Hezbollah's Pragmatism and Lebanon's

Tenuous Calm
August 23, 2012 | 1223 GMT
Summary
Clashes between Sunnis and Alawites resumed Aug. 22 in the northern Lebanese
city of Tripoli. Triggered by civil unrest in neighboring Syria, the clashes have left as
many as 10 dead as tensions rise throughout Lebanon.
Several of Syria's neighbors will be affected by Syrian President Bashar al Assad's
departure. Most important, al Assad's ouster could endanger Iran's geopolitical
position in neighboring Iraq and Lebanon, especially with Tehran's Shiite ally,
Hezbollah.
Lebanon has remained relatively calm since the uprising in Syria began in March
2011. Hezbollah's pragmatic response to the unrest is part of the reason for this. But
this pragmatism also makes Hezbollah look weak -- or at least fearful and nervous --
potentially alienating the group from its support base, which relies on Hezbollah's
domestic political strength to protect impoverished Shia in Lebanon. Ultimately, the
political transition in Syria could disrupt Lebanon's stability and eventually challenge
Hezbollah.
Analysis
A mosaic of religious sects and denominations, Lebanon has long been a
battleground for proxy groups aligned with foreign players such as Syria and Iran.
Iran's relationship with Hezbollah involves financial, logistical and political support,
and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has provided weapons and training to
the Lebanese group since its founding. Tehran views Hezbollah as a long-term
investment and has encouraged its growth and eventual independence while
retaining strong ideological and sectarian ties.
But the Syrian conflict has reduced Iran's influence in the country. The unrest has
also affected Hezbollah, which is a major power broker in the Lebanese government
and holds a majority of seats in the 30-member Cabinet. Hezbollah also holds a
majority in Lebanon's parliament through its "March 8 coalition" with former
Lebanese Prime Minister Michel Aoun's Christian Free Patriotic Movement,
Parliamentary Speaker Nabih Berri's Shiite Amal Movement and other parties.
Hezbollah and Syrian Unrest
Hezbollah has mostly kept a low profile throughout the Syrian unrest; the Lebanese
group believes that the al Assad regime has little hope for survival. Accordingly, the
group has taken a cautious and calculated approach to its relationship with
Damascus. Hezbollah's fighters have remained in Syria and along the Syria-Lebanon
border, but the group has tempered its pro-al Assad rhetoric, especially in recent
months.

On the domestic front, Hezbollah has repeatedly denied involvement in recent Shiite
militant activity such as the kidnapping of Syrians and a Turkish national in Lebanon
by the Meqdad clan, a Lebanese Shiite family. Hezbollah even showed restraint after
11 Shia were kidnapped and held hostage in Syria. Hezbollah also claimed that it
could not prevent protesters from blocking the road to Beirut's airport even though
the road runs through Dahiya, a southern part of the city controlled by the group's
supporters.
Hezbollah's restraint will not necessarily hurt the group in the short term, depending
on how the Shia who support Hezbollah view this approach. Hezbollah continues to
wield one of the largest and well-armed militias in Lebanon and has a firm grip on
vast tracts of Lebanese territory stretching from southern Beirut to the Israeli
border, as well as east into the Bekaa Valley due to an alliance with the Amal
Movement. In many ways, Hezbollah is stronger than the Lebanese state, and the
institutions it has built will not simply wither away.
Still, Hezbollah's opponents will read the group's apparent docility as weakness.
Already, the opposition March 14 movement -- led by former Lebanese Prime
Minister Saad al-Hariri's Future Movement and backed externally by Iran's regional
rival, Saudi Arabia -- has grown bolder in challenging the Shiite party. The Aug. 9
arrest of pro-Syria lawmaker Michel Samaha by Lebanon's Internal Security Forces,
which are aligned with the opposition, indicates that the March 14 coalition sees the
al Assad regime's allies as vulnerable. Samaha's ongoing detention suggests that
Lebanon's judiciary is not being pressured by the ruling coalition to secure his
release, even to house arrest.
Nevertheless, the March 14 movement is divided and likely will avoid confronting
Hezbollah directly. Indeed, all concerned parties in Lebanon are waiting to see
exactly what will happen in Syria. How the Syrian turmoil unfolds will determine
what happens in Lebanon and how much pressure Hezbollah (and Iran, by
extension) will eventually face.
Reports indicate that Hezbollah is feeling vulnerable, as rifts have formed within its
senior leadership. Disagreements within the group are not uncommon, but the
context of the dissonance is a new paradigm.
Thus, Hezbollah's long-term dilemma is one of identity. The group has reconstituted
itself primarily as a political movement rather than a militant Iranian proxy. But
fractures within Hezbollah are forcing the group to decide whether it will remain an
ideological resistance movement or let pragmatism guide its political decision-
making. Hezbollah's choice will affect its relationship with foreign allies, including
Syria, and with its domestic support base.
Iran and Saudi Arabia
In the interim, Lebanon will remain relatively calm. If excluded from Syrian
transition talks, Iran would support an insurgency in the country. But Tehran does
not want to support an insurgency in Lebanon and risk compromising Iran's position
in the Levant or endangering Hezbollah.
Saudi Arabia would like to counter Iran and Hezbollah, but Riyadh also has an
incentive to keep Lebanon at least temporarily calm. The Saudis have worked closely
with Ankara and with Syrian rebels to oust al Assad, and Riyadh will not risk that
goal by engaging Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon -- at least for the moment.
While no side wants a conflagration in Lebanon, however, it is unclear how long the
current detente can last, especially after al Assad falls. There also remains a
possibility that rogue elements in Lebanon could trigger a broader conflict. The
recent kidnappings by the Meqdad clan raised that possibility, especially as other
clans have followed suit by taking their own hostages.
In the short term, the tenuous coalitions that constitute Lebanon's political
landscape could fracture. For example, Aoun's Christian faction could end its support
for Hezbollah. Other actors, such as Saudi-backed Sunni jihadists, may also push for
more influential roles in the political process. No group will make too brazen a move
until al Assad goes. But when the president finally falls, the fragile peace in Lebanon
may go with him.