This article was downloaded by: [University of Nottingham]

On: 03 May 2014, At: 17:58

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Australian Journal of International
Affairs
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20
Discipline without democracy: military
dominance in post-colonial Burma
Nicholas Farrelly
Published online: 20 May 2013.
To cite this article: Nicholas Farrelly (2013) Discipline without democracy: military dominance
in post-colonial Burma , Australian Journal of International Affairs, 67:3, 312-326, DOI:
10.1080/10357718.2013.788122
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.788122
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
Content) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or
arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
Discipline without democracy: military dominance
in post-colonial Burma
1
NICHOLAS FARRELLY*
After five decades in which military dominance defined post-colonial
politics, Burma has recently embarked on a long-delayed process of political
reform. The gradual democratisation of the countrys political institutions
has meant that the history of its two twentieth-century coups is increasingly
overlooked. This article presents a focused study of military interventionism
in Burma and offers explanations for the successful entrenchment of military
rule. The mindset of the military leadership and its success at sidelining
opponents is explored alongside a preliminary consideration of the role that
international support has played. Crucially, military leaders have been
exasperated by what they consider feeble (and foreign-controlled) civilian
authorities that have been incapable of preventing national fragmentation.
This mindset, plus effective repression and support by neighbouring
countries such as China, formed the basis of the militarys rule. Therefore,
the prospects of future democratisation efforts will rely on a fuller
understanding of the processes that led the armed forces to exert consistent
dominance.
Keywords: Burma; coups; democratisation; military; Myanmar
Among the five countries*Burma, Fiji, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and
Thailand*considered in this special issues comparison of post-coup military
consolidation and processes of redemocratisation, Burma exemplifies long-term
military dominance.
2
Its armed forces (the Tatmadaw) are the central
institution of post-colonial politics, asserting leadership across all aspects of
national life. Ongoing efforts to create a new consensus for discipline-
flourishing democracy are the most recent example of the persistent militarisa-
tion of Burmas politics. During the twentieth century, there were two coups
detat that led to military dominance: the pivotal intervention was by General
Ne Win on March 2, 1962, followed by his subordinates awkward self-coup
on September 18, 1988. Since the first coup, Burma has experienced over 50
years of sustained military involvement in politics. Compared, however, to
other countries that have experienced multiple coups (such as Fiji and
*Nicholas Farrelly is a Research Fellow at the School of International, Political and Strategic
Studies, College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra, and co-founder
of New Mandala, a website on mainland South-East Asia. <Nicholas.Farrelly@anu.edu.au>
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2013
Vol. 67, No. 3, 312326, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.788122
# 2013 Australian Institute of International Affairs
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

Thailand), Burma is not usually described with respect to a coup culture.
Instead, the longevity and relative stability of military rule has generated other
frameworks for understanding militarised politics and government. Burma is an
example of a country which, while coups have proven momentous in its
political history, does not tend to be classified as coup-prone.
Burmas comparatively low vulnerability to coups is based on a high degree of
command unity and cohesion within the armed forces. Indeed, the mentality
defining the political role of the armed forces was established well before the
1962 coup; Feit (1973, 259) argues that because Burmese officers came to the
army from politics [they] had defined their political position as early as 1945.
And, with some notable exceptions, the military leadership has maintained a
united front, and surprising discipline within its own hierarchy, ever since. Anti-
communist battles hardened the militarys resolve and generated ingrained
institutional scepticism about supposedly feeble and self-serving civilian politi-
cians who have been unwilling to tackle the countrys problems aggressively,
especially in ethnic minority areas. Civilian commitments to fundamental
principles of national sovereignty, non-disintegration of the union and stability
have often been questioned. In fact, anxiety about the potential for territorial
fragmentation is the principle motivation for those who consider the militarys
role essential to national survival. Writing soon after the 1962 coup, Trager
(1963, 325) noted that the leadership [of the armed forces] has been historically
and deeply involved in the development of Burmese nationalism on the road to
independence and since. Nationalist impulses define a vision of Burmese society
that prioritises unity above diversity and tolerates no secessionist claims.
More generally, and especially compared to the fragile situations in Papua New
Guinea and Thailand, Burmas experience of coup politics is notable because of
the militarys success at entrenching its control. Opponents of military rule have
often proved timid by comparison. Aung San Suu Kyis National League for
Democracy is the best known and most popular opposition force, but even it has
struggled to disrupt military plans. That Aung San Suu Kyi was incarcerated for
most of the past two decades demonstrates the willingness of the armed forces to
discipline its civilian opponents. Fractiousness among Burmas democratic forces
has not assisted. The most robust resistance to military rule has historically been
galvanised in ethnic minority regions, where subnationalism has been a potent
addition to the already disturbed political mix. This has echoes of the ethnic
political preoccupations of Fijian military politics. In Burma, around 40 percent
of the population identify as ethnic (i.e. non-Burman) minorities. In all of the
ethnic states*Mon, Karen, Karenni, Shan, Kachin, Chin and Rakhine*ethnic
minority groups have built armies, some of them with tens of thousands of
fighters, to fortify their political claims. This proliferation of non-government
armed groups, many of which have been fighting for more than half a century, is
an extra complication for analysis of the military in Burmas politics. Im-
portantly, the consolidation of military power is not simply an issue for the
central Myanmar government, but is also a factor in the local politics of many
Discipline without democracy 313
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

ethnic groups.
3
They, too, face the challenges of maintaining united command
and purpose in the face of significant internal and external challenges.
The question of post-coup redemocratisation or military consolidation
encourages analysis of political, economic, strategic and historical factors.
Jackman (1976, 1090) posits that direct control of the machinery of govern-
ment is a core consideration of analysts hoping to understand an irregular,
extra-constitutional power transfer*that is, a military coup detat*in ways
that distinguish regimes such as the one headed by General Ne Win of Burma
fromthat headed by General Dwight Eisenhower of the United States. In Burma,
the thoroughly entrenched systemof military rule which began with Ne Win has,
since only November 2010, begun a tentative transition to a constitutional,
quasi-civilian parliamentary form. This system has been described as discipline-
flourishing democracy, an inelegant phrase crafted at the insistence of military
thinkers. Some, like Prager Nyein (2009, 647), are convinced that the new
constitution confirms the current power position of the military in state and
society . . . with a civilian veneer not unlike the 1974 constitution established by
the Ne Win regime. It is true that in 2013 most of the senior positions in Burmas
political system were still controlled by serving or retired military officers. The
president, Thein Sein, is a former senior army officer who traded his uniform for
a civilian political career. Nonetheless, his stewardship of the glasnost-style
reform process*he makes decisions to cautiously unravel aspects of military
dominance*has been warmly welcomed by domestic and international con-
stituencies exasperated by decades of military rule.
For now, the two coups which have kept the army at the centre of national life
continue to fade into obscurity. The fiftieth anniversary of the 1962 coup was
completely ignored by Burmas official media. There is usually heightenedtension,
and extra security in Yangon, for the milestone dates marking the violent events of
August 1988, but there is still almost no public discussion of the September 1988
coup. Years of stern media restrictions mean that the coups are deliberately
overlooked; a fog has descended over these episodes in Burmas political history.
This helps explain why thorough scholarly or journalistic analysis of Burmas
coups or their impact is lacking. In order to situate an argument about military
dominance and persistent hesitation about democratic reform, this article begins
with a historical consideration of the two twentieth-century coups. The second
section discusses the various phases of military consolidation and liberalisation
after the respective coups, while the third part tests a number of explanatory
propositions about the longevity and persistence of military control in Burma. The
article then concludes with an outlook on the years ahead.
A short history of Burmas coups
Within months of gaining independence from Britain in 1948, Burma was
already struggling to introduce a democratic political culture. The end of World
314 Nicholas Farrelly
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

War II and the gradual retreat of the British Empire from Asia left it in a
precarious situation (Aung-Thwin 1985). The situation was not helped by the
political and social tumult which followed the assassination of General Aung
San, one of the countrys independence heroes. Instead of benefiting from a
charismatic figure with the potential, at the very least, to unify Burmas
competing political factions and ethnic groups, the remaining leaders squabbled
and fought. Burma lurched quickly into turmoil . . . and . . . the maelstrom of
civil war (Tin Maung Maung Than 2007, 52). Then, on October 28, 1958,
General Ne Win, commander of Burmas armed forces, assumed control of the
government of the Union of Burma (Dupuy 1960, 429) in the context of an
invitation from Prime Minister U Nu. While this was not a coup in any strict
interpretation of the phenomenon, it established a pattern of military rule that
continues to this day. Dupuy acknowledges that:
On the record, the General took over as Prime Minister at the invitation of
his predecessor, U Nu. The assumption of authority was completely legal
and constitutional, following a unanimous nomination by Parliament. But
behind the constitutional facade were other facts (ibid.).
Indeed, Sao Sanda (2008, 240) calls the 1958 transfer of power the first
military coup detat and suggests that Ne Wins Caretaker Government laid
the foundations for the major military coup of 1962. Both then and now, there
was confusion about the causation of events; it all happened at a time when the
institutions of post-colonial parliamentary democracy were failing. Banditry
made travel outside the major towns dangerous and expensive. Crime swept
across the country, bringing with it a mood of crisis. The political factions that
had worked uneasily together to end British colonial rule never agreed on the
best direction after independence. By 1962, Ne Win [had] assembled radical
socialists to counter [the] communist ideology of the CPB [Communist Party of
Burma] (Badgley and Aye Kyaw 2009, 299). Ultimately, these ideological
disputes culminated in economic collapse and a more general breakdown in the
social and political order.
4
Not willing to see what he considered further weakening of the country, Ne
Win launched a coup on March 2, 1962 to wrest full and final control from the
parliament and politicians. Perry (2007, 24) argues that the event did not
attract a great deal of attention as it was, in those years of cold war
competition, just another Third World coup. For Ne Win, the coup was
justified by the threat of territorial fragmentation, especially in the Shan State.
Since then, Burmas political trajectory has been largely determined by the
ambitions of senior military leaders, who have assumed a Praetorian role (Tin
Maung Maung Than 2007, 53). Even in the immediate aftermath of the
takeover, there was an appreciation that [r]ecent developments (the coup detat
of March 1962) presumably will mean an extended military regime (Lissak
1964, 9). The first 26 years (19621988) of direct military involvement in
Discipline without democracy 315
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

politics were characterised by a uniquely Burmese medley of socialism,
mysticism and isolationism. This period, with Ne Win in charge, is often
described by one of the slogans of the era: The Burmese Way to Socialism
(Fenichel and Khan 1981). This vernacular ideology led to further economic
decay and widespread conflict.
It was during these years that insurgencies in ethnic minority regions peaked.
In response, the government continued to argue that the integrity of the unitary
state must be preserved (South 2008, 34). Two dozen different groups took up
arms against the central government. The strongest of these were the CPB, with
its major bases in the Shan State; the Karen National Liberation Army, which
controlled territory along the ThailandBurma border; and the Kachin
Independence Army, operating in portions of the Kachin and Shan States.
These armed insurgencies helped to justify the dominance of Ne Wins
government. Trager (1963, 325) argues that the armed forces as an institution
were well prepared for this task as they had, since independence, demonstrated
cohesion as one of the few disciplined sectors of Burmese life. Preoccupied
with existential threats to territorial integrity, the army remained central to all
government decision-making and sought to emphasise its unique role in
securing the countrys independence from Britain (Selth 1986).
More broadly, the army has consistently linked its own status to the value,
and prestige, of pre-colonial rule. According to Aung-Thwin (1985, 245): the
coup of 1962 could be interpreted more as a resurrection than a true
revolution. Identifying continuities with the pre-colonial period, Aung-Thwin
(1985, 247) called the coup an effort to restore meaningful order to a
psychologically disoriented society, thereby resurrecting a cultural identity
that had been made ambiguous (and thus its worth made ambivalent) by a
period of meaningless order. His reference to a meaningful order implies
that the coup of March 2, 1962 reinstituted patterns of governance which
had been disrupted by British colonial intervention. Aung-Thwin argues that
while
the immediate circumstances [of the coup] may have been more political and
even personal, the reason given was very nearly correct from the perspective
of our argument: it was carried out essentially to resurrect meaningful order
in a society that had experienced extreme social and psychological
dysfunction; the type of order that neither the colonial system nor the
subsequent artificial Parliamentary system had provided (Aung-Thwin
1985, 256).
5
This argument defines the terms of military interventions in Burmese society not
as disruptions, but as efforts to create or recreate appropriate systems of rule.
Aung-Thwins postulation that the colonial and parliamentary systems had
failed on the terms that mattered for Burmas nationalist military elite is one
that requires considered scrutiny.
316 Nicholas Farrelly
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

The situation is further complicated by difficulties in understanding the
motivations of Burmas 1962 coup-makers. We can speculate on their intentions
to a large extent, but, as Selth (2009) has eloquently argued, there is much that
we simply cannot know when it comes to Burmas military affairs. And, as
Marshall (2002, 155) clarifies: In Burma, history stopped in 1962, and
propaganda began. When Ne Win and his allies were contemplating the 1962
coup, there must have been some appreciation of, as Lissak (1964, 9) describes it,
a balance of rewards leading towards the renewal of the golden age before
and immediately after independence. Lissak (1964, 9) goes on to recount that:
Colonel Maung Maung, the number three man in Ne Wins first adminis-
tration, put it in this way: After the Second World War was over and we
had obtained our independence, the cream of the resistance movement
stayed with the Burma army, and most of the rest became politicians. It was
irksome to find that those who could not hold their own in the army came,
in time, to be our political superiors.
After all of this effort, in 1974, General Ne Win relinquished his military
position and took the presidency under a new, civilianised constitution (South
2008, 35), which provided a renewed foundation for managing ethnic issues
(Taylor 1979). But not everything was smooth for Ne Wins ruling group.
Martin (1977, 155) states that in 1976 ominous signs of opposition to
President Ne Wins leadership appeared within the Burmese army itself. What
followed was likely an abortive coup led by army officers said to have
denounced the socialist economic system. In response, beginning on
September 10, 1976, there was a trial of a group of junior army officers, who
were accused of plotting to stage a coup and kill Ne Win; it was, according to
Martin (ibid.), allegedly the first such attempt by members of the army since
Ne Win himself came to power by a military coup in March 1962.
It was not until September 18, 1988, in the aftermath of nationwide
demonstrations and popular agitation against the faltering socialist govern-
ment, that a new military clique actually did seize power. This self-coup*also
described as a bloody coup de tat (Seekins 1992, 246) and bloody, repressive
coup (Steinberg 1990, 587) or a pseudo-coup (Burma Watcher 1989, 179;
Lintner 1990, 50) and stage-managed coup (Seekins 1997, 525)*catapulted
Burma in a more explicitly militaristic direction. Hard-line factions triumphed
over more moderate views. The re-entrenchment of military control was
justified as a response to an alleged conspiracy designed to wrest State power
by means of BCP [Burma Communist Party] underground movements and
urban guerrilla warfare (Tin Htwe 1989, 2). Beyond the post-coup rhetoric,
however, it is difficult to deduce exactly what happened. When Hans-Bernd
Zollner (2011, 256), for example, asks, What happened in Burma in 1988?, he
suggests that: An honest first answer to this question must be: We do not
know. What we do know is that the coup was followed by a period of
Discipline without democracy 317
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

significant social stagnation defined by unprecedented military dominance and
the development of a crony-capitalist economic regime. Cosy ties to the Chinese
government and its allied commercial interests, and to facilitators in Singapore,
Thailand and elsewhere, ensured a steady flow of foreign investment,
technology and moral support (Selth 1996). Under these arrangements, direct
rule by the Tatmadaw stretched from the 1988 coup until November 2010,
when a transition to a quasi-civilian administration reintroduced formal
democratic processes, if not democratic culture.
The 1988 coup came at the end of a series of protests that could have toppled
the military from its privileged position. Since 1974, the army had been
gradually replaced as the key element in the countrys bureaucracy by civilian
technocrats sourced from the Burma Socialist Programme Party. Mistrust
between uniformed officers and the civilian leadership was widespread. These
underlying conflicts were finally ignited by a deeply destabilising, even
traumatising, series of political and economic events starting in 1987. First, a
decision to devalue the currency led to widespread popular anger about cost-of-
living pressures. Subsequently, a violent crackdown on protestors in August
1988 generated a power vacuum that was filled by a new military group, the
State Law and Order Restoration Council. Led by General Saw Maung, it
brought the armed forces high command into explicitly political positions once
again. Taylor argues that:
the fact that the 1988 demonstrations were conducted in the name of
democracy, and soon gained a highly visible and distinctive heroine in the
form of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of the slain independence hero
General Aung San, provided the military regimes opponents with a perfect
spokesperson through which to appeal for Western support (Taylor
1998, 4).
While this is true, it also strengthened the resolve of military commanders, who
were unwilling to surrender any power to an opposition leader they considered
unqualified and, worse still, foreign.
6
Indeed, Aung San Suu Kyis marriage to a
British citizen made her vulnerable to the regimes attacks in this regard.
Guyot describes the priorities of the military in those years by drawing on
their immediate post-coup statements:
Declaration No. 1 of the newly established State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC) . . . vowed that the military did not wish to cling to State
power for long, and the council chairman, Senior General Saw Maung,
enumerated the de facto governments four tasks: (1) maintain law and
order; (2) provide secure and smooth transportation; (3) strive for better
conditions of food, clothing, and shelter for the people and render necessary
assistance to the private sector and the cooperatives to do so, and after these
are accomplished; (4) hold multiparty democratic general elections (Guyot
1991, 205).
318 Nicholas Farrelly
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

These four goals were developed in an effort to postpone the unravelling of the
system of government that had been in place since 1962. The leaders of the self-
coup group worked closely with members of the former government to ensure
that their interests were protected, at least in the immediate aftermath of the
transfer of power. Steinberg (1990, 587) introduced the idea that the coup was
designed to shore up a collapsed government in the face of a popular revolution.
It prompted the severing of most foreign assistance on human rights grounds
and thus the suspension or cancellation of many contracts under foreign aid. In
response to the potential for political and economic disaster, trade with China
and Thailand was regularised, ceasefires were agreed with many ethnic armies,
and a new pro-market philosophy infused government policy.
Political, economic and social conditions since the 1988 coup have remained
heavily contested. Multiparty democratic general elections were held in 1990
but, when the triumph of the National League for Democracy was ignored,
Burmese politics began its descent into ever more entrenched military rule.
David and Holliday (2006, 91) suggest that, since 1990: Myanmar has been
trapped in political deadlock, with neither the military junta nor the array of
opposition groups that face it able to impose a viable political solution on the
country. Internal power struggles have generated conflict within the ruling
group. While this group was originally led by Saw Maung, it was in 1992 that
General Than Shwe took charge, and later changed the junta to the State Peace
and Development Council. With the title Senior General, Than Shwe served
for almost two decades as head of state. Taylor suggests that:
A long-held belief amongst the armed forces, repeated in their speeches and
training manuals, is that civilian politicians are self-serving and anti-
national . . . At the present time, in the eyes of the military, this belief is
lent credence by the financial and verbal support received from Western
governments and organisations by groups opposed to the regime (Taylor
1998, 11).
The implication of this military mindset has been apparent during the most
recent years of military rule. Under siege from foreign and domestic enemies*
often described as internal and external destructionists (see Skidmore 2003,
5)*the military has sought to defend its key interests. Taylor (1998, 12) goes so
far as to argue that the anti-engagement and pro-sanctions policies adopted by
some Western governments with the intention of speeding political change in
Myanmar probably have the opposite effect.
Phases of military consolidation and liberalisation
The two twentieth-century coups were key events, making the dominance of the
armed forces the defining characteristic of contemporary Burmese politics. And
while [i]n modern Burmese history, power and factional struggles were more
Discipline without democracy 319
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

the rule than the exception, for they were present in almost all post-
independence governments (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2008, 149), there has actually
been a remarkable capacity to maintain military dominance across the
generations. While, in Kyaw Yin Hlaings (2008) phrase, individual hegemons
have come and gone, the military has remained in charge. Curiously, and with
the exception of Kyaw Yin Hlaings study of factional disputes and power
struggles, there has been little attention to the specific processes of military
consolidation.
During the years since 1962, the armed forces have sought to claim
unquestioned authority as the only national institution capable of defending
the country against internal and external threats, but, in practice, the level of
military control has varied. Military control was not applied uniformly across
the country, and the experiences of post-coup politics have been very
inconsistent (Callahan 2007). At times, the military has appeared vulnerable
to popular protest movements, and its policies for maintaining power have
occasionally backfired. The current period of political reform fits a pattern
where military consolidation is followed by tentative liberalisation. In the past,
the liberal phase has usually been followed by anxiety, miscalculation and
crackdowns. As Beyrer (1998, 87) reports: There have been repeated civilian
and student uprisings against the Ne Win regime, and its successor, The State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), all of which have met with
brutal state repression.
However, in the current phase of liberalisation (since 2010), the repressive
instincts of the government appear more muted than in the past. Since joining
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1997 (Guyot 1998),
Burmas armed forces have endeavoured to build relationships with their
immediate neighbours and have learned to tolerate a degree of international
scrutiny. Burmese efforts to align with their South-East Asian neighbours, who
have been only too happy to accommodate such a large and strategically placed
country, complement similar initiatives to work with China, India and other
countries. This quest for international legitimacy, and for more peaceful
internal conditions, now motivates a gradual move towards democratic rule.
In practice, full engagement with Western democracies requires such a move.
Access to international partnerships, and to the economic advantages that
follow, provides another clear incentive for a shift towards a more transparent,
if not democratic, system. Due to their shared membership of ASEAN and their
lack of historical enmity, it is Indonesia that Burmas military leaders have
looked to most consistently for determining their approach to democratic
transition. The Burmese reading of Indonesian politics as being completely
military-dominated under Suharto may be questionable, but even the post-New
Order situation provides the comfort that Indonesias rambunctious democratic
politics has allowed continued influence for the armed forces.
7
Since the elections of November 7, 2010, when military-dominated legis-
latures were endorsed in a vote that was neither free nor fair, the country has
320 Nicholas Farrelly
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

undergone a rapid transformation. The changes that have occurred may not,
however, be permanent, and scepticism prevails about the ambitions of the
former military officers leading the reform process. This process of partial and
incomplete redemocratisation followed the move, in 2005, to the new capital of
Naypyidaw. This sudden move was initially greeted with bewilderment by
international audiences, which were convinced that it was yet another irrational
decision from the paranoid despots of an isolated and erratic regime. The
Naypyidaw experiment has, in the years since, become key to the wider
transition process, and is now considered a crucial step towards a more
consolidated and professional approach to governance (Dulyapak 2009; Seekins
2009a). The investment in the new capital has been immense. It is designed, like
most planned cities, as both an ornamental and a monumental project.
In the lead-up to this current phase of liberalising transformation, there was
an unusual level of instability. Popular protests in September and October 2007,
spearheaded by monks across the country, were followed by yet another violent
crackdown. Thousands of people were jailed and many more fled across the
border to Thailand. The death toll from this crackdown is difficult to verify, but
it is likely that dozens of people were killed. Soon after that bloody episode,
Yangon*and the delta areas where Burma meets the Andaman Sea*was
pulverised by Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 (Seekins 2009b). Approximately
140,000 people were killed. Countless houses were destroyed and almost 2
million acres of farmland were damaged. The scale of the catastrophe rattled
the military leadership. Only a week after the cyclone, it held a referendum to
endorse the new constitution that had been drafted in a stage-managed process.
Many considered this timing inauspicious and pleaded with the generals to
postpone the vote so that disaster recovery efforts could be the sole national
priority. Instead, the generals, overwhelmed by the tragedy, initially sought to
limit the dimensions of international assistance. But through the brokering
facilitated by ASEAN, international assistance, especially from Western
democracies, began to flow. While still wary of foreign interference and
meddling, the productive role of international humanitarian actors appears to
have generated trust and new opportunities for cooperation.
Discipline without democracy: explanatory propositions
In Burma, I argue that long-term military consolidation after the two twentieth-
century coups can be explained by: (1) a mindset that is permanently sceptical
of civilian leaders; (2) military successes in isolating and defeating political
opponents; and (3) international support, especially from strategic partners
such as China, Singapore and Thailand. These explanations serve to distinguish
the situation in Burma from that in other countries in the region*such as
Indonesia*where internal ideological and command factors are usually less
relevant. For Burma, the first two explanations tend to be more pronounced and
Discipline without democracy 321
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

prominent, while the third has received less attention. The context of long-
standing support by China in particular has been widely ignored by analysts of
Burmese politics, who have tended to emphasise the idea that sanctions, or
other international mechanisms, have a practical impact. Addressing this point,
I have previously argued that the economic sanctions imposed on Burma during
the years of military rule have proven merely limited, Western and symbolic
(Farrelly 2009).
First, military consolidation in Burma is best explained by a mindset which
assumes that civilian politicians are too feeble to rule. Now that we see the
beginnings of a new transformation process, it seems clear that the military may
have considered dispensing with direct leadership much earlier if there were not
such strong doubts about the capacities of non-military leaders. Military control
is perpetually defended as a reasonable nationalist response to the prospect of
anarchy and fragmentation. From the perspective of senior military officers,
there is a sacred obligation to ensure that Burma continues to be an independent
country, free from colonial impositions. Their control is fundamentally
predicated on the requirements of national unity and the non-disintegration
of the union. Claims for independence or autonomy from minority ethnic
groups only reinforce the heavy-handed efforts of the government to maintain
centralised rule. The role of the armed forces in providing security in urban
Burma, and fighting counter-insurgency campaigns in ethnic areas, bolsters this
explanation. The prospect of ethnic fracturing leading to a form of Balkanisa-
tion continues to scare the military and will remain one of its main
justifications for claiming a political role.
Second, the military has proven successful at sidelining its opponents and,
compared to countries such as Thailand or Indonesia, there has been no
tolerance for wide-ranging political debate. The Myanmar government has been
more committed to censoring, disrupting and criminalising opposition activities
than many other authoritarian regimes. Partly, it has benefited from the
limitations in terms of communications technology fostered by the countrys
poverty and isolation. Analysts speculate that the 2007 protest movement was
considered especially threatening because anti-government activists could
quickly disseminate footage and reports through the Internet. In fact, that
episode may have convinced the senior military leadership that their survival
required a more subtle effort to ensure personal, institutional and national
prestige. They may have also feared that, in time, wireless communication
technologies would make control impossible. Aung San Suu Kyi, who
commands immense personal popularity, has also been consistently out-
manoeuvred by the military leadership. Her organisations current diminished
status is a direct outcome of the careful efforts to disallow its involvement in
official politics. For two decades it was perched, as precariously as possible, on
the very edge of legality. Many of its leading members, including Aung San Suu
Kyi, have served lengthy terms of incarceration as a result of their political
activities. In ethnic areas, the armed forces have also managed to blunt the
322 Nicholas Farrelly
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

efforts of their fiercest ethnic critics. Most ethnic armies have spent the years
since 1988 under ceasefire conditions. Tatmadaw commanders have sought to
moderate the combat capacities of ethnic militias and, in some cases, non-
government armed groups have been forced to accept new statuses as
subordinate Border Guard Forces, answerable to a Myanmar army chain of
command.
Third, the Myanmar government has received sustained regional support
from many countries in ASEAN and beyond. Its key international partners
include China, Singapore and Thailand, all of which have been well placed to
facilitate the consolidation of military rule since the coup of 1988. Individuals
and businesses from these countries have been instrumental in a far-reaching
effort to undermine the sanctions imposed by Western governments. It is not a
coincidence that these three countries are also well positioned to capitalise on
their proximity to Burma in commercial and other dealings. Military
consolidation in Burma, with its ideological foundations and its demonstrated
success at neutering domestic opposition, has also benefited from these regional
links. Those links substituted for global economic ties during the years in which
sanctions impacted the ability of Burmas elites to receive international financial
transactions. Importantly, the Myanmar government also benefited from the
support it received from Russia and China at the United Nations Security
Council.
While these propositions help to explain the militarys consolidation after the
two coups in 1962 and 1988, the reasons for the ongoing political transforma-
tion are open to further debate. But some factors can already be identified as
essential. First and foremost, redemocratisation provides the armed forces with
a chance to have their country enjoy the same status as its semi-democratic
South-East Asian neighbours. Against this background, Aung San Suu Kyis
victory in the April 2012 by-election and her elevation to parliament will
generate further opportunities for the armed forces to dispense with their long-
standing reputation for presiding over a pariah regime. Redemocratisation has
also catalysed economic changes that are providing significant momentum for a
wider social transformation, even before sanctions are fully removed. The stale
authoritarian model no longer appears to hold appeal for Burmas leaders and,
after 50 years of military rule, fatigue may further help to explain why military
dominance is fading. Finally, the looming physical decrepitude of the most
senior military figures may also have produced heightened anxiety about their
capacity to discourage territorial fragmentation or a rebellion led by democratic
forces.
Conclusions
Since 2010, Burma has caught the worlds attention as a long-delayed process of
political reform appears to be slowly but gradually democratising the countrys
Discipline without democracy 323
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

political institutions. This comes after two coups and 50 years of military rule.
It is inevitable that many will be sceptical of the changes that are under way.
They will want to see unambiguous evidence that the changes are permanent
and that there is no prospect of regressive moves. This insistence on strong
proof for the irreversibility of the reforms fails, however, to appreciate the
political foundations for the militarys interventions in, and subsequent
dominance of, Burmese politics. Burma is an exemplar of military dominance
and, while other countries in the South-East Asian and Pacific region have also
experienced sustained military involvement, the primacy of the Tatmadaw is
without peer. Its moves to implement forms of more transparent, and
potentially democratic, government are also exemplary. In doing so, the
military demonstrates a confidence and an appetite for taking new risks which
surprises casual observers. Notwithstanding the prospect that this process could
still end badly, the pace of change is quickening. Enthusiastic receptions for
incremental changes only seem to embolden the decision-makers and incentivise
further risk-taking.
For now, the early redemocratisation and liberalisation process in Burma
must be treated with due caution. Long-term political strife, especially in ethnic
areas, means that the 50 years of military rule will require careful unravelling.
As I have explained, continued military dominance has been founded in
prevailing scepticism about civilian abilities to govern rebellious ethnic
minorities. Some nationalists fear that only the military can keep the country
together. While this remains the case, Burma retains the ingredients for a
comprehensive remilitarisation of politics. Its current period of glasnost
awakens hope in those who understand that military dominance need not be
inevitable. Thus, as Burma continues to experiment with more democratic
processes and tests its capacity to build both an open economy and a more open
society, it will remain a crucial case study for understanding the implications of
long-term military rule and the conditions under which it can potentially end.
Notes
1. I would like to note my special gratitude to Andrew Selth for his thorough and insightful
comments on my draft. The journals anonymous reviewer of this article also has my thanks
for their astute comments and suggestions on further sources.
2. Scholars have developed a range of compromises for dealing with the alternative names Burma
and Myanmar. My long-standing practice when writing about the contemporary politics of the
country is to use Myanmar for the government and Burma for the country. This helps clarify
ongoing contestation around the countrys system of government and, crucially, about
territorial control.
3. Inside ethnic armies there are also relatively regular periods of political turmoil; these
sometimes generate coup and counter-coup dynamics. In the Kachin Independence Army, as
just one example, a coup in 2001 led to a purge of senior political and military gures.
4. Spiro (1997) offers a masterful analysis of the political culture in Burmese villages before the
coup of 1962, when he and other foreign researchers were expelled fromthe country. It provides
evidence for the judgement that this period was deeply unsettled. Spiro (1997, 33) goes on to
324 Nicholas Farrelly
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

argue that: Given . . . belief in the karmically based legitimacy of any government, villagers held
that in principle all citizens had a minimum set of responsibilities to the regnant regime.
5. Aung-Thwins revisionism generates a further argument about the concept of coups and
revolutions in Burmese society. Aung-Thwin (1985, 256) considers it crucial that [e]ven the
Burmese term to hlan re, though translated now as revolution in the context of Burmese
history, implies less the creation of something new than it does resurrecting something old. Its
use, further, implies the replacing of illegitimate rule by what the actors considered legitimate
rule, making the coup of 1962 not a revolution but a resurrection, an attempt to recreate order
with meaning.
6. Burmas armed forces have a xenophobic streak, which is apparent not only in their dealings
with ethnic minorities, but also with others who are considered foreign. Perhaps the clearest
illustrations of their efforts to minimise foreign inuence are captured by the 2008
constitution. Those with signicant foreign ties are precluded, by law, from taking the
highest political ofces.
7. In discussions of political and military affairs concerning Burma, we sometimes overlook the
inuence of other South-East Asian countries on Burmas development. Even during the years
when Burma and its government were excluded from most conversations with Western
democracies, they retained regular contact, and even deepened relations, with their South-East
Asian neighbours.
References
Aung-Thwin, Michael. 1985. The British Pacication of Burma: Order without Meaning.
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 16 (2): 245261.
Badgley, John H., and Aye Kyaw. 2009. Red Peacocks: Commentaries on Burmese Socialist
Nationalism. New Delhi: Readworthy.
Beyrer, Chris. 1998. Burma and Cambodia: Human Rights, Social Disruption, and the Spread of
HIV/AIDS. Health and Human Rights 2 (4): 8497.
Burma Watcher. 1989. Burma in 1988: There Came a Whirlwind. Asian Survey 29 (2): 174
180.
Callahan, Mary P. 2007. Political Authority in Burmas Ethnic Minority States: Devolution,
Occupation and Coexistence. Washington, DC: East-West Center.
David, Roman, and Ian Holliday. 2006. Set the Junta Free: Pre-Transitional Justice in Myanmars
Democratisation. Australian Journal of Political Science 41 (1): 91105.
Dulyapak, Preecharushh. 2009. Naypyidaw: The New Capital of Burma. Bangkok: White Lotus.
Dupuy, Trevor N. 1960. Burma and Its Army: A Contrast in Motivations and Characteristics.
Antioch Review 20 (4): 428440.
Farrelly, Nicholas. 2009. Repositioning on Sanctions. Canberra Times, October 10: 1011.
Feit, Edward. 1973. Pen, Sword, and People: Military Regimes in the Formation of Political
Institutions. World Politics 25 (2): 251273.
Fenichel, Allen, and Azfar Khan. 1981. The Burmese Way to Socialism. World Development 9
(910): 813824.
Guyot, James. 1991. Myanmar in 1990: The Unconsummated Election. Asian Survey 31 (2):
205211.
Guyot, James. 1998. Burma in 1997: From Empire to ASEAN. Asian Survey 38 (2): 190195.
Jackman, Robert W. 1976. Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in
the Third World. American Political Science Review 70 (4): 10781097.
Kyaw Yin Hlaing. 2008. Power and Factional Struggles in Postindependence Burmese
Governments. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 39 (1): 149177.
Lintner, Bertil. 1990. The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB). Ithaca, NY:
Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University.
Discipline without democracy 325
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4

Lissak, Moshe. 1964. Social Change, Mobilization, and Exchange of Services between the
Military Establishment and the Civil Society: The Burmese Case. Economic Development
and Cultural Change 13 (1): 119.
Marshall, Andrew. 2002. The Trouser People: A Story of Burma in the Shadow of Empire. New
York: Counterpoint.
Martin, Edwin W. 1977. Burma in 1976: The Beginnings of Change? Asian Survey 17 (2): 155
159.
Perry, Peter John. 2007. Myanmar (Burma) since 1962: The Failure of Development. Aldershot:
Ashgate.
Prager Nyein, Susanne. 2009. Expanding Military, Shrinking Citizenry and the New Constitution
in Burma. Journal of Contemporary Asia 39 (4): 638648.
Sao Sanda. 2008. The Moon Princess: Memories of the Shan States. Bangkok: River Books.
Seekins, Donald M. 1992. Japans Aid Relations with Military Regimes in Burma, 19621991:
The Kokunaika Process. Asian Survey 32 (3): 246262.
Seekins, Donald M. 1997. BurmaChina Relations: Playing with Fire. Asian Survey 37 (6):
525539.
Seekins, Donald M. 2009a. Runaway Chickens and Myanmar Identity: Relocating Burmas
Capital. City 13 (1): 6370.
Seekins, Donald M. 2009b. State, Society and Natural Disaster: Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar
(Burma). Asian Journal of Social Science 37 (5): 717737.
Selth, Andrew. 1986. Race and Resistance in Burma, 19421945. Modern Asian Studies 20 (3):
483507.
Selth, Andrew. 1996. Burma and the Strategic Competition between China and India. Journal of
Strategic Studies 19 (2): 213230.
Selth, Andrew. 2009. Known Knowns and Known Unknowns: Measuring Myanmars Military
Capabilities. Contemporary Southeast Asia 31 (2): 272295.
Skidmore, Monique. 2003. Darker Than Midnight: Fear, Vulnerability, and Terror Making in
Urban Burma (Myanmar). American Ethnologist 30 (1): 521.
South, Ashley. 2008. Ethnic Politics in Burma: States of Conict. Abingdon: Routledge.
Spiro, Melford E. 1997. Ethnographic Notes on Conceptions and Dynamics of Political Power in
Upper Burma (Prior to the 1962 Military Coup). Ethnology 36 (1): 3147.
Steinberg, David I. 1990. International Rivalries in Burma: The Rise of Economic Competition.
Asian Survey 30 (6): 587601.
Taylor, Robert H. 1979. Burmas National Unity Problem and the 1974 Constitution.
Contemporary Southeast Asia 1 (3): 232248.
Taylor, Robert H. 1998. Myanmar: Military Politics and the Prospects for Democratisation.
Asian Affairs 29 (1): 312.
Tin Htwe. 1989. Burma Communist Partys Conspiracy to Take Over State Power. Yangon:
Ministry of Information of the Government of the Union of Myanmar.
Tin Maung Maung Than. 2007. State Dominance in Myanmar: The Political Economy of
Industrialization. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Trager, Frank N. 1963. The Failure of U Nu and the Return of the Armed Forces in Burma.
Review of Politics 25 (3): 309328.
Zollner, Hans-Bernd. 2011. Behind the Smoke of Myth and Counter-Myth: Contours of What
Happened in Burma in 1988. In Southeast Asian Historiography Unravelling the Myths:
Essays in Honour of Barend Jan Terwiel, edited by Volker Grabowsky, 248257. Bangkok:
River Books.
326 Nicholas Farrelly
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d

b
y

[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y

o
f

N
o
t
t
i
n
g
h
a
m
]

a
t

1
7
:
5
8

0
3

M
a
y

2
0
1
4