Lecture Guide Agrarian

LECTURE GUIDE of Assistant Secretary AUGUSTO P.
QUIJANO Department of Agrarian R

eform
a) Discuss the requisites for the existence of tenancy relations: b) The parties
are the landholder and the tenant; c) The subject is agricultural land; d) Ther
e is consent by the landholder for the tenant to work on the land, given either
orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly;
e) The purpose is agricultural production; f) There is personal cultivation or w
ith the help of the immediate farm household;
and
g) There is compensation in terms of payment of a fixed amount in money and/or
produce. (Caballes vs. DAR, 168 SCRA 254 [1988]; Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA
590 (1974); Oarde vs. CA, 280 SCRA 235, [1997]; Qua vs. CA, 198 SCRA 236 [1991]
.
h)
Agricultural leasehold tenancy distinguished from civil law lease.
i) Subject Matter - agricultural leasehold is limited to agricultural land; whil
e a civil
law lease may refer to rural or urban property;
j) Attention and Cultivation - leasehold tenant should personally attend to, and
cultivate the agricultural land; whereas the civil law lessee need not personall
y cultivate or work the thing leased;
k) Purpose - In leasehold tenancy, the landholding is devoted to agriculture;
whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits;
l) Law governing the relationship - Civil law lease is governed by the C ivil Co
de,
whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special law (RA 3844 as amended by RA 6
389). (Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974)
m) n) o) p)
An overseer of a coconut plantation was not considered a tenant (Zamoras vs. Su,
Jr., 184 SCRA 248 (1990); Castillo vs. CA, 205 SCRA 529 (1992). The owner tilli
ng his own agricultural land is not a tenant within the contemplation of law. (B
aranda vs. Baguio, 189 SCRA 197 (1990). Certification of tenancy/non-tenancy iss
ued by DAR are not conclusive evidence of tenancy relationship. (Oarde vs. CA et
al., 280 SCRA 235 [1997]). Successor-in-interest of the true and lawful landhol
der/owner who gave the consent are bound to recognize the tenancy established be
fore they acquired the agricultural land (Endaya vs. CA, 215 SCRA 109 [1992]). T
he law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work on t
he land (Bonifacio vs. Dizon; 177 SCRA 294), and the lessee cannot hire many per
sons to help him cultivate the land (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559).
q)
Lecture Guide ASEC AUGUSTO P. QUIJANO Page 2

r)
We agree with the trial court that We cannot have a case where a landlord is dive
sted of his landholding and somebody else is installed to became a new landlord.
(Oarde, et al., vs. CA, et al., 780 SCRA 235 [1997]). Tenancy relation was sever
ed when the tenant and/or his immediate farm household ceased from personally wo
rking the fishpond (Gabriel vs. Pangilinan, 58 SCRA 590 (1974). Since there is n
o sharing arrangement between the parties, the Court held that Matienzo is merel
y an overseer and not a tenant (Matienzo vs. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276 (1981). The
Supreme Court has consistently ruled that once a leasehold relation has been est
ablished, the agricultural lessee is entitled to security of tenure . The tenant
has a right to continue working on the land except when he is ejected therefrom
for cause as provided by law (De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559 (1989). Security o
f tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life
itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of the
ir only means of livelihood. (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 439 (1988)
. Security of tenure afforded the tenant-lessee is constitutional (Primero vs. C
IR, 101 Phil. 675 (1957); Pineda vs. de Guzman, 21 SCRA 1450 (1967) Once a tenan
t, always a tenant. The Supreme Court held that only the tenant-lessee has a rig
ht to a homelot and that members of the immediate family of the tenant are not e
ntitled to a homelot (Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation vs. CA, 278 SC
RA 819 (1997).
s)
t)
u)
v)
w)
x)
y) Causes for Termination of the Leasehold Relation z) Abandonment of the landho
lding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor
(Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, 27 SCRA 7 (1969);
aa)
Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notic
e of which shall be served three months in advance (Nisnisan, et al., vs. CA, 29
4 SCRA 173 (1998); or Absence of an heir to succeed the lessee in the event of h
is/her death or permanent incapacity (Section 8, RA 3844)
bb) cc)
The lessor who ejects his tenant without the courts authorization shall be liable
for:
dd) ee)
Fine or imprisonment; Damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in addition to
the fine or imprisonment for unauthorized dispossession; ff) Payment of attorne
ys fees incurred by the lessee; and gg) The reinstatement of the lessee.
hh)
The Supreme Court in upholding its constitutionality held that there is no legal
basis for declaring LOI No. 474 void on its face on equal protection, due proce
ss and taking of property without just compensation grounds. (Zurbano vs. Estrel
la, 137 SCRA 333 (1989) In the case of Locsin vs. Valenzuela which was promulgat
ed on 19 February 1991, the Supreme Court explained the legal effect of land bei
ng place under OLT as vesting ownership in the tenant. However, in a subsequent
case dated 13 September
ii)

1991 Vinzons Magana vs. Estrella citing Pagtalunan vs. Tamayo which pre-dated th
e Locsin case, the High Tribunal ruled that mere issuance of a certificate of la
nd transfer does not vest ownership in the farmer/grantee.
jj)
The consent of the farmer-beneficiary is not needed in the determination of just
compensation pursuant to Section 18 of RA No. 6657 (Land Bank of the Philippine
s vs. CA and Pascual (G.R. No. 128557, December 29, 1999).
kk) Just Compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property t
aken
from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Cour
t, that the measure is not the takers gain but the owners loss . The word just is us
ed to intensify the meaning of the word compensation to convey the idea that the e
quivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial
, full and ample. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 (1989).
ll)
It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Section II, the original and exc
lusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petition for determination of
just compensation has already been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. I
t only means that, in accordance with settled principle of administrative law, p
rimary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determin
e in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands t
aken under the CARP, but such determination is subject to challenge in the court
s. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less original and excl
usive, because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proc
eedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For the matt
er, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable.
Nevertheless, resort to courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts ar
e the guarantors of the legality of administrative action (Phil. Veterans Bank vs
. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 132767, January 18, 2000).
mm) The Supreme Court decided not to apply that 6% increment to the valuation be
cause
the Court of Appeals affirmed the PARADs use of the 1992 Gross Selling Price in t
he valuation of the private respondents land (following the ruling in the Court o
f Appeals case of Galeon vs. Pastoral, CA-G.R. No. 23168; Rollo, p. 36) (LBP vs.
CA and Jose Pascual, G.R. No. 128557, Dec. 29, 1999)
nn) The DAR must first resolve the issues raised in a protest/application before
the
distribution of covered lands to farmer-beneficiaries may be effected. (Roxas &
Co., Inc. vs Court of Appeals, G.R. 127876, 17 December, 1999).
oo) The CREATION and JURISDICTION of the DARAB was discussed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176 (1995) . The Supreme Court hel
d that: Section 17 of EO 229 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determi
ne and adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdic
tion over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform except those f
ollowing under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agricult
ure and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with l
aw. Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening
the DAR, created the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) t
o assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian r
eform cases. (Also Quismundo vs. CA, 201 SCRA 609 (1991).

pp)
In Ualat vs. Judge Ramos, 265 SCRA 345 (1996), complainant filed an administrati
ve case against the respondent Judge for taking cognizance of the ILLEGAL DETAIN
ER case filed by their landowner against them notwithstanding knowledge of previ
ously filed DARAB case and the fact that the illegal detainer case falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. Despite the separate affidavits of the co
mplainants containing allegation of landlord-tenant relationship, the respondent
judge took cognizance of the illegal detainer case. Knowledge of existing agrar
ian legislation and prevailing jurisprudence on the subject, together with an or
dinary degree of prudence, would have prompted respondent Judge to refer the cas
e to the DAR for preliminary determination of the parties relationship, as requi
red by law. However, DARAB has no jurisdiction with respect to agrarian matters
involving the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657 and the determi
nation of just compensation for landowners (Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 57).
Jurisdiction over said matters are lodged with the Special Agrarian Courts (SACs
). The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court maintain their appellate jurisdiction
over agrarian cases decided by DARAB. (Vda. de Tangub vs. Ca, 191 SCRA 885 (1990
).
qq) DARABs Jurisdiction over Agrarian Disputes was also resolved in Central Minda
nao
University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86.
rr) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agri
culture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representatio
n of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy
relating to compensation of lands acquired under RA 6657 and other terms and con
ditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and oth
er agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and l
essee (Isidro vs. CA, 228 SCRA 503 (1993).
ss) In the case of Vda. de Areiola vs. Camarines Sur Reg. Agricultural School, e
t al.,
110 SCRA 517 (1960), the Supreme Court explained the phrase by a third party in Se
ction 21 of RA 1199 (Ejectment; Violation; Jurisdiction. ---all cases involving t
he dispossession of a tenant by the landholder or by a third party - - -) The Su
preme Court held that when no tenancy relationship between the contending partie
s exist, the Court of Agrarian Relations has no jurisdiction, The law governing ag
ricultural tenancy, RA 1199 explains that tenancy relationship is a juridical tie
which arises between a landholder and a tenant once they agree expressly or impl
iedly to undertake jointly the cultivation of land belonging to the former, etc.
Necessarily, the law contemplated a legal relationship between landowner and ten
ant. This does not exist where one is owner or possessor and the other a squatte
r or deforciant.
tt) Section 57 of RA 6657 provides that the Special Agrarian Court (SACs) shall
have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of
just compensation and all criminal offenses. The Supreme held that any effort to
transfer the original and exclusive jurisdiction to the DAR Adjudicators and to
convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would
be contrary to Section 57 of RA 6657 and therefore would be void. (Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 758 SCRA 263 (1996).
uu) It should be stressed that the motion in Fortich were denied on the ground th
at the
win-win resolution is void and has no legal effect because the decision approving
the concession has already become final and executory. This is the ratio deciden
di or reason of the decision. The statement that LGUs have authority to convert
or reclassify agricultural lands without DAR approval is merely a dictum or expr
ession of the individual views of the ponente or writer of the Resolution of Aug
ust 19, 1997. It

does not embody the Courts determination and is not binding (Fortich, et al., vs.
Corona, et al., G.R. No. 131457 (August 19, 1999).
vv) Agricultural lands expropriated by LGUs pursuant to the power of eminent dom
ain need
not be subject of DAR conversion clearance prior to change in use. (Province of
Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 173 (1993) 32. Respondent DARs failure to observe
due process in the acquisition of petitioners landholding does not ipso facto gi
ve this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioners application for conversion
of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. (Roxas vs. CA, G.R. No.
127876, (December 16, 1999) 33. The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the
DARAB since it is definitely outside its jurisdiction. Whatever findings made b
y the DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the
matter. The issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate proceedings befo
re the appropriate trial court between the claimants thereof. (Jaime Morta, Sr.,
et al., vs. Jaime Occidental, et al., G. R. No. 123417, (June 10, 1999) (Note t
he Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Davide Jr.,) 34. P.D. No. 27, which imple
mented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program, covers tenanted rice or corn l
ands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) t
he land must be devoted to rice or corn crops : and (2) there must be a system o
f share crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either of these requisites i
s absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply f
or retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undis
turbed. On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of h
is right of retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or
corn crops ; (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy obtainin
g therein; and (3) the size of the landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24)
hectares or it could be more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at lea
st seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares
of it consist of other agricultural lands. In the landmark case of Association of
Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held t
hat landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No.
27 are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657. We disregarded
the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series o
f 1985 on landowners covered by OLT. However, if a landowner filed his applicati
on for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had previously filed the sworn sta
tements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the retentio
n limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27. Otherwise, he is only entitled
to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No. 6657. (Eudosia Daez and/or Her Heirs
presented by Edriano D. Daez, vs. The Hon. C.A. et. al., 325 SCRA 857). 35. Evid
ently, quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect
contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating
them in the proper Regional Trial Court. It is not within their jurisdiction and
competence to decide the indirect contempt cases. These matters are still withi
n the province of the Regional Trial Courts. In the present case, the indirect c
ontempt charge was filed, not with the Regional Trial Court, but with the PARAD,
and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Lorayes with indirect contempt (LBP vs. Sev
erino Listana, Sr., G.R. No. 152611. (August 5, 2003) There are only two ways a
person can be charged with indirect contempt, namely, (1) though a verified peti
tion; and (2) by order or formal charge initiated by the court MOTU PROPRIO.

36. We hold that our decision, declaring a petition for review as the proper mod
e of appeal from judgments of Special Agrarian Courts is a rule of procedure whi
ch affects substantive rights. If our ruling is given retroactive application, i
t will prejudice LBPs right to appeal because pending appeals in the Court of App
eals will be dismissed outright in mere technicality thereby sacrificing the sub
stantial merits thereof. It would be unjust to apply a new doctrine to a pending
case involving a party who already invoked a contrary view and who acted in goo
d faith thereon prior to the issuance of said doctrine. (Land Bank of the Philip
pines vs. Arlene de Leon, et al., G.R. No. 143275 (March 20, 2003)(Note: Sec. 60
in relation to Sec. 61 of R.A. 6657). 37. The Supreme Court ruled that if landow
ners are called to sacrifice in the interest of land reform, their acceptance of
Land Bank bonds in payment of their agricultural lands, government lending inst
itutions should share in the sacrifice by accepting the same Land Bank bonds at
their face value (Ramirez vs. CA, 194 SCRA 81) 38. The Supreme Court granted the
petition for mandamus seeking to compel respondent GSIS to accept Land Bank bon
ds at their face value as payment for a pre-existing obligation (Maddumba vs. GS
IS, 182 SCRA 281). 39. It is the DARAB which has the authority to determine the
initial valuation of lands involving agrarian reform although such valuation may
only be considered preliminary as the final determination of just compensation
is vested in the courts. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321
SCRA 629). 40. Court applied the provisions of Republic Act 6657 to rice and co
rn lands when it upheld the constitutionality of the payment of just compensatio
n for Presidential Decree 27 lands through the different modes stated in Sec. 18
. R.A. 6657. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 629).
41. Nothing contradictory between the provisions of Sec. 50, R.A. 6657 granting
the Department of Agrarian Reform primary jurisdiction (administrative proceedin
g) to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and exclusive original
jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform"
which includes the determination of questions of just compensation, and the prov
isions of Sec. 57, R.A. 6657 granting Regional Trial Courts "original and exclus
ive jurisdiction (judicial proceeding) over (1) all petitions for the determinati
on of just compensation to landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses
under Republic Act No. 6657. (Philippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139). It
is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, Sec. 11, the original and exclusi
ve jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of jus
t compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction . (Ph
ilippine Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139).
42.
43. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and
exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial
proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For tha
t matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappeal
able . Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory tha
t courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action. (Philippin
e Veterans Bank vs. CA, 322 SCRA 139). 44. In Vda. De Tangub vs. Court of Appeal
s, we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited
to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of ag
rarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and landtenure related proble
ms; and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjust
ment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other n
on-agricultural uses. (Morta, Sr. vs. Occidental, 308 SCRA 167).

45.
The findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations, supported by substantia
l evidence, is well-nigh conclusive on an appellate tribunal. ( De Chavez vs. Zo
bel, 55 SCRA 26).
46. The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his p
owers under martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales vs. Estrella and
we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of Pre
sident Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same wa
s authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constituti
on, quoted above. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343). 47. That fund, as earlier noted, is
itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requireme
nts of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however,
Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure even if it does provide for the c
reation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation la
w is one the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release o
f public funds from the treasury. The creation of the fund is only incidental to
the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform. (Ibid.) 48. T
he argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 shoul
d be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by
Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 665
7 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one
of its most controversial provisions. (Ibid.) 49. In other words, mandamus can
issue to require action only but not specific action. Whenever a duty is imposed
upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercis
e of such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will int
ervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel action. If the du
ty is purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. (Ib
id.) 50. With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and
manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of t
he CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that
a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but af
ter all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities an
d demands of society or oblivious as the rest of our people to see the goal of a
grarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our p
easant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalida
tion of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program,
killing the farmer s hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting t
he spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in
our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decre
e today. (Ibid.) 51. Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation
is not always required to be made fully in money, we find further that the propo
rtion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total paymen
t, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not und
uly oppressive upon the landowner. It is noted that the smaller the land, the bi
gger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be needing
it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and o
ther things of value. No less importantly, the government financial instruments
making up the balance of the payment are " negotiable at any time." The other mo
des, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not u
nreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other propert
ies or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount o
f just compensation. (Ibid.) 52. The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to t
he property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon
full payment of the just compensation .

Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other dem
ocratic jurisdictions. (Ibid.) 53. CARP Law (R.A. 6657) is more liberal than tho
se granted by P.D. No. 27 as to retention limits. (Ibid.) 54. The rule is settle
d that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the
time of the commencement of an action . There can be no question that at the tim
e the complaints in CAR Cases Nos. 760-802-UP 78 and 806-810-UP 78 were filed, t
he RTC of Pangasinan had no jurisdiction over them pursuant to Section 12 (a) an
d (b) of P.D. No. 946 which is vested the then Court of Agrarian Relations with
original exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving rights granted and obligati
ons imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian re
form program. However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judi
ciary Reorganization Act of 1980, took effect, the Courts of Agrarian Relations
were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the forme
r was vested in the latter courts. It can thus be seen that at the time Branch 4
6 of the RTC of Pangasinan dismissed the agrarian cases on 29 October 1985, Regi
onal Trial Courts already had jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. The issue tha
t logically crops up then is whether Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 automatically confe
rred upon the aforesaid Branch 46 jurisdiction over the subject agrarian cases c
onsidering that these cases were filed seven (7) years earlier at a time when on
ly the Courts of Agrarian Relations had exclusive original jurisdiction over the
m. We rule that it did not, for such a defect is fatal. Besides, the grant of ju
risdiction to the Regional Trial Courts over agrarian cases was not meant to hav
e any retroactive effect. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 does not provide for such retr
oactivity. The trial court did not then err in dismissing the cases. ( Tiongson
vs. CA, 214 SCRA 197). 55. On 22 July 1987, the President of the Republic of the
Philippines promulgated Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 providing for the mechan
isms for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program institu
ted by Proclamation No. 131 dated 22 July 1987. Section 17 thereof provides: "SE
C. 17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.- The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-ju
dicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall hav
e exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of a
grarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DEN
R and the Department of Agriculture (DA). x x x The decisions of the DAR may, in
proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately
executory notwithstanding such appeal." This provision not only repealed Sectio
n 12 (a) and (b) of B.P. Blg. 129 . The abovequoted Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 w
as the governing law at the time the challenged decision was promulgated. Then,
too, Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, substan
tially reiterates said Section 17 while Sections 56 and 57 provide for the desig
nation by this Court of at least one (1) branch of the Regional Trial Court in e
ach province to act as a special agrarian court which shall have exclusive origi
nal jurisdiction only over petitions for the determination of just compensation
and the prosecution of criminal offenses under said Act. (Tiongson vs. CA, 214 S
CRA 197). The constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 from which Letter of Instructions
No. 474 and Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978 are derived, is now well
settled. More specifically, this Court also upheld the validity and constitutio
nality of Letter of Instructions No. 474 which directed then Secretary of Agrari
an Reform Conrado Estrella to "undertake to place under the Land Transfer Progra
m of the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/co
rn lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own ot
her agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands u
sed for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which t
hey derive adequate income to support themselves and their families". (Vinzons-M
agana vs. Estrella, 201 SCRA 536). 57. It is settled that mandamus is not availa
ble to control discretion but not the discretion itself. The writ may issue to c
ompel the exercise of discretion but not the
56.

discretion itself. Mandamus can require action only but not specific action wher
e the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion. (Sharp Int
ernational Marketing vs. CA, 201 SCRA 299). 58. Actions for forfeiture of certif
icates of land transfer for failure to pay lease rentals for more than two (2) y
ears fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agraria
n Relations. (Curso vs. CA, 128 SCRA 567). 59. Referral of preliminary determina
tion of rights of tenant-farmer and the landowner to Ministry of Agrarian Reform
, not necessary, where tenancy relationship between the parties is admitted in t
he pleadings. ( Curso vs. CA, 128 SCRA 567). 60. Presidential Decree No. 816 imp
oses the sanction of forfeiture where the "agricultural lessee x x x deliberatel
y refuses and/or continues to refuse to pay the rentals or amortization payments
when they fall due for a period of two (2) years ." Petitioners cannot be said
to have deliberately refused to pay the lease rentals. They acted in accordance
with the MAR Circular, which implements P.D. 816, and in good faith. Forfeiture
of their Certificates of Land Transfer and of their farmholdings as decreed by t
he CAR and affirmed by the Appellate Court is thus unwarranted. (Curso vs. CA, 1
28 SCRa 567). 61. Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing pr
ohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiar
ies and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform.
Any such person who knowingly and willfully violates the above provisions of the
Act shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion of the Court.
( Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86). 62. The DARAB has no pow
er to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of
the CMU s titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordere
d segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the school
to be necessary for its purposes. There is no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdict
ion to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of the CARP. An
agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as any controversy relating to tenu
rial rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over lands devot
ed to agriculture. ( Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB, 215 SCRA 86). 63. Se
ction 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 deemed repealed by Section 1
7 Executive Order No. 229.- The above quoted provision should be deemed to have
repealed Section 12 (a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested th
e then Courts of Agrarian Relations with the original exclusive jurisdiction ove
r cases and questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presid
ential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program. In 1980
, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian relations were integrated into the Re
gional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter
courts. (Quismundo vs. CA, 201 SCRA 609). 64. The Department of Agrarian Reform
is vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving i
mplementation of agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive origin
al jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environme
nt and Natural Resources. Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorgan
izing and strengthening the DAR, created the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjud
ication Board (DARAB) to

assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian ref
orm cases. (Machete vs. CA, 250 SCRA 176). 65. Section 56 of R.A. 6657 confers "
special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional trial Co
urts designated by this Court-at least one (1) branch within each province-to ac
t as such. These Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts hav
e, according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original and exclusive jurisdiction ove
r: (a) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, a
nd (b) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act. (Machete vs. CA,
250 SCRA 176). 66. The failure of tenants to pay back rentals pursuant to a leas
ehold contract is an issue which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB and is c
learly beyond the legal competence of the Regional Trial Courts to resolve. (Ibi
d.) 67. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogat
e unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. The resoluti
on by the DAR of the agrarian dispute is to the best advantage of the parties si
nce it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administr
ative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. (Ibid.
) 68. The DAR has original, exclusive jurisdiction over agrarian disputes , exce
pt on the aspects of (a) just compensation; and (b) criminal jurisdiction over w
hich regular courts have jurisdiction. (Vda. De Tangub vs. CA, 191 SCRA 885). 69
. Where there are no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever b
etween the parties that could bring a controversy under the ambit of the agraria
n reform laws, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board has no juris
diction. (Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos vs. CA, 327 SCRA 293). 70. The CAR
ETAKER of the land may be considered as the cultivator of the land and, hence, a
tenant. (Latag vs. Banog, 16 SCRA 88).
71. The cultivator is necessarily tasked with duties that amount to cultivation.
(COCOMA vs. CA, 164 SCRA 568).
72. There are no squatters in Agricultural lands. Squatters are only found in UR
BAN
COMMUNITIES, not in RURAL AREAS. (On Presidential Decree No. 772- Illegal Squatt
ing) (People vs. Echaves, 95 SCRA 663).
73. It bears noting that the Decision, which prescribed for Rule 42 as the corre
ct mode of
appeal from the decisions of the SAC, was promulgated by this Court only on 10 S
eptember 2002, while the Resolution of the motion for reconsideration of the sai
d case giving it a prospective application was promulgated on 20 March 2003. Res
pondent appealed to the Court of Appeals on 31 July 1998 via ordinary appeal und
er Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Though appeal under said rule is not the prope
r mode of appeal, said erroneous course of action cannot be blamed on respondent
. It was of the belief that such recourse was the appropriate manner to question
ed the decisions of the SAC. In Land Bank v. De Leon, we held: On account of the
absence of jurisprudence interpreting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657 regarding t
he proper way to appeal decisions of Special Agrarian Courts as well as the conf
licting decisions of the Court of Appeals thereon, LBP cannot be blamed for avai
ling of the wrong mode. Based on its own interpretation and reliance on the Buen
aventura ruling, LBP acted on the

mistaken belief that an ordinary appeal is the appropriate manner to question de
cisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Thus, while the rule is that the appropriate
mode of appeal from the decisions of the SAC is through petition for review und
er Rule 42, the same rule is inapplicable in the instant case. The Resolution ca
tegorically stated that said ruling shall apply only to those cases appealed aft
er 20 March 2003 (Fernando Gabatin, et al., vs. LBP, G.R. No. 148223, November 2
5 2004)
74. The foregoing clearly shows that there would never be a judicial determinati
on of just
compensation absent respondent Land Banks participation. Logically, it follows th
at respondent is an indispensable party in an action for the determination of ju
st compensation in cases arising from agrarian reform program. Assuming arguendo
that respondent is not an indispensable party but only a necessary party as is
being imposed upon us by the petitioners, we find the argument of the petitioner
s that only indispensable can appeal to be incorrect. There is nothing in the Ru
les of Court that prohibit a party in an action before the lower court to make a
n appeal merely on the ground that he is not an indispensable party. The Rules o
f Court does not distinguish whether the appellant is an indispensable party or
not. To avail of the remedy, the only requirement is that the persons appealing
must have a present interest in the subject matter of the litigation and must be
aggrieved or prejudiced by the judgment. A party, in turn, is deemed aggrieved
or prejudiced when his interest, recognized by law in the subject matter of the
lawsuit, is injuriously affected by the judgment, order or decree. The fact that
a person is made a party to a case before the lower court, and eventually be ma
de liable if the judgment be against him, necessarily entitles him to exercise h
is right to appeal. To prohibit such party to appeal is nothing less than an out
right violation of the rules on fair play.
75. The Rules of Court provides that parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or de
fendants. In BPI v. Court of Appeal, 402 SCRA 449 this Court explained: . . . .
. . An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts a
ction in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can
be had. The partys interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief
sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties that his legal pre
sence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence ther
e cannot be resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is e
ffective, complete, or equitable. Conversely, a party is not indispensable to th
e suit if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and divi
sible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudi
ced by a judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court. He is not
indispensable if his presence would merely permit complete relief between him a
nd those already parties to the action or will simply avoid multiple litigation.
(Ibid)
76. In Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals, this Court even went o
n to say
that without the Land Bank, there would be no amount to be established by the go
vernment for the payment of just compensation, thus: As may be gleaned very clea
rly from EO 229, the LBP is an essential part of the government sector with rega
rd to the payment of compensation to the landowner. It is, after all, the instru
mentality that is charged with the disbursement of public funds for purposes of
agrarian reform. It is therefore part, an indispensable cog, in the government m
achinery that fixes and determines the amount compensable to the

landowner. Were LBP to be excluded from that intricate, if not sensitive, functi
on of establishing the compensable amount, there would be no amount to be establi
shed by the government as required in Section 6 of EO 229 (emphasis. supplied). (
Ibid)
77. We must stress, at the outset, that the taking of private lands under the ag
rarian
reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding. In a numbe
r of cases, we have stated that in computing the just compensation for expropria
ting proceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking not at t
he time of the rendition of judgment, which should be taken into consideration.
This being do, then in determining the value of the land for the payment of just
compensation, the time of taking should be the basis. In the instant case, sinc
e the dispute over the valuation of the land depends on the rate of the GSP used
in the equation, it necessarily follows that the GSP should be pegged at the ti
me of the taking of the properties. In the instant case, the said taking of the
properties was deemed effected on 21 October 1972, when the petitioners were dep
rived of ownership over their lands in favor of qualified beneficiaries, pursuan
t to E.O. No. 228 and by the virtue of P.D. No. 27. The GSP for one cavan of pal
ay at that time was at P35. Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the GSP s
hould be fixed at said rate, which was the GSP at the time of the taking of the
subject property . (Ibid)
78. Petitioners are not rendered disadvantage by the computation inasmuch as the
y are
entitled to receive the increment of six percent (6%) yearly interest compounded
annually pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. As amply
explained by this Court: The purpose of AO No. 13 is to compensate the landowner
s for unearned interests. Had they been paid in 1972 when the GSP for rice and c
orn was valued at P35.00 and P31.00, respectively, and such amounts were deposit
ed in a bank, they would have earned a compounded interest of 6% per annum. Thus
, if the PARAD used the 1972 GSP, then the product of (2.5 x AGP x P35.00 or P31
.00) could be multiplied by (1.06) to determine the value of the land plus the a
ddition 6% compounded interest it would have earned from 1972.
79. Petitioners reliance on Land Bank v. Court of Appeals where we ordered Land B
ank
to pay the just compensation based on the GSP at the time the PARAD rendered the
decision, and not at the time of the taking, is not well taken. In that case, P
ARAD, in its decision, used the GSP at the time of payment, in determining the l
and value. When the decision became final and executory, Land Bank, however, ref
used to pay the landowner arguing that the PARADs valuation was null and void for
want of jurisdiction. We rules therein that the PARAD has the authority to dete
rmine the initial valuation of lands involving agrarian reform. Thus, the decisi
on of the PARAD was binding on Land Bank. Land Bank was estopped from questionin
g the land valuation made by PARAD because it participated in the valuation proc
eedings and did not appeal the said decision. Hence, Land Bank was compelled to
pay the land value based on the GSP at the time of payment. (Ibid)
80. As can clearly be gleaned from the foregoing provision, the remedy of relief
from
judgment can only be resorted to on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excus
able negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence
and prudence could not have guarded against. Measured against this standard, th
e reason proferred by Land Banks counsel, i.e., that his heavy workload prevented
him from ensuring that the motion for reconsideration included a notice of hear
ing, was by no means excusable.

Indeed, counsels admission that he simply scanned and signed the Motion for Recons
ideration for Agrarian Case No. 2005, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 4
8, not knowing, or unmindful that it had no notice of hearing speaks volumes of h
is arrant negligence, and cannot in any manner be deemed to constitute excusable
negligence. (LBP vs. Hon. Elis G.C. Natividad G.R. No. 127198, May 16, 2005).
81. Indeed, a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is no
thing but
a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does not have the duty to accept it, m
uch less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge. The trial court th
erefore correctly considered the motion for reconsideration pro forma. Thus, it
cannot be faulted for denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration and petition
for relief from judgment. (Ibid)
82. At any rate, in the Philippines Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, We declar
e
that there is nothing contradictory between the DARs primary jurisdiction to dete
rmine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which include
s jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination
of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the
second refers to judicial proceedings. In accordance with settled principles of
administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a
preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian
reform program, but such determination is subject to challenged before the cour
ts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agra
rian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.
83. Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian
reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just comp
ensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time and not at
the time of possession in 1993, is likewise erroneous. In Office of the Preside
nt, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the seizure of the landh
olding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take eff
ect on the payment of just compensation. Under the factual circumstances of this
case, the agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation
to be paid private respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of
Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the completion of this process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under the said law.
Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and EO 228 having only supple
tory effect, conformably with our ruling in Paris v. Alfeche. (Ibid)
84. It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation on the guid
eline
provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs failure to determine the just c
ompensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be
determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially im
perative considering that just condensation should be the full and fair equivale
nt of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent bein
g real, substantial, full and ample.
85. All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), even through they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional i
n nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since the law has g
ranted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matter.
(DAR vs. Roberto J. Cuenca and Hon. Alfonso B. Combong, Jr., et al. G.R. N. 154
112, September 23, 2004).

86. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points plead
ed by
respondent in relation to the jurisdictional issue. We need only to point that i
n case of doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolvi
ng a controversy involving matters that demand the special competence of adminis
trative agencies, even if the question[s] involved [are] also judicial in charact
er, as in this case. (Ibid)
87. Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, i
t follows
that the RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the
assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be stricken do
wn as a nullity. Such nullity is particularly true in the light of the express p
rohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Courts Administrative Circular Nos. 29
-2002 and 38-2002. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to strictly observe S
ection 68 of RA 6657, which reads: Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies fr
om Undue Interference. No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus
shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (
DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natu
ral Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation
of the program.(Ibid)
88. It is a well-settled rule that only questions of law may be received by the
Supreme
Court in an appeal by certiorari. Findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are f
inal and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court. The o
nly time this Court will disregard the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
(which are ordinary accorded great respect) is when these are based on speculati
on, surmises or conjectures or when these are not based on substantial evidence.
(Samahan ng Magsasaka San Jose represented by Dominador Maglalang vs. Marietta
Valisno, et al., G.R. No. 158314 June 3, 2004).
89. The relevant laws governing the minors redemption in 1973 are the general Civ
il
Code provisions on legal capacity to enter into contractual relations. Article 1
327 of the Civil Code provides that minors are incapable of giving consent to a
contract. Article 1390 provides that a contract where one of the parties is inca
pable of giving consent is viodable or annullable. Thus, the redemption made by
the minors in 1973 was merely voidable or annullable, and was not void ab initio
, as petitions argue. Any action for the annulment of the contracts thus entered
into by the minors would require that: (1) the plaintiffs must have an interest
in the contract; and (2) the action must be brought by the victim and not the p
arty responsible for the defect. Thus, Article 1397 of the Civil Code provides i
n part that [t]he action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all
who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are ca
pable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted. The action
to annul the minors redemption in 1973, therefore, was one that could only have
been initiated by the minors themselves, as the victims or the aggrieved parties
in whom the law itself vests the right to file suit. This action was never init
iated by the minors . We thus quote with approval the ratiocination of the Court
of Appeals: Respondent contend that the redemption made by the petitioners was
simulated, calculated to avoid the effects of agrarian reform considering that a
t the time of redemption the latter were still minors and could not have recours
e, in their own right, to pay the price thereof. We are persuaded. While it is t
rue that a transaction entered into by a party who is incapable of consent is vi
odable, however such

transaction is valid until annulled. The redemption made by the four petitioners
has never been annulled, thus, it is valid. (Ibid)
90. As owner in their own right of the questioned properties, RedemptionerGrandc
hildren enjoyed the right of retention granted to all landowners. This right of
retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualificat
ion by the balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by implement
ing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an justice agai
nst the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not su
pposed to leave the landowners dominion, thus sparing the government from the inc
onvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which w
ould be a pointless process.
91. On the first assigned error, this Court has consistently held that the doctr
ine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible dependin
g on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings o
f a case. Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and (b) the admin
istrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdicti
on. (DAR vs. APEX Investment and Financing Corporation; G.R. No. 149422, April 1
0, 2003).
92. In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, we held that the aggrie
ved
landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protest
s (after it had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial proc
ess. Given the official indifference which, under the circumstances could have c
ontinued forever, the landowners has to act to assert and protect their interest
s. Thus, their petition for certiorari was allowed even though the DAR had not y
et resolved their protests. In the same vein, respondent here could not be expec
ted to wait for petitioner DAR to resolve its protest before seeking judicial in
tervention. Obviously, petitioner might continue to alienate respondents lots dur
ing the pendency of its protest. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in conc
luding that on the basis of the circumstances of this case, respondent need not
exhaust all administrative remedies before filing its petition for certiorari an
d prohibition. (Ibid)
93. In Roxas & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are required: (1) the
Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to preliminary conference sent to th
e landowner, the representative of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other
interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, series of 1989; and (2) the Not
ice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6657. The i
mportance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of in
vitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They a
re steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process.
The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the States police power and the
power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limit
s to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of
private property in accordance with the Constitution (Association of Small Lando
wners in the Philippines vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 373-374
[1989]. But where to carry out such regulations, the owners are deprived of lan
d they own in excess of the maximum area allowed there is also a taking under th
e power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of t
he use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physic
al possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner
in favor of the farm beneficiary (id.). The Bill of

Rights provides that [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property w
ithout de process of law (Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution). The C
ARL was not intended to take away property without due process of law (Developme
nt Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 245, 253 [1996]). The
exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observe in
taking of private property. (Ibid)
94. In the instant case, petitioner does not dispute that respondent did not rec
eive the
Notice of Acquisition and Notice of Coverage sent to the latters old address. Pet
itioner explained that its personnel could not effect personal service of those
notices upon respondent because it changed its juridical name from Apex Investme
nt and Financing Corporation to SM Investment Corporation. While it is true, tha
t personal service could not be made, however, there is no showing that petition
er caused the service of the notices via registered mail as required by Section
16(a) of R.A. 6657, On this point, petitioner claimed that the notices were sent
not only by registered mail but also by personal delivery and that there was actu
al receipt by respondent as shown by the signature appearing at the bottom lefthand corner of petitioners copies of the notices. But petitioner could not identi
fy the name of respondents representative who allegedly received the notices. In
fact, petitioner admitted that the signature thereon is illegible, It is thus sa
fe to conclude that respondent was not notified of the compulsory acquisition pr
oceedings, Clearly, respondent was deprived of its right to procedural due proce
ss . It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he s
hould be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is
premised. (Ibid)
95. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform L
aw
shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all publi
c and private agricultural lands. Section 3 defines agricultural land, as land devote
d to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. (Ibid)
96. In dismissing outright the petition for certiorari, the CA reasoned that sin
ce it
(petitioner LBP) was assailing the writ of execution issued by respondent Provin
cial Adjudicator, then its recourse was to file a petition for review under Rule
43 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 1 thereof provides: Sec. 1 Scope. Thi
s Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax
Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorize
d by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
Among there agencies are the . . . . Department of Agrarian Reform under Republi
c Act No. 6657. . . Contrary to the ratiocination of the appellate court, howeve
r, Rule 43 does not apply to an action to nullify a writ of execution because th
e same is not a final order within the contemplation of the said rule. As this Cou
rt fairly recently explained, a writ of execution is not a final order or resolut
ion , but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement of
a final order or a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order o
r judgment against the losing party. As such an order or execution is generally n
ot appealable. (LBP vs. Hon. Pepito Planta and Faustino Tabla, G.R. No. 152324 A
pril 29, 2005.
97. On the other hand certiorari lies where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy
and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994
DARAB Rules of Procedure, which was then applicable, expressly provided, in par
t, that the decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determi
nation and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but
shall be brought directly to the RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Courts wit
hin fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice hereof. In relation to this prov
ision, Section 16(f) of R.A. No. 6657 prescribed that any party who does not agr
ee with the

decision (in the summary administrative proceedings) may bring the matter to the
court for final determination of just compensation. (Ibid)
98. Petitioner LBP urges the Court to reconcile the seeming inconsistency betwee
n the
period to file certiorari under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 (within fifteen days
from receipt of copy of the decision, order, award or ruling) and that under Se
ction 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court (sixty days from notice of judg
ment, order or resolution). The Courts holds that Section 54 of RA No. 6657 prev
ails since it is a substantive law specially designed for agrarian disputes or c
ases pertaining to the application, implementation enforcement of interpretation
of agrarian reform laws. However, the fifteen-day period provided therein is ex
tendible, but such extension shall not extend the sixty-day period under Section
4, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
99. Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discre
tion in
denying his motion for extension on the grounds that the petition which petitione
r intended to file is not the proper remedy. . . Petitioners contention is well-ta
ken. The Court of Appeals was rather hasty in concluding that the petitioner was
going to file a petition for certiorari solely on the basis of petitioners alleg
ation that he was going to file a petition for certiorari. It should have reserv
ed judgment on the mater until it had actually received the petition especially
considering that petitioners motion for extension was filed well within the regle
mentary period for filing a petition for review. (Ibid) Supreme Court citing De
Dios vs. CA, 274 SCRA 520)
100. Cases should be determined on the merits after all parties have been given
full
opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalitie
s or procedural imperfections. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to exp
edite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A
strict and rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact, Rul
e 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court states that the Rules shall be liberally co
nstrued in order to promote their objective of ensuring the just, speedy and ine
xpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. (Paulina Diaz, et al., vs.
Carlos Mesias, Jr., G.R. No. 156345, March 19, 2004)
101. The mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not put the ownership of
the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation patents
may be cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations , Secti
on 12(g) of P.D. 946 (issued on June 17, 1976) vested the then Court of Agrarian
Relations with jurisdiction over cases involving the cancellation of emancipati
on patents issued under P.D. 266. Exclusive jurisdiction over such cases was lat
er lodged with the DARAB under Section 1 of Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Proced
ure. Aside from ordering the cancellation of emancipation patents, the DARAB may
order reimbursement of lease rental as amortization to agrarian reform benefici
aries, forfeiture of amortization, ejectment of beneficiaries, reallocation of t
he land to qualified beneficiaries, perpetual disqualification to become agraria
n reform beneficiaries, reimbursement of amortization payment and value of impro
vement, and other ancillary matters related to the cancellation of emancipation
patents. (Liberty Ayo-Alburo vs. Uldarico Matobato, G.R. No. 155181, April 15, 2
005).
102. Only questions of law, however, can be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Findings of fact by the CA are f
inal and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court, more
so if the factual findings of the appellate court coincide with those of the DAR
AB, an administrative body with expertise on matters within its specific and spe
cialized

jurisdiction. This Court is not thus duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over ag
ain the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, subject to certain
exceptions. (Ibid)
103. Petitioner furthermore argues that the amortization payments she made to th
e Land
Bank in the amount of P9,825.80 should not have been forfeited in favor of respo
ndent. On this score, the Court finds for petitioner. While the DARAB has jurisd
iction to Order forfeiture of amortizations paid by an agrarian reform beneficia
ry, forfeiture should be made in favor of the government and not to the realloca
tee of the landholding. (Ibid)
104. In Monsanto v. Zerna, (G.R. No. 142501, 7 December 2001) it was held that f
or
DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a disput
e, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to it: (1)
the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) subject
matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent betwee
n the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is t
o bring about agricultural production (5) there is personal cultivation on the p
art of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In the case a bar, the elem
ent that the parties must be the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee o
n which all other requisites of the tenancy agreement depends, is absent. Tenanc
y relationship is inconsistent with the assertion of ownership of both parties.
Petitioners claim to be the owners of the entire Lot No. 5198, by virtue of a Ce
rtificate of Sale of Delinquent Real Property, while private respondents assert
ownership over Lots Nos. 5198-A, 5198-A, 5198-B and 5198-D on the basis of an Em
ancipation Patent and Transfer Certificate of Title. Neither do the records show
any juridical tie or tenurial relationship between the parties predecessors-in-i
nterest. The questioned lot it allegedly declared for taxation purposes in the n
ame of petitioners father, Dalmacio Arzaga who does not appear to have any connec
tion with the private respondents nor with their alleged predecessorin-interest,
Caridad Fuentebella. (Rodolfo Arzaga, et al., vs. Salvacion Copias, et al., G.R
. No. 152404, March 28, 2003).
105. In Chico v. Court of Appeals, (348 Phil. 37 1998) also an action for recove
ry of
possession, the Court was confronted with the same jurisdictional issue. The pet
itioner therein claimed ownership over the disputed property pursuant to a final
judgment, while the respondents asserted right to possession by virtue of an al
leged tenancy relationship with one who has no juridical connection with the pet
itioners. In holding that it is the trial court and not the DARAB which has juri
sdiction over the case, the Court ruled that the absence of a juridical tie betw
een the parties or their predecessor-in-interest negates the existence of the el
ement of tenancy relationship.
106. The basic rules is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
by
the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or t
he theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss . Otherw
ise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the d
efendant. From the averments of the complaint in the instant case, it is that th
e petitioners action does not involve an agrarian dispute, but one for recovery o
f possession, which is perfectly within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trail C
ourts. (Ibid)
107. Section 3 thereof defines agricultural land, as land devoted to agricultural

activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residenti
al, commercial or industrial land. The terms agriculture or agricultural activity is
also defined by the same law as follows:

Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity means the cultiva
tion of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestoc
k, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other fa
rm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farm
ing operations done by persons whether natural or juridical. (DAR vs. DECS, G.R.
No. 158223, April 27, 2004)
108. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempte
d
from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz: xxx x
xx xxx
c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for n
ational defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations
operated by public or private schools for educations purposes, shall be exempt
from the coverage of this Act. xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, a reading of the paragraphs shows that, in order to be exempt from the
coverage: 1) the land must be actually, directly and exclusively used and found t
o be necessary; and 2) the purpose is :for school sites and campuses, including e
xperimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educations p
urposes. The importance of the phrase actually, directly, and exclusively used and
found to be necessary cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want
us to do by not taking the words in their literal and technical definitions. The
words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the Plain meaning rules or verb
a legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of
a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its litera
l meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. (Ibid) (Note: To be exem
pt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived therefrom, t
hat must be actually and exclusively used for educational purposes.)
109. In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were potential C
ARP
beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secr
etary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) iss
ued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP. Since the id
entification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly
the administrative implementation of the CARP, it behooves the court to exercise
great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there
is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. In this cas
e, there was none. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the basti
on of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistr
ibute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberat
e them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its benefit, it is the means t
owards a viable livelihood and ultimately, a decent life. The objective of the S
tate is no less certain: landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highes
t consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound ru
ral development and industrialization. (Ibid)
110. The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot change his the
ory of the
case or his cause of action on appeal. We have previously held that courts of jus
tice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue. A judgment
that goes outside the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the c
ourt did not hear the parties, is not only irregular but also extra-judicial and

invalid The rule rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play. In the present ca
se, the Court must stick to the issue litigated in the DARAB and in the Court of
Appeals, which is whether petitioner has the right to eject the Spouses Velasco
from the land under RA 3844. (Henry Mon vs. CA, Hon. Leopoldo Serrano, Jr., et
al., G.R. No. 118292, April 2, 2004).
111. Administrative Law: The power of subordinate legislation allows administrat
ive
bodies to implements the broad policies laid down in a statute by filing in the de
tails, and all that us required it that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of law and that the regulations be not in contradiction to
but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. The power of subordi
nate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the board policies la
id down in a statute by filing in the details. All that is required is that the re
gulations be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescr
ibed by the law. One such administrative regulations is DAR Memorandum Circular
NO, 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27,
i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by transferring to the tenant-farmers
the ownership of the land theyre tilling. (Rolando Sigre vs. CA and Lilia Gonzal
es, 387 SCRA 15).
112.
Since DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 essentially sought to accomplish the noble p
urpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid and has the force of law. The rationale
for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court whe
n it stated that The main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the lea
se rental payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the
purchase price of the land. x x x The circular is meant to remedy the situation
where the tenant-farmers lease rentals to landowner were not credited in his favo
r against the determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a perpetual
obligor for said purchase price. Since the assailed circular essentially sought
to accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid. Such being th
e case, it has the force of law and is entitled to great respect. (Ibid)
113. The Court cannot see any irreconcilable conflict between P.D. No. 816 and
DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the t
enant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner unti
l the value of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner
and the DAR. On the other hand, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, implemented in 19
78, mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental after the
value of the land has been determine. (Ibid)
114. Both Memorandum Circular No. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to and in
implementation of P.D. 27 these must not be read in isolation, but rather, in co
njunction with each other. (Private respondent, however splits hairs, so to speak,
and contends that the Curso case is premised on the assumption that the Circula
r implement P.D. 816, whereas it is expressed stated in the Circular that it was
issued in implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in isolation, but r
ather, in conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall be
made to the landowner. After the value of the land has been determined/establish
ed, then the tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations to the LBP, as provide
d in DAR Circular No. 6. Clearly there is no inconsistency between them. Au cont
raire, P.D. 816 and DAR Circular No. 6 supplement each other insofar as it sets
the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals on the agricultural property. (
Ibid)
115. That P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fac
t that has
been repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court. Further, that P.D. 27 does not
suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has been repeatedly
emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in the aforecit
ed case of De Chavez v. Zobel, P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and uph
eld as part and parcel of the land of the land, viz: There is no doubt then, as s
et forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the dec
ree

is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised Constitut
ion itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. Th
at would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has
spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so becaus
e of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundament
al law. It is also because any other approach would run the risk of setting at n
aught this basic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order
at war with the promise and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive
petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree cons
idered ratified by the new Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avo
wed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenan
cy had spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created.
There can be no justification for any other decision then whether predicated on
a juridical norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implem
enting and not thwarting fundamental policy goals. (Ibid)
116. Eminent Domain; Just compensation; the determination of just compensation u
nder
P.D. No. 27, like in section 16(d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or
conclusive unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation
of the property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the par
ties may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount
of compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court. The d
etermination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in section 16 (d) of R
.A. 6657 or the CARP Law is not final or conclusive. This is evident from the su
cceeding paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. 228: x x x In the event of dispute with t
he landowner regarding the amount of lease rental paid by the farmer beneficiary
, the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Barangay Committee on Land Productio
n concerned shall resolve the dispute within thirty (30) days from its submissio
n pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform Memorandum Circular No. 26, series o
f 1973, and other pertinent issuances, In the event a party questions in court t
he resolution of the dispute the landowners compensation shall still be processed
for payment and the proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust Department of
the Land Bank in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 hereof, pending the
resolution of the dispute before the court. Clearly therefrom, unless both the l
andowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the property by the Barri
o Committee on Land production and the DAR the parties may bring the dispute to
court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, a task unmis
takably within the prerogative of the court. (LBP vs. CA and Lilia Gonzales, 387
SCRA 15).
117. Republic Act No. 6657; The Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 o
r the
CARP Law operates distinctly from P.D. 27 R.A. 6657 covers all public and privat
e agricultural and including other lands of the public domain suitable for agric
ulture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229; whil
e, P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which provides f
or the mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically stat
es: (P)residential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue to operate with resp
ect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x It cannot be gainsaid, ther
efore, that R.A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in any way, P.D.27.And whatev
er provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A 6657 shall be supple
tory to the latter, and all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. 27 a
re retained even with the passage of R.A 6657.
118. We have repeatedly stressed that social justice or any justice for that mat
ter
is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in
his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are to tilt the bala
nce in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy
and compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the poor simply
because they are poor, or reject the rich simply because they are rich, for jus
tice must always be served for the poor and the rich alike according to the

mandate of the law. (Gelos vs. CA, 208 SCRA 608, 616) (cited in Victor G. Valenc
ia vs. CA, G.R. No. 122363; April 29, 2003)
119. From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a civil la
w lessee
cannot automatically institute tenants on the property under to Sec. 6 of R.A. N
o. 3844. The correct view that must necessarily be adopted is that the civil law
lessee, although a legal possessor, may not install tenants on the property unl
ess expressly authorized by the lessor. And if a prohibition exists or is stipul
ated in the contract of lease the occupants of the property are merely civil law
subleases whose rights terminate upon the expiration of the civil law lease agr
eement. (Victor Valencia vs. CA G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003).
120. Agrarian Reform ; Presidential Decree No. 27; Homesteads; Parcels of land,
though obtained by homestead patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are covered by
land reform under Presidential Decree 27. Petitioners contention is without legal
basis. Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, under which the Emancipation Patents so
ught to be cancelled here were issued to respondents, applies to all tenanted pri
vate agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sha
re-crop or lease-tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or not. The law mak
es no exceptions whatsoever in its coverage. Nowhere therein does it appear that
lots obtained by homestead patents are exempt from its operation. The matter is
made even clearer by Department Memorandum No. 2, Series of 1978, which states:
Tenanted private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and/or corn which
have been acquired under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, sha
ll also be covered by Operation Land Transfer. Unquestionably, petitioners parcels
of land, though obtained by homestead patents under Commonwealth Act 141, are c
overed by land reform under PD 27. (Florencia Paris vs. Dionisio A. Alfeche, et
al., 364 SCRA 110).
121. The right to retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute it is premise
d on
the condition that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained o
r will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law. Clearly, the right to
retain an area of seven hectares is not absolute. It is premised on the conditio
n that the landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained or will actua
lly cultivate it upon effectivity of the law. In the case at bar, neither of the
conditions for retention is present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the sub
ject parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is clearly not cultivating them, nor
will she personally retain any portion of her landholdings. (Ibid)
122. Homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain the
original homesteads, only for as long as they continue to cultivate them. Indisp
utably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own and retain t
he original homesteads only for as long as they continue to cultivate them. That p
arcels of land are covered by homestead patents will not automatically exempt th
em from the operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by
the original grantees or their direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their
lands from land reform coverage. (Ibid)
123. Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the la
nd
they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land, including intere
st, within fifteen years before the title is transferred to them. Thus, the cour
t held in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agr
arian Reform: It is true that PD 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenantfarmers as of October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be deemed the owner of
a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that no title to the
land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had beco
me a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers cooperative. It was underst
ood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made fir
st, conformably to the constitutional requirement. (Ibid)

124. Executive Order 228; Evidently, the law recognizes that the lands exact valu
e,
or the just compensation to be given the landowner cannot just be assumed it mus
t be determined with certainly before the land titles are transferred although Ex
ecutive Order 228, provides that the total lease rentals paid for the lands from
October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment, it does not sanction t
he assumption that such rentals are automatically considered as equivalent to ju
st compensation for the land. Presidential Decree 27 and subsequently Executive
Order (EO) 228, which recognized the rights acquired by tenant-farmers under PD
27, provides in detail the computation to be used in arriving at the exact total
cost of the parcels of land. Evidently, therefore, the law recognizes that thei
r exact value, or the just compensation to be given to the landowner, cannot jus
t be assumed; it must be determined with certainly before the land titled are tr
ansferred. Although EO 228 provides that the total lease rentals paid for the la
nds from October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance payment, it does not sa
nction the assumption that such rentals are automatically considered as equivale
nt to just compensation for the land. The provision significantly designates the
lease rentals as advance not full payment. The determination of the exact value
of the lands cannot simply be brushed aside, as it is fundament to the determin
ation of whether full payment has been made. (Ibid)
125. Respondent correctly cited the case of Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippi
nes,
where the Court held that in computing the just compensation for expropriation pr
oceedings, it is the value of the land at the time of the taking [or October 21,
1972], the effectivity date of P.D. No. 27], not at the time of the rendition o
f judgment, which should be taken into consideration. Under P.D. No. 27 and E.O.
No. 228, the following formula is used to compute the land value for palay: LV (
land value = 2.5 x AGP x GSP x (1.06)n It should also be pointed out, however, t
hat in the more recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Natividad, The C
ourt categorically ruled: the seizure of the landholding did not take place on t
he date of effectivity of P.D. No. 27 but would take effect on the payment of ju
st compensation. Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, the following factors are con
sidered in determining just compensation, to wit: Sec, 17. Determination of Just
Compensation. In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the
land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, t
he sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made b
y government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits con
tributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the proper
ty as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government fina
ncing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to
determine its valuation. (Emphasis supplied). Consequently, the question that ar
ises is which of these two rulings should be applied? Under the circumstances of
this case, the Court deems it more equitable to apply the ruling in the Nativid
ad case. In said case, The Court applied the provision of R.A. No. 6657 in compu
ting just compensation for property expropriated under P.D. No. 278, stating, vi
z.: Land Banks contention that the property was acquired for purposes of agrarian
reform on October 21, 1972, the time of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just com
pensation should based on the value of the property as of that time and not at t
he time of possession in 1993, is

likewise erroneous. In Office of the President, Malacaang, Manila v. Court of App
eals, we ruled that the seizure of the landholding did not take place on the dat
e of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensat
ion. Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform process i
s still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private respondents has y
et to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 before the co
mpletion of this process, the just compensation should be determined and the pro
cess concluded under the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with P
D 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in Pa
ris v. Alfeche. xxxx It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compens
ation based on the guideline proved by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DARs fail
ure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That j
ust compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27
or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the exprop
riator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. In this case, th
e trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their
property, taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the
highway, market value, assessors value and the volume and value of its produce. T
his Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of j
ust compensation due private respondents in accordance with, and guided, by RA 6
657 and existing jurisprudence. (Emphasis supplied). As previously noted, the pr
operty was expropriated under the Operation Land Transfer scheme of P.D. No. 27
way back in 1972. More than 30 years have passed and petitioners are yet to bene
fit from it, while the farmer-beneficiaries have already been harvesting its pro
duce for the longest time. Events have rendered the applicability of P.D. No. 27
inequitable. Thus, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 should apply in this case. (
Anacleto R. Menesis, et. al., vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, et. al., G.R. No. 156
304; October 23, 2006)
126. The Court agrees with the petitioners contention that, under Section 2(f), R
ule II of
the DARAB Rules of Procedures, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving t
he issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were registered with the
LRA. However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such case, they must relate
to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been is
sued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the issuance, correction and canc
ellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation of agraria
n laws, rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or les
sees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB. (Heirs of Juli
an dela Cruz, et. al., vs. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, represented by Benedicto V. Cr
uz., G.R. 162890; November 22, 2005)
127. Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute as any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or oth
erwise, over lands devoted to agricultural, including disputes concerning

farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, mai
ntaining, changing , or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acqu
ired under this Act and other terms and condition of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whet
her the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operation and benefic
iaries, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental (
G.R. 123417, 10 June 1999, 308 SCRA 167) , this Court held that there must be a
tenancy relationship between the parties for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over
a case. It is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1
) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2)
that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that th
ere is consent between the parties to the relationship (4) that the purposes of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is pe
rsonal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) tha
t the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural les
see. (ibid) 128. Certificates of Title issue pursuant to Emancipation Patents ar
e as indefeasible as TCTs issued in registration proceedings. Ybaes v. Intermedia
te Appellate Court ( G.R. No. 68291, 6 March 1991, 194 SCRA 743,749750) provides
that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are as indefeas
ible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings: It must be emphasi
zed that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceedings pursu
ant to a homestead patent, as in the instant case,, is as indefeasible as a cert
ificate of title issued under a judicial registration proceeding, provided the l
and covered by the said certificate is a disposable public land within the conte
mplation of the Public Law. There is no specific provision in the Public Land la
w (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land Registration Act (Act 496), now P.D. 15
29, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land patent is open t
o review on the ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land Registration
Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a pubic land patent certificate
of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the
aforecited cases clearly reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, n
ow Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by implication by this Court to the paten
t issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of Natural Reso
urces, under the signature of the President of the Philippines in accordance wit
h law. The date of issuance of the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of
the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases because the decree fi
nally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, and
the patent issued by the Director of Lands equally and finally grant, awards, an
d conveys the land applied for to the applicant. This, to our minds, is in conso
nance with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e. conservation of a f
amily home, and to encourage the settlement, residence and cultivation and impro
vement of the lands of the public domain. If the title to the land grant in favo
r of the homesteader would be subject to inquiry, contents and decision after it
has been given by the Government through the process of proceedings in accordan
ce with the Public Land Law, there would arise uncertainty, confusion and suspic
ion on the governments system of distributing public agricultural lands pursuant
to the Land for the Landless policy of the State.

The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of governmentacquired lands to the landless would arise if the possession of the grantee of a
n EP would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate of title wa
s issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No.
27 as to the indefeasibility of titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as t
hat in the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented: Inasmuch as t
here is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the titles grant
ed thereunder, such silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the
homesteader who come into the possession of his homestead after complying with t
he requirements thereof. Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should be inter
preted to apply by implication to the patent issued by the Director of Land, dul
y approved by the Minister of Natural Resources, under the signature of the Pres
ident, in accordance with law. (REGISTRATION OF LAND, TITLE AND DEEDS, Antonio H
. Noblejas, p. 431 (1992 revised ed.). After complying with the procedure, there
fore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Pro
perty Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding
certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied wi
th Presidential Decree No. 27 (Presidential Decree No. 1529, Section 105), the T
CT is issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection ac
corded to other TCTs. The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrov
ertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the ord
er for the issuance of the patent, x x x. lands covered by such title may no lon
ger be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decree to ano
ther person (Amando D. Aquino, LAND REGISTRATION AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS, Chapte
r XII Land Patent, p. 139; citing Gomez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-77770, 15
December 1988, 168 SCRA 503, 511; Dura v. Oliva, 113 Phil. 144.148-149 (1961) (S
amuel Estribillo, et. al., vs. Department of Agrarian Reform and Hacienda Maria,
Inc., et. al., G.R. 159674; June 30, 2006) 129. As we held through Justice J.B.
L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr. (147 Phil. 301,304 (1971). The rule in t
his jurisdiction, regarding public land patent and the character of the certific
ate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, it that where land is granted
by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent thereof is
recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee thereafter, the
land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act,
the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provide
d in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words upon expiration of one year from
its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasibl
e like a certificate issued in a registration proceeding (Emphasis supplied). Th
e EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Repub
lic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled i
n the Torrens system of registration. The Property Registration Decree in fact d
evotes Chapter IX (Chapter IX: CERTIFICATE OF LAND TRANSFER, EMANCIPATION PATENT
, AFFIDAVIT OF NON-TENANCY) on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs ar
e, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificate of title issued
in registration proceedings. (Ibid) 130. More importantly, petitioner is not a r
eal party-in-interest in this case. According to Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules o
f Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or inj
ured by the judgments in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the sui
t. We stand by the ruling in Fortich v. Corona that farmerbeneficiaries, who are
not approved awardees of CARP, are not real parties-in-

interest. In Fortich, the farmers who intervened recommendees. We stated in said
case that:
in the case were mere
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is party who woul
d be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. Real interest means a present substantial interest, as distinguish
ed from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest. Undoubtedly, movants interest over the land in question is a mere expec
tancy Ergo, they are not real parties in interest. In the case at bar, members o
f petitioners Samahan are mere qualified beneficiaries of CARP. The certificatio
n that CLOAs were already generated in their names, but were not issued because
of the present dispute, does not vest any right to the farmers since the fact re
mains that they have not yet been approved as awardees, actually awarded lands,
or granted CLOAs. Respondents cannot be considered estoppted from questioning pe
titioners legal standing since petitioner appeared before the OP after the latter
decided in respondents favor. When the petitioner appealed the case to the CA, r
espondents duly questioned the petitioners capacity to sue. (Samahang Magsasaka n
g 53 Hectarya, represented by Elvira M. Balaclad, et. al., vs. Wilfredo G. Mosqu
era, et. al., G.R. 152430; March 22, 2007) 131. In the case at bar, we find that
the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sough
t to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian refo
rm and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the d
eliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclud
e, inter alia, all land exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-rais
ing. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry
-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agric
ulture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is dif
ferent from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, acti
vity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of ind
ustrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainag
e, waters and blowers, feed mill with grinders, mixers, conveyor, exhausts and g
enerators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, antipo
llution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and conc
rete ponds. Deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other tec
hnological appurtenances. Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate lives
tock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agr
arian reform. It has exceeded it power in issuing the assailed A.O. (DAR et. al.
, vs. Delia T. Sutton et al., G.R. 162070, October 19, 2005) 132. The subsequent
case of Natalia Realy, Inc. v. DAR reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case.
In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial, commercials and residential
lands are not covered by the CARL. We stressed anew that while Section 4 of R.A.
No. 6657 provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural
lands, the term agricultural land does not include lands classified as mineral, f
orest, residential, commercial or industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even port
ions of the Antipolo Hill Subdivision, which are arable yet still undeveloped, c
ould not be considered as agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these
lots were already classified as residential lands. Moreover, it is a fundamenta
l rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress w
ithout substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the
previous law. On the other land, by making a new law, Congress seeks to superse
de an earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congr
ess enacted R.A, No. 7881 which amended certain provision of the CAR. Specifical
ly, the new law change the definition of the

terms agricultural activity and commercial farming by dropping from its coverage la
nds that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swineraising. With thi
s significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provision of ou
r agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform. (Ibid) 133. As general ru
le, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of ju
stice, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress (Rox
as & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 378 Phil. 727 (1999). In the instant case,
it is beyond dispute that petitioner failed to resort to proper administrative r
ecourse in resisting the Notice of Coverage issued by respondent MARO. Unsuccess
ful in its attempt to oppose the Notice of Coverage when it lodged its protest w
ith the incorrect administrative offices, petitioner resorted to a judicial reme
dy. The petition for mandamus, which it filed, however, was correctly denied by
the Court of Appeals. Truly, a petition for mandamus is premature if there are a
dministrative remedies available to petitioner (Gualberto Castro v. Ricardo Glor
ia, 415 Phil. 645 (2001) (Nicanor T. Santos Devt. Corp. vs. Hon. Sec., DAR, et al
., G.R. No. 159654; February 28, 2006) 134. Is it settled that mandamus is emplo
yed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duly, this being i
ts main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary
duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner shou
ld have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be imperative duty
of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful case
s. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely pressed, it must ne
vertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anythin
g which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the app
licant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers pow
ers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already posse
ssed and to perform a duty already imposed. (Erlinda C. Pefianco v. Ma. Luisa C.
Moral, 379 Phil. 468 (2000). (Ibid).
135. Petitioners filing of an answer has thereby cured whatever jurisdictional de
fect it now raises. As we have said time and again, the active participation of a
party in a case pending against him before a court or a quasi judicial body, is
tantamount to a recognition of that courts or bodys jurisdiction and a willingnes
s to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on i
mpugning the courts or bodys jurisdiction. (Alcantara vs. Commission on the Settlem
ent of Land [problems, 361 SCRA 664, 669 [2001]). (Lapanday Agricultural & Devt.
Corp. vs. Maximo Estita, et al., G.R. NO. 162109, January 21, 2005). 136. Waiver
s of rights and/or interests over landholdings awarded by the government are inv
alid for being violative of the agrarian reform laws. To quote from our decision
in Torres vs. Ventura, as reiterated in Corpus vs. Sps. Grospe. (333 SCRA 425,
436 [2000] x x x As such [the farmer-beneficiaries] gained the rights to possess,
cultivate and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over the particul
ar property were granted by the government to him and no other. To ensure his co
ntinued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, m
ake any valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary success
ion to his successors. (Ibid) 137. The court finds that the December 22, 1994 Ord
er of Execution issued by the DAR Regional Director suffers from jurisdiction an
d procedural defects as it directed the relocation of petitioners without first
conducting a hearing or survey to determine the portion of the subject property
excluded from the CARP.

A writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to
be executed, and the execution is void if it is excess of and beyond the origin
al judgment or award, for it is a settled general principle that a writ of execu
tion must conform strictly with every essential particular of the judgment promu
lgated. (ExBataan Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, 320 Phil. 517 (1995). It may no
t vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the t
erms of the judgment sought to be executed (Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, et al.
, 383 Phil. 229 (2000). Where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and e
xceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity (Bua
n v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 424 (1994). (Ernesto Ingles, et al., vs. Court o
f Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 125202, January 31, 2006). 138. Petitioners contentio
n that the authority to issue the Order of Execution is vested with the DARAB an
d not with the DAR Regional Director is likewise correct. A Regional Director is
the head of a DAR Regional Office which, under the Administrative Code of 1987,
is responsible for supporting the field units and supervising program implementa
tion of the Department within the region. The function of the DAR Regional Office
includes [implementing] laws, policies, plans, rules and regulations of the Depa
rtment in the regional area. A similar function is delegated to the DAR Regional
Offices under Executive Order No. 129-A. Thus, the functions of the DAR Regional
Director are purely administrative, that it , to put into operation agrarian la
ws and fill out the details necessary for their implementation, and not adjudica
tory. On the other hand, when a dispute arises between parties affected by the o
peration of agrarian laws, the controversy should be settled in a adversarial pr
oceeding before the DARAB, the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR (Section 50, R.A. N
o. 6657; Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. the DAR is hereby vested with primary
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agric
ultural (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). A f
unction becomes judicial or quasi judicial in nature when the exercise thereof i
nvolves the determination of rights and obligations of the parties. (Ibid).

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Lecture Guide Agrarian

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LECTURE GUIDE of Assistant Secretary AUGUSTO P.

QUIJANO Department of Agrarian R

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107. Section 3 thereof defines agricultural land, as land devoted to agricultural

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