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ARB Construction Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,

332 SCRA 427 (2000)

TBS Security (TBSS) entered into 2 service
contracts with ARB Corp. (ARBC) wherein the
former will provide secirity guards to the latter.
ARBC informed TBSS that it will terminate the
contract before its expiration because the guards
were incompetent. TBSS informed ARBC that it
cannot terminate the contract or hire other security
guards from Global Security (another company that
provides security) since it would run contrary to the
provisions of the service contracts. ARBC decided
to retain 1 guard to comply w/ the contract.

TRBS filed a Complaint for Preliminary Injunction
against ARBC and Global.

TBSS filed a Motion for Leave to File Attached
Amended and Supplemental Complaint. TBSS
submitted that it now desired to pursue a case for
Sum of Money and Damages instead of the one
previously filed for Preliminary Injunction. It
maintained that the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint would not substantially alter its cause of
action as both the original and amended complaint
were based on the same set of facts. TBS also
alleged in its Amended and Supplemental
Complaint that ARBC illegally deducted from the
payroll the amounts representing the value of 1
concrete vibrator and cassette recorder. It further
argued that ARBC withheld additional amounts
from its payroll as payment for the parts of the
grader that were stolen. TBSS maintained that
ARBC still had an outstanding obligations with
them. ARBC opposed the Motion for Leave to File
Amended and Supplemental Complaint

contending
that the cause of action had been substantially
altered.

RTC issued TRO and allowed the motion.

Issue:
WON TBSS can change the cause of action in view
of a change in the situation of the parties after filing
the original complaint.

Held:
Yes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "the
amendatory allegations are mere amplifications of
the cause of action for damages . . . . An
amendment will not be considered as stating a new
cause of action if the facts alleged in the amended
complaint show substantially the same wrong with
respect to the same transaction, or if what are
alleged refer to the same matter but are more fully
and differently stated, or where averments which
were implied are made in expressed terms, and the
subject of the controversy or the liability sought to
be enforced remains the same."

The original as well as amended and supplemental
complaints readily disclose that the averments
contained therein are almost identical.

In the original complaint, TBSS prays, among
others, that the two (2) Service Contracts be
declared as subsisting until 15 August 1994 and
that petitioners be made to pay P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees. Significantly, in its penultimate
paragraph, TBSS prays "for such other reliefs that
are considered just and equitable under the
premises." This is a "catch-all" phrase which
definitely covers the amplifications and additional
averments contained in the Amended and
Supplemental Complaint. Due to events
supervening after the filing of the original complaint,
it became incumbent upon TBSS to amend its
original complaint. One of the supervening
events was the withholding by petitioner ARBC
of some amounts intended for the payroll of
TBSS due to pilferage or losses which allegedly
occurred due to the negligence and inefficiency
of TBSS' security guards. Plainly, this withholding
of the payroll was only an offshoot of the
pretermination of the two (2) Service Contracts on
the part of ARBC.

Asiatic Petroleum Co vs. Veloso

Facts: The plaintiff and the defendant entered into
a written contract whereby, the latter was appointed
as agent to sell the former's gasoline and oil
products in the City of Cebu, and to manage the
office in the gasoline station or building constructed
for the purpose. The defendant, under the terms of
the contract of agency, was obliged to render an
Issue: Whether or not the supplemental complaint
should have been admitted as regards to the
installments that were not due at the filing of the
complaint but became due during the trial and
before its end.
Petitioner SC Argument: The plaintiff vigorously
contends that the supplemental complaint should
have been received under authority of section 105
of the Code of Civil Procedure allowing like
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account of the sales. However, he failed to live up
to this stipulation and retained the proceeds of such
sales in his possession. A liquidation on December
6, 1932, disclosed the fact that the defendant had
not turned over to the plaintiff what was due.
The defendant paid seven (7) installments or
P3,500, but defaulted as to the remainder.
Repeated breach by the defendant eventuated in
his voluntary surrender to the plaintiff of the
building or gasoline station leased to him, including
the stock on hand. From the second default up to
the rescission of the contracts of agency and of
lease and the return of the gasoline station as
stated.
The plaintiff, before judgment was rendered by the
court, filed a supplemental complaint, alleging that
other portions of the aforesaid note had become
due and had not been paid by the defendant, and
asking that judgment be rendered against the latter,
On account of the note, for P15,000, with interest
thereon, and for the remaining installments thereof
as they fell due and were not paid by the
defendant.
RTC Ruling: The court rejected the supplemental
complaint, in view of the fact that the plaintiff could
not recover the installments that had not yet
become due when the complait was filed on August
9, 1933.
Further it would involve the reopening of the trial to
enable the parties to adduce their evidence.
The plaintiff thus appealed to the SC.

pleadings.
Held: The Court agrees with the petitioners
contention.
We are the opinion that, while under said section, it
was discretional with the court to admit the
supplemental complaint, nevertheless, it should
have been admitted because when it was filed, the
alleged installments which formed part of the others
sued upon by the plaintiff, had already become
due.
Nor was the non-admission of the supplemental
complaint justified by the reasoning that its
admission would involve the reopening of the trial
to enable the parties to adduce their evidence.
Undoubtedly its admission would have meant a
retrial, but this should have been done in
furtherance of justice and to settle an the rights of
the parties in the same litigation.
The plaintiff asks in its brief to set the judgment as
to the installments of the note that have become
due, which now turn out to be all, and which have
not been paid by the defendant to remand the case
with instructions to admit the supplemental
complaint to be filed, and, after the new trial, to
render another judgment ordering the defendant to
pay his entire indebtedness. We understand and so
hold, that the remedy prayed for is the most just
and practicable, because multiplicity of actions may
thus be avoided.
NB: We cannot agree with the plaintiff that in this
case judgment can be rendered against the
defendant for all the installments of the note,
including those which became due after the
presentation of the complaint. It is already a settled
doctrine in this jurisdiction that in actions for the
recovery of debts payable in installments, those not
yet due and payable cannot be demanded in the
the complaint.
NB: In order that the plaintiff may recover all the
installments due to date, which appear to be all
those contained in the note which the defendant
had not paid when they became due, it is first
necessary to admit the supplemental complaint and
to give the plaintiff an opportunity to file another
alleging the maturity of the remaining installments
and the non-payment thereof by the defendant.

Godinez vs. CA

Facts: Delfina Village Subdivision Homeowners
Association (DVSHA), respondent, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Tagum City, Davao del Norte,
an amended complaint for injunction and damages
against spouses Zosimo and Elizabeth Godinez
and their son Edwin, petitioners. The complaint
alleges that petitioners were operating a mineral
Issue: (a) Whether or not the order of the RTC for
an amended complaint was valid, instead of
dismissing the case.
(b) Whether or not respondent was a part in
interest.
Held: DENIED.
In resolving this issue, we are guided by two
principles. First, there is nothing sacred about
processes or pleadings and their forms or contents,
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processing plant in the annex of their residential
house located within Delfina Village. The village
has been classified by Municipal Ordinance No. 63,
s. 1993 as a medium-density residential district.
Petitioners filed their answer raising the following
affirmative defenses: a) the complaint states no
cause of action; b) respondent DVSHA has no
capacity to sue; c) it is not a real party in interest; d)
the complaint fails to implead the real parties in
interest; and e) respondent failed to refer the
case for conciliation to the barangay before filing its
complaint.
The trial court issued an Order directing respondent
to amend its complaint and attach thereto proofs
showing that it is a juridical person with capacity to
sue and that it is the real party in interest.
Respondent submitted its amended complaint
impleading, as additional plaintiffs, its officers and
members, and attaching thereto its Certificate of
Registration with the Home Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation, as well as its Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws.
Petitioners filed an MR questioning the RTCs order
in allowing an amended complaint, which was
denied. They appealed on certiorari to the CA.
CA Ruling: Dismissed. The purpose of the trial
court was to determine whether respondent is a
juridical person and whether it is a real party in
interest. In sum, its intention was to ensure
respondents compliance with the procedural rules.
Petitioners filed an MR which was denied. They
thus filed a petitioner for certiorari to the SC

their sole purpose being to facilitate the application
of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.
Hence, pleadings as well as procedural rules
should be construed liberally. Second, the judicial
attitude has always been favorable and liberal in
allowing amendments to a pleading in order to
avoid multiplicity of suits and so that the real
controversies between the parties are presented,
their rights determined, and the case decided on
the merits without unnecessary delay.
Court cites Sec. 1 & 4, Rule 10.
Here, the amendment of respondents complaint at
the instance of the trial court merely involves the
designation of respondent as a proper party, i.e.,
whether it has a juridical personality and, therefore,
can sue or be sued. We note that when respondent
amended its complaint by attaching the required
supporting documents, such amendment did not
change its cause of action. Nor was its action
intended to prejudice petitioners. Verily, the Court
of Appeals correctly ruled that the RTC did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it ordered the
amendment of the complaint.
Anent petitioners contention that respondent is not
a real party in interest, the same is without merit.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the same Rules defines a real
party in interest as the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of a suit. In its
complaint, respondent alleged that it will be
prejudiced by petitioners act complained of. Even
assuming it will not suffer an injury from the alleged
unlawful act of petitioners, its members or
homeowners may sustain such injury. In this
jurisdiction, an association has a standing to file
suit for its members despite lack of interest if its
members are directly affected by the action.

Leobrera vs. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 711
(1989)

Leobrera was granted a credit facility by BPI w/c
was secured by 2 real estate mortgages (REM).
He also obtained another credit facility secured by
a third REM. Leobrera was not able to pay the load
thus BPI prepared to foreclose the REMs. Leobrera
then filed an injunction enjoining the foreclosure of
the REMs, which was granted by the trial court.
Before BPI could foreclose the mortgage, Leobrera
filed a motion to file supplemental complaint, w/c
prayed for issuance of an injunction restraining BPI
Issue:
WON the motion to file supplemental complaint
should be granted.

Held:
No, it should not be granted.

Petitioner filed the Motion to File the Supplemental
Complaint on 11 March 1987 attaching thereto a
copy of the supplemental complaint. A copy of the
motion was sent to BPI by registered mail on the
same day, but was received by the latter only on
March 13. A day earlier, however, on March 12, the
trial court had already issued an order granting the
motion and admitted the supplemental complaint.
There was haste in the trial courts admission of the
supplemental complaint since no notice had as yet
been received by BPI when the trial court issued
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from foreclosing 3
rd
mortgage. This was granted by
the trial court, denying BPIs motion to set it aside,
even if such motion did not contain a notice of
hearing and proof of service.
A petition for certiorari with CA was filed by BPI,
which was granted.
Leobrera appealed to the SC.

the 12 March order.

The suplemental complaint contained an invalid
notice of hearing. The notice of hearing is intended
to prevent surprise and to afford the adverse party
a chance to be heard before the motion is resolved
by the trial court. While the court has said that a
literal observance of the notice requirements is not
necessary, a seasonable service of a copy of the
motion on adverse party or counsel with a notice of
hearing indicating the time and place of hearing of
the motion are mandatory requirements that cannot
be dispensed with as these are minimum
requirements of procedural due process.

It is evident from the notice that no time and
place of hearing of the motion is
indicated. Neither does the record reveal that
there was proof of service attached to the
motion. The minimum requirements of procedural
due process was not satisfied thus the notice is just
a mere scrap of paper.
Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987)

This case is an action for torts and damages and
specific performance with prayer for temporary
restraining order.
Manchester prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction during the
pendency of the action against the buyer's
announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid
for the property in question, to attach such property
of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any
judgment that maybe rendered and for actual,
compensatory and exemplary damages.
The amount of damages sought is not specified in
the prayer although the body of the complaint
alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as
damages suffered by Manchester.
The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the
amount only of P410.00 by considering the action
to be merely one for specific performance where
the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary
estimation. The complaint was amended to include
Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff
and by emanating any mention of the amount of
damages in the body of the complaint.
The prayer in the original complaint was
maintained. Then the Court order the re-
assessment of the docket fee for the case and
directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint
by stating the amounts which they are asking for.
It was only then when they specified the amount of
Issue:
Should the basis of the assessment of the docket
fee be the amount of damages sought in the
original complaint or in the amended complaint?

Held:
It should be based in the original complaint.

The ruling in the Magaspi case cannot be applied
here.
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not
only one for recovery of ownership but also for
damages, so that the filing fee for the damages
should be the basis of assessment. Although the
payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found
to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that
since the payment was the result of an "honest
difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be
paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings
thereafter had were proper and regular."
Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the
original complaint, the allegations of damages in
the amended complaint should be the basis of the
computation of the filing fee.
In the present case no such honest difference of
opinion was possible as the allegations of the
complaint, the designation and the prayer show
clearly that it is an action for damages and specific
performance. The docketing fee should be
assessed by considering the amount of damages
as alleged in the original complaint.
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damages in the body of the complaint in the
reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. Still no
amount of damages were specified in the prayer.
The amended complaint was admitted.

As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-
settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court .
Thus, in the present case the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of
only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the
amendment of the complaint thereby vest
jurisdiction upon the Court.
For all legal purposes there is no such original
complaint that was duly filed which could be
amended. Consequently, the order admitting the
amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are
null and void.
Mercader vs. Development Bank of the Philippines
(Cebu Branch), 332 SCRA 82 (2000)

The Maderazos and the spouses Mercader
executed a contract of lease with the Manreals for
a period of 20 years over a parcel of land w/c
served as their right of way and w/c the Mercaders
cultivated. The Manreals failed to deliver the TCT
of the said lot because they used it together with
the improvements as collateral for loan with the
DBP.

DBP took steps to foreclose the lot w/
improvements when the Manreals defaulted in
payment of the obligation. The Mercaders, in their
complaint for specific performance, prayed that the
DBP declare the foreclosure null and void.

However, the lot was sold in a public auction with
DBP as the highest bidder.

When the case was set for hearing, the Mercaders
filed a supplemental pleading insisting the
consummation of the lease-purchase option w/
payment of earnest money subject of the intial
attempts on compromise.

TC ruled in favor of the Mercaders but the CA
reversed it in ruling that the TC erred in treating the
lease-purchase option as a controversial issue
considering that it was outside the parties
pleadings. The Mercaders contend that the TC
correctly took cognizance of the lease-purchase
option because it was part and parcel of the pre-
trial stages, the determination of which will prevent
future litigation thereon.

Issue:
WON the lease purchase option loses materiality
for failing to raise the same in the pleadings.

Held:
No, the lease-purchase option is material even if
not raised in the initiatory pleadings.

This is because lack of reference thereof in the
pleadings is due to the fact that the trial court only
took cognizance thereof when it became an integral
component of the pre-trial proceedings. That is
why the lease-purchase option was included firstly,
in the pre-trial order as one of the issues to be
resolved at trial and secondly, in the supplemental
pleading subsequently filed by the Mercaders.

As a supplemental pleading, it served to aver
supervening facts which were then not ripe for
judicial relief when the original pleading was filed.
As such, it was meant to supply deficiencies in
aid of the original pleading, and not to dispense
with the latter. Hence, it was patently erroneous
for the CA to pronounce that the lease purchase
option was not raised in the pleadings. The DBP
was even aware of the supplemental pleading
because it filed an opposition thereto.

Assuming arguendo that the Mercaders failed to file
the supplemental pleading, evidence relative to the
lease purchase option may be legitimately admitted
by the TC in conformity with Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court. This provision envisions two
scenarios, first, when evidence is introduced on an
issue not alleged in the pleadings and no objection
was interjected, and second, when evidence is
offered again, on an issue not alleged in the
pleadings but this time an objection was
interpolated. We are concerned with the second.
Thus, when evidence is offered on a matter not
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alleged in the pleadings, the court may admit it
even against the objection of the adverse party,
where the latter fails to satisfy the court that the
admission of the evidence would prejudice him
in maintaining his defense upon the merits, and
the court may grant him a continuance to
enable him to meet the new situation created by
the evidence.

The DBP in this case was not and would not be
prejudiced by the incorporation of the lease-
purchase option as one of the controverted issues.
Also, it had been afforded ample opportunity to
refute and object to the evidence germane thereto,
thus, the rudiments of fair play had been properly
observed.
Monte vs. Ortega, 2 SCRA 1041 (1961)

Monte filed a complaint for Replivin with Damages
against Mayor Ortega and Carceres who was the
Chief of Police. He alleged that the defendants
impunded his trucks with no valid ground.
Defendants claim that Monte was taking stones,
gravel and sand from Waras river w/o municipal
permit. In fact, the provincial fiscal has already
filed an information against him.

Monte filed a motion for admission of an amended
complaint w/c included Provincial Fiscal Estipona
as a party defendant alleging that the fiscal
connived with the defendants to file an information
against him.

Defendants opposed the admission of the
Amended Complaint on two grounds, namely: (1)
substantial changes were included by way of
damages, greatly prejudicial to defendants
(substantially and materially alters the cause of
action) and (2) no cause of action against Fiscal
Estipona.
Lower court denied the amended complaint on the
ground that amendments to the complaint introduce
a new cause of action which has not been shown to
be existing at the time of the filing of the original
complaint.

WON the amended complaint should be admitted.

Held:
Yes.
The purpose of allowing the amendment of
pleadings is in order that all matters in the action in
dispute between the parties may, as far as
possible, be completely determined in a single
proceeding'
The first cause of action alleges the illegal
impounding of petitioner's trucks by the original
defendants, while the second avers that
impounding is sought to be justified by the
malicious prosecution of petitioner on the part of
Fiscal Estipona who acted upon the inducement of
respondents. There is therefore intimate relation
between the allegations of the causes of action
which can only be threshed out in a single
proceeding. This attempt is within the purview of
the rule.
As this attempt was frustrated, petitioner has
reason to appeal from the ruling of the court.
Therefore, the court acted improperly in denying
the plaintiff right to appeal.

Pan-Asiatic Travel Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 164 SCRA 623 (1988)

Destinations Travel Philippines filed a complaint
against Pan-Asiatic Travel Corp. for the refund of
the price of alleged unutilizes plane tickets issued
by the latter for the passengers recruited by the
Issue:
WON the court has jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner.
WON the appeal was filed within the reglementary
period.

Held:
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former. DESTINATIONS later filed a motiond to
declare defendants in default. Pan-Asiatic filed a
motion to dismiss to object the jurisdiction of the
trial court on the ground that it was not properly
served with summons.

DESTINATIONS now filed an amended complaint
incrusing its claim for reimbursement of refunds. A
copy was served in Pan-Asiatic.
Pan_Asiatic filed motions for extension of time.
Instead of filing an Answer, it filed a Motion for Bill
of Particulars which was granted by the trial court.
DESTINATIONS did not file a bill of particulars but
served and filed a Motion to Admit attached second
amended complaint which detailed his causes of
action, -claim for reimbursement of refunds for
unutilized tickets, claim for commissions, claim for
incentives, claim for reimbursement
This was admitted by the trial judge but no new
summons was served on petitioner. The trial court
upon the motion of DESTINATIONS rendered
judgment by default against Pan-Asiatic.

Petitioner filed its Omnibus Motion to Lift Order of
Default and to Vacate Judgment by Default. It
alleged that the trial court's decision was rendered
without jurisdiction since petitioner was never
served with summons on the Second Amended
Complaint. This was denied by the court.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the CA.
Yes. The trial court had jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner.
Summons on the first amended complaint was
properly served on Pan-Asiatic. After which, the
company filed several motions for extension of time
within which to file responsive pleading, and then a
Motion for Bill of Particulars, all of which motions
were granted by the trial court. With the filing of
these motions, PAN-ASIATIC had effectively
appeared in the case and voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, no new
summons on the Second Amended Complaint was
necessary, ordinary service being sufficient.

Phil. Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp
Vs.
Phil Infrastructures Inc

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of
sum of money against herein respondents
Philippine Infrastructures, Inc. The complaint
alleges that: petitioner issued five separate Letters
of Guarantee in favor of the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) as security for various credit
accommodations extended by PNB to respondent
PII; respondents PII, BF Homes, PDC and Aguirre
executed a Deed of Undertaking binding
themselves, jointly and severally, to pay or
reimburse petitioner upon demand such amount of
money or to repair the damages, losses or
penalties which petitioner may pay or suffer on
account of its guarantees.
PNB called on the guarantees of petitioner, and so,
the latter demanded from respondent PII the
immediate settlement of P20,959, 529.36,
Issue: Whether or not amendment to a complaint
be allowed based on evidence proved in court but
not raised in the pleadings.

Held: It should be stressed that amendment was
sought after petitioner had already presented
evidence, more specifically, the testimony of
petitioners Treasury Department Manager and a
debit memo from the PNB (Exhibit LL) proving
that petitioner had paid the PNB in the amount of
P19,035,256.57 pursuant to the guarantees it
accorded to respondent PII.
A scrutiny of the pleadings filed by respondents
reveal that none of them denied petitioners claim
that said evidence was presented before the trial
court without objections having been raised by
respondents. None of them claimed that they
raised any objections at the time when petitioner
presented its evidence to prove its payment to
PNB. Respondents Pilar and Aguirre admitted the
presentation of the said evidence.
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representing the aggregate amount of the
guarantees of petitioner called by PNB and the
further sum of P351,517.57 representing various
fees and charges;
PII refused to settle said obligations; petitioner
likewise demanded payment from respondents
Solid and PBAC but they also refused to pay
petitioner.
Respondent BF Homes filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that it is undergoing rehabilitation
receivership in the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and pursuant to P.D. 902-A, the
trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
Respondent PII also filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action since it does not allege that petitioner has
suffered any damage, loss or penalty because of
the guarantees petitioner had extended for and on
behalf of respondent PII.
Judge Roberto M. Lagman issued an Order
suspending the case only as against respondent
BF Homes and denying respondent PIIs motion to
dismiss. Thereafter, hearing on the merits ensued.
Petitioner presented Rosauro Termulo, the treasury
department manager of petitioner, who testified that
the amount of P19,035,256.57 was paid on July 28,
1990 by petitioner to the PNB. Consequently,
petitioner filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to
Conform to Evidence pursuant to Section 5, Rule
10 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeking to
amend Paragraph 17 and the pertinent portion of
the prayer in the complaint: Because of the
unjustified refusal of the defendants to comply with
their respective obligations, the plaintiff as
guarantor has been constrained to pay the
Philippine National Bank thru the account of the
National Treasury the amount of Nineteen Million
Thirty-five Thousand Two Hundred Fifty-six and
57/100 (P19,035,256.57)

Note: None of the defendants questioned the
presentation of payments to PNB.

RTC Ruling: Acting on the motion to amend, the
trial court, at that time presided by Judge Joselito J.
Dela Rosa, issued the assailed Order dated
December 7, 1992, dismissing the case without
prejudice on the ground of failure of the complaint
to state a cause of action, thus in effect, reversing
the Order dated June 10, 1987 issued by Judge
Lagman five years earlier. MR denied.
This case was originally for certiorari on review to
the SC but was sent back to the IAC, now CA.

CA Ruling: CA dismissed the petition.
SECONDLY, the real purpose of petitioner herein
In Bernardo, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, respondents
therein also put up in their answer the affirmative
defense of failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action and the parties went on to present their
respective evidence. The Court did not consider
the allegation of this affirmative defense in the
answer as an objection to evidence presented by
the plaintiffs. Furthermore, the Court ruled that:
The presentation of the contrariant evidence for
and against imputations undoubtedly cured,
clarified or expanded, as the case may be,
whatever defects in the pleadings or vagueness in
the issues there might have been in the amended
complaint. . . .
It is settled that even if the complaint be defective,
but the parties go to trial thereon, and the plaintiff,
without objection, introduces sufficient evidence to
constitute the particular cause of action which it
intended to allege in the original complaint, and the
defendant voluntarily produces witnesses to meet
the cause of action thus established, an issue is
joined as fully and as effectively as if it had been
previously joined by the most perfect pleadings.
Likewise, when issues not raised by the pleadings
are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if
they had been raised in the pleadings.
Evidently, herein respondents failure to object to
the evidence at the time it is presented in court is
fatal to their cause inasmuch as whatever
perceived defect the complaint had was cured by
the introduction of petitioners evidence proving
actual loss sustained by petitioner due to payment
made by it to PNB.
GRANTED.

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in asking the respondent court a quo for leave to
amend its complaint was not ostensibly to make the
complaint conform to the evidence presented, as
petitioner alleges, but to introduce a cause of action
then non-existing when the complaint was filed.
The ruling in the leading case of Surigao Mine
Exploration Co. vs. Harris (69 Phil. 113) does not
allow such amendment.

Piramide vs. Go Guioc Sian, 74 SCRA 9 (1976)

Napoleon Piramide, son of Narciso Piramide,
alleges that he is the owner of two parcels of
coconut land 919 and 8 hectares) thru inheritance
from Narciso. He filed a case against Go Sian and
Benjamin (grandson of Narciso) claiming that the
latter two entered into a void contract in acquiring
the parcels of land.

The defendants moved to dismiss it on the grounds
of prescription and non-joinder of the siblings of
Napoleon who are Pilar and Pedro.

The RTC ordered Napoleon to amend his
complaint to include Pedro and Pilar as they are
indispensable or necessary parties. Napoleon did
not amend his complaint and the RTC dismissed
the case.
Issue: WON Napoleon should amend the
complaint.

Held:
Yes.

The contention that his co-heirs need not be a party
is not controlling even if the estate was already
partitioned. The reason why they must be made as
parties is that Napoleon wants to declare the
contracts void. The signatories to the contract were
Pilar, Pedro, Benjamin and Sian. He cannot limit
his complaint only to the two of the four contracting
parties.

RTC did not err in requiring him to cute the patent
deficiency in his complaint. Since he did not
comply, the RTC acted within its prerogative in
dismissing the complaint. However, to avoid
injustice, the dismissal should not operate as an
adjudication on the merits, or that dismissal is
without prejudice.

Remington Industrial Sales Corp. vs.
CA

Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of
money and damages arising from breach of
contract. Impleaded as principal defendant therein
was Industrial Steels, Ltd. (ISL), with Ferro Trading
GMBH (Ferro) and respondent British Steel as
alternative defendants.
ISL and respondent British Steel separately moved
for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that it failed to state a cause of action against them.
The RTC denied the motions to dismiss, as well as
the ensuing motion for reconsideration. ISL then
filed its answer to the complaint.
Respondent British Steel filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals. Respondent claimed therein that the
complaint did not contain a single averment that
respondent committed any act or is guilty of any
omission in violation of petitioners legal rights. The
complaint stated that: Defendants British Steel
(Asia) Ltd. and Ferro Trading Gmbh, while
understood by the plaintiff as mere suppliers of
Issue: Can a complaint still be amended as a
matter of right before an answer has been filed,
even if there was a pending proceeding for its
dismissal before the higher court?
Held: GRANTED.
Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court
explicitly states that a pleading may be amended
as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is
served. This only means that prior to the filing of
an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to
amend the complaint whether a new cause of
action or change in theory is introduced. The
reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent
Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this provision,
substantial amendment of the complaint is not
allowed without leave of court after an answer has
been served, because any material change in the
allegations contained in the complaint could
prejudice the rights of the defendant who has
already set up his defense in the answer.
Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendants
rights have been violated by changes made in the
complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In
such an event, the defendant has not presented
RULE 10
goods for defendant ISL, are impleaded as party
defendants pursuant to Section 13, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court. No other reference was
made to respondent that would constitute a valid
cause of action against it. Since petitioner failed to
plead any cause of action against respondent as
alternative defendant under Section 13, Rule 3, the
trial court should have ordered the dismissal of the
complaint insofar as respondent was concerned.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought to amend its
complaint by incorporating therein additional factual
allegations constitutive of its cause of action
against respondent. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 10
of the Rules of Court, petitioner maintained that it
can amend the complaint as a matter of right
because respondent has not yet filed a responsive
pleading thereto.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion in CA-
G.R. SP No. 44529 stating that it had filed a Motion
to Admit Amended Complaint together with said
Amended Complaint before the trial court. Hence,
petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the
special civil action be suspended.
RTC Ruling: Hearing suspended till CA resolution.
CA Ruling: Petition granted, original complaint of
petitioner is dismissed. As to the prayer of
suspension in the CA, it ruled: The incident which
transpired after the filing of the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition are immaterial in the
resolution of this petition. What this Court is called
upon to resolve is whether the lower court
committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint against
it. The admission or rejection by the lower court of
said amended complaint will not, insofar as this
Court is concerned, impinge upon the issue of
whether or not said court gravely abused its
discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss.

any defense that can be altered or affected by the
amendment of the complaint in accordance with
Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant still retains
the unqualified opportunity to address the
allegations against him by properly setting up his
defense in the answer. Considerable leeway is
thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint
once, as a matter of right, prior to the filing of an
answer by the defendant.
Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and
should be liberally allowed in the furtherance of
justice in order to determine every case as far as
possible on its merits without regard to
technicalities. This principle is generally
recognized to speed up trial and save party litigants
from incurring unnecessary expense, so that a full
hearing on the merits of every case may be had
and multiplicity of suits avoided.
In this case, the remedy espoused by the appellate
court in its assailed judgment will precisely result in
multiple suits, involving the same set of facts and to
which the defendants would likely raise the same
or, at least, related defenses. Plainly stated, we
find no practical advantage in ordering the
dismissal of the complaint against respondent and
for petitioner to re-file the same, when the latter can
still clearly amend the complaint as a matter of
right. The amendment of the complaint would not
prejudice respondents or delay the action, as this
would, in fact, simplify the case and expedite its
disposition.
The fact that the other defendants below has filed
their answers to the complaint does not bar
petitioners right to amend the complaint as against
respondent. Indeed, where some but not all the
defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still
amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, in
respect to claims asserted solely against the non-
answering defendant, but not as to claims asserted
against the other defendants.

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts: Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco,
Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago together with
Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr., Gliceria R. Tantoco,
and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda-are defendants
in Civil Case of the Sandiganbayan. The complaint
which initiated the action was denominated one "for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution
and damages," and was avowedly filed pursuant to
Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C.
Aquino.
After having been served with summons, Tantoco,
Issue: Whether or not Tantocos motions be
granted in light of Rule 25.
PCGG SC Argument: As regards to the production
of documents: (a) movants had not shown any
good cause therefor; (b) some documents sought
to be produced and inspected had already been
presented in Court and marked preliminarily as
PCGG's exhibits, and the movants had viewed,
scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and
made comments thereon; and (c) the other
documents sought to be produced are either
privileged in character or confidential in nature and
their use is proscribed by the immunity provisions
of Executive Order No. 1, or non-existent, or mere
products of the movants' suspicion and fear.
RULE 10
Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer,
jointly filed a "MOTION TO STRIKE OUT SOME
PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT AND FOR BILL
OF PARTICULARS OF OTHER PORTIONS." The
PCGG filed an opposition thereto, 2 and the
movants, a reply to the opposition. The
Sandiganbayan, in order to expedite proceedings
and accommodate the defendants, gave the PCGG
forty-five (45) days to expand its complaint to make
more specific certain allegations.
PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint. 8 As this
expanded complaint, Tantoco and Santiago
reiterated their motion for bill of particulars, through
a Manifestation. The Sandiganbayan denied the
motion to strike out, for bill of particulars, and for
leave to file interrogatories, holding them to be
without legal and factual basis. The Sandiganbayan
declared inter alia the complaint to be "sufficiently
definite and clear enough," there are adequate
allegations . . which clearly portray the supposed
involvement and/or alleged participation of
defendants-movants in the transactions described
in detail in said Complaint," and "the other matters
sought for particularization are evidentiary in nature
which should be ventilated in the pre-trial or trial
proper . ."
Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan
a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to
Plaintiff," and an "Amended Interrogatories to
Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for Production and
Inspection of Documents. PCGG filed an
opposition.
After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two
(2) Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first,
denying reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing
production of documents), and the second,
reiterating by implication the permission to serve
the amended interrogatories on the plaintiff
(PCGG).
Hence the petition for certiorari to the SC.

Held: sabaw to sir
Initially, that undertaking of laying the facts before
the court is accomplished by the pleadings filed by
the parties; but that, only in a very general way.
Only "ultimate facts" are set forth in the pleadings;
hence, only the barest outline of the facfual basis of
a party's claims or defenses is limned in his
pleadings. The law says that every pleading "shall
contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts
on which the party pleading relies for his claim or
defense, as the case may be, omitting the
statement of mere evidentiary facts."
Parenthetically, if this requirement is not observed,
i.e., the ultimate facts are alleged too generally or
"not averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable . . (an adverse party)
properly to prepare his responsive pleading or to
prepare for trial," a bill of particulars seeking a
"more definite statement" may be ordered by the
court on motion of a party. The office of a bill of
particulars is, however, limited to making more
particular or definite the ultimate facts in a pleading
It is not its office to supply evidentiary matters. And
the common perception is that said evidentiary
details are made known to the parties and the court
only during the trial, when proof is adduced on the
issues of fact arising from the pleadings.
The truth is that "evidentiary matters" may be
inquired into and learned by the parties before the
trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law
that the parties before the trial if not indeed even
before the pre-trial should discover or inform
themselves of all the facts relevant to the action,
not only those known to them individually, but also
those known to adversaries; in other words, the
desideratum is that civil trials should not be carried
on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this
ideal possible through the deposition-discovery
mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29. The
experience in other jurisdictions has been that
ample discovery before trial, under proper
regulation, accomplished one of the most
necessary of modern procedure: it not only
eliminates unessential issue from trials thereby
shortening them considerably, but also requires
parties to play the game with the cards on the table
so that the possibility of fair settlement before trial
is measurably increased. . ."
As just intimated, the deposition-discovery
procedure was designed to remedy the conceded
inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial
functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and
fact revelation theretofore performed primarily by
the pleadings.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are
RULE 10
meant to serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-
trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify
the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a
device for ascertaining the facts relative to those
issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable
parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to
obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues
and facts before trials and thus prevent that said
trials are carried on in the dark.
To this end, the field of inquiry that may be covered
by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as
when the interrogated party is called as a witness
to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all
facts which are relevant, whether they be ultimate
or evidentiary, excepting only those matters which
are privileged. The objective is as much to give
every party the fullest possible information of all the
relevant facts before the trial as to obtain evidence
for use upon said trial. The principle is reflected in
Section 2, Rule 24 (governing depositions) 34
which generally allows the examination of a
deponent
It should initially be pointed out as regards the
private respondents "Motion for Leave to File
Interrogatories" dated February 1, 1988 41 that it
was correct for them to seek leave to serve
interrogatories, because discovery was being
availed of before an answer had been served. In
such a situation, i.e., "after jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or over property
subject of the action" but before answer, Section 1
of Rule 24 (treating of depositions), in relation to
Section 1 of Rule 25 (dealing with interrogatories to
parties) explicitly requires "leave of court." 42 But
there was no need for the private respondents to
seek such leave to serve their "Amended
Interrogatories to Plaintiff" (dated August 2, 1989
43) after they had filed their answer to the PCGG's
complaint, just as there was no need for the
Sandiganbayan to act thereon.
The Court finally finds that, contrary to the
petitioner's theory, there is good cause for the
production and inspection of the documents subject
of the motion dated August 3, 1989. 53 Some of
the documents are, according to the verification of
the amended complaint, the basis of several of the
material allegations of said complaint. Others,
admittedly, are to be used in evidence by the
plaintiff. It is matters such as these into which
inquiry is precisely allowed by the rules of
discovery, to the end that the parties may
adequately prepare for pre-trial and trial. The only
other documents sought to be produced are
needed in relation to the allegations of the
counterclaim. Their relevance is indisputable; their
disclosure may not be opposed.
RULE 10

Santos vs. General Woodcraft and Design
Corporation, 117 SCRA 67 (1982)

Santos filed an acton for collection of separation
pay, overtime and vacation leave benefits against
their employer General woodcraft for terminating
their services without just cause.
At the pre-trial, RTC (at that time, jurisdiction is not
with NLRC) noted that complaint contained no clear
and categorical allegations as would entitle to OT
pay and sick leave. The court required the counsel
for the petitioner to file within 10 days an
amendment to the complaint which was not
followed.
General woodcraft moved for the dismissal which
was granted on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action.

Issue:
Was the dismissal proper due to the failure to
amend the complaint?

Held:
Yes. The allegations made in the complaint are
insufficient to assert the rights of the laborers
against the corporation. The deficiency, however,
does not amount to failure to state a cause of
action. It is curable by amendment or by bill of
particulars.

The order to amend is deemed proper and failure
to comply with the order will cause dismissal
although such dismissal will not operate as
adjudication on the merits as to bar plaintiffs to
furher enforce their rights. They can refile their
claims but the NLRC will now have jurisdiction.

Dissent by Justice Aquino: the complaint although
not expertly drafted contains sufficient cause of
action for separation and ot pay
Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 779
(2001)

In the 1
st
case the spouses De Guia filed a
complaint for specific performance acains spouses
Valenzuela before the CFI of Pasay. They prayed
that the Valenzuelas execute a deed of sale over
two parcels of land allegedly sold to them.

They filed a 2
nd
case for annulment of sale,
cancellation of title and damages when they
learned that the Valenzuelas sold it to spouses
Quiazon. They amended the complaint twice so as
to add defendants. The case was transferred to
Makati because of the reorganization law. The
Makati court admintted the second amended
complaint. The case was remanded back to Pasay
court at the motion of the parties where again, the
spouses De Guia filed a third amended complaint
to implead othere defendants. This was denied by
the Pasay court, The court later declared that the
decision of the Makati court is automatically
vacated. This case was then dismissed.

The De Guias no moved to admit amended
complaint in case 1 w/c was denied by the Pasay
court. They appealed to the CA where their motion
was granted.

Issue:
WON the admission of the amended complaint in
case 1 is proper.

Held:
Yes.

The court sanctions the amendment of the
complaint. Sec. 1, Rule 10 explicitly provides that
amendments as to the name of the parties may be
allowed so that the actual merits of the controversy
may speedily be determined, without regard to
technicalities, and in the most expeditions and
inexpensive manner. Also relevant is Sec. 3, Rule
10.

The said provisions are applicable in this case as
procedural rules are applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected.
Such amendment is allowed even if the same may
substantially alter the cause of action or defense.

This should only be true however, when despite a
substantial change or alteration in the cause of
action or defense, the amendments sought to be
made shall serve the higher interests of substantial
justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the
objectives of the rules to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings.
RULE 10

Thus, the amendment of the complaint in this
case is allowed even if the same substantially
alter or change the cause of action or defense,
in order to serve the higher interest of
substantial justice and to forestall further delay
in the resolution of the actual merits of the
case. The case has dragged on for a span of
twenty years, because of the many legal skirmishes
between the party due to technical niceties and
procedural rules. The actual merits of the
controversy have yet to reach their full adjudication,
which would only result to further delay if the
amendment is not allowed.
Zosio Godinez