NICMAR

Thoughts and Theories of

Scientific Management
Submitted By:
Sudhir Kabra (22!""#
Kirti Kausha$ (22!%#
Mu&u$ Mishra (22!'"#
Abhishe& Na(ander (22#
Nationa$ Institute of Construction
Management and Research
Thoughts and Theories of
Scientific Management
Scientific Management is a term coined in 1910 to describe the system of industrial
management created and promoted by )rederic& *+ Tay$or (1856 1915) and his followers.
hough aylor had used the term informally to describe his contributions to factory or !shop!
management" #orris $. %oo&e" a friend and professional associate" and $ouis 'randeis" a
prominent attorney" deliberately chose the ad(ecti)e !scientific! to promote their contention
that aylor*s methods were an alternati)e to railroad price increases in a rate case they were
preparing for the +nterstate %ommerce %ommission. he term also came to mean any system
of organi,ation that clearly spelled out the functions of indi)iduals and groups. -ith e)en
less fidelity to the original meaning" it has been used to describe any situation where (obs are
subdi)ided and indi)iduals perform repetiti)e tas&s.
,rigins
.arly attempts to study beha)iour in organi,ations came from a desire by industrial
efficiency e/perts to answer this 0uestion1 -hat can be done to get wor&ers to do more wor&
in less time2 +t is not surprising that attempts to answer this 0uestion were made at the
beginning of the twentieth century" since this was a period of rapid industriali,ation and
technological change in the 3nited 4tates. 5s engineers attempted to ma&e machines more
efficient" it was natural to focus efforts on the human side6ma&ing people more producti)e"
too.
he nineteenth7century factory system was characteri,ed by ad hoc organi,ation"
decentrali,ed management" informal relations between employers and employees" and
casually defined (obs and (ob assignments. 'y the end of the nineteenth century" howe)er"
increased competition" no)el technologies" pressures from go)ernment and labour" and a
growing consciousness of the potential of the factory had inspired a wide7ranging effort to
impro)e organi,ation and management. he focus of this acti)ity was the introduction of
carefully defined procedures and tas&s. 8istorians ha)e labelled these inno)ations
!systematic management.!
he central figure in this mo)ement was the 5merican engineer" in)entor" and
management theorist )rederic& *+ Tay$or. 'orn in 1856 to an aristocratic 9hiladelphia
family" aylor started his career in the machine shop of the #id)ale 4teel %ompany in 18:8"
rose rapidly" and began to introduce no)el methods. +n the ne/t decade he de)ised numerous
organi,ational and technical inno)ations" including a method of timing wor&ers with a
stopwatch to calculate optimum times. 5fter a brief career as the manager of a paper
company" aylor became a self7employed consultant" de)oted to impro)ing plant
management.
;uring these years aylor" an 188< engineering graduate of the 4te)ens +nstitute of
echnology" also became a ma(or figure in the engineering profession" whose adherents
sought an identity based on rigorous formal education" mutually accepted standards of
beha)iour" and social responsibility. +n factories" mines" and railroad yards" engineers re(ected
the e/periential &nowledge of the practitioner for scientific e/perimentation and analysis.
hey became the principal proponents of systematic management.
+n the 1890s" aylor became the most ambitious and )igorous proponent of systematic
management. 5s a consultant he introduced accounting systems that permitted managers to
use operating records with greater effecti)eness" production systems that allowed managers to
&now more precisely what was happening on the shop floor" time studies to determine what
wor&ers were able to do" piece7rate systems to encourage employees to follow instructions"
and many related measures. 'etween 1898 and 1901" as a consultant to the 'ethlehem +ron
%ompany (later 'ethlehem 4teel)" aylor introduced all of his systems and engaged in a
)igorous plan of engineering re7search. his e/perience was the capstone of his creati)e
career. wo de)elopments were of special importance. 8is disco)ery of !high7speed steel"!
which impro)ed the performance of metal cutting tools" assured his fame as an in)entor" and
his efforts to introduce systematic methods led to an integrated )iew of managerial
inno)ation. 'y 1901" aylor had fashioned scientific management from systematic
management.
5s the e)ents of aylor*s career indicate" systematic management and scientific
management were intimately related. hey had common roots" attracted the same &inds of
people" and had the same ob(ecti)es. heir differences also stand out. 4ystematic
management was diffuse and utilitarian" a number of isolated measures that did not add up to
a larger whole. 4cientific 'ethlehem" aylor resol)ed to de)ote his time and ample fortune
to promoting both. 8is first e/tensi)e report on his wor&" !4hop #anagement"! published in
190< in the (ournal of the 5merican 4ociety of #echanical .ngineers" portrayed an integrated
comple/ of systematic ma Scientific management" also called Tay$orism or the C$assica$
-ers.ecti(e" is a method in management theory that determines changes to impro)e labour
producti)ity. he idea was first coined by =rederic& -inslow aylor in The Principles of
Scientific Management. aylor belie)ed that decisions based upon tradition and rules of
thumb should be replaced by precise procedures de)eloped after careful study of an
indi)idual at wor&.
+n management literature today" the greatest use of the concept of aylorism is as a
contrast to a new" impro)ed way of doing business. +n political and sociological terms"
aylorism can be seen as the di)ision of labour pushed to its logical e/treme" with a
conse0uent de7s&illing of the wor&er and dehumanisation of the wor&place.
Overview
General approach
Select workers with appropriate abilities for each job.
Training for standard task.
Planning work and eliminating interruptions.
Wage incentive for increase output
Standard method for performing each job.
Contributions
Scientific approach to business management and process improvement
Importance of compensation for performance
Began the careful study of tasks and jobs
Importance of selection and training
Elements
abour is defined and authority!responsibility is legitimised!official
Positions placed in hierarchy and under authority of higher level
Selection is based upon technical competence" training or e#perience
$ctions and decisions are recorded to allow continuity and memory
%anagement is different from ownership of the organi&ation
%anagers follow rules!procedures to enable reliable!predictable behaviour
Mass production methods
Tay$orism is often mentioned along with =ordism" because it was closely associated
with mass production methods in manufacturing factories. aylor*s own name for his
approach was scientific management. his sort of tas&7oriented optimisation of wor& tas&s
is nearly ubi0uitous today in industry" and has made most industrial wor& menial" repetiti)e"
tedious and depressing> this can be noted" for instance" in assembly lines and fast7food
restaurants. =ord*s arguments began from his obser)ation that" in general" wor&ers forced to
perform repetiti)e tas&s wor& at the slowest rate that goes unpunished. his slow rate of wor&
(which he called !soldiering!" but might nowadays be termed by those in charge as !loafing!
or !malingering! or by those on the assembly line as !getting through the day!)" he opined"
was based on the obser)ation that" when paid the same amount" wor&ers will tend to do the
amount of wor& the slowest among them does1 this reflects the idea that wor&ers ha)e a
)ested interest in their own well7being" and do not benefit from wor&ing abo)e the defined
rate of wor& when it will not increase their compensation. 8e therefore proposed that the
wor& practice that had been de)eloped in most wor& en)ironments was crafted" intentionally
or unintentionally" to be )ery inefficient in its e/ecution. =rom this he posited that there was
one best method for performing a particular tas&" and that if it were taught to wor&ers" their
producti)ity would go up.
aylor introduced many concepts that were not widely accepted at the time. =or
e/ample" by obser)ing wor&ers" he decided that labour should include rest brea&s so that the
wor&er has time to reco)er from fatigue. 8e pro)ed this with the tas& of unloading ore1
wor&ers were taught to ta&e rest during wor& and output went up.
oday*s armies employ scientific management. ?f the &ey points listed> a standard
method for performing each (ob" select wor&ers with appropriate abilities for each (ob"
training for standard tas&" planning wor& and eliminating interruptions and wage incenti)e for
increase output. 5ll but wage incenti)es for increased output are used by modern military
organi,ations. -age incenti)es rather appear in the form of s&ill bonuses for enlistments.
Division of labour
3nless people manage themsel)es" somebody has to ta&e care of administration" and
thus there is a di)ision of wor& between wor&ers and administrators. ?ne of the tas&s of
administration is to select the right person for the right (ob1
@ow one of the )ery first re0uirements for a man who is fit to handle pig iron as a
regular occupation is that he shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he more nearly
resembles in his mental ma&e7up the o/ than any other type. he man who is mentally alert
and intelligent is for this )ery reason entirely unsuited to what would" for him" be the grinding
monotony of wor& of this character. herefore the wor&man who is best suited to handling
pig iron is unable to understand the real science of doing this class of wor&. (aylor 1911" 59)
his )iew match the wor&er to the (ob has resurfaced time and time again in
management theories.
Inf$uence of Tay$orism
aylorAs approaches and his thoughts influenced se)eral people and organisations during
his time. =or se)eral years" a powerful scientific management mo)ement pre)ailed in 345 and
some countries of the west. he remuneration and the producti)ity of the wor&ers also impro)ed
significantly. 4ome of the notable management authors and thin&ers li&e =ran& Bilbreth" 8enry
Bantt" .merson and 'arth de)eloped and refined aylorAs ideas and approaches. 5 new scientific
culture of wor& management" time and motion studies" simplification and standardi,ation"
production planning and control etc. too& place in 345.
/enry 0+ 1antt
Bantt7 li&e aylor" a #echanical .ngineer7 (oined aylor at the #id)ale 4teel %ompany
in 188:. 8e stayed with aylor in his )arious assignments until 1901" when he formed his own
consulting engineering firm. $i&e aylor" he emphasi,ed the need for de)eloping a mutuality of
interest between management and labour" a Charmonious cooperation.D +n doing this" he stressed
the importance of teaching" of de)eloping an understanding of systems on the part of both labour
and management" and of appreciating that Cin all problems of management the human element is
the most important one.D
Bantt is perhaps best &nown for his de)elopment of graphics methods of describing plans
and ma&ing possible better managerial control. 8e emphasi,ed the importance of time" as well as
cost" in planning and controlling wor&. his led e)entually to the famous Bantt chart which is in
wide use today and was the forerunner of such modern techni0ues as the 9rogram .)aluation and
Ee)iew echni0ue (9.E). he Bantt chart is regarded by some social historians as the most
important social in)ention of the twentieth century.
)ran& and 0i$$ian 1i$breth
he ideas of aylor were also strongly supported and de)eloped by the famous husband
and wife team of =ran& and $illian Bilbreth. =ran& Bilbreth at the age of F: in 1895 was a chief
superintendent of a building contracting firm and became a building contractor on his own shortly
thereafter. ;uring this period" he became interested in wasted motions in wor&> by reducing the
number of bric&laying motions from 18 to 5" he made possible the doubling of a bric&layerAs
producti)ity with no greater e/penditure of effort. 8is contracting firm wor& soon ga)e way
largely to consulting on impro)ement of human producti)ity. 5fter meeting aylor in 190:" he
combined his ideas with aylorAs to put scientific management into effect.
$illian Bilbreth was one of the earliest industrial psychologists and recei)ed her doctorAs
degree in this field in 1915. 5fter her husbandAs untimely death in 19FG" she carried on his
consulting business and was widely acclaimed as the Cfirst lady of managementD throughout her
long life" which ended in 19:F when she was 9<. =ran& Bilbreth long emphasi,ed that in applying
scientific management principles" we must loo& at wor&ers first and understand their personalities
and needs. Bilbreth came to the conclusion that it is not the monotony of wor& that causes so
much wor&er dissatisfaction but" rather" managementAs lac& of interest in wor&ers.
The 2iffusion of Scientific Management
5fter 1901" aylor de)oted his time to publici,ing his wor& and attracting clients"
whom he would refer to as trusted lieutenants" such as 8enry $. Bantt" %arl B. 'arth" #orris
$. %oo&e" and =ran& '. Bilbreth. aylor and his followers emphasi,ed the importance of
introducing the entire system. #ost manufacturers" howe)er" only wanted solutions to
specific problems. hey were particularly drawn to time study and the incenti)e wage"
seemingly the most no)el features of aylor*s system" which they had hoped would raise
output and wean employees from organi,ed labour. aylor and his followers had little
sympathy for unions and were slow to reali,e the implications of this course.
'y 1910" the metal trade unions and the 5merican =ederation of $abour (5=$) had
become outspo&en enemies of scientific management and aylor and his followers were
embroiled in a contro)ersy that would continue for another fi)e years. hese de)elopments
had a substantial influence on aylor*s efforts to publici,e his wor&.
o respond to opportunities li&e the 1911 rate case hearings" as well as the union
attac&s" aylor (with %oo&e*s assistance) prepared a new account of his system that he called
The Principles of Scientific Management (1911). 8e embraced the term !scientific
management"! made time study its centrepiece" and used it as a metaphor for the system as a
whole.
aylor argued that he had disco)ered uni)ersal !principles! of management1
he substitution of scientific for !rule7of7thumb! methods
he !scientific selection and training of the wor&men"!
5n e0ual di)ision of wor& between managers and wor&ers. o implement the
principles successfully" managers and wor&ers had to undergo a !complete re)olution
in mental attitude.!
The Principles of Scientific Management was an immediate success. +ts simplicity"
colourful anecdotes" and insistence that the details of factory management were applicable to
other acti)ities captured the imaginations of readers. ranslated into many languages" it
became the best7selling business boo& of the first half of the twentieth century.
wo additional de)elopments greatly e/tended aylor*s influence in the following years.
=irst" other writers restated his principles in more inclusi)e terms and e/plored their
implications. he most notable e/ample was 8enri =ayol" a prominent =rench mine manager
who discussed the functions of top e/ecuti)es in se)eral technical papers and in General and
Industrial Administration (1916). hough =ayol operated independently of aylor" he
demonstrated that aylor*s ideas applied to the entire organi,ation" not (ust the factory.
4econd" a growing corps of consultants installed scientific management in industry. Bantt"
'arth" %oo&e" Bilbreth" and others closely associated with aylor initially dominated this
acti)ity" but outsiders such as 8arrington .merson and %harles 'edau/" who too& a more
fle/ible and opportunistic approach to the application of aylor*s methods" became
increasingly popular.
Scientific Management in Industry
'etween 1901 and 1915" the year aylor died" his close associates introduced
scientific management in at least 181 5merican factories. 4ome of the plants were large and
modern" li&e those of the 9ullman Eailcar and Eemington ypewriter companies> others were
small and technologically primiti)e. #ost of the 181 companies fell into one of two broad
categories1 first were those whose acti)ities re0uired the mo)ement of large 0uantities of
materials between numerous wor& stations (such as te/tile mills" railroad repair shops" and
automobile plants)> the second group consisted of inno)ati)e firms" mostly small" that were
already committed to managerial inno)ation. ./ecuti)es at these latter firms were attracted to
aylor*s promise of social harmony and impro)ed wor&ing conditions.
he history of scientific management in these 181 plants pro)ides little support for the
contention" common to many later accounts" that aylor*s central concern was the indi)idual
employee. %onsultants de)oted most of their time and energies to machine operations" tools
and materials" production schedules" routing plans" and record systems. +n one7third of the
factories" these acti)ities generated such contro)ersy that time and motion studies were ne)er
underta&en.
+n others" such as the =ran&lin automobile company and se)eral te/tile mills" the
installation consisted almost e/clusi)ely of impro)ements in production planning and
scheduling. 5s a result" one7half or more of all employees were passi)e participants. hey
may ha)e e/perienced fewer delays" used different tools" or wor&ed for less powerful
super)isors" but their own acti)ities were unaffected. aylor promised that those wor&ers
directly affected would recei)e higher wages and ha)e less reason for conflict with their
super)isors. #ost assessments of these claims ha)e concluded that aylor promised more
than he could deli)er.
he e/periences of the 181 firms suggest that union leaders and other critics also
e/aggerated the dangers of scientific management. ?ne e/ample was the argument that
s&illed wor&ers would lose their autonomy and opportunities for creati)ity. +n the relati)ely
few cases where s&illed wor&ers were timed and placed on an incenti)e wage" they de)oted
more time to their specialties" while less7s&illed employees too& o)er other acti)ities. %ritics
were on firmer ground when they argued that scientific management would lead to speedups"
rate cuts" and the elimination of employees whose s&ills or moti)ation were below a)erage. +n
theory" only the most inferior wor&ers had to worry. 'ut many employers were less
scrupulous or less patient. hey ga)e lip ser)ice to aylor*s idea of an interrelated whole" but
loo&ed to the employees for immediate results. he association of time study with rate cuts
spar&ed a famous stri&e at -atertown 5rsenal in 1911" and was the apparent cause of stri&es
at the Hoseph and =eiss %ompany and at three 5merican $ocomoti)e %ompany plants.
?utside the aylor circle the problem was e)en more widespread.
+n summary" the a)ailable data from these early e/amples suggest that
(1) =irst7line super)isors lost much of their authority to higher7le)el managers and their
staffs>
(F) he proportion of the wor& day de)oted to production increased as delays were
eliminated>
(<) =ewer decisions depended on personal (udgments" biases" and sub(ecti)e e)aluations>
(G) +ndi)idual (obs were more carefully de7fined and some wor&ers e/ercised less discretion>
(5) +n most cases earnings rose" but there were enough e/ceptions to blur the effect>
(6) he le)el of s&ill re0uired in production did not change" though the most highly s&illed
employees" li&e foremen" lost some of their de facto managerial functions>
(:) 4ome uns&illed (obs disappeared as impro)ed scheduling and accounting reduced the
need for labourers.
hough the initial impact of scientific management would ha)e seemed surprisingly
modest to a contemporary reader of The Principles, in retrospect it is clear that aylor and his
associates pro)ided a forecast and a blueprint for changes that would occur in most large
industrial organi,ations o)er the ne/t 0uarter century.
5fter 1915" scientific management6usually features of scientific management rather
than the aylor system6spread rapidly in the 3nited 4tates. here were undoubtedly wide
)ariations in practice and" in the wor& of %harles 'edau/ and others li&e him" efforts to
e/ploit time study and the incenti)e wage to achie)e immediate cost reductions at the
wor&ers* e/pense. 'ut the sur)i)ing e)idence suggests substantial continuity between the
early e/periences" re)iewed abo)e" and those of the 1910s and 19F0s. ?ne ironic measure of
this continuity was the alliance between organi,ed labour and scientific management that
emerged after aylor*s death. 'y the mid71910s" union leaders" with considerable prodding
from aylor*s more liberal followers li&e #orris %oo&e6reali,ed that they had more to gain
than lose from scientific management. ./perience had shown that super)isors" not wor&ers"
were the real targets of scientific management and that the structured relationships
characteristic of scientifically managed plants was compatible with collecti)e bargaining.
Criticism
5pplications of scientific management sometimes fail to account for two inherent difficulties1
It ignores individual differences: the most efficient way of woring for one person may !e
inefficient for another"
It ignores the fact that the economic interests of worers and management are rarely
identical, so that !oth the measurement processes and the retraining re#uired !y Taylor$s
methods would fre#uently !e resented and sometimes sa!otaged !y the worforce.
'oth difficulties were recognised by aylor" but are generally not fully addressed by
managers who only see the potential impro)ements to efficiency. aylor belie)ed that
scientific management cannot wor& unless the wor&er benefits. +n his )iew management
should arrange the wor& in such a way that one is able to produce more and get paid more" by
teaching and implementing more efficient procedures for producing a product.
5lthough aylor did not compare wor&ers with machines" some of his critics use this
metaphor to e/plain how his approach to be made efficient by remo)ing unnecessary or
wasted effort. 8owe)er" some would say that this approach ignores the complications
introduced because wor&ers are necessarily human1 personal needs" interpersonal difficulties
and the )ery real difficulties introduced by ma&ing (obs so efficient that wor&ers ha)e no time
to rela/. 5s a result" wor&ers wor&ed harder" but became dissatisfied with the wor&
en)ironment. 4ome ha)e argued that this discounting of wor&er personalities led to the rise of
labour unions.
+t can also be said that the rise in labour unions is leading to a push on the part of
industry to accelerate the process of automation" a process that is undergoing a renaissance
with the in)ention of a host of new technologies starting with the computer and the +nternet.
his shift in production to machines was clearly one of the goals of aylorism" and represents
a )ictory for his theories.
8owe)er" tactfully choosing to ignore the still contro)ersial process of automating
human wor& is also politically e/pedient" so many still say that practical problems caused by
aylorism led to its replacement by the human relations school of management in 19<0.
?thers ('ra)erman 19:G) insisted that human relations did not replace aylorism but that
both approaches are rather complementary1 aylorism determining the actual organisation of
the wor& process and human relations helping to adapt the wor&ers to the new procedures.
8owe)er" aylor*s theories were clearly at the root of a global re)i)al in theories of
scientific management in the last two decades of the F0th century" under the moni&er of
*corporate reengineering*. 5s such" aylor*s ideas can be seen as the root of a )ery influential
series of de)elopments in the wor&place" with the goal being the e)entual elimination of
industry*s need for uns&illed" and later perhaps" e)en most s&illed labour in any form" directly
following aylor*s recipe for deconstructing a process. his has come to be &nown as
commodification" and no s&illed profession" e)en medicine" has pro)en to be immune from
the efforts of aylor*s followers" the *reengineers*" who are often called derogatory names
such as *bean counters*.
0egacy
4cientific management was the first attempt to systematically treat management and
process impro)ement as a scientific problem. -ith the ad)ancement of statistical methods"
the approach was impro)ed and referred to as 0uality control in 19F0s and 19<0s. ;uring the
19G0s and 1950s" the body of &nowledge for doing scientific management e)ol)ed into
?perations Eesearch and management cybernetics. +n the 1980s we had total 0uality
management" in the 1990s reengineering. oday*s 4i/ 4igma and $ean manufacturing could
be seen as new names for scientific management. +n particular" 4higeo 4hingo" one of the
creators of $ean #anagement who de)oted his life to scientific management" says that the
oyota 9roduction 4ystem and Hapanese management culture in general should be seen as
scientific management.
9eter ;ruc&er sees =rederic& aylor as the creator of &nowledge management" as the
aim of scientific management is to produce &nowledge about how to impro)e wor& processes.
5lthough some ha)e 0uestioned whether scientific management is suitable only for
manufacturing" aylor himself ad)ocated scientific management for all sorts of wor&"
including the management of uni)ersities and go)ernment.
4cientific management has had an important influence in sports" where stop watches
and motion studies rule the day. (aylor himself en(oyed sports especially tennis and golf
and he in)ented impro)ed tennis rac0uets and impro)ed golf clubs" although other players
li&ed to tease him for his unorthodo/ designs" and they did not catch on as replacements for
the mainstream implements.)
Conc$usion
'y the 19F0s" self7conscious management" systematic planning" speciali,ation of
function" and highly structured" formal relationships between managers and wor&ers had
become the hallmar&s of modern industry. hese features of the twentieth7century factory
system were the legacy of systematic management and especially of aylor and his disciples"
the most important contributors to the campaign for order and rationality in industry. +n the
process of reorgani,ing the factory they made scientific management a malleable symbol of
the potential of modern organi,ation for changing )irtually e)ery facet of contemporary life.
Case Study
+ -ATT3RNS ,) MANA13M3NT AT IBM
homas H. -atson" Hr.As father" an admired industrialist in 19F0s and 19<0s" mo)ed
+'# into punch card business. -atson" Hr." mo)ed +'# into the computer field and pro)ided
the )ision leading to its fundamental growth against competition from giant companies such
as Beneral .lectric" E%5" 8oney7well and Eemington Eand.
5fter -orld -ar ++" +#' grew 0uic&ly because of the demand for accounting
e0uipment using punch cards. 'ut it was in the mid71950s that computers" with their
recogni,ed calculating power" became the bu,,word of time.
-hat made +'# so successful was not technical inno)ation but mar&eting and
ser)ice. +n the early days of computers" competitors were e0ual or better in pro)iding
hardware. 'ut many competitors fell short when it came to installing and ser)icing the
e0uipment.
he early computers were built around electronic tubes. 5 limiting factor was the
need to find people to run them. o satisfy this need" +'# turned to uni)ersities for help. 5
new profession was born1 programmers and systems engineers. 5round 1958" wor&ing
against the resistance of +'# engineers" -atson insisted that electronic tubes be replaced by
transistors.
-atson attributes his success to selecting good people" integrating them into teams"
pro)iding financial incenti)es" being concerned about the people" and ha)ing open
communication channels to them. he selection of people was based not on personal li&ing
but on competence. 5nother +'# policy was to pro)ide (ob security a policy that dates
bac& to the Breat ;epression. .mployees" not (ust managers" were handsomely paid. 4tarting
in 1955" the company offered stoc& options that made many of them rich.
-atson" 4r." built an organi,ation culture that is similar to Hapanese practices. 4ales
personnel had to wear shirts with starched collars. here was also a company song. 'ut
-atson" Hr." rela/ed the rules. 4till" the older and the younger -atsons were perfectionists"
paying attention to details. he implicit principles were to )alue the indi)iduals" ma&e
customers satisfied" and go out of oneAs way to do the right thing.
o instil these )alues" one has to manage by e/ample. raining is also re0uired. Iet
until 1950s" management training was rather primiti)e" compared with that at Beneral
.lectric. +n 1966" howe)er" it was ruled that people" in order to manage" had to attend the
management school. he early programs were based on 8ar)ardAs case approach.
5nother step creating a certain corporate culture was to establish an out7door policy.
5fter employees had discussed their concerns with their managers" they could go to
indi)iduals at higher le)els. +n fact" -atson spent about a fifth of his time tal&ing with people
who Cwal&ed through the open door.D his policy" of course" results in open communication
and counters the problems of top7management isolation so often found in companies.
4till another factor that contributed to the rather uni0ue corporate culture was the
elimination of piece7wor&. his reduced the distinction between white7 and blue7collars
wor&ers. 5lso" starting in the late 1950s" all employees were paid salaries. +n addition"
employees began to recei)e medical co)erage and other benefits. he company also pro)ided
for matching grants for contributions to schools and charities. hese changes" too" helped to
reduce the distinction between managers and non7managers.
+'# has been )ery successful. 'ut in late 1989" +'# announced that because of
changing mar&et situations" it plans to restructure and cut 10"000 (obs. +n 1991" Hohn 5&ers"
+'#As %.?" announced additional restructuring of the organi,ation.
2+ T/3 CAS3 ,) T,4,TA5 A ST3- A/3A2 SCI3NTI)IC MANA13M3NT
?)er 100 years ago =rederic& -inslow aylorAs time studies and Claws and
principlesD of scientific management changed how wor&ers were paid" introduced a new
di)ision of labour and e/panded and strengthened the role of management. =ran& and $illian
BilbrethAs motion studies focused on how the wor& was done" and how to eliminate
unneeded" fatiguing steps in any process.
hey wanted CflowD manufacturing to ta&e place but they did not want wor&ers to
stop and thin&. 5nd through their wor& producti)ity climbed substantially allowing 8enry
=ord to produce an automobile in four days from iron ore to the finished car being put onto
the railroad cars. #odern manufacturing was born.
'oth aylor and the BilbrethAs eliminated decision ma&ing processes from wor&ers.
hey recogni,ed that when wor&ers were undecided and stopped to thin& tension and fatigue
entered. -or& was simplified and s&ills were automated. 9eople were as&ed to Cchec& their
brains at the door.D
he pressure for sol)ing problems was then placed on management. 'ut in the
process thousands of simple and small problems were neglected" 0uality suffered" wor&erAs
dignity suffered" and the wor&place was dehumani,ed.
-or&ers in the -est did repetiti)e tas&s and became attendants of machines. aylor
and Bilbreth wanted flow but wor&ers here would stand and watch machines. +t was deadly.
;r. 4higeo 4hingo" an independent consultant" and aiichi ?hno" )ice7president of
production at oyota" restudied the wor& of aylor" =ord and the BilbrethAs and clearly
understood the power of flow manufacturing. hey also disco)ered a powerful Jmissing
ingredient"D the wor&er on the factory floor is really the e/pert on the (ob" rarely e)er as&ed to
be creati)ely in)ol)ed in sol)ing problems. o be internationally competiti)e this waste of
human resources had to end.
4hingo and ?hno the creators of he oyota 9roduction 4ystemK$ean li&e aylor and
Bilbreth wanted both a producti)e wor&place and flow manufacturing. hey did not want the
wor&er to stand" wait and attend machines. hey wanted wor&ers to use both hands and mo)e
continually wor&ing multi7machines in the factory.
C+ ha)e been to o)er F50 plants in these past twenty years. +n 5merica + still see
people standing and watching machines. + ha)e ne)er seen this at oyotaD.
C8ow in the world can you e/pect to get continuous impro)ement without wor&er
participation2 8ow in the world can you attain si/ sigma without wor&er participation2 8ow
in the world can you e/pect to ha)e a lean organi,ation without full wor&er participationD2 7
?hno
+mpossibleL
#any of you ha)e run Mai,en 'lit, acti)ities and seen the success when people wor&
on teams focused on )alue adding and the elimination of wastes. -hat ma&es the Mai,en
'lit, successful and e/citing is that you are getting teams of people wor&ing together to
impro)e the process and sol)ing problems.
he indi)idual is almost hopeless in hisKher ability to bring meaningful change.
9eople are fearful and resist change. + meet so many people that ha)e a million reasons why
something should not be done.
5s $ean was created at oyota the wor&er was directly in)ol)ed1
1. -hene)er a problem was detected the wor&er either pulled a chain or pushed a button
to stop the line yes" they stopped other wor&ers from wor&ing. +magine the power
gi)en to a wor&er to stop others from wor&ing. oyota was serious. ;efects will not
be passed onto the customer. he wor&er was as&ed to immediately detect the cause
of the problem" sol)e it and also get to the root cause so that the problem would not
occur again. oyota wanted the e/act same C=lowD as aylor and Bilbreth. hey did
not want the wor&er to thin& on the (ob e/cept when a problem occurred. hey
reali,ed that the wor&er on the floor has brains and that those brains were re0uired to
help sol)e problems.
F. oyota also recogni,ed that many problems could not be sol)ed immediately so they
as&ed their wor&ers to come up with small impro)ement ideas to help sol)e problems
around their wor& area. +n fact" oyota was getting :0 ideas per wor&er per year in
writing. 5nd oyota noted for ma&ing (un& in 1960 became the worldAs highest
0uality producer" in fact" the richest automoti)e company in the world. oday"
oyotaAs stoc& is worth more than Beneral #otors" =ord and %hryslerK'en,
combined.
5nd it all happened as they in)ol)ed e)ery person at oyota in continuous
impro)ement acti)ities.
echnicolor %orporation in ;etroit two years ago recei)ed F50 suggestions with 11<
implemented from around 1800 employees. his past year they recei)ed 16"999 with :"GG<
implemented with no additional staffing to handle the ideas. hey are small ideas and the
person who came up with the idea is the one who normally implements them either
themsel)es or in their wor& teams. echnicolor has sa)ed o)er N10"000"000 from those ideas.
5nd imagine how the wor&er feels about themsel)es when they are respected for their
intelligence2 5nd imagine how management now loo&s at those creati)e wor&ers wor&ing for
them.
Ies" you can ha)e flow manufacturing and also a li)ely creati)e wor& en)ironment.
aylor and Bilbreth were necessary and a )ital part of 5mericaAs success but you
must update them. +n order for us to compete with the %hinese and +ndians" we must impro)e
e)ery wor&erAs s&ill le)el and also as& them to participate in creati)e problem sol)ing. +t is
the only way that $ean will wor&. +t is the only way to create a wor& en)ironment for human
beings.