March 18, 2014

POSTSCRIPT

Is Putin Rational?
Probably. Here's How to Work With Him
Alexander J. Motyl
ALEXANDER J. MOTYL is Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University
Newark.
Ukrainians are waiting to see whether Russian President Vladimir Putin, having
wrested Crimea from Ukraine, will continue his advance. The outward signs point to
yes. Tens of thousands of Russian troops and hundreds of tanks and other armored
vehicles are amassed along Ukraines borders. The Kremlin insists that they are
conducting military exercises, but that seems unlikely. Ukrainian armed services have
caught Russian agents, tasked with gathering military intelligence and fomenting
unrest, in several of Ukraines southeastern provinces. And border guards have
stopped thousands of armed Russian tourists from entering Ukraine. Pro-Putin
militants have seized government buildings and violently attacked peaceful
demonstrators outside of Crimea, in Donetsk and Kharkiv. Meanwhile, Russias statecontrolled channels whip up anti-Ukrainian hysteria as Putin and the Kremlin insist
that the government in Kiev illegitimate.
No one can fully know Putins intentions. Ones best guess depends on ones
assumptions of his rationality. If he is irrational -- unable to correctly judge the costs
and benefits of invading Ukraine because he is in thrall to some ideology or the
pursuit of power -- then it is safe to assume that he will continue on his current course.
Lilia Shevtsova [1], a liberal Russian analyst, and Andrei Illarionov [2], Putins
former economic advisor, make that case. He believes that he is chosen by divine
providence to punish liberated Ukrainians, Illarianov writes, He believes that now
there is a unique historical situation: Ukraine is in [a] state of severe crises, its
authorities and institutions do not function effectively. He dreams that providence
demands him to fulfill this mission. If Illarionov and Shevtsova are right, nothing
can stop Putin from launching a massive land war against Ukraine, regardless of how
much it would cost in human life, property, and prestige. Such a Putin could
conceivably keep marching up to the Atlantic, as Aleksandr Dugin [3], a Russian
political scientist and Putins ideological mentor, believes Russia must. If we win,
he recently wrote, we will begin the expansion of liberational (from Americans)
ideology into Europe. It is the goal of full Eurasianism -- Europe from Lisbon to
Vladivostok. Great Eurasian Continental Empire.
If, alternatively, Putin is rational -- and thus capable of weighing costs and benefits
and associating effects with causes -- then there is reason to hope that he will stop

somewhat short of destroying Ukraine and the world order. To make such an
assumption is not to suggest that Putin is a benign leader. Quite the contrary, he
probably possesses all the qualities he was trained to have as a KGB agent:
ruthlessness and arrogance. But that doesnt mean he cant understand risk or wont
respond to punishment. In this telling, the occupation of Crimea was a grand and
glorious little war that raised Putins popularity with hyper-nationalists in Russia, cost
no lives, and transpired quickly and relatively inexpensively. It might have turned
Russia into a rogue state, but Putin could reasonably argue that Russian glory was
worth that price, the full effects of which would not be felt immediately but sometime
in the future.
Seen in this light, a full-scale assault on all of Ukraine -- or even on Kiev -- would be
extremely risky and costly. And it would offer few or no tangible benefits to Putin or
to Russia. The Ukrainian army, newly formed National Guard, and militias would put
up a fight, and it is by no means certain that Russia could easily advance in Blitzkrieg
fashion. A subsequent occupation would entail the deployment of several hundred
thousand troops, who would be the targets of a popularly supported resistance
movement. And the West would be livid. It could provide significant military
assistance to Ukrainian partisans, and it would certainly impose sanctions on the
Russian economy as it searches for immediate alternatives for Russian energy.
Russian casualties would likely reach the thousands, and the hyper-nationalist hysteria
in Russia would diminish as the body bags start arriving home. Dugin might not be
fazed by these prospects, but a rational Putin should be.
Less risky and possibly less costly would be the annexation of one or more of
Ukraines southeastern provinces. They border Russia, theyre smaller than all of
Ukraine, and theyve been the targets of agitation and subversion by Russian special
forces, tourists, and thugs for months. But even that occupation wouldnt be as easy
as invading Crimea. Ukrainian armed forces with tanks and heavy weaponry are
already positioned along the eastern border. There would be fighting and Russian
casualties could be high. The occupation would be less costly, but resistance would
still be likely and pacifying the population would require a long-term commitment.
All in all, these provinces would be an enormous drain [4] on Russias economic
resources.
In all likelihood, Putin is motivated by some combination of Duginite ideology,
geopolitical interest, and self-interest. All leaders in all countries are. The ideology
provides a set of ultimate goals (freedom, democracy, socialism, Lebensraum) and
informs policy choices. But it rarely serves as the sole motivating force. Lenin, for
instance, believed in world communism but agreed to a peace with imperial Germany
in order to save the revolution. Stalin went even further, abandoning world revolution
for socialism in one country in 1925 and becoming an ally of Nazi Germany in
1939. Putin might want to teach Ukraine and the West a lesson even as he remains
responsive to Western and Ukrainian behavior.
For its part, Kiev has beefed up its armed forces and border defenses and started to
crack down on Russian special forces in Ukraine. The United States and European
Union have imposed ever more painful political and economic penalties on Russia
and its leaders. None of these measures may convince Putin to abandon his long-term
dreams in Eurasia, but they should encourage him to search for face-saving

alternatives to costly wars that bring little benefit to him or to Russia. The United
States could tip the scales in rationalitys favor by agreeing to supply the Ukrainian
armed forces with military assistance. Armaments need not be on the table just now.
Trucks, jeeps, uniforms, food, fuel, and medical supplies would suffice to send a
strong signal of the United States seriousness about Ukraines security.
At the same time, the West should be ready to talk with Russia at any time, any place.
On March 17, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement about
forming a Group for Assisting Ukraine [5] that would consist of Russia, the United
States, and Europe. Its job would be to help Ukraine overcome what the ministry calls
the deep crisis of the Ukrainian state in accordance with certain principles and
policy goals, most of which are not intrinsically offensive. (One point, that the right
of Crimea to determine its fate in accordance with the results of the free expression of
the will of its population in the March 16, 2014 referendum will be acknowledged and
respected, is a nonstarter.) Leaving aside the irony of Putin lecturing anybody on
constitutional norms and human rights, the statement does not sound like the sort of
thing an ideologically driven irrational leader would issue. Why pussyfoot with the
West when it is so much easier to send tanks toward Kiev?
Ukraine, the United States, and Europe should take up the ministrys offer and
propose a series of high-level meetings at which the issues raised by the Russians -- as
well as issues to be raised by Ukraine and the West -- would be discussed. Ukraine
and the West could reasonably insist that such discussions could not be held in good
faith as long as Russian troops were within striking distance of Ukraine and Russian
special forces were fomenting trouble in the southeast. Ukraine could also withdraw
its troops from the eastern border, and United Nations peacekeepers could be invited
to patrol the territories. The negotiations might turn out to be a bust, but they would at
least force everybody -- and especially the Kremlin -- to take a deep breath and survey
the situation with some measure of calm. As the diplomats talk, theres a chance that
Putin will come to his geopolitical senses, the war hysteria in Russia will cool down,
the sabers will stop rattling so loudly, and Ukraine will get some breathing space.
Peace might then appear to be the win-win solution.
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Published on Foreign Affairs (http://www.foreignaffairs.com)
Links:
[1] http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/03/10/falling-into-putins-trap/
[2] http://inforesist.org/putins-former-adviser-regime-of-yanukovich-its-a-kidsplayground-comparing-to-putins-regime/?lang=en
[3] http://openrevolt.info/2014/03/07/alexander-dugin-crimea/
[4] http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141020/alexander-j-motyl/is-losing-

crimea-a-loss
[5] http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/49766426492B6E9644257C9E0036B79A