[2] Nothing can be both eternally (F) and potentially (F)

[2a] If something is eternally (F), then it is imperishable (in respect of F) 1050b16

What is eternally (F) is necessary and imperishable (1050b16 eternal is replaced by
imperishable)
To deny [2a] is to claim that something can be eternally perishable and simply never in fact
perish. It would be a brute fact that some potentialities are actualized eternally and others for varying
but limited periods of time. The eternally F is F simply for a longer time.
[2B] If something is potentially (F), then it is perishable (in respect of F) 1050b14


1050b10-11 (2)
[Fail] Anything potential can fail to be actual.
Possibility is two way contingency.


Theta 2 1046b4-5 only rational capacities are two way capacitites for opposities. (capacity both for
phi-ing and counter-phiing.
All Aristotle is saying here is that there can be times at which a capacity is possessed but not exercised.
(this holds for rational and non-rational capacities. This is the conclusion of theta 3 argument against the
Megarians.



Suppose A is potentially (F)
That potentiality can fail to be actual (1050b10-11) (1) [FAIL]
So A can be (F) and A can fail to be (F) 1050b11-12 (2)(3?)
Since A can fail to be (F), A is perishable (in respect of F) (1050b13-16) (5)
So if A is potentially (F), then A is perishable (in respect of F).


Deny [2b]
Something eternally F is es eternally actualizing a potentiality which cannot fail to be actualized.
This is unmotivated. What does one gain by insisting on capcities which can never fail to be actualized.
Theta 5 : capacities cant fail to be exercised in the right conditions. But conditions arent always right.
Attributing a persisting capacity serves to explain, why the same stuff that burned yesterday also burns
today.
If we attribute a capacity to which is necessarily and eternally exercised, the capcity serves no
explanatory purpose. It does not explain why A is eternally (F). one would need to say why the capacity
is eternally and necessarily exercise. If that is just a brute fact, then one may as well stick with the brute
ffact that A is eternally F and exclude the capacity from the picture altogether. If there is something
which explains why the capacity is eternally and nec exercised, then again, the capacity appears to be
doing no explanatory work.
Potentialities (capacities) are useful precisely because they can persist even when unactualized
(unexercised). Potentialities which cannoti fail to be actual are redundant, and to insist on them is really
just to insist on a form of words. 214
Somethings being temporarily or intermittently (F) involves an explanatory capacity (potentiality) to be
(F), while somethings being eternally (F) does not.


The sun is eternally moving, and has no potentiality t move but the sun is not eternally at any particular
place and so does have a potentiality to be ath this place or that place.
No need to explain why the potentioality to move should continue to be actualized rather than lapse
into quiescence, because there is no such potentiality.

The suns motion is a detatched actuality



Int. 12, 21b12-17 For everything capable of being cut or of walking is capable also of not walking or of
not being cut. The reason is that whatever is capable in this way is not always actual, so that the
negation too will hold of it: what can walk is capable also of not walking, and what can be seen of not
being seen.
Met B6 1003a1-2 for the potency is prior to the actual cause, and it is not necessary for everything
potential to be actual.but if the elements exist potentially, it is possible that everything that is should
not be
Met Lambda 6 1071b13-14, 19, 25-6
that which has a capacity need not exercise it.
That which is potentially may possibly not be
For ti is possible for things to be capable of existing but not yet to exist
Met. N2 1088b19-20 the potential can be either actual or not