Synthese (2009) 168:319331

DOI 10.1007/s11229-008-9453-0
Knowledge in science and engineering
Sunny Y. Auyang
Received: 17 April 2007 / Accepted: 19 November 2008 / Published online: 6 December 2008
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008
Abstract It is now fashionable to say that science and technology are social con-
structions. This is true, or rather, a truism. Man is a social animal. Man is a linguistic
animal, and language is social. Hence all products of human activities and everything
that involves language are social constructions. But an assertion that covers everything
becomes empty. The constructionist mantra that science or technology is not a simple
input from nature attacks a straw man, for no one denies the necessity of enormous
human efforts in research, development, and design. To say that these are social activ-
ities should not imply that they are indistinguishable from other social activities such
as politicking or profiteering. An investigation into their peculiarities will bring to
relief their intellectual and technical characteristics. The argument that science and
technology are social constructions because they involve many assumptions is again
a truism. Whenever we think, whenever we nd things intelligible, we invariably
have used some concepts and made some assumptions. Philosophers such as Kant
have painstakingly analyzed concepts without which intelligibility is impossible. The
important questions are not whether scientists and engineers make assumptions but
what kind of assumptions they make; not whether they make judgments, but what kind
of reasons they offer to support their judgments. Are the assumptions and justications
all social? Or are they mainly technical? Admittedly, the boundaries between the two
are not always sharp, but is it impossible to make any differentiation at all?
Keywords Epistemology of technology Engineering Science
S. Y. Auyang (B)
Cambridge, MA, USA
e-mail: sauyang@alum.mit.edu
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1 Technical contents and social contexts
Conceptual analysis is a strong suite of philosophy. The philosophy of technology
tends to emphasize the inuences of technology on our meanings of life and being in
the world. The epistemology of technology, which concerns more with the production
of technology and shares common ground with the philosophy of science, receives
far less attention than it deserves. The lack of analysis leads to much confusion and
controversy. For instance, abuse of the general concepts of reality and objectivity, as
exemplied in the conation of nature with the representations of nature, is a major
criticism that scientists raised against social constructionists in the Science Wars of
the late 1990s.
Another conceptual distinction in need of clarication is that between the contents
and contexts of science and technology. I know or I think is an incomplete asser-
tion that invites the question: You knowwhat? You think about what? An essential
characteristic of human cognition is that we always think about some topics.
1
That
topic is the content of our thought or knowledge. As nite beings, humans cannot
grasp the innite complexity of the universe all at once. The topics of our thoughts
or sciences are only bits and pieces of the world. In carving out a topic, any topic,
we have already made many assumptions, some vague, others clearly articulated. Let
me crudely call those assumptions that are crucial to the topic technical. The tech-
nical contents of science and engineering refer mostly to physical laws and natural
phenomena, because they both tackle with the physical world. I say mostly, not exhaus-
tively. Utility is intrinsic to technology, thus technical considerations in engineering
also involve social factors such as costs and benets, although they often appear only
abstractly under the notion of functions, as we see shortly. These social factors belong
to the technical contents of engineering, because they are what engineering delibera-
tions are about. They should be distinguished from politics, money, culture, bureau-
cracy, personal jealousy, special interests, and other factors that constitute the social
contexts in which engineering activities proceed. Contextual factors do inuence the
direction of research and development and consequently the contents of science and
technology, but their effects are far less overwhelming than sociological determinism
claims. Again, the distinction between technical contents and social contexts is fuzzy
in places and variable through time. Prominent cases of such fuzziness are conicts of
interests. Nevertheless, the absence of absolute boundaries is not a license to muddle
up everything or to crowd out technical contents in contextual accounts of technol-
ogy. Precisely in such uncertainty cases is conceptual analysis most important, for
instance in clarifying what counts as acceptable evidence and valid justication. Here
the epistemology of technology can make much contribution.
This paper focuses on the technical contents of engineering. It investigates some
characteristics of engineering knowledge and compares them to scientic knowledge.
1
The directedness of mind to some topic is what cognitive scientists call intentionality.
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2 Science, engineering, and application
Basic science, applied science, and engineering are not three disjoint elds. Rather,
they form a continuous spectrum with varying degree of practicality. Scientists inves-
tigate many natural phenomena that are not useful for engineering. Engineers develop
systems theories and computer software that are beyond nature.
Computer science is a universally acknowledged name. Nevertheless, computer
professionals are still arguing whether their discipline is science or engineering, and
some electrical engineers quip: Those that must call itself science isnt.
2
Here I
adopt a general sense in which science means a capacity of knowing or possessing
knowledge that is sufciently general, clearly conceptualized, carefully reasoned, sys-
tematically organized, critically examined, and empirically tested. The passive verbs,
which are common usage, indicate the common sense that knowledge is not a simple
input from nature but is generated by human activities. Science is never omniscience,
but its generality and rigor do enable it to make limited predictions subject to empirical
tests. In this sense, Bernard Belidor wrote about engineering science in La Science
des Ingenieurs, published in 1729, more than six decades before the term social
science appeared in public discourse.
Many scientic laws and principles are very general. Their applications to restricted
topics or to the solutions of specic problems are ubiquitous in natural science and
engineering, consuming most scientic efforts and generating the bulk of technical
knowledge. Application does not necessarily imply practicality; for instance, the appli-
cation of the laws of quantum mechanics to atomic structures is basic research, the
potential usefulness of whose results surprised atomic physicists. Applied science, on
the other hand, implies utilitarian ends, which can be immediate or remote, clearly
dened or vaguely expected.
The difference between basic and applied sciences is mainly one of topic and ori-
entation, not of intellectual quality or epistemological priority. Pure research does
produce applicable results. However, this does not imply that pure science neces-
sarily precedes applied science and engineering. New scientic knowledge can and
do originate in applied research, as is evident in the voluminous Journal of Applied
Physics and other journals of applied science, not to mention numerous engineer-
ing journals, for example IEEE Journal of Quantum Electronics. Their authors come
from both science and engineering departments. They share a school in many uni-
versities, for example the California Institute of Technology. In many work places,
engineers and applied scientists cooperate so closely it is difcult to tell them apart.
The editors of a survey report with contributions from eighty engineers and scien-
tists from academia, industry, and the government asserted: Applied science is often
regarded as a synonym for engineering.
3
Synonym is an exaggeration. The name
genetic engineering notwithstanding, molecular biologists regard themselves not
engineers but scientists, even as they eagerly market potential therapeutic applications
of their research. Conversely, design engineers seldom cal themselves scientists, even
2
See Auyang (2004).
3
Arden (1980, p. 8).
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322 Synthese (2009) 168:319331
as they apply scientic knowledge. Nevertheless, since engineering stepped up its
research capacity after World War II, its overlap with applied science does enlarge
tremendously.
New knowledge also originates in systems development, engineering design, and
other practical activities. One of two of Galileos major books, Two New Sciences,
addressed topics in mechanics, which had been practiced since antiquity. Galileo
explicitly located its wellspring in the activities of the Venetian arsenal, observing that
experienced artisans not only constructed machines but also attempted to explain their
operations.
4
Scientic knowledge has advanced much since Galileos days, but so
has technological sophistication. Presenting recent cases in aeronautical engineering,
Vincenti explained howengineering design activities engender newproblems and new
knowledge.
5
Although Galileo turned his telescope toward the heavens, his writings made plain
that utilitarian applications have been valued since the beginning of the Scientic
Revolution. Historians found that Newton and every distinguished seventeenth-cen-
tury English scientist related some of their scientic research to immediate practical
problems.
6
Chemists and biologists are even more practical minded. Organic chemists
enthusiastically develop dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals fromthe beginning. Molecular
biologists scramble to set up rms for commercializing their research results. Even if
scientists do not deliberately pursue it, utility of research results is an honor and not a
disgrace among the scientic community.
Much evidence militates against the so-called scientic ideology that denigrates
applied science as thoughtless applications of scientic knowledge and routine exer-
cises incapable of new insight.
7
Constructed in technologies studies by much confu-
sion and distortion, the scientic ideology expresses attitudes less of the scientic
tradition than of the aristocratic culture where the idea of utility has long borne the
stamp of vulgarity.
8
As a straw man attributed to scientists, it fuels controversies and
obstructs understanding of science, engineering, and technology.
9
3 Tacit knowledge in technical activities
The same word science, engineering, or technology can refer to more than one
categories. These words can mean technical activities, mostly research, development,
and design. More subtly, they refer to capacities or abilities to performtechnical activ-
ities, different capacities being loosely grouped under various disciplines. For most
people, they mean products of technical activities: scientic knowledge and techno-
logical goods and services. The three meanings are reciprocally interrelated. Available
capacities constrain feasible activities, which in turn constrain achievable results.
4
Galilei (1954, p. 1).
5
Vincinti (1990).
6
Merton (1968, p. 663).
7
See, for example, Layton (1967).
8
Marx (1997).
9
For an analysis of confusions in the fabrication of the scientic ideology, see Auyang (2005a).
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Products of the activities can expand capacities for more activities, as knowledge
produced in scientic research enables further research.
The three meanings of activity, capacity, and product all conveyed by the termsci-
ence, but are shared between engineering and technology. The word engineer-
ing, derived from the name of practitioners and sometimes dened as what engineers
do, refers mainly to activities and disciplines. Products of engineering are variously
known as engineered systems, engineering sciences, or more generally, technology.
When people talk about technology, they mostly refer to artifactsnot just any artifact,
but only those goods and services that do wonderful things or facilitate extraordinary
activities. An advertisement announcing a camera with the latest technology conveys
messages not about the electronics inside but about the ability for users to take great
pictures and edit them digitally. Consumers get the messages. Although they tend to
locate technology at the camera when asked, they mainly regard it as an enabler for
making pictures. To be consciously active and productive are central to human exis-
tence. The notion of technology as an enabler is adumbrated by Aristotles definition:
Tchn e (art) is a state of capacity to produce with a true logos (course of reasoning).
10
Based on it I expounded technology as a scientic capacity to produce.
11
The results of scientic research are mainly knowledge. Engineering also produces
abstract knowledge, but the bulk of its products are concrete goods and services. If
scientic theories and engineering systems appear very different, the gap narrows in
the activities that produce them.
Research scientists and design engineers both perform tedious chores and grind
gritty details. Both solve numerous specic problems. Both idealize, hypothesize,
introduce concepts, make approximations, and render technical judgments. Scientists
design experiments to measure subtle phenomena, just as engineers design commer-
cial instruments. Scientists devise useful gadgets, although their utility is usually not
commercial but conned to certain research projects. Of course, there are many differ-
ences. Scientists are more prone to overarching theories, although engineers too can
theorize, as we see shortly. Individual scientists have more freedom in choosing and
dening their problems while engineers are more likely given well dened problems
to solve, although this difference is reduced in big-science projects. Many more dif-
ferences appear on more specic levels, tied to their disparate topics. On such specic
levels the differences between engineering and physics may not be much greater than
that between physics and biology.
On the general level we are considering now, one similarity between scientists
and engineers stands out. Both rely heavily on intuition and skill to combat igno-
rance, the crux research, which would be superuous if we know everything already.
Scientic research, like engineering design, is an art, a knowledgeable and critical art.
The arts product, scientic knowledge, consists of explicitly articulated statements
that describe and explain certain phenomena. Explicitness is what knowledge usually
implies. In considering technical activities, however, it is convenient to extend the
10
Aristotle, Ethics, 1140a.
11
Auyang, Engineering.
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324 Synthese (2009) 168:319331
meaning of knowledge to include also tacit knowledge, sometimes known as skill
and know-how. Although poorly articulated and ill conceptualized, tacit knowledge
is not inarticulate or irrational. As an art, it has its intrinsic reasoning, although its
reasoning falls short of the clarity, criticality, and systematicity of science. It contains
many rules of thumb, factual information, or fragments of relevant scientic knowl-
edge. But these are either too weak or too limited to deal with the complexity of real
world topics. Much mechanical knowledge that Galileo attributed to the artisans he
observed was tacit. The artisans could describe or explain bits and pieces of the topic at
issue, but failed at giving a comprehensive and critical account. Galileo would struggle
to provide such accounts by introducing novel concepts, a central task of science.
Tacit knowledge can be shown but cannot be taught. An experienced person can
readily point things out or makes things work but would have difculty in describ-
ing clearly what or how. Because demonstration is tied to the physical presence of
persons and things, tacit knowledge is difcult to promulgate. Modern technology
encompasses much tacit knowledge that is not written out but is embodied in sev-
eral repositories. The most important repository is human capital, which includes
skills, understanding, practices, and expertise of scientists, engineers, and techni-
cians. Then there is social capital: work organizations and institutional structures.
Over the ages, engineers have extracted many human skills and designed them into
operational machines, plants, algorithms, and other physical capitals, which become
embodiments of know-how. Tacit knowledge embodied in various capitals is the most
valuable asset of technologically advanced nations, their greatest comparative advan-
tage over catcher-ups, because it can only be patiently accumulated in concrete beings.
The transmission of tacit knowledge in technology transfer depends heavily on the
travel or migration of technical experts and managers, the establishment of educational
institutions, or the moving or building of physical plants.
The transfer of some human skills into physical capitals is known as automation,
a major task for engineering. It started with manual skills and, with rapid spread of
computers, increasingly moves into mental skills. Many sociologists condemn auto-
mation for deskilling the workforce. A bifurcation or a redirection of skills is perhaps
a more appropriate description. Much tacit knowledge that can be made explicit and
built into machines and algorithms seems to be of mid-level difculties to humans. Its
automation drives workers to jobs that require different skills, some of which demand
less training, some more. For instance, it takes much technical skill to write computer
codes for a website. With the development of software that generates codes automat-
ically, people with scant programming skill can design websites. Probably you have
done it yourself. This can be regarded as a deskilling of website production that costs
some programmers their jobs. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as enabling people
to engage their talent in more interesting skills. Similarly, CAD/CAM (computer
aided design/computer aided manufacturing) software that automates much routine
and tedious work in engineering design does not necessarily imply a deskilling of
engineers. Engineers now have to learn more to master sophisticated CAD/CAM,
skillful use of which enables them to more challenging designs. Redirection of skills
happens in scientic research also. The automation of gene sequencing in molecular
biology is a case in point. Work that worth a masters thesis a decade ago is now
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performed by robots, freeing new students for more exciting research problems. This
can hardly be call deskilling.
There is a continuous effort to make tacit knowledge explicit. Conversely,
explicit knowledge enables workers to tackle more challenging situations, in which
they develop new skills and gain new tacit knowledge. The never-ending cycle drives
the scientic and technological progress.
4 The general and the particular in explicit knowledge
Explicit knowledge begins with describing individual phenomena or operational pro-
cedures. It demands specic concepts pertaining to what is or how to. Biology began
with collecting and describing myriad species. A major task in early structural engi-
neering was to measure and catalog the strengths of various construction materials:
rocks, timbers, metals, and alloys. This was not at all easy; the concept of material
strength itself was not obvious, and ascertaining measurement accuracy and uniform
material quality was difcult. By itself, factual knowledge such as plant morphol-
ogies or material strengths may be insufcient for science, but it is indispensable.
Facts can be discovered in laboratories or factories. Advancing science and technol-
ogy make more phenomena accessible to inspection, so that the acquisition of new
factual knowledge never ends.
As factual knowledge about individual things accumulates, people begin to see
patterns of similarities and connections among disparate things. They introduce gen-
eral concepts to capture the patterns and connections. Factual generalizations have
relatively small scopes, covering a small area. Accumulating factual generalizations
enable people to see higher-level patterns and more remote connections. For these
they introduce even more general concepts or conceptual frameworks that have larger
scopes, covering ever greater varieties of phenomena. Proceeding from facts to fac-
tual generalizations to laws and theories, sciencenatural or engineeringgradually
develops the abilities to explain and predict.
Descriptions assert that it is so or how it is done. Explanations answer why it is
so or why it works. Favorite explanations in physical science and engineering refer
to common patterns and regularities. A particular phenomenon is explained in terms
of underlying forces that also operate in many other apparently disparate phenom-
ena or basic constituents that also make up many other apparently disparate things.
Interrelated concepts for these common forces and constituents constitute theories and
principles. They are general because they apply to wide ranges of things. Conversely,
because they apply to many things, they must abstract from dissimilar details of par-
ticular cases and retain only common elements. General principles attain great scope
by hiding or sacricing details.
The general, the particular, and the relation between them attract philosophical
attention since antiquity. Some academic disciplines, for instance history, are superb
in describing particular cases but unable to generalize and make predictions. Tech-
nology studies share this characteristic to a significant extent. A sociological study
describes in details many factors involved in a specic technological situation. Such
micro-studies are invaluable for understanding particular situations, but their values
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are limited if their results cannot be generalized to other cases. All too often technology
scholars jump from minute descriptions to grandiose slogans such as living in
harmony with nature, imposing human wills on nature, or all is social construc-
tion. Such reckless generalization produces at best catchy sound bytes, because they
fail to explain how the general claim is supported by the particular descriptions of-
fered. At worse, they produce falsity. Analysis of such generalizations would be a
fertile ground for the epistemology of technology.
The ability to explain and predict depends on the ability to connect the general and
the particular: to draw a valid general conclusion from a specic instance or to apply
a general principle to a particular case. How rigorous a science makes the connections
is a measure of its power. Physical and engineering sciences are relatively powerful
in this sense. They connect general principles and particular instances not by a ight
of fancy but by a kind of conceptual ladder, in which each step reduces generality by
specifying more detail conditions or, going the other direction, increases generality
by abstracting from specifics.
For example, Newtons laws cover all motions with speeds much less than the speed
of light. They are so general they leave out even the form of the motion-generating
force. The force may be gravity, the inverse square law of which Newton introduced
separately from the laws of motion. Or it may be electromagnetism. Specifying the
force narrows the scope of the dynamic theory to a particular range of phenomena.
Within gravitational theory, the scope is narrowed by focusing on the solar system.
Generality is reduced further by specifying the conditions pertaining to the return in
1705 of the comet previously known as the Spirit of Caesar or the Wrath of God.
Similar hierarchies of generality occur in engineering science. For instance, Claude
Shannons information theory lays out the general bounds for reliable communication.
As a systems theory that addresses on communicative functions in general, it leaves
out the physical media of communication, which can be copper wires, optical bers,
or wireless propagation in free space. A narrower scope is the study of optical com-
munication through glass bers. A still narrow scope is the OC1 system of optical
communication, which carries 672 simultaneous telephone conversations in a single
strand of glass ber the width of a human hair. An instance of it was the rst system
rolled out in Chicago in 1977 (Fig. 1).
In the ladder of generality, each step involves a limited amount of trade off between
scope and details. It ensures that the generalization in each step is valid and well sup-
ported. Usually, each step involves a tremendous amount of work. This also explains
why, contrary to the scientic ideology, applications of known general principles
produce much new knowledge.
5 Knowledge generated in applications
The common patterns represented by general theories enable scientists and engineers
to go beyond known cases and make predictions and contrary-to-fact hypothesis: if
such conditions obtain, then such a result will occur. If the golf ball receives such an
impact and ies in so strong a cross wind, then according to the dynamical theory it
will follow such a trajectory. Notice that the general dynamical theory is necessary
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Fig. 1 The connection between general principles and a particular instance involves many steps of inter-
mediate generality
but insufcient for prediction. It must be supplemented by substantive knowledge
pertaining to the particular situation at issue, in this case the impact and wind. Knowl-
edge about appropriate conditions is often complicated and requires much research
to ascertain, which can lead to new areas of discovery and new theories. Conditions
wherein engineered systems operate are often not quite natural. Vincenti and Mitcham
have identied the acquisition of knowledge relevant to practical conditions to be one
area where technology extends beyond natural science.
12
Galileo gave a simple example. He distinguished between machine in the abstract
and machine in the concrete. The general principle of lever, a basic principle for con-
structions, was known since Archimedes, who claimed he was able to raise the earth if
given a pivot. This, Galileo said, was only machine in the abstract. Archimedes boast
depended on ignoring the kind of lever required for the practical jobany realistic
lever will break way before the earth budges. For machines in the concrete, the abstract
lever principle must be supplemented by conditions such as the levers strength and
bending under load, which would vary according to its material and structure.
13
To
acquire systematic knowledge about these conditions took almost two centuries before
engineers condently applied the principle of cantilever to build long bridges and tall
buildings that bear heavy loads.
Even in the crudest sense, a bridge has at least two aspects, its material and the
way in which the material is structured. The former calls for knowledge in material
science, the latter structural mechanics. A concrete phenomenon of any complexity,
be it natural or articial, usually involves factors studied by several academic disci-
plines. To study a star, which is a nuclear fusion reactor, involves the application of
laws from nuclear physics, gravitational mechanics, uid dynamics, electromagne-
tism, and more. To design a nuclear power reactor calls for applying as many physical
laws, not to mention political regulations and economic constrains. To select relevant
knowledge fromdisparate elds and integrate themto explain a complex phenomenon
12
Vincinti, What engineers know; Mitcham (1994).
13
Galileo, Two New Sciences, p. 2.
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328 Synthese (2009) 168:319331
or design a complex system is an arduous task of research and development. Its
process usually generates new knowledge, and sometimes a new discipline, for in-
stance stellar physics.
Integrative knowledge is common in technology. An outstanding example is
chemical engineering, a new discipline created by integrating chemistry with ther-
modynamics, uid dynamics, and transport theory for general principles pertaining to
the design and operation of wide classes of chemical reactors and oil reneries.
14
6 Physical and systems theories
In engineering as in science, research shifted into high gear after World War II. One
result of intensive engineering research is the crystallization of several bodies of sys-
tematic and empirically tested knowledge, or several engineering sciences. A natural
science, such as atomic physics, takes as its topic a broad type of natural phenomena
and explores what can be under the relevant physical laws. An engineering science is
dened similarly, but instead of nature, it addresses a broad type of articial phenom-
ena, which is often dened not by physical properties but by functional properties. It
explores what can be of use.
Engineering sciences fall roughly into two groups. The rst comprises physical
theories, which mainly address the internal structures and mechanisms of technolog-
ical systems. The second comprises systems theories, which address the functions of
technological products.
Examples of physical theories are mechanics, electromagnetism, thermodynamics,
uid dynamics, and transport phenomena. They are essentially applied physics, but
not in the pejorative sense of applied science popular in technology studies. As
Vincenti explained, engineers develop the physics laws relevant to a wide class of
useful systems, introduce theoretical concepts to represent the peculiarity of articial
systems, and discover general practical operating principles. They contribute much to
the development of thermodynamics, uid dynamics, aerodynamics, and other physi-
cal theories. Thermodynamics originatedinstudyingthe performance of steamengines
and other heat-utilizing machines, the invention of which preceded the advent of the
science. The practical heritage is preserved in physics textbooks, which explain ther-
modynamic principles in terms of heat pumps and the Carnot cycleCarnot was an
engineer. One formulation of the second law of thermodynamics itself is the impossi-
bility of perpetual motion machines.
Notable examples of systems theories are control theory, information theory, com-
putation theory, theories for estimation and signal processing. Most systems theories
are indigenous to engineering, although many of their concepts have been adopted
by other disciplines, including biology. In contrast to physical theories, they abstract
from physical properties and focus on the functional properties of systems. A things
function is its impact on a larger environment or its behavior as viewed from the per-
spective of a larger context. Function is a purposive concept that seldomappears in the
physical sciences. It is central to engineering because the purpose of an engineered
14
See Auyang (2005b).
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Synthese (2009) 168:319331 329
system is to provide certain services to a larger community. Engineers are responsible
to design the structure of the system so that it performs those services satisfactorily.
Complementarity of internal structures and external functions are crucial to them.
Functional considerations constitute distinctive engineering knowledge.
Functional abstraction is the gist of systems theories. Asimple illustration in control
theory is the thermostat, whose function is to control the operation of the heater so that
the room temperature remains steadily at a preset value. The thermostat performs its
function as a controller by measuring the room temperature, which is a consequence
of the output of the heaters operation. Based on whether the measured temperature
is lower or higher than the desired value, it turns the heater on or off. In other words,
the thermostat feeds the heaters output performance back as a part of the input that
controls the heaters operation. These functional relations between output, input, and
controller holdregardless of the physical characteristics of the heater andthe controller,
the former may be gas or electric and the latter mechanical or electronic. Abstracting
from physical characteristics, we arrive at a functional statement for feedback control:
a controller (thermostat) measures the output of a plant (heater) and feeds the data
back as a part of the input that controls the plants operation for it to achieve a desired
output (steady desired room temperature). This abstract statement for the functional
relation between a plant and a controller is applicable to other feedback control sys-
tems that have no physical resemblance with thermostats and heaters. For example, a
cruse control (controller) measures the cars speed (output) and uses the data to adjust
the operation of the car engine (plant).
A basic categorical distinction is that between individuals and relations. While
physical theories stress the material aspects of individuals, function theories stress
the abstract relations among individuals. Such relations are suitable for mathematical
representations. The functional relations in a feedback control system can be repre-
sented by a simple block diagramor mathematical equation, as illustrated in Fig. 2. The
Fig. 2 Systems theories abstract from physical properties to reveal functional relations
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330 Synthese (2009) 168:319331
abstract symbols F and G in the equation can stand for complex mathematical expres-
sions with many variables that capture certain mechanisms of the plant, controller,
and their interaction. They enable engineers to calculate and predict the performance
of realistic feedback systems.
Mathematical equations are susceptible to manipulation in the abstract, so that engi-
neers can play with them, make imaginative variations, derive results, explore their
logical consequences, and invent new control concepts and devices. One important
variation of feedback control is the negative feedback for low distortion amplication
of signals. It was the device that got long distance telephony off the ground.
7 Knowledge and uncertainty
Explicit and tacit, our knowledge of the world is far from complete. Certainty is unat-
tainable in natural science, not to mention in engineering, technology, or daily life.
However, incomplete knowledge is not total ignorance. The lack of absolutely certain
knowledge does not imply that science is nothing but politics, in which anything goes.
Scientists and engineers are doers, not empty talkers; bold, but not reckless. They
are aware of desirable ideals, but they are also realistic about what they can achieve.
It is well to be able to know everything all at once, exactly, and with certitude. But
that goal is unrealistic. The success of science and technology depends partly on the
patience to take one step at a time and bite off what one can chew. One common
practice is to idealize closed system in an open universe, as in controlled experiments
and limited models. Scientists and engineers make approximations and acknowledge
the approximations by estimating errors and introducing corrective steps whenever
possible.
Engineers design products that will be used by real people in the real world. Safety
and reliability are paramount. When engineers are uncertain, they prefer to err on the
safe side and use tried methods. Bold designs may be exciting and glamorous, but their
risks of failure are also greater, and at stake are lives and properties. When in doubt,
be stout is a dictum I heard in the rst lecture of two separate freshman engineering
courses. For this engineers are often stereotyped as conservative, dull, and unimagin-
ative. They are conservative, but not from lack of imagination but from their sense of
responsibility.
At the frontier of research, scientists always face the unknown. When they are
unable to solve a problem, they leave it to future research. Newton disliked the idea of
gravity acting at a distance. He calmly said that he did not know the cause of gravity
and left it to future generations. Three centuries passed before Einstein lled the gap
in Newtons knowledge.
Waiting is a luxury engineers can ill afford; they have to deliver products in time.
Engineers opt for what is achievable under the technological, economic, social, and
time constraints. The practicality of their mission is a heavy burden that forces themto
make decisions and take actions, even in the face of incomplete knowledge and uncer-
tainty. Here is where critical rationality, the sense of responsibility, and the effort to
seek alternatives become most important. Hard choices under practical constraints are
often unpleasant and ugly. Ideologues demand absolute safety; they can talk pretty
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Synthese (2009) 168:319331 331
because they bear no responsibility for their grandiloquent. Engineers ask How safe
is safe? How much are you willing to pay for features with potentials to save lives in
rare accidents? Ideologues denounce engineering trade-offs as crass and vulgar, but
what practical alternatives have they offered? To avoid hard choices is a choice, an
easy but often most irresponsible one.
Science and technology have brought an enormous amount of knowledge, explicit
and tacit. They have also shown how much we do not know. To know ones ignorance
is the highest wisdom of Socrates, and not his alone. It is also captured in Confucius
remark: To know what one knows, to acknowledge what one doesnt know, thats
knowledge.
References
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Galilei, G. (1954). Dialogues concerning two new sciences (p. 1). New York: Dover.
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Marx, L. (1997). Technology: The emergence of a hazardous concept. Social Research, 64, 965.
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Mitcham, C. (1994). Thinking through technology. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Vincinti, W. (1990). What engineers know and how they know it. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
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