P.arumugham Vs P.balasubramaniam On 8 August, 2008

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF MADRAS
DATED: 08.08.2008
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE G.RAJASURIA
A.S.No.981 of 1993
1. P.Arumugham
2. P.Chidambaram .. Appellants
vs
1. P.Balasubramaniam
2. Palaniammal
3. Vanchi Ammal
4. R.Muthusamy Chettiar (died)
5. Jayadevi
6. M.Ranganathan
7. M.Rajendran
8. V.Muthulakshmi
9. D.Mahalakshmi
10.G.Mallika .. Respondents
Appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned II Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore passed in
O.S.No. 509 of 1985 dated 18.08.1993.
For appellant : Mr.S.V.Jayaraman, S.C. For
Mr.G.Ravishankar
For respondents : Mr.P.Veeraraghavan for R1 Mr.C.R.Prasannan for RR5 to 10
JUDGMENT
This appeal is focussed as against the judgement and decree dated 18.8.1993, passed in O.S.No.509 of 1985
by the learned II Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore. For convenience sake, the parties are referred to
here under according to their litigative status before the trial Court.
2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
P.Arumugham vs P.Balasubramaniam on 8 August, 2008
Indian Kanoon - http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1060730/ 1
3. Tersely but broadly, succinctly but narratively, the case of the plaintiffs as stood exposited from the
averments in the plaint could be portrayed thus:
(a) One Periyapalaniappa Chetty had three sons, namely, the first plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 and two
daughters, namely, D3 and D4, all born through his first wife Marudhayammal. The second plaintiff was his
second wife.
(b) Periyapalaniappa Chetty died on 16.4.1975, leaving behind the aforesaid two plaintiffs and defendants 1 to
4 as his legal heirs. The suit properties described in the schedule of the plaint belonged to the joint family. The
plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 4 constituted the Hindu Joint Family and they have been enjoying those
properties jointly.
(c) The defendants, by exercising undue influence over Periyapalaniappa Chetty, purchased the land
measuring an extent of 2.34 acres in Survey Nos.222/2 and 271 for a sum of Rs.9000/- from out of the joint
family income. Defendants 1 to 4 tried to dispose of the land in Survey No.532 to an extent of 1.99 acre in
favour of D5, R.Muthusamy Chettiar. Whereupon the lawyer's notice was sent by the second plaintiff, for
which, the defendants replied with false allegations as though there was a partition of the lands and houses
during the year 1962 itself among the co-sharers concerned. (d) Inasmuch as D5 purchased a portion of the
suit property during the pendency of the suit from D1 and D2, who had no right to alienate the same, D5 has
been added in the suit subsequently. After the death of Periyapalaniappa Chetty, D1, being the eldest son in
the family, became the kartha of the family. He obtained the compensation amount of Rs.17,365/- from the
Government in connection with the acquisition of the joint family land measuring an extent of 3.02 acres in
Survey No.344/1 by the Government and he is willing for apportionment of the said amount among the
members of the joint family. Despite the incessant demand made by the plaintiffs for partition of the suit
properties, the defendants were evading the same under one protext or other. (e) As per law, the first plaintiff
and defendants 1 and 2 are entitled to 1/4th share each in the suit property, consequent upon the death of
Periyapalaniappa Chetty, who had 1/4th share in the suit property. The said 1/4th share of Periyapalaniappa
Chetty is to be apportioned among his wife and children. Accordingly, the plaintiffs prayed for partition and
for mesne profits.
4. Per contra, denying and refuting, challenging and impugning the allegations and averments in the plaint, D1
and D2 filed the written statement, the pith and marrow of it would run thus:-
The properties of the family were partitioned even 23 years anterior to the filing of the suit during the life time
of Periyapalaniappa Chetty, who himself did not take any share for himself, as he was very old at that time;
during the year 1963 itself, the first plaintiff got himself separated from the family, after getting his share, so
as to say an extent of 3.30 acres in Survey Number 344 in Vadavalli Village and an extent of 6 cents of vacant
land in the Western portion of the 4th Schedule of the plaint (the description is not found to be correct as per
the facts available on record); the defendants were allotted with the lands in Survey No.558/A, 571/1 and
532/1 and the house properties described in items 1 to 3 of the II Schedule of the plaint; the defendants 1 and
2 were unmarried at the relevant time and they were living with their parents; as per the terms of the said
partition, D1 and D2 started enjoying the agricultural lands on the Southern half and Northern half
respectively; D1 was allotted with the Western half of the house property and D2 was allotted with the Eastern
half of it; the said Periyapalaniyappa Chetty was maintained by D1 and their mother(P2) was maintained by
D2; Only six months anterior to the filing of the suit, P2 joined with the first plaintiff in filing the suit; in fact,
the parents relinquished their rights in favour of D1 an D2 as they were maintained by them only; the first
plaintiff, after such partition, purchased house properties in his name and is enjoying the same, but he has not
added those properties for being partitioned, in the suit; defendants 1 and 2 purchased an extent of 2.34 acres
of agricultural land in Survey No.221 and 222/2 as per the sale Deed dated 21.6.1968, out of their own
earnings; since the land in Survey No.344, which was allotted to the share of the first plaintiff was acquired by
the Government, he received the compensation amount; separate patta books were also issued in respect of the
respective sharers and they have been paying kist separately; the suit is barred by limitation and the plaintiffs
prayer for incidental reliefs, including the mesne profits are untenable. Accordingly, the defendants prayed for
dismissal of the suit.
5. The trial Court framed the relevant issues. During the trial, on the side of the plaintiffs one
Balasubramaniam was examined as P.W.1 and Ex.A1 to A13 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, the
second defendant-Chinnappan was examined as D.W.1, and fourth defendant Vanjiammal was examined as
D.W.2, and 15 documents were marked as Ex.B1 to Ex.B15. Ultimately, the trial Court decreed the suit and
passed the preliminary decree allotting an extent of 7/24th share in favour of P1 and 1/24th share in favour of
P2; granting liberty to the plaintiffs to initiate separate action to claim mesne profits.
6. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgement and decree of the trial Court, D1 and D2 have
preferred this appeal on the following grounds, the pith and marrow of them would run thus:
(1) the trial Court erred in holding that the suit properties are the joint family properties, ignoring the oral
partition, which was effected during the year 1963;
(2) the trial Court should not have decreed the suit ignoring the plea of limitation;
(3) the admission made by the first plaintiff in his deposition was not considered by the trial Court;
(4) the factum of the first plaintiff having received the entire compensation amount from the Government in
respect of the land acquired by the Government, which was earlier allotted to the plaintiffs in the oral
partition, was not considered by the trial Court;
(5) the trial Court failed to hold that the land in Survey Nos.222/2, 221/2 are the self-acquired properties of
D1 and D2 as per Ex.A7.
(6) the first plaintiff purchased two houses in his name and it was not his case that he purchased them from
out of the income from his wife's properties and these facts have not been considered by the trial Court;
(7) the lower Court had given undue weightage to Ex.B8 and Ex.B9 notices sent by the Survey Department
during the year 1976;
(8) Without any basis, Ex.B1 to Ex.B15 and the deposition of D.W.1 were discarded by the trial Court.
(9) the recitals in Ex.A8-the partition deed, which emerged between D1 and D2 were wrongly considered by
the trial Court along with the evidence of P.W.1.
(10)the trial Court failed to hold that in any event, the said compensation received by the first plaintiff and the
two houses purchased by him should also be treated as joint family property, for partition.
Accordingly, they prayed for setting aside of the judgement and decree of the trial Court.
7. The learned counsel for the contesting respondents/defendants would raise the plea of res-judicata by
presenting the memo of the first respondent to the effect that the common judgement and decree dated
18.8.1993 was relating to O.S.No.509 of 1985, on the file the Court of II Additional Sub-Judge, Coimbatore,
which was filed by the plaintiffs seeking partition and O.S.No.337 of 1988, which was filed by the first
plaintiff in O.S.No.509 of 1985 for injunction; the present appeal is focussed as against the portion of the
common judgement and decree relating to O.S.No.509 of 1985, at the instance of defendants 1 and 2 therein;
whereas, the same defendants herein filed appeal A.S.No.154/94 before the I Additional District Judge cum
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore, as against the portion of the said common judgement and decree
relating to O.S.No.337 of 1988, and the said appeal was dismissed for default on 31.12.1996 itself. As such,
the said judgement and decree dated 31.12.1996 passed in A.S.No.154/94 would operate as res-judicata for
the appellants herein to prosecute this appeal.
8. Whereas, the learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the dismissal of A.S.No.154/94 by the
District Court for default would in no way hamper the appellants herein to argue the appeal before this Court,
as the said appeal, which was dismissed, was relating to O.S.No.337 of 1988, which was one for seeking bare
injunction, and it was not a title suit. Both sides ultimately agreed that the objection based on res-judicata also
could be decided along with the adjudication in the appeal. As such the following points emerged for
consideration: (i) Whether this appeal is barred by res-judicata in view of the judgement and decree dated
31.12.1996 in A.S.No.154/94?
(ii) Whether there was any oral partition among the family members during the year 1963 and shares allotted
thereunder as contended by defendants 1 and 2?
(iii) Whether the suit is bad for partial partition?
(iii) Whether the compensation amount received by the first plaintiff from the Government in respect of the
land acquisition proceedings should also be subjected to partition along with the two houses purchased by
him? and Whether the suit is bad for partial partition?
(iv) What shall be the shares of the respective co-sharers?
(v) What are the rights of D5 in having purchased certain items of the suit property from D1 and D2?
(vi) Whether there is any infirmity in the judgement and decree of the trial Court?
Point No.(i): The learned Senior counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff placing reliance on various
precedents would develop his argument that if by way of a common judgement two suits are decided, out of
which, two appeals are filed, then the disposal of one appeal would have impact on the adjudication of the
ot her pendi ng appeal . I t i s al s o hi s cont ent i on t hat t he di s mi s s al of t he ear l i er appeal
A.S.No.154/94(O.S.No.337 of 1988) by the First Additional-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore, for
de-fault, would operate as res-judicata.
9. Whereas, the learned counsel for the appellants/D1 and D2 would submit that absolutely there is no scope
for ushering in the principle of res-judicata in the facts and circumstances of this appeal, in fact the previous
appeal, namely, A.S.No.154/1984(O.S.No.337 of 1988) was dismissed for default and it was an appeal as
against the decreeing of the suit O.S.No.337 of 1988, which was filed for bare injunction.
10. At this juncture, it is just and necessary to refer to the following decisions cited by the learned counsel for
the plaintiff as under:-
82 L.W.425-KARTHIAN KONE, CO-TRUSTEE OF AYAN PAPAKUDI CHOULTRY CHARITY V.
BAGHYATHAMMAL CO-TRUSTEE OF AYAN PAPAKUDI CHOULTRY CHARITY - an excerpt from it
would run thus:-
". . . . . . . . . . In Rajlakshmi Desi v. Banamali Sen (3) their Lordships point out that the test of res judicata is
the identity of title in the two litigations and that so long as the competency of the former court to try the
subsequent suit cannot be denied, the general rule of res judicata applies. Even apart from this, the defendant
Kartik Kone against whom the point was decided in the second appeal, sought to have judgment of the Court
reviewed. Undoubtedly, Kartik Kone could have appealed against the decision, for otherwise it is difficult to
see how a review application could at all have been maintained. The learned Judge in dealing with the review
application pointed out that though the question was raised fo the first time in the second appeal, at the time of
the hearing as objection was raised, and, as we said earlier, both sides argued the question, before the learned
Judge rendered his decision in the second appeal. We may further point out that far from the observations of
the learned Judge being in the nature of an obiter dicta, the actual decision on this point was incorporated in
the decree in the second appeal, the clause of the decree reading thus: "That the first defendant
(Bhagyathammal) shall also be entitled to joint management along with the plaintiff (Kartik Kone) of the trust
properties and the first defendant shall be at liberty to take appropriate steps to work out her rights to joint
management by way of separate proceedings..."
There is accordingly a decree embodying the decision of the Court and it seems to us that it can no longer be
maintained that the observations are merely obiter dicta having no executable force. It is not open to Kartik
Kone to question the decree unless he can say it is nullity which it obviously is not. In Kolu Nambiar v.
Chathu Nambiar (4), this Court held that a matter could be in issue under S.11 of the Civil Procedure Code
even though an express issue had not been framed. It would be in issue if the decision about it is necessary for
the decree. They say further that if the finding has been arrived on a matter which is not necessary for the
disposal of the suit and it is not made the basis of the decree which is given in spite of it, that matter cannot be
said to have been substantially in issue between the parties and such finding would be more in the nature of
obiter dicta. It follows that where the finding was incorporated in a decree, the position would clearly be
otherwise. This has been emphasised in Sankara Mahalinga Chettiar v. Muthulakshmi (5), where it was held
that though a finding might be unnecessary, yet if it is embodied in the decree, it will operate as res judicata."
11. The perusal of it would at once make the point clear that the aforesaid decision is not enuring to the
benefit of the plaintiff and it is quite obvious that in the cited decision their Lordships clearly observed that if
a decree embodies the decision of the Court, it can no longer be contended that the observations are merely
obiter dicta, having no executable force.
12. Here in the judgement dated 31.12.1986, passed in A.S.No.154/94 by the I Additional District
Judge-cum-Chief Judicial Magistrate, Coimbatore, absolutely there is no such finding is found embodied
relating to the title of any one over the suit property. The said injunction suit itself was an off shoot litigation,
which was one for injunction. A bare perusal of the common judgement in O.S.No.509 of 1985 and
O.S.No.337 of 1988 passed by the Sub Court, Coimbatore on 18.8.1993 would evince and evidence that only
two issues were framed concerning O.S.No.337 of 1988 as under: (i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to
permanent injunction as prayed for?;
(ii) to what relief the plaintiff is entitled to?
13. No common issues in these two suits were framed and decided. The said injunction suit O.S.No.337 of
1988 was filed by Balasubramaniam-the first respondent/plaintiff herein, even during the pendency of
O.S.509 of 1985, which was filed by the same Balasubramaniam and his mother Palaniammal for the
substantive relief of partition and consequential reliefs. Instead of filing a separate suit, namely, O.S.No.337
of 1988, for injunction, he could have very well filed an interlocutory application in the pending suit
O.S.509/85 and sought for necessary relief. But he has not chosen to do so. In my considered opinion, the
second suit, namely, O.S.337 of 1988, strictly speaking, was not at all maintainable and it was against the
wholesome public policy that there should not be any multiplicity of proceedings. The relief of injunction
obtained in O.S.No.337 of 1988 in stricto senso, is interim in nature as pending adjudication in O.S.No.509 of
1985 only it could be operative and the ultimate decision in the partition suit would have direct legal impact
on the said injunction. It is therefore crystal clear that a virtual interim injunction cannot be put forth as one
constituting as resjudicata as against the proceedings in the connected partition suit.
14. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would contend that there need not be any specific issue framed and
even then the said decision would operate as res-judicata.
15. I am at a loss to understand as to how the decision in an injunction suit, where the title to the suit property
cannot be gone into in the judgement to be rendered relating to it, could be treated as resjudicata as against the
person, who seeks remedy in a different proceedings based on title. The substantial issue is as to whether the
suit properties are joint family properties or not and whether there was already any oral partition or not and
these issues are found framed in the partition suit O.S.No.509 of 1985 and relating to that suit, an d for
adjudication of those issues alone, now the present appeal is pending. In such a case, by no stretch of
imagination, it could be taken that the dismissal of the said appeal by the District Judge could be taken as one
operating as res-judicata as against the appellants in this appeal.
16. The learned counsel for the plaintiff also relied on the decision of the Honourable Apex Court reported in
AIR 1966 SCC 1332-SHEODAN SINGH, V. DARYAO KUNWAR, excerpts from it would run thus:-
(10a). Re.(i): The judgment of the Additional Civil Judge shows that there were five issues common to all the
four suits, and the main point raised in these common issues was whether Harnam Singh and his adopted son
Ram Kishan were joint with the appellant and his father and whether Ram Kishan died in a state of jointness
with them. This main question was decided against the appellant and his father and it was held by the
Additional Civil Judge that Harnam Singh and Ram Kishan were separate from the appellant and his father
and that Ram Kishan did not die in a state of jointness with them. On this view of the matter, the Additional
Civil Judge held that the respondent, Smt Daryao Kunwar, succeeded to Ram Kishan on his death and was
entitled to the separated share of Ram Kishan and the appellant and his father had no right to the property by
survivorship. In the face of the judgment of the Additional Civil Judge which shows that there were five
common issues in all the four suits, the appellant cannot be heard to say that these issues were not directly and
substantially in issue in Suits Nos. 77 and 91 also. Further this contention was not raised in the High Court
and the appellant cannot be permitted to raise it for the first time in this Court. Besides the question whether
these common issues were directly and substantially in issue in Suits Nos. 77 and 91 can only be decided after
a perusal of the pleadings of the parties. In the paper book as originally printed, the appellant did not include
the pleadings. Later he filed copies of the plaints an application. Even now we have not got copies of the
written statements and replications, if any of Suits Nos. 77 and 91. In the circumstances we must accept from
the fact that the judgment of the Additional Civil Judge shows that these five issues were raised in Suits Nos.
77 and 91, that they were directly and substantially in issue in those suits also and did arise out of the
pleadings of the parties. We therefore reject the contention that issues as to title were not directly and
substantially in issue in Suits Nos. 77 and 91.
12. Then it is urged that all the four suits were consolidated and decided on the same day by the same
judgment and there can therefore be no question that Suits Nos. 77 and 91 were former suits and thus the
decision as to title in those suits became res judicata. It is not in dispute that the High Courts decision in the
appeals arising from Suits Nos. 77 and 91 was earlier. Reliance in this connection is placed on the decision of
this Court in Nahari v. Shankar. That case however has no application to the facts of the present case, because
there the suit was only one which was followed by two appeals. The appeals were heard together and disposed
of by the same judgment though separate decrees were prepared. An appeal was taken against one of the
decrees. In those circumstances this Court held that as there was only one suit, it was not necessary to file two
separate appeals and the fact that one of the appeals was time-barred did not affect the maintainability of the
other appeal and the question of res judicata did not at all arise. In the present case there were different suits
from which different appeals had to be filed. The High Courts decision in the two appeals arising from Suits
Nos. 77 and 91 was undoubtedly earlier and therefore the condition that there should have been a decision in a
former suit to give rise to res judicata in a subsequent suit was satisfied in the present case. The contention
that there was no former suit in the present case must therefore fail.
13. Re.(iv): This brings us to the main point that has been urged in these appeals, namely, that the High Court
had not heard and finally decided the appeals arising out of Suits Nos. 77 and 91. One of the appeals was
dismissed on the ground that it was filed beyond the period of limitation while the other appeal was dismissed
on the ground that the appellant therein had not taken steps to print the records. It is therefore urged that the
two appeals arising out of Suits Nos. 77 and 91 had not been heard and finally decided by the High Court, and
so the condition that the former suit must have been heard and finally decided was not satisfied in the present
case. Reliance in this connection is placed on the well-settled principle that in order that a matter may be said
to have been heard and finally decided, the decision in the former suit must have been on the merits. Where,
for example, the former suit was dismissed by the trial court for want of jurisdiction, or for default of
plaintiffs appearance, or on the ground of non-joinder of parties or misjoinder of parties or multifariousness,
or on the ground that the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a technical mistake, or for failure on the
part of the plaintiff to produce probate or letters of administration or succession certificate when the same is
required by law to entitle the plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or on the ground
of improper valuation or for failure to pay additional court fee on a plaint which was undervalued or for want
of cause of action or on the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any), the
decision not being on the merits would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit. But none of these
considerations apply in the present case, for the Additional Civil Judge decided all the four suits on the merits
and decided the issue as to title on merits against the appellant and his father. It is true that the High Court
dismissed the appeals arising out of Suits Nos. 77 and 91 either on the ground that it was barred by limitation
or on the ground that steps had not been taken for printing the records. Even so the fact remains that the result
of the dismissal of the two appeals arising from Suits Nos. 77 and 91 by the High Court on these grounds was
that the decrees of the Additional Civil Judge who decided the issue as to title on merits stood confirmed by
the order of the High Court. In such a case, even though the order of the High Court may itself not be on the
merits, the result of the High Courts decision is to confirm the decision on the issue of title which had been
given on the merits by the Additional Civil Judge and thus in effect the High Court confirmed the decree of
the trial court on the merits, whatever may be the reason for the dismissal of the appeals arising from Suits
Nos. 77 and 91. In these circumstances though the order of the High Court itself may not be on the merits, the
decision of the High Court dismissing the appeals arising out of Suits Nos. 77 and 91 was to uphold the
decision on the merits as to issue of title and therefore it must be held that by dismissing the appeals arising
out of Suits Nos. 77 and 91 the High Court heard and finally decided the matter for it confirmed the judgment
of the trial court on the issue of title arising between the parties and the decision of the trial court being on the
merits the High Courts decision confirming that decision must also be deemed to be on the merits. To hold
otherwise would make res judicata impossible in cases where the trial court decides the matter on merits but
the appeal court dismisses the appeal on some preliminary ground thus confirming the decision of the trial
court on the merits. It is well settled that where a decree on the merits is appealed from, the decision of the
trial court loses its character of finality and what was once res judicata again becomes res sub-judice and it is
the decree of the appeal court which will then be res judicata. But if the contention of the appellant were to be
accepted and it is held that if the appeal court dismisses the appeal on any preliminary ground, like limitation
or default in printing, thus confirming toto the trial courts decision given on merits, the appeal courts decree
cannot be res judicata, the result would be that even though the decision of the trial court given on the merits
is confirmed by the dismissal of the appeal on a preliminary ground there can never be res judicata. We cannot
therefore accept the contention that even though the trial court may have decided the matter on the merits
there can be no res judicata if the appeal court dismisses the appeal on a preliminary ground without going
into the merits, even though the result of the dismissal of the appeal by the appeal court is confirmation of the
decision of the trial court given on the merits. Acceptance of such a proposition will mean that all that the
losing party has to do to destroy the effect of a decision given by the trial court on the merits is to file an
appeal and let that appeal be dismissed on some preliminary ground, with the result that the decision given on
the merits also becomes useless as between the parties. We are therefore of opinion that where a decision is
given on the merits by the trial court and the matter is taken in appeal and the appeal is dismissed on some
preliminary ground, like limitation or default in printing, it must be held that such dismissal when it confirms
the decision of the trial court on the merits itself amounts to the appeal being heard and finally decided on the
merits whatever may be the ground for dismissal of the appeal."
17. A mere perusal of the above said excerpt, including the entire judgement would at once make the point
explicitly clear that the cited decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. It is
apparent in the cited precedent that as many as 5 issues were framed common to all the four suits involved in
that matter and the main issue raised was whether Harnam Singh and his adopted son Ram Kishan were joint
with the appellant and his father and whether Ram Kishan died in a state of jointness with them.
18. As such, in that factual matrix, the Honourable Apex Court, for reasons as found set out in the above said
excerpts, held that the plea of res-judicata was applicable. But here my above discussion supra would clearly
indicate that the said injunction suit itself was an off shoot litigation, which ought not to have been instituted
and the trial Court also has not framed any issues relating to the joint nature of the suit property and also about
the alleged oral partition. In fact, the parties are not the same in both the suits and it is quite obvious,
warranting no further elaboration.
19. The learned counsel also cited the following decisions relating to the plea of res-judicata:
AIR 1973 ALLAHABAD 63 BUDHAN V. LALA HARBANS LAL AND OTHERS;
AIR 1977 SUPRE COURT 1268 NARAYANA PRABHU VENKATESWARA PRABHU V. NARAYANA
PRABHUH KRISHNA PRABHU (DEAD) BY L.RS.;
AIR 1962 SUPREME COURT 338 BADRI NARAYA SINGH VS. KAMDEO PRASAD SINGH AND
ANOTHER;
AIR 1976 SUPREME COUT 1645 LONANKUTTY V. THOMAN AND ANOTHER;
AIR 1937 MADRAS 544 KRISHNAN NAIR V. KAMBI;
AIR 1966 SUPREME COURT 153 PANDURANG DHONDI CHOUGULE AND OTHERS V. MARUTI
HARI JADHAV AND OTHERS;
2001(1) CTC 222 RENGANAYAKI AND ANOTHER VS. K.R.RENGANATHA MUDALIAR;
AIR 1990 NOC 163(ANDHRA PRADESH)- PALA NARAYANAN AND ANOTHER VS. M.VEERA
SAMAIAH.
20. In view of the ratiocination adhered to by me, in not upholding the plea of res-judicata, the aforesaid
precedents also are found to be not relevant to this case. Accordingly, this point No.(i) is decided to the effect
that the judgement dated 31.12.1986, passed in A.S.No.154/94, would not operate as res-judicata as against
the appellant herein from arguing this appeal on merits.
21. Point No.(ii) Indubitably and unassailably by items 1 to 4 of the suit properties, which are agricultural
lands and an extent of 20 cents of plot area in Survey No.225/1, as described in the same schedule of property
and the three houses referred to therein, are the joint family properties. Even though the suit property, as
found described in the schedule of the plaint is not so clear, nevertheless the learned counsel for the plaintiff
would clarify the factual position by portraying and detailing that the suit properties could be taken under
three segments as found set out in the plaint; the first segment would comprise of six items of agricultural
properties, totally measuring an extent of 10 acres and 8 cents; the second segment is the 20 cents of land in
Survey No.225/1; and the third segment would refer to the three houses. The items 5 and 6 of the agricultural
properties referred to supra are claimed to have been acquired by Arumugha Chettiar (D1) and Chidambaram
Chettiar (D2) as per Ex.B7-the sale deed dated 21.6.1968.
22. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would contend that those two items of properties covered under
Ex.A7 are also the joint family properties, as there had been no partition at all much less any oral partition, as
claimed by the defendants; the said items 5 & 6 were purchased in the name of D1 and D2 from out of the
income derived from the joint family nucleus, to wit from out of the income derived from items 1, 2, 3 and 4
of the agricultural lands referred to supra; and those items were admittedly in possession and enjoyment of the
defendants and their father Periyapalaniappa Chetty. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the plaintiff would
pray for partition.
23. The learned Senior counsel for the defendants would advance his argument to the effect that the said
Periyapalaniappa Chettiar died only on 16.4.1975. Even during his life time, there was only a family
arrangement/understanding for convenient enjoyment of the property and accordingly, the plaintiff was in
possession of tbhe Survey No.344/1 measuring an extent of 3 acres and 2 cents, which is not one among the
suit properties herein, but it was subsequently acquired by the Government and the compensation of
Rs.17,365/- paid to the R1/plaintiff herein, being the eldest son of Periyapalaniappa Chetty, being the kartha
of the family, after the death of the said Periyapalaniappa Chetty. Even though the said sum of money was not
referred to in the schedule of the plaint for being partitioned, nonetheless the first respondent/plaintiff is ready
to distribute the shares of the other co-sharers and such receipt of compensation by the first plaintiff ipso facto
would not lead to any presumption of any oral partition. Ex.A8, the partition deed, according to him, which
emerged between D1 and D2 during the pendency of the suit would torpedo the plea of oral partition and
accordingly he prayed for the dismissal of the appeal.
24. The contention of the learned Senior counsel for the defendants would be to the effect that even as early as
in the year 1963 there was an oral partition among Periyapalaniappa Chetty and his descendants and as per
which, the divided sharers started enjoying their respective share; the first plaintiff also acquired two houses
and similarly defendants 1 and 2 also acquired items 5 & 6 of the agricultural suit properties; patta also
correspondingly got changed in the name of the respective sharers incommensurate with and in concinnity
with the shares allotted at the oral partition and that the said oral partition became a fait accompli.
25. The learned Senior counsel for defendants 1 and 2, au courant with facts and laws alternatively would put
forth the point that in the event of this Court not countenancing and upholding the plea of the defendants that
there had been oral partition, then this Court might order for partition, in respect of the two houses also
purchased by the first plaintiff in his name from out of the joint income derived from the joint family nucleus
and also the compensation amount, which admittedly, the first plaintiff received from the Government.
26. In this factual matrix, it is just and necessary, at the first instance, to scrutinise the evidence as to whether
the oral partition as alleged by the defendants, in fact had taken place at all.
27. The learned counsel for the plaintiff placing reliance on Ex.A8-the partition deed, dated 2.9.1989, which
emerged during the pendency of the suit, would advance his argument that the very recitals in that document
would torpedo the plea of oral partition as put forth by the defendants.
28. A bare perusal of Ex.A8 would unequivocally highlight and spotlight the fact that the said document is
fraught with unreal facts, which are quite antithetical to what the defendants themselves had contended earlier
in their written statement. There is no reference in Ex.A8, about the oral partition, which allegedly had taken
place during the year 1963. Had really an oral partition taken place, certainly there would have been some
reference to it in Ex.A8. The recitals in Ex.A8 would proceed on the footing as though Periyapalaniappa
Chetty was having ancestral properties, and consequent upon his death, those properties devolved upon
defendants 1 and 2 and that they wanted to partition such properties in the presence of Panchayatdars. The
learned counsel for the plaintiff would correctly and convincingly strike the nail on the head of it by arguing
spotlight and highlight that the recitals in Ex.A8-Partition Deed dated 2.9.1989 would ignore the very
existence of the plaintiffs as well as the daughters of the said Periyapalaniappa Chetty.
29. On the contrary, unconvincingly and dubiously from the defendants' side, the explanation, which was
forthcoming relating to Ex.A8-the Partition Deed dated 2.9.1989, was to the effect that only for the purpose of
availing loan such a document was brought about by the defendants. Whereas, the learned counsel for the
plaintiff would correctly torpedo such explanation by pointing out that a perusal of Ex.B15-the copy of plaint
filed in O.S.No.3701 of 1991, would reveal that the bank filed the suit as against the defendants for recovery
of dues long prior to the emergence of Ex.A8 and that there is no iota or shred of evidence to exemplify that
based on Ex.A8 any loan was availed by the defendants.
30. The whole kit and caboodle of evidence on record would in no way highlight that Ex.A8 was brought
about by the defendants purely for the purpose of obtaining loan. If really any oral partition had taken place
during the year 1963, it is not known as to why during the year 1968, as per Ex.A7-the Sale Deed dated
21.6.1968, both D1 and D2 should have purchased items 5 & 6 in their joint names and the very Ex.A7-Sale
Deed dated 21.6.1968 itself is indicative of the fact that there was no actual division among the co-sharers.
31. The learned counsel for the plaintiff drawing the attention of this Court to Ex.B1 to Ex.B14, would
advance his argument that none of those documents issued by the Revenue officials would enure to the benefit
of the defendants to canvass their plea of oral partition.
32. Ex.B1 is the patta book dated nil relating to 4th item of the suit property, which stands in the name of D1
and one other 3rd party and in that document it is found specified that the property is an ancestral property.
Ex.B2 patta book dated 1.7.1974 stands in the name of D1 and D2 relating to items 5 & 6, which have
purchased as per Ex.A7, and in that document it is found mentioned that it is an ancestral property.
33. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would develop his argument to the effect that even as per Ex.B2, the
suit items 5 & 6 are stated to be the joint family property of Periyapalaniappa Chetty and not the separate
self-acquired properties of D1 and D2. Ex.B4-the patta book dated 6.10.1986 stands in the name of the first
plaintiff and D1 and D2 and various other persons, relating to the said second segment of the property in
Survey No.225/1. However, Ex.B4 is relating to a vast extent of land and not only relating to the 20 cents of
land, as contemplated under the second segment. As such, the learned counsel for the plaintiff would develop
his argument that had there been an oral partition in the year 1963, then the first plaintiff's name would not
have found a place there. Ex.B5 patta dated 5.10.1986 is relating to items 1, 2, 3 of the agricultural properties,
which stands in the name of the sons of Periyapalaniappa Chetty and there is no indication that there was any
division of status among them. Ex.B6 dated 6.10.1986 is the chitta relating to items 4 & 5 of the suit
properties. This stands in the name of D2.
34. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would raise a valid contention that item No.4 was sold in favour of
D5-Muthusamy Chettiar, but Ex.B6-Chitta-dated 10.3.1985 does not reflect the same. Ex.B8 and Ex.B9- the
Survey notices dated 6.8.1976 are in the name of D1 and D2 respectively, which are relied on by the
defendants to advance the plea that there had been oral partition and thereupon alone those survey notices
were sent to D1 and D2 relating to item No.4. But the learned counsel for the plaintiff would deny their
genuineness and submit that those are only mere Survey notices and nothing more and that cannot also be
taken as evidence of the alleged oral partition, which was claimed to have emerged during the year 1963.
35. Ex.B12 dated 31.3.1983 and Ex.B13 dated 19.2.1985 are the house tax receipts in the name of the
deceased Periyapalaniappa Chettiar, and that would indicate that there was no mutation in the house tax
register relating to the house properties, which were also claimed to have been partitioned as per the
defendants.
36. As such, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has correctly highlighted that those Exhibits referred to supra
marked on the side of the defendants would not enable the Court to arrive at a reasonable conclusion that there
was oral partition during the year 1963. He would also convincingly argue that had really there been an oral
partition in the year 1963, then the defendants must be able to produce patta or Revenue records or tax
receipts anterior to 1974 to that effect, but apparently, between 1963 and 1974 not even any modicum or
exiguous extent of evidence has been produced to prove the said oral partition.
37. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would be right in his argument that the plaint is as silent as silence
could be relating to the details about the oral partition. Normally, if an oral partition had taken place, the
party, who relies on such oral partition, must be able to expatiate as on what date, before whom and at which
place, it had taken place. But there is no such indication at all in the written statement. Even in the reply notice
Ex.A13 dated 22.6.1985, which emerged in response to Ex.A12 dated 23.5.1985- the lawyer's notice sent by
the plaintiff to D1 and D2, there are no details about the oral partition. On the contrary for the first time, on
the defendants' side, DW.1 Chinnappan, (Claiming to be D2, but in the plaint D2 is referred as Chidambaram)
would depose as though the partition was effected in the presence of elders namely, Avinasi Chetty,
Chinnapalaniappa chetty, Vanji(D.W.2). No date has been specified. None of those Panchayatdars and elders
have been examined to speak about such oral partition. In consonance with the deposition of D.W.1, D.W.2
(D4) also spoke about the oral partition unconvincingly. The depositions of D.W.1 and D.W.2 the parties to
the proceedings are turned out to be nothing but their ipse dixit and it is not preceded by averments in the
written statement. It is a trite proposition of law that any amount of evidence, without pleadings, should be
eschewed. In this connection, the following decisions of the Full Bench of this Court reported in 2006 (4)
L.W.409-B.SURESH CHAND VS. 1.STATE OF TAMIL NADU, REP.BY THE SECRETARY REVENUE
DEPARTMENT, FORT ST.GEORGE, MADRAS-9, 2.THE DEPUTY COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER,
THIRUPATTUR, NORTH ARCOT DISTRICT has been cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. In the
said decision, various decisions of the Honourable Apex Court have been adverted to and certain excerpts
from it would run thus: "28. In this context it will be useful to refer to Order 6 Rule 2 of C.P.C., which reads
as follows:
"Order 6 Rule 2: Pleading to state material facts and not evidence.- (1) Every pleading shall contain, and
contain only, a statement in a concise form of the material facts on which thek party pleading relies for his
claim or defence as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are to be proved."
29.A reading of the above provisions show that the party must plead all material facts on which he means to
rely at the trial. If any one of the material fact is omitted, the statement of claim is bad and it would mean no
pleading and no cause of auction for the suit. If material facts are not pleaded, a court cannot permit evidence
to be led. In 1977 (1) S.C.C.511 (Udhav Singh vs. Madhav Rao Scindia) the Supreme Court has defined the
expression "material facts' in the following words:- "All the primary facts which must be proved at the trial by
a party to establish the existence of a cause of auction or his defence are material facts".
30. The distinction between "material facts' and "particulars" cannot be overlooked. Material facts are primary
and basic facts which must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him, either to establish his
cause of auction or defence. Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite party to know the case he
has to meet, in absence of pleading a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single
material fact, hence, will entail dismissal of the suit. Particulars, on the other hand, are the details of the case.
They amplify, refine and embellish material facts. They give the finishing touch to the basic contours of a
picture already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative."
38. It is therefore clear that the Full Bench of this Court, adverting to the Honourable Apex Court's
judgements, categorically set out that if material particulars are missing in the pleadings, then oral evidence
cannot be entertained. It is also worthy and significant to note that even before the institution of the suit, in the
reply notice the defendants have chosen to come forward with the plea of oral partition and the plaintiff in the
plaint contended that such plea of oral partition was false and despite that in the written statement there found
no details set out. The learned counsel for the defendants placing reliance on the deposition of
P.W.1(P1-Balasubramanian) during his cross-examination, has advanced his argument that P.W.1 candidly
and categorically admitted that there had been an oral partition. No doubt the perusal of the deposition would
evince that there is one sentence found in the cross-examination as under:- ". . .. . . . . . . jdpg;gl;l ghfk; gphpj;j
gpwF th';fpajpy; mJ jdpg;gl;l brhj;J / / / / / / @
39. Per contra, the learned counsel for the plaintiff would submit that no such admission was made by P.W.1,
conveying such a meaning as though there had been an oral partition.
40. At this juncture, I would like to point out that a deposition has to be read as a whole. The tenor of the
deposition is the sure test. When doubt arises as to whether a party unwittingly gave any answer to a question,
in my considered opinion placing reliance on a stray answer to a question during cross-examination and
deciding a serious matter involving a serious issue relating to the existence or otherwise of the oral partition,
would lead to travesty of justice. The duty of the Court in such circumstances under Section 165 of the Indian
Evidence Act is to ascertain from the witnesses as to his own contradictory versions in his deposition.
41. Here it is the consistent contention of P.W.1 even in his pre-suit notice as well as in the plaint and also in
his deposition during Chief-examination and in cross-examination that there had been no oral partition and in
such a case, placing reliance on a fragment of a sentence during cross-examination of P.W.1 cannot be treated
as the decisive factor to decide the lis. It is also not readily known as to whether it was recorded properly. I am
fully aware of the fact that the appellate Court cannot look askance at the deposition recorded by the lower
Court. But if the circumstances warrant so, the appellate Court should not hesitate to doubt such recording of
the deposition. Hence, I would like to extract the portion before and after the doubtful sentence including the
disputed portions, as under:- "1963 nyna v';fs; ghfk; th';fpf; bfhz;L jdpf;Foj;jdk; nghndd; vd;why; rhpay;y/
FoapUf;Fk; tPL v';fs; nghpy; th';fpaJ/ tptrha tUkhdk; jtpu ntW tUkhdk; Vjkpy;iy/ FoapUf;Fk; tPL jhthtpy;
fhl;ltpy;iy/ mJ jdpf;Foj;jdk; nghdt[ld; th';fpaJ/ 2 fpiuaj;jpw;F th';fpaJ/ tPl;Lthp v';fs; nghpy; eh';fs; fl;o
tUfpnwhk;/ ,J bghJf; FLk;gk; brhj;J my;y/ jdpg;gl;l brhj;J/ ghujpahh; (,jd; mrypd; 7 k; gf;f Kot[)/ University
f;F xU g{kp fpiuak; S.No.344, 3.32 br 3/30 vd;why; rhpay;y/ mJ 1963 k; tUlk; Vw;gl;l ghfj;jpy; tpl;lJ vd;why;
rhpay;y/ / / / / / / //@
42. A mere perusal of the aforesaid extract at once support the view taken by me that such stray portion of the
sentence in the middle of the cross-examination cannot be taken as admission by P.W.1 about the alleged oral
partition.
43. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would also correctly advance his argument that mere separate mess
and separate physical living from other coparceners, would not constitute division in coparcenary status
relating to coparcenary properties. In support of his contention, he would place reliance on the decision of this
Court reported in AIR 1987 Madras 24- P.KALIAPPA GOUNDER AND ANOTHER V. MUTHUSWAMI
MUDALIAR, certain excerpts from it would run thus:- "8.Partition is the intentional severance of the joint
ownership by an unequivocal expression of an intention to bring out severance in the eye of law and further
implementing it by actual division by metes and bounds. What was held in common as a single property gets
converted into a holding in severalty and in specie. Joint ownership turns into ownership in severalty and in
specie. It is true that 'partition' is not a transfer. But there must be the element of conversion as the joint
ownership into ownership in severalty and in specie. Therefore, the essence of partition is that the joint
ownership is put an end to and the joint owners come to hold the property in severalty and each in his own
individual right. In this country, it is common that not only coparceners of a joint Hindu family but also
individuals join or continue together to own property in common. If this common ownership is to be put an
end to not only in theory but also in practice, there must be primarily severance of the joint ownership in the
eye of law, followed up by actual physical division. We make it clear that in the present case, we are not
concerned with the concept of a bare unequivocal expression of an intention to separate to bring about
division in status in a joint Hindu family. It is not unusual for parties holding properties jointly or in common
to have separate enjoyment of portions for the sake of sheer convenience. But such separate enjoyment of
convenience cannot be equated to partition in the eye of law and in fact, so as to say that the joint ownership
has been put an end to and in its place ownership in severalty or in specie has come into existence. Separate
enjoyment for the sake of convenience is one thing and partition in the eye of law is another. The latter carried
with it the legal incidents of mutating the joint ownership. The latter has to pass through and satisfy a more
rigorous test in law and on facts.
9. Keeping in mind the above principle, when we examine the present case, we are not able to subscribe our
support to the case of the defendants that there was in fact a partition or a division of the common properties
as between the parties in the eye of law. The features which Mr.T.S.Subramanian, learned counsel for the
defendants, brings to our notice are not adequate in law to support the theory of 'partition'. Learned counsel
would state that the parties are admittedly in possession of different portions; the plaintiff in possession of the
southern portion and the defendants in possession of the northern portion. Learned counsel further states that
the defendants have deepened the well in their portion and have put up a motor pump set and there is also an
underground pipe line in their portion, which exclusively serves the requirements of the defendants and this is
the finding of fact rendered by the Court below. Learned counsel would also urge that on the basis of
certificate of ownership, the parties, both the plaintiff and the defendants, have obtained loans for the purpose
of deepening the wells in the portions in their enjoyment. In our view, these features are not unusual even in
the case of common ownership in the eye of law along with separate enjoyment of specified portions for the
sake of convenience. They could be in consonance with the admitted enjoyment of separate portions by the
parties, explained by the plaintiff as one for the sake of convenience. We could not spell out that the joint
ownership as such was put an end to and in its place the ownership in severalty and in specie came into
existence. The title of the defendants to the undivided share in the suit properties is derived under several
deeds of sale. In all these documents what the defendants acquired is described as only an undivided share. If
in fact, there was a division and consequently a separate ownership long prior to these alienations, as claimed
by the defendants, the parties would not have omitted to make a specific reference to the same. Such a recital
which is not only a natural one but also an absolutely necessary one, is conspicuously absent in all the title
deeds under which the defendants claim right to the suit properties. Admittedly, there was no mutation and no
separate payment of kist. None of the documents relied on by the defendants reflects or speaks about division
at all."
44. As such, the cited decision is in support of the contention of the plaintiff that there was no oral partition
and my above discussion relating to the documents and evidence relied on by the defendants would also
evince that the parties, for the sake of convenience, have been enjoying different portions of the joint family
properties and by that alone the Court cannot jump to the conclusion that there had been oral partition.
45. The learned counsel for the plaintiff also would cite the decision of the Division Bench of the Andhra
Pradesh reported in 1982 ANDHRA PRADESH 270- PURNA BAI AND OTHERS V. RANCHHODDAS
AND OTHERS, certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"26. It is next contended by Mr.H.S.Gururaja Rao that Ex.B-14 is a letter written by Gopinath on 6.6.66
stating therein that he had distributed the amounts as stated in the Will. In that it is shown that Dwaraka Das
was paid Rs.15,000/-. Gopinath is not examined to prove this payment or Ex.B-14. Except D.W.1, no one else
is examined to prove Ex.B-14. In the cross-examination of P.W.2 it is suggested that Dwaraka Das was paid
Rs.25,000/- in pursuance of the Will. The suggestion, thus, is not in accordance with the contents of Ex.B-14.
Ex.B-14 is dated 6.6.66 i.e., after the death of Dwaraka Das. Further, Ex.B-14 was not put to P.W.1 or P.W.2
during their cross-examination. Therefore, there is any amount of doubt as regards the contents of this
Ex.B-14. Further, it is to be noted that it is in the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 that D-1 used to pay them
Rs.1,500/- per month for their maintenance after the death of Dwaraka Das. There were also occasions when
D-2 and D-6 paid to the plaintiffs. They stopped payment only some time earlier to the filing of the suit. As
held supra, the evidence of D.W.1 is not trustworthy as regards the fact that there was a partition or settlement
in 1942 or 1957. It is very difficult to believe his evidence even in respect of this aspect of the case also. No
doubt, he denied having made payments at the rate of Rs.1,500/- to the plaintiffs. But having regard to the
circumstances and other evidence adduced, it seems to be true as deposed to by P.Ws.1 and 2 that they were
being paid by the defendants at the rate of Rs.1,500/- per month for their maintenance. This fact, further,
supports the case of the plaintiffs that the family was a joint family and the properties were joint. For all these
reasons we hold that there was no division or settlement of the family properties as alleged by the defendants
and that the family continues to be joint. It is a fact that P.Ws.1 and 2, both, deposed that the families of the
plaintiffs and D-1, D-6 and other defendants are living separately since 20 to 25 years. Merely because the
families are living separately the nature of the joint family property will not be changed unless there is
partition, division or settlement. Therefore, the properties continue to be joint family properties only.
27. The third point to be considered is, whether the suit is barred by limitation. In the plaint it is alleged that
the plaint schedule properties are joint family properties and when the plaintiff demanded for partition the
defendants refused it. The plaintiffs served the suit notice, Ex.A-15 dated 14.1.1976 and the defendants issued
a reply, Ex.A-16 denying that the properties are joint family properties. Therefore the suit was filed. In the
written statement filed by D-1, D-2, D-3, D-5 and D-10 in paragraph 6 it is stated that the business was carried
on independently even long before 1943, late Dwarakadas at Secunderabad and D-1, Motilal, at Gulzara
House as partners of the shop. Thus, according to the written statement the business was so carried on
independently by the sons even during the lifetime of Purandas. In view of this, it is pleaded, the suit for
partition is wholly untenable and time barred. Except this allegation that the suit is time-barred, there is no
specific plea in the written statement that Dwaraka Das was excluded from enjoyment of the joint family
properties to the knowledge of Dwaraka Das and his sons. Since there is no plea of exclusion, there is also no
issue and consequently no evidence or finding. It is a settle principle of law that when there is no plea, there
will be no issue and therefore there cannot be any finding. What amounts to exclusion is a question depending
upon the particular facts of each case. The exclusion must be to the knowledge of the person excluded and
there should be sufficient (material) to prove the said exclusion. Merely because the members of the joint
family are living separately with the consent of each other and managing the joint business, it cannot be said
that there is exclusion. For this proposition of law, it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Privy Council in
Radhoba v. Aburao, AIR 1929 PC 231. The Privy Council held: "There is no definition of the word
"exclusion", in the Limitation Act and the question whether a person has been excluded from joint family
must depend upon the facts of the particular case. An intention to exclude is an essential element. It is
necessary, therefore, for the Court to be satisfied that there was an intention on the part of those in control and
possession of the joint family property to exclude the person and that exclusion was to his knowledge." In so
far as the question of limitation is concerned, it is raised for the first time in this appeal. Since it is not raised
before the trial Court, the learned counsel for the plaintiffs contended that in view of the decision of the Privy
Council in Virayya v. Adenna, AIR 1930 PC 18, the same cannot be entertained in this appeal. The Privy
Council laid down that although the plea of limitation may have been mentioned in the written statement and
also in the grounds of appeal, if no issue is directed to bear upon the question before the trial Judge and the
point has not been taken at the Bar during the trial, it cannot be allowed in appeal. The learned counsel further
submitted that the question of limitation is a mixed one of law and fact and that unless there is an issue and
evidence, the same cannot be considered in appeal. In the present case, though there was a plea in the written
statement no issue is framed and no evidence was let in and no finding is given by the trial Court. On the other
hand, the learned counsel Sri H.S.Gururaja Rao, contended that the plea of limitation is a pure question of law
and therefore even though it is not raised before the trial Court it can be raised at the appellate stage. For this
proposition of law, the learned counsel sought to place reliance upon a decision of the Federal Court in
Ratneshwari Nandan v. Bhagwati Saran, AIR 1950 FC 142 and also of this High Court in Sambhasiva Rao v.
Kanakamma, AIR 1960 Andhra Pradesh 213. He further contained that the documentary evidence i.e., the
partnership deeds between the defendants and their sons, the income-tax assessment orders and the certificates
issued by the Income-tax Authorities show that since 1959 onwards the defendants are doing business
exclusively and therefore the suit filed in the year 1976 is barred by limitation as per Art.110 of the Limitation
Act. First of all, there was no issue, evidence or finding on this point. We have also held that once there is a
joint family and the properties are joint family properties managed by some members of the joint family, the
said properties will not seize to be joint family properties merely because the other members have not
managed the said properties, unless it is proved that the other members to their knowledge have been excluded
from the joint family. As held by us, the properties are still joint family properties as the alleged settlement or
partition pleaded was held to be false. The evidence of D.W.1 on this point was held to be not believable. The
case of the plaintiffs is that though the two shops are there one at Gulzara House and the other in
Secunderabad managed by the defendants and Dwaraka Das, the entire profits were enjoyed by all the
members jointly and this is even spoken to by D.W.1 in the cross-examination that earlier to the division they
were all enjoying the fruits jointly. We have held that there is no settlement either in 1942 or 1957. Therefore,
the joint family properties continues to be joint. Even the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 is that the defendants used
to pay Rs.1,500/- per month for their maintenance from the income of Gulzara House Shop. All these facts
show that there was no exclusion of Dwaraka Das from enjoyment of the joint family properties. Even
otherwise once the property is the joint family property, unless there is exclusion of one member to his
knowledge from the joint family for over a period of twelve years, it cannot be said that the said member has
ceased to have any right in the joint family properties. Mr.Mohan Rao, the learned counsel for the 4th
respondent submitting that P.W.1 herself hash in evidence deposed that they were living separately since 30
years, that the house in which she is living is in her name having been purchased some 30 to 35 years back,
that Motilal has got a separate business in a separate shop, that since 1957 the business was carried on in
partnership, while P.W.2 also admitted that himself, the 2nd plaintiff as well their mother was carrying on
business in the shop at Sultan Bazar in a partnership till the end of 1972, sought to contend that these
admissions and portions in their evidence indicate that they were not only living separately since more than
two decades but the businesses were run on partnership basis to the exclusion of others and, therefore, the suit
brought in after twelve long years is barred by limitation. All these contentions have been in fact adverted to
earlier and held that simple separate living is no indication to conclude either exclusion or division and that
the plaintiffs were even paid at the rate of Rs.1,500/- per month for their maintenance from out of the earnings
of the shop at Gulzara House by the defendants. Further at the time of death of Dwaraka Das, the 3rd plaintiff
was a minor in 1966 and he attained majority only thereafter. As held by the Madras High Court in
Marudanayagam v. Sola Pillai, AIR 1965 Mad 200, a suit filed by the minor after attained majority within
twelve years thereof (i.e. From the date of attaining majority) is within the period of limitation. For all these
reasons we hold that the suit is not barred by limitation and that there is no exclusion of the plaintiffs also as
contended."
46. The said decision would highlight the law point that merely because coparceners live separately, there is
no presumption that there was division of status relating to coparcenary properties. There is also one another
dictum found set out in the said precedent that simply because some members managed some properties there
could be any presumption that there had been division in status.
47. The learned Senior counsel for the defendants would draw the attention of this Court to paragraph 7 of the
plaint and advance his argument that the very conduct of first plaintiff in receiving the compensation amount
relating to the land acquired by the Government would speak volumes that he admitted the oral partition. Per
contra, the learned counsel for the first plaintiff would place reliance on the first plaintiff's stand in his pre-suit
notice itself and submit that the first plaintiff being the kartha of the joint family, after the death of his father
Periyapalaniappa Chettiar, received the said compensation amount and that he expressed his desire to share
that amount with the other co-sharers and that even now the first plaintiff is ready and willing to share the
compensation amount with other co-sharers.
48. No doubt, the first plaintiff could have very well already shared that compensation amount along with the
other co-sharers, but he did not do so. The Core question arises as to whether such receipt of compensation
amount itself would amount to accepting the oral partition. It is a common or garden principle in Hindu Law
that in a co-parcenary, after of the death of the father, the eldest male member would be deemed to be the
kartha and in such a case, the factum of the first plaintiff qua kartha having received the compensation amount
would not constitute an estoppel against him from contending that there was no oral partition. In fact, in
paragraph 7 of the plaint, the first plaintiff himself would admit that he is the kartha of the family after the
death of Periyapalaniappa Chetty.
49. It is therefore clear that even though certain items of properties were under the enjoyment of some of the
co-sharers, it could only be taken that they were enjoying so for convenience sake and not after division of
status in the coparcenary family and accordingly, point No.(ii) is decided to the effect that there was no oral
partition among the co-sharers and that they have been enjoying the various items of properties for their own
convenience.
50. Point No.(iii): In view of the finding above that there had been no oral partition as contended by the
defendants, as a sequale the aforesaid admitted joint family properties should be partitioned among the shares
concluded.
51. The pertinent question arises as to whether items 5 & 6 of the agricultural lands referred to in the suit
property, claimed to have been purchased by D1 and D2, as per Ex.A7, and the two houses admittedly
purchased by the first plaintiff, but not shown in the schedule of the plaint, should be treated as joint family
properties or not?
52. Indubitably,the items 1 to 4 - agricultural properties, as found set out in the schedule of the plaint, have
been in possession and enjoyment of defendants 1 and 2 as on the date of emergence of Ex.A7-the sale deed,
dated 21.6.1968, relating to purchase of the said items 5 and 6. As such it is crystal clear that defendants 1 and
2 had income from the joint family nucleus and out of that they purchased those items. The learned Senior
counsel for the defendants would contend that there is no evidence on record to demonstrate and exemplify
that D1 and D2 purchased those properties only from out of the income derived from the joint family nucleus.
At this juncture my mind is redolent with the following decisions:- (i) AIR 1954 SC 379 (Srinivas Krishnarao
Kango vs. Narayan Devji Kango and others). An excerpt from it would run thus:
"8. Proof of the existence of a joint family does not lead to the presumption that property held by any member
of the family is joint, and the burden rests upon anyone asserting that any item of property was joint to
establish the fact. But where it is established that the family possessed some joint property which from its
nature and relative value may have formed the nucleus from which the property in question may have been
acquired, the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was
acquired without the aid of the joint family property.
10. Whether the evidence adduced by the plaintiff was sufficient to shift the burden which initially rested on
him of establishing that there was adequate nucleus out of which the acquisitions could have been made is one
of fact depending on the nature and the extent of the nucleus. The important thing to consider is the income
which the nucleus yields. A building in the occupation of the members of a family and yielding no income
could not be a nucleus out of which acquisitions could be made, even though it might be of considerable
value. On the other hand, a running business in which the capital invested is comparatively small might
conceivably produce substantial income, which may well form the foundation of the subsequent acquisitions.
These are not abstract questions of law, but questions of fact to be determined on the evidence in the case.
Where the finding of the Courts is that the income from the ancestral lands was not sufficient even for the
maintenance of the members, and the houses in dispute are substantial, burden is on the plaintiff who alleges
the houses to have been acquired out of joint family funds, to establish it.
Held that if the contention that on proof of the existence of the Watan lands the burden had shifted on to the
defendants to prove that the acquisitions were made without the aid of joint family funds,that burden had been
discharged.
Likewise, it was held that since the ancestral Watan lands are intact, and were available for partition, and the
small income derived from them must have been utilised for the maintenance of the members of the family,
whether it were held that the plaintiff had failed to discharge the burden which lay on him of establishing
sufficient nucleus, or that the defendants had discharged the burden of establishing that the acquisitions were
made without the aid of joint family funds, the result was the same."
53. The aforesaid precedent would unambiguously spot light and make apparent and pellucid the point that in
order to prove that the property is the joint family property, there should be evidence to indicate that there was
joint family nucleus and income was arising out of it so as to enable the joint family to purchase such
additional properties and that the burden of proof is on the person, who pleads that even though the property
might stand in the name of one of the co-sharers, nonetheless, it belongs to the joint family. Undoubtedly, this
case should necessarily be analysed in the light of the dictum set out in the cited decision. (ii) AIR 1960 SC
335 (Rukhmabai vs. Lala Laxminarayan and others) and an excerpt from it would run thus:
"5. There is a presumption in Hindu law that a family is joint. There can be a division in status among the
members of a joint Hindu family by refinement of shares which is technically called division in status, or an
actual division among them by allotment of specific property to each one of them which is described as
division by metes and bounds. A member need not receive any share in the joint estate but may renounce his
interest therein, his renunciation merely extinguishes his interest in the estate but does not affect the status of
the remaining members vis-a-vis the family property. A division in status can be effected by an unambiguous
declaration to become divided from the others and that intention can be expressed by any process. Though
primafacie a document clearly expressing the intention to divide brings about a division in status, it is open to
a party to prove that the said document was a sham or a nominal one not intended to be acted upon but was
conceived and executed for an ulterior purpose. But there is no presumption that any property, whether
movable or immovable, held by a member of a joint Hindu family, is joint family property. The burden lies
upon the person who asserts that a particular property is joint family property to establish that fact. But if he
proves that there was sufficient joint family nucleus from and out of which the said property could have been
acquired, the burden shifts to the member of the family setting up the claim that it is his personal property to
establish that the said property has been acquired without any assistance from the joint family property."
54. A perusal of the said judgement would highlight that there is no presumption that any property whether
immovable or movable property held by the member of the joint Hindu family is a joint family property and
the burden is on the person, who pleads that the property is the joint family property, to prove it. The same
decision highlights one other important proposition of Hindu law that there is a presumption under the Hindu
law that the family is a joint one. (iii) MLJ (II) 1976 225 ((Pattusami Padayachi vs. Mullaiammal and others:
"18. The properties purchased by one or other of the members of a co-parcenery or joint family when the
family is joint cannot as a matter of course be treated as joint family property. The co-parcener who
challenges such title in the member and pleads that they should also be brought to the hotch-pot ought to
establish by cogent and mature evidence that there was enough surplus income which was available in the
joint family and which positively could be the foundation for such annexures made by one or the other of the
members of the joint family. In all cases definite proof is required that the further purchase in the names of
joint family members ought to have been made and could not have been made otherwise than from the surplus
income of the family. For a greater reason the rule is made strict in the case of properties in the name of
female members. The fact that a female member in a joint family has properties in her own name would not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the origin of such properties should be traced to the joint family or to
the income from the joint family, inasmuch as the stridhanam property of a female and possession of property
by her have been recognised from ancient times." (iv) MLJ (1) 1978 56 (Ranganayaki Ammal and others vs.
S.R.Srinivasan and others).
(v) AIR 1959 SUPREME COURT 906 - MALLAPPA GIRIMALLAPA BETGERI AND OTHERS VS.
R.YELLAPPAGOUDA PATIL AND OTHERS;
(vi) AIR 1954 SC 379 - SHRINIVAS KRISHNARAO KANGO VS. NARAYAN DEVJI KANGO AND
OTHERS.
55. The aforesaid decisions would unambiguously highlight that the burden of proof is on the party, who
pleads that the property purchased by one of the co-sharers is the joint family property. It is also pertinent to
note that once it is established that the co-sharer purchased certain properties in his own name at a time when
he was in receipt of income from the joint family nucleus, then the burden of proof would get shifted on him
to prove that he acquired those properties from out of his own earnings. So far this case is concerned, it is the
admitted case of both sides that they all belonged to agricultural family and they derived income only by
doing agricultural operation. In fact, D.W.1(D2) in his deposition candidly and categorically deposed that he
had no other avocation or job except agricultural operation. In such a case, it is crystal clear that items 5 and 6
were purchased from out of the income derived from the joint family nucleus. Had really defendants 1 and 2
got separate income, other than the income derived only from the joint family nucleus, then they should have
adduced evidence aliunde to prove that they purchased those properties from out of such separate income;
however there is no modicum of evidence in that regard. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that items 5
and 6 of the agricultural properties, described in the schedule of the plaint, would constitute part and parcel of
the coparcenary property.
56. The learned Senior counsel for the defendants would submit that the two houses purchased by the first
plaintiff as admitted by him should be treated as co-parcenery property and in fact, he ought to have showed
those items also in the schedule of the plaint along with the three houses, which had already been shown in the
plaint schedule as the co-parcenery properties, but he had not done so and consequently, the suit itself is bad
for partial partition. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would contend that the evidence on record would
demonstrate that the first plaintiff purchased two houses from out of the income derived from his wife's
agricultural properties and not from out of the income derived from the joint family nucleus. The fact remains
that admittedly, the plaintiff, as per his own version, was in possession and enjoyment of an extent of 3 acres
and 2 cents in Survey No.344/1 as kartha of the joint family and which was subsequently acquired by the
Government and compensation was paid to him. Readily it is not known about the description of those two
houses as well as the date of those purchases. Instead of furnishing all the relevant facts pertaining to the
purchase of the of two houses with description, in accordance with Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act,
the first plaintiff, he simply relies upon the written statement filed by the defendants and contends that those
houses were purchased by the first plaintiff, soon after the alleged oral partition during the year 1962/63. Such
an argument cannot be countenanced and upheld as tenable under the law. The pertinent questions arise thus:
What is the stand of first plaintiff? Is there any straight answer to it by him?
Absolutely, there is no clarification or answer to those questions. No doubt, in the written statement in
paragraph 7, it is stated thus:
"7. The plaintiff No.1 after taking his share, purchased a separate 2 sets of house property in his name and he
is residing in the said house right from the date of purchase immediately after partition. Cleverly he has
omitted to include those items in the suit property. Similarly, these defendants have purchased 2.34 acres of
agricultural land in SF.No.221 and 222/2 as per Sale Deed dated 21.6.1968."
57. The unassailable fact is that the first plaintiff purchased two houses. But he has not adduced precisely
evidence relating to them or furnished particulars about them. But he would develop his contention that the
defendants themselves contended that the two houses were purchased soon after the alleged oral partition. The
law and the logic, including the case laws applied as against D1 and D2 so as to treat the said items 5 and 6 of
the suit properties as part and parcel of the co-parcenary properties shall also be applicable as against the first
plaintiff so as to treat the said two houses purchased by him as the ones acquired by him from out of the
income derived by him from the joint family nucleus.
58. The contention of the first plaintiff is that from out of the income derived from his wife's property, he
purchased those two houses in his name. At this juncture, I would like to recollect the well known proposition
that preponderance of probabilities would govern the adjudication in civil cases. Normally, if an undivided
coparcener wants to purchase a property, he would normally purchase in the name of his wife or his other
close relatives, so as to keep the property away from the reach of other coparceners. But, in this case, it is the
specific contention of the first plaintiff that from out of the income derived from his wife's property, those two
houses were purchased not in the name of his wife but in his own name.
59. The learned counsel for the first plaintiff would place reliance on the answer given by D.W.1(D2) to the
effect that the first plaintiff's wife was having properties, which were looked after by the first plaintiff. Simply
because, D.W.1 admitted that the first plaintiff was looking after his wife's property, there is no presumption
that D1 and D2 admitted that the first plaintiff purchased those two houses from out of the income derived
from his wife's property. On the side of the plaintiff, apart from the plaintiff, no one was examined. As such,
the deposition of P.W.1 remains only his ipse dixit and constitutes his self-serving version, which cannot be
relied on to hold that those two houses purchased by him were from out of his wife's income.
60. The plaintiff came forward with the specific case that he, being the eldest male member, after the death of
his father, because the kartha of the co-parcenery family and it is therefore, as sequela could be understood
that during the life time of his father Periyapalaniappa Chetty, he was his eldest son and that he acquired those
two houses while he was admittedly enjoying the joint family nucleus. In such a case, the presumption as
applied as against D1 and D2 should also be applied as against the first plaintiff and it has to be held that
those two houses purchased by the first plaintiff should be treated as co-parcenary properties. No more
elaboration is required to hold that those two houses should necessarily be treated as part and parcel of the
co-parcenary properties.
61. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the defendants would contend that as of now there are no
particulars about those two houses and that it would be difficult for partition of those houses also and on that
ground itself the suit has to be dismissed as one bad for partial partition. Even though, the description and
details about the two houses are not readily available , nonetheless during the final decree proceedings, the
plaintiff is bound to furnish those particulars. It is a trite proposition that at the final decree stage, description
and inclusion of properties are possible. But only requirement is that during the preliminary decree
proceedings itself, the controversy concerning title relating to those items should have been settled. Even
items which have been left out due to over sight could be added during the final decree proceedings.
62. Simply because the plaintiff did not come forward to include the sum of Rs.17,365/-, which he received
from the Government as compensation, in the suit property, and that he, as per his own stand, was exclusive
owner of the two houses and that he did not include them in the suit properties, the suit cannot be held to be
bad for partial partition. Merely, because the plaintiff owing to some motive or as per his own stand did not
include certain items in the suit property, it would not lead to the conclusion that the suit is bad for partial
partition. There are instances where the parties would deliberately leave certain items of properties, without
any valid reasons for getting it divided at once, but to get them divided at a later date at their own whims and
fancies and in such a case, the Court could hold that the suit is bad for partial partition. Even in such cases, the
Courts have got the power to direct that the left out items also should be included in the partition, once there
are evidence available on record that those items are co-parcenary properties. In fact, both sides relied on
Mulla's Hindu Law on this Aspect. I would like to extract a passage from the famous Mulla Hindu Law (19th
Edition) "327. PARTIAL PARTITION:
(1) A partition between coparceners may be partial either in respect of the property or in respect of the persons
making it.
After a partition is affected, if some of the properties are treated as common properties, it cannot be held that
such properties continued to be joint properties, since there was a division of title, but such properties were
not actually divided.
(2) Partial as to property.- It is open to the members of a joint family to make a division and severance of
interest in respect of a part of the joint estate, while retaining their status as a joint family and holding the rest
as the properties of a joint and undivided family. However, where there is evidence to show that the parties
intended to sever, then the joint family status is put to an end, and with regard to any portion of the property
which status is put to an end, and with regard to any portion of the property which remained undivided the
presumption would be that the members of the family would hold it as tenants-in-common, unless and until a
special agreement to hold as joint tenants is proved. When a partition is admitted or proved, the presumption
is that all the property was divided and a person alleging that family property, in the exclusive possession of
one of the members after the partition, is joint and is liable to be partitioned, has to prove his case."
332. . . . .
. . . . . . .
Whether a suit for partition should comprise all the joint family properties, in other words, whether the suit
should be one for general partition, or whether it can be one for a partial partition only depends upon who the
parties to the suit are:
(i) The general rule is that where a suit for partition is brought by a coparcener against the other coparceners,
it should embrace the whole family property. This rule is subject to certain qualifications. Thus, where a
portion of the property is not available for actual partition, as being in the possession of a mortgagee, or where
it is held jointly by the family with a stranger, a separate suit for partition may be brought in respect of that
portion in the courth of the place where that portion is situated. (ii) The next case is where a coparcener sells
his undivided interest in one of several properties belonging to the coparcenary, and a suit for partition is
brought by the purchaser of such interest against his vendor and the other coparceners. In this case, there is a
conflict of decisions as to whether he can sue for partition of that property alone in which he is interested as a
purchaser, or whether he should sue for general partition of all the family properties. This subject is dealt with
in 261(3). (iii) The third case is where a coparcener sells his undivided interest in one of several properties
belonging to the coparcenary, and a suit for partition is brought by the other coparceners against the
purchaser. As to the rights of the other coparceners in such a case, see 261(3).
(iv) The last case may be put in the form of an illustratin. A and B are members of a joint family property
consists of three houses, X, Y and Z. A sells his interest in house X to C. B sells his interest in the same house
to D. In such a case, D can sue C for partition of house X, without asking for a partition of houses Y and Z. A
and B, no doubt, must be joined as defendants; but the real contest in this case is between strangers to the
family, namely, C and D, and there is no reason why such contest should not be determined without reference
to the remaining property of the family."
63. It is therefore clear from the above excerpts that the view taken by me that those two houses and the
compensation amount even though not included in the suit properties, the same could be ordered to be
included during the final decree proceedings for effective partition. Accordingly, point No.(iii) is decided that
the suit is not bad for partial partition.
64. Point No.(iv): The relationship among the parties is an admitted one, over which, there is no controversy.
Periya Palaniappa Chetty, had three sons, namely, the first plaintiff-P.Balasubramaniam, D1-P.Arumugham,
D2-P.Chidambaram, and two daughters, namely, D3-Palaniammal and D4-Vanchiammal and his wife
Palaniammal, plaintiff No.2. The deceased Peria Palaniappa Chetty and his three sons being Hindus,
constituted the co-parcenary and accordingly, each were entitled to 1/4th share. Consequent upon the death of
Peria Palaniappa Chetty on 16.4.1974, his 1/4th share in the co-parcenary is deemed to have devolved on his
legal heirs, namely, his wife(P2), and his sons and daughters(P1, D1 to D4) respectively. As such, it amounts
to P1, D1 and D2(the sons) are entitled to 7/24th share each and P2, D3 and D4(wife and daughters) are
entitled to 1/24th share each.
65. The trial Court did not choose to incorporate in the decree the compensation amount received by the first
plaintiff for being divided according to their respective shares of the parties. Even though the trial Court
adverted to the evidence concerned, it has failed to consider the importance of including in the partition the
two houses purchased by the first plaintiff from out of the income derived from the joint family nucleus. As
such, the judgement and decree of the trail Court requires modification. Accordingly point No.(iv) is decided.
66. Point No.(v): The learned Senior counsel for the fist plaintiff would contend that D5, despite notice having
been issued to him, did choose to purchase a portion of the suit property and that he does not deserve any
equity. Whereas the learned counsel for D5 (consequent upon D5's death R5 to R10-the legal representatives
were impleaded) would contend that D5 was a bona fide purchaser for value and that he was not in receipt of
notice earlier to the purchase of the suit property.
67. I am of the considered opinion that this Court need not probe into the fact as to whether D5 was the bona
fide purchaser for value without notice or not, as it is not a case where D5 purchased the property covered by
any agreement to sell and only in such or similar circumstances, the question as to whether D5 was a bona
fide purchaser or not, would gain prominence. It has become a common or garden principle that the purchaser
of the undivided share of the sharers could work out his remedy during final decree proceedings and the
equity before the Court concerned could be pleaded and got adjudicated. Accordingly, point No.(v) is decided.
68. In the result, the judgement and decree of the trial Court is modified as under:-
"(a) In the suit properties, the sum of Rs.17,365/-(Rupees seventeen thousand three hundred and sixty five
only) received by the first plaintiff shall be added as a one among the co-parcenary properties. The two houses
admittedly purchased by the first plaintiff, the details of which, the first plaintiff is bound to furnish to the
Court during the final decree proceedings, shall also be part of the coparcenary properties for being
partitioned, as per the judgement and decree of this Court. All the suit properties already referred to in the
schedule of properties in the plaint shall also be the coparcenary properties for being partitioned, as per this
judgement and decree. (b) The first plaintiff(P1), first defendant(D1) and second defendant(D2) are entitled to
7/24th share each in all the aforesaid items of co-parcenary properties. The second plaintiff (P2), third
defendant(D3) and the fourth defendant (D4) are entitled to 1/24th share each in all those properties. The first
plaintiff is bound to pay 6% interest on the share of the other sharers in the sum of Rs.17,365/- (Rupees
seventeen thousand three hundred and sixty five only) from the date of suit till the deposits are made before
the lower Court. On such deposits, the respective sharers are permitted to withdraw the same without waiting
for finalisation of the final decree proceedings. It is made clear that R5 to R10-the legal representatives of D5,
are deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the vendor of D5, corresponding to the shares allotted to them as
per this judgement and decree. (c) The parties are at liberty to file necessary application for getting assessed
the future income from the date of the suit till their respective portions are divided and allotted. However, I
make it clear that during the final decree proceedings, the parties are at liberty to adduce evidence relating the
income derived from the suit properties, as well as to the fact as to who should pay in favour of whom the
mesne profits. The parties are directed to bear their own respective costs throughout. This appeal is ordered
accordingly. No costs.
Msk 8.8.2008
Index : Yes
Internet: Yes
To
II Additional Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore
G.RAJASURIA,J.,
msk
Pre-delivery judgment in
A.S.No.981 of 1993
8.8.2008

P.arumugham Vs P.balasubramaniam On 8 August, 2008

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF MADRAS

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