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MAJOR UNIT OPERATIONS AND PROCESSES: AN OVERVIEW

SYDNEY LIPTON
This article presents information on basic process equipment, storage, plant layout and operations considerations in
chemical process industries, including major items and concepts that are broadly applicable throughout the chemical
industry. However, much of the equipment required in chemical processing is highly specialized and cannot be
broadly generalized. More detailed information on toxicity and hazardous materials and process safety are reviewed
elsewhere in this Encyclopaedia.
There are two basic categories of layout in chemical processing industries plant layout, which covers all process
units, utilities, storage areas, loading!unloading areas, buildings, shops and warehousing, and unit or process layout,
which covers only equipment placement for a specific process, also termed a process bloc".
Plant Layout

Siting
#ocating or siting an overall plant is based upon a number of general factors, as shown in table $$.% &''() *++,-.
These factors vary considerably with locations, governments and economic policies. .f these various factors, safety
considerations are an extremely important concern, and in some locations they can be the major factor that governs
plant siting.
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Table 77.2. Some general site selection factors
0 (opulation density around the site
0 1atural disaster occurrence &earthqua"e, flood, etc.-
0 (revailing winds and meteorological data
0 2vailability of power, steam and water
0 )afety considerations
0 2ir, water and waste regulations and their complexity
0 2ccessibility to raw materials and mar"ets
0 Transportation
0 )iting permits and complexity of obtaining them
0 3nteraction requirements in industrial developments
0 #abour availability and costs, local labour problem
0 3nvestment incentives
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.ne important aspect of plant safety in siting is defining a buffer zone between a plant with hazardous processes and
nearby plants, dwellings, schools, hospitals, highways, waterways and airplane corridors. )ome overall safety
considerations are presented in table $$.,. The buffer zone is important because distance tends to reduce or mitigate
potential exposures from various accidents. The distance necessary to reduce toxic concentrations to acceptable
levels through atmospheric interaction and the dispersion of toxic materials from an accidental release can be defined.
Moreover, the time lag between a toxic release and public exposure created by a buffer zone can be used to warn the
population through pre4planned emergency response programmes. )ince plants have various types of facilities
containing toxic materials, dispersion analyses should be conducted on the potentially hazardous systems to ensure
the buffer zone is adequate in each area surrounding the plant perimeter.
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Table 77.3. Plant siting safety considerations
0 5uffer zone
0 #ocation of other hazardous installations in vicinity
0 3nventory of toxic and hazardous materials
0 2dequacy of firefighting water supply
0 6mergency equipment access
0 2vailability of emergency response support from adjacent industries and the community
0 7eather extremes and prevailing winds
0 #ocation of highways, waterways, railroad and airplane corridors
0 6nvironmental and waste disposal restrictions during emergencies
0 8raining and grade slope
0 Maintenance and inspection
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9ire is a potential hazard in process plants and facilities. #arge fires can be a source of thermal radiation which can
also be mitigated by distance. 6levated flares can also be a source of thermal radiation during an emergency or
startup!shutdown operation. 2 flare is a device that automatically burns exhaust gases or emergency vapour releases
at elevated positions or special ground locations. These should be sited away from the plant perimeter &for community
protection- and an area at the flare base should be prohibited to wor"ers. 3f not operated properly, liquid carryover into
the flare can result in burning liquid droplets. 3n addition to fire, there can be explosions within equipment or a vapour
cloud that produces blast waves. 2lthough distance will reduce the blast intensity somewhat over the buffer zone, the
blast will still have an effect on the nearby community.
The potential of accidental releases or fires from existing facilities that may be near the proposed site should also be
considered. (otential incidents should be modelled and evaluated to determine the possible effect on the proposed
plant layout. 6mergency responses to an external event should be evaluated and responses coordinated with other
plants and affected communities.
Other considerations
8ow 'hemical 'ompany has developed another approach to plant layout based on an acceptable level of Maximum
(robable (roperty 8amage &M((8- and 5usiness 3nterruption :is" &5*- &8ow 'hemical 'ompany *++;a-. These
considerations are important for both new and existing plants. The 8ow 9ire and 6xplosion 3ndex is useful in new
plant layouts or in the addition of equipment to existing plants. 3f ris"s calculated from the 3ndex are found to be
unacceptable, the separation distances should be increased. 2lternatively, layout changes may also reduce the ris"
potential.
Overall layout
3n an overall plant layout, the prevailing winds are an important consideration. 3gnition sources should be located
upwind of potential lea" sources. 9ired heaters, boilers, incinerators and flares are in this category &''() *++,-. The
location of storage tan"s downwind of process units and utilities is another recommendation &''() *++,-.
6nvironmental regulations have led to significantly reduced lea"age from tan"age &#ipton and #ynch *++;-.
Minimum separation distances have been outlined in various publications for process units, equipment and different
plant functions &''() *++,< 8ow 'hemical 'ompany *++;a< 3:3 *++*-. =eneral facilities that normally have
recommended distance separations in overall plant layouts are shown in table $$.;. 2ctual distance recommendations
should be carefully defined. 7hile fired heaters and process furnaces are not shown in table $$.;, they are an
important item and recommended distance separations must be included in a unit process layout.
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Table 77.4. Facilities generally separated in overall plant layouts
0 (rocess units
0 Tan" farms
0 #oading and unloading facilities
0 9lares
0 (ower, boilers and incinerators
0 'ooling towers
0 )ubstations, large electrical switch yards
0 'entral control houses
0 7arehouses
0 2nalytical laboratories
0 3ncoming utility metering and bloc" systems
0 9ire hoses, fixed monitors, reservoirs and emergency fire pumps
0 7aste treatment areas
0 Maintenance buildings and areas
0 2dministrative buildings
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3n addition, roads are necessary for emergency and maintenance vehicle or equipment access and require careful
placement between process units and throughout the various sections of the plant. 2cceptable clearances for
overhead pipe rac"s and other overhead equipment should be established along with lateral clearances at cross4
roads and entrances to all facilities.
The layout requirements can be based on recommended minimum separation distances &''() *++,< 19(2 *++>< 3:3
*++*< Mec"lenburgh *+?@- or determined through a hazard analysis &8ow 'hemical 'ompany *++;a-.
Process Unit Layout
Table $$.; presents an overall plant separations layout summary. The process units are contained within the specific
bloc" shown in the general layout. The chemical process is generally shown in detail in process and implementation
diagrams &(A38s-. 2 process layout requires considerations beyond specific equipment separation distances, some of
which are shown in table $$.@.
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Table 77.5. eneral considerations in a process unit layout
0 2rea definition for future expansion and unit accessibility
0 :epair equipment accessibility for frequent maintenance
0 )pace requirements for individual equipment repair &e.g., area needed for pulling heat exchanger bundle or
accessibility for control valve-
0 5arriers for high pressure equipment or reactors with explosion potential
0 Mechanical and space requirements for loading!unloading solids4filled reactors or towers )pace for venting dust
explosions
0 )eparation of frequently opened or maintained equipment from high temperature piping, vessels, etc.
0 )pecial buildings or structures and necessary clearance &e.g., a compressor house with an internal bridge crane
or external crane-
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The assemblage of equipment in any particular process unit will vary considerably, depending on the process. The
toxicity and hazardous characteristics of the streams and materials within the units also vary widely. 8espite these
differences, minimum distance standards have been developed for many equipment items &''() *++,< 19(2 *++><
3:3 *++*< Mec"lenburgh *+?@-. (rocedures for calculating potential lea"age and toxic exposures from process
equipment that can also affect separation distance are available &8ow 'hemical 'ompany *++;b-. 3n addition,
dispersion analysis can be applied when lea"age estimates have been calculated.
Equipment and separation distance
2 matrix technique can be used to calculate the space needed for separating equipment &''() *++,< 3:3 *++*-.
'alculations based upon specific processing conditions and an equipment hazard evaluation may result in separation
distances that differ from a standard matrix guide.
6xtensive lists for a matrix can be developed by refinement of individual categories and by the addition of equipment.
9or example, compressors may be split into several types, such as those handling inert gas, air and hazardous gases.
)eparation distances for engine4driven compressors may differ from motor4 or steam4driven machines. )eparation
distances in storage facilities that house liquefied gases should be analysed on the basis of whether the gas is inert.
The process battery limits should be carefully defined. They are the boundary lines or plot limits for a process unit &the
name derives from the early use of a battery of ovens in processing-. .ther units, roads, utilities, pipeways, runoff
ditches and so on are plotted based upon battery limits. 7hile unit equipment location does not extend to the battery
limits, separation distances of equipment from battery limits should be defined.
Control rooms or control houses
3n the past each process unit was designed with a control room that provided operational control of the process. 7ith
the advent of electronic instrumentation and computer4controlled processing, individual control rooms have been
replaced by a central control room that controls a number of process units in many operations. The centralized control
room is economically advantageous because of process optimization and increases in efficiency of personnel.
3ndividual process units still exist and, in some specialized units, older control houses which have been supplanted by
centralized control rooms may still be used for local process monitoring and for emergency control. 2lthough control
room functions and locations are generally determined by process economics, the design of the control room or
control house is very important for maintaining emergency control and for wor"er protection. )ome considerations for
both central and local control houses include
0 pressurizing the control house to prevent the entrance of toxic and hazardous vapours
0 designing the control house for blast and explosion resistance
0 establishing a location that is at minimal ris" &based upon separation distance and probability of gas releases-
0 purifying all inlet air and installing an inlet stac" location that minimizes the inta"e of toxic or hazardous vapours
0 sealing all sewer outlets from the control house
0 installing a fire suppression system.
Inventory reduction
2n important consideration in process and plant layouts is the quantity of toxic and hazardous material in the overall
inventory, including the equipment. The consequences of a lea" are more severe as the volume of material increases.
'onsequently, the inventory should be minimized wherever possible. 3mproved processing that reduces the number
and size of pieces of equipment reduces the inventory, lowers the ris" and also results in lower investment and
improved operating efficiencies.
)ome potential inventory reduction considerations are shown in table $$.B. 7here a new process facility will be
installed, processing should be optimized by ta"ing into consideration some of the objectives shown in table $$.B.
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Table 77.!. Steps for limiting inventory
0 :educing storage tan" inventory reduction through improved process control, operation and just4in4time inventory
control
0 6liminating or minimizing onsite tan" inventory through process integration
0 Csing reaction variable analysis and development for reactor volume reduction
0 :eplacing batch reactors with continuous reactors, which also reduces downstream holdup
0 #owering distillation column holdup through bottoms4volume reductions and tray holdup with either more
advanced trays or pac"ings
0 :eplacing "ettle reboilers with thermosyphon reboilers
0 Minimizing overhead drum and bottoms surge drum volumes
0 3mproving pipe layout and sizing to minimize holdup
0 7here toxic materials are produced, minimizing the toxic section holdup
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Storae !acilities
The storage facilities in a chemical processing plant can house liquid and solid feed, intermediate chemicals, by4
products and process products. (roducts stored in many facilities serve as intermediates or precursors for other
processes. )torage may also be required for diluents, solvents or other process materials. 2ll of these materials are
generally stored in above4ground storage tan"age &2)T-. Cnderground tan"age is still used in some locations, but use
is generally limited due to access problems and limited capacity. 3n addition, potential lea"age of such underground
storage tan"s &C)Ts- presents environmental problems when lea"s contaminate ground water. =eneral earth
contamination can lead to potential atmospheric exposures with higher vapour4pressure materials lea"s. #ea"ed
materials can be a potential exposure problem during ground remediation efforts. C)T lea"age has resulted in
stringent environmental regulations in many countries, such as the requirements for double4walled tan"s and
underground monitoring.
Typical above4ground storage tan"s are shown in figure $$.%. Dertical 2)Ts are cone or domed roof tan"s, floating
roof tan"s that are covered or non4covered floating roof or external floating roof tan"s &69:Ts-. 'onverted or closed
roof tan"s are 69:Ts with covers installed on the tan"s that are frequently geodesic type domes. )ince 69:Ts over
time do not maintain a perfectly circular shape, sealing the floating roof is difficult and a covering is installed on the
tan". 2 geodesic dome design eliminates roof trusses needed for cone roof tan"s &9:Ts-. The geodesic dome is more
economical than a cone roof and, in addition, the dome reduces losses of materials to the environment.
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Figure 77.2. Typical above"ground storage tan#s

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1ormally, the tan"s are limited to liquid storage where the liquid vapour pressure does not exceed $$ "(a. 7here the
pressure exceeds this value, spheroids or spheres are used since both are designed for pressure operation.
)pheroids can be quite large but are not installed where the pressure may exceed certain limits defined by the
mechanical design. 9or most higher vapour4pressure storage applications, spheres are normally the storage container
and are equipped with pressure relief valves to prevent over pressuring. 2 safety concern that has developed with
spheres is rollover, which generates excessive vapour and results in relief valve discharges or in more extreme
situations such as sphere wall rupture &''() *++,-. 3n general, the liquid contents stratify and if warm &less dense-
material is loaded into the sphere bottom, the warm material rises to the surface with the cooler, higher density
surface material rolled over to the bottom. The warm surface material vaporizes, raising the pressure, which may
result in relief valve discharge or sphere overpressuring.
Tan layout
Tan"age layout requires careful planning. There are recommendations for tan" separation distances and other
considerations &''() *+??< *++,-. 3n many locations, separation distances are not specified by code, but minimum
distances &.)H2 *++;- can be a result of various decisions applicable to separation distances and locations. )ome of
these considerations are presented in table $$.$. 3n addition, tan" service is a factor in tan" separation for
pressurized, refrigerated and atmospheric tan"s &''() *++,-.
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Table 77.7. Tan# separation and location considerations
0 )eparation based on shell to shell distances can be based on references and subject to calculating the thermal
radiation distance in the event of fire in an adjacent tan".
0 Tan"s should be separated from process units.
0 2 tan" location, preferably downwind from other areas, minimizes ignition problems in the event of a tan"
releasing a significant vapour quantity.
0 )torage tan"s should have dy"es, which are also required by law in most regions.
0 Tan"s can be grouped for utilization of common dy"es and firefighting equipment.
0 8y"es should have isolation capability in an emergency.
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8y"es are required and are nominally sized volumetrically to hold the contents of a tan". 7here multiple tan"s are
within a dy"e, the minimum volumetric dy"e capacity is equivalent to the capacity of the largest tan" &.)H2 *++;-.
The dy"e walls can be constructed of earth, steel, concrete or solid masonry. However, the earth dy"es should be
impenetrable and have a flat top with a minimum width of >.B* m. 3n addition, the soil within the dy"ed area should
also have an impenetrable layer to prevent any chemical or oil lea"age into the soil.
Tan leaage
2 problem that has been developing through the years is tan" lea"age as a result of corrosion in the tan" bottom.
9requently, tan"s have water layers in the tan" bottom that can contribute to corrosion, and electrolytic corrosion may
occur due to contact with the earth. 2s a result, regulatory requirements have been instituted in various regions to
control tan" bottom lea"age and underground soil and water contamination from contaminants in the water. 2 variety
of design procedures have been developed to control and monitor lea"age &Hagen and :ials *++;-. 3n addition,
double bottoms have also been installed. 3n some installations, cathodic protection has been installed to further
control metal deterioration &5arletta, 5ayle and Eennelley *++@-.
!ater dra" o##
Manually discharging water periodically from the tan" bottom can result in exposure. Disual observation to determine
the interface through open manual draining can result in wor"er exposure. 2 closed discharge can be installed with an
interface sensor and control valve minimizing potential wor"er exposures &#ipton and #ynch *++;-. 2 variety of
sensors are commercially available for this service.
Over#illing tans
9requently, tan"s are overfilled, creating potential safety and wor"er exposure hazards. This can be prevented with
redundant or dual4level instruments controlling inlet bloc" valves or feed pumps &5ahner *++B-. 9or many years,
overflow lines were installed on chemical tan"s, but they terminated a short distance above a drain opening to permit
visual observation of the overflow discharge. Moreover, the drain had to be sized for greater than the maximum fill
rate to ensure proper drainage. However, such a system is a potential exposure source. This can be eliminated by
connecting the overflow line directly to the drain with a flow indicator in the line to show the overflow. 2lthough this will
function satisfactorily, this results in overloading the drain system with a very large contaminant volume and potential
health and safety problems.
Tan inspection and cleaning
(eriodically, tan"s are removed from service for inspection and! or cleaning. These procedures must be carefully
controlled to prevent wor"er exposure and minimize potential safety hazards. 9ollowing draining, tan"s are frequently
flushed with water to remove process liquid traces. Historically, the tan"s have then been cleaned manually or
mechanically where necessary. 7hen tan"s are drained, they are filled with vapour that may be toxic and can be
within a combustible range. 7ater flushing may not significantly affect vapour toxicity, but it may reduce potential
combustion problems. 7ith floating roofs, the material below the floating roof can be flushed and drained, but some
tan"s may still have material in the sump. This bottom material must be removed manually and may present potential
exposure concerns. (ersonnel may be required to wear personal protective equipment &((6-.
1ormally, enclosed tan"s and any volume below the floating roofs are purged with air until a specified oxygen
concentration level is achieved before entry is permitted. However, concentration measurements should be continually
obtained to ensure toxic concentration levels are satisfactory and do not change.
$apour venting and emission control
9or fixed roof or converted floating roof tan"s &'9:Ts-, venting to the atmosphere may not be acceptable in many
locations. The pressure4vacuum &(D- vent &shown in figure $$.% these tan"s are removed and the vapours flow
through a closed duct to a control device where the contaminants are destroyed or recovered. 9or both tan"s, an inert
purge &e.g., nitrogen- can be injected to eliminate the diurnal vacuum effect and maintain a positive pressure for the
recovery device. 3n the '9:T tan", the nitrogen eliminates the diurnal effect and reduces any vapours to the
atmosphere through a (D vent. However, vapour emissions are not eliminated. 2 large number of control devices and
techniques are available including combustion, absorbers, condensers and absorption &Moretti and Mu"hopadhyay
*++,< 'arroll and :uddy *++,< 5asta *++;< (ennington *++B< )iegall *++B-. )election of a control system is a
function of final emission targets and operating and investment costs.
3n floating roof tan"s, both external and internal, seals and auxiliary fitting controls effectively minimize vapour losses.
Sa#ety ha%ards
9lammability is a major concern in tan"age and fire4fighting systems are required to aid in control and prevention of
expanded fire zones. 9irewater systems and installation recommendations are available &''() *++,< 8ow 'hemical
'ompany *++;a< 19(2 *++>-. 7ater can be sprayed directly on a fire under certain conditions and is essential in
cooling adjacent tan"age or equipment to prevent overheating. 3n addition, foam is an effective fire4fighting agent and
permanent foam equipment can be installed on tan"s. The installation of foam equipment on mobile fire4fighting
equipment should be reviewed with a manufacturer. 6nvironmentally acceptable and low toxicity foams are now
available that are effective and comparable to other foams in quic"ly extinguishing fires.
Processin E"ui#$ent
2 wide variety of process equipment is required in chemicals processing as a result of the numerous processes,
specialized process requirements and variations in products. 'onsequently, all of the chemical equipment in use
today cannot be reviewed< this section will concentrate on the more widely applied equipment found in processing
sequences.
&eactors
There are a large number of reactor types in the chemical industry. The basis for reactor selection is a function of a
number of variables, beginning with classifying whether the reaction is a batch or continuous reaction. 9requently,
batch reactions are converted to continuous operations as experience with the reaction increases and some
modifications, such as improved catalysts, become available. 'ontinuous reaction processing is generally more
efficient and produces a more consistent product, which is desirable in meeting product quality targets. However,
there are still a large number of batch operations.
$eaction
3n all reactions, the classifications of a reaction as exothermic or endothermic &producing heat or requiring heat- is
necessary in order to define the heating or cooling requirements necessary to control the reaction. 3n addition,
runaway reaction criteria must be established to install instrument sensors and controls that can prevent a reaction
from becoming out of control. (rior to full4scale operation of a reactor, emergency procedures must be investigated
and developed to ensure the runaway reaction is safely contained. )ome of the various potential solutions are
emergency control equipment that is automatically activated, injection of a chemical that stops the reaction and vent
facilities that can accommodate and contain the reactor contents. )afety valve and vent operation are extremely
important requiring well4maintained and functioning equipment at all times. 'onsequently, multiple interloc"ed safety
valves are frequently installed to ensure that maintenance on one valve will not reduce the required relief capacity.
)hould a safety valve or vent discharge due to malfunction, the discharge effluent must be contained in practically all
circumstances to minimize potential safety and health hazards. 2s a result, the method of containing the emergency
discharge through piping along with final disposition of the reactor discharge should be carefully analysed. 3n general,
liquid and vapour should be separated with the vapour sent to a flare or recovery and liquid recycled where possible.
)olids removal may require some study.
%atc&
3n reactors involving exothermic reactions, an important consideration is fouling on the walls or internal tubing by the
cooling media used to maintain the temperature. :emoval of fouled material varies considerably and the method of
removal is a function of the fouled material characteristics. 9ouled material can be removed with a solvent, a high4
pressure jet nozzle stream or, in some cases, manually. 3n all these procedures, safety and exposure must be
carefully controlled. Movement of material in and out of the reactor must not permit the entrance of air, which may
result in a flammable vapour mixture. Dacuums should be bro"en with an inert gas &e.g., nitrogen-. Dessel entry for
inspection or wor" can be classified as entry into a confined space and the rules for this procedure should be
observed. Dapour and dermal toxicity should be understood and technicians must be "nowledgeable about health
hazards.
'ontinuous
9low4through reactors can be filled with liquid or a vapour and liquid. )ome reactions produce slurries in the reactors.
2lso, there are reactors that contain solid catalysts. The reaction fluid may be liquid, vapour or a combination of
vapour and liquid. )olid catalysts, which promote a reaction without participating in it, are normally contained within
grids and are termed fixed beds. The fixed4bed reactors may have single or multiple beds and can have exotherinic or
endothermic reactions, with most reactions requiring a constant temperature &isothermal- through each bed. This
frequently requires the injection of feed streams or a diluent at various locations between beds to control the
temperature. 7ith these reaction systems, temperature indication and sensor location through the beds are extremely
important to prevent a reaction runaway and product yield or quality changes.
9ixed beds generally lose their activity and must be regenerated or replaced. 9or regeneration, deposits on the bed
may be burned off, dissolved in a solvent or, in some cases, regenerated through the injection of a chemical in an
inert fluid into the bed, thereby restoring catalyst activity. 8epending on the catalyst, one of these techniques may be
applied. 7here beds are burned, the reactor is emptied and purged of all process fluids then filled with an inert gas
&usually nitrogen-, which is heated and recirculated, raising the bed to a specified temperature level. 2t this point, a
very small volume of oxygen is added to the inert stream to initiate a flame front that gradually moves through the bed
and controls the temperature rise. 6xcessive oxygen quantities have a deleterious effect on the catalyst.
Fi(ed"bed catalyst removal
:emoval of fixed4bed catalysts must be carefully controlled. The reactors are drained of process fluid and then the
remaining fluid is displaced with a flushing fluid or purged with a vapour until all of the process fluid has been
removed. 9inal purging may require other techniques before the vessel can be purged with an inert gas or air prior to
opening the vessel or discharging the catalyst from the vessel under an inert blan"et. )hould water be used in this
process, the water is drained through closed piping to a process sewer. )ome catalysts are sensitive to air or oxygen,
becoming pyrophoric or toxic. These require special procedures to eliminate air during filling or emptying the vessels.
(ersonal protection along with handling procedures must be carefully defined to minimize potential exposures and
protect personnel.
)pent catalyst disposal may require further treating before it is sent to a catalyst manufacturer for recycling or into an
environmentally acceptable disposal procedure.
)t&er catalyst systems
=as flowing through a loose solid catalyst bed expands the bed and forms a suspension that is similar to a liquid and
termed a fluid bed. This type of reaction is used in various processes. )pent catalysts are removed as a gas4solids
side stream for regeneration and then returned to the process through an enclosed system. 3n other reactions, catalyst
activity may be very high and, although catalyst is discharged in the product, the concentration is extremely low and
does not pose a problem. 7here a high concentration of catalyst solids in the product vapour is undesirable, solids
carryover must be removed before purification. However, traces of solids will remain. These are removed for disposal
in one of the by4product streams, which in turn must be clarified.
3n situations where spent catalyst is regenerated through burning, extensive solids recovery facilities are required in
fluid4bed systems to meet environmental restrictions. :ecovery may consist of various combinations of cyclones,
electric precipitators, bag filters- and! or scrubbers. 7here burning occurs in fixed beds, the basic concern is
temperature control.
)ince fluid4bed catalysts are frequently within the respiratory range, care must be exercised during solids handling to
ensure wor"er protection with either fresh or recovered catalysts.
3n some instances a vacuum may be used to remove various components from a fixed bed. 3n these situations, a
steam4driven vacuum jet is frequently the vacuum producer. This produces a steam discharge that frequently contains
toxic materials although in very low concentration in the jet stream. However, the discharge of a steam jet should be
carefully reviewed to determine contaminant quantities, toxicity and potential dispersion if it is discharged directly to
the atmosphere. )hould this be unsatisfactory, the jet discharge may require condensing in a sump where all vapours
are controlled and the water is sent to the closed sewer system. 2 rotary vacuum pump will perform in this service.
The discharge from a reciprocating vacuum pump may not be permitted to discharge directly to the atmosphere, but
can in some instances discharge into a flare line, incinerator or process heater.
Safety
3n all reactors, pressure increases are a major concern since the vessel pressure rating must not be exceeded. These
pressure increases may be a result of poor process control, malfunction or a runaway reaction. 'onsequently,
pressure relief systems are required to maintain vessel integrity by preventing reactor overpressuring. :elief valve
discharges must be carefully designed to maintain adequate relief under all conditions, including relief4valve
maintenance. Multiple valves may be required. )hould a relief valve be designed to discharge into the atmosphere,
the discharge point should be elevated above all nearby structures and a dispersion analysis should be conducted to
ensure adequate protection for wor"ers and nearby communities.
3f a rupture dis" is installed with a safety valve, the discharge should also be enclosed and the final discharge location
designated as described above. )ince a dis" rupture will not reseat, a dis" without a safety valve will probably release
most of the reactor contents and air may enter the reactor at the end of the release. This requires a careful analysis to
ensure that a flammable situation is not created and that highly undesirable reactions do not occur. Moreover, the
discharge from a dis" may release liquid and the vent system must be designed to contain all liquids with vapour
discharged, as described above. 2tmospheric emergency releases must be approved by regulatory authorities before
installation.
Mixer agitators installed in reactors are sealed. #ea"s may be hazardous and if they occur the seal must be repaired
which requires a reactor shutdown. The reactor contents may require special handling or precautions and an
emergency shutdown procedure should include reaction termination and disposition of the reactor contents.
9lammability and exposure control must be carefully reviewed for each step including final disposition of the reactor
mix. )ince a shutdown can be expensive and involve production loss, magnetic driven mixers and newer seal systems
have been introduced to reduce maintenance and reactor shutdowns.
6ntrance to all reactors requires compliance with safe confined4space entry procedures.
'ractionation or distillation to"ers
8istillation is a process whereby chemical substances are separated through methods which ta"e advantage of
differences in boiling points. The familiar towers in chemical plants and refineries are distillation towers.
8istillation in various forms is a processing step found in the great majority of chemical processes. 9ractionation or
distillation can be found in purification, separation, stripping, azeotropic and extractive process steps. These
applications now include reactive distillation, where a reaction occurs in a separate section of the distillation tower.
8istillation is conducted with a series of trays in a tower, or it can be conducted in a tower filled with pac"ing. The
pac"ings have special configurations that readily permit the passage of vapour and liquid, but provide sufficient
surface area for vapour4liquid contact and efficient fractionation.
)peration
Heat is normally supplied to a tower with a reboiler, although the heat content of specific streams may be sufficient to
eliminate the reboiler. 7ith reboiler heat, multiple step vapour4liquid separation occurs on the trays and lighter
materials ascend through the tower. Dapours from the top tray are fully or partially condensed in the overhead
condenser. The condensed liquid is collected in the distillate recovery drum, where part of the liquid is recycled to the
tower and the other portion is withdrawn and sent to a specific location. 1on4condensed vapours may be recovered
elsewhere or sent to a control device which can be a combustor or recovery system.
Pressure
Towers typically operate at pressures higher than atmospheric pressure. However, towers are frequently operated
under vacuum to minimize liquid temperatures that may affect product quality or in situations where tower materials
become a mechanical and economic concern due to the temperature level that may be difficult to achieve. 2lso, high
temperatures may affect the fluid. 3n heavy petroleum fractions, very high tower bottoms temperatures frequently
result in co"ing problems.
Dacuums are typically obtained with ejectors or vacuum pumps. 3n process units, vacuum loadings consist of some
light vapour materials, inerts that may have been in the tower feed stream and air from lea"age. 1ormally the vacuum
system is installed after a condenser to reduce the organic loading to the vacuum system. The vacuum system is
sized based upon the estimated vapour loading, with ejectors handling larger vapour loadings. 3n certain systems a
vacuum machine may be directly connected to a condenser outlet. 2 typical ejector system operation is a combination
of ejectors and direct barometric condensers where the ejector vapours have direct contact with the cooling water.
5arometric condensers are very large consumers of water and the steam4water mixture results in high water outlet
temperatures that tend to vaporize any organic compound traces in the atmospheric barometric sump, potentially
increasing wor"place exposures. 3n addition, a large effluent load is added to the waste4water system.
2 large water reduction is achieved along with a substantial reduction in steam consumption in modified vacuum
systems. )ince the vacuum pump will not handle a large vapour load, a steam ejector is used in the first stage in
combination with a surface condenser to reduce the vacuum pump load. 3n addition, a sump drum is installed for
above4ground operation. The simpler system reduces waste4water loading and maintains a closed system that
eliminates potential vapour exposures.
Safety
2ll towers and drums must be protected from overpressure that may result from malfunction, fire &Mowrer *++@- or
utility failure. 2 hazard review is necessary and is required by law in some countries. 2 general process safety
management approach that is applicable to process and plant operation improves safety, minimizes losses and
protects wor"er health &2uger *++@< Murphy *++;< )utton *++@-. (rotection is provided by pressure relief valves
&(:Ds- that discharge to the atmosphere or to a closed system. The (:D is generally mounted at the tower top to
relieve the large vapour load, although some installations locate the (:D in other tower locations. The (:D can also
be located on the distillate overhead recovery drum as long as valves are not placed between the (:D and the tower
top. 3f bloc" valves are installed in the process lines to the condenser then the (:D must be installed on the tower.
7hen distillation tower overpressure is relieved, under certain emergency scenarios, the (:D discharge may be
exceedingly large. Dery high loading in a closed system discharge vent line may be the largest load in the system.
)ince a (:D discharge can be sudden and the overall relieving time may be quite short &less than *@ minutes-, this
extremely large vapour load must be carefully analysed &5ewanger and Erecter *++@< 5oicourt *++@-. )ince this short,
large pea" load is difficult to process in control devices such as absorbers, adsorbers, furnaces and so on, the
preferable control device in most situations is a flare for vapour destruction. 1ormally, a number of (:Ds are
connected to a flare line header that in turn is connected to a single flare. However, the flare and overall system must
be carefully designed to cover a large group of potential contingencies &5oicourt *++@-.
*ealt& &a+ards
9or direct relief to the atmosphere, a detailed dispersion analysis of the relief valve discharge vapours should be
conducted to ensure that wor"ers are not exposed and that community concentrations are well within allowable
concentration guidelines. 3n controlling dispersion, atmospheric relief valve discharge lines may have to be raised to
prevent excessive concentrations on nearby structures. 2 very tall flare4li"e stac" may be necessary to control
dispersion.
2nother area of concern is entering a tower for maintenance or mechanical changes during a shutdown. This entails
entering a confined space and exposes wor"ers to the associated hazards. The flushing and purging method prior to
opening must be carefully conducted to ensure minimal exposures by reducing any toxic concentrations below
recommended levels. 5efore commencing with flushing and purging operations, the tower pressure must be reduced
and all piping connections to the tower must be blinded &i.e., flat metal dis"s must be placed between the tower
flanges and the connecting pipe flanges-. This step should be carefully managed to ensure minimum exposures. 3n
different processes, the methods of clearing the tower of toxic fluids vary. 9requently, the tower fluid is displaced with
a fluid that has very low toxicity characteristics. This displacement fluid is then drained and pumped to a selected
location. The remaining liquid film and droplets can be steamed to the atmosphere through a top flange that has a
special stand4off blind with an opening between the blind and tower flange. 9ollowing steaming, air enters the tower
through the special blind opening as the tower cools. 2 manhole at the tower bottom and one at the tower top are
opened permitting the blowing of air through the tower. 7hen the internal tower concentration reaches a
predetermined level, the tower can be entered.
(eat e)changers
There are a wide variety of heat exchangers in the chemical process industry. Heat exchangers are mechanical
devices for the transfer of heat to or from a process stream. They are selected in accordance with process conditions
and exchanger designs. 2 few of the common exchanger types are shown in figure $$.,. )election of the optimum
exchanger for a process service is somewhat complicated and requires a detailed investigation &7oods *++@-. 3n
many situations, certain types are not suitable because of pressure, temperature, solids concentration, viscosity, flow
quantity and other factors. Moreover, an individual heat exchanger design can vary considerably< several types of
floating head tube and sheet exchangers are available &=reen, Maloney and (erry *+?;-. The floating head is
normally selected where the temperatures may cause excessive tube expansion that otherwise could not maintain
integrity in a fixed tube sheet exchanger. 3n the simplified floating head exchanger in figure $$.,, the floating head is
contained completely within the exchanger and does not have any connection with the shell cover. 3n other floating
head designs, there may be pac"ing around the floating tubesheet &=reen, Maloney and (erry *+?;-.
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Figure 77.3. Typical &eat e(c&angers


///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
,ea#age
The pac"ing on floating tubesheets is in contact with the atmosphere and may be a source of lea"age and potential
exposure. .ther exchangers may also have potential lea"age sources and should be examined carefully. 2s a result
of their heat transfer characteristics, plate and frame exchangers are often installed in the chemical industry. The
plates have various corrugations and configurations. (lates are separated by gas"ets that prevent mixing of the
streams and provide an external seal. However, the seals limit temperature applications to about *?> F', although
seal improvements may overcome this limitation. )ince there are a number of plates, the plates must be compressed
properly to ensure proper sealing between them. 'onsequently, careful mechanical installation is necessary to
prevent lea"age and potential hazards. )ince there are a large number of seals, careful seal monitoring is important to
minimize potential exposures.
2ir cooled exchangers are attractive economically and have been installed in a wide number of process applications
and in various locations within process units. To save space, these exchangers are often installed over pipe runs and
are frequently stac"ed. )ince tube material selection is important, a variety of materials is used in the chemical
industry. These tubes are connected to the tube sheet. This requires use of compatible materials. #ea"age through a
tube crac" or at the tube sheet is a concern since the fan will circulate vapours from the lea" and dispersion may
result in potential exposures. 2ir dilution may significantly reduce the potential exposure hazard. However, fans are
frequently shut down under some weather conditions and in these circumstances lea" concentrations can increase
thereby increasing potential exposures. Moreover, if lea"ing tubes are not repaired, the crac" may worsen. 7ith toxic
liquids that do not readily vaporize, dripping can occur and result in potential dermal exposure.
)hell and tube heat exchangers may develop lea"s through any of the various flanges &=reen, Maloney and (erry
*+?;-. )ince shell and tube heat exchangers vary in size from small to very large surface areas, the diameter of outer
flanges is generally much larger than typical pipe flanges. 7ith these large flanges, the gas"ets must not only
withstand process conditions, but provide a seal under bolt load variations. Darious gas"et designs are used.
Maintaining constant bolt load stresses on all of the flange bolts is difficult, resulting in lea"age in many exchangers.
The flange lea"age can be controlled with flange sealing rings &#ipton and #ynch *++;-.
Tube lea"age may occur in any of the available exchanger types, with the exception of plate exchangers and a few
other specialty exchangers. However, these latter exchangers have other potential problems. 7here tubes lea" into a
cooling water system, the cooling water discharges the contaminant into a cooling tower which can be an exposure
source to both wor"ers and a nearby community. 'onsequently, the cooling water should be monitored.
The dispersion of cooling tower vapours can be widespread as a result of the fans in forced and induced draft cooling
towers. 3n addition, natural convection towers discharge vapours to the atmosphere which then disperse. However,
dispersion varies considerably based upon both weather conditions and the discharge elevation. #ess volatile toxic
materials remain in the cooling water and the cooling tower blowdown stream, which should have sufficient treatment
capability to destroy contaminants. The cooling tower and tower basin must be cleaned periodically and contaminants
add to the potential hazards in the basin and in the tower fill. (ersonal protection is necessary for much of this wor".
E(c&anger cleaning
2 problem with tubes in cooling water service is the build4up of material in the tubes resulting from corrosion,
biological organisms and solids deposition. 2s described above, tubes may also lea" through crac"s, or lea"age may
occur where tubes are rolled into striations in the tube sheet. 7hen any of these conditions occur, exchanger repair is
required and the process fluids must be removed from the exchanger. This requires a completely contained operation,
which is necessary to meet environmental, safety and health exposure objectives.
=enerally, the process fluid is drained to a receiver and the remaining material is flushed out of the exchanger with a
solvent or inert material. The latter material is also sent to a receiver for the contaminated material by draining or
pressuring with nitrogen. 7here toxic material was in the exchanger, the exchanger should be monitored for any
traces of toxic material. 3f testing results are unsatisfactory, the exchanger can be steamed to vaporize and remove all
traces of material. However, the steam vent should be connected to a closed system to prevent vapour escape into
the atmosphere. 7hile the closed vent may not be absolutely necessary, at times there may be more contaminant
material in the exchanger, requiring closed steam venting at all times to control potential hazards. 9ollowing steaming,
a vent to the atmosphere admits air. This general procedure is applicable to the exchanger side or sides containing
toxic material.
'hemicals then used for cleaning the tubes or the shell side should be circulated in a closed system. 1ormally, the
cleaning solution is recirculated from a tan" truc" system and the contaminated solution in the system is drained to a
truc" for disposition.
Pumps
.ne of the most important process functions is the movement of liquids and in the chemical industry all types of liquid
materials are moved with a wide variety of pumps. 'anned and magnetic pumps are sealless centrifugal pumps.
Magnetic pump drivers are available for installation on other pump types to prevent lea"age. Types of pumps used in
the chemical process industry are listed in table $$.?.
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Table 77.-. Pumps in t&e c&emicals process industry
0 'entrifugal
0 :eciprocating &plunger-
0 'anned
0 Magnetic
0 Turbine
0 =ear
0 8iaphragm
0 2xial flow
0 )crew
0 Moving cavity
0 #obe
0 Dane
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Sealing
9rom a health and safety standpoint, sealing and repairing centrifugal pumps are major concerns. Mechanical seals,
which constitute the prevalent shaft sealing system, can lea" and at times have blown out. However, there have been
major advances in seal technology since the *+$>s that have resulted in significant lea"age reductions and extended
pump service life. )ome of these improvements are bellows seals, cartridge seals, improved face designs, better face
materials and improvements in pump variable monitoring. Moreover, continuing research in seal technology should
result in further technology improvements.
7here process fluids are highly toxic, lea"less or sealless canned or magnetic pumps are frequently installed.
.perating service periods or the mean time between maintenance &MT5M- has improved mar"edly and generally
varies between three and five years. 3n these pumps, the process fluid is the lubricating fluid for the rotor bearings.
Daporization of the internal fluid adversely affects the bearings and often ma"es bearing replacement necessary.
#iquid conditions in the pumps can be maintained by ensuring the internal pressure in the bearing system is always
greater than the liquid vapour pressure at the operating temperature. 7hen repairing a sealless pump, completely
draining a relatively low volatility material is important and should be carefully reviewed with the supplier.
3n typical centrifugal process pumps, pac"ing has essentially been replaced with mechanical seals. These seals are
generally classified as single or dual mechanical seals, with the latter term covering tandem or double mechanical
seals. There are other dual seal combinations, but they are not as widely used. 3n general, tandem or double
mechanical seals with liquid buffer fluids between the seals are installed to reduce seal lea"age. (ump mechanical
seal standards for both centrifugal and rotary pumps covering single and dual mechanical seal specification and
installation were issued by the 2merican (etroleum 3nstitute &2(3 *++;-. 2 mechanical seal application guide is now
available to aid in the evaluation of seal types &)T#6 *++;-.
To prevent excessive lea"age or blow4out from a failed seal, a gland plate is installed following the seal. 3t may have a
gland flush fluid to move the lea"age into a closed drain system &2(3 *++;-. )ince the gland system is not a complete
seal, auxiliary seal systems, such as throttle bushings are available.They are installed in the gland that controls
excessive lea"age to the atmosphere or seal blow4out &#ipton and #ynch *++;-. These seals are not designed for
continuous operation< after activation they will operate for up to two wee"s before failure, thereby providing time for
operations to switch pumps or ma"e process adjustments.
2 newer mechanical seal system is available that essentially reduces emissions to the nil level. This is a double
mechanical seal system with a gas buffer system that replaces the liquid buffer in the standard dual mechanical seal
system &9one *++@< 1etzel *++B< 2dams, 8ingman and (ar"er *++@-. 3n the liquid buffer systems, the seal faces are
separated by an extremely thin lubricating film of buffer fluid that also cools the seal faces. 2lthough separated
slightly, a certain amount of face contact exists which results in seal wear and seal face heating. The gas seals are
called non4contact seals since one seal face with curved indentations pumps gas through the seal faces and builds a
gas layer or dam that completely separates the seal faces. This lac" of contact results in a very long seal life and also
reduces the seal friction loss, thereby noticeably decreasing power consumption. )ince the seal pumps gas there is a
very small flow into the process and to the atmosphere.
*ealt& &a+ards
2 major concern with pumps is draining and flushing to prepare the pump for maintenance or repair. 8raining and
removal covers both process fluid and buffer fluids. (rocedures should require discharge of all fluids into a closed
connection drain system. 3n the pump stuffing box where a throat bushing separates the impeller from the stuffing box,
the bushing acts as a weir in holding some liquid in the stuffing box. 7eep holes in the bushing or a drain in the
stuffing box will permit complete process liquid removal through draining and flushing. 9or buffer fluids, there should
be a method of draining all fluid from the dual seal area. Maintenance requires seal removal and if the seal volume is
not completely drained and flushed, the seals are a potential source of exposure during repair.
Dust and po"ders
Handling of dusts and powders in solids processing equipment is a concern due to the potential for fire or explosion.
2n explosion within equipment may burst through a wall or enclosure as a result of explosion4generated pressure
sending a combined pressure and fire wave into the wor"place area. 7or"ers can be at ris", and adjacent equipment
can be severely impacted with drastic effects. 8usts or powders suspended in air or in a gas with oxygen present and
in a confined space are susceptible to explosion when a source of ignition with sufficient energy is present. )ome
typical explosive equipment environments are shown in table $$.+.
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
Table 77... Potential e(plosion sources in e/uipment
Con%eyin e"ui#$ent Storae
(neumatic ducts 5ins
Mechanical conveyors Hoppers

:otary valves
Processin e"ui#$ent
9ilter dust collectors =rinders
9luid bed dryers 5all mills
Transfer line dryers (owder mixing
)creening 'yclones
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////

2n explosion produces heat and rapid gas expansion &pressure increase- and generally results in deflagration, which
is a flame front that moves rapidly but at less than the sound velocity for these conditions. 7hen the flame front
velocity is greater than the sound velocity or is at supersonic velocity the condition is termed detonation, which is
more destructive than deflagration. 6xplosion and flame front expansion occur in milliseconds and do not provide
sufficient time for standard process responses. 'onsequently, the potential fire and explosion characteristics of the
powder must be defined to determine the potential hazards that may exist in the various processing steps &''()
*++,< 6badat *++;< 5art"necht *+?+< 'esana and )iwe" *++@-. This information can then provide a basis for the
installation of controls and the prevention of explosions.
E)plosion ha%ard quanti#ication
)ince the explosions generally occur in enclosed equipment, various tests are conducted in specially4designed
laboratory equipment. 7hile powders may appear similar, published results should not be used since small
differences in the powders can have very different explosion characteristics.
2 variety of tests conducted on powder can define the explosion hazard and the test series should encompass the
following.
The classification test determines whether a powder dust cloud can initiate and propagate flames &6badat *++;-.
(owders that have these characteristics are considered 'lass 2 powders. Those powders that do not ignite are
termed 'lass 5. The 'lass 2 powders then require a further series of tests to evaluate their explosion and hazard
potential.
The minimum ignition energy test defines the minimum spar" energy necessary for ignition of a powder cloud
&5art"necht *+?+-.
3n explosion severity and analysis =roup 2 powders are then tested as a dust cloud in a sphere where the pressure is
measured during a test explosion based on minimum ignition energy. The maximum explosion pressure is defined
along with the rate of change in pressure per unit time. 9rom this information, the explosion specific characteristic
value &Est- in bar metres per second is determined and the explosion class is defined &5art"necht *+?+< =arzia and
)enecal *++B-
Est&bar0m!s- 8ust explosion class :elative strength
*4%>> )t * )omewhat wea"er
%>*4,>> )t % Dery strong )trong
,>>G )t ,

2 large number of powders have been tested and the majority were in the )t * class &5art"necht *+?+< =arzia and
)enecal *++B-.
3n assessment of non4cloud powders, powders are tested to determine safe operating procedures and conditions.
E(plosion prevention tests
6xplosion prevention tests can be helpful where explosion suppression systems cannot be installed. They provide
some information on desirable operating conditions &6badat *++;-.
The minimum oxygen test defines the oxygen level below which the dust will not ignite &9one *++@-. 3nert gas in the
process will prevent ignition if the gas is acceptable.
The minimum dust concentration is determined in order to establish the operating level below which ignition will not
occur.
Electrostatic &a+ard tests
Many explosions are a result of electrostatic ignitions and various tests indicate the potential hazards. )ome of the
tests cover the minimum ignition energy, powder electric charge characteristics and volume resistivity. 9rom the test
results, certain steps can be ta"en to prevent explosions. )teps include increasing humidity, modifying construction
materials, proper grounding, controlling certain aspects of equipment design and preventing spar"s &5art"necht *+?+<
'esana and )iwe" *++@-.
E(plosion control
There are basically two methods of controlling explosions or fronts from propagating from one location and another or
containing an explosion within a piece of equipment. These two methods are chemical suppressants and isolation
valves &5art"necht *+?+< 'esana and )iwe" *++@< =arzia and )enecal *++B-. 5ased upon the explosion pressure
data from the explosion severity tests, rapid response sensors are available that will trigger a chemical suppressant
and! or rapidly close isolation barrier valves. )uppressants are commercially available, but suppressant injector
design is very important.
E(plosion vents
3n equipment where a potential explosion may occur, explosion vents that rupture at specific pressures are frequently
installed. These must be carefully designed and the exhaust path from the equipment must be defined to prevent a
wor"er presence in this path area. Moreover, impingement on equipment in the explosion path should be analysed to
ensure equipment safety. 2 barrier may be required.
Loading and *nloading
(roducts, intermediates and by4products are loaded into tan" truc"s and railcars. &3n some cases, depending on
location of facilities and doc"age requirements, tan"ers and barges are used.- #ocation of the loading and unloading
facilities are important. 7hile the materials loaded and unloaded usually are liquids and gases, solids are also loaded
and unloaded at preferred locations based upon the type of solids moved, potential explosion hazard and the degree
of transfer difficulty.
Open hatches
3n loading tan" truc"s or railcars through top opening hatches, a very important consideration is minimizing splashing
as the container is filled. 3f the fill pipe is located well above the bottom of the container, filling results in splashing and
generation of vapour or mixed liquid4vapour evolvement. )plashing and vapour generation can be minimized by
locating the fill pipe outlet well below the liquid level. The fill pipe is normally extended through the container a
minimum distance above the container bottom. )ince liquid filling also displaces vapour, toxic vapours can be a
potential health hazard and also present safety concerns. 'onsequently, the vapours should be collected. 9ill arms
are commercially available that have deep fill pipes and extend through a special cover that closes the hatch opening
&#ipton and #ynch *++;-. 3n addition, a vapour collection pipe extends a short distance below the special hatch cover.
2t the upstream end of the arm, the vapour outlet is connected to a recovery device &e.g., an absorber or condenser-,
or the vapour can be returned to the storage tan" as a vapour balance transfer &#ipton and #ynch *++;-.
3n the tan" truc" open hatch system, the arm is raised to permit draining into the tan" truc" and some of the liquid in
the arm can be pressured with nitrogen as the arm is withdrawn, but the fill pipes during this operation should remain
within the hatch opening. 2s the fill arm clears the hatch, a buc"et should be placed over the outlet to catch arm
drippings.
&ailcars
Many railcars have closed hatches with deep fill legs very close to the bottom of the container and a separate vapour
collection outlet. Through an arm that extends to the closed hatch, liquid is loaded and vapour collected in a fashion
similar to the open hatch arm method. 3n railcar loading systems, following valve shut off at the arm inlet, nitrogen is
injected into the container side of the arms to blow the liquid remaining in the arm into the railcar before the fill valve
on the railcar is closed &#ipton and #ynch *++;-.
Tan trucs
Many tan" truc"s are filled through the bottom to minimize vapour generation &#ipton and #ynch *++;-. The fill lines
can be special hoses or manoeuvrable arms. 8ry brea" couplers are placed on the hose or arm ends and on the tan"
truc" bottom connections. 7hen the tan" truc" is filled and the line is automatically bloc"ed, the arm or hose is
disconnected at the drybrea" coupling, which automatically closes as the couplings are separated. 1ewer couplings
have been designed to disconnect with almost zero lea"age.
3n bottom loading, vapour is collected through a top vapour vent and the vapour is conducted through an external line
that terminates near the bottom of the container &#ipton and #ynch *++;-. This permits wor"er access to the vapour
coupling connections. The collected vapour, which is at a pressure slightly above atmospheric, must be collected and
sent to a recovery device &#ipton and #ynch *++;-. These devices are selected based upon initial cost, effectiveness,
maintenance and operability. =enerally, the recovery system is preferable to a flare, which destroys the recovered
vapours.
Loading control
3n tan" truc"s, level sensors are permanently installed within the truc" body to indicate when the fill level has been
reached and signal a remote control bloc" valve that stops flow to the truc". &#ipton and #ynch *++;-. There may be
more than one sensor in the tan" truc" as bac"up to ensure that the truc" is not overfilled. .verfilling can result in
serious safety and health exposure problems.
:ailcars in dedicated chemical service may have level sensors mounted internally in the car. 9or non4dedicated cars,
a flow totalizer controls the amount of liquid sent to the railcar and automatically shuts the remote control bloc" valve
at a predetermined setting &#ipton and #ynch *++;-. 5oth container types should be investigated to determine whether
liquid remains in the container prior to filling. Many railcars have manual level indicators that can be used for this
service. However, where level is shown by opening a small level stic" vent to the atmosphere, this procedure should
only be performed under properly controlled and approved conditions due to the toxicity of some of the loaded
chemicals.
*nloading
7here chemicals have a very high vapour pressure and the railcar or tan" truc" has a relatively high pressure, the
chemical is unloaded under its own vapour pressure. )hould the vapour pressure fall to a level that will interfere with
the unloading procedure, nitrogen gas can be injected to maintain a satisfactory pressure. Dapour from a tan" of the
same chemical can also be compressed and injected to raise the pressure.
9or toxic chemicals that have a relatively low vapour pressure, such as benzene, the liquid is unloaded under nitrogen
pressure, which eliminates pumping and simplifies the system &#ipton and #ynch *++;-. Tan" truc"s and railcars for
this service have design pressures capable of handling the pressures and variations encountered. However, lower
pressures after unloading a container are maintained until the tan" truc" or railcar is refilled< the pressure rebuilds
during loading. 1itrogen can be added if sufficient pressure has not been attained during loading.
.ne of the problems in loading and unloading operations is draining and purging lines and equipment in the
loading!unloading facilities. 'losed drains and particularly low point drains are necessary with nitrogen purges to
remove all traces of the toxic chemicals. These materials can be collected in a drum and returned to a receiving or
recovery facility &#ipton and #ynch *++;-.

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