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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA


IN RE: THE SCR 111(10 PETITION FOR
REINSTATEMENT OF
ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, ESQ.
NEVADA BAR NO: 9473
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Case 65587

SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT PURSUANT TO SCR 111(10)

COMES NOW, ZACHARY BARKER ESQ., on his own behalf, and hereby supplements his
May 7
th
, 2014 Petition for Reinstatement Pursuant to SCR 111(10).
FACTS: Asst. Bar Counsel King filed an SCR 111(6) Petition on 5/10/12 that attached the
3/15/12 Order Affirming the Ruling of the Reno Municipal Court thereto.
1
However, it is not clear
that such is affirming the conviction for petty theft rather than the Order for Summary Punishment of
Contempt that Coughlin appealed in conjunction therewith. To whatever extent such is viewed as
affirming the conviction, Coughlin submits this in a SCR 111(7) good cause sense and notes that, in
61462, he previously file a Petition to Dissolve such temporary suspension based on SCR 102(4)(D)
based on his, perhaps, mistaken belief that such was applicable to temporary suspensions of the SCR
111(6) variety. Coughlin seeks to incorporate such 8/13/12 filing in 61462 herein to supplement the
instant petition.
2

Hereafter, the undersigned will cite to pages of the combined record in the petty larceny trial
and appeal of the conviction therein underlying this matter, which comprises the 352 page 12/23/11
record on appeal filed by the RMC and all filings in the appeal thereof.
3
Coughlin was arrested on
Electronically Filed
May 22 2014 09:09 a.m.
Tracie K. Lindeman
Clerk of Supreme Court
Docket 65587 Document 2014-16680
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9/9/11 and charged with the petit larceny of "a candy bar and cough drops" from a Walmart store.
Coughlin applied for court appointed counsel, filing a sworn declaration of his indigency in a timely
manner on 10/26/11 which attested to Coughlin then having a yearly income of $11,000, which easily
met the presumptive indigency threshold of less than 200% the federal poverty guideline for a
household of one. Further, Coughlin's "Application for Court Appointed Counsel" made clear that he
had just been ordered summarily evicted the day prior to filing such application on October 26th,
2011.
RMC Judge Kenneth Howard, the presiding judge in the matter, violated ADKT 411 in
himself ruling on such application in his Order
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of 10/27/11 denying
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Coughlin court appointed
counsel, as well as denying Coughlin a continuance or new trial date.
On 11/3/11, Coughlin filed a Motion for Reconsideration
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of such 10/27/11 Order by Judge
Howard denying him court appointed counsel wherein Coughlin indicates that he is an attorney
licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada, thus implicating SCR 111(6)s characterization of the
petty larceny charge as a serious crime requiring the appointment of counsel per ADKT 411 (2008
Indigent Defense Order) regardless of Judge Howards contention at trial that he need not appoint
counsel unless Coughlin were to be incarcerated for the petty larceny charge (see page 1048).
However, the states may provide greater protections than that required under federal law, and
the combination of ADKT 411 and SCR 111(6) (attorneys convicted of a serious crime receive no
pre suspension hearing before their Fourteenth Amendment protected property right, ie, their law
license, is temporarily suspended) mandated that Coughlin be provided court appointed counsel for
such charge that he committed a serious crime, regardless of whether any incarceration was
possible or actually ordered.

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Coughlin was rearrested on 11/13/11 for criminal trespass at his former home law office.
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The
trial in this petty larceny matter had been scheduled for the following day, 11/14/11, however, upon
Coughlin being transported to the RMC in the red jail clothing given to those place in mental
segregation, consistent with the mandatory stay required where a competency evaluation is indicated,
Judge Howard chose to not have Coughlin brought into the courtroom for the trial. Despite
Coughlins then in custody status establishing his indigency per the 2008 Indigent Defense Order,
Judge Howard still refused to appoint Coughlin counsel where addressing such motion and an
11/29/11 Motion for Continuance
8
at the start of trial on 11/30/11 which again reiterated his right to
counsel and identified himself as an attorney licensed to practice in Nevada (pages 26-107 of the
record).
Judge Howard denied
9
Coughlin counsel, indicating this Court does hereby DENY said
appointment for the reason that if convicted of this charge, the standard sentence carries no jail
time." However, a trial judge only possesses restricted discretion to limit an indigent defendant's
state constitutional right to counsel by certifying, in writing, before trial that the defendant will not be
imprisoned. State v. Kelly, 999 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2008). Judge Howard plainly failed to so indicate
in writing that Coughlin would not face the possibility of any incarceration incident to such petty
larceny trial.
Judge Howard failed to rule that Coughlin was not indigent in either his 10/27/11 Orders, (the
10/27/11 Order interlineated on Coughlins 10/26/11 Application indicates merely non-jailable
offense, which is plainly not the case given such a misdemeanor carries the possibility of six months
in jail. Regardless, the states can provide greater protections to individuals than required by federal
law, and the combination of the Indigent Defense Order in ADKT 411's requirement that indigent
individuals be provided court appointed counsel for any charge involving a "serious crime", and SCR
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111(6)'s defining any theft offense, even misdemeanor theft, as a "serious crime" necessarily required
Coughlin be provided court appointed counsel regardless of the fact that Judge Howard did not
sentence Coughlin to any jail time for the petty larceny conviction.
Judge Howard found Coughlin guilty of petty larceny
10
: (noting at page 106 Defendant
refused to state whether or not he would be testified (sic). At the 8:13pm to 8:15 pm minute mark of
the audio transcript of the trial Judge Howard rendered his decision thusly:
Judge Howard: The evidence is clear and I am going to take that that Mr.
Coughlin will not be making a summation in regard to the evidence presented at
this trial. Therefore, the evidence is clear that Mr. Coughlin, the evidence is clear
that Mr. Coughlin was seen consuming an item of chocolate and disposing of the
packaging. The evidence is also clear that he was seen and observed to pick up and
consume a number of cough drops, and once again dispose of that packaging. Both
items were the property of Walmart. The evidence is sufficient in my mind that he
failed to purchase those items, then he left the premises of Walmart and at that time
was retained by store security. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he is, in fact,
guilty of the crime of petty larceny. Sentencing?

Noticeably, Judge Howard fails to rule that Coughlin had the requisite intent to steal such
property, rather, merely noting that Coughlin failed to purchase such. This is problematic given
much of Coughlins cross-examination of Walmarts Frontino (the sole eye witness offered by the
City) focused on whether or not Frontino could hear Coughlin's conversation with the Walmart clerk
whom rang up the $83.82 worth of groceries that Walmart admits Coughlin paid for. Walmarts
Frontino admitted he could not hear such conversation, but testified that he personally observed
each and every item rung up by the clerk, and that none included any cough drops (Duract Cough
Melts) of the variety Frontino alleges Coughlin consumed while shopping and failed to pay for.
However, Coughlin produced the $83.82 receipt and such does, in fact, contain an entry with the UPC
and description of the exact same item that Walmarts Frontino alleged was not included amongst
those rung up (see page 152:7-12; 265:4-9; 377:20-378:1-15; 481; 481; 483; 486; 490; in Appellants
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Opening Brief at page 642:11-26; 654:27:-655, in Supplement to Appellants Opening Brief at 683-
684; 949; 1018-1028; 1032-1034, 1044, 1062; 1068-1079, 1105; 1105-1110).
Further, Frontino was forced to admit that it is a common and accepted practice at Walmart
for individuals buying more than one of the same item to tell the clerk ringing them up how many of
such item are being purchased, whereupon the clerk, rather than manually ring up each of the
identical items one by one, merely types in a quantity number after ringing up one of those such items
via scanning its universal parcel code (UPC).
Further, it is quite noteworthy that Judge Howards ruling adopts different language to
describe the chocolate item alleged stolen (Howard: consuming an item of chocolate than that
utilized in the Criminal Complaint of 9/14/11 (Walmarts Frontinos Criminal Complaint (pages 8-9)
indicates said items consisted of: cough drops, chocolate bar) where such an issue was made of the
fact that Frontino was caught lying that he had personally eyewitness Coughlin select and consume
such candy bar from the candy isle, which Frontino admitted was not refrigerated, only for
Frontino to be forced to admit that the UPC of the candy bar he alleged he personally saw Coughlin
select and consume from the candy isle actually belonged to an ice cream bar that would
necessarily need to be located in a refrigerated isle of the store. Such goes to the heart of the lack
of evidence to support Judge Howards conclusion that an item of chocolate that Mr. Coughlin
was seen consuming was the property of Walmart. Apparently, anything one might be consuming
while in a Walmart necessarily belongs to Walmart. Such is obviously rather problematic where
many individual are diabetic, or have problems with low blood sugar, or are alcoholics engaging in
the practice recommended by the Big Book of Alcoholics Anonymous of having some ready
chocolate on hand when they feels such is necessary.
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Further, Judge Howard failed to rule that the alleged fruit of the search incident to arrest
(which Walmarts Frontino testified was a partial package of the very cough drops he alleged that
Coughlin had stolen) was an item that Coughlin had stolen. Rather, Judge Howard ruled that The
evidence is also clear that he was seen and observed to pick up and consume a number of cough
drops . However, Walmarts Frontino testified that he did not see Coughlin consume such
cough drops, even going so far as to describe how the stores internal policies (page 1055:9-28)
prevented him from being able to follow Coughlin into a restroom as he would have like to in an
attempt to witness such alleged consumption. The fruit of such search incident to arrest ought have
been subject to the exclusionary rule in light of NRS 171.136 and NRS 171 (it was not stolen, so it is
dubious to call it fruit) as the fruit of the poisonous tree. But, Judge Howard did deny Coughlins
objections to the admission of such motion to exclude the testimony (as, of course, no physical
evidence (such as packaging, or video) was offered by the City by Walmarts Frontino and the RSIC
tribal police officers as to what was recovered from Coughlins pockets during the search incident to
arrest However, his doing so means the City put on no evidence that Coughlin consumed such
cough drops, and Judge Howards ruling fails to find that Coughlin concealed such cough drops
and left the store with them, but, rather, that Coughlin consumed such in the store then left. There
was no evidence put on by the City to support such beyond Frontino speculating that Coughlin may
have consumed such cough drops in the bathroom:
Page 1055: 3:16:57

Thomas Frontino: on the day in question Stanley Cunningham was the only other person
working for asset protection.
Zach Coughlin: Okay, so is it your testimony that immediately upon my entering the store you
began to follow me?
Thomas Frontino: No, I did not say that. I followed you immediately upon seeing you, and
followed you for approximately half an hour to an hour and I personally witnessed you select
open and consume a candy bar and select, open, and conceal two packages of cough drops.
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Zach Coughlin: Did you tell the police that night that you personally saw the accused
consume the candy bar, but you did you fail to mention anything about personally seeing
anything with regard to the cough drops?
Thomas Frontino: I did not fail to make that note to them, I stopped you specifically for the
candy bar, because after consuming the candy bar and concealing the cough drops you went
into the bathroom with the cough drops, which, per Wal-Mart policy I had to then say well I
can't stop him for the cough drops because you could have flushed the cough drops, you could
have done whatever you wanted with the cough drops, however, I stopped you for the candy
bar and that is why I stopped you... we recovered more walmart merchandise later.

Further, Judge Howard failed to rule just how many cough drops Coughlin did so pick up
and consume (a number), which is problematic in terms of the analysis of whether there was
sufficient evidence to support a conviction here where the receipt for the $83.82 worth of groceries
Walmart admits Coughlin purchased did, in fact, contain an entry with the UPC of a package of the
very brand and type of cough drops Walmart alleged Coughlin consumed without paying for.
Additionally, Judge Howard failed to specify just what the evidence was that he was
referring to (ie, be it eye witness testimony, video evidence, physical evidence, the dubious fruit of an
illegal search incident to arrest and inferences drawn therefrom?). The utter paucity of evidence
here, much less credible evidence is perhaps best underscored by a review of the City Attorneys
Statement of the Facts and legal argument applying such in her Answering Brief (pages 732-733):
"STATEMENT OF FACTS: The City presented testimony through Loss
Prevention Officer Thomas Frontino and Reno Sparks Indian Colony Police
Officer Braunworth in support of the charge of Petit Larceny. The Appellant
zealously cross-examined each witness. Appellant called Reno Sparks Indian Colony
Police Officer Crawford to the stand in his case. There was sufficient evidence for
the trial court to find the Appellant guilty of Petit Larceny.
Respondent is unable to cite to the facts or testimony presented in this case as
the Appellant did not provide either a trial transcript or audio CD. However, should
this Honorable Court receive and review the audio CD, Respondent believes that the
testimony of the City's witnesses provided sufficient evidence to support the
conviction.
LEGAL ARGUMENT...In the instant case, the evidence of guilt was
substantial and uncontroverted. Three witnesses testified during the trial. The
evidence in the case at hand was substantial and is sufficient to establish guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt as determined by a rational trier of fact."

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City Attorney Roberts obviously steered well clear of actually specifying what any of the
evidence actually was (ie, what the witnesses purported to have observed, what was recovered from
the search incident to arrest). Nor, of course, did Roberts actually respond to any of Coughlins
arguments and Statement of the Facts wherein he details the lack of credibility of Walmarts Frontino
incident to his repeatedly contradicting his own testimony (did he or did he not merely witness
Coughlin conceal some cough drops versus consume such? See page 1055 where Frontino admits
he did not see Coughlin consume any cough drops), and where Frontino was caught attesting to have
witnessed Coughlin select and consume such chocolate candy bar from the candy isle only to be
flummoxed upon being forced to admit the UPC of such belong to a refrigerated ice cream bar, and
where Frontino was forced to admit that he earlier testimony that none of the items rung up shared
the UPC of the cough drops was incorrect upon such UPC being found on the $83.82 receipt for the
items Walmart admitted Coughlin purchased. Also, Roberts fails to address the doubt as to whether
Coughlin could have indicated a quantity of cough drops being purchased to the cashier and whether
the cashier merely failed to ring such up, unbeknownst to Coughlin.
Further, Roberts never addresses the fact that the credibility of both Walmarts Frontino and
Officer Crawford is severely undermined where they both were caught lying that Coughlin failed to
provide the necessary information to the officers to issue a citation where the very Walmart
interrogation room videos that Hill (see case 61383) was applying an unlawful rent distraint to (for
which Judge Howard refused Coughlin even one continuance) and Officer Crawfords own entries on
the Probable Cause sheet contradict such. Such is especially dubious given the importance to the
Citys case of getting the alleged fruit (of the search incident to arrest into evidence where Frontino
had already testified that he did not witness Coughlin consume any cough drops) into evidence
(Roberts at the 8:10 pm mark: when they did conduct the search incident to arrest they found
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wrappers that were consistent with the cough drops that Mr. Frontino observed him select and
consume).
Rather, Reno City Attorney Roberts Answering Brief, like her closing argument at trial
consisted solely of circular arguments. City Attorney Roberts closing argument (occurring from 8:05
pm to 8:09 pm or from the 5:38:10 to 5:42:30 mark out of the 5:58:00 long audio recording of the
entire trial available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7C_3JzIoL4 ) consisted of the
following:
Judge Howard: We will proceed to summation. Ms. Roberts, go ahead.

City Attorney Roberts: You Honor the Complaint in this case alleges the
defendant did take or carry away, uh, items belonging to Walmart with the intent
to deprive Walmart of those items, specifically, a candy bar like chocolate bar, or
a chocolate item as described more, but not much more completely, by the
testimony, and the cough drops.
Mr. Frontino, the asset protection agent for Walmart testified that he
personally observed the defendant select some kind of a chocolate bar and
consume that bar an ultimately he recovered the wrapper of that bar. He also
observed the defendant select two different packages of cough drops and he
followed him throughout the store and observed him consume part of those
cough drops. He followed the defendant all the way to the register where the
defendant did purchase some items, including some candy bars and other items.
And, he testified that because he had seen him select and consume a candy
item, the chocolate bar, and the cough drops that he was particularly focusing on
seeing whether or not the Defendant attempt to pay for those items. For example,
take the wrapper and say Here, I ate this but I want to pay for it. He didnt
observe any wrapper or any candy bar that was consistent with the one that he
saw eaten paid for at the cashier.
He did not observe that there were any cough drops that were identical to
the ones he saw the Defendant consume in the store. And then the Defendant
proceeded to go out the door of Walmart without paying for either the candy, er,
chocolate item, or the cough drops. There is testimony that this defendant, Mr.
Coughlin is the person who stole those items, that this happened in the City of
Reno, that the Defendant would have been issued a citation but he failed to
provide the necessary information to the officers to issue a citation. That
information was testified to by both Mr. Frontino as well as Officer Crawford.
Officer Braunworth testified that he was not the primary officer, that he
did not prepare a report, that he did not have an independent recollection of
many of the facts that Officer Crawford testified to. But, Officer Crawford, who
was the primary officer who repaired the report and the P.C. sheet was very
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thorough and had a good recollection of what transpired in the asset protection or
loss prevention office where ultimately Mr. Coughlin was taken into custody for
the shoplifting or petty theft of the candy bar.
They had reason to believe that he had also stole or eaten, or eat, Im
sorry, consumed is the better word, some of the cough drops and that when they
did conduct the search incident to arrest they found wrappers that were
consistent with the cough drops that Mr. Frontino observed him select and
consume.
I believe the City has proved its burden beyond a reasonable doubt. I
dont believe the Defendant has offered any evidence to contradict that, and I
believe the court should find him guilty of petty larceny. Thank you.

Judge Howard did issue a concomitant Order Punishing Summary Contempt
11
at the
conclusion of the trial after having found Coughlin in contempt ten minutes into a five and half hour
long trial (at which point Coughlin moved to disqualify the judge from presiding over the trial of the
contempt a la NRS 22.030(3). Beyond the fact that such contemptuous conduct was obviously not
so grave as to require immediate action by Judge Howard (whom continued to hold another five
hours and twenty minutes of trial, keeping RMC staff and the parties in court until 8:30 pm), any
allegedly contemptuous conduct occurring after such initial contempt finding ten minutes into the
trial had yet to occur in the immediate presence of Judge Howard, and thus Howard violated NRS
22.030(3) in insisting on presiding over the trial of the contempt over Coughlin's objections, which
Coughlin made immediately upon being held in contempt ten minutes into the trial. At such point,
Coughlin also moved for counsel for the trial of the contempt, which Judge Howard summarily
denied as well.
Ten minutes into the trial on 11/30/11 Judge Howard found Coughlin in contempt of court.
Coughlin immediately requested counsel and moved for disqualification of Judge Howard, pursuant
to NRS 22.030(3), Coughlin objecting to Judge Howard presiding over the trial of the contempt,
which Judge Howard indicated he would address at the conclusion of the petty larceny trial, which
did not conclude before another five hours of trial took place.
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Pages 107 contains Judge Howards Order for Summary Punishment of Contempt. There is
not and never has there been a certificate of service attached to or filed for such Order, nor has any
Notice of Entry been filed for such.
Coughlins Notice of Appeal, Motion to Vacate and or Set Aside, JCRCP 59, JCRCP 60,
Motion for Reconsideration; Motion for Recusal; Motion For Publication Of Transcript at Public
Expense, Petition for In Forma Pauperis Status at pages 109-114 clearly indicates he is appealing
both the 11/30/11 Judgment of Conviction and Court Order and the 11/30/11 Order for Summary
Punishment of Contempt
12
.
Coughlin timely filed a post-trial motion and Notice of Appeal
13
of both the 11/30/11
Judgment of Conviction and Court Order and the concomitant 11/30/11 Order for Summary
Punishment of Contempt which Judge Howard refused to adjudicate, where in his 12/15/11 Order he
indicated that Coughlin had not provided a basis for such (Judge Howard wrote: MOTION TO
VACATE AND/OR SET ASIDE, MOTION FOR RECONSIDERA TION AND MOTION FOR
RECUSAL These motions will not be addressed as Defendant Coughlin has not submitted a basis
for their consideration.). (Coughlins 12/13/11 Notice and Motion attached plenty of material (via
disc (see following SkyDrive link) detailing his financial straits and the difficult position he was in as
an attorney whom still owed a duty of representation to clients despite their not paying him very
much: https://onedrive.live.com/cid=43084638f32f5f28&id=43084638F32F5F28%211031) Such
disc/link also contained the Walmart interrogation room videos that Coughlin was prevented from
placing in evidence at trial which clearly undermine the RSIC police officers testimony and
credibility vis a vis the contention that Coughlin failed to provide him his drivers license.
Despite such being Judge Howards duty under NRS 189.030(1), Coughlin ordered the
transcript prepared by contacting the very transcriber the RMC insisted Coughlin must use. Coughlin
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attempted to make payment to such transcriber and she refused to accept such, and further refused to
prepare the transcript. Coughlin apprised the RMC of all of this.
Coughlin filed a timely notice of appeal of both the 11/30/11 "Judgment of Conviction and Court
Order" and the concomitant "Order Punishing Summary Contempt". Coughlin was not appearing on
his own behalf as an attorney representing a client. Rather, Coughlin, whom had never even worked
on a criminal law matter in his career at that point in time, was forced to represent himself. As such,
to whatever extent Coughlin's filing of a notice of appeal was not/is not viewed as the functional
equivalent of a petition for writ of mandamus, Pengilly's holding (ie, that an attorney is not a party,
and thus, an attorney wishing to challenge an order finding him in contempt must do so via a petition
for writ of mandamus) ought not apply to preclude Coughlin from being able to appeal such Order
Punishing Summary Contempt accompanying the Judgment of Conviction and Court Order.
Coughlin was informed by the Reno Municipal Court that he must utilize only its chosen
transcriptionist, Pam Longoni, for the transcript of the trial. Coughlin contacted Longoni on three
separate occasions and she refused to prepare the transcript, and even refused to accept payment from
Coughlin. The RMC provided Coughlin a printed handout explaining its policies, which require all
criminal defendant's to comply with statutes like NRS 4.410(2)(a), despite the fact that such only
applies to civil cases. (See combined record for explication of and facts related to the lack of a
transcript issue at pages 170, 283, 422, 437, 438, 445, 461, 546, 547, 878, 879, 899, 900, and 1121)
(See, also, on transcript issue pages 110, 141, 142, 170, 172, 176, 177, 182, 283, 379, 380, 388, 416,
418, 426, 429, 436-438, 453, 615, 629, 672, Coughlins Supplement to Appellants Opening Brief
even types out verbatim extensive portions of the audio transcript (see pages 675 to 684) and cites to
time markers on the recording of such (making Judge Elliott assertion that Coughlin failed to do so
perplexing and deserving of the very NRAP 40 relief that Judge Elliott refused to even consider
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where his 8/27/12 Order alleged he lacked jurisdiction to do so upon automatically remanded the case
to the RMC at the time of issuing his 3/15/12 Order Affirming the Ruling of the RMC) at pages 674
to 681 which illustrates in particular the reversible error incident to the denial of a continuance to
Coughlin where an unlawful rent distraint was being applied to exculpatory materials (see 61383) and
again at 1043 to 1062; see, also 912, 912, 918, 1020, 1021, 1039, 1120, 1121, 1164, and 1167).
On 12/14/11 (Judge Howards ultra quick Order
14
denying
15
such of 12/15/11 (pages 141-
143) mistakenly indicates that Coughlin filed such on 11/14/11) Coughlin filed a Financial Inquiry
Application and Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperis
16
attesting to having a monthly income of $800,
$700 in one checking account, one vehicle only (a $1,000 1996 Honda Accord) and monthly
expenses of $900.
17

Judge Howard's 12/15/11 Order reads:
"On November 30, 2011, Defendant Coughlin was found guilty of the offense
of Petit Larceny, a violation of RMC 8.10.040. Thereafter, Appellant filed his Notice
of Appeal on December 13, 2011. Additionally, Defendant Coughlin filed a Motion
to Vacate and/or Set Aside, Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for Recusal and
Motion for Publication of Transcript at Public Expense. Appellant Coughlin
requested that he be provided the RMC trial transcript at public expense on the
basis that he was indigent. On November 14, 2011, (NOTE: Judge Howard
misstates the filing date of such by one month, as such was filed on 12/14/11
18
:)
Defendant Coughlin filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis wherein he seeks a
waiver of certain fees due to his asserted indigence....
B. MOTION FOR PUBLICATION OF TRANSCRIPT AT PUBLIC
EXPENSE and MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS Defendant
Coughlin cites to NRS 12.015 as authority for allowing him to issue "any, necessary
writ, process, pleading or paper without charge, with the exception of jury fees
because I lack sufficient financial ability to proceed without this waiver". Appellant
Coughlin's reference to NRS 12.015 is misplaced as that provision refers to civil
procedure. He cites no other authority for his request.
This case has gone to verdict and the defendant was found guilty. It is
difficult to see what additional costs will be incurred by Appellant Coughlin
other than the trial transcript. This is not a complex case with numerous factual
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or legal issues. Mr. Coughlin is a licensed attorney-at-law who implied during trial
that his incarceration for contempt would adversely affect his clients. Yet, Mr.
Coughlin, in his "affidavit of poverty" does not indicate any income from his
practice of law. Of note, Mr. Coughlin posted cash bail during the litigation of
the instant matter. This Court has not been provided sufficient information to
determine Mr. Coughlin's indigency status and will not grant him carte blanche
authority to continue the fishing expedition he conducted during the trial of this
matter. Appellant's motion to further pursue this matter at public expense is denied.
C. MOTION TO VACATE AND/OR SET ASIDE, MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION FOR RECUSAL
These motions will not be addressed as Defendant Coughlin has not
submitted a basis for their consideration.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Coughlin's Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis and Motion for Publication of Transcript at Public Expense is
DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside,
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Recusal are presently DENIED. DATED
this 15 day of December, 2011. /s/ Judge Kenneth Ray Howard"
"We note that while the determination of a party's indigency status is
generally within the trial court's sound discretion and, therefore, entitled to great
deference on review, it is also subject to careful scrutiny when it involves the
protection of basic constitutional rights.21 (FN 21...We believe that this case
presents one of the limited scenarios where consideration of a party's earning
capacity is relevant.) ...While a contemnor's private liberty interest in personal
freedom is indeed an important interest to consider, it is not on par with that of
the accused in a criminal prosecution....." Rodriguez v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct.,
102 P.3d 41, 120 Nev. 798 (2004). Rodriguez involved a child support contempt
hearing. See page 591 of record.
AMJUR Criminal Law: XXII. Rights Pertaining to Nature or Conduct of
Trial or Other Critical Stage of Prosecution J. Assistance of Counsel 2. Right As
Requiring Appointment of Counsel for Indigent Accused 1111. Who is
indigent or otherwise sufficiently impecunious for purposes of entitlement
to appointed counsel Determination of indigency of accused entitling him to
appointment of counsel, 51 A.L.R.3d 1108...The fact that a defendant is
employable,[FN7] has previously retained counsel,[FN8] owns valuable
property,[FN9] or has succeeded in obtaining his or her release on bail[FN10]
does not compel a conclusion that he or she is not indigent.
[FN7] Baldwin v. State, 51 Md. App. 538, 444 A.2d 1058 (1982). [FN8]
State v. Dubrock, 649 S.W.2d 602 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). [FN9] State v.
Masilko, 226 Neb. 45, 409 N.W.2d 322 (1987); State v. Lathe, 132 Vt. 631, 326
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A.2d 147 (1974). [FN10] Hancock v. State, 26 Ark. App. 107, 760 S.W.2d 391
(1988); Vera v. State, 689 So. 2d 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1997); State v.
Hesse, 110 Idaho 949, 719 P.2d 1209 (1986). Trial judge only possesses restricted
discretion to limit an indigent defendant's state constitutional right to counsel by
certifying, in writing, before trial that the defendant will not be imprisoned. State
v. Kelly, 999 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 2008).

Also troubling is the extent to which the RMC granted Coughlin the right to submit filings via
email, and, in fact, included some such filings in the record (such as that found at page 25, which
Coughlin submitted to the RMCs Chief Filing Office Supervisor Donna Ballard via email only, and
only after receiving Ballards written permission to so submit filings), only to fail to transmit the disc
attached to Coughlins 12/12/11 (which the RMC stamped 12/13/11) Notice of Appeal and Motion
for New Trial (the RMC instead, at page 135, transmitted only a picture of the disc, with some
unnamed RMC employee interlineating unable to image cd located in exhibit room thereon.
Further, the version of such filing that the RMC did place in the record on appeal was missing the
final 793 pages of such filing, Ballard retroactively revoking her earlier express written permission to
submit filings electronically (and RMC Rule 5 allows for filing by facsimile, and the 1996
Telecommunications act defines such as including electronic mail, see, also NRS 178.589). The
complete 893 page version of such filing electronically mailed to the RMCs Ballard is available here
(NOTE: such does not include the videos located on the disc that was attached to the physical version
of such filing Coughlin filed upon growing more and more weary of the RMC (afraid it would reneg,
unannounced, with no prior notice, on the written permission obtained to submit filings by electronic
mail. Such physical version bares further indicia of Coughlins indigency as he was so low on
money he was forced to print such off at four pages per page, and even then, could only do so for the
first 107 pages of such 893 page filing (see pages 115-116 of the record on appeal wherein
Coughlins Index to Exhibits for such motion notes such 893 page pdf file collection of materials
supporting the Motion For Publication Of Transcript at Public Expense, Petition for In Forma
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Pauperis Status Coughlin submitted therewith.
19
Regardless, pages 408 to 413 of the record on
appeal contain copies of the very e-mail to the RMC (with pdf attachments containing such 893 page
filing so detailing Coughlins indigency statuts and the extent to which his being an attorney license
to practice law in Nevada incident to having only taken on his first clients as a solo practitioner (after
having been fired from Washoe Legal Services, which claimed to fire Coughlin solely on the basis of
a sanction that was ultimately vacated by the judge issuing such one month after WLSs fired
Coughlin) in August 2011), then actively representing a number of clients, actually made it more
difficult for him to suddenly come up with enough money to hire private counsel.
While the contents of such disc further undermine Judge Howards dubious contention in his
12/15/11 Order that the court has not been provided sufficient information to determine (Mr.
Coughlins) indigency status, such is still manifest from what the RMC did transmit in the record, as
Coughlins filings detail the chaotic, difficult time he was having starting up a law practice in the
shadow of a wrongful no cause summary eviction against his home law office in violation of the
prohibition against such in NRS 40.254, especially considering the Reno Justice Court had dubiously
ordered Coughlin deposit $2,275 in rent escrow per NRS 118A.355(5)s withholding of rent
provision where the landlord was not claiming any rent was owed (a necessary trade-off for the ease
of litigating a no cause summary eviction compared to defending against the habitability and
retaliation claims arising in a non-payment based summary eviction) and where Coughlin indicated
he had not withheld any rent. The fact that Coughlin was arrested for criminal trespass at his former
law office shortly before the trial here (which Judge Howard was made well aware of via Coughlins
filing and the fact that Howard was forced to continue the 11/14/11 trial date due to Coughlin having
been transported to the RMC in custody wearing the red clothing (see NRS 178.415) the jail provides
those it feels need to be placed in administrative segregation due to mental health issues) only further
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underscored Coughlins indigency status. Coughlin also made Judge Howard aware of the fact that
the Reno Justice Court had converted such $2,275 rent escrow deposit it required of Coughlin to
preserve his right to defend against such summary eviction into some bond on appeal that was ten
times the amount required under NRS 40.385 to obtain the very stay during the pendency of such
appeal of the 10/25/11 Order summarily evicting Coughlin (which Howard was provided notice of
and a copy of in writing prior to his 12/15/11 Order) that the RJC was purported to have denied
Coughlin sufficient to allow for his custodial arrest for trespassing and the concomitant bail required
there (and revocation of the previous bail he had posted)
Further, the serious damage to Coughlins only real property of any value at the time of Judge
Howards denial of counsel (ie, Coughlins license to practice law in consideration of SCR 111(6)) is
absolutely a factor
20
that can and should have been considered as weighing in favor of not only
appointing counsel, but also for ordering the transcript prepared and filed with the district court
(beyond the fact that NRS 189.030(1) requires have been done by Judge Howard regardless of
whether Coughlin was able to force the court reporter the RMC insisted upon to accept his down
payment or not.
Judge Howards 12/15/11 Order appears to have denied Coughlins Motion for New Trial
before City Attorney Roberts was even able to file her 12/21/11 Opposition
21
to such:
Judge Howard entered an order on February 5th, 2014 refusing to rule on Coughlins Motion
for New Trial and any supplemental thereto and threatening Coughlin with incarceration for contempt
if he filed anything further in the case.
On 12/16/11 (before Judge Howards 12/15/11 Order was even mailed to Coughlin according
to the RMCs certificate of service thereon) and on 12/19/11, Coughlin filed the functional
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equivalents of a reconsideration motion
22
of Judge Howards 12/15/11 Order denying Coughlins
motion for publication of the transcript at public expense.
Coughlins 12/19/11
23
Application for Deferral Or Waiver of Court Fees and Costs;
Declaration and Supplement to Motion tor New Trial, Directed Verdict, Motion to Set Aside both the
Contempt in Court's Presence Summary Finding and the Theft Conviction, at page 288 of the
12/23/11 ROA contains the Index to Exhibits to Coughlins 12/19/11 Notice ofOther Tolling
Motions, etc., which further clarifies Coughlins indigent status (and rebuts Judge Howards
basis for denying Coughlins indigency application where Judge Howard wrote: Mr. Coughlin is
a licensed attorney-at-law who implied during trial that his incarceration for contempt would
adversely affect his clients. Yet, Mr. Coughlin, in his "affidavit of poverty" does not indicate any
income from his practice of law. Of note, Mr. Coughlin posted cash bail during the litigation of the
instant matter. This Court has not been provided sufficient information to determine Mr. Coughlin's
indigency status) and explains how little income he had from the practice of law
24
at such point,
and contrasts such sharply with the difficulty and length of two filings for clients he thereafter
attaches for which he was paid only $250 each:
2. Sample of Coughlin's recent work as an attorney, for which he has been paid a
grand total of $250 so far Carpentier v. Aames CV08-1709, 3. Another sample of Coughlin's
work, for which he was paid $250: Cadle V Keller AP in BK.

District Court Judge Elliott entered on 1/5/12 an Order
25
which made law of the case the fact
that the record on appeal had already been filed, making any purported subsequent affirming of
the ruling here based upon Coughlins alleged failure to (see 3/15/12 Order Affirming the Ruling of
the RMC at page 911-913) meet his burden in providing an adequate appellate record, sufficient
to required that this Court must affirm the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court clearly erroneously
and patently misleading to boot:
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Coughlin pointed out that, due to Judge Howards announcing the last part of his decision at
the close of trial on 11/30/11 out of the presence of one of the parties (the City Attorney),
Additionally, a Notice of Entry of Order here from the RMC is likely required given the Order was
complete outside the presence of one of the parties (made in absentia), and therefore rendition of
Order is likely not sufficient. As such, jurisdiction could not have vested with the district court as
the deadline to file a notice of appeal has still yet to begin running.
26

On 12/16/11 Coughlin filed: http://www.scribd.com/doc/225500440/12-16-11-Coughlin-s-
Application-for-Deferral-or-Waiver-of-Court-Fees-and-Costs-2064-22176-60838 (pages 150-173 of
the record) and http://www.scribd.com/doc/225477213/12-16-11-2064-Motion-for-Publication-of-
Transcript-at-Public-Expense-22176 Both counter Judge Howards purported basis for finding
Coughlin to have not provided sufficient information to determine whether or not he was indigent.
The Reno City Attorney's Office did not move to have Coughlin's appeal dismissed on the
basis of any failure on Coughlin's part to file the transcript, and thus the RCA waived any such
basis for denying Coughlins appeal, and so limited the adjudicatory boundaries upon which Judge
Elliott could do so. The appellate judge's 3/15/12 "Order Affirming the Ruling of the Reno
Municipal Court" did not dismiss Coughlin's appeal. It is not clear what "ruling" such 3/15/12 Order
in the appeal in CR11-2064 is affirming, as such 3/15/12 Order fails to even indicate which "ruling"
Coughlin was appealing ("Presently before the Court is an Appeal from a ruling of the Reno
Municipal Court..."; ie, whether the Order Punishing Summary Contempt, or the Judgment of
Conviction and Court Order, or both).
In his appellate order Judge Elliott invoked NRAP and a case applying the NRAP despite the
fact that state law under NRS 189 and NRAP 1
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makes clear that NRAP does not apply to appeals to
district courts of municipal court convictions, where such reads:
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Coughlin again requested court appointed counsel at the appellate level
28
, and for the
transcript to be produced at public expense
29
, in addition to requesting an extension of time to file his
brief. All such motions were denied.
30

Coughlin sought an extension of time to file his brief based on the RMCs failure to comply
with NRS 189.030(1) in its failing to file the transcript, or even order it prepared (pages 650-656).
The Reno City Attorneys Office did not file a Motion to Dismiss based on the lack of a transcript
being filed in the district court. Not having been granted any extension, Coughlin, under protest,
filed a brief within the deadline originally set out in the Order for Briefing Schedule. Such Brief
attached the audio recording of the trial the RMC required Coughlin to pay $35.00 despite his
extreme indigency at such point. The brief references time points on the recording and page
numbers and filing dates of various filings in the 12/23/11 record on appeal filed by the RMC
(the RMC failed to number the pages of such 352 page filing or place and bates stamping
thereon, despite NRAP 9, 10, and 11 requiring a variety of things of the district court clerk and
court reporter vis a vis the record and transcript, none of which were fulfilled here, seeing as how
NRAP supposedly applies to appeals to the district courts and all).
Coughlin filed an Opening Brief and Supplement thereto
31
that cited to the portions of both
the 352 page 12/23/11 record on appeal filed by the RMC and the audio transcript (via time markings
and in several cases accompanied with verbatim transcriptions prepared by Coughlin himself)
Coughlin himself obtained from the RMC and filed with the 2JDC and served on the Reno City
Attorneys Office, in both hard copy and digital transmission. Further, such audio transcript was
linked to at page 178 of the record. As such, while the City did not file a Motion to Dismiss based on
the lack of a transcript, its Answering Brief did dubiously attempt to allege some prejudice to its
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ability to defend inherent to such purported failure. However, Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order made no
note of such.
Further, Coughlins 1/30/12 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal (which did not cite any
failure to file the transcript as a basis for such) is the functional equivalent, in many ways, to a
Supplement to the Appellants Brief, as was Coughlins 2/1/12 Supplement to his Opposition to the
Citys Motion to Dismiss
32
, each of which where the functional equivalents of a sufficient substitute
for a verbatim transcript (a proposed statement of facts that the Reno City Attorney failed to object to
or dispute in any way, which is telling), particularly where Coughlin also provided the complete
audio recording of the trial from the RMC (and cited to minute markings therein, in addition to pages
from the 352 page 12/23/11 record on appeal filed by the RMC):
The City Attorney filed an Answering Brief which utterly failed to address any of Coughlins
contentions and similarly failed to actually specify any evidence and the specifics relative thereto to
support its contention that there existed sufficient evidence to affirm the conviction.
33

The district court judge, in his appellate capacity, entered a 3/15/12 Order Affirming the
Ruling of the Reno Municipal Court"
34
purporting it to be Coughlins (pages 910-914) which
held:
In light of Appellant's failure to provide this Court with an adequate
appellate record, and Appellant's correspondent failure to cite to such a record,
this Court is unable to conduct a meaningful review of Appellant's appeal. Thus,
Appellant has failed to meet his burden in providing an adequate appellate
record
35
, and this Court must affirm the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court.
36


Coughlin filed a timely functional equivalent of an NRAP 40 Petition for Rehearing
37

(arguing that the RMC had failed in its duties to transmit that required of it under NRS 189), which
the district court judge then refused to adjudicate, indicating in his 8/27/12 Order
38
denying such that:
On March 15, 2012, this Court entered an Order denying the Appeal and affirming the decision of
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the Municipal Court. This Court no longer has jurisdiction over this case and the Appellant's
Motion for New Trial is moot.. However, NRAP 40 provides that Coughlin is to have 18 days to
file such after any order disposing of his appeal, and that remittitur shall not occur until the passing of
such period of time. Judge Elliott, after all, invoked NRAP 28, 30, and 32 in affirming the ruling of
the RMC.
39

A loose but apt analogy may be found in our criminal practice. A Rule 59(e) motion is the
functional equivalent of a motion for a new trial or, on appeal, of a petition for rehearing." Bruce
v. 2. Bruce, 587 So. 2d 898, 903 (Miss. 1991)).
A case from Utah, Falkner v. Lindberg, 288 P. 3d 1097 (Utah 2012)
40
is instructive here,
especially where Utahs Rules of Appellate Procedure parallel NRAP 1 in specifying the
applicability of such to certain courts of which neither the court there nor the court here (ie,
NRAP does not apply to appeals from the justice courts (or, as here, from a municipal court that is
allegedly a court of record) to the district court), are included amongst and as to whether the
relationship between remittitur and jurisdiction, concluding that remand to the justice court does not
necessarily divest the district court of jurisdiction. However, one key distinction between such and
the issues arising here is that this Utah case did not involve a question of whether a district
court, borrowing the jurisdictional principles from a set of rules of appellate procedure that do
not apply to it (but, rather, to high courts in such state) may apply one such rule where such
expressly contradicts a statute requiring the filing of the transcript by a justice or municipal
court of record with the district court, as NRS 189.030(1) plainly does in Nevada:
Judge Stiglich took over this case from Judge Elliott and entered an 8/23/13 Order providing:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Coughlin's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis filed on July
31, 2013 is GRANTED. However, neither the RMC nor the 2JDC has ordered the transcript of the
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trial prepared. Coughlin has a pending Petition for Writ of Mandamus to so required the RMC to file
such.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Reinstatement may be both automatic and retroactive if the conviction is reversed. In re
McDonald, 292 Ala. 426, 296 So. 2d 141 (1974). In such a jurisdiction, where a suspension was
based solely on the attorney's conviction of a felony, reversal of the conviction and dismissal of the
indictment mean the basis for the suspension has been eliminated, and the suspension must be
revoked and the attorney's right to practice law restored. Application of Weinstein, 240 Or. 555, 402
P.2d 751 (1965).
41

Such a reversal may authorize the court to vacate or modify the disbarment. N.Y.Matter of
Glucksman, 57 A.D.2d 205, 394 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1st Dep't 1977). A lawyer's application for
reinstatement based upon a reversal of the felony conviction, regardless of the ground for reversal,
should not place upon the lawyer the burden of proving that he is innocent of the underlying charges
Barash v. Ass'n of Bar of City of New York, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 228 N.E.2d 896 (1967).
Where conviction on which disbarment was based had been subsequently set aside on appeal
and indictment had been dismissed, and no specific charges of misconduct were filed by bar
association which had notice of application for readmission, petition for readmission would be
granted Application of Docherty, 42 A.D.2d 117, 345 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1973).
While lawyer disbarred for felony conviction is not entitled automatically to reinstatement
upon reversal of the conviction, he is, nevertheless, entitled either to prompt reinstatement on his
application or to the institution of proceedings to preclude him from reinstatement on the basis of
charges and proof sufficient to debar him. Barash v. Ass'n of Bar of City of New York, 20 N.Y.2d
154, 228 N.E.2d 896 (1967). Should the State Bar of Nevada or NNDB feel the Recommendation
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on appeal in 62337 is tantamount to such, the recent Orders of Dismissal vacating the lion's share of
what the Panel cited as the basis for its Recommendation should operate to defeat such position,
where the criminal trespass and the criminal contempt convictions were vacated by such 4/8/14
Orders in RMC 11 CR 26405 (criminal trespass) resulting in purported RPC 8.4(b) "criminal act
which reflects adversely on...fitness as an attorney" and RMC 11 TR 26800 ("criminal" contempt
"conviction" resulting in purported RPC 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(c) violations (both of which factored
heavily in aggravating factors analysis).
Reversal of 1964 judgment of conviction destroyed it as support for order of suspension from
bar of federal district court. In re Echeles, 374 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1967)
The crux of my argument (as set out in skeletal form in the attached 5/7/14 SCR 111(10)
Petition for Reinstatement) is that the appellate court remanded the matter I appealed "for all further
proceedings" (plural). The big questions are:
1. Why did the appellate court use the term "ruling" (as in "Order Affirming the Ruling of the
Reno Municipal Court") rather than the term "conviction" or "judgment of conviction". Is the term
"ruling" not rather strange a choice in such a setting? Does it not lend a more narrow sense than that
necessary to affirm a conviction?
Matters are further muddied by the fact that I was forced to represent myself in such trial and
was found in summary contempt, per NRS 22.030 via an 11/30/11 file stamped "Order for Summary
Punishment of Contempt" separate and distinct from the 11/30/11 "Judgment of Conviction and Court
Order" (ordering community service be performed) given three days in jail (which I appealed and or
filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus as to where Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Assoc.,
116 Nev. 646, at 650, 5 P.3d 569 (2000), seems to make possible that I, then a pro se licensed attorney
was found in contempt in a capacity other than that of "a party"). So, the "ruling" alluded to is
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arguably the summary contempt conviction, or, perhaps, even the order to perform community
service.
Arguably the only "ruling" that could be "affirmed" in such circumstance would be that of a
summary contempt order pursuant to NRS 22.030, where some jurisdictions hold such to be civil,
rather than criminal, or a mixture of civil and criminal, and having a lower burden of proof than a
criminal case, and, therefore, are not accorded all the procedural protections given in criminal matters
(like the transcript on appeal required by NRS 189.030(1) where NRS 4.410(2)(a) expressly limits
the application of such to "in a civil case").

(Nevada law seems to distinguish between a "ruling" and a "conviction": "... We disagree,
approve the ruling and affirm the conviction..." Dawes v. State, 110 Nev. 1141, 881 P.2d 670 (Nev.,
1994). Arabia v. State, 82 Nev. 453, 421 P.2d 952, (Nev., 1966) ...suppress evidence of his possession
of the marijuana and he appeals from that order and his conviction. We feel the ruling was correct and
affirm the conviction ... Woerner v. State, 85 Nev. 281, 453 P.2d 1004 (Nev., 1969 ) ...prior to both
trials, and the motions were denied. Likewise, motions for new trials were denied. We agree with the
rulings of the trial judges, and we affirm both convictions. Woerner v. State, 85 Nev. 281, 453 P.2d
1004 (Nev., 1969)
2. What is there to remand if the conviction was affirmed? What is meant by "remanded for
all further proceedings" if not a reference to NRS 189.035's mandate to remand for new trial where
the transcript is defective, where NRS 189.030(1) makes it the justice or muni court judge (if such so
designated a court of record by local ordinance)'s duty to order the transcript prepared and file such
within 10 days of the filing of the notice of appeal.
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It seems to me a district court judge ought not be permitted to rewrite NRS 189.030(1) by
glomming NRS 4.410(2)(a) on thereto, especially where such expressly provides such applies only to
civil cases.

Reversal on procedural grounds: A suspended attorney was not entitled to removal of a
suspension order, when the initial murder conviction was overturned on procedural grounds, absent a
showing that he would probably avoid a guilty verdict in a second trial. Matter of Strickland, 258 Ga.
50, 365 S.E.2d 410 (1988).
The materials and analysis provided herein are offered in an effort to demonstrate such.
42


Respectfully submitted DATED this 5/22/14



/s/ Zachary Barker Coughlin
Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No 9473
1471 E. 9
th
St.
Reno, NV 89512
Tel and Fax: 949 667 7402
Attorney for Petitioner


CERTIFICATE/DECLARATION OF ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN PURSUANT TO
SCR 111(10)
STATE OF NEVADA)
ss.
COUNTY OF WASHOE)

Comes Now, Declarant, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, being first duly sworn, deposes
and says under penalty of perjury and certifies the following is true and correct:
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1. I am subject attorney in the above-referenced matter, have personal knowledge of the facts
contained herein and am competent to attest thereto, and I hereby declare that all assertions I have
made herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.
Respectfully submitted DATED this 5/22/14



/s/ Zachary Barker Coughlin
Zachary Barker Coughlin, Esq.


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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 22nd, 2014 a true and correct copy of the foregoing
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT PURSUANT TO SCR 111(10) was
submitted for electronic filing to be electronically served upon the State Bar of Nevada's Patrick O.
King and or David Clark:





/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin,


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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225561745/5-10-12-0204-60838-SCR-111-6-Petition-Over-22176-11-
30-11-Walmart-Conviction-Compare-to-SCR-111-4-Beckett-Petition-for-Nrs-199-280-Conviction-
and-Sc
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225561745/5-10-12-0204-60838-SCR-111-6-Petition-Over-22176-11-
30-11-Walmart-Conviction-Compare-to-SCR-111-4-Beckett-Petition-for-Nrs-199-280-Conviction-
and-Sc
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225316199/12-23-11-to-9-8-13-0204-62337-all-filings-except-RMC-
ROA-from-22176-in-2064-60838-ocr
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225396260/10-26-11-Coughlin-s-Application-and-Affidavit-for-
Appointment-of-Counsel-and-Judge-Howard-s-Order-Denying-Violate-2008-Indigent-Defense-
Order-Judicial

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A judges refusal to appoint counsel to assist indigent defendants constituted willful
misconduct in office..." In re Whitney, (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 1 [56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 705, 922 P.2d 868].
See, also, Discipl. Counsel v. Elum, 979 N.E. 2d 289.


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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225477214/11-3-11-Coughlin-s-Mtn-Reconsideration-or-Vacate-Order-
Denying-Right-to-Counsel-Motion-to-Dismiss-60838-2064-22176
Such is found at ages 18-20 of the record Trevino v. State 555 SW.2d 750 Formerly
110k641.2(4), 110k641 .2 Tex.Crim.App.,1977 Criminal defendants in misdemeanor cases are enti-
tled to counsel if there exists a possibility that imprisonment may be imposed.: In addition to the
requirements set forth in specific definition of indigency in its Administrative Docket 411 Order of
January 4, 2008, which can be found at http://www.nevadaJudiciary.us/index.php/vlewdocu-
mentsandforms/func-startdown/70/ , and is commonly referred to as the Indigent Defense Order.
The definition is a follows: A person will be deemed 'indigent' who is or earn less than
200 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines. A defendant is presumed to have a substantial hard-
ship if he or she is currently serving a sentence in a correctional institution or housed in a mental
health facility. Further. I have just been evicted from my home, as such, my ability to defend my-
self and prepare for a Trial on November 14th. 2011 has been severely compromised and would work

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an undue hardship on me, especially to the extent these charges, for which I am innocent, would im-
pact my reputation and job prospects. I do probably make under $10,830, depending upon from when
to when its measure. I am indigent, have barely any money to my name.
The ADKT 0411 Indigent Defense Order also provides that: Defendants not falling below the
presumptive threshold will be subjected to a more rigorous screening process to determine if their
particular circumstances, including seriousness of charges being faced, monthly expenses, and local
private counsel rates, would result in a substantial hardship were they to seek to retain private
counsel.

7
Ultimately, he was not convicted), from which he had been wrongfully evicted on 11/1/11 where the
Washoe County Sheriff failed to abide by the requirement under NRS 40.253 to allow for the passing
of 24 hours from, at the very least, the posting of the summary removal order by the Sheriff at 4:30
p.m. on 11/1/11. Further, at such time, the Reno Justice Court still had not returned to Coughlin the
$2,275 rent escrow deposit it required him to place with the court via NRS 118A.355(5) (where
Coughlin had not claimed to have withheld any rent and the landlord was not alleging any rent owed)
despite such being a no cause summary eviction against a commercial tenant, which is forbidden
under NRS 40.254. At the 10/25/11 summary eviction proceedings conclusion the justice court
judge converted such rent escrow deposit to Coughlins bond on appeal. Per NRS 40.385, only
$250 is required to be posted with the court to obtain a stay of such a summary eviction pending the
appeal.

8
http://www.scribd.com/doc/225495106/11-29-11-Coughlin-s-Mtn-for-Continuance-2064-22176-
60838
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225491460/10-27-11-Order-Denying-Legal-Defender-RMC-Judge-
Howard-11-Cr-22176-60838-Despite-Aigersinger-Mandatory-Authority-Ocr

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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225533051/11-30-11-RMC-Judge-Howard-Judgment-of-Conviction-
and-Court-Order-2064-22176-60838
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225495107/11-30-11-Judge-Howard-s-Order-Summary-Punishment-of-
Contempt-2064-22176-60838
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See, also, page 571: The notice of appeal does and should apply to the Summary Contempt ORder
as well,
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225490010/12-13-11-Final-0204-60838-RMC-11-CR-22176-Notice-of-
Appeal-Motion-to-Vacate-Motion-for-Reconsid-and-Motion-for-Recusal-Stamped-With-Exhbit-and-
Pic-o
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225502859/12-15-11-22176-2064-Order-by-Howard-on-Transcript-
Costs
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Misconduct, including judge's repeated failures to produce transcripts timely, accurately, or
frequently not at all, resulting in eleven appellate reversals of serious felony criminal convictions and
sentences for violation of the defendants' constitutional right to judicial review, and her continuous
lack of cooperation with the court of appeal in securing transcripts for appellate review, amounted
to willful and persistent failure to perform her duty to administer her court in professional and
competent manner, and conduct gravely prejudicial to administration of justice that brought the
judicial office into disrepute. LSA-Const. Art. 5, 25(C); Code of Jud.Conduct, Canon 3, subd. B(1),
8 LSA-R.S. In re Hunter, 2002-1975 (La. 8/19/02), 823 So. 2d 325.
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See generally, Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387 (5th Cir.1982). Issues such as failure to
provide a transcript and failure to timely try a case or have a hearing are clearly related to judicial
duties.
Where prisoner asked to be declared insolvent or to be provided with forma pauperis
transcript, state trial judge's denial of right to appeal by completely and arbitrarily ignoring all
evidence presented resulted in discrimination against prisoner in denying her equal protection of the
laws and depriving her of her liberty without due process of law. Purdy v. U.S., 416 F.2d 1052 (5th
Cir. 1969). A court should not consider a defendant's earning potential in determining indigency.
March v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. 3d 422, 102 Cal. Rptr. 597, 498 P.2d 437, 66 A.L.R.3d 945 (1972);
Nikander v. District Court In and For First Judicial Dist., 711 P.2d 1260 (Colo. 1986).

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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225477213/12-16-11-2064-Motion-for-Publication-of-Transcript-at-
Public-Expense-22176
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Page 18 of the record (Coughlins 11/3/11 Moti0n for Reconsideration, Motion to Vacate or
Set Aside (under Rule 59 and or 60) Order Denying Right to Counsel: Trevino v. State 555 SW.2d
750 Formerly 110k641.2(4), 110k641 .2 Tex.Crim.App.,1977 Criminal defendants in misdemeanor
cases are entitled to counsel if there exists a possibility that imprisonment may be imposed.: In ad-
dition to the requirements set forth in specific definition of indigency in its Administrative Docket
411 Order of January 4, 2008, which can be found at http://www.nevadaJudiciary.us/in-
dex.php/vlewdocumentsandforms/func-startdown/70/ , and is commonly referred to as the Indigent
Defense Order.
The definition is a follows: A person will be deemed 'indigent' who is or earn less than
200 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines. A defendant is presumed to have a substantial hard-
ship if he or she is currently serving a sentence in a correctional institution or housed in a mental
health facility. Further. I have just been evicted from my home, as such, my ability to defend my-
self and prepare for a Trial on November 14th. 2011 has been severely compromised and would work
an undue hardship on me, especially to the extent these charges, for which I am innocent, would im-
pact my reputation and job prospects. I do probably make under $10,830, depending upon from when
to when its measure. I am indigent, have barely any money to my name.
Page 288: 2. Sample of Coughlin's recent work as an attorney, for which he has been paid a
grand total of $250 so far Carpentier v. Aames CV08-1709, 3. Another sample of Coughlin's work,
for which he was paid $250: Cadle V Keller AP in BK (indication by Coughlin of how very little
money he was making in the practice of law doing complicated, time intensive work).
Coughlins 10/26/11 Application for Court Appointed Counsel contained a sworn declaration
that his yearly income was then $11,000, well below 200 percent of the Federal Povery Guidelines,
and at page 379 the another reason Judge Howard coyly references was the fact that Coughlin,
having been arrested for criminal trespass (no conviction thereof) on 11/13/11, was still in custody, in
jail reds (the clothing given to inmates whom have been place in administration segregation due to
mental health concerns; see NRS 178.415 and the mandatory stay pending the resolution of the
competency evaluation such required) (Judge Howard: however, its my recollection, improperly,
that you had failed to appear at the previous proceeding, and that's not correct, uh, there was
another reason as to why we were unable to proceed, so I am going to delete the 24 hours of
community service,), and thus, Coughlin was, at such time, wrongfully denied counsel in this petty
larceny matter as well, given his out of custody status had then changed to being incarcerated.

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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225396475/12-14-11-Coughlin-s-IFP-Motion-Publication-Transcript-
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Public-Expense-22176-60838-0204
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The 893 page version electronically mailed to the RMC is available here:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/225597047/12-13-11-0204-2064-22176-Motion-for-New-Trial-Notice-of-
Appeal-NRS-189-030-1-Requires-RMC-Add-to-ROA-in-CR11-2064-RMC-Deficiencies-Opt

20
For example, in the following cases, the courts applied the de minimis infraction defense to charges
of theft against the defendant. The court in State v. Smith, 195 N.J. Super. 468, 480 A.2d 236 (Law
Div. 1984), held that shoplifting three pieces of bubble gum was a de minimis infraction in light of
the circumstances surrounding the offense. The defendant was charged with shoplifting under N.J.
Stat. Ann. 2C:2011 by concealing three pieces of bubble gum in his pocket at a grocery store. At
the time of the offense, he was a fulltime college student pursuing a degree in electrical
engineering. He argued that his actions were too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction.
The court found that an objective consideration of the surrounding circumstances was authorized.
The court noted that the defendant had no prior record, that a conviction would seriously damage
his ability to find a job in the engineering field, that he had worked his way through college,
and that he had already suffered substantial detriment in his personal life from the notoriety of
his arrest. The court found that the consequences which had already attended the arrest of the
defendant were more punitive than those which would follow conviction. The court also stated that it
was difficult to envision a prosecution more acceptable for the invocation of the discretion granted
the assignment judge than one for the theft of three pieces of bubble gum. Therefore, the court held
that dismissal of the charge against the defendant was warranted.

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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225507197/12-21-11-RCA-Roberts-Oppos-to-Mtn-for-New-Trial-
2064-22176-60838
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225477213/12-16-11-2064-Motion-for-Publication-of-Transcript-at-
Public-Expense-22176
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Page 250: Application for Deferral Or Waiver of Court Fees and Costs; Declaration and
Supplement to Motion tor New Trial, Directed Verdict, Motion to Set Aside both the Contempt in
Court's Presence Summary Finding and the Theft Conviction
Page 286: APPLICATION FOR DEFERRAL OR WAIVER OF COURT FEES AND
COST This is an Application for Deferral of Court Fees and Costs. STATEMENTS MADE TO THE
COURT UNDER OATH. I swear or affirm that the information in this application is true and correct.
I make this statement under the penalty of prosecution for perjury if it is determined that I did not
tell the truth. I am requesting a deferral or waiver of the following fees and costs in my
case: ___X___Filing fees and photocopy fees for the preparation of the record on appeal.
___X___Court reporters fees of reporters or transcribers employed by the court for the preparation
of the transcript. The basis for the request is: 1. WAIVER: I am permanently unable to pay. My
income and liquid assets are insufficient or barely sufficient to meet the daily essentials of life and
unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 2. DEFERRAL: a. My income is insufficient or is
barely sufficient to meet the daily essentials of life, and includes no allotment that could be
budgeted for the fees and costs that are required to gain access to the court. B. I do not have the
money to pay the court fees and costs now. I do not know if I can pay the fees and costs at a later
date....Pursuant to NRS 53.045, I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and
correct. Executed on December 16, 2011

http://www.scribd.com/doc/225505974/12-19-11-Coughlin-s-Declaration-and-Supplement-to-
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Mobon-Tor-New-Tnal-Directed-Verdict-Mohon-to-Set-Aside-Both-the-Contempt-in-Court-s-
Presence-Suurrua
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Incidentally, the State Bar has sought to have Coughlin disbarred irrevocably (see 62337) based
upon another of its characteristic errors relative to Coughlins 12/14/11 Motion for Publication of
Transcript at Public Expense in 11 CR 22176 and Judge Howards Order denying such, which
misstates the date of filing such as 11/14/11, rather than 12/14/11). The State Bars 8/23/12
Complaint alleged:
17. Respondent filed Affidavits of Poverty in Support of his Motion to
Proceed Informa Pauperis, wherein he fails to disclose that he is a licensed attorney
and instead under Employment and Self-Employment he identifies himself as a
"Jack of All Trades".
18. Despite a claim of poverty in the above mentioned affidavits, Respondent
told the Court that his incarceration for contempt would adversely affect his clients.
(NOTE: the State Bar does not actually plead or allege the basis for a quasi-RPC 8.4-
c violation that the Panel ultimately cites (ie, failed to identify any income from the
practice of law is not mentioned at all in the SBNs Complaint, in violation of In re
Schaefer) as a finding of fact to support its conclusion of law at R1367:10-11 that
such was tantamount to an RPC 8.4(c) violation ((JJJ) The record, as described at
length above, establishes several violations of RPC 8.4(c). See parag. (AA), (BB),
(CC), (AAA), (BBB) and (CCC)).

See 12/14/12 Recommendation by NNDB in 62337:

32. The record also indicates that Coughlin had also filed a motion on
November 14, 2011 to proceed In Forma Pauperis in case number 11CR 22176
pending in the Reno Municipal Court before Judge Kenneth R. Howard. See Hearing
Exhibit 10. Judge Howard's Order denying Coughlin's motion specifically noted that
Coughlin's "affidavit of poverty" did not identify any income from the practice of
law yet Coughlin had implied to the court when sentenced to incarceration for
contempt that his incarceration would adversely affect his clients. See Hearing
Exhibit 10, P 2, L 19 -23.
Candor to the Tribunal
(Z) RPC 3.3(a)(1) states "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (m)ake a false
statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement .of material
fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer."
(CC) The record also establishes that Coughlin was less than candid with the
Court in two separate applications to proceed in forma pauperis, when he failed to
disclose his true occupation as an attorney and instead indicated he was self-
employed as a "Jack of all Trades" failed to identify any income from the practice
of law after having represented to the court that his incarceration would adversely
affect his clients. Supra Parag. 31 & 32

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ORDER FOR BRIEFING SCHEDULE
The record on appeal in the above-entitled matter having been filed with the
Clerk of this Court on December 23, 2011;
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant file and
serve on Respondent an Opening Brief within thirty (30) days of the date of this
Order. The Opening Brief shall contain a statement of the errors committed in
Reno Municipal Court, with accompanying authorities, and shall not exceed five
pages. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall file and serve on
Appellant an Answering Brief, which shall not exceed five pages, within twenty
(20) days after the filing date of Appellant's Opening Brief. IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that Appellant's failure to file an Opening Brief within the time
limitation hereinabove stated shall be deemed an admission that the appeal was
not well founded and shall constitute adequate grounds for dismissal of the
appeal. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that upon the briefs having been filed, the
matter should be submitted by Appellant pursuant to WDCR 12(4). This Court
will take the matter under submission without oral argument. DATED this S day
of January, 2012. /s/ Judge Steven P. Elliott"

26
See page 579: McCrary v. McCrary, 764 P.2d 522, 1988 OK 122 (Okla. Nov 01, 1988) (NO.
62,814) judgment is deemed rendered only when its *527 terms are announced to the parties by the
judge, and a judgment in absentia is not rendered until notice of its entry is mailed to the parties.
27
"I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES RULE 1. SCOPE, CONSTRUCTION OF RULES (a) Scope of
Rules. These Rules govern procedure in the Supreme Court of Nevada....(e) Definitions of Words
and Terms. In these Rules, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires: ... (3) Clerk
means the clerk of the Supreme Court. (4) Court means the Supreme Court."

28
http://www.scribd.com/doc/225396007/2-15-12-Coughlin-s-IFP-Mtn-on-Appeal-CR11-2064-
2711839-Mtn-Proceed-Forma-Pauperis

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AMJUR Appeals 448. Right of criminal defendant to complete record: indigent criminal
defendant who appeals his conviction is entitled under the federal Constitution's 14th Amendment to
the use of a transcript or other record of his trial which is sufficiently complete to allow consideration
of the errors assigned.[FN1] A state is not required to furnish to the defendant a verbatim
transcript,[ FN3] except where it is necessary to assure him or her as effective an appeal as would be
available to a defendant with financial resources.[FN4]
[FN1] Draper v. State of Wash., 372 U.S. 487, 83 S. Ct. 774, 9 L. Ed. 2d 899 (1963). [FN2]
Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2d 594 (Wyo. 1993). [FN3] State v. DePastino, 228 Conn. 552, 638 A.2d
578 (1994). [FN4] Farbotnik v. State, 850 P.2d 594 (Wyo. 1993). The State is only required to
provide an indigent defendant a record on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of
the errors alleged regarding the proceedings below in order to satisfy due process. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 14. State v. Brunet, 316 P.3d 640 (Idaho 2013).

30
Manifest from the record is the fact that Judge Howard, the judge presiding over the matter, ruled
on Coughlin's application for appointment of counsel and on Coughlin's Motion to Proceed Informa
Pauperis and for Publication of Transcript at public expense despite ADKT 411 prohibiting such.
Clearly, that is why Judge Hardy had to rule on Coughlin's similar motion on appeal, rather than
Judge Elliott, whom was then presiding over such appeal.
2JDC Chief Judge Hardy's 3/5/12 Order (pages 904-905 or combined record) reads:
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"ORDER DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS This Court
has reviewed Zach Coughlin's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and attached affidavit in
support of the motion. "Any person who desires to prosecute or defend a civil action may file
an affidavit with the court setting forth with particular facts concerning his income, property
and other resources which establish that he is unable to prosecute or defend the action because
he is unable to pay the costs of so doing." NRS 12.015(1). This Court finds Mr. Coughlin has
provided insufficient financial information to grant the motion at this time. Mr. Coughlin is a
licensed member of the Nevada State Bar. In his financial declaration, Mr. Coughlin refers to
his employment as "jack of all trades," yet he does not reveal the extent of his business affairs.
Mr. Coughlin shall support any future motion to proceed in forma pauperis with a profit/loss
statement, balance sheet, and sworn affidavit showing the financial nature of his business
affairs. Mr. Coughlin shall also supplement his affidavit with his 2010 and 2011 tax returns.
Alternatively, Mr. Coughlin may pay the requisite fees. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: March'-
, 2012. /s/ David A. Hardy, District Court Judge"
http://www.scribd.com/doc/225396008/3-8-12-0204-2JDC-Chief-Judge-Hardy-Denying-
Coughlin-s-IFP-CR11-2064-2756404-Citing-to-Same-Civil-Statute-NRS-12-015-That-RMC-
Howard-Took-Issue-Coughli
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225386546/2-3-12-CR11-2064-221176-to-RCA-Roberts-
Courtesy-Copy-of-Audio-of-Trail-Exhibit-1-to-Supplement-to-Opposition-to-Motion-to-Dismiss
http://www.scribd.com/doc/225477209/2-7-12-Coughlin-s-Opening-Brief-22176-60838-
CR11-2064-2691386-Opening-Brief http://www.scribd.com/doc/225477211/2-22-12-CR11-2064-
Supplement-to-Appellant-s-Opening-Brief-22176-60838

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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225477217/1-30-12-CR11-2064-Coughlin-s-Opposition-to-
Motion-to-Dismiss-Appeal-22176-60838 http://www.scribd.com/doc/225477216/2-1-12-CR11-
2064-Coughlin-s-Supplement-to-Mtn-to-Dismiss-22176-60838

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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225386547/2-23-12-RCA-Roberts-Answering-Brief-CR11-2064-
22176-60838
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Such 3/15/12 Order held: Although Appellant's arguments on appeal are unclear,
Appellant raises a wide variety of issues, including, inter alia: that he was denied his Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel, that the Municipal Court erred in failing to grant him a
continuance, that the prosecution engaged in misconduct, that he was refused an
opportunity to testify on his own behalf, that certain evidence should have been
suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, that his
conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence, and that "[f]urther improprieties and
due process deficiencies" occurred.
Unfortunately, Appellant neither supports his arguments with relevant authority nor
citations to relevant portions of the record. Most importantly, Appellant has failed to
provide this Court with a copy of the transcript of relevant proceedings in the Reno
Municipal Court. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that an "[a]ppellant has the
ultimate responsibility to provide this court with 'portions of the record essential to
determination of issues raised in appellant's appeal'" Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37 N.
4, 83 P.3D 818 (2004) (citing NRAP 30(b)(3). Further, NRAP 28(e) provides that "[e]very
assertion in briefs regarding matters in the record shall be supported by a reference to
the page of the transcript or appendix where the matter relied on is to be found."
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While Appellant did provide this Court with a Compact Disc containing a
recording of the Municipal Court proceedings, Appellant did not cite to the portions of
the Compact Disc that he felt supported his arguments, and it is not the responsibility
of this Court to guess which portions of the Compact Disc might support Appellant's
arguments.
In short, Appellant did not satisfy his responsibility to supply and cite to relevant
portions of the record merely by producing a Compact Disc recording of the entire
Municipal Court proceeding. In light of Appellant's failure to provide this Court with an
adequate appellate record, and Appellant's correspondent failure to cite to such a record,
this Court is unable to conduct a meaningful review of Appellant's appeal. Thus,
Appellant has failed to meet his burden in providing an adequate appellate record, and
this Court must affirm the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court.1
(Fn 1: 1 It is worth noting that, pursuant to NRS 4.410(2), "[T]he fees for
transcripts and copies [of municipal court proceedings] must be paid by the party ordering
them. In a civil case the preparation of the transcript need not commence until the fees
have been deposited with the deputy clerk of the court." Accordingly, NRS 189.030,
Which requires the municipal court to transmit various papers to the district court
upon appeal, does not require action until such fees have been paid. Here, it appears
that Appellant never paid the requisite fees to secure the transcription of the
proceedings. For this reason, the appellate record is incomplete. )
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the ruling of the Reno
Municipal Court is AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is
remanded back to the Reno Municipal Court for all further proceedings. Dated this 15th
day of March, 2012 /s/ Steven P. Elliott District Judge

35
AMJUR Appellate Review: VI. Record on Appeal
445. Duty to present adequate record
448. Right of criminal defendant to complete record
B. Transcript of Proceedings
449. Necessity for transcript
450. Ordering of transcript, generally
452. Payment for transcript
453. Transcript as inadequate; effect of inadequate transcript
2. Substitution for Transcript
454. Generally
455. Circumstances under which transcript is deemed unavailable
456. Stipulations
457. Agreed statement in federal court
3. Lack of Complete Transcript as Grounds for Reversal of Judgment or New Trial
458. Generally
459. In criminal cases
4. Absence of Transcript, Due to Death or Disability of Court Reporter, as Grounds for Reversal or
New Trial
460. Where notes are transcribed by another reporter
461. Where notes are never transcribed
C. Correction, Amendment, or Supplementation of Record
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462. Generally
463. Court in which record is corrected or amended
464. Nature of corrections or amendments
465. Deletion of matter from record
466. Procedure for correcting or supplementing record

CJS Appellate Review
D. RECORD AND PROCEEDINGS NOT IN ' RECORD, o 1719-1797 1. General Requisites' and
Essentials, 1719-1740 2. Scope and Contents of Record, 1741-1750 3. Bill of Exceptions,
1751-1763 4. Case Made and Statement of Facts, 1764-1^68 5. Abstract of Record, and Transcript
or Return, 1769-1774 6. Defects, Objections, and Amendment br Correction, 1775-1782

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An appellant who elects to appeal based on such a substitute waives the issue of the adequacy of the
record. State v. Rood, 188 W. Va. 39, 422 S.E.2d 516 (1992). Such principle should be applied to the
City's failure to file either a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a transcript (which the RCA
regularly does) or seek a writ from the district court requiring the RMC to obey NRS 189.030(1) and
file such transcript with the district court. Regardless, it has been well established that the lack of a
verbatim transcript does not constitute a constitutional defect when a suitable alternative is provided,
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194, 92 S.Ct. 410, 414, 30 L.Ed.2d 372 (1971). It is plainly
ridiculous to on one hand rule that Coughlin's case is not complex enough to require a transcript (see
Judge Howard's 12/15/11 Order) only for the district court to then allege Coughlin's failure to provide
a verbatim typed transcript provided the basis for affirming the ruling of the RMC. The Supreme
Court in Mayer, supra reasoned that: Alternative methods of reporting trial proceedings are
permissible if they place before the appellate court an equivalent report of the events at trial from
which the appellant's contentions arise. A statement of facts agreed to by both sides, a full narrative
statement based perhaps on the trial judge's minutes taken during trial or on the court reporter's
untranscribed notes, or a bystander's bill of exceptions might all be adequate substitutes, equally as
good as a transcript. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 495, 83 S.Ct. 774, 778, 9 L.Ed.2d 899
(1963).
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http://www.scribd.com/doc/225574773/3-26-12-NRAP-40-Functional-Equivalent-CR11-2064-
2790430 At pages 916 to 993 of combined record.
38
That Judge Elliott 8/27/12 Order reads:

ORDER DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL Presently
before the Court, is a Motion for New Trial, or Pled in the Alternative, Motion to Alter or
Amend filed by Appellant ZACH COUGHLIN ("Appellant'') on March 26, 2012.
Subsequently, on March 27, 2012, Respondent CITY OF RENO ("Respondent'') filed a
Motion to Strike Appellant's Motion for New Trial.
Following, on July 25, 2012, Appellant filed a Motion to Set Aside or Vacate
Conviction and or Order Affirming it. Thereafter, on July 26, 2012, Appellant filed a
Supplemental Motion to Set Aside or Vacate Conviction and or Order Affirming it. On that
same date, Appellant filed a Request for Submission, thereby submitting the matter for the
Court's consideration.
On March 15, 2012, this Court entered an Order denying the Appeal and affirming
the decision of the Municipal Court. This Court no longer has jurisdiction over this case
and the Appellant's Motion for New Trial is moot.
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant's Motion for a New
Trial is DENIED. DATED this 27th day of August, 2012. /S/ Steven P. Elliott District Judge"

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Thus, Judge Elliott lack jurisdiction to even enter his 3/15/12 Order Affirming the Ruling of the
RMC. Further, the practice of 2JDC judges entering brief orders/schedules prior to the RMC
complying with the statutory requirement that it file the transcript within 10 days of the appellant
filing a notice of appeal ought be made to stop, particularly where the RJC and Longoni and Type-
Write services are and have informed appellants that they are only allowed to utilized the RMCs
chosen transcriber, and where the RMC refused to even allow Coughlin to purchase the audio of his
trial for over two weeks from the date of conviction, claiming it would only release such to its
official transcriber, Pam Longoni.
Further, the most salient errors sought to be remedied here, the denial of counsel and refusal
to file the transcript are manifest from the record even without any transcript or citation to such
transcript being found (where SCR 111(6) and ADKT 411 and NRS 189.030(1)/NRS 4.410(2)(a) all
add up to Coughlin being entitled to counsel and a transcript in light of Coughlins 10/26/11
Application for Court Appointed Counsel (swearing under penalty of perjury that his yearly income
met the presumptive indigency threshold set out in ADKT 411) appear on the record as filed by the
RMC in its 352 page 12/23/11 Appeal Proceedings from Municipals Court (which lacks bates
stamping or any pagination).
AMJUR Appeals 453. Transcript as inadequate; effect of inadequate transcript
Appeal and Error 608(1) , Criminal Law 1104(.5), 1109 , Federal Courts 694.1, 698.1 Forms
Am. Jur. Pleading and Practice Forms, Appeal and error 774 (MotionTo dismiss appeal Record
insufficient to permit consideration of claimed errors)
The sufficiency of a transcript in a particular case depends upon the issues presented by
the appeal.[FN1] The fact that a transcript transmitted to an appellate court is not as complete as
might be wished will not preclude resolution of the appeal where the omissions from the transcript
do not prevent meaningful review of the questions raised.[FN2] While the federal courts of appeals
are authorized to dismiss an appeal for failure to file an adequate transcript, it is generally recognized
that the drastic sanction of dismissal should not be imposed for minor infractions of the appellate
rules.[FN7] Thus, in most cases a court of appeals will not dismiss an appeal for failure to file an
adequate transcript, but will rather grant such review as the record allows (NOTE: NRS 189.050 even
specifies that district court judges must judge appeals such as these on the record, and the record
does not automatically include a verbatim transcript), which is to say that the court will generally
not review the factual determinations of the district court but will merely determine whether the
district court's conclusions of law follow from its findings of fact. (NOTE: even if such is applied
here, NRS 171.136 (see page 49:11-14; 505, 687-688 (in Coughlins Supplement to Appellants
Brief); NRS 171.1255 at page 1021-1028, 1087 and Couglins transcription of the audio transcript
therein (Coughlin sorry I just would like to interject here with an objection to the extent that any
information gleaned a recovered for an arrest for a misdemeanor that did not occur within the officers
present should be excluded the actus reus involved in this crime charge is alleged to have occurred
outside of this officers presence and NRS provides that if that is the case no custodial arrest is
permissible as such any search incident to arrest any such custodial arrest should be excluded Howard
Ms. Roberts Roberts Your Honor this officer attempted to build the issue the suspect a citation and it's
his own actions that prevented him from doing's just that because he can't fill out the citation if he
doesn't know the information that the defendant in the suspect in this case was unwilling to give to
him there was a complainant that observed the misdemeanor action and what he is doing is affecting
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arrest based upon statement of an eyewitness that was right there I don't believe there was an
unlawful arrest by this police officer. (5:24:02 p.m.) Howard the objection) makes clear error
Judge Howard ruling admissible the testimony by Walmarts Frontino and Officer Crawford as to the
result of the search incident to such an arrest violative of Nevada law).
[FN1] Elazier v. Detroit Non-Profit Housing Corp., 158 Mich. App. 247, 404 N.W.2d 233
(1987). [FN2] Eldridge v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 105 N.M. 660, 735 P.2d 1166 (Ct. App. 1987).
[FN7] Coats v. Pierre, 890 F.2d 728, 57 Ed. Law Rep. 389, 15 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 583 (5th Cir. 1989).
[FN8] Parrilla-Lopez v. U.S., 841 F.2d 16, 10 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1272 (1st Cir. 1988); Savard v. Marine
Contracting Inc., 471 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1972). [FN9] Birchler v. Gehl Co., 88 F.3d 518, 35 Fed. R.
Serv. 3d 970 (7th Cir. 1996). [FN10] Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22, 22 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 904 (5th Cir.
1992); Syncom Capital Corp. v. Wade, 924 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1991). [FN11] Anuforo v. Dennie, 119
N.C. App. 359, 458 S.E.2d 523 (1995). [FN12] Fisher v. Krajewski, 873 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1989).
When a trial transcript is not provided, the Supreme Court's review is restricted to the allegations of
error that do not require a review of the evidence presented before the district court that has been
memorialized in the transcript. Barrett-Oliver v. Quast, 2013 WY 71, 302 P.3d 909 (Wyo. 2013).
VI. Record on Appeal B. Transcript of Proceedings 2. Substitution for Transcript. 454.
Generally
Appeal and Error 610 , Criminal Law 1104(.5) , Federal Courts 694.1 Rules of appellate
procedure usually provide that where no record was made of proceedings in connection with a
judgment appealed from or where the record thereof is unavailable, the appeal may nonetheless be
decided in the absence of a transcript on the basis of some substitute therefor.[FN1] An appellant
(OR Appellee, in the case of RCA Roberts failing to file a Motion to Dismiss based on lack of a
transcript) who elects to appeal based on such a substitute waives the issue of the adequacy of the
record.[FN2] The procedure for developing a substitute for a transcript commonly requires the
appellant to prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings and to serve the statement upon the
appellee.[ FN3] The appellee may in turn serve objections or proposed amendments to the appellant's
statement on the appellant.[FN4]
[FN1] Woodfin v. Woodfin, 575 So. 2d 597 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991); Mayhood v. Mayhood, 4
Va. App. 365, 358 S.E.2d 182 (1987). Defendant was permitted to demonstrate the inadequacy of the
official record and to reconstruct an adequate record through the use of an unofficial transcript of
proceedings. Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (D. Colo. 2003). [FN2] State v. Rood,
188 W. Va. 39, 422 S.E.2d 516 (1992). [FN3] Fed. R. App. P. 10(c), providing that the statement of
the evidence or proceedings is to be prepared from the best available means, including the appellant's
recollection. Government's proposed statement of evidence was approved, and appeal of Medicare
fraud conviction could proceed in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 10(c), where some trial testimony
had not been transcribed due to lengthy illness of one court reporter. U.S. v. Corcoran, 872 F. Supp.
175 (M.D. Pa. 1993). Use of statement of facts under state rule of procedure, see Woodfin v.
Woodfin, 575 So. 2d 597 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991). [FN4] Fed. R. App. P. 10(c). Alternatively, the trial
court's narrative statement of the facts,[FN8] a bystander's report of the proceedings,[FN9] or a bill of
exceptions[FN10] may be used as a substitute for a transcript of proceedings. No statement or
formulation of the proceedings prepared by only one party may be used in this respect without giving
the opposing party an opportunity to be heard.[FN11] (RCA Roberts had every opportunity to
respond to Coughlin's various functional equivalents thereof and Roberts attempt to claim she did
not receive a copy of the audio transcript from Coughlin is laughable, especially where such was not
only served on her office in hard copy form, but linked to (ie available for streaming and or download
online) in filings found in the record, and emailed to her as well). [FN8] Gonzalas v. Louisiana Power
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and Light Co., 487 So. 2d 1254 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986). [FN9] Bouhl v. Gross, 133 Ill. App. 3d 6,
88 Ill. Dec. 305, 478 N.E.2d 620 (4th Dist. 1985). [FN10] 447. [FN11] U.S. v. Chesapeake & O.
Ry. Co., 281 F.2d 698, 3 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1103 (4th Cir. 1960); Hamid v. Sew Original, 1982 OK 46,
645 P.2d 496 (Okla. 1982).
455. Circumstances under which transcript is deemed unavailable , Appeal and Error
610 , Criminal Law 1104(.5) , Federal Courts 694.1 It has been held that if an official record of the
proceeding exists, it may nonetheless be deemed unavailable for the purposes of appellate rules
governing the preparation and use of substitutes for transcripts, depending upon such matters as the
ability of the appellant to pay for its transcription,[FN1] the willingness of the stenographer to make
the record available,[ FN2] or any other relevant consideration.[FN3] (like RMC Judge Howard's
willful failure to follow the law (which resulted in a judge being removed from the bench in one
case).
[FN1] State ex rel. Motley v. Capers, 23 Ohio St. 3d 56, 491 N.E.2d 311 (1986); Beef N' Bird
of America, Inc. for Use and Benefit of Galbreath v. Continental Cas. Co., 803 S.W.2d 234 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1990). [FN2] Beef N' Bird of America, Inc. for Use and Benefit of Galbreath v. Continental Cas.
Co., 803 S.W.2d 234 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). [FN3] Beef N' Bird of America, Inc. for Use and Benefit
of Galbreath v. Continental Cas. Co., 803 S.W.2d 234 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
459. In criminal cases Criminal Law k1109(3) Federal Courts k694.1, 698.1 Where a
criminal defendant has a statutory right to a complete and accurate transcript of his or her trial, a
criminal conviction may be reversed if such a transcript cannot be obtained.[FN1] [FN1] Whitmire-
Harris v. State, 1993 OK CR 51, 863 P.2d 1255 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993). Although statute
requiring that transcriptions be prepared by the court is mandatory, a violation of its provisions
does not require reversal of a conviction unless the defendant can show that the appellate record
is not adequate to permit meaningful appellate review. People v. Zambrano, 41 Cal. 4th 1082, 63
Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 163 P.3d 4 (2007).
Judge Elliott's 3/15/12 Order Affirming Ruling of the RMC admits just that:
"Most importantly, Appellant has failed to provide this Court with a copy of the transcript of
relevant proceedings in the Reno Municipal Court. The Nevada Supreme Court has held that an
"[a]ppellant has the ultimate responsibility to provide this court with 'portions of the record essential
to determination of issues raised in appellant's appeal.'" Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37 n. 4, 83 P.3d
818 11 (2004) (citing NRAP 30(b)(3)). In light of Appellant's failure to provide this Court with an
adequate appellate record, and Appellant's correspondent failure to cite to such a record, this Court
is unable to conduct a meaningful review of Appellant's appeal.".

Judge Elliotts 3/15/12 Order Affirming the Ruling of the RMC at least hinted that such was
born of purported procedural errors or violations of procedural rules on Coughlins part where Elliott
invoked NRAP: "Further, NRAP 28(e) provides that "[e]very assertion in briefs regarding matters in
the record shall be supported by a reference to the page of the transcript or appendix where the matter
relied on is to be found." While Appellant did provide this Court with a Compact Disc containing a
recording of the Municipal Court proceedings, Appellant did not cite to the portions of the Compact
Disc that he felt supported his arguments, and it is not the responsibility of this Court to guess which
portions of the Compact Disc might support Appellant's arguments. In short, Appellant did not satisfy
his responsibility to supply and cite to relevant portions of the record merely by producing a Compact
Disc recording of the entire Municipal Court proceeding. In light of Appellant's failure to provide this
Court with an adequate appellate record, and Appellant's correspondent failure to cite to such a
record, this Court is unable to conduct a meaningful review of Appellant's appeal."
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IX. Decision on Appeal and Subsequent Procedures A. Dismissal of Appeal 1. Dismissal
by Court b. Particular Grounds for Dismissal 809. Procedural errors
While the dismissal of an appeal for failure to comply with procedural rules is not
favored,[FN1] and it is preferred that an appellate court address the merits of an appeal whenever
possible,[FN2] an appellate court generally has the power to dismiss an appeal for failing to comply
with the jurisdiction's rules of appellate procedure,[FN3] (NOTE: NRAP does not apply here, as
such, Coughlin can not be held to have failed to comply with such).
Thus, an appellant has a duty to perfect its appeal in the manner provided by statute, and
absent such compliance, the reviewing court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal.[FN5].
(Coughlin absolutely perfected his appeal in the manner provided by statute, as NRS 189.010
makes clear his filing of a timely notice of appeal did just that, as such automatically triggers the
requirement in NRS 189.030(1) that the municipal court judge here file the transcript and other
related papers within 10 days).
However, compliance with procedural rules may be viewed as not relating to the court's
jurisdiction,[FN7] so that an appellate court may have the discretion to overlook procedural
variations, which might warrant the dismissal of the appeal when necessary to avoid harsh
results[ FN8] or where there is no evidence of prejudice [FN9].
(The City of Reno was not prejudiced by anything Coughlin did. In fact, Coughlin went
above and beyond here, providing the City of Reno (and the district court) the audio transcript of the
trial at his own expense despite his being homeless/indigent at various relevant times here. Further,
Reno City Attorney Roberts had filed numerous motions to dismiss in past cases based upon the
defendant failing to file a transcript, yet she chose not to do so here. Such amounts to a waiver of the
dubious, at best, argument that Coughlins failure to file the transcript somehow prejudiced the City
of Reno.)
Thus, the appellate court retains the discretion to decide appeals, notwithstanding failure to
comply with the rules of appellate procedure, when it prejudices neither the respondent nor the
court's review, and when the issues presented are important.[FN10] Also, procedural violations by
the appellants during their appeal do not warrant dismissal of the appeal, where the appeal is
meritorious, and the procedural violations are not so egregious as to prevent the appellee from
meaningfully responding to the appeal.[FN12].
[FN1] U.S. v. Carelock, 459 F.3d 437 (3d Cir. 2006). [FN2] 804. [FN3] DiLeo v.
Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990) (federal rules); Penick v. Cado Systems of Cent.
Alabama, Inc., 628 So. 2d 598 (Ala. 1993); Houston v. Weisman, 197 S.W.3d 204 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D.
2006); State v. Cagle, 641 S.E.2d 705 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (the rules of appellate procedure are
mandatory and a violation subjects the appeal to dismissal); Com. v. Murphy, 405 Pa. Super. 452, 592
A.2d 750 (1991) (criminal case); Leger v. State, 855 P.2d 359 (Wyo. 1993). As to the degree of
compliance necessary to avoid a dismissal for failure to follow appellate rules of procedure, see
810. [FN5] Colmore v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 2005 MT 239, 328 Mont. 441, 121 P.3d 1007
(2005). [FN7] Boone v. Evanston Hosp., 225 Ill. App. 3d 195, 167 Ill. Dec. 474, 587 N.E.2d 1089
(1st Dist. 1992); City of Wichita v. 200 South Broadway, Ltd. Partnership, 253 Kan. 434, 855 P.2d
956 (1993).
[FN8] Krebs v. State, 588 So. 2d 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1991) (the dismissal of an
appeal may be too harsh a sanction for the late filing of an initial brief); Boone v. Evanston Hosp.,
225 Ill. App. 3d 195, 167 Ill. Dec. 474, 587 N.E.2d 1089 (1st Dist. 1992). [FN9] State v. Manes, 112
N.M. 161, 812 P.2d 1309 (Ct. App. 1991) (an appellate court may decline to dismiss a criminal
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defendant's appeal for failure to designate necessary exhibits, as required by the appellate rules of the
jurisdiction, where the state ensured that the proper exhibits were before the appellate court); L.W.
Shoemaker, M.D., Inc. v. Connor, 81 Ohio App. 3d 748, 612 N.E.2d 369 (10th Dist. Franklin County
1992); Helms v. Boyle, 431 Pa. Super. 606, 637 A.2d 630 (1994) (noting that the issue was not raised
in the opposing party's brief). [FN10] Furlong Companies, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 2005 WL
405852 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2005), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Mar. 29, 2005) and transferred to
Mo. S. Ct., 189 S.W.3d 157 (Mo. 2006). [FN11] Fed. R App. P. 3(a)(2). [FN12] Ward v. Circus Circus
Casinos, Inc., 473 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007); Coley v. State, 173 N.C. App. 481, 620 S.E.2d 25 (2005),
aff'd as modified on other grounds, 360 N.C. 493, 631 S.E.2d 121 (2006).
District Court Judge Elliott did indicate, here, that he was, due to Coughlins failing to
provide him with a typed verbatim transcript, unable to conduct a meaningful review. However,
Coughlins Brief presented a multitude of basis for reversing both the Judgment of Conviction
and Court Order and concomitant Order for Summary Punishment of Contempt plainly
manifest even without reading a page of the trial transcript, or even listening to a moment of
the audio. Rather, such could have been plainly gleaned from a review of the other related papers
(352 pages) filed by the RMC pursuant to the mandate in NRS 189.030(1) that it do so (this is
particularly true with regard to the issues of the RMC having denied defendant his Sixth Amendment
Right to Counsel, and in its failing to grant a continuance, and that certain evidence should have been
suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (particularly given
the time of arrest (by tribal police no less, see NRS 171.1255) for a misdemeanor (9:30 p.m.), see
NRS 171.136).

Judge Elliott ruled: " Appellant raises a wide variety of issues, including, inter
alia: that he was denied his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, that the Municipal Court
erred in failing to grant him a continuance, that the prosecution engaged in misconduct,
that he was refused an opportunity to testify on his own behalf, that certain evidence
should have been suppressed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence, and that "[f]urther
improprieties and due process deficiencies" occurred.
Unfortunately, Appellant neither supports his arguments with relevant authority nor
citations to relevant portions of the record. Most importantly, Appellant has failed to
provide this Court with a copy of the transcript of relevant proceedings in the Reno
Municipal Court
While Appellant did provide this Court with a Compact Disc containing a
recording of the Municipal Court proceedings, Appellant did not cite to the portions of
the Compact Disc that he felt supported his arguments, and it is not the responsibility
of this Court to guess which portions of the Compact Disc might support Appellant's
arguments.
In short, Appellant did not satisfy his responsibility to supply and cite to (NOTE:
Judge Elliott italicized and cite to, the other emphasis herein are attributable to the
undersigned) relevant portions of the record merely by producing a Compact Disc recording
of the entire Municipal Court proceeding.
In light of Appellant's failure to provide this Court with an adequate appellate
record, and Appellant's correspondent failure to cite to such a record, this Court is unable to
conduct a meaningful review of Appellant's appeal. Thus, Appellant has failed to meet his
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burden in providing an adequate appellate record, and this Court must affirm the ruling of
the Reno Municipal Court.

(NOTE: Judge Elliott, while being critical of Coughlins alleged failure to cite to the portions
of the Compact Disc (notice Judge Elliott does not rule that Coughlin failed to cite to the portions of
the 352 page 12/23/11 Appeal from Municipals Court (record on appeal), nor address the fact that
Coughlin went to great lengths to supplement the deficient record after the RMC refused to address
the problems associated with RMC Chief Clerk Ballard providing Coughlin with authorization to
submit filings via email, which the RMC thereafter selectively chose not to include in the ROA)
containing the audio of the trial ( that Coughlin provided the district court at his own expense) that
he felt supported his arguments, Judge Elliott does not base his affirming the ruling of the RMC
on such failure to cite to the portions, but rather, ultimately specifies such affirming is based on
Coughlins alleged failure to meet his burden to provide an adequate appellate record: Thus,
Appellant has failed to meet his burden in providing an adequate appellate record, and this Court
must affirm the ruling of the Reno Municipal Court.
This is likely because, especially in criminal cases, particularly in those like the one at bar,
where vast consequences attach to, at least, ones career and or livelihood (SCR 111(6)), such alleged
procedural transgression are not severe enough to justify ignoring Coughlins brief wholesale and
affirming the RMCs ruling. Indeed, even if NRAP 28 and 32 applied here (which, they do not),
Coughlin would merely face and issue by issue, contention by contention refusal to countenance the
argument he made in his brief, rather than an across the board allegation that the court was unable to
conduct a meaningful review in light of appellants allegedly having failed to meet his burden in
providing an adequate appellate record).
However, it is not accurate for Judge Elliott to assert that Coughlin failed to cite to the
portions of the audio transcript in any way whatsoever. On numerous occasions Coughlin provided
an indication of at what minute mark of the audio transcript certain exchanges occurred.
Page 372 of the combined record reads: Though Pam Roberts had agreed in writing to a
continuance previous thereto, she decided to change her mind on the date of the Trial, and
Judge Howard refused one anyway. In fact, Judge Howard thought it was such an urgent matter of
public importance to get this petit larceny charge of a "chocolate bar and some cough drops" done
that he get literally an entire Department of the Reno Municipal Court working until 9 pm at night on
November 30th, 2011, with everybody collecting overtime, all courtesy of the public fisc. Appellant
received a fine in the amount of $360.00 and 24 hours of community service, but then Judge
Howard realized he was mistaken in his belief that Appellant had failed to appear for the originally
scheduled November 14th, 2011 Trial Date. So Judge Howard excised his earlier requirement that
Appellant before 24 hours of Washoe County Sheriff work program community service, with
no extensions, by December 18ht, 2011, despite the Appellant being indisposed serving three days
in Washoe County Jail immediately following the Trial in this matter pursuant to a finding Summary
Contempt Order announced by Judge Howard at the conclusion of the November 30th, 2011 Trial
in this matter, only to return to the full time practice of law upon the conclusion of the three day
sentence (A Motion for Stay requested by the Appellant while being handcuffed and arguing that his
client's would be unduly prejudiced by such a Summary Contempt finding). See Certified Copy of
Docket.
Page 379: Please see the undersigned's Declaration, under penalty of perjury attached hereto,
concerning the following excerpt from the end of the audio record of the November 30th, 2011 Trial
in RMC 11 CR 22176, which represents a completely true and accurate transcription (made from the
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CD of the Trial that the undersigned purchased from the RMC and taken from the file named:
"[MCFTRB]_20111130-2033_01ccaf9f451ed090" ; this audio excerpt and perhaps the entire audio
record will likely be provided to the District Court in the form of an attachment to a Supplemental to
a motion in compliance with the indications given by Appeals Clerk Lori Matheus and Clerk of Court
Orduna Hastings) of what was said in open court, on the record, beginning at 8:33:11 pm on
November 30th, 2011 in Judge Howard's court room:
JH: Is there any questions at all with regard to the appeal process?
ZC: The availability of a Stay, that I guess would go more towards the finding of
Contempt? Um, when you say "appeal process" are you referring to...?
JH: The filing of appeal in regard to the petit theft.
ZC: Not in regard to the Contempt?
JH: No, thats a summary proceeding and we are going to go forward with that. One thing
that I will say in regard to the petit theft Trial and subsequent sentencing, however, its my
recollection, improperly, that you had failed to appear at the previous proceeding, and
that's not correct, uh, there was another reason as to why we were unable to proceed, so
I am going to delete the 24 hours of community service, the fine of $360 will stand.
Alright, any other questions involving the Appeal process?
ZC: Yes, to the extent my law practice's clients, that their cases will be unduly prejudiced
by your incarcerating me right now... J
H: I am standing by that and I wish you would have thought about that after each
admonishment that I gave you during the Trial.
ZC: You are saddened by that.
JH: We are in recess. " (commotion of Marshals can be heard and the audio recording of the
record of the Trial ends).

Indeed, page 421 of the combined record contains Coughlins indication that:
If the RMC can afford all that damn overtime for everyone, why couldn't it appoint me a
defense attorney in RMC 11 CR 22176, especially where Judge Howard ruled, not 20 minutes into
Trial that he was finding me in Contempt of Court and would decide the sentence (which
obviously included a possibility of incarceration) at the conclusion of the Trial?
Also, at page 560: "About 10 minutes into the "Trial" Judge Howard Found the
undersigned in contempt, whereupon the sixth amendment righ to counsel was invoked, which
Judge Howard curtly dismissed. the Summary Contempt ORder is void, avaingst public policy,
prevented a fair trial, demonstrated evident impartialit, and severly curtailed the undersigned faith in
the court and belief that any evidence he offered or testimony would be given fair treatment, but
rather, the undersigned was givne the message that he would be clubbed with anything he said, as
such, testimony and
Further, more citation to the portions of the audio transcript Coughlin feels support his
arguments for reversal occur at page 656: "Appellant could not reasonably be said to have been
appropriately or sufficiently informe dof just how he could comply with Judge Howard's contempt
warning/finding/order 10 minutes into a 6 hour Trial, nor could Appellant or anyone be said to be
capable of both zealously advocating on their own behalf while also complying with Judge Howard's
menacing and vague Order that contravened fundamental notions of fairness and due process."
At page 667: In the first 10 min. trial judge Howard disagreed with the defendant on the
record as to whether or not the case he was about to try was a complex case rather judge Howard had
already made up his mind that he was not on lag but that was rather open and shut any dedicated
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judge our new house rule on this case before it even started which is kind of impermissible under
most notions of due process and fundamental fairness judge Howard banged his fist my gavel mind
you but his fist on the bench causing terrible feedback on the microphones recording proceedings
exhibited an unbalanced and erratic approach to his rulings in this matter that are indicative of a bias
or other evident impartiality this is particularly troubling
At page 668: this is troubling particularly where judge Howard then proceeded to deny the
accused is six-member right counsel to bang his this on the bench in an apparent a mosh to the year
he's been playing football at you and our and where judge Howard informed the defendant that he
would have him arrested and incarcerated should the defendant continued to attempt to preserve
objections for the record on appeal a scant 5 min. into the trial room of the Judge Howard, at 2:31:52
pm in the AT, responded to the pro so accused Defendant arguing that the Sixth Amendment, as
interpreted by Ainsgliser requires the appointment of counsel where even the mere possibility of jail
time is present under a plain reading of the charge. Judge Howard cited to Scott v. Illinois for his
contention that the RMC was not required to provide an indigent like the Appellant any appointed
counsel. Under Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), counsel must be appointed in any case
resulting in a sentence of actual imprisonment. However, in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the
Court ruled that counsel did not need to be appointed if the defendant was not sentenced to any
imprisonment. It was reversible error for Judge Howard and so rule particularly where he ultimately
did sentence appellant to three days incarceration. Further this perversion of any holding in Scott
versus Illinois on Judge Howard's part is indicative of the troubling lack of fidelity to the true intent
of the sixth amendment..."
Additionally, at page 670: "Judge Howard's oral ruling with regard to the fact that
incarceration would not occur in this matter is binding upon judge Howard it is law the case
however judge Howard in order incarceration in any mincing attempts to suggest that the fact that the
incarceration was for a fine of summary contempt committed in the course presents under NRS
22.010 sub three should simply be unavailing particularly where a fundamental constitutional right is
involved and where it judge Howard's ruling as rendered from the bench 5 min. into the trial did
not limit the application of his ruling in any way as such no incarceration the matter what it stems
from is permissible in this matter or anything connected thereto as such this entire judgment order of
conviction is void us as the two are inextricably intertwined in fact sixth amendment right to counsel
once right to zealous advocacy summary contempt finding and a conviction for the crime alleged
herein are all inextricably intertwined in ways disturbing the judge Howard has event such a clear
disregard for matters that have such a preeminent importance in the canyon of due process and
notions of fundamental fairness further at the trial when after 5 min. of proceedings that is to say
trial it only been going on just a few scant minutes and a defendant upon the first time he tried to
preserve and objections for the record judge Howard going quote from 0 to 60 in one second"
announced to the defendant in a bullying menacing voice that he would have the defendant clearly
custody and the trial continued if the defendant were to continue to try to preserve issues for appeal
or objections thereto....".
Page 682: Page 9 of the ROA reveals the "ARREST REPORT AND DECLARATION OF
PROBABLE CAUSE" filled out by Reno Sparks Indian Colony (RSIC) Officer Cameron Crawford.
Crawford perjured himself with his testimony at trial in this matter (and Reno City Attorney Pam
Roberts suborned his perjury in violation of numerous Rules of Professional Conduct and
prosecutorial standards). Crawfords testimony is littered with lying and or sloppy errors, justifying
overturning the conviction in this matter. At 5:54 pm on the audio transcript from 11/30/11 in RMC
11 CR 22176 (AT) Cameron incidates that the UPC for the "cough drops" Coughlin was accused of
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stealing "did not appear on the receipt" of the items Coughlin actually purchased: Crawford: I did
check for the UPC, yes, just the numbers Coughlin: for which? Cr: For both. Co: For Both? So, now
you're saying that the UPC for the cough drops did not appear on the receipt? Cr: Correct. Co: So, if
the UPC for the cough drops does appear on the receipt, that would make your testimony, inaccurate
or unreliable? Cr: I guess. I don't know. Co: You guess? "
Page 296 of the record contains the Washoe Jail Inmate Property Booking sheet showing
Coughlin had his State of Nevada drivers license in his possession at the time of being transported to
the jail by Officer Crawford, which further undermines the contention of the City and Crawford in
support of the dubious fruit from the search incident to arrest not being subject to the exclusionary
rule.
Page 686 (from Coughlins Supplement to Appellants Brief): "Further, earlier in this "AP
Overview" video at 9:24:27 pm Coughlin can clearly be seen responding to Crawfords request for
Coughlin's driver's license by giving Crawford Coughlin's driver's license. Crawford lied about this at
trial, and even asserted that he was unable to issue a citation to Coughlin in light of Coughlin's refusal
to provide Coughlin's drivers license. However, the Arrest Report and Probable Cause sheet Crawford
filled out (see the ROA page 9) clearly show that Crawford had Coughlin's driver's license number
(which he got from the driver's license Coughlin gave Crawford, as shown in the AP Overview video
at 9:24:24 pm). Further, as indicated on the probable cause sheet, Crawford wrote down the address
for Coughlin from Coughlin's driver's license: 121 River Rock St. Reno, NV 89501. ... Crawford
received Coughlin's driver's license from Coughlin at 9:24:27 PM in the AP Overview video. The
video clearly reveals it is Coughlin's State of Nevad drivers license Coughlin hands to Crawford,
which Crawford subsequently called into the Incline Dispatch Center (which contracts with the
RSIC) to run a check for priors using Coughlin's name and drivers license number. Upon receiving
the driver's license, Crawford looks at it and pins it to a clip on his front right shirt pocket, shortly
before conducting a pat down of Coughlin. At 9:24:30 pm the female..."
Further, at page 686-688 Coughlins Brief provides a detailed, minute by minute marking
explication of how the Walmart interrogation room video Judge Howard refused admission of (the
Compact Disc Coughlin provided the district court contained such videos as well, in addition to the
materials filings by Coughlin that the RMC willfully failed to transmit to the district court), along
with citations to the page number of various documents (the Arrest Report and Declaration of
Probable Cause, etc.) , though Judge Elliott apparently never even looked at the contents of the
Compact Disc but rather, felt he could colorably allege that the text of Coughlins brief did not
cite to the portions of the trial audio) supported his appeal:
At 9:24:11 pm Frontino pulls out a sheet of paper from a file in his lower left desk drawer. At
9:24:32 a hispanic female Walmart Supervisor enters the room, making the total 2 Walmart
employees, and two RSIC Officers and Coughlin in a 10 foot by 10 foot room. While jutting his
crotch forward into the sitting Coughlin's face, Crawford grabs the plastic bag with Coughlin's
purchases out of Coughlin's lap and demands that Coughlin allow him to do a "pat down" to check
for weapons. This weapons check "pat down" beginning at 9:25:00 pm is overly long and involves
much manipulation and rubbing of Coughlin's pockets, well beyond that reasonably necessary to
assure the suspect did not have a weapon.
Crawford lied about whether Coughlin would provide his driver's license because he is
sneaky and dishonest. Crawford knew that the law in Nevada does not allow for an Officer like
Crawford to arrest one accused of a misdemeanor not committed in the presence of the officer. In
such situations, an Officer may issue a citation, but not conduct a custodial arrest. Without a
custodial arrest, the officer is unable to perform a search incident to an arrest. However, Crawford
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badly wanted to perform such a search incident to arrest here, and so he lied about whether
Coughlin provided his driver's license. Then, at Trial, Crawford lied about just how he was able
to get Coughlin's drivers license number, address, date of birth adn teh exact height and weight
listed on Coughlin's drivers license if Crawford did not receive the driver's license form
Coughlin upon request
At page 1021 Coughlin continued in his repeated practice of doing just that which Judge
Elliotts 3/15/12 Order purported Coughlin to have failed to do (ie, cite to portions of the audio
transcript supporting his positions):
6. At Trial, at 2:52:25 pm, in the audio transcript submitted into evidence by Coughlin in
the Record on Appeal (ROA) in the form of a cd of the audio recording, Frontino testified under oath
as follows with regard to what he and Coughlin discussed upon Frontino instructing Coughlin to go
with him back to the asset protection interrogation room: City Attorney Pam Roberts: What specific
information did you ask of Mr. Coughlin? Thomas Frontino: Identification, his name birth date, social
security number. City Attorney Pam Roberts: And did he provide any of that information to you?
Thomas Frontino: No, he did not. City Attorney Pam Roberts: Based upon his unwillingness to
provide that information did you take any further action? Thomas Frontino: Yes, we called the police,
the Reno Sparks Indian Colony Tribal Police Department. They usually arrive within ten minutes, I
believe my statement reflects it was less than that. However, it was not long before Frontino
contradicted that testimony, becoming uncomfortable with Coughlin's line of questioning..."
At page 1029: A minute by minute chronology reveals that the $83.82 receipt was issued at
21:14 on September 9th, 2011. The $14.74 receipt that Wal-Mart created to support its valuation of
the items allegedly consumed while shopping but not paid for was created some ten minutes later at
21:24 (military time, 24 hour clock). The RSIC Police Officers Cameron Crawford and The time
stamping on the two Interrogation Room videos provided by Wal-Mart indicate the interrogation ran
from 21:17 to 21:39. Coughlin provided RSIC Officer Crawford his driver's license at
approximately 21:23 (the 6 minute 49 second mark of the Interrogation Room video).
At page 1078 (NOTE: page 577 contains the $83.82 receipt containing the UPC for the cough
drops/ melts (DXM)):
"C I am just asking you, Sir, about your earlier testimony, not your state of mind about
what you, what you feel about the events or your recollections, just what you testified to
earli-er...is it fair to say that what you testified to earlier was that "I was primarily only
concerned about making sure that the cough drops or an item of the same UPC was not
being pur-chased"...to the exclusion of not caring whether or not similar candy items
were being pur-chased? Did you not say that on the record today? F I believe that I said
earlier that I was concerned with the items that you had selected and
consumed...um....the cough drops were a primary concern, but, you also did not ring up
an-ything that included the chocolate item. C Yet, earlier, didn't you testify that a number
of candy items were selected and later purchased? F Yes. C But, now your are saying,
that your were somehow able to verify and discern from thirty feet away that that
particular candy item was not...the UPC for that, was not also included on the $80
receipt. F I was primarily only concerned with the cough drops, I was watching for the
candy, the wrapper...the candy was still in the cart. c And that's where I have an
objection, non-responsive. H Are you done? C No, Sir, I am not, I just objected to the
fact that he didn't answer the question I asked. Every-time he gets cornered he starts
talking about irrelevant stuff. (4:55:43 p.m.) H If your tendering that objection to the
Court, its overruled. C Were you able to verify, from your position of some thirty feet
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away, that the candy item alleged to have been stolen...and the UPC for that candy item,
was not included on the $80 receipt? F I was unable to verify, other than the fact, that it
was not hand keyed in, it was never presented for scanning... c Okay, but similar to the
cough drops, you were not able to verify that the same item was key in, or an item with
the same UPC was key in, and upon that a quantity number was added to the receipt to
reflect the purchase of the item, the chocolate item, you are alleging was stolen? F You
selected two packages of cough drops and one candy bar, and...and... one of that
identical chocolate item, and no more, so had...there where no other items for her to be
able to ring up (4:56:56 p.m.) c Well earlier you testified that a number of chocolate
items were purchased? F Those specific ones. C Well you also testified that you had no
idea, specifically, what was on the $80 receipt? F Correct, I do not know what was on
your $80 receipt".

There would be no need for Judge Elliott to guess which portions of the Compact Disc might
support Appellant's arguments (and it is not the responsibility of this Court to do so, though there
is some authority in Nevada that indicates a judge has the responsibility to review the record for
reversible error: District court has a duty review the entire record in deciding whether to allow
appellant to withdraw her plea. Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 721 P.2d 364 (1986).).

On the other hand, numerous and egregious procedural violations may warrant the dismissal
of an appeal, and additional consideration favoring dismissal may include the failure of the appellant
to cure procedural defects and a non-meritorious appeal.[FN13] (NOTE: Judge Elliott could have
easily entered an order requiring Coughlin to provide the district court with the typed verbatim
transcript which he seems to purport to be essential, even, required, to obtain his review of the matter,
and provided Coughlin an opportunity to do so) In other words, flagrant violations of appellate rules
may result in the dismissal of the appeal.[FN14] (NOTE: Coughlin going above and beyond in
purchasing at his own indigents expense the audio of the trial from the RMC and providing the
district court with such. Thus, the dismissal of the appeal, rather than remand for hearing on the
record, is deemed appropriate, where there is failure to file a complete record[FN15] or where the
record was not sufficiently developed to allow for a meaningful direct review of the appellant's
claim[FN16] or where it is uncertain whether the transcript of trial proceedings has been
made.[FN17] Likewise, the failure to meet the requirements that an appellant's brief contain a fair
and concise statement of facts relevant to the questions presented for determination on appeal has
resulted in the dismissal of an appeal.[FN18] Similarly, a defendant's appeal may be dismissed
because of deficiencies in the defendant's appellate brief where the defendant's statement of facts, the
points relied on, and the argument are not in compliance with the rule governing appellate
briefs.[FN19] Also, a criminal defendant pursuing his or her own appeal who fails to file
enumerations of errors or brief after being ordered by the appellate court to do so, may have the
appeal dismissed.[FN20] Moreover, the failure to timely file transcripts or statements of error in
criminal cases may result in the dismissal of an appeal.[FN21]
However, where the issues on appeal are important, an appeal may not be dismissed on
the ground that the statements of facts in the brief were argumentative and not in compliance
with the appellate rules of procedure.[FN25] Observation: Although the power of an appellate
court to dismiss an appeal for violation of appellate procedure rules exists in both civil and criminal
cases, the sanction of dismissal for failure to comply with appellate rules of procedure is
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primarily reserved for civil cases. In criminal cases, sanctions may be imposed on counsel
personally.[FN26]
[FN13] Ward v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 473 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007); The Beyt, Rish,
Robbins Group, Architects v. Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 784 (Ky. Ct. App.
1993) (absence of indispensable party on cross appeal). [FN14] Coachmen Industries, Inc. v. Crown
Steel Co., 577 N.E.2d 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1991). [FN15] City Of Cleveland v. Cornell, 2004-
Ohio-135, 2004 WL 63931 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 2004). [FN16] U.S. v.
Barnhart, 152 Fed. Appx. 210 (3d Cir. 2005). [FN17] Hedrick v. Director of Revenue, 207 S.W.3d
675 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 2006). [FN18] White v. White, 846 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1993).
[FN19] Wenzel v. State, 185 S.W.3d 715 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 2006), reh'g and/or transfer denied, (Feb.
14, 2006) and transfer denied, (Apr. 11, 2006) and cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 265, 166 L. Ed. 2d 204
(U.S. 2006). [FN20] Whittle v. State, 210 Ga. App. 841, 437 S.E.2d 842 (1993). [FN21] Whittle v.
State, 210 Ga. App. 841, 437 S.E.2d 842 (1993); State v. Peak, 823 S.W.2d 228 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1991). [FN22] In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 391 F.3d 812, 60 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 267, 2004
FED App. 0429P (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1049, 125 S. Ct. 2297, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1089
(2005). [FN23] Penick v. Cado Systems of Cent. Alabama, Inc., 628 So. 2d 598 (Ala. 1993). [FN24]
Clement v. Graves, 924 So. 2d 196 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2005). [FN25] State v. Miller, 815 S.W.2d
28 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1991). [FN26] Leger v. State, 855 P.2d 359 (Wyo. 1993).
Only in the most egregious instances of nonjurisdictional default will dismissal of the appeal
be appropriate. Dogwood Development and Management Co., LLC v. White Oak Transport Co., Inc.,
362 N.C. 191, 657 S.E.2d 361 (2008). In determining whether a party's noncompliance with the
appellate rules rises to the level of a substantial failure or gross violation, the court may consider,
among other factors, whether and to what extent the noncompliance impairs the court's task of
review and whether and to what extent review on the merits would frustrate the adversarial
process. Dogwood Development and Management Co., LLC v. White Oak Transport Co., Inc., 362
N.C. 191, 657 S.E.2d 361 (2008).
When a party fails to comply with one or more nonjurisdictional appellate rules, the court
should first determine whether the noncompliance is substantial or gross, if it so concludes, it
should then determine which, if any, sanction should be imposed, and finally, if the court concludes
that dismissal is the appropriate sanction, it may then consider whether the circumstances of the
case justify invoking the appellate rule allowing suspension of the rules to reach the merits of the
appeal. Dogwood Development and Management Co., LLC v. White Oak Transport Co., Inc., 362
N.C. 191, 657 S.E.2d 361 (2008). AMJUR APPELLATE 809

Where the appellant is proceeding pro se in the appeal and where the reviewing court is for
that reason disposed to disregard defects in his brief, he or she is not excused from the duty of
providing an adequate record.[FN2] If the appellant fails to meet that burden the trial court will be
affirmed,[FN3] at least where its judgment is not fundamentally erroneous on its face . (RMC Judge
Howard's relying on dubious "fruit" of the NRS 171.136, 171.1255 poisonous tree renders his finding
that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction erroneous on its face, as does the denial
of counsel in light of the "serious crime" nature of the offense and SCR 111(6) IN in view of the
dictates of ADKT 411) [FN4] [FN2] Thorp Loan and Thrift Co. v. Morse, 451 N.W.2d 361 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1990). [FN3] Troutt v. Matchett, 305 Ark. 474, 808 S.W.2d 777 (1991); Delong v. Kermit
Lumber & Pressure Treating Co., 175 W. Va. 243, 332 S.E.2d 256 (1985). [FN4] McNair v.
Pavlakos/McNair Development Co., 576 So. 2d 933 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1991).
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Chadd v. State, 230 S.W.2d 822 110CRIMINAL LAW 110XXIVReview 110XXIV(G)Record
and Proceedings Not in Record 110XXIV( G)6Transcript or Return 110k1104In General
110k1104(2)k. Caption. Tex.Crim.App.,1950 On appeal from bigamy conviction, clerk of trial court
had duty to make out and forward record to Court of Criminal Appeals and to prepare transcript, and
defendant would not be held responsible for failure of caption to transcript to show date of convening
and adjournment of term of court at which conviction was had, and defendant's right of appeal could
not be abridged because of defect, and defendant was entitled, after dismissal of appeal for such
defect, to writ of certiorari directing clerk of trial court to forward complete transcript of record,
including a proper caption. Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. arts. 822, 841. References 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate
Review 484-532.
State v. Johnson, 259 S.E.2d 752 110CRIMINAL LAW 110XXIVReview
110XXIV(G)Record and Proceedings Not in Record 110XXIV( G)6Transcript or Return 110k1104In
General 110k1104(6)k. Proceedings for preparation. N.C.,1979 Action of trial court, in excluding
certain items from record on appeal in case in which defendant was convicted of first-degree murder
and was sentenced to death, was final and was not to be reviewed on appeal; defendant's remedy, if
any, would have been by certiorari. Appellate Procedure Rules, rule 11(c).
Jackson v. State, 270 S.W. 1018 Tex.Crim.App.,1925 Appellate court, by agreement, or, if
necessary, by writ of certiorari, can have record corrected to correspond with that in trial court, but
cannot grant rehearing in order that appellant may have matters omitted inserted in minutes of trial
court order.
Egbuka v. U.S., 968 A.2d 511 110CRIMINAL LAW 110XXIVReview 110XXIV(G)Record
and Proceedings Not in Record 110XXIV( G)6Transcript or Return 110k1104In General
110k1104(.5)k. In general. D.C.,2009 Although a defendant has an obligation to try to reconstruct the
record when a trial transcript is not available on appeal, and the trial judge has the
ultimateresponsibility to certify a substitute statement as adequate for appeal, when the trial judge is
unable to settle and approve a substitute statement, it must set aside the judgment and permit a new
trial. Arnold v. State, 789 S.W.2d 525 Mo.App.E.Dist.,1990 Having burden of demonstrating error,
appellant has ultimateresponsibility for preparation and filing of transcript; transcript on appeal must
contain all necessary material to make determination of issues raised, and where such information is
not included, there is nothing for appellate court to review because appellate court is unable to
determine if trial court erred.
Childress v. State, 695 S.W.2d 541 Tenn.Crim.App.,1985 District attorney, in addition to
being required to respond to postconviction petition, is responsible for seeing that records or
transcripts, material to the questions raised, are included in the record. T.C.A. 40-30-104.
Com. v. Dixon, 385 A.2d 391 Pa.Super.,1978 Responsibility for producing transcript for
appellate review lies with state, not with defense counsel. Com. v. Shields, 383 A.2d 844 Pa.,1978
Defense counsel was justified in relying upon the record to disclose prejudicial material and to
preserve his objections and when the trial record became unavailable through no fault of defendant,
prosecution had the responsibility to reconstruct a meaningful record in its place. Com. v. Morgan,
364 A.2d 891 Pa.,1976 Defendant's right to meaningful appeal requires that he be provided with copy
of transcript or other equivalent picture of proceedings in trial court; and moreover it is responsibility
of State to see that transcript is made available to defendant so that he may effectively pursue his
appeal rights. Com. v. Goldsmith, 304 A.2d 478 Pa.,1973 It is the responsibility of the state, not
defense counsel, to see that a transcript or equivalent picture is available so that a defendant may
effectively pursue his appeal rights to which he is entitled. People v. Carney, 425 N.Y.S.2d 323
110CRIMINAL LAW 110XXIVReview 110XXIV(G)Record and Proceedings Not in Record
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110XXIV( G)7Authentication and Certification 110k1105In General 110k1105(.5)k. In general.
N.Y.App.Div.1.Dept.,1980 When stenographic transcript of original criminal proceeding sought to be
reviewed is unavailable or inaccurate, trial judge retains ultimate responsibility for certifying the
accuracy of the record. Judiciary Law 7-a; CPLR 5525(c, d); N.Y. Ct. Rules, 600.5(e). People v.
Childs, 670 N.Y.S.2d 4 110CRIMINAL LAW 110XXIVReview 110XXIV(G)Record and
Proceedings Not in Record 110XXIV( G)7Authentication and Certification 110k1105In General
110k1105(2)k. Sufficiency. N.Y.App.Div.1.Dept.,1998 It is generally responsibility of the trial judge
to certify accuracy of record, and stenographic minutes are merely aid to accomplishing this task; if
transcript is unavailable or inaccurate, trial judge is final arbiter of what occurred before him or her
There is authority that the rules on briefing are to be liberally construed, rather than requiring
meticulous compliance. Anderson v. Gilbert, 897 S.W.2D 783 (Tex. 1995).
VII. Motions, Briefs, and Oral Argument B. Briefs 2. Contents a. In General Topic
Summary Correlation Table References 507. References to record
Appeal and Error k760 Criminal Law k1130(.5), (3) Federal Courts k712 Trial Strategy
Considering Appeals, 61 Am. Jur. Trials 1, 66 In the federal courts, references in briefs to parts of
the record reproduced in an appendix must generally be to the pages of the appendix at which those
parts of the record appear.[FN1] If the appendix is prepared after the briefs are filed, references in the
briefs to the record must be made by one of the methods allowed under the Federal Rules.[FN2] If the
case is to be heard on the original record (see NRS 189.050) and the record is not consecutively
paginated, or if the brief refers to an unreproduced part of the record, any reference must be to
the page of the original document. (NOTE: the RMCs 12/23/11 ROA lacks pagination) [FN3] The
failure to include proper citations to the record may result in the imposition of sanctions against the
offending party,[FN6] or even, in rare cases,[FN7] dismissal of the appeal.[FN8] The court may also
disregard asserted facts or arguments that are not supported by record references. References are
important, because courts are not obligated to search the record for error and will consider only a
legal argument that is supported by references to the factual record.[FN11] [FN1] Fed. R. App. P.
28(E). A brief is deficient where it notes only the beginning and ending page numbers of testimony of
several witnesses. Rebuck v. Vogel, 713 F.2D 484, 37 Fed. R. Serv. 2D 334 (8th Cir. 1983). [FN2]
Fed. R. App. P. 28(E), referring to Fed. R. App. P. 30(C). As to alternative methods of designating the
contents of the appendix, see 486. [FN3] Fed. R. App. P. 28(E). [FN6] L.S.F. Transp., Inc. V.
N.L.R.B., 282 F.3D 972 (7th Cir. 2002); Allianz Ins. Co. V. Gagnon, 109 Nev. 990, 860 P.2D 720
(1993). [FN7] Karl v. Davis, 100 Md. App. 42, 639 A.2D 214 (1994); Symons Corp. V. Insurance Co.
Of North America, 94 N.C. App. 541, 380 S.E.2D 550 (1989). [FN8] Moore v. F.D.I.C., 993 F.2D
106, 26 Fed. R. Serv. 3D 112 (5th Cir. 1993); Collier v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 248 Ill. App.
3D 1088, 188 Ill. Dec. 201, 618 N.E.2D 771 (1st Dist. 1993). [FN11] 5.
512. Response to issues argued by appellant Appeal and Error k761 Criminal Law k1130(5)
Federal Courts k714 Trial Strategy Considering Appeals, 61 Am. Jur. Trials 1, 66 An appellee's
response to an issue must consist of more than a conclusory statement that the appellant's proposition
has no merit.[FN1] If an appellee fails to respond to an issue in its brief, the court may treat the
failure to respond as a confession that the appellant's position is correct,[FN2] reverse the judgment
on that issue if the appellant establishes prima facie error,[FN3] or determine the issue on the
merits.[FN4] [FN1] Howard v. State, 1991 OK CR 76, 815 P.2D 679 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991). [FN2]
Trammell v. State, 622 So. 2D 1257 (Miss. 1993). [FN3] Laux v. Chopin Land Associates, Inc., 615
N.E.2D 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 3D Dist. 1993). [FN4] McDonough v. City of Rosemount, 503 N.W.2D
493 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
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Clearly, in light of NRAP 1(e) and the fact that state law (under NRS 189) provides explicitly
otherwise, NRAP does not apply to appeals to the district courts, and such certainly does not apply to
defeat the express requirements (shall) of a statute such as NRS 189.030(1) and NRS 189.035
(must).
Boyle v. CertainTeed Corp., 40 Cal.Rptr.3D 501 (2006): Local court rule providing for
expedited summary judgment on 60 days notice and no supporting papers in asbestos cases
impermissibly conflicted with statewide statute requiring 75 days notice and supporting evidence for
summary judgment motions; thus, local court rule was invalid.
While Judge Elliott may be entitled to draw jurisdictional principles from NRAP, where
NRAP 1 makes quite clear the Nevada Supreme Court, incident to its inherent and constitutional right
to promulgate rules governing procedure in Nevada courts, did not intend for NRAP to apply to
appeals to the district court. NRAP is clear:
I. APPLICABILITY OF RULES RULE 1. SCOPE, CONSTRUCTION OF
RULES (a) Scope of Rules. These Rules govern procedure in the Supreme Court
of Nevada.

Thus, Judge Elliotts basing his affirming the ruling of the RMC (whether that be the
contempt ruling or the judgment of conviction is not clear) on NRAP 28 and 32 and a case, Thomas
v. State, whose holding is limited to appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court (to which the NRAP are
expressly applicable), is clearly erroneously. Further, the massive collateral consequences here to
attorney Coughlin justify this Court invoking its inherent authority to issue a Writ providing relief.
The case relied on here by the district court judge, Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 43 & n.4, 83
P.3d 818, 822 & 11.4 (2004) ("Appellant has the ultimate responsibility to provide this court with
'portions of the record essential to determination of issues raised in appellant's appeal." (quoting
NRAP 30(b)(3)) expressly limited its reach to those case to which NRAP 30(b)(3) are applicable, ie,
appeals to the Nevada Supreme Court.
It must be one or the other but not both. Either NRAP applies to appeals to the district court
and the district court failed to embrace its jurisdiction in incongruously denying Coughlins filing a
Petition for Rehearing; or, NRAP does not so apply, and the district courts reliance on NRAP 28 and
32 and a case (Thomas v. State) to those cases to which NRAP 30(b)(3) is applicable, was an
example of judicial action worthy of mandamus relief from.
Coughlins NRAP 40 Petition for Rehearing of 3/26/12 clearly detailed the extent to which it
was the RMC, not appellant Coughlin, whom failed to comply with Nevada law in choosing not to
file the transcript that NRS 189.030(1) mandates the justice shall file the transcript with the district
court), whilst claiming to be unable to adjudicate such due to lack of jurisdiction. Judge Elliott
purported to lack jurisdiction to do so in light of jod auto-remand (remittitur) in his 3/15/12 Order) or,
Judge Elliotts basing his Order Affirming the Ruling of the RMC on NRAP 28 and 32 and a case,
Thomas v. State, inapplicable to appeals to the district courts, is clearly erroneous. Further, if NRAP
applies to appeals to the district courts, then NRAP 9, 10, and 11 present serious problems with
respect to the form in which the record was transmitted by the clerk of the RMC, the clerks
certification of such, and the behavior of the court reporter the RMC insists criminal appellants
utilize.
Further, Coughlin sought oral argument/a trial de novo (indeed, the extent to which the RMC
fails to actually fulfill the requirements of being a court of record arguably requires a trial de novo)
consistent with the WDCR 19.
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Judge Elliott, at the RCAs prompting, simply refused Coughlin the hearing required by
WDCR 19 even where Coughlin filed a Notice to Set such.
WDCR Rule 19. Appeals from municipal and justice courts.
1. All appeals from the municipal or justice courts in criminal cases shall be set for
trial or hearing within 60 days of the date of application for setting.
3. Appeals in criminal cases shall be set for trial on Thursdays and Fridays, unless
the trial judge or the chief judge grants permission to make such settings on other judicial
days.
4. In civil appeals from the justice court, appellant shall file within 30 days after the
filing of a notice of appeal a written brief containing a statement of the errors committed in
the justice court with accompanying authorities which shall not exceed 5 pages


Article 6, section 8 of the Nevada Constitution confers upon the legislature the power to "pre-
scribe by law the manner, ... In which appeals may be taken from Justices and other courts." See also
Cavanaugh v. Wright, 2 Nev. 166 (1866).
By enacting NRS 189.030(1) (NRS 189.030 Transmission of transcript, other papers,
sound recording and copy of docket to district court. 1. The justice shall, within 10 days after
the notice of appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk of the district court the transcript of the case, all other
papers relating to the case and a certified copy of the docket.) , NRS 189.035 (NRS 189.035 Pro-
cedure where transcript defective. 1. if the district court finds that the transcript of a case which
was recorded by sound recording equipment is materially or extensively defective, the case must be
returned for retrial in the justice court from which it came, and NRS 189.050 (NRS 189.050 Ac-
tion to be judged on record. An appeal duly perfected transfers the action to the district court to be
judged on the record.) the legislature saw fit to pre-scribe certain things. See Woofter v. O'Donnell, 91
Nev. 756, 762, 542 P.2D 1396, 1400 (1975), where this Court said: "[T]he word `shall' embodied within
[a statute] operates to make its use mandatory."Cf. Thran v. District Court, 79 Nev. 176, 380 P.2D 297
(1963); Ex Rel. Williams v. District Court, 48 Nev. 459, 233 P. 843 (1925).
The provisions of NRS 189 containing the word shall (and arguably, the word must in
NRS 189.035 is an equivalent thereof) are mandatory. Plankinton v. District Court, 93 Nev. 643, 572
P.2d 525 (1977). In State ex rel. Baker v. Wichman, 52 Nev. 17, 24, 279 P. 937, this Court held:
"[W]hether a word is to be construed as mandatory or directory depends upon the intention to be
gathered from the statute, if such intention can be ascertained."
Clearly, NRS 189.030(1), NRS 189.035, and NRS 189.050 and the Citys failure to move to
dismiss on the basis of a lack of a verbatim, typed transcript being filed, operate to preclude the
district court judge here from any purported affirming of the Judgment of Conviction, though, to the
extent the Order Punishing Summary Contempt was the ruling being affirmed, to whatever extent
such is civil in nature, and NRS 189 would not, then, perhaps, apply
The above works both waysthe RMC failed to comply with NRS 189.030(1)NRS
189.035 Is mandatory, therefore, Judge Elliott had no jurisdiction to enter his autoremand of 3/15/12
in 2064, particularly where Coughlin thereafter timely filed a Petition for Rehearing or functional
equivalent thereof
The City of Renos Brief in this matter was less than conclusory, even. Judge Elliotts failure
to recuse himself, much less disclose that he was the President of CAAWs Executive Board (Elliott
presided over Coughlins suit against CAAW in CV11-01955, dismissing such on dubious
insufficiency of service and process sua sponte rulings, even where a Motion to Dismiss filed by
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defendants tolled the running of NRCP 4s 120 day deadline) lends and appearance of impropriety
here, see NVSCT 60317, where he makes such sua sponte arguments on the Appellees behalf and
holds none of the Appellees failing against it.
Failure of clerk to furnish duly requested transcript in sufficient time to enable indigent
prisoner to apply for appeal was denial of due process of law. State ex rel. Kennedy v. Boles, 150 W.
Va. 504, 147 S.E.2d 391 (1966).
The conviction was appealed to the state district court but was dismissed after Judge Gale
failed to timely transmit the transcript from his court to the district court as required by Utah law.
Allred v. Svarczkopf, 573 F.2d 1146 (C.A.10,1978).
"statutory provisions made it the duty and responsibility of the Justice of the
Peace of file such transcripts. See c. 151, Section 2, Acts of 1905. This Court in a
unanimous opinion, Cain v. State, 86 Ark. 455, 111 S.W. 267, (1908), noting that the
Justice of the Peace had failed to seasonably file the transcript and that appellant's appeal
had been dismissed because thereof, reversed the dismissal of the appeal, stating:
Section 2 of the act of April 11, 1905 * * *, makes it the duty of the justice, and not of
the appellant, to file the transcript in the circuit clerk's office. every time appellant asked
the Justice of the Peace to proceed with the filing of his transcript on appeal, appellant
was unequivocally*218 (Cite as: 241 Ark. 213, *218, 406 S.W.2d 883, **886) advised
by the Justice of the Peace that same would be done in time to protect his interests, i.e.,
30 days from judgment.
These unfulfilled promises served to deprive appellant of a proper basis in fact
for a petition for relief by mandamus. We are also confronted with the inescapable fact
that this appellant could not control the actions of the Justice of the Peace in preparing
and filing the transcript, nor could this appellant personally presume to prepare a
certified transcript of the proceedings. These functions were peculiarly within the power
of the Justice of the Peace.
The constitutional guaranty of a fair and impartial trial of one accused of a crime
could become a nullity if trial courts are permitted to mislead persons convicted of a
crime as to matters necessary to their appeals and so as to effectively deny such persons
appellate review. [4] Appellant vigorously sought to prosecute his appeal. He made
repeated requests of the Justice of the Peace to file the transcript and when the Justice of
the Peace defaulted in filing his transcript, appellant filed his affidavit of appeal in the
circuit court within a matter of two days.
The Justice of the Peace finally filed the certified transcript some 90 days after
the judgment of conviction. Thus we conclude that appellant diligently, prudently and
seasonably met every burden which could be reasonably placed upon him in seeking
appellate review in the circuit court.
The following facts in this case are pertinent: (a) Here, the trial court and not a
deputy or clerk personally made the explicit assurances and promises to appellant. (b)
There was no showing that the certified transcript had been seasonably prepared by the
Justice of the Peace, and that appellant had been called to pick it up and file it himself if
he cared to do so. (c) The record here shows no inadvertence or *219 (Cite as: 241 Ark.
213, *219, 406 S.W.2d 883, **886) oversight by the Justice of the Peace with reference
to his statutory duty to file the transcript; but, on the contrary, it indicates a deliberate
course of action to deprive appellant of his appeal. (d) Appellant did not stand idly by but
diligently and persistently importuned the Justice of the Peace to make certain that the
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transcript was properly and seasonably filed to protect his rights on appeal, each time
being assured that this would be done.
[5] [6] So long as appellant was being assured by the Justice of the Peace that the
transcript would be seasonably filed as required by law, appellant could rely thereon.
There is certainly no presumption of law that a public official will refuse to discharge a
duty detailed by statute. It is doubtful, in view of the assurances of the Justice of the
Peace, that appellant could state adequate grounds for relief by mandamus prior to the
default as to such promises. This appellant seasonably and prudently met every
reasonable burden which was his in respect to this appeal. It would abort the ends of
justice to deny appellant de novo review in the circuit court. For analogous reasoning,
see Marshall Motor Service v. Norm Co., 194 Ark. 805, 109 S.W.2d 662 (1937), wherein
we stated: Of course, if there is a satisfactory showing that the delay is due to matters
over which the appellant had no reasonable**887 (Cite as: 241 Ark. 213, *219, 406
S.W.2d 883, **887) control, and justice requires that the delay be disregarded and that
the cause be heard de novo on its merits, then the circuit court should overrule a motion
to dismiss.
The cause is reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the appeal from
the judgment of the Justice of the Peace. Hoelzeman v. State, 241 Ark. 213, 406 S.W.2d
883 (Ark. 1966).

Page 296 of the 12/23/11 ROA reveals that Coughlins State of Nevada drivers license was in
his possession at the time of booking, further undermining Officer Crawfords contention that it was
not (which he asserted justified his violating NRS 171.136 and NRS 171.1255 for fear that merely
issuing Coughlin a citation would result in a no show by Coughlin at the trial).
However, where NRAP clearly was applied here by the appellate judge, Coughlins' 3/26/12
filing operates as the functional NRAP 40 Petition for Rehearing, which the district court has refused
to adjudicate, claiming it no longer had jurisdiction upon entering its 3/15/12 Order Affirming the
Ruling of the RMC and remanding the matter.
Recently, in In Re Hunter, 02-1975 (La.8/19/02), 823 So.2d 325, this court removed a judge
for reasons stemming from administrative incompetence evidenced by poorly organized case files,
missing portions of records, poorly drafted or non-existent minute entries, unsigned motions for
appeal, cases that had fallen off the docket, and failure to produce transcripts for appellate review
which resulted in the reversal of serious criminal convictions.
Misconduct, including judge's repeated failures to produce transcripts timely, accurately, or
frequently not at all, resulting in eleven appellate reversals of serious felony criminal convictions and
sentences for violation of the defendants' constitutional right to judicial review, and her continuous
lack of cooperation with the court of appeal in securing transcripts for appellate review, amounted to
willful and persistent failure to perform her duty to administer her court in professional and
competent manner, and conduct gravely prejudicial to administration of justice that brought the
judicial office into disrepute. LSA-Const. Art. 5, 25(C); Code of Jud.Conduct, Canon 3, subd. B(1),
8 LSA-R.S. In re Hunter, 2002-1975 (La. 8/19/02), 823 So. 2d 325
Judge Howard willfully refuses to comply with NRS 189.030(1)'s requirement that he file the
transcript with the district court upon a criminal defendant appealing his conviction.
NRS 189.030 Transmission of transcript, other papers, sound recording and copy of docket
to district court.
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1. The justice shall, within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk
of the district court the transcript of the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified
copy of the docket.

40
Falkner v. Lindberg, 288 P. 3d 1097 (Utah 2012): "Having analyzed supreme court
cases dealing with the relationship between remittitur and jurisdiction, we conclude that
remand to the justice court does not necessarily divest the district court of jurisdiction. We
further determine that the district court must retain jurisdiction for a reasonable time
sufficient to resolve appropriate postjudgment1 motions. Because the district court in this
case declined on an improper basis to exercise jurisdiction, we find it appropriate to grant
Falkner's petition for extraordinary relief and remand the case to the district court with
additional instructions for resolving Falkner's motion to reinstate.
I. We Look to the Rules of Appellate Procedure for Guidance in Analyzing the District
Court's Jurisdiction Over Appeals from Justice Court.
6 "[T]he appeals process from a justice court decision is unique" in that "[a] defendant
who has pleaded guilty or been convicted in justice court is entitled to a trial de novo in a
district court, provided that he or she files a notice of appeal within thirty days of the sentence
or guilty plea." Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT 1, 8, 106 P.3d 707. The hybrid nature of this
proceeding makes it difficult at times to determine what procedures might apply in situations
where no procedure is explicitly provided for in the context of appeals from justice court.
Falkner asserts that we should employ only the rules of civil and criminal procedure to
resolve the jurisdictional issue, while Judge Lindberg suggests that we rely on the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. While the form of a trial de novo differs from that of a traditional
appeal, it is still considered an appellate proceeding,2 see id. 25, 30-32, and we therefore
find it appropriate to employ the rules of appellate procedure "as a model in the context of
justice court appeals," see Gordon, 2009 UT App 25, 22 n. 7. (NOTE, Gordon, provides:
While not applicable to appeals from justice court convictions, rule 23A's criteria justifying
reinstatement could serve as a model in the context of justice court appeals. Gordon did not
address any of these possibilities in her motion to the district court or in the present
petition.)
II. An Appellate Court Does Not Necessarily Lose Juris-diction When a Case Is
Remanded to a Lower Court.
7 In support of her assertion that the district court lost jurisdiction upon remand, Judge
Lindberg points us to our decision in State v. Clark, 913 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct.App.1996), in
which we rejected a defendant's attempt to appeal his case after the appeal had once been dis-
missed for failure to prosecute, explaining that once the case was remitted, "this court lost
jurisdiction over the matter and the dismissal became an adjudication on the merits." Id. at
362-63. Judge Lindberg asserts that Clark stands for the proposition that a remand to a lower
court necessarily divests the appellate court of jurisdiction and prevents it from further
considering any issues relat-ing to the case.
8 However, additional case law from our supreme court suggests that there are at least
two circumstances where an appellate court may retain jurisdiction after a case has been
remitted to the district court. First, if a remittitur is premature, it cannot effectively return
jurisdiction to the lower court. See Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Foothills Water
Co., 942 P.2d 305, 306-07 (Utah 1996) (per curiam) (determining that a remittitur issued
before a pending petition for certiorari was resolved did not serve to divest the Utah Court of
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Appeals of jurisdic-tion). Second, even after a remittitur returns jurisdiction to the lower
court, the appellate court may retain limited jurisdiction over certain matters, particularly
where consti-tutional rights are implicated. See State v. Lara, 2005 UT 70, 21, 124 P.3d 243
(holding that the Utah Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to consider the voluntariness of a
defendant's withdrawal of his appeal despite having re-mitted the case to the trial court).
A. Premature Remittitur
9 First, a remittitur cannot serve to return jurisdiction to a lower court for
implementation of the appellate court's mandate while the case is still pending on appeal. See
Hi-Country, 942 P.2d at 306. Our rules of appellate proce-dure outline a schedule for
remittitur that implements this principle. Specifically, the rules instruct the court of ap-peals
to remit a case "immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of
certiorari" and to stay the remittitur if such a petition is filed. See Utah R.App. P. 36(a)(2).
The rules similarly instruct the su-preme court to issue remittitur "15 days after the entry of
the judgment" or, "[i]f a petition for rehearing is timely filed, ? five days after the entry of the
order disposing of the petition." Id. R. 36(a)(1). See generally id. R. 35(a) ("A petition for
rehearing may be filed with the clerk within 14 days after the entry of the decision of the
court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by order."). If a case is remitted before the time
for such petitions has passed or before the petitions can be considered, jurisdic-tion will
nevertheless remain with the appellate court and not return to the lower court. See Hi-
Country, 942 P.2d at 306-07 (holding that the trial court did not have juris-diction to
implement the mandate of the court of appeals while a petition for certiorari was pending in
the supreme court, despite the fact that the court of appeals had remit-ted the case to the trial
court).
B. Limited Retained Jurisdiction
10 Furthermore, there are circumstances where an appel-late court may retain limited
jurisdiction, despite the low-er court having regained jurisdiction as a result of a re-mand....11
However, because "remittitur is a procedure created pursuant to the rule making authority
vested in [the su-preme court]," see id. 13; see also Utah R.App. P. 36, its jurisdictional
effect is judicially, rather than constitution-ally, imposed, see Lara, 2005 UT 70, 12-13
(internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, "the significance of remittitur as a limitation
on ? jurisdiction" should not be overinflated. Id. 9. "[T]he appellate court retains [at least]
the jurisdiction necessary to compel compliance with the terms of the remittitur." Id. 16.
Additionally, the jurisdictional implications of remittitur "cannot be in-terpreted in a manner
that would stymie a legitimate quest to assert important constitutional guarantees," id. 19,
which "override ? whatever jurisdictional significance might reside within ? jurisprudence
relating to remit-titurs," id. 21-22 (holding that because the constitu-tional right to an appeal
overrides any jurisdictional effect of the rules of appellate procedure, the court of appeals had
the authority to exercise jurisdiction over an appel-lant's claim that he had not knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to an appeal by withdrawing it, even af-ter the case had been
remitted).
12 Thus, had Falkner identified a constitutional right or other appropriate claim, the
district court could have exer-cised jurisdiction over the motion to reinstate, even if it had
properly returned jurisdiction to the justice court. Cf. id. 21. No such claim was raised.
However, because the district court remanded the case immediately, without allowing any
time for filing of postjudgment motions, re-mittitur was premature and could not have
immediately divested the district court of jurisdiction. Thus, the ulti-mate question of whether
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the district court had jurisdic-tion over Falkner's motion to reinstate turns on whether the
motion was filed prior to the time that jurisdiction could properly have been surrendered by
the district court.
III. The District Court Must Retain Jurisdiction over Appeals from Justice Court for a
Reasonable Time Sufficient to Permit Consideration of Postjudgment Matters.
13 Unlike the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
do not provide clear guidelines regarding the district court's retention of juris-diction
following a remand for abandonment. Although section 78A-7-118(8) of the Utah Code
provides that "[t]he district court shall retain jurisdiction over the case on trial de novo," see
Utah Code Ann. 78A-7-118(8) (Supp.2012), the provision in the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure which permits remand to the justice court in the case of abandonment, see Utah
R.Crim. P. 38(h), sug-gests that jurisdiction must eventually return to the justice court after an
appeal has been abandoned. Nevertheless, a remand under such circumstances must allow at
least some time for parties to file appropriate postjudgment mo-tions before the district court
loses jurisdiction.
14 Judge Lindberg argues that we should look to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
as a guide in deter-mining the appropriate deadline for returning jurisdiction to the justice
court after an appeal is remanded for aban-donment. Under rule 36 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the court of appeals is expected to issue a re-mittitur "immediately after
the expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari," Utah R.App. P. 36(a)(2),
and a "petition for a writ of certiorari must be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court
within 30 days after the entry of the final decision by the Court of Ap-peals," id. R. 48(a).
Thus, jurisdiction may be appropriate-ly returned to the district court following appeal thirty-
one days after the court of appeals makes its final deci-sion. Judge Lindberg asserts that,
likewise, the district court's "jurisdiction is lost no later than 31 days after the dismissal
decision is made."
15 We agree that the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure may "serve as a model in
the context of justice court appeals." Cf. Gordon v. Maughan, 2009 UT App 25, 22 n. 7,
204 P.3d 189 (suggesting that rule 23A of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure might serve
as a guide for determining whether reinstatement of an appeal from jus-tice court might be
appropriate). However, the time for remittitur outlined in rule 36 is not an arbitrary number of
days but is based on the time allowed for filing petitions for certiorari and rehearing. Indeed,
the supreme court is directed to remit a case a mere fifteen days after a final decision,
consistent with the fourteen-day period allotted for filing a petition for rehearing. See Utah
R.App. P. 36(a)(1); see also id. R. 35(a). Thus, the guidance provid-ed by rule 36 is not a
strict deadline for returning jurisdic-tion to a lower court but, rather, a method for
determining the appropriate deadline in light of the circumstances. That method requires that
the court retain jurisdiction for a period sufficient to allow appropriate postjudgment mo-tions
to be filed and considered.
... IV. The District Court Exceeded Its Discretion When It Denied the Motion to Reinstate
Without Conducting an Analysis Under Rule 23A of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
19 We also reject the district court's alternative ground for denying the motion to
reinstate, namely, that Falkner offered no excuse for his failure to appear. Because we
determine that Falkner did offer an explanation for his failure to appear, we determine that the
district court ex-ceeded its discretion by denying the motion to reinstate without considering
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whether Falkner's failure was excus-able under rule 23A of the Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure.
20 In Gordon v. Maughan, 2009 UT App 25, 204 P.3d 189, this court upheld a district
court's denial of a motion to reinstate an appeal from justice court remanded for
abandonment, in part based on the fact that the defendant "provided no reasons justifying her
failure to appear." Id. 22. In so doing, we explained that the criteria outlined by rule 23A of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for determining whether reinstatement of an appeal is
appropriate "could serve as a model in the context of justice court appeals." See id. 22 n. 7.
Rule 23A provides that "[a]n appeal dismissed for failure to take a step other than the timely
filing of a notice of appeal may be reinstated by the court upon motion of the appellant for (a)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect or (b) fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct of an adverse party." Utah R.App. P. 23A." Falkner v. Lindberg, 288 P. 3d 1097
(2012).

41

42
Coughlin has demonstrated, beyond the Reno City Attorney's Office choosing not to pursue a new
trial (which means Coughlin definitely avoided any such second guilty verdict), that he would likely
avoid a guilty verdict in any such new trial. To whatever extent at this point nearly three years after
the September 9th, 2011 arrest at issue in such matter, Coughlin need shown he would avoid any such
guilty verdict upon a new trial being held, please incorporate herein the following:
http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=29629 case 61462
08/13/20
12
Petition/Bar
Filed Petition for Dissolution of Temporary Suspension Pursuant to Supreme Court R
alternatively, SCR 111(7) Petition to Show Good Cause For the Court To Set Aside It
Suspending Attorney from the Practice of Law.

Also, in case 60838: http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseView.do?csIID=29004

06/11/2012 Motion Filed Motion for Leave to File Opposition or to Show Cause why Temporary Suspen
06/18/2012 Motion
Filed Motion for Leave to File Amended or Supplemental Opposition or Motion to S
Suspension.

"We hold that the late filing of the transcript by the justice's court does not warrant
dismissal..." STATE v. O'DONNELL NO. 14010. 646 P.2d 1217 (1982)

Where there is not statute or rule requiring otherwise (such as NRS 189.030(1) clearly
requiring the RMC Judge Howard to do so in the matter appealed in CR11-2064 (NRS
189.030 Transmission of transcript, other papers, sound recording and copy of docket to district
court. 1. The justice shall, within 10 days after the notice of appeal is filed, transmit to the clerk of the
district court the transcript of the case, all other papers relating to the case and a certified copy of the
docket.)) appellee shares the responsibility for ensuring the appellate court has a complete
record.[FN10] All parties are obligated to see that the settled record contains all matters necessary for
the disposition of the issues raised on appeal.[FN11] When an appellant has designated a part of the
record for appeal that is sufficient to support a conclusion of error by the trial court, the appellee must
also designate portions of the record in support of the appellee's position.[FN12] It is the
responsibility of the parties to ensure that all documents relevant to the disposition of an appeal are
duly filed with the clerk of court before the issuance of an appellate decision.[FN13] For review to be
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meaningful, the record must only be of sufficient completeness to permit proper consideration of an
appellant's claims.[FN14] A record of sufficient completeness does not translate into a complete
verbatim transcript.[FN15]
[FN10] Tenn.-Jennings v. Sewell-Allen Piggly Wiggly, 173 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2005). -
[FN11] S.D.-Toben v. Jeske, 2006 SD 57, 718 N.W.2d 32 (S.D. 2006). - [FN12] Ky.-Mifflin v.
Mifflin, 170 S.W.3d 387 (Ky. 2005). - [FN13] Ga.-Drake v. Drake, 279 Ga. App. 576, 632 S.E.2d 165
(2006), cert. denied, (Oct. 16, 2006). - [FN14] N.M.-Village of Angel Fire v. Wheeler, 133 N.M. 421,
2003-NMCA-041, 63 P.3d 524 (Ct. App. 2003). - [FN15] N.M.-Village of Angel Fire v. Wheeler, 133
N.M. 421, 2003-NMCA-041, 63 P.3d 524 (Ct. App. 2003). See generally, Brewer v. Blackwell, 692
F.2d 387 (5th Cir.1982). Issues such as failure to provide a transcript and failure to timely try a case
or have a hearing are clearly related to the defendant's judicial duties.

One 2JDC case in instructive: CR09-2007 Robert Roy (PO BOX 8033, Reno 89507) v. City
of Reno. RCA Drake. Judge Howard. Motion to Dismiss (10/10/09) cites to Mitchell v. State, 109
Nev 137 ('93) "In order to review the record, the Court must have a transcript of the proceedings" and
"It is the duty of the Appellant to furnish the court with the complete record properly certified. See
NRAP 9; State v. Hill, 32 Nev 185, 188 (1909). Judge Polaha denied such Motion to Dismiss via
2/17/10 Order, citing to NRS 189.030, and distinguishing such: "Unlike an appeal from the district
court to the Supreme Court, the justice court is responsible for transmitting the transcript to
the district court. See NRS 177.165".

RCA Drake file a Motion for Reconsideration indicating that:
"it is obviously the Appellant's obligation to request and pay for the transcript before it can be
provided, since the appeal is at his request. While the RMC must make the transcript available to the
Defendant within 10 days of the filing of the notice of appeal, it would impose and undue financial
burden to require the RMC to physically provide every transcript for appeal to the District
Court. The City does not believe this was the intent of the NV Legislature when it enacted NRS
189.030. The Nevada Supreme Court has consistently ruled that it is the Appellant's duty to ensure
that the transcript is transmitted to the Court. See Barkley v. State, 114 Nev. 635, Mitchell v. State,
109 Nev. 137, and Hill v. State, 32 Nev. 185....procedurally, when the defendant files an appeal the
RMC provides Defendant with instructions on how to obtain the transcript (See Exhibit 1), the RMC
downloads the audio recording of its proceeding to the internet, within 10 days of the filing of the
notice of appeal. Typewrite Transcript Services is then able to download the information upon request
and payment from Defendant. See attached Exhibit 2, RMC Appeal Procedures, and see attached
Exhibit 3, a copy of the tice of Appeal where at the bottom Roy marked and initialed that he received
those instructions. Roy's failure to obtain that transcript (and perfect his appeal) was obviously
willful..."
RCA Drake files a Motion for Reconsideration attaching two different RMC handouts
provided to appellants that plainly skirt Nevada law. Type-Write Services involved.
Judge Polaha denied the RCA's Motion in his 6/9/10 Order. In response to Drake's argument
that "Appellant must request and pay for the transcript before it can be provided, since the appeal is at
his request", Judge Polaha notes "NRS 189.030 says nothing about requiring payment by the
appellant prior to the transmission. Braham, 103 Nev. 644. Instead, NRS 4.410(2) establishes who
pays for the transcript....unlike civil cases, neither 4.410(2), nor 189.030 requires the appellant to
request and pay for the transcript prior to its transmittal. See Braham).
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The City of Renos continually citing to NRAP 9, Mitchell, Hill, and Barkley as support for
its various Motions to Dismiss appeals by criminal defendants would seem to violate RPC 3.1 where
NRAP 1 makes quite clear NRAP does not apply to such appeals and there is nothing in either of
those three cases to support the City Attorneys citation to such.
Nevada RPC Rule 3.1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions. A lawyer shall not
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law
and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law

For instance, RCA Drake cites to Barkley as authority for her contention that: the Nevada
Supreme Court has consistently ruled that it is the Appellant's duty to ensure that the transcript is
transmitted to the Court. See Barkley v. State, 114 Nev. 635, Mitchell v. State, 109 Nev. 137, and
Hill v. State, 32 Nev. 185.
However, Barkley v. State, 114 Nev. 635, 958 P.2d 1218 (1998) does not say that at all:
"footnote 2. Appellant's fast track statement cites to the transcript of appellant's trial, but appellant's
counsel has failed to cause transmission of a transcript to this court. Appellant has the
responsibility to provide materials necessary for appellate review. See NRAP 3C(d)(3) and (e)(2);
Greene v. State, 96 Nev. 555, 558, 612 P.2d 686, 688 (1980); Jacobs v. State, 91 Nev. 155, 158, 532
P.2d 1034, 1036 (1975). Since the factual statements in both the fast track statement and the fast track
response were consistent, we accepted the facts as set forth by appellant and were able to decide this
appeal
Also, Hill does not support such contention either (not to mention that such case is from 1909
and applies to a statute long since retired and cites to a rule of procedure long since replaced by the
1973 adoption of the NRAP):
State v. Hill, 32 Nev. 185 (1909) 105 P. 1025: The record in Hill was submitted in two
volumes, only one of which bore a certification by the clerk. ...The Attorney General, in pursuance
of the provision of rule 8 of this court, has interposed a number of objections to the transcript on
appeal affecting the right of appellant to be heard upon the points discussed in the brief, only one of
which objections we deem necessary to consider, to wit: (4) That the pretended record or transcript
on appeal has not been duly authenticated or certified by the clerk of the district court in the
manner prescribed by law, and that a portion of the record or transcript on appeal has not been
authenticated or certified by the clerk of the district court in any way or manner, and the same is
totally uncertified and unauthenticated, and is of no legal force or value. Rule 7, of this court
provides: For the purpose of correcting any error or defect in the transcript from the court below,
either party may suggest the same, in writing, to this court, and, upon good cause shown, obtain an
order that the proper clerk certify to the whole or part of the record, as *1026 may be required, or
may produce the same, duly certified, without such order.
In spite of the fact that the objection was properly raised to the consideration of this
uncertified volume of the record, no attempt was made to remedy the defect. This court has adopted a
liberal practice in the granting of applications to amend defects in transcripts, but where no move is
made to obviate a valid objection, there is no other alternative than to grant it....We again call
attention to an act regulating appeals to the Supreme Court (Comp. Laws, 3862), and to the
several decisions of this court as to the proper authentication of the record on appeal. Holmes v.
Mining Co., 23 Nev. 23, 41 Pac. 762; Streeter v. Johnson, 23 Nev. 194, 44 Pac. 819; Peers v. Reed, 23
Nev. 404, 48 Pac. 897; Becker v. Becker, 24 Nev. 476, 56 Pac. 243. It is the duty of the appellant in
all appeals to furnish this court with a record properly certified. When proper attention is paid to the
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above statute, motions to dismiss appeals on the ground of defective certificates, and motions for
leave to withdraw the records for the purpose of having them properly certified, will not be of such
frequent occurrence as heretofore, and delay and unnecessary expense with respect thereto will be
avoided.
It is clear that we can only consider the volume certified to be a true and correct transcript of
appeal herein. As we said in Kirman v. Johnson, 30 Nev. 151, 93 Pac. 500: It may be contended
that it was the fault of the clerk in sending up a record of this kind; but, even if that be so in the strict
sense of the law, nevertheless it would be better for counsel to see that clerks send up proper
transcripts. If counsel in all cases will adopt the only safe practice of looking over transcripts on
appeal and making certain themselves that they comply with the provisions of the statute, before they
are transmitted to this court by the clerk of the lower court, they will not only avoid much trouble for
themselves and this court, but will obviate largely the danger of their client's case not being heard
upon its merits. Clerks are not usually lawyers, and unless they receive some assistance or direction
in the preparation of transcripts upon appeal, errors are very apt to be made...." State v. Hill, 32 Nev.
185 (1909) 105 P. 1025.
Likewise, Mitchell does not hold what the City Attorney indicates it does either as the term
record does not, and never has, meant a transcript is absolutely required, and, further, such holding
does not even apply to an appeal, but, rather, to a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed with the trial
court: Mitchell v. State, 109 Nev. 137 (1993) 848 P.2d 1060: "Pursuant to Bryant, when a defendant
brings a motion to *141 withdraw a guilty **1062 plea, the trial court has a duty to review the entire
record to determine whether the plea was valid. A district court may not simply review the plea
canvass in a vacuum, conclude that it indicates that the defendant understood what she was doing,
and use that conclusion as the sole basis for denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea."
See Sparks City Attorney's admission in 7/9/12 filing in CR12-1018 on page 3 thereof, stating
that NRAP 9(a)(3)(A)-(B) are being erroneously applied to the municipal court. "Respondent
contents that the NRAP apply only to appeals to the NVSCT and are not applicable here. See NRAP
1(a). State law provides for these appeals under NRS 189.

CR09-0889 Kimberly Cradler v. COR. RCA Roberts Motion to dismiss 6/15/09: "in
reviewing this matter, the appellant has failed to order the transcript from the RMC that was
established before Judge Van Winkle. In order to review the record, the Court must have a
transcript of the proceedings. Mitchell v. State, 109 Nev. 137. It is the duty of the Appellant to
furnish the court with the complete record properly certified. See NRAP 9, Hill v. State, 32 Nev 185,
189 (1909).
7/16/09 Judge Elliott's "Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Appeal Without
Prejudice" "NRAP 9(a) requires the appellant file a transcript request form specifying the portions of
the transcript requested no later than 15 days ...no request form was filed. This is in contravention of
the clear language of NRAP 9(a). Therefore, pursuant to NRAP 9(c) and in light of the fact that no
Opposition was filed, the Motion to Dismiss shall be granted without prejudice. As such, the
appellant may perfect her appeal by filing the necessary documents in accordance with
aforementioned rule."

RCA Roberts did not file a Motion to Dismiss Coughlin's appeal in CR11-2064 based upon
any lack of a transcript. Breliant precludes Elliott from skirting the adjudicatory boundaries placed
before him by such failure to make the argument (which would be an RPC 3.1 violation anyways by
RCA Roberts).
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CR09-0751 Alvon Surrell, Judge Elliott's "Order Denying Appeal" (differs from language
Elliott used in CR11-2064), 4/8/09 fails to remand, and simply reads "Appellant's appeal is Denied".
to Dismiss.