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Afghanistan's partitinn might bc unprcvcntablc
America's unwinnable war in Afghanistan, after exacting a staggering cost in blood
and treasure, is finally drawing to an official close. How this development shapes Afghanistan's
future will have a significant bearing on the security of countries located far beyond. After all,
Afghanistan is not Vietnam: The end of U.S.-led combat operations may not end the war, because
the enemy will seek to target Western interests wherever located.
Can the fate of Afghanistan be different from two other Muslim countries where the United States
militarily intervened - Iraq and Libya' Iraq has been partitioned in all but name into Shiite,
Sunni and Kurdish sections, while Libya seems headed toward a similar three-way but tribal-
based partition, underscoring that a foreign military intervention can effect regime change but
not establish order.
Will there be an Iraq-style "soft partition" of Afghanistan, with protracted strife eventually
creating a "hard partition"'
Afghanistan's large ethnic minorities already enjoy de facto autonomy, which they secured after
their Northern Alliance played a central role in the U.S.-led ouster of the Afghan Taliban from
power in late 2001. Having enjoyed autonomy for years now, the minorities will resist with all
their might from coming under the sway of the ethnic Pashtuns, who ruled the country for long.
For their part, the Pashtuns, despite their tribal divisions, will not rest content with being in
charge of just a rump Afghanistan made up of the eastern and southeastern provinces. Given the
large Pashtun population resident across the British-drawn Durand Line that separates
Afghanistan from Pakistan, they are likely sooner or later to revive their long-dormant campaign
for a Greater Pashtunistan - a development that could affect the territorial integrity of another
artificial modern construct, Pakistan.
The fact that the ethnic minorities are actually ethnic majorities in distinct geographical zones in
the north and the west makes Afghanistan's partitioning organically doable and more likely to
last, unlike the colonial-era geographical line-drawing that created states with no national
3/3/13 Afghanistan`s partition might be unpreventable | The Japan Times
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identity or historical roots. The ethnic minorities account for more than half of Afghanistan -
both in land area and population size. The Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities alone make up
close to 0 percent of Afghanistan's population.
After waging the longest war in its history at a cost of tens of thousands of lives and nearly a
trillion dollars, the U.S. is combat-weary and even financially strapped. The American effort for
an honorable exit by cutting a deal with the Pakistan-backed Afghan Taliban, paradoxically, is
deepening Afghanistan's ethnic fissures and increasing the partitioning risk. With President
Barack Obama choosing his second-term national security team and his 2014 deadline to end all
combat operations approaching, the U.S. effort to strike a deal with the Taliban is back on the
front burner.
This effort, being pursued in coordination with Afghan President Hamid Karzai amid an ongoing
gradual withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops, is stirring deep unease among the Afghan
minorities, who fought the Taliban and its five-year rule fiercely and suffered greatly. The
Taliban's rule, for example, was marked by several large-scale massacres of Hazara civilians.
The rupturing of Karzai's political alliance with ethnic-minority leaders has also aided ethnic
polarization. Some non-Pashtun power brokers remain with Karzai, but most others now lead
the opposition National Front.
The minority communities are unlikely to accept any power-sharing arrangement that includes
the Taliban. In fact, they suspect Karzai's intention is to restore Pashtun dominance across
Afghanistan.
The minorities' misgivings have been strengthened by the "Peace Process Road Map to 201 put
forward recently by the Karzai-constituted Afghan High Peace Council, empowered to negotiate
with the Taliban. The document sketches several striking concessions to the Taliban and to
Islamabad, ranging from the Taliban's recognition as a political party to a role for Pakistan in
Afghanistan's affairs. The road map dangles the carrot of Cabinet posts and provincial
governorships to prominent Taliban figures.
The ethnic tensions and recriminations, which threaten to undermine cohesion in the fledgling,
multiethnic Afghan Army, are breaking along the same lines as when the Soviet forces withdrew
from Afghanistan in 1080, an exit that led to civil war and Taliban's subsequent capture of Kabul.
This time the minority communities are better armed and prepared to defend their interests after
the U.S. exit.
In seeking to co-opt the Taliban, the U.S., besides bestowing legitimacy on that thuggish militia,
risks unwittingly reigniting Afghanistan's ethnic strife. A new civil war, however, would likely tear
Afghanistan apart, Balkanizing the country into more distinct warlord-controlled zones than the
situation prevailing today.
3/3/13 Afghanistan`s partition might be unpreventable | The Japan Times
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This raises a fundamental question: Is the territorial unity of Afghanistan essential for regional or
international security' In other words, should the policies of outside powers seek to keep
Afghanistan united'
First, the sanctity of existing borders has become a powerful norm in world politics. Border fixity
is seen as essential for peace and stability. Yet this norm, paradoxically, has allowed the
emergence of weak states, whose internal wars spill across international boundaries and create
serious regional tensions and insecurity. In other words, a norm intended to build peace and
stability may be creating conditions for conflict and regional instability. The survival of
ungovernable and unmanageable states can be a serious threat to regional and international
security.
Second, outside forces, in any event, are hardly in a position to prevent Afghanistan's partitioning
along Iraqi or Yugoslavian lines.
A weak, partitioned Afghanistan may not be the best outcome. Yet it will be far better than an
Afghanistan that dissolves into chaos and bloodletting. And infinitely better than one in which
the medieval Taliban returns to power and begins a fresh pogrom. Indeed, it may be the only way
to thwart transnational terrorists from rebuilding a base of operations there and to prevent the
country from sliding into a large-scale civil war.
In this scenario, Pakistani generals, instead of continuing to sponsor Afghan Pashtun militant
groups like the Taliban and the Haqqani network, will be compelled to fend off a potential threat
to Pakistan's unity.
With American options in Afghanistan narrowing considerably and a deal with the Taliban
appearing both uncertain and perilous, some sort of partition may also allow the U.S. to exit with
honor intact.
Brohmo Chelloney ls ihe ouihor of "Aslon }uggernoui (HorperColllns, 2010) onJ "Woier,
Peoce, onJ Wor (Poumon & LliileflelJ, forihcomlng).