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
15

All other property of the State, it is provided further, which is not of the character mentioned in ... article
[4201, is patrimonial property,
16
meaning to say, property 'open to disposition
17
by the Government, or
otherwise, property pertaining to the national domain, or public lands.
18
Property of the public dominion, on
the other hand, refers to things held by the State by regalian right. They are things res publicae in nature and
hence, incapable of private appropriation. Thus, under the present Constitution, [w]ith the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.'
19

Specifically:
ART. 502. The following are of public dominion:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their natural beds
and the beds themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands, and their beds;
(5) Rain waters running through ravines or sand beds, which are also of public dominion;
(6) Subterranean waters on public lands;
(7) Waters found within the zone of operation of public works, even if constructed by a
contractor;
(8) Waters rising continuously or intermittently on lands belonging to private persons, to
the State, to a province, or to a city or municipality from the moment they leave such
lands;
(9) The waste waters of fountains, sewers and public establishments.
20

So also is it ordained by the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:
Art. 44. Natural ponds and lakes existing upon public lands and fed by public waters, belong to the public
domain.
Lakes, ponds, and pools existing upon the lands of private individuals, or the State or provinces, belong to the respective owners of
such lands, and those situated upon lands of communal use belong to their respective pueblos.21
Assuming, therefore, for purposes of this petition, that the lands subject of the Republic's reversion efforts are foreshore in nature,
the Republic has legitimate reason to demand reconveyance. In that case, res judicata or estoppel is no defense.
22

Of course, whether or not the properties in question are, indeed, foreshore lands is the core of controversy. According to the trial
court, the aforementioned parcel of land is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
23
and
hence, available disposition and registration. As we have pointed out, the Government holds otherwise, and that as foreshore laud,
it is not registerable.
The question, so it follows, is one of fact: Is the parcel foreshore or is it part and parcel of the public domain?
Laguna de Bay has long been recognized as a lake .
24
Thus:
Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depressions of the earth; it contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks or
springs, and is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. According to the definition just quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake.
25

And, "[i]nasmuch as Laguna de Bay is a lake, so Colegio de San Jose further tells us, "we must resort to the legal provisions
governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds and shores, in order to determine the character and ownership of the
parcels of land in question.
26
The recourse to legal provisions is necessary, for under Article 74 of the Law of Waters, [T]he natural
bed or basin of lakes ... is the ground covered by their waters when at their highest ordinary depth.
27
and in which case, it forms
part of the national dominion. When Laguna de Bay's waters are at their highest ordinary depth has been defined as:
... the highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the dry season, such depth being the regular,
common, natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the year . . .
28

Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the extraordinary action of nature, rainfall for instance, the portions inundated
thereby are not considered part of the bed or basin of the body of water in question. It cannot therefore be said to be foreshore
land but land outside of the public dominion, and land capable of registration as private property.
A foreshore land, on the other hand, has been defined as follows:
. . . that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the
tides...
29

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternatively wet and dry according
to the flow of the tide.
30

If the submergence, however, of the land is due to precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite its proximity to the waters.
The case, then, has to be decided alongside these principles and regretfully, the Court cannot make a ruling, in the first place,
because it is not a trier of facts, and in the second, it is in possession of no evidence to assist it in arriving at a conclusive
disposition
31
We therefore remand the case to the court a quo to determine whether or not the property subject of controversy is
foreshore. We, consequently, reverse both the Court of Appeals and the trial court and reinstate the Republic's complaint.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
[G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998]
SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS,
JR., petitioners, vs. LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J:
In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been adjudged to have a registrable title, may the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already be included
in an existing Torrens certificate of title? Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such decree?
The Case

These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action for mandamus
[1]
under Rule 65 which asks this Court
to direct the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration in Land Registration Case (LRC) No.
N-11022.
[2]

The Facts

Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong
City. On January 8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision disposing thus:
[3]

WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda
Laburada, have a registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the Court declares, confirms and orders the
registration of their title thereto.
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree be issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and
Erlinda Laburada, both of legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880 Rizal Ave., Manila.
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, issued an order
[4]
dated March 15, 1991 requiring
the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed this action for
mandamus.
[5]

Attached to the LRAs comment on the petition is a report dated April 29, 1992 signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA
Department of Registration, which explained public respondents refusal to issue the said decree:
[6]

In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the above-
noted case/record, the following comments are respectfully submitted:
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of
Lot 3, Block No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic]
Laburada and Erlinda Laburada;
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of the
parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as per plotting of the subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said subdivision plan is Annex A hereof;
The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on
August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex B hereof,
requesting for a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the name of Compania Agricola de Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority, a copy is
Annex C hereof, per unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex D hereof;
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the technical description of the parcel of land described therein is not
readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April 15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a
copy is Annex E hereof, requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof a certified copy of the
subsisting certificate of title with complete technical description of the parcel of land involved therein. To date, however, no reply
to our letter has as yet been received by this Authority;
After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision
plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337
issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex F hereof. Said TCT No. 29337 is a transfer
from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be located
because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several sheets are [sic] incomplete.
For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the Decision dated January
8, 1991 and Order dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus
contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (G.R. No. 63189, Pedro
E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et al.,); x x x.
In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the petition be dismissed for being premature.
After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent motion, dated September 4, 1995,
[7]
for an early
resolution of the case. To this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution, dated October 23, 1995, which ordered:
[8]

x x x Acting on the urgent motion for early resolution of the case dated 04 September 1995 filed by petitioner Erlinda Laburada
herself, the Court resolved to require the Solicitor General to report to the Court in detail, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
this Resolution, what concrete and specific steps, if any, have been taken by respondent since 19 May 1993 (the date of
respondents Memorandum) to actually verify whether the lot subject of LRC Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 68), described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and situated in Mandaluyong City, might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in
Court of Land Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917.
On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with the above resolution, to which was
attached a letter dated November 27, 1997 of Felino M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division, which
states:
[9]

With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed herewith is a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992
addressed to Hon. Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk.
159, Swo-7237 is really covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Bunaflor [sic]
which was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6395, per verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of
Rizal. However, the title issued for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595
is incomplete.
It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners
pursuant to the decision dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991, would result in the duplication of [the] title over
the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purposes of the torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity
of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et. al.).
Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid duplication of title over the same parcel of land.
Issue

Petitioners submit this lone issue:
[10]

Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be compelled to issue the corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-
11022 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68).
The Courts Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.
Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy?

Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office x x x. They cite four reasons why the writ should be
issued. First, petitioners claim that they have a clear legal right to the act being prayed for and the LRA has the imperative duty to
perform because, as land registration is an in rem proceeding, the jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication should be
complied with.
[11]
Since there was no showing that the LRA filed an opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the
corresponding decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA to take the cudgels for the private persons in possession of OCT No.
355, TCT No. 29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595. Rather, it is the sole concern of said private person-holders of said titles to institute
in a separate but proper action whatever claim they may have against the property subject of petitioners application for
registration. Third, petitioners contend that they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their title, because of the failure of the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of [sic] the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. 6595
notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said titles.
[12]
Fourth, the State consented to its being sued in this
case[;] thus, the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this case as final and make provision for its
satisfaction.
[13]

On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends that the decision of the trial court is not valid,
considering that [the] Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already decreed in an
earlier land registration case and [so] a second decree for the same land is null and void.
[14]
On the question of whether the LRA
can be compelled to issue a decree of registration, the solicitor general cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez
[15]
which held:
[16]

Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in the proceedings below, these may be ignored by the
Court in the interest of substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in this case, a strict adherence to the rules would result
in a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of registration over land which has already been decreed to and
titled in the name of another.
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious,
without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been issued under the Torrens system,
enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in an early case, (t)he very purpose of the Torrens system would be
destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action for registration. The application for registration of
the petitioners in this case would, under the circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed
under Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (Underscoring supplied.)
We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the proper remedy for three reasons.
First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory

Contrary to the petitioners allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in this petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible
under the Land Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to implement it. We have unambiguously ruled
that a judgment of registration does not become executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree
of registration. We explained this in Gomez vs. Court of Appeals:
[17]

It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said
decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section 30
of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court
shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate
of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment
becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the law,
petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the
order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
Petitioners contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration
proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the entry of the
final decree of registration. This Court, in several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered by the
Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the
title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound discretion
of the court rendering it.
Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance
in the performance of its duty, the LRAs reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over
the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the
Torrens system of registration.
In Ramos vs. Rodriguez,
[18]
this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt it may have in
regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as administrative
officials but as officers of said court, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to extend assistance to
courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.
True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive
against all persons including the government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were personally notified of the
application for registration, and whether they filed an answer to said application. This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38
of Act 496 which provides:
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse
claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall bind
the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and
against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice, or citation, or included in the general description To all whom it may concern. Such decree shall not be opened by reason
of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree
of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of
the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year, every
decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the
decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal herein
before provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal shall be
cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against
the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value. (As amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD 1529, Sec. 39).
However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino M. Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27,
1995, respectively, clearly stated that, after verification from the records submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the property
which petitioners are seeking to register -- Lot 3-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-1372 -- is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan S.W.O.-
7237, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337
was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRAs refusal to issue a decree of registration is based on documents which, if
verified, may render the judgment of the trial court void.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of
another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and void,
[19]
since the principle behind
original registration is to register a parcel of land only once.
[20]
Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to
register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said
principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia:
[21]

As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that
the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of land
covered by the certificates of title of the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et al. v. The City of
Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24, 1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court. All the other contentions of respondent
regarding possession in good faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to
which we here express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as land registration court, had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957, the registration, in favor of respondent city, of a lot already
previously decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners.
In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the
registration of land already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for the same land is null and void. This
is so, because when once decreed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is already a res
judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based
on fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the registration of
the property in the name of first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that said property is
already registered in his name. Hence, the latter applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already covered
by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the
Torrens system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence
of the people in the efficacy of the registration law.
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may
be compelled through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable:
[22]

Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral court, there remain many things to be done before the
final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended descriptions, especially where the decision
orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party, to fit the said decision. As
said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234:
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the
certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requires trained technical men. Moreover, it
frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such
portions can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes
additional surveys become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself; the law
very wisely charges the chief surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the administrative
officer, the issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for the reason that said Chief of the General Land
Registration Office acts not as an administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the issuance of a final decree is a
judicial function and not an administrative one (De los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra). x x x (Underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the
exercise of discretion.
[23]
Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners legal right to the
performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete.
[24]
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a
clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is
meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded.
[25]
But where the right sought to be enforced is in
substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.
A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be
enjoined to decide for or against one of the parties.
[26]
As stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable by mandamus.
[27]
The court
has to decide a question according to its own judgment and understanding of the law.
[28]

In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of registration. However, to avoid
multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its study, to
determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the
court of origin within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, after which the said court shall act with deliberate speed
according to the facts and the law, as herein discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The Land
Registration Authority, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot
3-A is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, the land
registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue
the decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as herein discussed.
SO ORDERED.
1. HEIRS OF PEDRO LOPEZ vs. DE CASTRO
324 SCRA 591-618, February 3, 2000
FACTS:
In this case, two applications for registration of the same parcel of landwere filed in different branches of the Court of First
Instance. The certificatesof title were issued in the name of respondent de Castro, while the other, forthe heirs of Pedro Lopez was
still
pending.O n J u l y 2 5 , 1 9 5 6 , P e d r o L o p e z e t a l . f i l e d a n a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e regi
strati on of a 69-hectare parcel of l and i n Tagaytay Ci ty wi th the CFI
of Cavite.O n J u n e 2 4 , 1 9 5 7 , A s s i s t a n t F i s c a l L e g a s p i , r e p r e s e n t i n g t h
e M u n i c i p a l i t y o f S i l a n g C a v i t e , s u b m i t t e d a n o p p o s i t i o n o n b e h a l f o f t h e muni ci pal i ty
. The opposi ti on was amended al l egi ng that the subj ect l ot hadbeen its patrimonial property since 1930 or earlier.In
their answer, the applicants claimed that a part of the whole tract of l and they sought to regi ster was thei r i nheri tance.
The muni ci pal i ty f i l ed amotion to dismiss.On F e b r u a r y 7 , 1 9 6 9 , t h e l o we r c o u r t i s s u e d a n o r d e r
d e n y i n g
t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s f o r l a c k o f m e r i t o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e o p p o s i t o r m
u n i c i p a l i t y h a d n o p e r s o n a l i t y t o i n t e r v e n e c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t L o t 1 wa s outside of its territorial
limits. The municipality filed a motion for reconsideration of the saidorder. The court denied it in its July 23, 1970
order. The applicants filed a motion praying that the clerk of court becommi ssi oned to recei ve evi dence f or them i t
appeari ng that the order of July 23, 1970 had become final and executor by virtue of which themunicipality of Silang no
longer had any personality. The court granted saidmotion and directed clerk of court to submit a report.In hi s report, dated
Apri l 15, 1971, cl erk of court Rol ando Di az statedthat since time immemorial, the Delos Reyes owned and possessed
parcel
of l a n d i n q u e s t i o n . O n N o v e m b e r 3 , 1 8 7 0 , t h e y s o l d i t t o D i m a r a n a n . O n September
15, 1892, the property was passed to Pedro Lopez de Leon,
Sr.A n d M a x i m a T r i n i d a d u n t i l t h e i r d e a t h w h e n t h e i r c h i l d r e n t o o k o v e r ow
nershi p and possessi on thereof . Upon thei r death, thei r respecti ve hei rssucceeded over the property and on
February 25, 1971, they partitioned it.



On Apri l 19, 1971, the court rendered a deci si on approvi ng the reportof the clerk of court and ordering the decree of
title be issued in favor of theapplicants (Lopez).In the course of exami ni ng the records for the purpose of i ssui ng
thedecree of regi strati on i n favor of Pedro Lopez, et al . , the Land
Regi strati onC o m m i s s i o n d i s c o v e r e d t h a t l o t 1 h a d b e e n d e c r e e d i n f a v o r o f p r i v a t e res
pondent Honesto de Castro, et
al.F u r t h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n r e v e a l e d t h a t s o me t i me i n 1 9 6 7 , Ho n e s t o d e castro et al . sought the
regi strati on of the same parcel of l and i n questi onand succeeded in declaring it in their names.On August 19, 1981,
the CFI of Cavi te i ssued an order decl ari ng thecourt had lost jurisdiction, without however dismissing the case.Seven (7)
years later, on June 28, 1988, the heirs of Pedro Lopez filed acompl ai nt f or executi on of j udgement and cancel l ati on of
l and ti tl es of thedefendants and their successors-in-interest before the RTC of Cavite.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the titles issued to the defendants be cancelled?
HELD:
No. In l and regi strati on proceedi ngs, al l i nterested parti es are
obl i gedt o t a k e c a r e o f t h e i r i n t e r e s t a n d t o z e a l o u s l y p u r s u e t h e i r o b j e c t i v e o f r
egistration on account of the rule that whoever first acquires title to a pieceof l and shal l prevai l . Where more than one
certi f i cate of ti tl e i s i ssued overt h e l a n d , t h e p e r s o n h o l d i n g a p r i o r c e r t i f i c a t e i s e n t i t l e d t o
t h e l a n d , a s agai nst a person who rel i es on a subsequent certi f i cate. Thi s rul e ref ers tothe date of the
certificate of title, not the date of filing.P e t i t i o n e r s f a i l e d t o e x e r c i s e t h e d u e d i l i g e n c e r e q u i r e d o f
t h e m a s applicants for land registration. In the year 1981, the CFI of Cavite issued anorder regardi ng the case-stati ng
that i t had l ost j uri sdi cti on regardi ng thecase. With this, petitioners were presumed to have been notified of the land
registration proceedings filed by private respondent. They let seven years topass from such discovery before they acted to
revive what already was a
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_______________________________________________________________________ _ dormant judgment. In short, they were
guilty of laches-negligence/failure todo that which is ought to be done.Sec. 32. Revi ew of decree of regi strati on
(Presi denti al Decree
1529) The decree of registration shall not be reopened by reason of absence,m i n o r i t y o r o t h e r d i s a b i l i t
y , s u b j e c t , h o w e v e r , t o t h e r i g h t o f a n y p e r s o n . . . d e p r i v e d o f l a n d , t o f i l e i n
t h e p r o p e r C o u r t o f CF I a p e t i t i o n f o r reopening and review not later than ONE
YEAR.U p o n t h e e x p i r a t i o n o f s a i d p e r i o d o f o n e y e a r , t h e d e c r e e o f
registration and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible.Hence, the heirs of Pedro Lopez lost their property in
favor of Honestode Castro.