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American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 2 May 2007
DOI: 10.1017.S0003055407070128
Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in non-Muslim Liberal
Democracies
ANDREW F. MARCH Yale University
I
n this article I take up John Rawlss invitation to investigate the capacity of a given comprehensive
ethical doctrine to endorse on principled grounds the liberal terms of social cooperation. In the case
of Islamic political ethics, however, far more is at stake in afrming citizenship in a (non-Muslim)
liberal democracy than state neutrality and individual autonomy. Islamic legal and political traditions
have traditionally held that submission to non-Muslim political authority and bonds of loyalty and
solidarity with non-Muslim societies are to be avoided. In this article, I examine the Islamic foundations
for afrming on principled grounds residence, political obligation, and loyalty to a non-Muslim state.
My research shows not only that such grounds exist even in classical Islamic legal discourses, but also
that the concerns of Islamic scholars vindicate political liberalisms claim to successfully accommodate
the adherents of certain nonliberal doctrines by refraining from proclaiming controversial metaphysical
truthclaims.
P
olitical theory has always concerned itself not
only with the search for philosophically justi-
able normative principles but also with how a
social order might overcome the perpetual hindrances
to the realization of justice, freedom, or happiness,
such as those arising from the defects of human na-
ture. Philosophers from Plato onwards have addressed
the ways in which ignorance, greed, selshness, short-
sightedness, amour-propre, superstition, or ideology
might be transcended in a just society. In doing so,
they have concerned themselves with the fundamental
problem of the stability of an ideal political order, or
with giving an account of how actual individuals might
come to accept and support the normative foundations
of a just society.
The later work of John Rawls contains a unique con-
tribution to this tradition. For Rawls, in addition to all
of the familiar obstacles placed by human nature, a
well-ordered society is also threatened by the efforts
of persons to advance through the state aims derived
from undemocratic or illiberal conceptions of the good
(or comprehensive doctrines). Such persons are not
necessarily ignorant or selsh in the ways conceived
by Plato, Hobbes, or Marx. They do not use the values
and symbols of a conception of the good simply as
a mask or legitimation for material self-interest. Nor
does Rawls declare that these conceptions of the good
are false, and that that is why they must be overcome
or transcended. Rather, however sincere such persons
are intheir adherence tocomprehensive doctrines, they
may be fundamentally unreasonable in the sense of
being unwilling to propose and abide by fair terms of
cooperation or by failing to recognize fellow citizens
as free and equal. Citizens so motivated will thus have
little to no loyalty to a liberal political regime.
Andrew F. March is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale
University, Department of Political Science, P.O. Box 208301 New
Haven, CT 06520-8301 (marcha@msu.edu).
I am grateful to Michael Freeden, Sohail Hashmi, Guy Kahane,
Steven Kautz, Tariq Ramadan, and Micah Schwartzman, as well as
the editor of American Political Science Reviewfor comments on and
criticisms of previous versions of this article.
The nature of Rawlss project of political justication
means that his solutiontothis problemdiffers fromthat
of most classical theorists. Because his aim is not the
realizationof a givenconceptionof truthor of the good,
the problem of stability cannot be a question of how to
inculcate that conception and suppress false religions
or ideologies. Political liberalisms claim to be free-
standing from any single comprehensive doctrine and
limited to a commitment to the reasonable rather
than fully true or rational means that it has limited re-
sources for shaping and motivating morally individual
citizens.
The Rawlsian account of howa just society might en-
joy stability consists insteadof the following twoclaims.
First, Rawls assures us that political liberalisms free-
standing values (such as liberty, equality, stability, pros-
perity, and democracy), although not derived from any
sectarianconceptionof the good, are nonetheless very
great values. They are powerful in their own right
and over time will come to enjoy historical legitimacy
withina political community that endorses and upholds
them. Given their potency, they will gradually create a
political culture in which citizens recognize that they
are, all things considered, better off living under a
democratic regime, even if it means some limitations
on their own comprehensive doctrine. In turn, some
citizens may revise their comprehensive doctrines to
remove any lingering dissonance. This account of the
possibility of a stable, well-orderedsociety is essentially
that many persons will feel stronger about the intrinsic
benets of living in a decent, democratic society than
pursuing aims deriving from abstract conceptions of
the good.
However, Rawls acknowledges that the independent
force and appeal of liberalisms purely political values
will not likely be enough. Many citizens will continue to
derive their deepest commitments (intellectual, moral,
emotional, spiritual) from comprehensive doctrines,
particularly because under political liberalism public
institutions abstain from any decisive claim to these
commitments. It is not enough to presume that all of
these comprehensive doctrines will be largely apoliti-
cal, happy to regard liberal values as authoritative in
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Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in non-Muslim Liberal Democracies May 2007
an autonomous sphere of human activity. What then
allows these citizens to support liberal institutions, and
not grudgingly but thoroughly?
Rawls thus introduces a second claim, namely, that
the liberal terms of social cooperation may be the
subject of an overlapping consensus between compre-
hensive doctrines. An overlapping consensus obtains
when the comprehensive doctrines ourishing in so-
ciety actually concur with and give support to liberal,
democratic principles in their own terms and for their
own reasons. The belief is that at least this threat to
the stability of a liberal society (that of how compre-
hensive doctrines motivate citizens) can be removed or
mitigatedwhenmany of these doctrines are congruent
with, or supportive of, or else not in conict with, polit-
ical values as these are specied by a political concep-
tion of justice for a democratic regime (Rawls 1993,
169). That is, while a political conception of justice will
justify itself philosophically through public forms of
reason or the independent force of its political values, it
will come to enjoy additional support from within com-
prehensive ethical and religious doctrines that people
hold in private and in civil society. It is the combination
of the force of political liberalisms freestanding val-
ues and its potential to receive full justication from
within comprehensive doctrines that enables political
liberalism to claim the support of citizens for princi-
pled (and, thus, hopefully stable) reasons (Rawls, 1993,
386).
The potential for political liberalism to receive this
full justication rests not only on the assumption that
many comprehensive doctrines are, in fact, disposed
toward such institutions as democracy and individual
freedom, but also on political liberalisms abstinence
from any claims of truth for its political values. The
belief is that avoiding judgments of truth about con-
troversial metaphysical claims allows citizens to decide
for themselves how the political conception of justice
or citizenship relates to their conception of truth, good,
or rationality. This will make it easier for citizens who
hold a nonliberal comprehensive doctrine to endorse
liberalism as a purely political conception of justice
because they are not being asked to profess the truth of
any doctrine contrary to their own. Nonliberal citizens
hostile to comprehensive forms of liberalism should
thus have reasons to endorse political liberalism, where
they do not have reasons to endorse liberal regimes
based on perfectionist public justications.
For political liberals it thus matters deeply whether
popular comprehensive doctrines support a liberal con-
ception of justice, if not for the truth of that conception,
then for its prospects. To the extent that citizens afrm-
ing a given comprehensive doctrine themselves care
whether that doctrine is compatible with their societys
public conception of justice, and to the extent that their
judgment on this matter has an effect on certain social
goods that liberals care aboutnamely, stability, trust,
harmony, efcient decision making, social integration,
political legitimacy, and respect for rightsliberals
have powerful reasons to concern themselves with the
prospects for a stable overlapping consensus (Cohen
1993, 27475).
Islam is one important such comprehensive doctrine
in many contemporary liberal democracies. It is worth
special consideration not only because Muslims are
now citizens of liberal societies in large numbers, but
also because it is a comprehensive ethical doctrine
par excellence. Indeed, Islams comprehensiveness, ac-
cording to orthodox Islamic doctrine as represented
in the traditional genres of theology, Quranic exegesis
and Islamic jurisprudence (qh), is itself virtually an ar-
ticle of faith: Islamsets out to give mankind knowledge
and guidance on everything from questions of meta-
physics properly understood to the social and political
conditions for achieving salvation. It offers a single vi-
sion for uniting the individual quest for virtue with the
social goods of justice and solidarity. A pious Muslim
has no problem recognizing the source of Rawlss con-
cern that there be an overlapping consensus supporting
a societys public conception of justice. Indeed, what
we might call normative Islam prescribes just the
form of reection Rawls imagines that each citizen will
perform, consisting of the self-conscious interrogation
of the norms of ones social and political systemin light
of formal religious doctrine.
What, then, does a sincere, pious Muslim encounter
when they ask the Rawlsian (and Islamic) question:
May I without great contradiction regard the terms of
citizenship in a pluralist liberal democracy as reason-
able from an Islamic standpoint?
From the perspective of traditional Islamic legal, po-
litical, and ethical doctrines, the idea of Muslim cit-
izenship in non-Muslim states is deeply problematic.
One can readily nd within classical and modern le-
gal discourses prohibitions on submitting to the au-
thority of non-Muslim states, serving in their armies,
contributing to their strength or welfare, participating
in their political systems and, indeed, even residing
within them. These prohibitions are not mere medieval
legalisms; rather they are reections of a range of more
general Islamic beliefs, including those that Muslims
must always strive to live under Islamic law and politi-
cal authority, that Muslims have obligations of loyalty
(perhaps exclusively) to Muslims and Muslim polities,
and that non-Muslims are not eligible for relationships
of social and political solidarity.
However, even premodern Islamic legal discourses
afrm a certain set of values and principles which pre-
scribe very rigorous ethical standards for dealing with
non-Muslims, within both Muslim and non-Muslim
polities. Chief among these is the insistence within Is-
lamic jurisprudence on the inviolability of contracts.
Furthermore, Islamic legal, political, and ethical dis-
courses contain considerable diversity on the afore-
mentioned questions of residence, political obligation,
loyalty, and solidarity within non-Muslim societies.
Thus, whether Islam can provide believers with re-
sources for afrming citizenship in a non-Muslim lib-
eral democracy is very much an open question, in-
deed the subject of considerable debate and the cause
of much rich and creative thinking in contemporary
Islamic intellectual circles. In this article, I examine
the potential for a positive, principled, and stable Is-
lamic afrmation of citizenship in a non-Muslimliberal
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American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 2
democracy. In particular, I focus on Islamic doctrinal
foundations for afrming residence, political obliga-
tion, and loyalty within the context of a non-Muslim
state, in other words, the core terms of a social con-
tract. One should not confuse the search for Islamic
doctrinal afrmations of the terms of citizenship with
more empirical or sociological questions of how any
given really existing Muslim community regards these
questions. However, there can be no doubt that the
existence of strong religious motivations for endorsing
the terms of liberal citizenship can contribute in the
long term toward support for, and thus the stability of,
liberal institutions. The results of the present inquiry
are thus of interest to any political theorist or political
scientist interested in that problem. For political theo-
rists, perhaps the most important additional question
on which this case sheds light is whether political lib-
eralisms claim to earn the support of nonliberals by
refraining from truth-claims is warranted. My research
in Islamic sources provides strong evidence that, at
least in this one case, political liberalisms public com-
mitment to neutrality does in fact appeal to adherents
of a nonliberal comprehensive doctrine.
In what follows, I briey discuss some important
ethical and methodological issues related to this form
of inquiry, namely, how outsiders ought to investigate
alien comprehensive doctrines and how sources are
best identied, followed by an elaboration of my pre-
viously cited claims that the terms of liberal citizen-
ship pose a doctrinal problem in Islam. I then present
the Islamic sources which could serve to ground a
stable social contract in non-Muslim liberal democra-
cies and defend my claim that these sources do in-
deed help vindicate political liberalisms justicatory
project.
RAWLSIAN COMPARATIVE ETHICS: THE
SEARCH FOR AN OVERLAPPING
CONSENSUS THROUGH CONJECTURE
How the overlapping consensus is supposed to obtain,
and what ought to be the role of political theorists in
examining it or bringing it about, is an area of Rawlss
project left underdeveloped. Rawls did propose, with-
out much explanation, a form of non-public reasoning
which would involve defending a political conception
of justice or specic policies from within an alien ethi-
cal tradition. Rawls referred to this form of nonpublic
reasoning, perhaps unfortunately, as conjecture and
dened it as arguing from what we believe, or con-
jecture, are other peoples basic doctrines, religious or
secular, and try[ing] to show them that, despite what
they may think, they can still endorse a reasonable
political conception that can provide a basis for public
reasons (Rawls 1999, 156).
One may nd the image of outsiders entering oth-
ers ethical traditionsparticularly ones as elaborate
and technical as is, say, the Islamic legal traditionand
blithely try[ing] to show them that, despite what they
may think, they can still endorse a reasonable political
conception that can provide a basis for public reasons
to be rather implausible. However, I do believe that the
invitation to engage in a similar form of comparative
political theory is worth accepting. In addition to the
way conjecture throws light on, or even contributes
to, the search for social stability, and the way engag-
ing with moral contemporaries from different ethical
traditions is an act of respect, it tests and thus illu-
minates our own substantive beliefs about citizenship
and justice in a diverse society in two ways: one, the
dialogical process of asking what precisely liberalism
demands of citizens in light of the various comprehen-
sive ethical doctrines held in a society may alter (if only
at the margins) our understanding of those demands
(March 2006); two, this form of comparative political
theory may be the only way of resolving certain con-
troversies within political liberalism, such as whether
it is in fact justied in claiming to gain the support
of otherwise nonliberal doctrines by refraining from
asserting any truth-claim for its public conception of
justice.
I propose, however, at least as a starting point, a
slightly less ambitious form of conjecture, or compar-
ative ethics, which I characterize as diagnostic, evalu-
ative, and synthetic. It involves primarily investigating
the capacity of any given comprehensive ethical doc-
trine to provide support for an overlapping consensus
on a public conception of justice or citizenship, even if
adherents of that tradition have not yet done so. Such
a process, as will become clear in this article, is more
complex than merely reading what others have to say
in light of our own concerns. It consists of the following
steps:
1. Articulating from the liberal perspective what pre-
cisely is sought by way of consensus or afrmation
from the nonliberal tradition in question. This step
requires familiaritynot onlywithliberal conceptions
of justice and citizenship but also with the outside
ethical tradition and where specically it may con-
ict with liberal norms (I have done this at length in
March 2006.)
2. Making transparent the range of views and reasons
for those views, from within an ethical tradition,
which serve to reject liberal terms of social cooper-
ation, which we can call incompatible positions.
3. Searching for and presenting views, fromwithin that
tradition, which ostensibly approve of or accept lib-
eral terms of social cooperation, which we can call
compatible positions. Steps 2 and 3 represent the
diagnostic stage of conjecture. The purpose is to
identify what, fromthe perspective of the doctrine in
question, is involved in endorsing a particular aspect
of liberal citizenship: can it be done from within the
range of diversity approved by traditional schools
of thought, or does it require signicant departure
from orthodoxy?
4. Analyzing those views in terms of the nature of their
reasoning and argumentation in an attempt to judge
whether the underlying foundation for those views
merits accepting them as principled and stable argu-
ments for accepting liberal terms of social coopera-
tion. This is the evaluative stage of conjecture. A
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Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in non-Muslim Liberal Democracies May 2007
primary concern of political liberalism is that it not
be a mere modus vivendi among conicting social
groups, but rather a potentially stable social con-
tract. Thus, for it to be said that an overlapping con-
sensus obtains, there would have to be good reason
tobelieve that the comprehensive ethical doctrine in
question is providing principled (rather than tactical
or strategic) reasons for afrming a given liberal
norm or institution, such that they would continue
to be valid should the group in question improve its
relative position of strength in society.
Most of what my form of conjecture consists of is
this type of analysis of reasons, rather than direct ar-
gumentation from within an alien ethical tradition.
In any event, direct argumentation from within an
alien ethical tradition would necessitate extensive
knowledge of the tradition in question; the method-
ology I adopt here presumes a preference for exist-
ing arguments already articulated by persons who
claim to endorse the metaphysical underpinnings of
the tradition and whose views reect its authorita-
tive methodologies. It seems intuitive that a person
wishing to engage in the more direct form of con-
jecture suggested by Rawls would begin where I do,
by pointing out the range of views already advanced
within discourses ones interlocutor would likely re-
gard as signicant.
5. Finally, conjecture might involve presenting as a co-
herent overall doctrine of citizenship or overlap-
ping consensus a series of arguments or positions
drawn from a variety of sources, scholars, and time
periods. This is the synthetic stage of conjecture.
One scholar or school may be invoked as a source
of a compatible position on one question, and of an
incompatible position on another. What the conjec-
turer is trying to showis that for any given question a
principled and also authentic and plausible afrma-
tion can be given from within the ethical doctrine.
The aspiration is that an individual adherent of the
doctrine who is also a citizen of a liberal democracy
could in good faith articulate a general doctrine
of citizenship based on the synthesis of a variety
of positions. Although I do not see why it should
be necessary that a single scholar or school be the
source of a comprehensive overlapping consensus,
it is important that the positions being brought to-
gether do not contradict one another or rely on
incompatible underlying foundations or method-
ologies.
ON ORTHODOXY, CONTEXT, AND
SOURCES: LOCATING ISLAM AS A
COMPREHENSIVE DOCTRINE
Conjecture, eventhe more modest versionwhichI have
elaborated, is vulnerable to a certain skepticism and
series of criticisms. Two in particular are worth address-
ing. First, one might say that it is not the business of
outsiders to argue from within alien ethical traditions.
They will lack the training and sincerity, and may in
fact do more harm than good to the prospects of an
overlapping consensus if they end up tainting or dele-
gitimating moderate positions. Second, one might say
that the conjecturer is only looking for compatible po-
sitions which might not enjoy authority or authenticity
for believers. In doing so, the conjecturer might neglect
incompatible positions or treat the tradition in an a la
carte, context-free way.
I take both of these concerns very seriously, to the
extent that I submit that the rst principle of conjecture
ought to be plausibility. By plausibility I mean that
we ought to be looking for the overlapping consensus
least vulnerable to being dismissed by insiders to an
ethical tradition as heterodox or spurious. We are not
looking for just any interpretation of Islamic doctrine
or scripture that can afrm the terms of liberal cit-
izenship, but one that has the greatest possibility of
convincing those most likely to be skeptical of liberal
terms of citizenship.
It is not the outsiders place tomake judgments about
the relative authenticity or veracity of one school of
interpretation over another, and I do not wish to sug-
gest that various internal reformers or social critics are
thus insufciently orthodox or pious. However, this
enterprise has in mind a certain ideal-typical Rawl-
sian Muslim citizen who takes their own tradition seri-
ously, tends toward a formal, doctrinal understanding
of religion, and self-consciously weighs the demands of
citizenship against the duties of faith. It is this ideal-
typical Muslim citizen, rather than one who already
sees religion as but one aspect of their identity and
source of values, and who already afrms an individual
right to interpret their religion, who is most likely to
reject on grounds of principle and conscience a non-
Islamic conception of justice or citizenship regardless
of more value-neutral markers of that persons well-
being in a society, such as wealth, personal security,
and life prospects.
I thus propose that the diagnostic stage of conjec-
ture must begin by theorizing out from more ortho-
dox sources to less orthodox sources, a principle which
we might call canon rst. There are three assump-
tions operating here: rst, that an overlapping con-
sensus will be stronger and more stable the greater
number of adherents it can claim; second, that if one
can demonstrate the possibility of an overlapping con-
sensus with a traditions conservative orthodoxy that
such a consensus will be less vulnerable to rejection;
three, that if one can demonstrate a consensus within
conservative, orthodox sources, consensus with more
liberal or reform-minded traditions can be presumed to
follow.
This begs the question of how one identies ortho-
doxy. Of course, for a religious tradition, one must
begin, where possible, with the scriptural background:
what do the divinely inspired or revealed texts have
to say on this matter? However, for an outsider, scrip-
tural citation can only ever be a beginning, a way of
setting the context. What is important, rather, is what
insiders have interpreted those texts to require. I see
little point in insisting that a given verse could ground
such and such a value, if no one, or almost no one,
within that tradition has done so. Or, rather, the best
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American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 2
way of showing that certain views or values could be
derived from a certain text is showing that they have
been derived. Thus, what the outside conjecturer is re-
ally interested in are the various traditions of doctrinal
formulation, whether that be through scriptural exege-
sis or, in the case of Islam, jurisprudence, which should
not be understood as Islamic statute law but rather
the formalized Islamic search for and elaboration of
ethics and social norms.
This paper draws heavily particularly from the lat-
ter tradition, although there is often a substantive and
methodological overlap between exegesis and jurispru-
dence. The simple reason for this is that the juridical
sources are still used by Muslims today to orient them-
selves. When doctrinally minded Muslims ask them-
selves what is Islamic? or what does Islam allow?
(whether it is related to worship, private behavior or
political ethics) the legal sources still remain the rst
point of orientationfor the interpretationof revelation.
Although the pre-modern sources are not regarded
as nal or unambiguous, they still remain relevant for
modern Muslims. Thus, although the overlapping con-
sensus must be established between present-day lib-
eral conceptions of citizenship and present-day Islamic
ethics, the presentation of modern and contemporary
Islamic juridical or doctrinal positions must be done in
light of classical positions. This is particularly true when
contemporary Muslims are engaged in reinterpreta-
tion of doctrine. Where classical sources present no
incompatibility with liberal citizenship, modern Mus-
lims tend to see no incompatibility; the overlapping
consensus can thus be regarded as particularly sta-
ble. Where classical sources do present incompati-
bilities, modern Muslims inclined toward skepticism
of liberal citizenship have particularly strong grounds
for declaring it unacceptable; the burden is on those
(Muslims or outside conjecturers) to demonstrate
compatibility.
Readers will observe also that this paper employs
an eclectic approach to Islamic jurisprudence; I draw
from sources across the four Sunni legal schools and
across time and space. Furthermore, in the modern
period Islamic jurisprudence has given way to some
new genres of Islamic theorizing, and old genres (like
exegesis and fatwa-issuing) have been appropriated
by persons who would not traditionally be considered
qualied. I have included some of these thinkers, such
as the Muslim Brotherhood ideologue Sayyid Qutb
and Swiss Muslim reformer Tariq Ramadan, within my
survey.
As to the eclectic nature of my survey, this is very
much in keeping with modern Islamic practice. Both
Islamic reformers and fundamentalists tend to down-
play the signicance of the boundaries among the
traditional legal schools. Although various ideologi-
cal trends may tend to cite one school disproportion-
ately to others, this is due to ideological afnity, not
a doctrine of delity to a school in principle. Modern
scholars refer to this practice of surveying the range
of views from all schools across time and place with
the aim of nding an amenable position as takhayyur
or talq (Hallaq 1997, 210, 261). Similarly, premodern
Islamic jurisprudence cultivated a genre of identifying
the range of acceptable disagreement across and within
schools, referred to as works of ikhtilaf (difference
or disagreement).
Nor does drawing from modern works which are not
strictly speaking works of jurisprudence undermine my
general approach. Indeed, the only principle to which
the outside conjecturer is absolutely committed is that
of plausibility. Where it is the case that modernMuslims
look to other sources or genres, such as the examples I
have given of Qutb and Ramadan, they can be invoked
as examples of what a sincere, pious Muslim might
regard as Islamic doctrine. However, it is never the
case that these sources (or indeed any single source)
are invoked as authoritative in their own right. Rather,
they are invoked as representatives of a certain pat-
tern or trend in Islamic discourses. Where any given
source stands alone as offering a certain position, it
is crucial that this fact be made transparent and that
any conclusions drawn from that source take this into
account.
This brief explanation should satisfy the two criti-
cisms introduced above. This formof conjecture should
not taint or delegitimate any potential overlapping
consensus, because the arguments are almost always
drawn from mainstream, orthodox sources. The con-
jecturers job is not to create Islamic arguments, but
to nd them and analyze them in terms of their na-
ture as reasons for action. Similarly, my eclectic ap-
proach to sources not only is in keeping with contem-
porary Muslimpracticethat is, contemporary Muslim
scholars and lay believers do not apply a historical,
context-bound approach to their sources but rather
a living, appropriative onebut also afrms trans-
parency as a crucial value. One is always committed
to presenting the range of existing views and the rel-
ative centrality of the view one is advancing as com-
patible.
ISLAMIC OBJECTIONS TO CITIZENSHIP IN
NON-MUSLIM STATES
Rawls characterizes the conception on which an over-
lapping consensus is sought as the fundamental idea of
a well-ordered society as a fair system of co-operation
between reasonable and rational citizens regarded as
free and equal (Rawls 1993, 103). Of course, the cru-
cial feature of a liberal regime usually regarded as the
primary focus of nonliberal opposition is its political
conception of individual autonomy and the set of poli-
cies arising to protect individual liberties and uphold
state neutrality between conceptions of the good.
However, endorsing the freedoms arising from the
right to revise ones conception of the good is not the
only ideological challenge political liberalism poses to
Muslim citizens. For Islamic doctrine, there are two
broad problems with citizenship in non-Muslim liberal
states: one, in those states being liberal in character;
two, in those states being non-Muslim in character,
both socially and politically. The challenge of citizen-
ship in liberal democracies for Muslim communities
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Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in non-Muslim Liberal Democracies May 2007
is not only to recognize constraints on the exercise of
both state and nonstate coercion to advance a concep-
tion of the good but also to recognize the legitimacy of
the political community in which they live and of their
own membership in it, that is, to endorse the very idea
of entering into a social contract within a non-Muslim
political community.
The afrmation of citizenship in a non-Muslim lib-
eral democracy faces in Islamic doctrine a challenge
at a very basic level. A certain minority tradition in
Islamic law and ethics maintains that it is not permit-
ted for Muslims to reside in non-Muslim states (what
is often referred to as dar al-harb [the abode of war]
or dar al-kufr [the abode of unbelief]), both in the
sense of states with non-Muslim majority populations
and states governed by other than Islamic law, and
that Muslims who nd themselves in such situations
through conquest are obligated to migrate (perform
hijra) tothe Abode of Islam (dar al-Islam; AbouEl
Fadl 1994). In classical jurisprudence, this position was
advanced mostly by the Maliki school of law, predom-
inant in North Africa (e.g., al-Wansharisi 1981, 2: 121
38), but in the modern period it has been advanced by
Saudi adherents of the Wahhabi doctrine, which claims
derivation from the Hanbali school of law (e.g., al-
Shithri n.d.), as well as certain fundamentalist thinkers
not adhering to any single school, such as the Egyptian
Sayyid Qutb (Qutb 2001, 3: 286).
However, the reasons that have traditionally been
advanced as underlying the prohibition are illuminat-
ing for our purposes, and Islamic scholars addressing
the problem of Muslims living under non-Muslim po-
litical authority often feel the need to begin by rais-
ing the question of the permissibility of residence in
non-Muslim lands (e.g., al-Qaradawi 2001a, 25). In ad-
dition to the claim that there is a categorical divine
command to migrate from spheres of non-Muslim rule
based on two Quranic verses
1
and a number of reports
of Prophetic speech (hadith),
2
Muslim thinkers who
regard residence in a non-Muslim polity as impermis-
1
Q. 4:97100: Those whom the angels gather in death while in a
state of sin against themselves they will ask: What was your plight?
They reply: We were oppressed on earth. The [angels] will say: Was
not Gods earth vast enough for you to migrate within it? They will
have their refuge in hell and how evil is such a destiny, except for
those truly oppressed, those men, women and children who cannot
nd any means and have not been shown the way. For these there is
hope that God will forgive them, for God is Forgiving and Merciful.
Anyone who migrates in the path of God will nd in the Earth many
an abundant refuge. Whoever leaves his home in migration towards
God and his Messenger, and death overtakes him, his reward with
God is guaranteed, for God is Forgiving and Merciful. And, Q.
8:72: Those who believed and migrated and struggled in the path of
God with their property and their souls and those who sheltered and
supported them, and friends and supporters of one another. Those
who believed and did not migrate, you have no duty of protection
towards them until they migrate. But if they seek your support in
religion, you owe them this support, except against a people with
whom you have a treaty. God sees all that you do.
2
The hijra [migration to a Muslim polity] will not come to an end
until repentance comes to an end and repentance will not come to an
end until the sun shall rise fromits place of setting. I aminnocent of
[I disown] any Muslimwho lives with the polytheists. For you will not
be able to tell them apart. Do not live with and associate with the
polytheists. Whosoever lives with them and associates with them is
sible generally advance six types of rational arguments
(Abou El Fadl 1994): (1) that Muslims must not be
subject to non-Muslim laws (e.g., Sahnun n.d., 3: 278);
(2) that Islam and Muslims must not be put in a posi-
tion of inferiority to non-Muslims (e.g., al-Wansharisi
1981, 2: 13237); (3) that Muslims must avoid aiding or
increasing the strength of non-Muslims (e.g., al-Shirazi
n.d., 2: 227); (4) that Muslims are forbidden fromform-
ing bonds of friendship or solidarity with non-Muslims
(e.g., al-Shithri n.d., 34, 2830); (5) that Muslims are
required to avoid environments of sin or indecency;
(6) and that in non-Muslim environments it will be
more difcult to prevent sin or the loss of religios-
ity in subsequent generations (e.g., Nadwi 1983, 113
14).
It is clear that all of the underlying reasons for pro-
hibiting residence in a non-Muslim polity reveal a de-
sire to avoid precisely the types of relationships with
non-Muslims constitutive of both thin and thick con-
ceptions of citizenship: from basic political obligation
to deep bonds of solidarity based on values and ends
shared with fellow citizens. What is crucial to note here
is that although most Islamic scholars have not drawn
the conclusion from these arguments that residence in
non-Muslim lands is prohibited, many of those who
regard it as permissible nonetheless have expressed
some sympathy with the underlying arguments them-
selves. Thus, it is not uncommon to nd both classical
and modern Islamic jurists arguing that it is permitted
to reside in a non-Muslim polity if Muslims can do so
safely and without threat to religious practice, but if
possible Muslims should seek to establish their own
political authority (often considered part of what it
means to enjoy religious freedom), avoid contribution
to non-Muslim welfare or strength, and in the mean-
while commit themselves to the ultimate Islamization
of the non-Muslim society, all conditions on this resi-
dence incompatible with the spirit and letter of citizen-
ship in a liberal democracy (Abou El Fadl 1994; Abd
al-Qadir 1998).
Given that there has been a debate among jurists
about whether Muslims are even permitted to reside
permanently in non-Muslim states, it follows that ren-
dering loyalty to them will present an even more de-
manding ideological requirement of citizenship. At
the most general level, there are two basic attitudes
for which Islamic revelatory texts provide grounding
which serve to problematize the idea of being loyal to
a non-Muslim state. The rst, mentioned earlier, is the
idea that Muslims should not ally themselves with non-
Muslims or non-Muslim polities. Islamic scholars often
point to a number of Quranic verses, including 60:1,
3
like them. These are found in the various authoritative collections of
hadith, the reported sayings and doings of the Prophet Muhammad.
3
O you who have believed! Do not take My enemies and your
enemies as friends, offering them affection while they have denied
what Truth has come unto you, driving away the Messenger of God
and yourselves because you believe in God your Lord. If you have
gone forth to struggle in my cause and longing for my blessing do
you secretly hold affection for them? For I know all that you may
conceal as well as what you do openly. And who does so has erred
from the path.
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American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 2
3:28,
4
and 3:118,
5
to draw the conclusion that political
alliances with unbelievers, of which they consider citi-
zenship to be a form, are impermissible. The second, in-
verse, position is that Muslims should not harmindivid-
ual Muslims andevenless sothe interests of the Muslim
community or polity. A just life for a Muslim consists
not only in performing acts of worship or avoiding sin
but also in serving the community of believers in any
way required of him, including (perhaps especially
6
)
in war for the cause of Islam. This intuitive stance
receives authoritative grounding in both the Quran
7
and in a few reports of Muhammads speech (hadith)
considered to be authentic and accurately transmitted.
Two indicative such hadith reports are the following,
found in all of the authoritative collections: The blood
of a Muslim who proclaims that there is no god but
God and that I am the Messenger of God may not be
legally spilt other than in one of three [instances]: a life
for a life, the married person who commits adultery,
and one who forsakes his religion and abandons his
community; and whoever carries arms against us is
not one of us (Bukhari 1997, 9: 20).
A further hadith would seem to have implications
for even noncombatant service in a non-Muslim army
engaged in combat with Muslims: Whoever assists in
killing a believer even by half a word will meet God
with no hope of Gods mercy written on His face.
Finally, Islamic tradition holds that Muhammads con-
tract with the peoples of Medina (the Constitution of
Medina) included the following article: A believer
shall not slay a believer for the sake of an unbeliever,
nor shall he aid an unbeliever against a believer. Be-
lievers are friends one to the other to the exclusion of
outsiders (Guillaume 1955, 232).
Muslim jurists and exegetes have, of course, argued
from these two basic attitudes for very specic posi-
tions contrary to the idea of Muslim loyalty to a non-
Muslim liberal democracy. Virtually all Islamic legal
scholars from the earliest times of Islam to the present
have agreed that serving in a non-Muslim army against
Muslim forces is apostasy and, thus potentially pun-
ishable by death (surveyed in Abd al-Qadir 1998 and
4
Let not the believers take the indels for their allies in prefer-
ence to the believersfor who does this has nothing to do with
Godunless it be to protect yourselves from them in this way. God
warns you about Himself and the nal goal is to God.
5
Oh you who have believed! Do not take for your intimates other
than your own kind. They will continually cause you turmoil and love
anything that will distress you. Loathing has already come forth from
their mouths and what is concealed in their breasts is even greater.
We have made the signs clear to you if you will use your reason.
6
Q. 4:95: Not equal are those believers who sit [at home] and
receive no hurt, and those who strive and ght in the cause of God
with their goods and their persons. God has granted a grade higher
to those who strive and ght with their goods and persons that to
those who sit [at home]. Unto all has God promised good, but those
who strive and ght has He distinguished above those who sit [at
home] by a special reward.
7
4:9293: Never should a believer kill a believer; but (if it so
happens) by mistake (compensation is due) . . . Whosoever slays a
believer intentionally his reward is Hell forever, and the wrath and
curse of God are upon him, and a dreadful penalty is prepared for
him.
Topoljak 1997). Even serving in a non-Muslim army
against other non-Muslims has been either strongly
discouraged or only permissible if it advances Muslim
aims (al-Shaybani 1966, 193; al-Sarakhsi 2001, 10: 106).
One nds in juridical sources a frequent antipathy to
Muslims helping non-Muslims when it is viewed that
the cause is the advancement of a non-Islamic faith
or conception of truth. The roots of this antipathy are
manifold: not only might such help be seen as directly
detracting from the Islamic cause, but also, even if
there is no direct harm to Islam or Muslims, advancing
the cause of unbelievers is something prohibited to
Muslims. This antipathy thus applies not only during
military or political conict, but also often to social
and political forms of cooperation (Qutb 2001, 2: 62
63).
When dealing with the classical legal sources, it must
also be kept in mind that these sources advanced a
concept of just war (jihad) which permitted (and often,
required) war for the expansion of the area ruled by
Islamic law (e.g., al-Nawawi 2000, 21: 39; Ibn Rushd
(Averroes) 1996, 3: 40791). Modern fundamental-
ists or revivalists maintain the truth of the classical
doctrine over modernists who have interpreted jihad as
permitting only defensive war to repel aggression (e.g.,
Shaltut 1983; al-Zuhayli 1981), and at times suggest
that this and the duty of Muslims to contribute to a
jihad properly declared imply that participation may
be a duty also for Muslims living under non-Muslim
authority, including in a war against their state of resi-
dence (e.g., Qutb 2001, 8: 162; Mawdudi 1990, 3: 209
10).
This brief preceding section should sufce to demon-
strate that Islam, as a comprehensive ethical doctrine,
has the resources to provide believing Muslims with
reasons for rejecting some of the most basic terms
of citizenship within a non-Muslim liberal democracy.
For that same comprehensive ethical doctrine to give
support to an overlapping consensus on the terms of
citizenship, it would thus have to provide reasons for
endorsing on principled grounds something like the
following positions (I argue for this in March 2006):
1. It is permissible for Muslims to reside in non-Muslim
polities under their legal authority if they enjoy security
and the freedom to manifest their religion, even without
separate political and legal authority.
2. In conicts when a non-Muslimstate in which Muslims
live is under attack by a Muslim force, even if a Muslim
nds it morally impermissible by divine imperative to
kill a fellow Muslim, it is nonetheless legitimate for a
Muslim to forswear on grounds of principle any active
aid to the Muslim force and promise to engage in no
activities damaging to their non-Muslim states activities
of self-defense.
3. In conicts when the state in which Muslims live is
under attack by a non-Muslim force, and thus no con-
ict of loyalty or theological imperative is at stake, it
is permissible to contribute directly to the self-defense
efforts of the non-Muslim state.
These three statements are clearly not sufcient to
establish a comprehensive doctrine of citizenship in
a non-Muslim liberal democracy. For such a doctrine,
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Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in non-Muslim Liberal Democracies May 2007
we would be interested in examining Islamic founda-
tions for (at least) the following further beliefs: that the
classical expansionist doctrine of jihad has been plau-
sibly supplanted by a modern doctrine which allows
Muslimcitizens to afrmthe right of non-Muslimstates
to permanent recognition, that Muslims may regard
non-Muslims as political equals, that Muslims may re-
gard non-Muslims as objects of solidarity in secular
matters (possibly including schemes of distributive jus-
tice), and that Muslims may participate in certain as-
pects of non-Muslim political systems. However, the
questions addressed in this present inquiry are not only
fundamental to the basic idea of a social contract but,
as I show next, the answers to them suggest the likely
foundations for afrming the other demands of citizen-
ship which I necessarily neglect.
LOYALTY AND BELONGING IN A
NON-MUSLIM STATE: ISLAMIC
FOUNDATIONS
The Conditions of Residence in an
non-Muslim Polity
As noted earlier, Muslim legal and political thinkers
have often found it necessary to justify residence within
non-Muslim societies and submission to non-Muslim
legal and political authority. Although those proclaim-
ing an outright prohibition form a minority school,
many of the scholars who permit residence concur that
life under non-Muslimlawand in a position of inferior-
ity to non-Muslims is deeply unfortunate. It is the na-
ture of Islamic legal discourses that scholars permitting
residence nd it necessary to show rst that residence
is not, in fact, categorically banned by the authoritative
texts (the Quran and the hadith). For our purposes it is
enough to note that most Islamic legal scholars reject
on technical grounds the evidence advanced by the
minority school: they dispute the interpretation of the
two Quranic passages cited earlier (4: 97100 and 8:
72), arguing that they referred specically to the Mus-
lim community living in Mecca during Muhammads
exile and offer another series of hadith reports where
Muhammad or his Companions declare the duty to
migrate to the Islamic polity lifted on the return of
Muhammad, victorious, to Mecca (e.g., Abu Dawud
1997, 3: 8).
In addition to rejecting the evidence in favor of a
ban on residence on technical grounds, Muslim jurists
and exegetes have advanced roughly four further ar-
guments for the legitimacy of living permanently in a
non-Muslim state: (1) that one may live safely and that
it may be possible to fulll the basic duty to manifest
ones religion even in the absence of sovereign Mus-
lim political authority; (2) that great benets to Islam,
including its possible spread and the strengthening of
Muslim communities, can be gained by living in non-
Muslim lands (e.g., Qaradawi 2001a, 3334); (3) that
the duty to migrate can be understand as a spiritual
duty to avoid sin and sinners in ones own life rather
than merely as a duty to live in a certain state (Ibn
Taymiyya 1980, 28: 204206); and (4) that even if there
were reasons to believe that migration to a Muslim
polity is a religious duty, it is practically infeasible for
masses of Muslim communities to migrate from one
country to another, and, moreover, it is not obvious
to which country they would migrate today in the
absence of an Islamic caliphate (e.g., Topoljak 1997,
54).
Most interesting for us is the rst argument and the
related juridical discussions on the conditions of such
residence and what behavior towards their host state
and society Muslims are expected to maintain. The cru-
cial conditions underlying the two technical arguments
for the permissibility of residing in a non-Muslim land
are, of course, the Muslims security, his lack of fear of
seduction away from Islam, and his freedom to mani-
fest his religion. In fact, many jurists and exegetes do
not see the freedom to practice religion as a mitigating
factor on a general ban supposedly implied by Q. 4: 97
100; rather, they read these verses themselves as only
requiring migration because of the oppression expe-
rienced in Mecca. The argument is that those verses
refer specically to Muslims who were oppressed, har-
ried, and constantly being induced to abandon Islam.
Thus, the obligation to migrate is only for those who
nd themselves in this condition. For all others, jurists
arrive at a variety of recommendations. Some argue
that residence in non-Muslim lands where one is safe
and can manifest ones religion is permitted, but that
migration is still preferred in order to avoid the nega-
tive consequences of such residence already discussed,
such as increasing the strength of non-Muslims (e.g.,
al-Tabari 1999, 4: 14751; Ibn Qudama 1990, 13: 151).
Other jurists, however, go so far as to argue that res-
idence in non-Muslim lands, given the conditions of
security and freedom, is even recommended, in rare
cases required, or that if a Muslim is able to manifest
his religion in one of the unbelievers countries, this
country becomes a part of the Abode of Islam (al-
Nawawi 2000, 21: 57). The argument in these cases is
invariably that Muslims residing in non-Muslim lands
may be the cause of the eventual return of Islam (in
the cases of conquered lands) or of its spread, which is
grounded in the belief that Islamis a universal religion,
that the entire earth belongs to God, and that Muslims
have the duty of calling (dawa) to Islam. Given this
paramount duty, present-day Muslim jurists ask how
is could be possible for residence in non-Muslim lands
to be forbidden (e.g., al-Qaradawi 2001a, 3334; al-
Fawzan 1992, 236).
These arguments leave some important questions for
the evaluative stage of conjecture, foremost: What do
Muslim jurists mean when they refer to freedom from
seduction from religion [al-tna min al-din] and the
freedomto manifest [izhar] or practice/uphold [iqama]
ones religion? Do these discourses include a concep-
tion of practicing ones religion that is consistent with
liberal restraints on communal and paternal authority
over group and family members, or do they presume
some formof communal autonomy within non-Muslim
states where certain areas of Islamic law will be ap-
plied? (Lewis 1992)
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American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 2
Manifesting Ones Religion
All Muslim jurists have insisted on the condition of
enjoying religious freedom as crucial to justifying res-
idence in a non-Muslim polity. However, the majority
of these jurists do not specify what these terms re-
quire. Indeed, Abou El Fadl remarks that there is
no consensus among jurists with regard to the level
of freedom necessary for Muslims in a non-Muslim
territory. Perhaps the vagueness of their expressions
on this point indicates that the jurists did not wish to
articulate a xed, nonnegotiable rule that might be dif-
cult toapply tospecic situations, especially situations
in which Muslimterritory is occupied by non-Muslims
(Abou El Fadl 1994, 159). Even scholars who refer in
some way to a duty to live according to the Sharia in
non-Muslim lands do not always discuss whether this
requires coercive political authority or indeed whether
present freedoms guaranteed by liberal states permit
such a life. The essential question in Islamic juridical
terms is whether the duty to manifest or practice re-
ligion is satised by the rituals of worship (ibadat) or
only by some quasipolitical authority applying the laws
of social relations (muamalat).
The concern, for our inquiry into an Islamic doc-
trine of citizenship in a non-Muslim state compatible
with the liberal conception, is that Muslim jurists will
insist that religious freedom for Muslim communities
entail some formof communal autonomy with substate
institutions of authority competent to enforce Islamic
family, commercial, and certain criminal codes. Indeed,
a number of jurists have suggested this more or less
explicitly (e.g., Ibn al-Humam n.d., 8: 131; Ibn Abidin
1994, 3: 25253). Helpfully, one of the most preemi-
nent legal scholars of the medieval period, al-Nawawi,
distinguishes among levels of religious freedomby con-
trasting the conditions of self-protection [al-imtina:
related to refusal, abstention, forbearance, etc.] and
segregation [al-itizal: related to self-seclusion, with-
drawal, disassociation, etc.]. For al-Nawawi (2000), the
second more demanding condition is clearly analogous
to some form of parallel political authority, as demon-
stratedby his expectationthat sucha community will be
in a position to challenge the wider non-Muslim polity.
He writes that if they are capable of self-protection
and segregation, then it is obligatory that they reside
in the Abode of War [i.e., non-Muslim polity] because
its [legal] status is actually the Abode of Islam, and if
they were to migrate then it would then become the
Abode of War, which is forbidden. And while living
there it is necessary for them to call the polytheists to
Islamby argumentation or ghting (al-Nawawi, 21: 5).
It is al-Nawawis position on a condition without this
form of communal autonomy that is interesting for our
purposes:
And if they are capable of self-protection but not [com-
plete] segregation or calling for ghting, then migration is
not obligatory. In fact, if one hopes that by remaining Islam
might spread in his place of residence, then it is obligatory
that he reside there and not migrate, as well as if it is hoped
that Islam might prevail there in the future. Yet, if one is
weak in the Abode of Unbelief and is not able to mani-
fest ones religion then ones residence there is forbidden.
(21: 7)
Although the Islamic political imagination certainly
can include a call for some communal autonomy within
non-Muslim states (such as that enjoyed in countries
like India and Israel), modern theorists by and large
endorse the weaker condition of a liberal conception
of free practice as sufcient. Particularly helpful here
is a fatwa by the prominent twentieth-century Syrian
jurist and exegete Rashid Rida, which was his response
to a questioner from Bosnia inquiring whether mi-
gration was required of the Muslims of Bosnia after
that territorys incorporation into Hapsburg Austria.
This fatwa is important because Rida, unlike most of
the classical jurists, actually species what constitutes
seduction away from religion, the condition which
virtually all jurists agree mandates emigration. Rida
writes: Migration is not required for those who are
able to practice their religion free from seduction away
from it, that is, coerced abandonment of religion or the
prohibition on performing religious duties. This is akin
to what Aisha is reported to have said when she was
asked about migration: There is no migration today.
Before a believer ed with his religion to God and His
Messenger out of fear of temptation away from it, but
today God has made Islam manifest and a believer
may worship his Lord wherever he may be (Rida
1980, 2: 77374). Further on, he denies arguments that
worship and marriage are invalid under non-Muslim
rule: There is no difference between the worship and
marriage of a Muslim in the Abode of Unbelief and
a Muslim in the Abode of Islam but only in the or-
dinances of political, civil and military relations. The
implication of Ridas justication of life lived under
these conditions is that the latter ordinances are not
prerequisites for living a just life or securing salvation.
Amore satisfactory treatment of this problemwould
involve a much deeper investigation of plausible Is-
lamic arguments for strictly noncoercive maintenance
of Islamic ideals of virtue and the good. Because such
an investigation goes beyond the more narrow task set
for this paper, I will limit this present discussion of
what jurists mean when they speak of freedom from
seduction away from religion and freedom to man-
ifest ones religion to the above demonstration that
most jurists prefer vagueness to precise descriptions
of conditions, and that within those texts that are less
vague there is a range of positions that includes both
calls for communal authority and for satisfaction with
freedom of worship and practice. I believe this is suf-
cient at least to demonstrate that we are not proceeding
with a radical misunderstanding of some obvious and
universally held conception of manifesting, practicing,
or upholding religion.
The previous discussion contains some important re-
sources for our construction of an Islamic social con-
tract with non-Muslim liberal democracies. The rst
thing we have established is that not only is it per-
mitted to reside in a non-Muslim polity, but also it is
permitted to do so while being subject to and obey-
ing non-Muslim law. It is true that we have not yet
243
Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in non-Muslim Liberal Democracies May 2007
introduced any substantive arguments for the potential
justness of non-Islamic law, which would have to occur
for a case to be made for a comprehensive Islamic
doctrine of citizenship in a non-Muslim liberal democ-
racy. However, given that some Islamic scholars have
argued that living under non-Muslim law is a sin, it is
surely signicant to nd some of the most authorita-
tive classical jurists (such as al-Nawawi) refuting this
position. Secondremembering that the search for an
overlapping consensus through the practice of conjec-
ture is primarily an exercise in evaluating reasonsit
is important that we have encountered reasons for
permitting residence in a non-Muslim state that are
deeply compatible with liberal aims: namely, the pos-
sibility that a Muslim may enjoy safety and freedom
of religion. These two goods, although not exclusive
to liberal polities, might not be enjoyed in all non-
Muslim societies (or, indeed, all nominally Muslim
ones, which is a common theme in the Muslim liter-
ature on these questions). Muslim scholars have given
us Islamic grounds for arguing that liberal societies
that protect individual rights and liberties (including
security, freedom of property, and freedom of religion)
are particularly worthy of loyalty and recognition.
Establishing the permissibility of residing in a non-
Muslim state and obeying its laws, however, does not
alone make the case for the possibility of a full so-
cial contract. How have Muslim jurists conceived of
the status of Muslims residing in non-Muslim polities?
Afrming the legitimacy of ones (potentially perma-
nent) physical presence in such a space does not resolve
this. As we will see, some thinkers that are on record
permitting residence are explicitly opposed to Muslims
fullling certain duties of citizenship such as military
service, or even adopting the citizenship of these coun-
tries in the rst place (Topoljak 1997, 79).
The assumption of Muslim jurists was that Muslims
would reside under non-Muslimauthority under a con-
tractual guarantee of security known as the aman (as
would non-Muslims visiting or residing in a Muslim
polity). In the following section I examine Islamic ju-
ridical discussions of what moral obligations the ac-
ceptance of the aman places on Muslims, focusing in
particular on the question of loyalty during wartime.
Like the question of migration, the question of con-
tributing to the self-defense of a non-Muslim state re-
lates to the problem of balancing loyalties between a
state of residence and the global community of believ-
ers, and will thus serve as the complement to the above
discussion of residence in a non-Muslim state.
The Aman: Foundation for a Social Contract
of Civic Loyalty
The most prominent contemporary advocate of the no-
tion that Muslims can fully and without contradiction
embrace their citizenship in European countries, Tariq
Ramadan, has written that contracts determine our
status, x our duties and rights and direct the nature
and scope of our actions. Once agreed, the terms of a
covenant should be respected and if there is a point
which seems to work against Muslim rightsor even
their conscience as Believersthis has to be discussed
and negotiated because Muslims are, unilaterally, not
allowed to breach a treaty (Ramadan 1999, 162).
Ramadan argues further that millions of Muslims
have tacitly or explicitly recognized the binding char-
acter of the constitution or the laws of the country they
enter into and then live in. By signing a work contract
or asking for a visa, they acknowledge the validity and
authority of the constitution, the laws and the state all
at once (Ramadan, 164).
For most contemporary Islamic scholars, even those
less ambitious than Ramadan, the question of general
political obligation to a non-Muslim state does indeed
fall under the rubric of the duty to uphold contracts.
Once a Muslim has accepted the security of a non-
Muslim state he is bound to follow all of its laws, in-
cluding paying taxes that contribute to general social
welfare. Crucially, for most scholars this is a moral duty
grounded in religion, and not a mere quietest exhor-
tation to avoid punishment or other negative conse-
quences for the Muslim community.
Is loyalty during wartime, however, an obligation of
citizenship to a which a Muslim may legitimately con-
tract himself? In what follows, I examine in more detail
the specic contours of this idea of contract in classical
and contemporary juridical works. The question to be
addressed here is to what extent the duty to uphold
contracts can ground compatible responses to the spe-
cic demands of civic loyalty as I characterized them,
particularly the second statement. (In conicts when a
non-Muslim state in which Muslims live is under attack
by a Muslim force, even if a Muslim nds it morally im-
permissible by divine imperative to kill a fellowMuslim,
it is nonetheless legitimate for a Muslim to forswear on
grounds of principle any active aid to the Muslim force
and promise to engage in no activities damaging to their
non-Muslim states activities of self-defense.)
A well-known series of Quranic verses exhort Mus-
lims to honor any contract into which they enter, in-
cluding:
Fulll Gods covenant when you have entered into it and
break not your oaths after asserting them, for you thereby
make God your guarantor [Q. 16:91].
Fulll every contract for contracts will be answered for
[on the Day of Reckoning] [Q. 17:34].
There is alsoa famous hadithreportedthroughmulti-
ple chains and in multiple forms about the sinfulness of
breaching contracts: When God gathers all earlier and
later generations of mankind on the Day of Judgment
he will raise a ag for every person who betrays a trust
so it might be said that this is the perdy of so-and-so,
son of so-and-so (Muslim 1998, 3: 1094).
In addition to these texts which deal generally with
the status of promises and contracts there are a number
of revelatory texts which apply this duty to the con-
text of military conict with non-Muslims. Verse 8:72
speaks of those who failed to join the Islamic com-
munity through migration: If they [Muslims living
amongst non-Muslims] seek your aid in religion, it is
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American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 2
your duty to help them, except against a people with
whom you have a treaty. This verse has been tradi-
tionally read to impose upon the Islamic polity a duty
of restraint toward non-Muslim states harboring Mus-
lim subjects if there is a treaty between them (e.g.,
al-Qurtubi 1996, 8: 37; Ibn Kathir 1998, 4: 8486).
Another hadith applies the principle of upholding
promises to non-Muslims not to ght them to a per-
sonal level. A certain Companion of the Prophet is
reported to have said
. . . nothing prevented me from being present at the Battle
of Badr except this incident: I came out with my father
Husail to participate in the Battle but we were caught by
some Qurayshi unbelievers. They said: Do you intend to
go to Muhammad? We said: We do not intend to go to
him but we wish to go back to Medina. So they took from
us a covenant in the name of God that we would turn back
to Medina and would not ght on the side of Muhammad.
So when we came to the Messenger of God and related the
incident to him he said: Both of you proceed to Medina.
We will fulll the covenant made with thembut seek Gods
help against them. (Muslim 1998, 3: 1129)
Although this episode does not deal with a contract
with non-Muslims arising as a consequence of legal
residence, it seems a perfect example of the justication
of some Muslims refraining fromghting non-believers
because of a promise made to them. The fact that the
hadith is situated during the lifetime of Muhammad
(when there can be no question about a Muslims fealty
to the leader of the community and his obligation to
participate in jihad) can only add to its potency as a
guide for Muslim behavior in non-apostolic times.
Jurists from across the Sunni schools are quite clear
that contracts made with non-Muslims, including the
aman, are as morally binding as those made with Mus-
lims. They are unanimous in holding that the enjoy-
ment of an aman imposes on the Muslim certain moral
and sometimes legal obligations to the non-Muslim
entity in question (Abd al-Qadir 1998, 160). Eleventh-
century jurist al-Sarakhsi declared that it is abhorred
for a Muslim who requests an aman from them [by
swearing] on his religion to deceive or betray them,
for treachery is forbidden in Islam. The Prophet said:
He who betrays a trust will have a ag raised for him
on the day of judgment so that his betrayal may be
known (al-Sarakhsi 2001, 10: 105). The thirteenth-
century jurist Ibn Qudama agrees with, and in fact goes
beyond, Sarakhsis position:
Whoever enters the land of the enemy under an aman
shall not cheat them in transactions. [This] is forbidden,
because they only gave the aman under the condition of
refraining from deceit or betrayal, and of his [guarantee
of] security to them from himself. Even if this [contract]
is not explicitly pronounced it is still binding because it is
presumed. For this same reason, whoever comes to one of
our lands from one of theirs under an aman and betrays us
thereby violates his contract. So if this is established then
it is not permitted [for a Muslim] to betray them, because
this is deceit [ghadr], which is not permitted in our religion.
The Prophet said: Muslims are bound by their terms. If a
Muslimunder anamansteals, cheats or borrows something
from a non-Muslim and then ees to the Abode of Islam,
then if the non-Muslim goes there under an aman Muslim
authorities are obligated to provide for the return of his
property as if he had taken it froma Muslim. (Ibn Qudama
1990, 13: 15253)
Note a number of additional elements tothis basic posi-
tion, most importantly: (like many Westerndoctrines of
political obligation) a recognition of tacit agreements,
the usage of parity and reciprocity as operative ethical
values, as well as the legal point that Muslimauthorities
may in fact enforce the rights of non-Muslims. Interest-
ingly, Ibn Qudama was a jurist of the Hanbali school,
often regarded as the most conservative and usually
the source of inspiration for modern fundamentalists.
That such a position is to be found within this school
would seem to be particularly strong evidence of the
plausibility of this aspect of the overlapping consensus.
On this sections narrower question of loyalty in
wartime Muslim jurists have traditionally spoken in
surprisingly precise terms. It is quite clear for the ma-
jority that this duty to honor contracts and to abide by
conditions freely endorsed overrides for many jurists
any general duty to contribute to an Islamic politys
military efforts against a non-Muslim state. Indica-
tive here are the juridical treatments on the behavior
of Muslim prisoners. Note how seriously al-Nawawi
takes the act of agreeing to conditions even as a
prisoner:
If they capture [a Muslim soldier] then he is obligated to
ee as soon as he can. If they free him without condition
then he is obligated to try and kill them because they
are unbelievers with no guarantee of security. But if they
free him on the condition that he is under a guarantee of
security [aman] fromthem, thenthey are alsounder a guar-
antee of security from him. If they guarantee his security
and ask for a guarantee from him then it is forbidden for
himto kill themor steal their property on the basis of what
the Almighty has said: O you who have believed! Fulll
all contracts. [5:1] But if they violate their guarantee to
him then he may do so as well to them. If they free him
under a guarantee of safety but without asking for one
themselves, then even in this case the majority say that
they are still under such a guarantee on his part because
of their placing him under a guarantee. (al-Nawawi 2000,
21: 130; also, Abd al-Qadir 1998, 167)
Ibn Qudama advances a similar position with the ad-
dendum that even the condition to remain in the coun-
try rather than return to the Islamic polity must be
honored, again for the Prophet said: Muslims are
bound by their conditions (Ibn Qudama 1990, 13:
18485). Although the jurists in question do not seem
to address directly the obligations of Muslims residing
or visiting non-Muslim countries for purposes other
than war to the war effort of a Muslim polity, the only
reasonable interpretation is that if the above applies
to prisoners during wartime then it does a forteriori to
non-prisoners and non-combatants who reside or en-
ter there willingly under an aman. The duty to honor
contracts, even tacit ones, is binding on all Muslims,
and entering a non-Muslim land is only done under
an aman, which is regarded as a contract including
among its conditions the obligation to do no harm to
non-Muslim interests. If a Muslim decides that it is his
245
Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in non-Muslim Liberal Democracies May 2007
duty to serve in a jihad or otherwise advance Muslim
interests over non-Muslim ones, then jurists require
that he rst renounce his aman as a way of advising
non-Muslims honorably of his intentions.
This value, articulated deeply and widely in the clas-
sical legal tradition, is the most common present-day
Islamic justication (in both Sunni and Shiite sources)
for honoring non-Muslim interests while residing in
non-Muslim lands (European Council for Fatwa and
Research 1999, 1920; Fadl Allah 1999, 8081). The
contemporary system of visas and naturalization are
commonly referred to as the legal and moral equiva-
lent of the former aman; thus delity to their terms is
exhorted (Mawlawi 1999, 222). Importantly, the most
prominent clerics issuing fatwas on these matters, in-
cluding through their co-chairmanship of the Euro-
pean Council for Fatwa and Research, Faysal Mawlawi
and Yusuf Qaradawi, extract from the duty to honor
contracts an even more robust position than my origi-
nal wording, which refers only to a Muslims behavior
when his state of citizenship itself is under attack. They
insist that the duty extends toself-restraint during times
when ones non-Muslim state of residence is attacking
a Muslim state, and when it thus may be held that all
Muslims have a duty to resist or oppose this action
(al-Qaradawi 2003; Mawlawi 2003).
Mawlawi, Qaradawi, and the European Council for
Fatwa and Research represent what we might refer to
as the neoclassical strand of contemporary Islamic
ethical thought, insofar as they seek to articulate their
positions as much as possible within the framework of
the classical juridical tradition and thus claim a certain
conservative authority and authenticity. The articula-
tion of compatible positions from within such conser-
vative or canonical discourses represents particularly
strong evidence of a plausible overlapping consensus.
In this case it seems quite clear that there are very
stable Islamic foundations for a principled, religiously
grounded afrmation of our rst statement of loyalty,
the abstention fromand repudiation of any acts damag-
ing to ones state of citizenship even when it is engaged
in conict with a Muslim force or entity.
Defending a non-Muslim State
AMuslimcould coherently afrmthe moral obligation
to refrain from harming his state of residence while at
the same time asserting that it is impermissible for him
to risk his life for a non-Muslim society or to advance
non-Muslim communal interests. Such a position was
indeed that generally advocated by the classical jurists,
who held that it is impermissible to contribute to the
military strength of non-Muslims. Yet, because Islamic
law does not proclaim a general doctrine of pacism
but rather a duty on the part of individuals to con-
tribute to their societys self-defense, I argue that in
the Islamic case a doctrine of refusal in the context of
a non-Muslim state may in fact suggest a rejection of
the bonds of solidarity characteristic of citizenship and
an indifference to the fate of the society in which they
live. While recognizing that liberalism has traditionally
placed limits on the goals for which a state may demand
that its subjects risk their lives, we can assert that there
are likely to be moments when all residents, aliens and
citizens alike, are morally obligated to defend the state
that defends their everyday social life. . . . The existence
of borderline cases does not call the original distinction
into question (Walzer 1970, 1056). I thus submit that
a doctrine of citizenship in a non-Muslim state would
include the justication of direct contribution to self-
defense efforts (whether or not in the form of direct
military participation), particularly when the aggress-
ing force is a non-Muslim one.
Although classical jurists did not argue on principled
grounds for a Muslim residents contribution to a non-
Muslim politys self-defense efforts, it is not rare for
contemporary neoclassical scholarssome of whom
hold that ghting fellow Muslims on behalf of non-
Muslims constitutes apostasyto assert that there is
no moral dilemma in serving in non-Muslim armies
against other non-Muslimarmies. There are three basic
categories of argument for permitting this: one, that the
revelatory texts do not prohibit such service and, there-
fore, it is presumed to be permitted; two, that it is un-
desirable, but there may be certain benets to Muslims
arising as a double-effect of such service; three, what
the Quran and hadith prohibit is serving to advance
the word of unbelief, which is not what service in a
modern-day non-Muslim army constitutes. The second
two categories are clearly the most interesting for our
purposes; indeed, it is the third category that justies
my claimthat states proclaiming political liberalismwill
be more attractive to Muslims than states proclaiming
perfectionist forms of liberalism.
Statements permitting military service of the rst
category are not generally based on positive textual
evidence of the permissibility of this, and are usually
satised with noting the various restrictions on such
service. In his book devoted entirely to Muslim mi-
nority issues, Qaradawi simply remarks Muslims are
confronted with the question of mandatory military
service in these countries, and there is no objection
to this unless such a country declares war against a
Muslim country, before moving on to other questions
(al-Qaradawi 2001a, 25). A typical statement is that of
Canadian Muslim Sheikh Ahmad Kutty, who empha-
sizes not the Muslim or non-Muslim character of the
state but the ethical status of the war:
Muslims who are citizens are denitely allowed to serve in
the armies of their own country, regardless of whether it is
a Muslim country or predominately non-Muslim country.
They are also allowed to ght wars that are legitimate and
ethical. But they are not allowed to ght in a war of aggres-
sion; for all wars of aggressionare unlawful inIslam. War in
Islamis sanctioned only either in self-defense or to remove
oppression and tyranny. So Muslim soldiers cannot ght in
wars which are considered unjust and unethical. They can
excuse themselves on grounds of moral conscience.
8
In the case of the positions here, the primary rea-
son for holding that it is permissible to serve in a
8
This was a response to my request for a fatwa through Islamon-
line.net which was delivered but not publicly posted.
246
American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 2
non-Muslim army is merely that this is not one of
the things specically forbidden by the revelatory texts.
Thus, one can do whatever is not specically forbidden,
limited here to ghting brother Muslims, contributing
to a war of aggression, or aggressing within war. The
response to the variety of arguments against serving
in a non-Muslim armythat it is wrong to add to the
strength of unbelievers, that one is not allowed to be-
friend or associate with them at all, that one cannot
uphold the law of unbelief, that war is only just when it
is to advance the cause of Islam, and so forthis one
of silence rather than direct engagement or refutation.
Legitimating service in a non-Muslim army simply on
the grounds that nothing in Islam forbids it is an ac-
ceptable form of the type of argument we are looking
for: it is an Islamic argument (rather than public), and
it is principled. The only potential question relates to
its plausibility: if aware of Islamic arguments against
such service which rely on authoritative texts, then the
Muslim believer looking for guidance may not be sat-
ised with anything less than direct refutation of the
incompatible positions or at least similar citation of
evidence.
An example of the second type of argument, that is,
referring to benets accruing to Muslims from serving
in a non-Muslim army, is Rashid Ridas 1907 fatwa on
Russian Muslims participating in the Russo-Japanese
War. Rida proclaimed that he did not consider that
ghting on behalf of the Muslims of Russia against
Japan is disobedience to God [sin] nor forbidden by
sharia, and in fact may be one of the things rewarded
by God if engaged in with the correct intention (Rida
1980, 2: 565). He proceeds to outline two different ra-
tionales for ghting in the Russian army which would
qualify as correct intentions.
The rst reads: His obedience to the state [by serv-
ing in the army] protects his brothers from among the
states subjects from any oppression or evil that may
befall them if the state is an oppressive, autocratic one;
it makes them equal to any other citizen in rights and
privileges if it is a representative, just state; and it ben-
ets them in other ways if the state is in between. The
concerns in this statement all relate to benets that
accrue to the Muslim community from participating in
the war and have nothing to do with either the rights
or interests of the state of citizenship or the justness of
the war in question.
A concern with advancing the interests of Mus-
lim communities is also central in the justications
of many contemporary scholars of Muslims serving in
non-Muslim armies. The argument is that there may
be a certain general communal interest (maslaha) in
the performance of otherwise forbidden acts. Yusuf
Qaradawi, for example, who declares ghting fellow
Muslims on behalf of non-Muslims unbelief, also
holds that Muslims should be willing to accept noncom-
batant positions to avoid accusations of high treason
which would pose a threat to the Muslim community
and also disrupt the course of missionary activities
and that individuals should not set their conscience at
ease and refuse to participate in the war, if this will en-
danger the whole Muslim community. This is based on
the juristic rules, which state that the lesser harm may
be borne to prevent a greater harm, the private harm
may be borne to prevent a general one and the right
of the group takes precedence over that of the indi-
vidual (al-Qaradawi 2001b). This fatwa is not directly
relevant toour present discussion(because it deals with
ghting Muslims, which is uniformly held to be imper-
missible), but it serves as a more crude and obvious
example of justications for performing certain acts
that are not actually arguments for an overlapping con-
sensus because they still hold the acts to be wrong and
unjust.
Thus, the concern is that Ridas rationale might be
read as implying more problematic positions, includ-
ing: one, that if none of the benets here described
will in fact accrue to Muslims then there is no justi-
cation for aiding non-Muslims; two, that if the ben-
ets accrue then Muslims are permitted to engage in
whatever acts secure them, including unjust wars; and,
three, that even if Muslims are permitted to join non-
Muslim armies to secure benets for themselves, there
is no suggestion that the cause of the non-Muslim
state is in itself just or reasonable. Thus, there might
be a reading of Ridas rst rationale that sees it as
either insufciently principled or principled in the
wrong way (i.e., only concerned with the interests of
Muslims).
The case for the compatibility of Ridas rationale
with a liberal conception of citizenship rests in his
recognition of some states as representative and just.
This statement alone constitutes a major step toward
an overlapping consensus in its suggestion that states
might be at the same time non-Muslim and just, quite
a break indeed from the implications of some jurists
which equate non-Muslim states unjustness precisely
with their non-Muslimness. More specically, however,
he seems to be accepting the desirability of a social
contract in which Muslims enjoy equality with non-
Muslims in exchange for sharing the same duties. Even
if his comprehensive motivations are the welfare of a
given substate community, his long-termmethod for in-
creasing that welfare is precisely the greater integration
of the Muslim population as citizens in a non-Muslim
state. In terms of our interest in the specically Islamic
grounding of the desirability or acceptability of this
type of social contract, we caninfer a similar type of no
prohibition justication discussed previously: if there
is nothing specically contrary to Islamic requirements
in a given act, then it is in that way the object of an
overlapping consensus. Note that this argument would
alsoresolve the dilemma of dealing withthe fatwa onits
utilitarian interpretation from the previous paragraph:
it doesnt matter if the jurist is advancing consequen-
tialist reasons for doing something if he does not think
that these are reasons for doing something that would
otherwise be impermissible or sinful, as is the case with
Qaradawis justication for taking noncombatant po-
sitions in wars against Muslim forces. The utilitarian
justication can simply be an added benet to ones
conception of the good, but the legitimation of the act
consists in the statement that nothing in the conception
of the good contradicts it.
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Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in non-Muslim Liberal Democracies May 2007
Rida (1980) also offers a second rationale for serving
ina non-Muslimarmy whichrequires separate analysis:
The knowledge and practice of war remain amongst the
most important facets of social life for human beings. Thus,
if they are forbidden for a certain people then that people
is weakened, and the weak are never but humiliated and
degraded. It is thus better for Muslims who are subjects
of those states that they participate like the ordinary peo-
ple of those nations in the basic elements of social life,
strengthened and made proud, rather than being weak
and degraded by their religion, for Islam does not permit
that its adherents chose weakness and subjugation over
strength and pride. Thus, if they chose the latter [by not
serving in the Russian army] they are incapable of preserv-
ing their religion. . . . [We] advise Muslims to choose pride
over humiliation whatever the source of pride and strength
may be over weakness and consider that preserving Islam
outside of its abode requires this.
The question to be addressed here is whether Ridas
emphasis on strength and pride for Muslims, as well
as military knowledge, is a questionable justication
for discharging a civic duty. By comparison, note the
response of Topoljak, which is that participation in
the army of a non-Muslim country with the intention
of training and gaining ghting skills for jihad is per-
mitted, even required (Topoljak 1997, 113). He gives
the examples of those Muslims who had been trained in
non-Muslim armies but later helped used those skills
in the wars in Bosnia and the Caucasus, and in fact
cites this fatwa by Rida. What is problematic about
Topoljaks argument are the auxiliary beliefs by which
they are legitimated: namely, that Muslims ought not
be citizens of a non-Muslim country if the Islamic state
exists, that there is a duty to prepare for jihad in the
classical sense and that Muslims are not supposed to
strengthen non-Muslims if they can help it. For Topol-
jak, serving in a non-Muslim army is justied by the
jurisprudential principle of necessity (darura) as the
only way of acquiring the skills to discharge a duty that
is directly hostile to the interests and rights of a non-
Muslim state, a further step away from compatibility
from Qaradawis jurisprudential principle of utility or
public interest (maslaha).
For Rida, despite some similar use of language, it
appears that the benet in question is quite different.
He speaks generally in terms of strength (quwwa)
and pride (izza) without referring, as does Topoljak,
to jihad or to the acquisition of these qualities at the
expense of non-Muslims or in order to use military
skills against them. Thus, his understanding of these
qualities does not seem to be incompatible with the
aims of a liberal democratic society, if enjoying a sta-
tus of equality in relation to non-Muslims constitutes
strength and pride. It is likely that given his his-
torical context, the alternative for him was a situation
of hostility, marginalization, and suspicion. Countering
this potentially destructive majorityminority dynamic
through insisting on full inclusion and full participa-
tion is precisely the response that liberalism prefers
minority communities to articulate.
Ridas (1980) three justications of service in a non-
Muslim army (as something that might earn Muslims
equal treatment in a non-Muslim democracy, as a way
of acquiring the military knowledge which Islam pre-
scribes, and as a path to communal strength and pride)
are thus presented as benecial double-effects of the
given civic duty in question. Even though the citizen
is afrming a civic duty for a different set of reasons
than the ones for which it is required by the state, and
even though there is no direct consideration of the
interests of the non-Muslim community, they must be
judged as compatible motivations: all of these goals are
themselves consistent with the aims of a liberal society
(i.e., a Muslim can both pursue these aims without vi-
olating any of the legitimate interests of a non-Muslim
society and hold these motivations alongside a recogni-
tion of non-Muslim rights without incoherence or self-
contradiction), and they presume the desirability of
political integration into the non-Muslim community.
The third path to compatibility on this question is
one of great interest for political liberalisms aspira-
tions. I rst introduce twopositions I previously citedto
demonstrate the traditional Islamic rejection of serving
in non-Muslim armies:
I asked: If some Muslims were in the dar al-harb [abode
of war] under an aman and that territory were attacked by
people of another territory of war, do you think it would
be lawful for those Muslims to ght on their side?
He replied: No. . . because the jurisdiction of the un-
believers prevails there and the Muslims cannot enforce
non-Muslim rulings.
I asked: If the Muslims were fearful of their own persons
from the enemy, should they ght in defense of them-
selves?
He replied: If the situation were thus, there would be
no harm to ght in defense of themselves. (al-Shaybani
1966, 193)
If there is a group of Muslims under an aman in the abode
of war and that country is attacked by another non-Muslim
country, then the Muslims are not allowed to ght, for
ghting involves exposing oneself to danger which is only
allowed for the purpose of exaltation of the Word of God,
may He be gloried, and the glorication of religion, which
are not present in this case. Because the laws of idolatry
are dominant over them Muslims are not able to rule by
the laws of Islam, and thus any ghting on their part would
take the form of exaltation of the word of idolatry and this
is not permitted unless they fear for their lives from the
invaders, in which case there is no sin incurred in ghting
to defend themselves rather than ghting to exalt the word
of idolatry. (al-Sarakhsi 2001, 10: 106; emphasis added)
A similar view is advanced today by Topoljak (1997,
11921): It is permitted to ght on behalf of non-
Muslims against other non-Muslims if they are defend-
ing themselves, their families and their property from
the same attacking non-Muslims and if the non-Muslim
commander respects the Muslims, grants them their
rights and if they fear that he may be defeated by some-
one who will oppress them. If Muslims fear a greater
enemy then they can co-operate with a smaller enemy.
There are twopossible reasons tothinkthat the views
encountered in the previously cited three quotations
might be approaching a compatible position. The rst is
that the scholars all implicitly allow for the possibility
248
American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 2
of identifying Muslim interests with those of the
non-Muslim majority, and with the consideration
that a Muslim would naturally prefer the state which
practices the least oppression towards them. It is, of
course, central to liberal justication that the rights
it gives citizens, particularly minorities, give those
citizens reasons to support and be loyal toward liberal
institutions. This is the very idea of a social contract.
Furthermore, there are prominent theories of political
obligation (from Hobbes to Nozick) that presume that
the citizen (if he can be so called) will be interested
in the fate of his state and fellow citizens no further
than it concerns his own safety and welfare. Political
liberalism cannot require as part of a minimal doctrine
of citizenship any robust or emotional attachment to
ones community of citizenship, or principled altruism,
beyond what is necessary to secure the equal rights of
all. Thus, there is an argument to be made that even if
Muslims are ghting an invading force only to defend
their own property, families, and persons, that that is all
some theories of citizenshipassume any citizenis doing.
In the case of these particular scholars, this is prob-
ably an optimistic reading. The potential difference
between Shaybani, Sarakhsi, and Topoljaks reasoning
and that of individualist theories of political obligation
lies in the distinction between initial motivations for
endorsing a social contract and subsequent reasoning
in society (and, of course, that fellow citizens are not
regarded as enemies merely because of their con-
ception of the good). A social contract may appeal to
individual (or group) self-interest (whether in the form
of appeals to reciprocity or mutual advantage) as a jus-
tication for the general structure of rights and duties,
but cannot allow that every discrete demand made by
the state be acceptedor rejectedinsituby the individual
according to some self-regarding utility calculus. This
latter scenario seems to be precisely what Topoljak has
inmind: that Muslims residinginnon-Muslimstates (let
us presume that they enjoy both security and religious
freedom) can adopt a stance toward a war of aggres-
sion against their state depending on whether it directly
threatens them and their interests or on whether they
have more to gain by their state preserving itself or be-
ing conquered. That is, there is no suggestion of general
moral duties toward a state that has fullled the needs
of protection, respect for rights, and welfare provision,
nor of the independent rights and interests of non-
Muslims except when and where they align narrowly
withthose of Muslims. There is noquestionbut that this
justication of serving a non-Muslim state as it stands
in Topoljaks present formulation does not indicate the
existence of an overlapping consensus.
However, a believing Muslim could plausibly draw
different conclusions on the basis of the same basic
reasoning. First, a Muslim could accept that the only
justication for ghting is to defend himself and his
family without necessarily adopting the auxiliary mis-
trust andhostility towardnon-Muslimpolities one nds
in Topoljaks reasoning. He could also accept that the
only reliable way to defend himself is not alone or in
groups selected by him personally (such as substate re-
ligious communities), but by supporting the institutions
of his political community. But then, on this reading,
the Muslims reasoning is no different from that of
any other citizen entering into a social contract. The
only difference is for him, in that he does not feel in
this case the additional motivations and reasons that
he has for defending a Muslim state. But his reasons,
as they stand, are certainly sufcient for the Rawlsian
liberal. The question is: does he have reasons not to
adopt Topoljaks indifference cum hostility toward the
non-Muslim polity?
Here I would like to draw attention once again to
the underlying objection to serving in a non-Muslim
army in the views of Shaybani and Sarakhsi, namely,
that Muslims should not be enforcing non-Muslim
rulings or exalting the word of idolatry. I believe
that this objection has a strong and a weak form. The
strong form holds that all non-Muslim authority is il-
legitimate simply in being un-Islamic. Here, a Muslim
would have no good reason for making a moral dis-
tinction between, say, liberal and communist forms of
government. He may have reasons to prefer one over
the other, but they wouldbe equally illegitimate intheir
being non-Muslim and he would be equally committed
to overturning both.
There is also a weaker form implied in Islamic legal
discourses; here that is reected in Sarakhsis phrase
any ghting on their part would take the form of ex-
altation of the word of idolatry. An argument could
be made (and here I venture into a stronger form of
conjecture) that Sarakhsi is assuming not only will that
non-Muslim polities be non-Muslim in not applying
Islamic conceptions of justice, but also that they will
be so in applying conceptions of truth which directly
contradict Islamic metaphysical claimsthe laws of
idolatry. Thus, this is what a Muslimis never permitted
to do: to uphold or strengthen forces that proclaim the
falsity of Islam.
And here is where political liberalism feels it can
sincerely and transparently address Muslim citizens in
light of Islamic concerns. Of course, the whole project
of political liberalism aims at responding to just this
kind of objection to a political system: that it is based
on the public afrmation of a controversial truth-claim.
To the Muslim invoking an argument like Sarakhsis,
the political liberal responds: But we are not asking
you to exalt of the word of idolatry. We are asking you
to recognize that at times our interests in security and
welfare overlap, for no other reason than that we live in
a commonstate. We, too, prefer a political systemwhich
does not ask you to proclaim the truth of anything
whichcontradicts Islam. We, too, are committedtoonly
permitting laws which can be justied based on com-
mon civic interests, rather than particular, un-Islamic
moral ones. Of course, the Muslim may deny this. He
may assert that merely in not afrming Islamic truth-
claims, the non-Islamic state in fact rejects and denies
them, or that democracy is in fact idolatry in calling
for obedience to the will of humans. Here we have no
response beyond what we have said. However, what I
believe I have shown is something very important: that
the Muslim might not deny this. He might look at his
authoritative sources and decide that there is a crucial
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Islamic Foundations for a Social Contract in non-Muslim Liberal Democracies May 2007
difference between what a Marxist non-Muslim state
or another militantly secular republic would demand
of him and what a politically liberal regime demands.
This distinction may very well determine whether the
Muslim feels that he can in good conscience contribute
to that societys security and well-being.
CONCLUSIONS: THE VINDICATION OF
POLITICAL LIBERALISM
There is, in fact, good reason to believe that my al-
ternative reading of Sarakhsi reects something that
Muslim scholars care about deeply. It will be remem-
bered that the more general Islamic attitude behind
the discomfort with serving in a non-Muslim army is
the idea that Muslims should not ally themselves with
non-Muslims or non-Muslimpolities. A Quranic verse
often invoked to ground this aversion is 3:28:Let not
the believers take the indels for their allies in prefer-
ence to the believersfor who does this has nothing to
do with Godunless it be to protect yourselves from
them in this way. God warns you about Himself and
the nal goal is to God. Military service and loyalty
during wartime characterize but one of the political
alliances with unbelievers often regarded as impermis-
sible. Verse 3:28 and a series of other verses (including
60:1,
9
3:118,
10
4:139,
11
4:144,
12
and 5:8081
13
) seeming
to prohibit loyalty, friendship, or alliance with
non-Muslims have all been used to prohibit residence
in non-Muslim states, contribution to non-Muslim wel-
fare, and cooperation with non-Muslims in common
ventures.
As Muslim scholars grapple with the ideological de-
mands of citizenship in non-Muslim liberal democra-
cies, addressing the previously cited verses (what we
may call the loyalty verses)so often invoked by
scholars wishing tolimit the integrationof Muslims into
non-Muslim societieshas been imperative. Through-
out all of these discussions, a clear pattern of two camps
emerges. The rst are those Islamic scholars, such as
Qutb and Topoljak, who regard any form of obedience
9
O you who have believed! Do not take My enemies and your
enemies as friends, offering them affection while they have denied
what Truth has come unto you, driving away the Messenger of God
and yourselves because you believe in God your Lord. If you have
gone forth to struggle in my cause and longing for my blessing do
you secretly hold affection for them? For I know all that you may
conceal as well as what you do openly. And who does so has erred
from the path.
10
Oh you who have believed! Do not take for your intimates other
than your own kind. They will continually cause you turmoil and love
anything that will distress you. Loathing has already come forth from
their mouths and what is concealed in their breasts is even greater.
We have made the signs clear to you if you will use your reason.
11
Those who take unbelievers as friends rather than believers: Are
they looking for honor amongst them? All honor is with God.
12
O you who believe! Do not take as friends unbelievers rather
than believers. Do you want to give God a clear proof against you?
13
Can you see many of them allying with those who disbelieve?
So vile indeed is what their passions make them do that God has
condemned them and in suffering shall they remain. For if they truly
believed in God and the Prophet and all that was bestowed on them
from on high they would not take unbelievers for their allies, but
many of them are iniquitous.
to non-Muslim legislation or subordination to non-
Muslim political authority as itself an impermissible
setback and defeat for Islamic aims, justiable only
as an unfortunate and hopefully temporary necessity
(akin to eating pork or carrion to stave off hunger).
For this camp there is nothing special about liberal
regimes, except perhaps for their navet e in allowing
greater space to pursue Islamic aims.
The second camp is composed of those scholars who
seek to distinguish between the loyalty that Muslims
render to non-Muslim states in secular, mundane mat-
ters and the possibility of having to render such obedi-
ence, even in symbolic form, in religious or metaphys-
ical matters. In his exegesis of verse 3:28, for example,
Rashid Rida understands the prohibition on loyalty
or friendship (muwalah) with non-Muslims as refer-
ring only to approval of non-Muslims unbelief and
allying with them in pursuit of these aims. What is for-
bidden is anything that results in subjugation or defeat
for religion, harm to its people, or damage to their
interests; but what opposes this, such as trade or other
social interactions of a secular nature, is not included
amongst that which is forbidden because it does not
involve any opposition to God and His Apostle or any
opposition or resistance to Their religion (Rida 1973,
3: 288). Tellingly, Abd al-Qadir, in expanding on Ridas
views, emphasizes the need to avoid contributing to
the aggrandizement of the word of unbelief (Abd
al-Qadir 1998, 63435).
Faysal Mawlawi addresses the question of solidarity
and civic friendship raised by the loyalty verses in
a startlingly Rawlsian way, by bifurcating solidarity
into one kind based on shared interests, secular val-
ues, and geographical proximity; and another based on
shared metaphysical beliefs. Furthermore, like the lib-
eral view, Mawlawis understanding of secular solidar-
ity is universal: the bonds of sharedinterest candevelop
among humans anywhere and without regard to cul-
tural, racial, or ethnic differences. He claims that Mus-
lims can even feel a form of innate love [hubb tri]
for non-Muslims, meaning affection based on shared
humanity and common interests, to be distinguished
from the creedal love [hubb aqaidi] shared among
Muslims. Mawlawi, in fact, says something like the fol-
lowing: Islam would prefer to be expressed through a
community where politics and metaphysics are fused.
But giventhe reality of sharing political space withnon-
Muslims, it is preferable to limit solidarity and political
power to that which all humans have in common. Were
non-Muslim states to make wider claims to metaphysi-
cal truth, then it might be more difcult for Muslims to
afrmcitizenship within them(Mawlawi 1999, 21019).
One of the main criticisms of political liberalism is
that its retreat from a comprehensive to a political
defense of liberal values will do nothing to assuage con-
servative communitarian critics of comprehensive
liberalism (among which we must rank Islamic schol-
ars) because it leaves in place roughly the same sets
of policies and institutions, while adopting a public
form of justication no one personally believes in. Will
Kymlicka, for example, nds that because adopting
autonomy as a purely political value has effects on the
250
American Political Science Review Vol. 101, No. 2
private pursuit of the good that liberalism is supposed
to endorse, Rawlss strategy of endorsing autonomy
only in political contexts, rather than as a general value,
does not succeed. Accepting the value of autonomy for
political purposes enables its exercise in private life,
an implication that will only be favored by those who
endorse autonomy as a general value. Rawls has not
explained why people who are communitarians in pri-
vate life should be liberals in political life (Kymlicka
1996, 162). Admittedly we have not addressed in this
essay the Islamic response to the protection of indi-
vidual freedom in a liberal society; however, we have
encountered other aspects of social cooperation which
Islam nds much easier to afrm precisely because
of liberalisms public philosophy of epistemic absti-
nence (Raz 1990). For many Muslimscholars, it is also
the rhetoric employed by a state which is crucialare
Muslims being asked to profess something contrary to
Islam or even to endure quietly the glorication of a
contrary truth?
In this article, I have shown that rm and culturally
authentic Islamic values exist which can ground Islam-
ically a social contract between Muslims and a non-
Muslim liberal democracy. What these Islamic sources
also demonstrate, which should be of considerable in-
terest for contemporary political theorists, is a certain
vindication for the aspirations of political liberalism to
win the support of otherwise nonliberal social groups.
In disavowing any claim to metaphysical truth as the
basis for community, in requiring of citizens no such
afrmations in order to participate politically, and in
establishing no collective goals that require adherence
to a controversial metaphysical doctrine, political lib-
eralism can plausibly claim that it requires of Muslim
citizens no statement whatsoever about the truth or
superiority of any one religion, doctrine or way of
life. Given that Muslim jurists are prepared to allow
residence even in states that exhibit no such restraint,
their own discourse on the acceptable scope of loy-
alty to non-Muslims reveals Islam-specic reasons why
Muslims should be more willing to take a step beyond
resident alienage toward citizenship in a politically lib-
eral state than in any other non-Muslim regime.
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