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Reading notes for Russia IR Assignment 2 (sorted alphabetically by Surname Authors)

Color index (on Subjects)


Ukraine's Domestic Politics
Multi-vector foreign policy
EU relations with Ukraine
Russian relations with Ukraine
relations between Ukraine and Eastern-entral !tates
"ibliographical entry
Paste this and fill out under every bibliographical entry#
$bout $uthor
!ummary of $rticle
itations
Personal ommentary
D'$nieri% Paul& '()'a& *Ukrainian +oreign Policy from ,ndependence to ,nertia&- Communist and Post-
Communist Studies ./# ..01./2&
$ bout $uthor
!ummary of $rticle
itations
Personal ommentary
"amaceda% Margarita M& '().& *3ill heap Russian 4as !ave Ukraine5- Problems of Post-Communism 2) 6'7# 2)120&
$bout $uthor
M&M& "almaceda is professor of diplomacy and ,R at !eton 8all Univesity and a member of the finnish center of
e9cellence on choices of russian moderni:ation&
!ummary of $rticle
;anukovych motivated his wavering of the EU agreement in favor of a move towards the russian led ustoms Union on
)0 december '()< with two arguments#
)& Ukr eco would have been crippled by Rus sanct as a conse= of an EU move
'& $dv of moving closer to Rus is a reduction of the gas prices 6from .)( doll>tcm to '2?%/( doll>tcm7 and a
bailout on Ukr gas dept 6)/ billion dollar7
"almaceda's argument is that these accords might be positive for Ukr on the short term% but won't save it on the long
term for three sets of reasons&
First set: The december 201 deal
'the fine print'
@he '()< accords do not replace that of '((A& ,t is merely a clause that gives Russia more leverage over ;anukovych
and Ukr to make political choices to its benefit& $ return to the old prices can be made% and possible reasons for that are
obscured& $dv over EU third energy package 6EU members only7
'winners and losers'
winners#
;anukovych himself# by reducing stress on the economy immediately he could fend of social pressure 6he did
of course cause more social tensions on the Maida s=uare7
@he big national gas importer !aftoha" pays lower import prices and makes more gains
,ndustries that did not moderni:e since '((A 6still heavily gas dependent# sugar% petrochemicals etc&7 for these
every dollar not spent on gas is the difference between blackout and sustaining the business
Bosers#
Private gas producers% bcs state determined prices may be too low to provide incentives to increase production
Cot sure what they win>lose#
Private gas importers# - Dcsthem 6owned by Dimitry +irtash7
- EE@EF 6!erhiy FurchenkoG who is close to ;anukovych7
'Pipe Dreams and Russian Reality'
December agreements are not likely to stay in place for long% bcs 4a:prom refuses to modify its gas price formula
which gradually makes gas price rise H Rus pressured from 3@D and ,M+ to raise domestic gas prices to international
levels 6Ukra and Rus both in 3@D7& $ny discounts made to Ukr are bound to be short-lived&
Second set: #essons of the $%olden %as Period$ (1&&'-200()
'lesson )# cheap gas as @roIan 4as'
Bow gas prices do not provide incentives to moderni:e energy consumption and delayed development of a long-term
energy policy based on the reality of energy poverty& Diversification debate put of until '((0% when Rus was highering
the prices& 4as is only )%/ percent of median household e9penditure 6then again where does electricity come from57
'lesson '# "elow-Market Prices facilitate corruption'
low energy prices enables businessmen to make high arbitrage gains on western european markets% attracting rent-
seekers 6since markets were not transparent% and still aren't7& Energy system became a feeding ground for those with the
right connections% so huge economic and political gains could be made 6rise of Ukr oligarchs in the A.-(/ period7&
'lesson <# energy rents have a fatal attraction'
Rents could give an incentive to incumbent leaders to become corrupt even though their agenda was 'curing' towards
Ukr 6like the Drange Beaders7& Beaders can collect people around them who profit from them and provide them with a
political base& Political decision making is tied up with the domestic actors that could possibly profit from it&
Third set: #oo)in* ahead
Reintroduction of low gas prices could put a stop to energy diversification proIects% but still there
reverse flow proIects through poland% slovakia and hungary of german gas 6russian origin7
!hale gas proIects with !hell 6)( billian dollar7
BC4 terminals to be build on croatia's coast
Bot of the deals to reimport are not transparent& @emptation of energy rent seeking via transparency-reducing
arrangements and russian leverage is main phenomenon of Ukr energy moves&
+fter,ord

crisis in ukr unfolds as article goes to press& Rus has cancelled gas price discount $CD the debt of Caftoha:& Energy
Dligarchs loyal to Ukr independence& 3ill nontransparent energy trade schemes stay in place5
itations
*Even though gas accounts for only about )&/ percent 6'()<7 of a median household's e9penditures% Ukrainian leaders
have instrumentali:ed the fear of the catastrophic impact of higher energy prices from the presidency of Beonid
Fuchma 6)AA.-'((.7 to the present& $ll of them have cited the dangers of energy poverty and energy dependency in
pursuit of their own ends&- 62.7
iting ,hor "akai 6current deputy prime minister and former head of Caftoha:% '(()7# *$ll maIor political fortunes in
post-independence Ukraine were made on the basis of Russian oil and gas&- 62/7
*@oday% too% discussions about energy e9changes between Ukraine and Russia are never simply bilateral talks between
states but always involve debates on which domestic actors may benefit from specific means of organi:ing the
multibillion gas trade&- 62/7
Personal ommentary
Eery recent article which e9plains the rus-ukr gas relation not as a normal bilateral relation between two states but as a
negotiation between what domestic actors are going to benefit from this relation& ,t follows that this deepens the
problem of energy dependence of ukr on rus& ,t is in fact a rent-addiction of domestic elites that seek those rents on the
lucrative gas market& Energy prices therefore must be low and nontransparent system must be in place& @his is a stab in
the heart of the ukr people by ukr elites% and maybe one of the hardest diseases for a country to cure&
+riedman% Uri& '().& *Putin's Playbook# @he !trategy "ehind Russia's @akeover of rimea&- The +tlantic- March '&
http#>>www&theatlantic&com>international>archive>'().>(<>putins-playbook-t he-strategy-behindrussias-takeover-of-
crimea>'?.)/. > / pages
$bout author
Deputy managing editor with +oreign Policy Maga:ine% studied "$ of Euro history at the uni of Pensylvania& $lso staff
writer associate ed& $nd senior analyst at $tlantic media ompany&
!umm& $rticle
@his article e9plains the events happening in Ukriane as a part of Putin's new tactic of 'soft anne9ation'# Using and
supporting secessionist forces abroad in order to e9pand influence in post-soviet space& +riedman bases his piece on
work and =uotes by @homas de 3aal% Cico Popescu and !teven Pifer&
'!oft $nne9ation' can be applied in different ways#
)& Protection from alien 'civili:ational' ideas and values from the west and EU 6which Russia perceives as a
strategic threat% that rips away territory from its sphere of interests7
'& Protection of their own *Peace keeping troops- 6occupying forces7
<& Protection of ethnic Russians&
@o these actions should be a strong response from the 3est% but Putin seems able to fend these responses off& @here is
the belief that Moscow has the resources and that the international conditions are right for Russia to reassert its
dominance over the former soviet territory&
Juotes
*$ny Russian escalation deserves a strong response from the 3est& "ut if you read what Putin is actually saying he is
being more e=uivocal& 8e is ruthless% but he is not !auron in Bord of the Rings& 8e certainly wants the government in
Fiev to fail% but he is also hosting the 4? !ummit in !ochi in Kune&-
6citing @homas de 3aal% .7
* Moscow's support for secessionist movements in 4eorgia and Moldova% he said% was proof of Russia's larger decision
over the past decade to make e9panding its influence in Eurasia% not creating favorable conditions for domestic
economic growth% the top priority of its foreign policy&-
6paraphrasing popescu% .7
Personal commentary
,t is a newspaper article% citations and ideas are not annotated&
@his article has been written before the actual anne9ation of the rimea by Russia% and before Putin's speech& ,t
is an interesting article% but it might need ramifications to recent events&
Fropatcheva% Elena& '())& *Ukraine's +oreign Policy hoices after the '()( Presidential Election&- .ournal of
Communist Studies and Transition Politics '0 6<1.7# /'(1/.(&
$bout $uthor
!ummary of $rticle
itations
Personal ommentary
Fu:io% @aras& '((/b& *Ceither East Cor 3est# Ukraine's !ecurity Policy under Fuchma&- Problems of Post-
Communism /' 6/7# /A12?& )( pages
$bout $uthor
@aras Fu:io is born in )A/? in 8alifa9% UF& $n academic and e9pert in Ukranian political% economic and security
affairs& 3orked as research-fellow at ,nternat& ,nst& +or strat& !tudies and for Ukranian council of advisers& 3as editor of
multiple Iournals& 3orked for the C$@D informat& $nd doc& enter in Fyiv as deputy director& 3as active observer for
D!E in Ukraine& @haught at 4eorge 3ashington University& $ll in all a lot of practical e9perience& 8e has written
many influential books and articles on Ukr& Politics% international relations and nationalism&
!ummary of $rticle
,n this article dr& Fu:io tries to show that Fuchma failed to integrate its security policies with that of the EU and C$@D%
because his shallow take on democracy&
Securit/ 0olic/
ukr& Multi-vector security policy under Fravchuk and Fuchma often e9pl& $s a product of contradicting domestic
influences& +or assumptions supp& @his claim and problemisation of those#
)& national interest defended by kuchma and kravchuk are indeed those of the ukr& 'nation'&
'& Elites understood and reacted to domestic influences&
<& Drdinary Ukr& $re concerned enough with secur policies to make it a priority&
.& Drdinary ukr that are concerned are in a position to do something about it
Ukr elites cannot understand national interests H ukr inherited politics that identify the leader closely with the state& @he
split between the citi:ens and elites is so big that they can be perceived to be living in different 'virtual worlds'& $fter
)AA?-A oligarchs emerged in Ukr who became Fuchma's primary supp base& Multi-vectorism dominated by short term
needs of the ruling elites% not by long term strategic interests&
Pro-1uchma securit/ 0olic/
kuchma said his secur pol is pro-Ukrainian& +or this two assumptions made# )& Fuchma and allies should have been
broad based ruling elites '& national interest should have been elaborated&
@here is a contradiction between ukr fp goals and domestic policies& Bead to )& Fuchma not taken serious by the west L
'ukraine fatigue' '& 3est thought that ukr is culturally not a 'european country'&
Pra*matic nationalism
Pragmatic nationalism is pursuing a security policy that supp cooperation with but not integration into the 3est& Under
Fuchma's term prag nat rose vis a vis the outside world& Derived from deep feelings of post-colonial insecurity&
entrists like ;anukovich did not supp integration with either the EU or C$@D% since integration of any type could
deprive them of monopolistic power& ,ntegration of any kind would mean the same time% but ukr elites are more inclined
to work together with Russia% since it does not make demands from ukr&
2oad to no,here: disinterest in 3nte*ration 4ast or 5est
!ecurity policy that is actually pursued contradicts the te9t of four decrees that were devised to promote integration into
Europe&
4lection rethorics 6s7 +ctual securit/ 0olicies
Fuchma ran elections in )AA. promoting a pro-Russian standpoitn% while a year later he made a u-turn towards a pro-
western fp& ,n '((( he was on a pro ,! and russia boat again% while he was re-elected in )AAA being on a pro-European
platform& ,n '(() kuchmagate crisis and selling of radar systems to ira= in '((' left Ukr as a international outcast&
8e could pull this euro vs rus orientation-flip-flop of because# )& ruling elites not driven by ideology& '& Dligarchs
changed the perception of Russia# more self-confident stance& 3est under "ush Ir& Bess concerned with ukr% while
cooperat with rus on fight against terror&
1uchma 1
his pro-russian platform was unworkable& Russia did not come to terms with an independent ukr until )AAA& $lso
kuchma had few real allies during his first term% because there were no centrist parties& Main threat was the resurgent
communist party% e9ternal russian threat and a russian backed separatist uprising in the rimea& During term Fuchma
adopted a pro-European orientation% PfP accrod with C$@D and became its most active member from the ,! region&
1uchma 2
in )AAA-'((( his security policy shifted from a pro-wesetrn one to a pro-russian one& @hree factors for Fs isolation# )
the way he dealt with Fuchamagate scandal# outright denial& '& Unwillingness to resolve the murder of g& gongad:e& <&
Russia eclipsed ukr in foreign policy of U! after A>))& $s a conse=uence his security policy shifted towards russia&
To,ard a 0ost 1uchma 4ra
"y )AAA oligarch emerged as a political class in ukr leading to a redivision on the political spectru# new support base for
Fs pro-russian fp# interest were )& foreign pol with Rus and '& domestic interest of authoritarianism& Democrats allied
with the left against the centrists& Elections campaign tehreafter was ruled by disillussioned rethoric on european
integration&
;uschenko's more ideological driven position on security policies 6and pro western i think7 was mainly supported by
younger generations&
Conclusion
Fuchma's multivectorism was not driven by national interest but because of the presidents personal needs& @here is thus
a gapa between domestic policies and fp& ;ucheknko has been elected which is more ideological driven and potentially
good for ukr&
itations
*Fuchma described Ukraine's security policy as neither pro-3estern nor pro-Russian but pro-Ukrainian&- 62)7
*Ukraine's multi-vector policy was geared toward fulfilling the short-term obIectives of President Fuchma and his allies
Mit was not responsive to domestic factors& @hese short-term hori:ons were an outgrowth of the foreign policy only
being pro-Fuchma% not pro-Ukraine&- 62)7
*Disillusionment with Europe was the Fuchma-;anukovich camp's response to the 3est's pervasive Ukraine fatigue&-
6227
*@he Fuchma decade was characteri:ed by a confusing% contradictory% and vague multi-vector security policy&
Multivectorism was not the product of domestic influences or public opinionM it came about because of Ukraine's
security policy was being shaped to suit the political obIectives of the president and his allies&- 6207
Personal ommentary
L article gives good overview about the pre-yanukovich>yuchenko time of ukr foreign polcieis&
Fu:io% @aras& '()'a& *Ukraine's Relations with the 3est since the Drange Revolution&- 4uro0ean Securit/ ')
6<7# <A/1.)<&
$bout $uthor
!ummary of $rticle
itations
Personal ommentary
Motyl% $le9ander K& '((<& *Ukraine% Europe% and Russia# E9clusion or Dependence&- in +mbi6alent !ei*hbors:
The 48 and the Price of Membership% edited by $ntol Bieven and Dmitrti @renin% )/1.<& 3ashington% D&&#
arnegie Endowment for ,nternational Peace& '? pages
$bout $uthor
"orn Dctober ')% )A/< in Cew ;ork ity& Motyl is a professor% writer% and fine artist living in Cew ;ork ity& 8e
studied at olumbia University% graduating with a "$ in 8istory in )A0/ and a Ph&D& in Political !cience in )A?.&
Motyl has taught at olumbia University% Behigh University% and 8arvard University and is currently professor of
political science at Rutgers University-Cewark&
Motyl has written e9tensively on the !oviet Union% Ukraine% revolutions% nations and nationalism% and empire& $ll his
work is highly conceptual and theoretical% attempting to ground political science in a firm philosophical base% while
simultaneously concluding that all theories are imperfect and that theoretical pluralism is inevitable&
!ummary of $rticle
@his article is about the EU- Enlargement in the '(((s which will definitely e9clude Ukraine 6will not become member
in the forseeable future% say '(<(7& Eu enlargement will isolate Ukraine and force the country to enter in either an
une=ueal partnership with Russia against the 3est or enter into a conflictual relationship with it&
4u enlar*ement:
Eu should take a breather with enlargement after taking in Poland% "altics% 8ungary% :ech Republic and !lovenia&
"ecause# )& 4eopolitically important territory is then already incorporated& '& 8as to cope with potentially destabili:ing
conse=uences and should take time to adIust to the medium and long- term impact of enlargement&
8)raine outside the 48:
Ukraine fails to move towards EU standards% because of unfavorable initial conditions% ineffective government% poorly
designed reforms% widespread corruption and popular apathy& @hese factors combine into a system that is prone to
stagnation and resistant to change& Ukraine will not be able to move normatively towards EU-!tandards&
EU stance towards Ukraine is contradicting # )& rhetorical supp& Df Ukr& European choice while '& e9cl& Ukr& +rom any
prospect of EU membership&
,t is e9cluded on cultural grounds% to use 8untington's thesis that Ukraine is part of the Drthodo9 'eastern' civili:ation%
while the EU is atholic 3estern 'civili:ation' 6also Be4off claims that Russia is a problem for Europe7& ivili:ational
claims about ' europe' are deem malicious# )& European norms and values achieved through bloodsheds '& EU members
do not share a coherent set of identical cultural% political and social characteristics% and it is easy to show that Ukr&
!hares some of these with EU member states&
,n terms of 4eopolitics% EU fears meddling in Russia's 'sphere of influence'& @o be part of the EU is also to be part of an
ever-more complicated set of institutional arrangements with EU and C$@D& !chengen agreement of )AA/ imposes a
sort of European ,ron-urtain between entral-eastern EU-member states and non-members in the east H Russia& ,t is
=uestionable if Ukr& 3ould be able to arrange !chengen-like controls on its border with Russia&
The 2ussian Problem:
+ear that e9clusion from EU means deliverance to Russia& $nd this fear of semi-authoritarian Russia is not wholly
unfounded% since it is stronger than counterparts in the 'near abroad for three reasons# )& Resource base is enormous '&
russian elites are far more skilled in statecraft <& Russian state ministries have an institutional history 6since tsarist
times7&
Russia is also a regional superpower# )& energy provider '& largest economy& Ukr& 8as natural and mutually beneficial
economis relations with Russia& @hese will cont& ,f nothing really surprising happens&
Russia will not change& Ukraine will be caught between East and 3est after e9pansion&
8)raine$s Ti*htro0e +ct:
Ukr& hoice between east and west is and endemic feature of its politics& @he name of the country derives from the word
9)raina which means 'borderland'& ,t is a borderland to multiple states% not to some state only# it is a 'space between' &
!o Ukr& Policy elites pursue a 'multi-vector foreign policy'# ingratiate with both Russia and the 3est& Beading to# )&
remaining on good terms Russian ' elder brother' 6bcs of power and cultural-historical links7& '& Establ& 4ood rel& 3ith
U! and EU to balance against Rus H economic sense# integration into the world's most dynamic economies&
@he necessity of these multi-vector policies is dep& Dn . factors#
)& Russia's relations with the west M most imp& !ince it establishes the overall strategic framework within which
ukr& 8as to pursue its foreign policy&
'& Ukraine's relations with Russia and the west M Russia is Ukr& Dverriding geopolitical concern bcs geography%
economic and energy dependence% relat& Milit& 3eakness and at the same time the west is an attractive
alternative bcs& ,t is a balance against Rus% and possible source of investments 6but limited bcs own domestic
economy7
<& Domestic developments within Ukr& M the population is divided on foreign policy# entral and west of ukr&
More or less pro-western% while eastern part is more or less pro-russian& Elites could not afford to alienate any
group of population in the face of economic problems&
.& Ukr& Relations with Eastern1European !tates M througout nineties good relations with Poland in particular&
3ill this continue after Poland Ioined the EU5
Ukraine is not likely to give up relations with Russia in favor of Ioinging the west% bcs& ,t is highly unlikely that it is
granted full EU> C$@D membership& Multi-vector policy should be continued as long as# )& population remains divided
'& Russia remains its primary strategic concern <& the west does not embrace Ukraine .& 3est's relations with Russia
remain amicable&
3nter6enin* :ariables:
@he Multi-vector prognosis 6which is =uite optimistic since no conflict7 is dependent on two variable factors # )& the
level of democracy and rule of law in Ukr& H Rus& '& the global economic environment& $s both countries would be less
capable of coping with a globali:ing world their relations will probably intensiy and deepen# for ukr& @his means a
choice between dependence on Rus& Dr conflict with rus&
@hree possible conse=uences#
)& as entral eastern states develop according to EU standards% Ukr& 3ill either stagnate or develop in a different
way% maybe inimical to those of the EU&
'& Rus and Ukr reduce chances to adapt market oriented reforms as they are e9cluded from competition in the
global economy&
<& Developments are likely to isolate Ukraine and Russia and increase the dependence on each other% the former
imperial core and military and economic power& Reinforcing authoritarianism&
Ukr& 3ill be inev& ;ounger brother of russia&
+lternati6e Futures:
3hat are the alternatives for this macabre prospect for Ukraine5
)& globali:ation could not go smooth as e9pected and Ukr might be given a bit more time to develop its
institutions&
'& East-central european states might not be incorporated into EU as fast as is being proclaimed% which would
lead to less isolation and the possibility to organi:e with other eastern european countries&
<& 'stagnant' countries could develop suddenly# 'rising tiger-effect'
further isolation from the EU could result into a resurge of 'indigenous' nationalist values% turning away from Europe&
Kustification# perceived threat from Russia& @his would be a bad development for the EU&
Malicious side effects of economic growth#
)& unlikely to be e=uitable
'& can create variety of social tensions
<& rapid growth could lead to authoritarianism
economically booming Ukr& 3ill be far less stable&
onclusion# Ukraine will be harmed by EU enlargement into the east& $nd most prospects for Ukr& $re bleak% even
without EU enlargement& @he 'schengen curtain' could be a division that would divide geographical Europe for a long
time 6an epoch7&
itations
*Ukraine is so far behind Poland% 8ungary and the :ech Republic% and the EU is so unprepared to absorb an
impoverished state of .A million people that the =uestion of Ukraine's membership in the EU is at present only of
normative interest&- 6)A7
*$fter the European Union e9pands% Ukraine will therefore be caught between a powerful and possibly meddlesome
east and a powerful% in principle benign% but indifferent west& Under conditions such as these% the best Ukrianian policy
elites will be able to do is walk a fine line between e9clusion and dependence% in the hope of minimi:ing both and
ma9imi:ing Ukraine's space for independent maneuvering N $voiding the danger of both !cylla and harybdis has
historically been a feature of the political choices faced by independence-minded elites in Ukraine&- 6'?7
*@he result Oof multi-vector foreign policyP has been that% at least since )AA'% Ukraine has succeeded in managing post-
imperial tensions with Russia while e9panding postcommunist relations with the capitalist west&- 6'A7
*Ukraine's relation with Russia and the west are also unlikely to change dramatically in the near term& Russia will
inevitably remain a strategic priority for Ukraine N $s for the west% Ukraine's chances of Ioining C$@D or the EU
anytime soon are% as , have argued above% nil% while the west's interest in Ukraine can but remain secondary to its
interest in Russia&- 6<)7
Personal ommentary
3ritten before the EU enlargement of '((.% '((0 and '()< which incorpated many eastern european states
into the EU
article gives a very good impression of what is at stake for Ukr& ,n EU membership&
Bangbein% Kulia and Fataryna 3olc:uk& '()'& *onvergence without Membership5 @he ,mpact of the European
Union in the Ceighbourhood# Evidence from Ukraine&- .ournal of 4uro0ean Public Polic/ )A 627# ?2<1??)&
$bout $uthor
!ummary of $rticle
itations
Personal ommentary
Popescu% Cico and $ndrew 3ilson& '())& *@urning Presence into Power# Bessons from the Eastern
Ceighbourhood&- 4uro0ean Council of Forei*n 2elations <)&
http#>>www&ecfr&eu>page>->E+R<)QECPQ$3&pdf
$bout $uthor
!ummary of $rticle
itations
Personal ommentary
Proedrou% +ilippos& '()(& *Ukraine's +oreign Policy# $ccounting for Ukraine's ,ndeterminate !tance between
Russia and the 3est&- Southeast 4uro0ean and ;lac) Sea Studies )( 6.7# ..<1./2&
$bout $uthor
Dr +ilippos Proedrou is a lecturer of ,nternational Relations in ity ollege% ,nternational +aculty of the University of
!heffield% in @hessaloniki& 8e studied Iournalism and mass media !outheast European and "lack !ea !tudies .// 6"$7
in the $ristotle University of @hessaloniki% and was awarded M$ degree in international relations from the University
of 3arwick% UF% and PhD from Democritus University of @hrace% 4reece& 8is main research interests revolve around
energy politics% global governance% and cosmopolitan democracy& "esides articles in edited volumes in 4reece% he has
published articles in Iournals such as European !ecurity 6'((07% Kournal of ontemporary European !tudies 6'()(7% and
!tudia Diplomatica# @he "russels Kournal of ,nternational Relations 6'()(7& 8e is also a co-author of the book @he
Democrati:ation of 3ord Politics# $ ritical ,ntroduction to osmopolitan Democracy 6in 4reek7& !ummary of $rticle
introduction
Paper based on trad of theoretical eclecticism# theories of ,R should not be e9clusive but complementary& 8ybrid model
is tested on the case of post-independence Ukr fp&
Ukr +P dillema#
)& integrate into the 3estern structures
'& Reoientate to big brother Russia
<& !tance in between
@heories#
)& !ystemic pressures
'& ,nward1outward liberal approach# interest of ukr and its mighty actors
<& ,dentity politics# ideological orientation interests of elites and population
Theoretical under0unnin*s
hybrid system of complementary theories#
)& !ystemic onstraints# 4eographyG effect of anarchy leading to alliance and shift from unipolar world to
multipolar world
'& !tate and societal interests# Declared interestsG societal factors that influence fp course and conflicting interest
that e9plain fp contradictions
<& ,dentity politics# ideology of elites and people determine actual fp measuresG 8istorical e9perience and sepcific
ideas that conIunct>oppose concrete interests
The case of Post-,ar 8)rainian forei*n 0olic/: amidst the 5est and 2ussia
in the last two decades of independence Ukr has not been able to either re-embrace with Russia or rigidly allign with the
3est& E9plain this phenomenon by borrowing the described schools of thought& !ystemic press set ukr space for action
and poss alternatives& ,nterests and their lobbies e9plaining contradicting fp that coe9ist& Population and elite remain
divided# western Ukr pro-3estern% eastern part pro-Russian&
S/stemic constraints
Due to its geographical location Ukr will fall under the influence of regional power Russia& $s kharkiv accords show
Ukr is still dependent on Russia and retreats to its will& Energy dependence on Russia will work against +P that work as
a detriment to Rus policies& Ukr also has a huge debt to 4a:prom# russia has and economic influence over teh coturny&
@wo options# )& side with Russia '& Ioin with an ally and seek protection from russia&
EU unenthousiastic about ukr waitning to Ioin& U! does not push ukr to go into a C$@D 6since it has a 'russia first
policy'7&
Societal and state interests
Ukr economy and security is needy of moderni:ation& Especially to counter its energy poverty& Moderni:ation can be
achieved by entering 3estern structures& !o western alignment might be the most plausible +P choice for ukr& 8owever
the situation is far more comple9 than this% since some sectors' interests in ukr domestic politics can mold fp&
Fuchma got elected for second term with help from eastern ukr businesspeople% granting them a lot of priveleges and
consessions&
;uchenko government was anti-russian# final resolution on transiesterG strengtheneing 4U$MG establish community for
Democratic hoice&
;anukovych% who lead the parliament 6since '((.>/57 did away with yuschenko's priority of C$@D membership as pre-
mature and hasty% since it would detoriate working-relations with Russia& Party of Regions pro-russian&
@his division cleaves through the entreprise circles as well& ,n the East corporate group called the 'Donetsk lan'# steel
magnates% metal and coal mining% machine building and chemical production& )& Ceed Russia as a market for Ukranian
goods& '& 8eavily dependend on government subsidies% thus working against liberali:ing the market& Cot long-term
orientation% like EU membership% but short>medium term# loose free-trade area option& 8owever% some industrialist
would favor a better relation with the west# )& Market for steel is good '& alleviate fears of Russian take-overs&
+riction within the Drange coalition diminished the will to go on with political pro-western reforms% because personal
gains of politicians are in =uestion& orruption is also important here& Especially Ukranian energy officials and their
Russian counterparts are not efficient in reaching deals that are good for the Ukranian people% they rather get the best
personal gains& ;ankuovych should not be seen as anti-western# he will distance from C$@D% but further amiable
relations with the EU# he stated that his first priority is to restore Ukraine's devastated economy& EU may help% allying
with kremlin is imminent since C$@D membership is no possibility% therefore# both pro EU and pro Rus# a balanced
path&
3dentit/ Politics
Ukr remains a divided nation when it comes down to its ideological stance by which it could orientate its foreign policy
6@his division has deep historical roots7# )& 3esterni:ers who want to see Ukr developing into the modern 3est% both
eco and political to the advantage of the people& '& Eastern Ukrainians who perceive themselves as brothers with the
Russians and want to be closely related with the russians& Russia has a lot of soft-power in Ukraine# language% minority
of ethnic russians% movies% literature and music% and russia actively subsidi:es some think tanks in Ukr& !o for the
consent of this part of the population% good relations with Rus should be taken into regard&
@his difference plays out in Ukr domestic politics and politcal patterns
Conclusion
,deational factors remain on the centre stage# Eastern Ukranians firmly attached to Russia% 3estern Ukr want to be with
the west 6membership EU and C$@D7& @wo camps support by differen businessmen and politicians&
Developments#
)& Unipolar world to multipolar world shift# U! leverage to get ukr into C$@D declined&
'& Ukr priority is the moderni:ation of its economy which can be attained thoguh EU membership $CD
cooperation with russia& Remember# for Eastern vector EU market could be interesting and fear of rus investG
rus energy dependenceG Rus could become source of investments&
<& @he way ukr elite and ukr population conceptuali:e ukraines place in the world remains a catalytic force&
itations
*4eography is inescapable&- 6..07
*Russia views democratic movements in the wider region as @roIan horses of the 3est and facilitators of disentangling
from Russian influence&- 6..A7
*,n other words% the political landscape is =uite blurred& 4overnmental programs are soberly intertwined with personal
motives and ambitions% and bitter antagonisms&- 6./)7
*alignment with the 3est is the ultimate priorityG getting along with Russia% however% remains crucially important&-
6./)7
Personal ommentary
interesting perspective taken in this paper% even though the author makes many mistakes 6minskLkiev57& Co
deep understanding in what happens within the domestic policieis of ukraine though it sheds light on the
agenda and the way domestic priorities could logically lead to a multi vector policy&
!molansky% Dles M& '((.& *Ukriane and Russia# $n Evolving Marriage of ,nconvenience&- 9rbis .? 6)7# ))01
)<.&
$bout $uthor
Dles !molansky 6born )A<( in Ukraine7 is University Professor of international Relations at the Behigh University
6Private research university in "ethlehemm Pensylvania% U!$7& 4ot his PhD at olombia University in )A/A& 8as
published widely on the topic of U!!R and Russian foreign policy towards the middle east and Ukraine&
!ummary of $rticle
Russia in the )AA(s was pre-occupied with integration into the western institutions in order to reform its economy and
restore its status as a great power in the world& $s this did not yield the desired result Russia rediscovered its formal
imperial sphere 6the ,! and the Cewly ,ndependent sphere7& +irst it tried to collect the former territories through the
,! and the Eurasian Economic Union 6EE7& $fter this failed it tried to find bilateral relations with each of the newly
independent states& Protecting its economis% political and military interests in these states Putin applied economic
pressure 6espec in Ukr% 4eo% and Mol7
this paper treats the problems in Relations between Rus and Ukr in the first Putin era 6H- '(((-'((<7&
Feul 3ssues
'oil'# Ukraine is heavily dependen on Russian oil& Rus not contend with )& tariffs paid for transport through Ukr& '& Ukr
looking to bypass Rus in e9porting caspian oil by importing from georgia and shipping through poland to west&
'gas'# Ukr dependent on rus gas and turkmen gas& 8as to pay russia for its gas& Disputes about these payments# )& Much
of the gas debt is paid by ukr in goods and services& @his barter transaction complicate the the assesment of the worth of
these deals& '& reluctance to assume obligations that were incurred by private fuel importers&
)AAA-'((( dispute about gas siphoning% called 'stealing' by rus& @his makes a civili:ed dirvorce meaningless for rus&
Ukr inability to pay debts provides russia with an uni=ue opportunity to e9ert political and economical influence on ukr&
'gas pipelines'# Rus buidling ;amal ,, to bypass ukraine and end in germany& Koint internat proIect of rus Hger H frH ita H
pol& Fiev protests to this# ) ukr capable to mainaining pipelines& $nd e9pand e9isting pipelines capacity by <( R& resul
in restruc of uk debt to ga:prom on advant to kiev& Fiev pressing to develop an international pro-kiev gas consurtium
with germ so that ukr would not be bypassed& )& assures flow for russian gas to euro markets% and save billions '& kiev
gets fuel it needs and transit fees& H flow of foreign capital into Ukr&
Trade and economic coo0eration
decli trade )AA?-'((( in revers since '(()&
itations
*@he problems between Ukraine and Russia are firmly grounded in Eastern Europe's geography and history and
encompass a wide range of economic% military% political% and humanitarian concerns&- 6))A7
Personal ommentary
@igipko% !ergei& '())& *Ukraine's European hoice# 3hat it Means for Russia&- trans& "y !tephen D& !henfield in
2ussian Politics and #a, .A 6/7# //120&
$bout $uthor
!erhiy Beonidovych @ihipko 6born +ebruary )<% )A2(7 is a Ukrainian politician and finance specialist who has been
Eice Prime Minister of Ukraine& @ihipko was Minister of Economics in '((( and subse=uently served as hairman of
the Cational "ank of Ukraine from '((' to '((.& 8e ran unsuccessfully for President of Ukraine in the '()(
presidential election and has announced his candidacy for the '(). presidential election& @ihipko is also former Eice
Prime Minister1Minister of social policy Beader of the !trong Ukraine party&
!ummary of $rticle
$bstract# European choice limits the country's willingness to cooperate with Russia& "ut it needs a multidirectional fp&
$fter five years of political anarchy the poltical elite is now divided as a opposition dismissed from power and those
who have power& Bittle transition between coalition and opposition& ;anukovich's gov made a choice 6charkiv accords7
to work together with moscow% which leads to emotional claims from the oppistion that ukr is reinventin the U!!R with
russia& Fremlin men say they didnt like yuschenko's 'civili:ational choice&'
+,a/ from <osco,
Drange revolution in Ukr meant that society wanted freedom# freedom of self-e9pressionGprevention of one-person ruleG
restriction of state involvementin affairs of society and businessG the overcoming of systemic corruptionG integration
into the EU and elimination of the risk of e9ternal control by Moscow& @uschenko only succeeded in the latter LLS
turning anti russian% creating interregional tensions and fp and eco faillures and low election results in '()(&
;alancin* the course
;anukovich# )& ukr will stay unaligned and cont its coop with C$@D '& Ukrainian remains sole state language&
Under ;akunovich ukr fp has ceased to be purely anti russian& Russia is neede for better gas prices% without good prices
little economic stability due lack of budget and without stability no funds from the ,M+& !ame must go for defense and
foreign policy& Cor will Ukr have a pro-Russian fp course& Most ukr don't want that and it will cost dear in EU
relations&
4rror &(
!ome pro russian and russians see the situation still in some kind of western roman>eastern roman split& Makes C$@D>
EU enlargement not only poltical but a civili:ational split& Moscow must abandon this paradigm since it is casuing
dangerous illusions and interpretations of events&
!ome ukr think ukr should become a 'other russia'#more liberal milder% more european&
The Shade of 36an the terrible
Most ukr see the EU integration as the guarantee of a more attractive development model& ,t would make the state as a
comfortable :one of self-reali:ation&
1ie6=<osco,: the limits of friendshi0
Ruling class will want to work on further EU integration% while taking in regard the responsibilities that come with that%&
@his will however not prevent some of the rulers to support cooper with Russia& "ut the friendship has limits# cannot
make decisions that undermine national capital or the west-ward way it develops& Ukr will not Ioin ustoms Union or
Eurasion integration proIects% but ma9imi:e profit from observer status in EE and seek status as priveleged partner in
the !D& Eastward vector does not have to be in MoscowT Russia limits fraternal love and is conducting policy as
businesspeople not as geopoliticians and that is ok for Ukr&
>ifferent roads to modernit/
Ukr orientat towards the EU is not a leap away from Rus% but a different way to develop and moderni:e the country& Ukr
needs the e9ternal stimuli that would cause the bureaucracy to reform& EU-membership would grant these to Ukr& "U@
there is no prospect of EU-membership&
+n +sset- !ot a ;urden
EU politicians see stereotype cur:on line# everything east of poland falls under muscovite rule& Bobbyist for Ukraine#
Poland and UF& !ceptics# +rance and 4ermany& riti=ue# Ukraine is too big and potentially too strong for EU& ,t is also
very different from what we frame as 'european'& EU presupposes that a country will adopt e9ternal management& "ut#
large popu with different values and mental
a strong national capital market% unwilling to become a Iunior partner of EU institutions
ambitious political elite
contradiction# more successful ukr will lead it to be less open for e9ternal influence will diminish the possibility for EU
membership 6if conceived as a paris-berlin tool to reach fp goals7& @his intertial thinking should be given up% since Ukr
could be an asset that would strengthen the EU's diminising position in the face of hina% U! and ,ndia& $nd unlike
turkey it will not bring the civili:ational choice in European identity 6but wait&&& this is =uite contrdictory% since he
reIects civili:ational thinking of russia&7
The u)rainian exam0le
Russia does not officially obIect ukr euro choice% maybe because it holds a view that it will never attain membership&
"ut ukr can put an e9ample to rus that pluralistic democracy and social responsible liberal economy can take root in
eastern slavic soil& Ukr could act as a model for Rus and therefore the euro choice should not be feared& !ince it can
help to dispel myths% and historical detritus& ,D3# it will help to counter historical determinism and civili:ational
thinking&
itations
*$way from MoscowT- 6as slogan for yuschenko's platformG /27
*;uschenko's course ceased even to be pro-3estern# it was reduced to being purely anti-Russian&- 6/07
*3e had no choice but to compromise&- 6/?7
*+or most Ukrainians% this is a choice not of a geopolitical umbrella% but of a development model&- 62'7
*@he Ukrainian political elite sees in the EU more attractive opportunities and prospects& $s yet% of course% it rarely
adds an awareness of responsibility and of unavoidable need to change its own behavior& "ut sooner or later these
changes will happen&- 62'7
Personal ommentary
!ergei @igipko is a politician himself& @hough , really like this piece% and he makes a strong point# namely that Russian
elites should not fear ukr euro choice% he might be operating on a political and biased agenda of his own& , wonder what
he is currently doing&&& he is currently running for president in the upcoming '(). elections& @hough he has low poll
ratings he seems to be the more popular after poroshenko6.?&.R7 and tymoshenko6).R7 with 0%.R& 8e was in banking
and is really rich% estimated at <2A million dollars by korrespondent in '((A& !o he is less rich than the lucrative gas
oligarchs 6who own billions7 or Poroshenko 6@ara ku:io calling him ;anukovich-lite7& 8e ranks '0
th
on lis of richest
ukrainians% poroshenko )<
th
% tymochenko is not on the list 6which surpises me7&
Umland% $ndreas& '()<& *"erlin% Fiew% Moskau und die RUhre# Die deutsche Dstpolitik im !panungsfeld de
russisch-ukrainischen "e:iehung&- +u?en Sicherheits0olit 2# .)<1.'?&
$bout $uthor
!ummary of $rticle
itations
Personal ommentary

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