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Macy La
Phil 168
Paper 2: Question 7 FINAL DRAFT
November 7
th
, 2011
Bus Ride Tranquility
In his book On Liberty, John Stuart Mill asserts that the only restriction of liberty should
be based on the harm principle. Mill distinguishes harm from mere offense, arguing that offense
is an inadequate justification for limiting liberty. While Mill believes that the harm principle is a
sufficient standard for the restriction of liberty, Joel Feinberg asserts in Offense to Others that the
harm principle should be supplemented with what he deems the offense principle (Feinberg 2).
When applying these suppositions to the restrictions of liberty imposed by the state in modern
times, Feinbergs offense principle appears to be the more reasonable limit to liberty.
Mill asserts that the main goal of restricting ones rights is for the sake of the preservation
of mankinds progression. As such, the freedom of thought and discussion should never be
restricted, since doing so would also hinder individuality (Mill 65). According to Mill,
individuality is the greatest form of human progression; individuality breeds happiness within the
individual, as well as contributing to the happiness of others. Reasonable beliefs and actions are
cultivated through critical analysis and assessment, which can only be obtained through free
debate. Mill strongly believes that the state and local government should acknowledge these
liberties and appropriately limit the freedom of action. Additionally, these restrictions of liberty,
specifically coercive intervention by the government, necessitate a special form of justification;
actions of the individual should only be limited such that harm to others is prevented. In other
words, the individual is sovereign over oneself, but must obey regulations concerning others in
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accordance with society. Mill does not believe that harm is a necessary condition for imposing
restrictions on liberty, but he does assert that it is sufficient (Mill 12). According to Mill,
restrictions can be placed in order to provide benefit to others, such as providing evidence in a
court case; failure to supply the benefits of evidence would do harm (Mill 14).
In order to support his claim that liberty should be restricted only to prevent harm to
others, Mill implements a categorical approach in which he distinguishes between various forms
of restrictions and their adequacy. He asserts that restrictions of liberty which are placed on the
individual by the state for her own benefit are illegitimate, since the individual has the freedom
of causing self-harm for personal happiness as long as no harm is done to others (Mill 100).
Moreover, these paternal limits are potentially dangerous for society, considering that the state
has the ability to abuse such restrictions for the politicians personal gain at the cost of the
liberties an individual should intrinsically have. However, since Mill is mainly concerned with
the progression of humankinds best interest, he is not against autonomy-advancing paternalism,
or restrictions of liberty implemented such that the freedom of an individual is maintained. For
example, selling oneself into slavery should be prohibited, since doing so would not be in the
best interest of promoting freedom of action (Mill 102). In other words, Mill justifies certain
types of paternalism by appealing to the conservation of humankinds progressive nature, or the
capacity for practical deliberation that allows an individual to be a morally responsible agent.
Mill also opposes state paternalism due to the notion that individuals have greater knowledge of
what defines a good citizen than the state or ruler does.
While the harm principle can be considered a moral ground for limiting liberty, Mill
argues that government interference dealing with restrictions of individual liberty should not be
based on appeals to any other moral considerations. Immoral acts such as murder, theft, and rape
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are prohibited due to the fact that they directly cause harm to another. According to Mill,
although an individual may be ostracized or looked down upon for committing harmless immoral
acts, they cannot be legitimately restricted by the state, since human notion of morality is fallible
and may differ with societies. Therefore, a behavior that is harmless is not a matter of legal
concern, regardless of its underlying moral or immoral attributes.
In addition to paternal and moral restrictions, Mill also distinguishes harm from mere
offense. Misconduct or public indecency is not sufficient for restrictions of liberty since it is self-
regarding, unless this directly resulted in the harm of others. For instance, drunkenness is
normally not a case involving legal interference. However, if an individual was prone to
harming others while being drunk, restriction of liberty is justified (Mill 97). According to Mill,
all offenses are fundamentally self-regarding acts, and as such should not be legally restricted.
However, some offenses may also be considered other-regarding conduct when they occur in
public. These other-regarding offenses only result in harmless nuisance. Although these acts of
misconduct or violation of good manner may cause intense dislike within others, mere dislike is
neither a sufficient nor necessary ground for legal interference (Mill 98).
Although Mill believes that the harm principle is the only sufficient ground for restricting
liberty, Feinberg asserts that the state can justifiably restrict liberties relating to offensive
conduct, since there is no other way to do so as equally and as effectively without the cost of
other values (Feinberg 1). In other words, since there is good reason to restrict liberty in order to
prevent harm to others, there is also good reason for doing so in order to limit offensive conduct.
The offense principle that Feinberg proposes is concerned with offense in the normative sense, or
offense referring to mental states caused by wrongful or right-violating conduct of others.
According to Feinberg, the harm principle is a valid justification for limitations of liberty since it
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is concerned with only other-regarding behavior and their detrimental effect on society.
However, offensive behavior is other-regarding as well in that these acts may cause intense
unpleasantness or great inconvenience for others. Feinberg acknowledges the contrast between
the severity of harm and offense, but believes offensive conduct can still invoke legal
punishment on a gentler scale. Also, criminal sanction must be effective and necessary in order
to stop the offensive behavior. Feinberg claims that harm or offense can be seen as the only
legitimate grounds for state coercion, since they are the most effective and least costly values of
liberty. Despite the fact that there are other grounds for legal coercion, Feinberg believes that
harm and offense are the most compelling reasons for preventing other-regarding conduct and
have minimal impact on other individual liberties.
Unfortunately, limiting offensive behavior could potentially undermine the limits of the
harm principle. Since each individual is offended by a diverse set of conducts, expanding
regulations of liberty to include offenses appears to allow government interference in almost any
behavior. However, Feinberg proposes several criteria in order to reasonably limit offensive
behavior such that the state cannot do so (Feinberg 7). According to Feinberg, offensive behavior
should be restricted if it causes universally disliked mental states, such as disgust, shame,
revulsion, unpleasant sensory experiences, and so on. Feinberg asserts that there are some
harmless offenses that are so unpleasant that legal protection should be demanded at the cost of
the other persons liberty. Furthermore, the behavior must be a serious offense, which is
evaluated on extent, duration, and characteristic of the offense. Finally, the interests of those
who wish to avoid the offense must be weighed with the interests of those who engage in it. In
other words, the inconvenience each member experiences who is involved with the offense must
be taken into account, compared to alternatives, such as taking a different bus.
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Feinberg argues that there are extreme cases of nuisance which can be detrimental to an
individual, such as unreasonable inconvenience. Feinberg believes that such private nuisances
which deprive an individual of the ability to enjoy one's own inner state are an invasion of
privacy, or autonomy (Feinberg 23). In order to illustrate his point that there are some offensive
behaviors that may be legitimately be restricted by the state, Feinberg proposes a series of
hypothetical situations on a bus ride. In each scenario, the reader is asked to imagine oneself on a
crowded bus on the way to work or important meeting (Feinberg 10). If forced to leave the bus,
the individual will be greatly inconvenienced. In each story, another person or group enters the
bus and proceeds to cause great offense to the individual. These offenses are divided into six
distinguishable classes such as affront to the senses, shame, or shock to moral sensibilities. For
example, one scenario involves a couple who sits directly in front of an individual and begins to
perform sexual acts with each other (Feinberg 12). Such sexual acts in public cause a
disquietude within captive observers that is complicated due to innate psychological behaviors.
The presence of such behaviors in an individuals field of perception commands attention, since
it evokes an unresolved conflict of instinctual desires and cultural taboo (Feinberg 17). The
bystander must attend to or cope with the distraction in some manner, often times with
unpleasant strain. Although the individual suffers shame or other nuisances, these experiences
do not cause or constitute harm. Nuisances such as those proposed in the bus rides make it
difficult for an individual to enjoy ones work or leisure, where one cannot reasonably be
expected to leave in the specific circumstances. In the extreme case, offensive conduct forces
the captive observer to stray from ones inner state and drop ones task at hand in order to cope,
which is greatly inconvenient. This unnecessary inconvenience that the offended must
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experience is an unfair intrusion upon ones personal sovereignty. In other words, individuals
who live within a society must allocate at least a part of their environment with others who may
have little to nothing in common with them. What publicly occurs within these spaces is of
common interest to everyone who uses the area. Avoiding such places requires some sacrifice
of an individuals daily and reasonable activities, which is contrary to Feinbergs goal of
promoting private autonomy.
Mills assumption that the only legitimate reason to restrict liberty is the harm principle
appears flawed, since what constitutes harm presently may not be deemed so in another time.
However, Feinberg provides a logical revision which asserts that it is greatly beneficial to
prevent harm to others in accordance to the respective societies as a means of promoting the
well-being of all individuals. This manner of expression can also be applied to offense, since it
is also in the best interest of society to prevent offensive behavior that severely inconveniences
others. Furthermore, when errors are exceptionally probable or costly to the individuals whose
liberties are being restricted, the state should be limited to making such restrictions to merely
offensive behavior for a small set of apparent cases (Feinberg 5). While these private nuisances
do not involve harm, they may still be regulated for the protection of each individuals right to
self-sovereignty. Mills assertion that offense should not be restricted in any way appears to be
unreasonable, since there are clear cases in which offenses can be detrimental to an individual,
such as the bus ride scenarios. Everyone should have a say in what the common environment
should be, but that does not necessarily mean that individuals with completely different
perspectives and inclinations must share an entirely common environment. While offensive
conduct within public spaces should be restricted according to Feinbergs principles, non-
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harmful behavior committed away from the senses of others is done in private spaces, and should
therefore not be limited.
















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Citations
Mill, J.S.- On Liberty, Copyright 2006 The Pennsylvania State University
Feinberg, J. - Excerpts from Offense to Others; 1985 Oxford University Press, Inc.

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