Judicial Ethics: A Guide to the Code of Conduct

J UDICIAL ETHICS
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JUDICIAL ETHICS
Hilarion L. Aquino

INTRODUCTION

A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE SUBJECT

This is a monograph on judicial ethics. Ethics is the study of morality, a
subject which involves universal principles of right and wrong. J udicial ethics is,
therefore, ethics as applied to the conduct of judges and magistrates both in the
performance of their judicial task and in the way they live their lives.

J udicial ethics imposes upon a judge an ethical duty and prescribes an
ethical ideal. An ethical duty is obligatory while an ethical ideal is aspirational.
When a judge fails to perform an ethical duty, he incurs an administrative liability,
but when he fails to attain the ethical ideal, no administrative liability may be
visited upon him but, nonetheless, suffers a professional prejudice: he stagnates
in the status of an ordinary judge.

The ethical duty of a judge is to be a good judge, while his ethical ideal is
to be a great judge. J ustice Adolfo S. Azcuna, Chancellor of the Philippine
J udicial Academy, asks the question: What is the difference between a good
judge and a great judge?

To the mind of this writer, a good judge is one who possesses integrity
and in the performance of his judicial task, he is and appears to be independent,
free from any pressure or extraneous influence, fair, competent, and diligent. In
addition, he should at all times act and appear to act with propriety and treat
those having business with his court equally, ever sensitive to their individual
differences on account of gender, age, ethnicity, cultural, social, economic,
political, and religious status and orientation.

J ustice Azcuna says that what makes a judge a great judge is his passion
and vision in his judicial work.

This writer ventures to elaborate on J ustice Azcunas profound concept of
a great judge. A great judge is a good judge who is possessed of a superlative
intellect which allows him to fearlessly go beyond the frontiers of conventional
judicial thought and the courage to espouse novel, if sometimes controversial,
theories of law and legal philosophy.

This monograph is essentially a commentary of the Canons of the New
Code of J udicial Conduct for the Philippine J udiciary, which was promulgated by
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the Supreme Court in A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC on April 27, 2004 and became
effective on J une 1, 2004. This New Code is patterned after the Bangalore Draft
of the Code of J udicial Conduct.

B. THE JUDGE

Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution states: A member of the
J udiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.

In several Supreme Court decisions, the singularities and attributes of a
judge are elegantly stated.

He is a judge who is a man of learning who spends tirelessly the weary
hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the
learning of the law. He bears himself in the community with friends but without
familiars; almost lonely, evoking himself exclusively to the most exacting mistress
that man ever had, the law as a profession in its highest reaches where he not
only interprets the law but applies it, fearing neither friend nor foe, fearing only
one thing in the world that in a moment of abstraction, or due to human
weakness, he may in fact commit some error and fail to do justice.
1

J udges are not common men and women, whose errors men and women
forgive and time forgets. J udges sit as embodiment of the peoples sense of
justice, their least recourse where all institutions have failed.
2

C. SOME POSTULATES ON JUDICIAL ETHICS

1. The office of a judge is of divine origin. J udges are instruments of God in
the fulfillment of His divine will to establish on earth a regime of justice,
truth, and peace.

2. When the conduct of a judge is challenged, the question is not, Is it
legal?, but Is it proper? This is so because not everything legal is
moral. In ethics, it is the morality and propriety of an act or behavior that
are the subjects of inquiry.

3. In the adjudication of cases, the judge is required to look only at the
evidence and the law. Public opinion should not weigh in the decisional
process. Implicitly, a judge should have the moral courage to render
unpopular decisions if these are called for by the law and evidence.

1
Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, A.M. No. RTJ -91-758, September 26, 1994, 237 SCRA 1.
2
Dela Cruz v. Pascua, A.M. No. RTJ -99-1461, J une 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 569.
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4. In the world of a judge, reality and perception are practically the same. A
judge, therefore, should not only be objectively honest, independent, fair,
and competent but must appear to the people to be so.

5. To Filipinos, gratitude is a very powerful value. However, if a sense of
gratitude inveigles a judge to disturb the scales of justice, then utang na
loob or sense of gratitude becomes a bane. Better that a judge should be
right than be grateful.

6. It is not enough that a judge should do his work he should do it well.
Therefore, a judge should always strive for excellence in his judicial task.

CANONS UNDER THE NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT OF THE
PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY

A. CANON 1: INDEPENDENCE

1. Concept

There are two aspects of judicial independence: the institutional
independence and individual independence.

Institutional Judicial Independence

Institutional judicial independence is the capacity of courts to
function effectively and independently of the executive and legislative
departments of government. The preamble of the Code of J udicial
Conduct, the precursor of the New Code of J udicial Conduct for the
Philippine J udiciary, states that:

An honorable, competent, and independent judiciary exists
to administer justice and thus promote the unity of the
country, the stability of government, and the well-being of the
people.

Indi vidual Judicial Independence

On the other hand, individual judicial independence means the
capacity of individual judges to perform their task without fear or favor,
unfettered by outside influence, or pressure from any source so that their
decisions shall be based only upon the applicable law and the facts
established by evidence.
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This fundamental doctrine is ensconced in Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution which provides that:

No decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly, the facts and the
law on which it is based.

2. Epigram of Canon 1

Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a
fundamental guarantee of a fair trial.

3. Abstract of the Rules in Canon 1
3

3.1. What judges should be: they should be

3.1.1. free from inappropriate connections with, and influence
by, executive and legislative branches of government and
appears to be so to a reasonable observer;
4
and

3.1.2. independent, in relation to society in general and in
relation to the particular parties to a dispute which they
have to adjudicate.
5

3.2. What judges shall do: they shall

3.2.1. exercise their judicial functions independently on the basis
of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a
conscientious understanding of the law, free of any
extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any
reason;
6

3.2.2. perform their judicial duties independently from judicial
colleagues in respect of decisions which they are to
render;
7

3
NEW CODE OF J UDICIAL CONDUCT OF THE PHILIPPINE J UDICIARY, Secs. 1 to 8.
4
Id., Sec. 5.
5
Id., Sec. 6.
6
Id., Sec. 1.
7
Id., Sec. 2.
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3.2.3. encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of
judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the
institutional and operational independence of the
judiciary;
8
and

3.2.4. exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct.
9

3.3. What the judges shall not do: they shall not

3.3.1. influence in any manner the outcome of litigation or
dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency;
10
and

3.3.2. allow family, social or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment; or use or lend the prestige of
the judicial office to advance the private interests of others
or convey or permit others to convey the impression that
they are in a special position to influence the judge.
11

4. Comment

Judges and public opinion

Media, as an institution, is undisputedly a pillar of a democratic
polity. It is the main engine in the formulation of public opinion. It can
indeed influence in large measure all instrumentalities of government
sometimes, even the judiciary. This reality sometimes clashes with the
doctrine of judicial independence and this happens when media
intrudes into the domain of judicial adjudication. In such a case, judges
are advised that, in furtherance of the canon of judicial independence,
they should ignore public opinion, disregard intrusive editorials and
columns and brush aside the horn in arguments and opinions of TV and
radio commentators.

In Go v. Court of Appeals,
12
it was shown that media had depicted
the accused as guilty even though the proceedings were still on-going.
This situation led to widespread public belief in the suspects guilt, despite
the fact that he had not yet even been subjected to preliminary
investigation. J ustice Isagani C. Cruz observed:

8
Id., Sec. 7.
9
Id., Sec. 8.
10
Id., Sec. 3.
11
Id., Sec. 4.
12
G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992, 206 SCRA 165.
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It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to
cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial
administration of justice. The petitioner as portrayed by
media is not exactly a popular person. Nevertheless, the trial
court should not have been influenced by this irrelevant
consideration, remembering instead that its only guide was
the mandate of the law.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court ordered the suspension of the
proceeding and directed that a preliminary investigation be first conducted.

In one case,
13
the trial judge hastily fixed the bail of an accused
without hearing due to the pressure brought upon him by a rally staged by
the complainant and his sympathizers demanding the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against the accused. The High Court ruled that
respondent judge should not have allowed himself to be swayed into
issuing an order fixing bail for the temporary release of the accused
charged with murder, without a hearing which is contrary to established
principles of law.

Corrollarily, a judge should not be afraid to render unpopular
decisions. He is not supposed to seek popularity but to render justice. If a
judge believes that his decision is supported by the evidence and the
applicable law, he should render it even if he has a reasonable
apprehension that he would be pillored by media or the public for his
judgment. J ustice commands that in such a situation, the judge should be
willing to bite the bullet that is what moral courage is all about!

Judges and family

One of the most admirable cultural traits of Filipinos is their close
family ties. To a Filipino, his family is the source of his happiness,
strength, protection and support. When one fights a member, he is
fighting his entire family. For the support and education of his children, a
parent is willing to go anywhere and anytime to do any kind of decent
work.

However, the very close relationship with the members of a family
has its downside. This is especially so with judges. Family members of
the judge sometimes influence him in the performance of his judicial work.
Some judges are willing to cross the line and wield the influence of their

13
Libarios v. Dabalos, A.M. RTJ --89-1286, J uly 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48.
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office when a member of a family is in conflict with the law or desires an
appointment to or a promotion in an office. The judge must resist such
insidious influence of his own family in what should be his proper conduct.

Judges and judicial colleagues and other relationships

In regard to judicial colleagues, the Annotated Code of J udicial
Conduct
14
has this to say:

J udges working in the same building or justices of
collegiate courts develop what is often referred to as
compaerismo, a kind of camaraderie bound by respect and
personal friendship resulting from sharing a common
profession. This camaraderie often leads judges to seek
accommodations from fellow judges ranging from the
allowance of provisional remedies to the issuance of
favorable decisions. The judge requesting the
accommodation may be prompted either by personal or
familial interests, or by a desire to benefit a friend. Many
such accommodations are exchanged for little more
consideration than a free dinner or similar token. While
seemingly innocuous, this kind of unethical conduct
frequently gives rise to a quid pro quo situation, whereby
the judge who requested the accommodation is later asked
to return the favor. This is especially true in the Philippines
where utang-na-loob is a sacrosanct cultural value. Once
a judge engages in this kind of favoritism, the circle of
mutual accommodation will continue to widen, involving
increasingly larger segments of the judiciary. This must be
assiduously avoided.

Judges and their relationship with society

Section 6, Canon 1 provides:

SECTION 6. J udges shall be independent in relation to
society in general and in relation to the particular parties to a
dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.

14
page 40.
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While Section 6 is a new provision, it is inspired by the
provision on Social Relations in the Canons of J udicial Ethics,
which reads:

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty
that judges should live in retirement or seclusion; it is
desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the
completion of their work will permit, they continue to mingle
in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue
their interests in or appearance at meetings of members of
the bar. A judge should, however, in pending or prospective
litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such
action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that
his social or business relations or friendships constitute an
element in determining his judicial course.
15

It is desirable that the judge should, as far as reasonably
possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to
arouse the suspicion that such relations warp his judgment and
prevent an impartial attitude of mind in the administration of judicial
duties.
16

J udges are not required to live a hermits life. They should
socialize and be sensitive to social concerns and developments.
J udges may join civil, religious or professional organizations but
their membership in these organizations should not interfere with
their judicial tasks. There is nothing more regrettable and probably
unbearable for a judge than to suffer an ignominious dismissal from
the service due to slothfulness and inefficiency and failure to render
services that could have been fully rendered were it not for the
extrajudicial activities, which distracted the judges time and efforts
from his or her official duties.
17

More importantly, judges should not fraternize with litigants
and their counsel. In fact, they should make a conscious effort to
avoid them in order to avoid the perception that their independence
has been compromised. Under the 1989 Code, a judge must
refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to increase
involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the
court.
18
In Tan v. Rosete,
19
respondent judge was suspended by

15
Canons of J udicial Ethics, Canon 30.
16
Canons of J udicial Ethics, Canon 25 (Personal investment and relations), paragraph 1, 2
nd

sentence.
17
E. Pineda, LEGAL AND J UDICIAL ETHICS, 1994 ed., p. 392.
18
CODE OF J UDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5, Rule 5.02.
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the High Court for gross misconduct. The Court ruled that
respondents act of sending a member of his staff to talk with
complainant and show copies of his draft decisions, and his act of
meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office
hours violate the standard of judicial conduct required to be
observed by members of the Bench. The Supreme Court ruled that
respondent judges actions constitute gross misconduct which is
punishable under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court.
20

B. CANON 2: INTEGRITY

1. Concept

In the hierarchy of judicial values, integrity occupies the highest place. A
judge has integrity if he possesses an impeccable character, characterized by
fairness, fidelity, truthfulness, high-mindedness, honesty, honor, moral
strength, and rectitude. J udicial integrity embraces all the other canons in the
New Code of J udicial Conduct for the Philippine J udiciary, namely:
independence, impartiality, propriety, equality, diligence, and competence. It
is a virtue required of a judge, not only in his public but also in his private life.

It has often been said that it is exceedingly better to have a mediocre
judge with integrity than a brilliant judge with no integrity. How true!


Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial
office but also to the personal demeanor of a judge.

21


3.1.1. ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach but that it
is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer;
22

19
A.M. No. MTJ -04-1563, September 8, 2004, 437 SCRA 581.
20
The Rule is captioned CHARGES AGAINST J UDGES.
21
22
Id., Sec. 1.
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3.1.2. reaffirm, through their behavior and conduct, the peoples faith
in the integrity of the judiciary, and ensure that justice must
not merely be done but must also be seen to be done;
23
;and

3.1.3. initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or
court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge
may have become aware.
24

4. Comment

The Supreme Court, in several decisions, dealt with the cardinal
value of judicial integrity. The New Code of J udicial Conduct for the
Philippine J udiciary, Annotated
25
compiled the abstracts of these
decisions. Thus

In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal
virtue; it is a necessity,
26
J udges have been disciplined for
lack or loss of good moral character, both in the performance
of their duties and in their private lives. With respect to
professional integrity, judges have been penalized for
demanding and/or accepting bribes,
27
fraternizing with
litigants and/or lawyers,
28
altering orders,
29
delay in
rendering decisions,
30
sexual harassment of employees,
31

and ignorance of the law.
32
With respect to personal
integrity, judges have been penalized for transgressions in
their private lives such as keeping and/or flaunting a

23
Id., Sec. 2.
24
Id., Sec. 3.
25
February 2007, pages 10 and 11.
26
Fernandez v. Hamoy, A.M. No. RTJ -04-182, August 21, 2004, 436 SCRA 186; Dy Teban
Hardware & Auto Supply Co. v. Tapucar, A.M. No. 1720, J anuary 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 494.
27
Tan v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ -04-1563, September 8, 2004 ,37 SCRA 581; Mamba v. Garcia,
A.M. No. MTJ -96-10, J une 25, 2001, 349 SCRA 426; Marquez v. Jardin, A.M. RTJ -99-1448, April
8, 2000, 339 SCRA 79.
28
Dela Cruz v. Bersamin, A.M. No. RTJ -00-567, J uly 25, 2000, 130 SCRA 353.
29
Rallos v. Gako, A.M. No. RTJ -98-1484, March 18, 2000, 328 SCRA 324.
30
Fernandez v. Hamoy, A.M. No. RTJ -04-1821, August 21, 2004, 436 SCRA 186; Salud v.
Alumbres, A.M. No. RTJ -00-1594, J une 20, 2003, 494 SCRA 411.
31
Dawa v. De Asa, A.M. No. MTJ -98-1144, J uly 22, 1998, 292 SCRA 703.
32
Macalinta v. Teh, A.M. No. RTJ -93-1375, October 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 623.
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mistress,
33
inebriated behavior,
34
and frequenting casinos
and cockfights.
35

J udges who failed to observe the Rules of Court in such
matters as issuance of warrants of arrest, temporary
restraining orders, injunctions, hold departure orders and
citations for contempt, conducting hearings in their residence
and using intemperate language, were found to have
damaged the integrity of the judiciary.

In regard to the avoidance of perception of absence of
integrity, the High Court has stressed that judges must not only
render just, correct and impartial decisions; but must do so in a
manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and
moral uprightness.
36

The three most abominable acts or behavior showing manifest
lack of integrity of a judge are dishonesty, immorality, and grave abuse of
authority. Dishonesty is a disposition to cheat, lie, deceive, defraud, or
betray a party or a cause. One of the biggest problems of the judiciary
today is the perception of graft and corruption among judges. Although it
cannot be denied that there are indeed incidents of corruption among
some judges, they are, however, few. The great majority of our judges are
decent and honorable persons. Public perception of the existence of this
malady, however, is indeed exaggerated and far removed from reality.
But even if there are only a few judges who are dishonest, that is enough
to tarnish the image of the judiciary. To combat corruption is the collective
responsibility of the bar, the bench, and, in general, the public.

New jurisprudence on dishonesty

There are a number of new cases dealing with dishonesty of judges.

1. After respondent judge was appointed RTC judge, he submitted to the
Office of Administrative Services and Office of the Court Administrator
his Personal Data Sheet (PDS) in which he categorically stated that he
has never been formally charged of any infraction. This is false because

33
Re: Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and her children against Judge Marcos, A.M. No. 97-2-
53-RTC, J uly 6, 2001, 360 SCRA 539.
34
Lachica v. Flordeliza, A.M. No. MTJ -9-921, Mar. 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 278.
35
City of Tagbilaran v. Hontanosas, A.M. No. MTJ -98-1169, November 29, 2002, 375
SCRA 1.
36
Rallos v. Gako, A.M. No. RTJ -98-1484, Mar. 7, 2000, 328 SCRA 324.
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when he submitted said PDS, an administrative charge against him was
still pending.

The SC held that the respondent judge committed an act of
dishonesty for which he was dismissed from office with all the accessory
penalties. In addition, he was disbarred.
37

2. The respondent judge rendered conflicting decisions in each of
several cases. In Pancho v. Gopez,
38
for declaration of nullity of
marriage, the respondent judge rendered a decision on March 4, 2005
dismissing the case, but in another decision rendered by him on J une
16, 2005, he declared the marriage void ab initio. In Tomboc v.
Tomboc,
39
for declaration of nullity of marriage, respondent rendered a
decision on April 29, 2005 dismissing the case but in his decision dated
May 20, 2005, he granted it. In a Petition for Voluntary Dissolution of the
Conjugal Partnership of Gains and for Separation of the Common
Properties, respondent judge rendered a decision on J uly 27, 2004
dismissing the case, but in his decision dated September 7, 2004, he
granted it.

The respondent judge was charged of graft and corruption for
having sold his decisions to the interested parties. The Supreme Court
found no sufficient evidence to support the charges. For rendering two
diverse decisions, in each of the three cases, even if they were not
eventually promulgated, the judge opened himself to the reasonable
suspicion that he was up to something illegal. The Court found the
respondent judge guilty, among others, of gross misconduct violative of
Section 2 of Canon 2, which provides that a judges conduct shall be
perceived by a reasonable observer to be beyond reproach in order to
reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary.

Respondent judge was dismissed from the service with all
accessory penalties.
40

3. Respondent judge who was a former court attorney in the Supreme
Court asked for and was given by complainant P100,000.00 to follow-up
the case of the latters friend in the Supreme Court. When that act
eventually became the subject of an administrative case, the respondent

37
Samson v. Judge Caballero, A.M. No. RTJ -08-2138, August 5, 2009, 595 SCRA 423.
38
Civil Case No. 180-0-2001 entitled Lanie Pancho v. Rolando Gopez for declaration of Nullity
of Marriage which was dismissed in a decision dated March 14, 2005 but granted in a decision
dated J une 6, 2005.
39
Civil Case No. 433-0-2003 entitled Jeffrey Joseph T. Tomboc v. Ruth Tomboc for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage which was dismissed in a Decision dated April 29, 2005 but granted in a
Decision dated May 20, 2005.
40
Suarez v. Judge Dilag, A.M. No. RTJ -06-2014, March 4, 2009, 580 SCRA 491.
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judge returned the P100,000.00 to complainant. Complainant then
moved to withdraw the administrative case.

The Supreme Court denied the motion and found respondent
judge guilty of gross misconduct for which she was suspended without
salary and benefits for six (6) months.
41

4. The complainant was an accused in a case before the court of
respondent judge. He posted a property bond but two months after, he
was surprised that he was again arrested. He went to the respondent
judge to complain but he was told that the warrant of arrest could not be
withdrawn unless he put up P27,000.00. Later on, the accused returned
and told the judge that all he could produce was P15,0000.00. The
judge got the money.

Denying the charge, the judge put up the defense that the amount
he received was for premium of a surety bond. The Court rejected the
defense, saying that a judge has no business securing surety bond of an
accused in a case in his court.

In imposing the penalty, the High Court took into consideration the
fact that earlier on, the respondent judge had been fined P2,000.00 for
gross ignorance of the law, and P5,000.00 for dishonesty and
reprimanded for violating Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code. During the
pendency of the instant case, he was also facing two other
administrative cases for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and for
conduct unbecoming a judge.

The Supreme Court dismissed the respondent judge with all
42

5. In his comment to the administrative charge against him, respondent
judge said that he allowed the protestees counsel to testify over the
objection of the protestants counsel because the latter failed to submit a
memorandum in support of his objection. This defense is belied by the
records of the case for protestants memorandum was in the records.
The Court found respondent judge guilty of having foisted a falsehood
upon the Court. The Court fined the respondent judge P25,000.00.
43

41
Santos v. Judge Arcaya-Chua, A.M. No. MTJ -07-20093, February 17, 2009, SCRA
42
Lacanilao v. Judge Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ -08-1702, April 8, 2008.
43
Salazar v. Judge Marigomen, A.M. No. RTJ -06-2004, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 25b.
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New jurisprudence on immorality

1. For the same act, the offended party filed two cases against the
respondent judge; one, a criminal case for rape, and the other, an
administrative case for gross misconduct. In the administrative case, the
Supreme Court considered the following facts as established: that in the
videoke bar, the respondent judge made sexual advances on the
complainant even kissing her behind the ear; and that he also followed
her to the bathroom, and all the while, respondent judges friends were
egging him: Go ahead, fuck her.

The Supreme Court found respondent judge guilty of gross
misconduct and immorality for which he was dismissed from public
service with all the accessory penalties.
44

New jurisprudence on grave abuse of authority

1. Four decisions of grave abuse of authority against the same judge,
three of them of substantially the same nature, where recently rendered
by the Supreme Court.

1.1. For citing the complainant, a city government employee for
indirect contempt of court and imposing upon him a fine of
P2,000.00 for his act of parking his vehicle on the space reserved
for the respondent judge at the basement of the Makati Hall of
J ustice, the Court found him guilty of grave misconduct for abusing
his power of contempt. The act of the complainant was certainly
not contemptuous so that, at the very least, a simple warning or
admonition would have sufficed. Respondent judge was fined
P40,000.00.
45

1.2. The complainant, a driver of the Engineering Department of the
Makati City Government, parked his service van on the reserved
space in the basement of the Makati Hall of J ustice. The
complainant was cited by the respondent judge for direct contempt
of court and fined him P1,000.00. Complainant was also ordered
incarcerated for five (5) days at the City J ail in Fort Bonifacio.

The respondent judge claimed that the improper act of the
complainant disrupted for one (1) hour the administration of justice
as he had to look for a place to park his vehicle.

44
Jamin v. Judge De Castro, A.M. MTJ -1616, Oct. 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 395.
45
Inonog v. Judge Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ -09-2175, J uly 28, 2009, 594 SCRA 168.
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The Supreme Court again cast away respondent judges
reason in citing the complainant in contempt of court. It said that it
could not see how the act of the complainant could have disrupted
the speedy administration of justice. The Court held that what the
respondent judge did was a serious misconduct for gravely abusing
his contempt power. He was fined P40,000.00.
46

1.3. Respondent judge cited in contempt of court three laborers and
sent them to jail. The laborers, who were complainants, painted a
part of the Makati Hall of J ustice. When the painters finished their
job, they removed the scaffolding that they used and in the process
they could have misaligned a part of the window in the chambers of
the judge. One day, it rained and rainwater sipped into the
chambers of the respondent judge and soiled its carpet. A
computer was also allegedly damaged because of complainants
negligence.

The Supreme Court reminded the respondent judge that
government service is people-oriented. Patience is an essential
part of dispensing justice and courtesy is the mark of culture and
good breeding. The Court held that the respondent judge was an
irate magistrate who spitefully jailed the complainants for the
inconvenience caused by them. Indeed his acts were tainted with
personal hostility toward the complainants.

Respondent judge was fined P25,000.00.
47

1.4. Respondent judge cited in contempt of court, fined the
complainant and sent him to jail just because the latter switched off
the electric power on the floor where respondent judges sala was
located during the latters tour of duty the night before. The
Supreme Court ruled that this act amounts to grave abuse of
authority.
48

2. The respondent judge was found to have committed the following
improprieties: a) she borrowed money from lawyers and litigants in a
case pending before her court in violation of Section 8, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court; b) she failed to find some missing cases in her court
resulting in the delay in the resolution of pending incidents therein; c)
she failed to decide two (2) civil cases within the reglementary period; d)
she failed to present to the J udicial Audit Team the orders or decisions

46
Nuez v. Judge Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ -06-1984, J une 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 394.
47
Machrohon, et. al. v. Judge Ibay, A.M. NO. RTJ -06-1970, November 30, 2006, 509 SCRA 75.
48
Panaligan v. Judge Ibay, A.M. No. RTJ -06-1972, J une 21, 2006, 491 SCRA 545.

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purportedly dated before the start of the audit; and e) she has been
absent several times for extended periods in 2007; f) that in those times
that she went to office, on the average, she arrived at 9:30 a.m. and
stayed for less than four (4) hours in the office; and g) she delegated to
her OIC-BCC who is not a lawyer the task of receiving evidence ex-
parte, contrary to Section 9, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court.

The Court held: a) respondent judges lawyer-creditor has two (2)
cases pending in her sala. In fact the lawyer already waived the
collection of the debt. The act of respondent judge of borrowing money
from lawyers practicing in her courts violates Section 13, Canon 4 of the
New Code of J udicial Conduct of the Philippine J udiciary. Under Section
8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the act of the respondent judge
constituted gross misconduct, a serious offense: a) respondent judge
was guilty of defying the rules imposing upon her the duties to dispose of
the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods; b) to diligently discharge administrative responsibilities and
maintain professional competence in court management; and c) her
tardiness and absenteeism contravene SC Administrative Circular No. 1-
99 dated J anuary 15, 1999.

The High Court concluded that the various violations of the
respondent judge reflected a totality of transgressions of one who no
longer deserves a seat in the bench.

Respondent judge was dismissed with the accessory penalties
provided for in the laws and rules.
49

C. CANON 3: IMPARTIALITY

1. Concept

Impartiality is the capacity of a judge to apply the law and render
justice fairly, without favor, bias or prejudice.

Explaining this concept, the Supreme Court said that a judge has
both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a
manner completely free from suspicion as to his fairness and integrity.
The appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public
confidence and the administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.
50

49
Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Judge Villalon-Pornillos, A.M. No. RTJ -09-2183, J uly 7,
2009, 592 SCRA 36.
50
Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ -04-1538, March 12, 2004, 425 SCRA 413.
J UDICIAL ETHICS

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While a judge should profess proficiency in law in order that he can
competently construe and enforce it, it is more important that he should
act and behave in a manner that the parties before him should have
confidence in his impartiality.
51
Verily, a judge should always exhibit the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
52


Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It
applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the
decision is made.

53

3.1. What judges should do: they should

3.1.1. perform their judicial duties without fear or favor, bias, or
prejudice;
54

3.1.2. ensure that their conduct, both in and out of court, maintain
and enhance the confidence of the public, the legal
profession and litigants in their impartiality and that of the
judiciary;
55

3.1.3. conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it
will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing
and deciding cases;
56
and

3.1.4. disqualify themselves from participating in any proceeding in
which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in
which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are
unavailable to decide the matter impartially.
57

51
Fernandez v. Presbitero, A.M. No. 486-MJ , September 13, 1977, 79 SCRA 60; Tan v. Gallardo,
Nos. L-41213-14, October 5, 1976, 73 SCRA 306.
52
Cojuangco v. PCGG, G.R. No. 92319-20, October 2, 1990, 190 SCRA 226; Javier v.
COMELEC, G.R. Nos. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986, 144 SCRA 194; Villapando v. Quitain,
G.R. No. L-41333, J anuary 20, 1977, 75 SCRA 25; Castillo v. Juan, G.R. Nos. 39516-17, J anuary
28, 1975, 62 SCRA 124.
53
54
Id., Sec. 1.
55
Id., Sec. 2.
56
Id., Sec. 3.
57
Id., Sec. 5.
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3.2. What judges may do: they may

3.2.1. if, disqualified under Section 5, Canon 3, instead of
withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the records
the basis of their disqualification and if the parties and their
lawyers agree in writing and signed by them stating that the
reason for inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, they
(judges) may then participate in the proceeding
58
;

3.3. What judges shall not do: they shall not

3.1. knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before
them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected
to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the
manifest fairness of the process and neither should they
make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the
fair trial of any person or issue.
59

4. Comment

The time honored rule recognized universally and through the centuries
is that trial judges and appellate justices should not only be impartial,
independent and honest but should be perceived as impartial, independent
and honest.
60
Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal and every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
61

Impermissible conduct and comment of a Judge

1. The manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned,
the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or
even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of
yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions
or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the
suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in
the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the
parties, as well as the public, that he follows the traditional mode of
adjudication requiring that he hears both sides with patience and
understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum.

58
Id., Sec. 6.
59
Id., Sec. 4.
60
Nazareno v. Almario, A.M. No. RTJ -94-1195, February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 657.
61
Castillo v. Juan, supra note 52.
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It is not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is
essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is equally important is that
he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his impartiality. What has
been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics; it is impressed with
constitutional significance.
62

2. A judge should not, in or outside the court, make any comment which
may give the impression that he has already prejudged the case or which
may manifest unfairness in the litigation process.

The New Code of J udicial Conduct (Annotated) gives this sound
advice to judges:

J udges should avoid side remarks, hasty conclusions, loose
statements or gratuitous utterances that suggest that they are
prejudging a case. J udges should be aware that the media might
consider them a good and credible source of opinion or ideas,
therefore should refrain from making any comment on a pending
case. Not only is there a danger of being misquoted, but also of
compromising the rights of the litigants in the case.

Undue interference of a Judge in the conduct of trial

In Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank,
63
the judge ordered
the presentation of specific documentary evidence without a corresponding
motion from any party or without the participation of the parties. The act of
the judge constituted undue interference in the conduct of the trial which
tended to build or bolster the case of one of the parties. The judges act
violates the canon of impartiality.

Certainly, a judge can ask questions from witnesses but this should be
limited to clarifying vague points in the narration of witnesses. Questions
designed to disentangle obscurity in the testimony and to elicit additional
relevant evidence to fill in the gaps in a testimony are not improper.
64
In other
words, what is prohibited is the asking of adversarial or impeaching
questions.

In disposing of a criminal case, a judge should avoid appearing like an
advocate for either party. It is also improper for a judge to push actively for

62
Id.
63
GR Nos. 149797-98, February 13, 2004, 422 SCRA 649.
64
Paco v. Quilala, et. al., A.M. No. RTJ -02-1699, October 15, 2003, 413 SCRA 364.
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amicable settlement against the wishes of a party. A judges unwelcome
persistence makes the judge vulnerable to suspicions of favoritism.
65

Disqualification and inhibition of Judges

There are two rules governing the disqualification and voluntary
inhibition of judges; Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court and Rule 3.12
of the New Code of J udicial Conduct for the Philippine J udiciary.

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial
officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he
has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or
in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.

Canon 3 of the New Code of J udicial Conduct for the Philippine J udiciary
states:

RULE 3.12 A J udge should take no part in a proceeding
where the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
These cases include, among others, proceedings where:

(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge served as executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge
served as counsel during their association, or the
judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(c) the judges ruling in a lower court is the subject of
review.

65
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(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a
party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel
within the fourth degree;
(e) the judge knows that his spouse or child has a
financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary,
or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or
in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest
that could be substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding.

In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason
for inhibition.

Disqualification of Judge

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, supra, and Rule 132 of the
Code of J udicial Conduct for the Philippine J udiciary, supra, pertain to
disqualification of judges. The reasons for disqualifications are not limited to
the circumstances cited in Section 5, Canon 3. Grounds of substantially the
same nature can support the disqualification of a judge.
66

If a judge believes that, in view of certain circumstances, he cannot
adjudicate a case impartially, he should disqualify himself from acting on the
case even without a motion to that effect. If, however, there is a motion to
disqualify him on the ground of bias or partiality, the judge should determine
whether there is a factual basis to support the motion. If he finds no factual
basis, then he should deny the motion. He should not see in the situation an
opportunity for him to take off one case from his docket.

1. Bias or Prejudice

Bias or prejudice may either be factual bias or perceived bias. One
type is as bad as the other.

Factual bias or prejudice is a judges inclination or personal
preference to a party or to a cause or antipathy to a party or counsel or
aversion to his cause based upon extraneous or irrelevant factors. In one
case, it was held that bias or prejudice must be shown to have stemmed
from an extrajudicial source and results in an opinion on the merits of a
case based upon a bias other than the evidence.
67

66
Marifel v. Cuachos, A.M. No. 2360-MII, August 31, 1981, 107 SCRA 41.
67
Aleria, Jr. v. Velez, G.R. No. 127400, Nov. 16, 1998, 298 SCRA 611.
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On the other hand, perceived bias arises when a judges conduct,
behavior, utterances or comments suggest his partiality in favor of a party
in a case.

Examples of judges actions in court which suggest bias include the
following: undue interference of the judge in the conduct of trial which
tends to build or bolster a case of one of the parties;
68
extensively cross-
examining a witness; vigorously pushing for an amicable settlement
against the wishes of the plaintiff;
69
insistence for the accused to plead
guilty to a lesser offense; unequal treatment of counsel or parties (strict to
one but liberal to the other); inconsistent rulings; and even body language
while presiding, like moving or shaking his head.

Not sufficient basis for inhibition of a Judge for bias or prejudice

Bare allegations of partially and prejudgment will not suffice in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that
the judge will undertake his role to dispense justice according to law and
evidence without fear or favor.
70

Inhibition must be for just and valid causes: mere impression of bias
and partiality is not ground for a judge to inhibit, especially when the charge is
without sufficient basis.
71

The following are some examples of insufficient grounds to inhibit a
judge on the ground of bias or prejudice: mere filing of an administrative case
against a judge;
72
that the judge is a next-door neighbor of the complainant;
73

divergence of opinion between a judge and a partys counsel as to a
applicable law and jurisprudence;
74
and reasons of strained personal
relationship, animosity and hostility between a judge and party or counsel.
75

68
Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, et al., G.R. Nos. 149797-98, February 13,
2004, 422 SCRA 649.
69
70
Heirs of Juaban v. Boncale, et. al., G.R. No. 156011, J uly 6, 2008, 557 SCRA 1; Law Firm of
Tungcol & Tibayan v. CA, G.R. No. 169298, J uly 9, 2008, 557 SCRA 451.
71
City of Naga v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 174042, J uly 9, 2008, 528 SCRA 528.
72
Mantaring v. Roman, Jr., G.R. No. A.M. No. RTJ -93-964, March 28, 1996, 254 SCRA 158;
Medina v. De Guia, A.M. No. RTJ -88-216, March 1, 1993; 219 SCRA 153; Aparicio v. Andal, G.R.
Nos. 86587-93, J uly 25, 1989, 175 SCRA 569.
73
Choa v. Chiongson, A.M. No. MTJ -95-063, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 371.
74
Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108251, J anuary 31, 1996, 252 SCRA 641.
75
Villapando v. Quitain, Nos. L-41333, 41378-41, J anuary 20, 1977, 75 SCRA 24.
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Judges knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts

When a judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceedings, he should recuse from the case.

The purpose of this ground for disqualification is to avoid a situation
where a judge may factor into the decisional process facts which are not
borne out by evidence duly presented in and admitted by the court in the
course of trial. Thus, any kind of knowledge of a judge which he obtains
extrajudicially about a case before him should be sufficient reason for him to
recuse from the case. For example, if a judge witnessed the killing of a
person, he should disqualify himself from trying a criminal case involving such
incident which is filed and raffled to his court.

In Umale v. Villaluz,
76
the Supreme Court commended a judge who
voluntarily inhibited himself on the ground that he had personal knowledge of
the case.

The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the
matter in controversy.

A judge may be disqualified if he was formerly associated with one of the
parties or their counsel.
77

In one case, a judge was disqualified for notarizing the affidavit of a
person to be presented as a witness in a case before him.
78

The judge or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in
the outcome of the matter in controversy

The Canon on Impartiality identifies three (3) grounds for a judges
disqualification on account of kinship:

a) Section 5(c), economic interest in the outcome of the matter in
controversy of the judge or the members of his family;
b) Section 5(f), relationship by consanguinity or affinity of a judge to a
party within the sixth civil degree or to a counsel within the fourth civil
degree; and,

76
G.R. No. 33508, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 84
77
Masadao v.Elizaga, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC, October 26, 1987, 155 SCRA 72; Bautista v.
Rebueno, G.R. No. 46117, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 535; Austria v. Masaquel, G.R. No. L-
22536, August 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 1247.
78
Mateo v. Villaluz, G.R. Nos. 34756-59, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 18.
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c) Section 5(g), knowledge of a judge that his spouse or child has a
financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary or otherwise, in
the subject matter in controversy or in a party to a proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceedings.

In the case of Oktubre v. Velasco,
79
a municipal judge who filed
complaints in his own court for robbery and malicious mischief against a party
for the purpose of protecting the property interests of the judges co-heirs, and
then issued warrants of arrest against the party, was found guilty of serious
misconduct and ordered dismissed from the bench before he was able to
recuse himself. The Supreme Court held that his subsequent inhibition from
the cases which he filed in his own court does not detract from his culpability
for he should have not taken cognizance of the cases in the first place the
evil that the rule on disqualification seeks to prevent is the denial of a party of
his right to due process.

The judges ruling in a lower court is the subject of review

In Sandoval v. Court of Appeals,
80
an Associate J ustice of the Court of
Appeals refused to inhibit himself from reviewing the decision in a case which
he had partially heard as a trial judge prior to his promotion, on the ground
that the decision was not written by him. The Supreme Court upheld his
refusal, but nevertheless commented that he should have been more prudent
and circumspect and declined to take on the case owing to his earlier
involvement in the case. The Court has held that a judge should not handle a
case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to
bias and prejudice.

The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within
the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree.

The Supreme Court has, in several cases, admonished judges from
participating in proceedings in which one of the parties or counsel is a relative
within the sixth or fourth civil degrees, respectively. In Villaluz v. Mijares,
81
a
judge was fined for presiding over a petition for correction of a birth record
where the petitioner was the judges daughter. In Hurtado v. Judalena,
82
a
preliminary injunction issued by a judge in favor of his sister before inhibiting

79
A.M. No. MTJ 02-1444, J uly 20, 2004, 434 SCRA 636.
80
G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260 SCRA 283.
81
A.M. No. RTJ -98-1402, April 3, 1998, 288 SCRA 594.
82
G.R. No. 40603, J uly 13, 1978, 84 SCRA 41.
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himself was found reprehensible. Similarly, in Perez v. Suller,
83
a judge
improperly presided over the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint
wherein the complaining witness was his nephew. The High Court held that
the judge should have inhibited himself, because while conducting
preliminary investigation may not be construed strictly as sitting in a case,
the underlying reason behind disqualification under Rule 3.12 of the New
Code of J udicial Conduct for the Philippine J udiciary and Section 1 of Rule
137. (The incident took place before the first level courts had been relieved of
the duty to conduct preliminary investigation).

In Garcia v. Dela Pena,
84
a Municipal Trial Court judge was dismissed
for taking cognizance of a criminal complaint lodged by his brother, and
issuing a warrant of arrest. The Supreme Court stated:

The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a
case where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside
in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just
decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to his fairness and integrity. The law conclusively
presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such
a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his
authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent
of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the peoples
faith and confidence in the courts justice.

The Judges duty to sit

J udges must always bear in mind that they have a duty to sit. Their
duty to sit is to try and decide cases filed and raffled to their courts.
Accordingly, this duty is violated when a judge inhibits himself not on any
ground provided for in the rules. There are times when judges inhibit
themselves from a case not because of their honest belief that under
circumstances they may not be able to try and decide the case with
objectivity but for personal reasons. Usually these personal reasons are
the judges aversion to handle hot potato cases which involve disputes
between two or more very powerful parties; their slothfulness or feeling of
inadequacy to work on difficult and complicated cases or those involving
extremely recondite issues; their desire to relieve themselves of a case
because they have been approached or pressured by individuals about the

83
A.M. No. MTJ -94-436, November 6, 1995, 249 SCRA 665.
84
A.M. No. MTJ -92-637, February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA 766.
J UDICIAL ETHICS

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case whom they can ill-afford to displease; their fear of being administratively
charged by a lawyer appearing before them who has a notorious reputation
of filing administrative cases against judges at the drop of a hat.

J udges must exercise utmost circumspection in granting motions for
their voluntary inhibition because this practice is sometimes resorted to for
forum shopping purposes. If a judge determines that he has to inhibit, he
must state in his order the precise reason or reasons for the inhibition.

Voluntary inhibition

A judge is allowed under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137
of the Rules of Court, supra, to voluntary inhibit from a case for just or valid
reasons other than those grounds of disqualification. The judge should
always remind himself to hear or decide cases filed or raffled to his court. In
inhibition of judges, a judge may motu proprio or on motion of a party
voluntarily recuse from a case if he has good or valid reasons which render
him incapable of acting objectively on the case.

Absent any ground for disqualification, a judge should not inhibit and if a
motion to that effect is filed, he should deny it if, despite the circumstances
cited by the movant, he honestly believes that he can act on the case
objectively. That notwithstanding, it may be helpful for a judge, faced with a
motion to inhibit, to consider the counsel of the Supreme Court:
85

A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a
litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might
be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice
against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably
capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a
way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired.

One factor that a judge should consider in resolving a motion for
voluntary inhibition is the availability of a judge to take over the case should
he decide to recuse from it. Parayno v. Meneses,
86
suggests that under the
circumstances, the judge should not inhibit in order that justice may not be
delayed.

85
Pimentel v. Salonga, G.R. No. L-27934, September 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 160.
86
G.R. No. 112684, April 26, 1994, 231 SCRA 807.
J UDICIAL ETHICS

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There can be situations which put a judge in a dilemma as when there
is an otherwise persuasive motion to inhibit impugning his impartiality but the
latter knows it to be not true. Should he inhibit or not?

This is actually addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. He has
to carefully balance the equities: the duty to sit and the duty to see to it that
the peoples trust in the court is not impaired. It is not advisable to give a
pandemic solution because each case has its peculiar circumstances.

Remittal of disqualification

Remittal of disqualification is the process by which a judge who is
disqualified to sit on a case on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 5,
Canon 3, may purge himself of such a disqualification so that he may act
upon the case. This process is allowed under Section 6 of the same Canon
which provides:

A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing
from the proceeding, disclose on the records the basis of
disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and
lawyers, independently of the judges participation, all agree in
writing that the reason for inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial,
the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement,
signed by all the parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the
record of the proceedings.

The New Code of J udicial Conduct for the Philippine J udiciary
(Annotated) comments: Notably, the decision to continue hearing the case,
despite the existence of reasons for disqualification should be: (1) coupled
with bona fide disclosure to the parties-in-litigation; and (2) subject to
express acceptance by all the parties of the cited reason as material or
substantial. Absent such agreement, the judge may not continue to hear the
case.

The judge should disclose on the record the basis for his
disqualification. Perhaps prompted by cultural sense of delicadeza, some
magistrates state only personal reasons as the ground for inhibiting
themselves. The parties affected would often not question such
disqualification, usually for fear of incurring the judges ire. However, such
vague reasoning is not acceptable, as it would effectively place voluntary
disqualification at the whim of the judge. This kind of latitude is not intended
to affect the rule.

x x x x
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Each step must be strictly followed. Any deviation renders the
waiver invalid. For example, the judge must affirmatively disclose facts
that might be grounds for disqualification. Moreover, in some jurisdictions,
the judge must obtain a waiver from both lawyers and parties. Waivers by
lawyers alone will not suffice.

The judge is invested with the great responsibility of ensuring that
the judiciarys impartiality will forever be maintained and upheld. The
decision of whether the judge will proceed or recuse in a case depends on
which course of action would allow the parties to be properly heard and
given their day in court so that ultimately the ends of justice are fully
served.

D. CANON 4: PROPRIETY

1. Concept

Propriety is a conduct which is in accord with the conventional
practices of decorum, dignity and decency which is demonstrative of good
breeding, good manners and refinement.

In regard to a judge, propriety is his becoming behavior not only as a
magistrate but also as a private individual which shows his rectitude,
respectability, urbanity and graciousness. A judge should not only act and
behave with propriety but must appear to be so in order to earn the trust of
the people in the courts.


Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.

87


3.1.1. avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
their activities;
88

87
88
Id., Sec. 1.
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3.1.2. accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of
the judicial office;
89

3.1.3. in their personal relations with lawyers regularly practicing in
their court, avoid situations which may reasonably give rise
to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism;
90
and

3.1.4. in exercising their freedom of expression, belief, association
and assembly, act and behave in such a manner as to
preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality
and independence of the judiciary.
91

3.2. What judges may do: they may

3.2.1. subject, to the proper performance of judicial duties, teach
and participate in activities concerning the law and related
matters; appear at public hearing before an official body
concerned with matters relating to law and the legal system,
the administration of justice or related matters; engage in
other activities which do not detract from the dignity of the
judicial office or otherwise interfere with the performance of
judicial duties;
92

3.2.2. form or join associations of judges or participate in other
organizations representing the interest of judges;
93
and

3.2.3. subject to law and to any legal requirements of public
disclosure, receive a token gift, award or benefit as
appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that
such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived
as intended to influence the judge in the performance of
judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of
partiality.
94

89
Id., Sec. 2.
90
Id., Sec. 3.
91
Id., Sec. 6.
92
Id., Sec. 10.
93
Id., Sec. 12.
94
Id., Sec. 15.
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3.3. What J udges shall not do: they shall not

3.3.1. participate in the determination of a case in which any
member of their family represents a litigant or is associated in
any manner with the case;
95

3.3.2. allow the use of their residence by a lawyer to receive clients
of the latter or of other members of the legal profession;
96

3.3.3. use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their
private interest or those of any member of their family or
anyone else;
97

3.3.4. use or disclose confidential information acquired by them in
their judicial capacity for any purpose unrelated to their judicial
duties;
98

3.3.5. practice law;
99

3.3.6. ask for or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by them in
connection with the performance of judicial duties; this
prohibition includes the members of their families;
100
and

3.3.7. knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their
influence, direction or authority to ask for, or accept, any gift,
bequest, loan, or favor in relation to anything done or to be
done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties and
functions.
101

4. Comment

The bulk of Supreme Court decisions on administrative cases
against judges pertains to acts, omissions, conduct or behavior
constituting judicial impropriety.

95
Id., Sec. 4.
96
Id., Sec. 5.
97
Id., Sec. 8.
98
Id., Sec. 9.
99
Id., Sec. 11.
100
Id., Sec. 13.
101
Id., Sec. 14.
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The earlier cases are cited in the New Code of J udicial Conduct of
the Philippine J udiciary (Annotated) including: Hadap v. Lee,
102
in which
a judge, while solemnizing a marriage told the bride and groom to
sexually satisfy each other at all times; Mariano v. Gonzales,
103
in which
a judge assigned a female stenographer to his chambers; Rifical v.
Valimire,
104
where the judge, before a trial, invited a counsel of a party
into his chambers without disclosing the reason for such invitation; In re:
Acua,
105
where the judge during the trial uttered the following
expressions: putris and putang ina even if they are not directed to any
particular individual; and, in Tan v. Rosete,
106
where the respondent
judge sent a member of his staff to talk with complainant and show
copies of his draft decisions, and his act of meeting with litigants outside
the office premises beyond office hours.

New jurisprudence

The new cases on impropriety need an extended treatment
because of their importance and in order for the judges to know the nature
of the acts and conduct which were adjudged by the Supreme Court to be
violative of the canon on propriety and the sanctions imposed thereon.

1. Six administrative cases were filed against respondent judge. The
cases were jointly heard by the investigating justice who thereafter
submitted to the Supreme Court his findings that respondent judge is
guilty of gross misconduct (abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the
law) in several cases. The investigating magistrate recommended to the
Court the dismissal of the respondent judge. The Supreme Court adopted
the findings of the investigating magistrate.

Prosecutor Reyes, Complainant

For failure of the prosecutor to appear in several hearings before
respondent judges court, he was cited in contempt of court despite his
explanation that the hearings referred to by respondent judge were cases
which were the subject of a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus which complainant filed against the judge. His explanation
was ignored and respondent judge sent him to jail for one day. She fixed

102
110 SCRA 555.
103
144 SCRA 112.
104
85 SCRA 313.
105
464 SCRA 350.
106
A.M. No. MTJ -04-1563, September 8, 2004, No. 02-1207-MTJ , 437 SCRA 581.
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the bail for the temporary liberty of the prosecutor in the amount of
P238,000.00.

In the proceeding in which complainant was explaining that his
having been cited in contempt of court and sent to jail was erroneous, the
respondent judge did not only reject the contention of the prosecutor but
she also cited her for indirect contempt of court, this time sentencing her
to an imprisonment of seven (7) days.

The investigating magistrate held that respondent judge manifested
an abysmal lack of knowledge of the rules on contempt and the
jurisprudence on the subject. In fixing an atrociously exorbitant bail
calculated to be beyond the means of the prosecutor, respondent judge
showed vindictiveness and oppressiveness.

In another case, respondent judge ordered the same prosecutor to
conduct an inquest against her Branch Clerk of Court on the basis of an
affidavit of a person sworn to before the respondent judge. The affiant
stated that the Branch Clerk of Court committed acts constituting
malversation of public funds. The prosecutor explained to the judge that
inquest was not proper because the charge was malversation and the
Branch Clerk of Court was not arrested without a warrant of arrest. The
respondent judge told the prosecutor that if inquest was not proper, then
she should conduct right there and then a preliminary investigation. The
prosecutor explained that this could not be done either because there was
a process to be followed under the rules. Nonetheless, respondent judge
ordered the police to detain the Branch Clerk of Court.

The acts of the respondent judge constituted blatant and gross
ignorance of the law and demonstrated arrogance and bullheadedness.

Migrio Case

For failure of her Branch Clerk of Court to set for arraignment the
case of People v. Rivera,
107
for a period of 1,510 working days from the
filing of the information and to set for hearing several other cases,
respondent judge ordered Migrio to show cause why he should not be
cited for indirect contempt for at least 2,330 contemptuous acts.

Before the proceeding in that indirect contempt of court, the
respondent judge ordered the incarceration of Migrio for 4 days pending
preliminary investigation of the charge of malversation against him. There

107
People vs. Marcos Rivera, (Criminal Case No. 36172).
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was absolutely no basis for the imprisonment of Migrio. Patently, these
acts constitute gross ignorance of the law, abuse of authority with bad
faith and oppression.

Flordeliza Case

Respondent judge was found to have committed the following
unethical acts: a) borrowing money from the staff; b) instructing her
stenographer to collect a minimum amount far in excess of what is allowed
by the rules; c) uttering the following vulgar words to the members of her
staff: Ano kaya kung mag-hearing ako ng hubot hubad tapos naka-robe
lang, puwede kaya? Hayaan mo Farah, pagnatikman ko na siya, papasa
ko sa iyo, hahaha!, Alam ko staff ko rin nagsumbong, eh, putang ina nila,
putang ina talaga nila.

On several occasions, respondent judge walked out of the
courtroom during hearings shouting invectives at her staff and lawyers.

The investigating magistrate pronounced that respondent judges
words were vulgar and curt which demonstrated his unfitness for a judicial
office.

Evidence also showed that for sometime, respondent judge resided
in her chambers. In fact, she put in there her big aparador. On several
occasions, she was brought out at midnight by a military officer and would
be brought back at 4:00 oclock in the morning.

Respondent judge violated the circular of the Supreme Court that
judges should not use their chambers as their residence. Her nocturnal
activities of going out with a military officer, at the very least, gave the
perception that she was committing an immoral act.

Sebastian Jr.s Case

During the promulgation of judgment against complainant presided
by respondent judge, she allowed the Branch Clerk of Court to read only
the dispositive part of the decision of conviction. When counsel for the
accused demanded a copy of the decision, he was given a diskette by the
judge which according to her contained her decision.

These acts at promulgation of judgment of conviction contravened
the Rules of Court.

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As recommended by the investigating magistrate, the Supreme
Court dismissed the respondent judge with all the accessory penalties.
108

2. In the monthly meeting of Mandaluyong City, the subject of allowances
of judges from the City Government was taken up. There was a heated
discussion on the subject of allowance. Respondent judge angrily
shouted at complainant judge telling her sinungaling ka a number of
times. Complainant judge responded: Matanda ka na, halos malapit ka
na sa kamatayan, gumagawa ka pang ganyan! Respondent judge shot
back: Bog, sana mangyari sa iyo, bog.

Following that incident, respondent judge prepared a memorandum
in which she again narrated the unseemly conduct and attitudes of the
complainant judge. She had this memorandum distributed to the other
judges in that City.

The Supreme Court ruled that both complainant judge and
respondent judge violated Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of J udicial
Conduct. By quarrelling within the court premises, said judges failed to
observe proper decorum expected of members of the J udiciary. More
detestable is the fact that their squabble arose out of mere allowances
from the local government unit. The complainant judge and respondent
judge were each fined P11,000.00.
109

3. The respondent judge was observed to have a very close association
with a lawyer of a party which led the complainant to believe that he has
already been predisposed to the opposing party. This behavior
transgresses the norms of judicial propriety. In imposing the
administrative penalty on the respondent judge, the Supreme Court took
into consideration his scrappy record. Earlier, he was fined P10,000.00 for
gross irregularity, P40,000 for serious inefficiency, P20,000 for misconduct
and dishonesty, and P5,000.00 for failure to act with dispatch in the
performance of his official functions.

108
Reyes v. Judge Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ -06-1623; Migrinio, et. al. v. Judge Reyes, A.M. MTJ -06-
1624; Flordeliza, et. al. v. Judge Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ -06-1625; Lagdameo v. Judge Reyes, A.M.
No. MTJ -06-16l27; Migrio v. Judge Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ -06-1638; Sebastian, Jr. v. Judge
Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ -06-1638, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 345.
109
Judge Capco-Umali v. Judge Acosta-Villarante, A.M. No. RTJ -082124, August 27, 2009, 597
SCRA 240.
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Although the charge against the respondent judge was not that
serious, the Court, in view of his bad record, imposed upon him a fine of
P20,000.00.
110

4. Respondent judge was under preventive suspension as a result of a
rape case filed against him. While in that status, he represented two
accused in two criminal cases and a party in a civil case. The Supreme
Court suspended him for three months for his unethical conduct of
practicing law considering that technically, he was still in the service.

Note: He was finally acquitted of the rape case.
111

5. Respondent judge accommodated the request of two ladies to
accompany them to a house being occupied by the complainant to explain
to him that what the sheriff delivered to his mother-in-law was the wrong
property and that the two ladies, who clamed to be the owner of said real
property, were willing to pay him P100,000.00 to leave the premises.

When questioned about his act, respondent judge explained that he
acted in his private capacity and just wanted to help the two ladies.

The Supreme Court said that the judges intention may be good but
he should bear in mind that his office demands standards of decorum to
avoid the impression of impropriety. The judge could not avoid the
perception that he was using his judicial position to help persons settle a
legal dispute. Respondent judge was fined P5,000.00.
112

6. The Supreme Court dismissed from the service the respondent judge
for borrowing P5,000.00 from a lawyer who had at least two cases
pending in her sala. That respondent judge had already paid the debt
does not militate against her administrative culpability. Her conduct
violated paragraph 7, Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court (borrowing
money from a lawyer who has a case pending before the court) which also
constituted gross misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility aggravated by, among others, undue delay in rendering
decisions and orders, and violation of Supreme Court rules, directives,
and circulars.
113

110
Malabed v. Judge Asis, A.M. No. RTJ -07-2031, August 4, 2009, 595 SCRA 23.
111
Binalay v. Judge Lelina, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ -08-2132, J uly 11, 2009, 594 SCRA 547.
112
Favor v. Judge Untalan, A.M. RTJ -08-2158, J uly 30, 2009 594 SCRA 282.
113
Concerned Lawyers of Bulacan v. Judge Villalon-Pornillos, A.M. No. RTJ -07-2063, J uly 7,
2009, 592 SCRA 36.
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7. Respondent judge was fined P40,000.00 for grave misconduct for
harassing and publicly humiliating a clerk, calling her a whore, GRO,
and pakialamera among others.
114

8. The act of leaking an unpromulgated decision is a grave misconduct. In
this case, respondent Supreme Court justice was found, on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, to be the source of the leakage. The Court
pointed out that an unpromulgated decision in a pending case is a
privileged or a confidential matter because it has not yet been made a
matter of public record. Undoubtedly, the release of such a document
infringed on the confidential internal deliberations of the Court. The
respondent justice was found guilty of grave misconduct and fined
P500,000.00 plus other sanctions.
115

9. The respondent judge was exonerated of a charge of misconduct
because the records of a case in his former sala were lost at the time
when he was already presiding over another court. But the importance of
the decision in this case is that it sets down the rules on the responsibility
to act on cases left by a judge who has been designated to preside over
another court.

a. Basically, a case once raffled to a branch belongs to that branch
unless re-raffled or otherwise transferred to another branch in
accordance with established procedure. When a presiding judge is
transferred to another station, he leaves behind all the cases he tried
with the branch to which they belong. He does not take these cases
with him even if he tried them and were submitted for decision before
his transfer. The judge who takes over this branch inherits all these
cases and assumes full responsibility for them. He may decide them
as they are his cases, unless any of the parties moves that his case
be decided by the judge who substantially heard the evidence and
before whom the case was submitted for decision. If a party
therefore so desires, he may simply address his request or motion to
the incumbent Presiding J udge who shall then endorse the request to
the Office of the Court Administration (OCA) so that the latter may in
turn endorse the matter to the judge who substantially heard the
evidence and before whom the case was submitted for decision.
This will avoid the renvoir of records and the possibility of an irritant

114
Lihaylihay v. Judge Canda, A.M. No. MTJ -05-1588, J une 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 363.
115
In re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC, February 24, 2009, 580
SCRA 106.

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between the judges concerned, as one may question the authority of
the other to transfer the case to the former. If coursed through the
OCA, the judge who is asked to decide the case is not expected to
complain, otherwise, he may be liable for insubordination and his
judicial profile may be adversely affected.

b. When a judge is designated presiding judge in another branch of the
court, the following procedure may be followed: First, the J udge who
takes over the branch must immediately make an inventory of the
cases submitted for decision left behind by the previous J udge
(unless the latter has in the meantime been promoted to a higher
court). Second, the succeeding judge must then inform the parties
that the previous judge who heard the case, at least substantially,
and before whom it was submitted for decision, may be required to
decide the case. In this event, and upon request of any of the
parties, the succeeding judge may request the Court Administrator to
formally endorse the case for decision to the judge before whom it
was previously submitted for decision. Third, after the judge who
previously heard the case is through with his decision, he should
send back the records together with his decision to the branch to
which the case properly belongs, by registered mail or by personal
delivery, whichever is more feasible, for recording and promulgation,
with notice of such fact to the Court Administrator.

Since the primary responsibility over a case belongs to the presiding
judge of the branch to which it has been raffled or assigned, he may
also decide the case to the exclusion of any other judge provided that
all the parties agree in writing that the incumbent presiding judge
should decide the same, or unless the judge who substantially heard
the case and before whom it was submitted for decision has in the
meantime died, retired or for any reason has left the service, or has
become disabled, disqualified, or otherwise incapacitated to decide
the case.
116

10. Respondent judge failed to obey the order of the OCA to file his
comment on an administrative complaint filed against him. This was not
the first time that he failed or refused to obey an OCA order to comment
on administrative complaint. Earlier on, respondent judge was suspended
for six (6) months for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of
authority for which he was fined P14,000.00 for his failure to comment on
an administrative complaint.

116
Heirs of Jose and Olorga v. Judge Beldia, Jr., AM No. RTJ -08-2137, February 10, 2009, 578
SCRA 191.
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In this case, the Supreme Court held that such repeated
disobedience to an order to comment betrays not only a recalcitrant streak
in character but also disrespect of the Court Administrators lawful orders
and directives. Respondent judge was suspended for two (2) months
without pay.
117

11. Respondent judge made the following offensive statements in his
Comments:

CA Locks hostile mindset and his superstar complex xxx;

xxx in his frenzied display of arrogance CA Lock loses his
objectivity and misuses the power of his office; Velascos
malicious speculations about the guilt of the undersigned xxx
Speculations, especially those that emanate from the poisonous
intentions of attention-seeking individuals, are no different from
garbage that should be rejected outright.

For this harsh and insulting language, the Supreme Court
reprimanded the respondent judge.
118

12. For just one offensive remark of respondent judge in open court, he
was fined P5,000.00. Addressing the complainant, the respondent judge
said: Next time you see your husband, open your arms and legs.
119

E. CANON 5: EQUALITY

1. Concept

Equality, in its juridical sense, is equal opportunity of all persons in the
enjoyment and exercise of human rights and the constitutional freedoms and
liberties, including equal protection by the State of peoples lives, security,
properties and other interests.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution commands that no person shall
be denied the equal protection of the law. This principle mandates
government and all its functionaries to treat the people alike, both as to rights

117
Sinaon, Sr. v. Judge Dumlao, A.M. No. MTJ -04-1519, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 531.
118
Re. Conviction of Judge Angeles, A.M. No. RTJ -06-9-5215-RTC, J anuary 31, 2008, 543
SCRA 196.
119
Guanzon v. Judge Rufon, A.M. No. RTJ -07-2038, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 38.
J UDICIAL ETHICS

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conferred and responsibilities imposed. No man is above the law, and the
law must be applied equally to all.

Discrimination on account of race, nationality, gender, social status,
and degree of education is anathema to justice and fair play. It also offends
the Constitution and if the perpetrator is a judge, he transgresses, in addition,
Canon 5 of the New Code of J udicial Conduct for the Philippine J udiciary.


Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the
due performance of the judicial office.

3. Abstract of the Rules on Canon 5
120


3.1.1. be aware of, and understand diversity in society and
differences arising from various sources, including but not
limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin, case,
disability, age, marital status, sexual orientations, social and
economic status and other like causes;
121

3.1.2. carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all
persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff
and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant
ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties;
122

and

3.1.3. require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from
manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on
irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally relevant to an
issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate
advocacy.
123

120
121
Id., Sec. 1.
122
Id., Sec. 3.
123
Id., Sec. 5.
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3.2. What judges shall not do: they shall not

3.2.1. manifest, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice towards any
person or group on irrelevant grounds;
124
and

3.2.2. knowingly permit court staff or others subject to the judges
influence, direction or control to differentiate between persons
concerned, in a matter before the judge; on any irrelevant
grounds.
125

4. Comment

The New Code of J udicial Conduct for the Philippine J udiciary
(Annotated) pertinently comments:

Conducting judicial proceedings in a manner and with an attitude that
affirms the dignity of such proceedings is crucial to maintaining public
confidence in the judiciary. J udges should not yield to first impression, reach
hasty conclusions or prejudge matters.
126
They have a duty to ensure that
the minority status of the accused plays no part in their decisions.
127
Neither
should judges insult witnesses in the hallway or in pleadings filed before the
Supreme Court.
128
Likewise, judges may not use derogatory or
condescending language in their judgment when dealing with a rape
complaint.
129
Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of objectivity on
the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants that the judicial system is fair
and just.
130

J udges should avoid private remarks, hasty conclusions, or
distasteful jokes that may give even erroneous impressions of prejudice and
lead the public to believe that cases before them are being prejudged.
131

When a judge in an arraignment advised an accused of the best course of
action, it appeared that the judge was taking sides with the accused. This
behavior may create the impression that the sentence meted out to the
accused is in colorful vernacular lutong macao.

124
Id., Sec. 2.
125
Id., Sec. 4.
126
Castillo v. Juan, supra note 52.
127
People v. Orvillas, G.R. No. 137666, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 659.
128
Sy v. Judge Fineza, A.M. RTJ -03-1808, October 15, 2003, 413 SCRA 374.
129
Iglesia ni Kristo v. Gironella, A.M. No. 2440-CFI, J uly 25, 1981, 106 SCRA 1.
130
Castillo v. Juan, supra note 52; Mateo v. Villaluz, G.R. No. 34756, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA
18.
131
Castillo v. Juan, supra note 52; Abinag v. Estonina, Adm. Case No. 91-MJ , J uly 23, 1974, 58
SCRA 49; Otero v. Esguerra, Adm. Case No. 6550-MJ , May 23, 1974, 57 SCRA 47.
J UDICIAL ETHICS

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The other examples of violation of this canon are: a) favoritism
toward some lawyers; b) discrimination in the calendaring of cases; c) trifling
with small cases; d) impatience with unlettered witnesses; e) manifest
deferential treatment of powerful parties; and d) very low regard for the
credibility of homosexual or lesbian witnesses.

F. CANON 6: COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

1. Concept

1.1. Competence

J udicial competence is an important value which means proficiency
with the basic legal principles and well-settled and authoritative
doctrines. This value expected of a judge to strive for excellence is
exceeded only by his passion for truth to the end that he be the
personification of justice and the rule of law.
132

1.2 Diligence

Diligence subsumes the attribute of efficiency. The most important
aspects of diligence are: a) the observance of the reglementary periods
in resolving motions, deciding cases and undertaking a process
provided for in the laws and the rules; b) proper and effective
management of the business of the court; and c) the intensity and
pertinacious attention to ones work and the zeal to accomplish the task.


Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of
judicial office.

132
Conducto v. Monzon, A.M. No. MTJ -98-1147, J uly 2, 1998, 291 SCRA 619.
J UDICIAL ETHICS

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3. Abstract of the Rules on Canon 6
133

3.1. Competence
134

3.1.1. What judges shall do: they shall

3.1.1.1. take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their
knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the
proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for
this purpose of the training and other facilities which should
be made available under judicial control to judges;
135
and

3.1.1.2. keep themselves informed about relevant
developments of international law, including international
conventions and other instruments establishing human rights
norms.
136

3.2. Diligence
137

3.2.1. What judges shall do: they shall
3.2.1.1. always keep in mind that their judicial duties take
precedence over all other activities;
138

3.1.1.1. devote their professional activity to judicial duties,
which include not only the performance of judicial functions
and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but
also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the courts
operations;
139

3.1.1.2. perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable
promptness;
140
and

3.1.1.3. maintain order or decorum in all proceedings before
the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation
to litigants, witnesses, lawyers, and others subject to their
influence, direction or control.

133
134
Id., Secs. 3 and 4.
135
Id., Sec. 3.
136
Id., Sec. 4.
137
Id., Secs. 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7.
138
Id., Sec. 1.
139
Id., Sec. 2.
140
Id., Sec. 5.
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3.2.2. What judges shall not do: they shall not

3.2.2.1. engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent
discharge of judicial duties.
141

4. Comment

4.1. Competence

The Constitution prescribes that a judge, among others, must be a
person of proven competence. Antithetical to competence is gross
ignorance of the law. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, an error or
irregularity on the part of a judge on the application and interpretation of
the law must not only be contrary to law and jurisprudence but should be
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption.
142

Gross ignorance of the law is classified under Section 8, Rule 140
of the Rules of Court as a serious charge. Under Section 11 of that Rule,
a serious offense may be sanctioned by a fine exceeding P20,000.00 but
not more than P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6)
months; or dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the court may determine, and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.

Good faith is a defense against a charge of gross ignorance of the
law. To be an effective defense, however, good faith must be within the
perimeter of tolerable judgment and does not apply when the issues are
so simple and the legal principles are so evident and basic as to be
beyond possible margins of error.
143

Recent jurisprudence on gross ignorance of the law

1. In the three administrative cases against a respondent judge, the
Supreme Court found him guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

In A.M. No. RTJ -07-2063, respondent judge, in contravention of a
hornbook decisional doctrine, issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the collection of taxes. The Court restated the doctrine that

141
Id., Sec. 7.
142
Duduaco v. Laquindanum, A.M. No. MTJ -05-1601, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 428.
143
Poso v. Mijares, A.M. No. RTJ -02-1693, August 21, 2002, 387 SCRA 485
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taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and it is of public interest that
their collection should not be restrained.

Respondent judge also ignored basic procedural rule in granting
the motion for intervention without notice to the Republic which was a
party in the case.

In A.M. No. RTJ -07-2064, respondent judge issued a writ of
preliminary injunction which was enforced outside of his territorial
jurisdiction. The facts in this case would not bring the questioned act of
the respondent judge under the umbrella of the exception enunciated in
Gayacao v. Executive Secretary.
144

Finally, in A.M. No. RTJ -07-2005, the respondent judge erroneously
issued a writ of execution ordering the sheriff to place private respondents
in possession of the disputed property, even when there was no
adjudication of possessory rights over the subject property.

Considering that respondent judge had already been fined
P5,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law in Dantes v. Judge Caguioa,
145

the Court this time imposed upon the judge the supreme penalty of
dismissal from the service with all accessory penalties.
146

2. The grant by respondent judge of a Motion for New Trial in Moreno v.
Moreno,
147
was improper because the psychological report and the
affidavit of psychiatrist who conducted the examination were not attached
to the motion, pursuant to the 2
nd
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court which requires that a motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence shall be supported by affidavits of witnesses by
whom such evidence is expected to be given, or by duly authenticated
documents which are supposed to be introduced in evidence. Moreover,
the psychological report cannot be considered a newly discovered
evidence because it did not yet exist at the time of the trial as the
psychological examination was conducted only after the dismissal of the
case.

In Perez v. Perez,
148
the respondent judge was also found guilty of
ignorance of the law when he erroneously took cognizance of the second

144
Gayacao v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 21066, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 753, 756-757.
145
Dantes v. Judge Caguiao, RTJ -05-1919, J une 27, 2005, 461 SCRA 236.
146
Republic v. Judge Caguioa, A.M. No. RTJ -07-2063, Commissioner of Customs v. Judge
Caguioa, A.M. No. RTJ -07-2064, and Burns, Jr. v. Judge Caguioa, A.M. No. RTJ -07-2064, J une
26, 2009, 591 SCRA 51.
147
Joyce Moreno v. Alvin Moreno (Civil Case No. 188-0-01).
148
Eliodoro Q. Perez v. Adelita Perez (Civil Case No. 328-0-2001).
J UDICIAL ETHICS

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petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity filed by the petitioner therein considering that he had already
dismissed with prejudice the first petition involving the same parties,
issues and causes of action as those of the second petition. When the
dismissal is with prejudice, then the same case cannot be refiled unless
otherwise ordered by a superior court.

Respondent judge was also found to be grossly ignorant of the law
when, during the administrative investigation, he asserted that whether the
dismissal was with or without prejudice, the aggrieved party can refile the
case.

Finally, the respondent judge showed yet again his gross ignorance
of the law when in the same Perez case, he rendered a decision without
awaiting the report of the public prosecutor on the result of his
investigation to determine collusion between the parties as required by the
rules.

For the serial commission of acts constituting gross ignorance of
the law, the Court imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service of the
respondent judge.
149

3. The respondent judge was the pairing judge of another branch. The
judge of this other branch filed his leave of absence. Before the effectivity
of the leave of absence, respondent judge took cognizance of and acted
upon consolidated cases belonging to the other branch without permission
of the presiding judge therein.

In the same consolidated cases, respondent judge acted upon an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Order Respondent to Comply with the Writ of
Habeas Corpus with Urgent Partial Reconsideration (of the Order dated
May 1, 2006). This motion contained no notice of hearing. Despite the
contestable nature of the motion, the respondent judge did not require the
adverse party to file his comment.

Respondent judge also cited the complainant in direct contempt of
court when what he committed could only possibly be indirect contempt of
court. Moreover, complainant was not given any opportunity to respond to
the charge of contempt.

The Supreme Court found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of
the law for her above-stated acts and for abusing her contempt power in
violation of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

149
Suarez v. Judge Dilag, A.M. No. RTJ -06-2014, OCA v. Judge Dilag, A.M. No. 06-07-415-RTC,
March 4, 2009, 580 SCRA 491.
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The respondent judge was fined P40,000.00.
150

4. The accused whose case was pending in the RTC was arrested and
detained within the territorial jurisdiction of the municipal trial court
presided by the respondent judge. Respondent judge acted upon the
accuseds application for bail and granted the same. He was found guilty
of gross ignorance of the law because he granted bail without any
showing that there were no available RTC judges in the province. Thus,
he violated Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

What aggravated respondent judges administrative culpability was
his failure to file his comment to the administrative charge despite
repeated orders of the Office of the Court Administrator. For his
disobedience to the orders of the said office, he was fined P5,000.00.

For gross ignorance of the law and disobedience to the orders of
the COA, the respondent judge was dismissed from the service with all the
151

5. The respondent judge acted upon a case of grave coercion without
preliminary investigation. The imposable penalty of grave coercion is six
(6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of imprisonment. The
respondent judge reasoned out that since the minimum prescribed penalty
is only six (6) months and one (1) day, there is no need for preliminary
investigation because this process is required only when the imposable
penalty for the crime charged exceeds four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day. The minimum penalty for grave coercion does not exceed
that said benchmark penalty.

Either the respondent judge was unaware or simply ignored the
doctrinal pronouncement of the Supreme Court in San Agustin v.
People,
152
that, it is not the minimum but the maximum imposable penalty
of the crime charged that determines whether preliminary investigation is
required or not. The respondent judge was fined P20,000.00.
153

6. Undocumented forest products were seized by forestry officer. During
the pendency of the administrative adjudication conducted by the DENR,
the claimants of the seized forest products filed a complaint for replevin to

150
Tabujara III v. Judge Gonzales-Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ -08-2126, J anuary 20, 2009, 576 SCRA
404.
151
Barbero v. Judge Dumlao, A.M. MTJ -02-1682, J une 19, 2008, 555 SCRA 193.
152
G.R. No. 158211, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 392.
153
Santos v. Judge Bernardo, A.M. No. MTJ -07-1670, J uly 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 310.
J UDICIAL ETHICS

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recover possession of said forest products. Acting upon the application
for a writ of replevin, the respondent judge issued the same.

Respondent judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
on two counts: a) violation of the basic rule that a court cannot interfere in
the proceeding before an administrative body conducted in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction; and b) violation of the fundamental principle in
remedial law that replevin is not proper to secure possession of a property
under custodia legis.

Respondent judge was dismissed from office with all accessory
penalties.
154

7. Respondent judge tried an estafa case filed under Art. 315, par. 4(d) of
the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for which was in excess of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day. The respondent judge
treated the case as a violation of B.P. No. 22. Accordingly, the judge tried
the case under the Rule on Summary Procedure and without the benefit of
preliminary investigation. Respondent judge did not know a basic rule in
criminal law that the crime of estafa under the Revised Penal Code and
violation of B.P. No. 22 are distinct offenses governed by different rules of
procedure.

Respondent judge, who was also guilty of undue delay in the
resolution of a motion in two criminal cases, was fined P25,000.00.
155

8. The respondent judge committed gross ignorance of the law because
contrary to the rules and SC circulars, a) he issued a TRO without
conducting a summary hearing; b) he extended the 20-day period of the
TRO to another twenty (20) days; and c) he issued the TRO even if the
adverse parties were not at all notified of the application for the said
provisional remedy. Additionally, respondent judge violated the SC
circulars on raffle of cases when he allowed his branch clerk of court to
exchange a case raffled to his branch with another raffled to another
branch.

In dismissing the respondent judge from the public service, the
Court also took into consideration the fact that in two earlier cases, he was
fined P20,000.00 and P50,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law; and b)
suspended for six (6) months without salary for the same administrative
offense.
156

154
Dagudag v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ -06-2017, J une 19, 2008, 555 SCRA 217.
155
Blanco v. Judge Anday, A.M. No. MTJ -08-1700, J uly 22, 2008, 559 SCRA 328.
156
Mangandingan v. Judge Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ No. 04-1826, February 6, 2008, 544 SCRA 43.
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9. A criminal complaint for qualified theft of personal properties worth
P187,000.00 was filed with the municipal trial court presided by the
respondent judge. Without conducting a preliminary judicial examination,
respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest against the accused, herein
complainant. Complainant was arrested and incarcerated in the Provincial
J ail.

Respondent judge conducted a clarificatory hearing after which he
issued a resolution holding that he had jurisdiction over the case. A copy
of this resolution was mailed to the complainant more than two (2) months
after the issuance.

On a complaint for gross ignorance of the law, the Supreme Court
found the respondent judge to have committed three serious errors: a) he
acted on a criminal case in which his court has no jurisdiction because the
imposable penalty for the crime charged under Article 309, in relation to
Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, is very much higher than prision
correccional; b) he issued a warrant of arrest without preliminary judicial
examination resulting in the incarceration of the complainant; and c) for
serving a copy of his resolution to the complainant long after it was issued.

The Court found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for which he was fined P25,000.00.
157

10. Respondent judge issued a warrant of arrest against an accused
charged with a crime whose imposable penalty is only a fine in violation of
Sec. 5(c), Rule 112, Rules of Court. For gross ignorance of the law, the
judge was fined P5,000.00.
158

11. The case before the respondent judge was between Lavine
Loungewear, Mfg. v. Rizal Surety and Insurance Co.,
159
The plaintiff took
a fire insurance for its properties from several insurance companies,
including Rizal Surety and Insurance Co. The insured properties were
burned and so plaintiff sued the insurers, including Rizal Surety and
Insurance Co., for the fire insurance policy. Respondent judge rendered
judgment against the insurers, including Rizal Surety and Insurance Co.
In that decision, defendant Rizal Surety and Insurance Co was ordered to
pay plaintiff P17,100,000.00.

157
Garay v.Judge Bartolome, A.M. No. MTJ -08-1707, J une 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 492.
158
Si v. Judge Calis, A.M. No. MTJ -03-1483, December 28, 2007, 541 SCRA 534.
159
Lavine Loungewear, Mfg. v. Philippine Fire and Marine Insurance Corp., Rizal Surety and
Insurance Co., Tabacalera Insurance Co., First Lepanto-Taisho Insurance Corp., and Equitable
Insurance Corp. (Civil Case No. 68287).
J UDICIAL ETHICS

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A writ of execution was issued against defendant corporation.
Subsequently, the respondent judge issued another order directing the
sheriff to enforce the writ of execution against herein complainant QBE
Insurance Phils., Inc. An order of garnishment was also issued against
complainant, and resultantly, the latters credits and accounts were
garnished.

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge violated one of
the most basic and well-settled rules that a writ of execution cannot be
enforced against a non-party to the suit. The defense of the respondent
judge that OBE Insurance Phils., Inc. is just the new name of the
defendant Rizal Surety and Insurance Co. could not justify his action
because he should have observed due process before the respondent
judge could make such conclusion.

Respondent judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and was fined P40,000.00.
160

12. The respondent municipal court judge was found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for granting bail to an accused whose case was
pending in the RTC in Isabela, but was arrested within the territorial
jurisdiction of respondent judges court. There being no showing that the
RTC courts in Isabela were not available, there was no legal basis for the
respondent judges granting bail. He violated Section 17, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

During the administrative proceedings, respondent judge was
ordered by the Office of the Court Administrator to comment on the
complainants complaint but he failed for which he was fined P5,000.00.
Despite several reminders to him to file his comment, respondent judge
failed to comply.

Through it all, the Supreme Court dismissed the respondent judge
from office with all the accessory penalties.

Earlier jurisprudence on gross ignorance of the law

Note: In earlier cases, respondent judges were individually found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for the following acts: a) solemnizing
a marriage without a marriage license for which he was fined P10,000.00;
b) in an election case, ordering the revision of only 13 of the 162
precincts, the results of which were protested in violation of Section 255 of

160
QBE Insurance Phils., Inc. v. Judge Lavina, A.M. No. RTJ -06-1971, October 17, 2007, 536
SCRA 372.
J UDICIAL ETHICS

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the Omnibus Election Code; and putting the ballot boxes in the custody
of a janitor, contrary to Section 12 of the Rules on 1996 COMELEC Rules
on Procedure for which he was fined P20,000.00;
161
granting bail in a
murder case without hearing and based solely on the supporting affidavits
attached to the information in violation of Sections 7 and 8, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, for which he was fined
P20,000.00;
162
and solemnizing a marriage without the required marriage
license in violation of the Family Code, for which he was fined
P10,000.00.
163

4.2. Diligence

The usual acts, behaviors and conducts of a judge which offend the
canon on diligence are delay in acting upon interlocutory matters and
disposing of cases, inefficiency in conducting the business of the court,
and negligence in the performance of his official duties. Certainly, these
malapropos acts and conducts are intimately interrelated.

Gross inefficiency (delay in disposing of judicial business)

1. Respondent judge committed the following omissions constituting
gross inefficiency: failure a) to decide within the reglementary period
three (3) criminal cases and one (1) civil case; b) to resolve within the
reglementary period pending incidents in four (4) criminal and three (3)
civil cases; and c) to include in his monthly report nineteen (19) pending
cases. Respondent judge was fined P20,000.00.
164

2. For failure to resolve a motion for reconsideration of an order denying a
motion for reinvestigation for four (4) months, the Court fined the
respondent judge P20,000.00 for gross inefficiency.
165

3. The Branch Clerk of Court and respondent judge failed to transmit the
records of an appealed case to the appellate (RTC) court within 15 days
from the perfection of an appeal, as provided for in Section 6, Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court rejected the defense of the
respondent that he has a very heavy workload. The Court reminded the
respondent judge that conducting trial, resolving motions and rendering

161
Jaucian v. Judge Espinas, A.M. No. RTJ -01-1641, May 9, 2002, 382 SCRA 11.
162
Buzon v. Judge Velasco, A.M. No. RTJ -94-129, February 13, 1996, 252 SCRA 641.
163
Moreno v. Judge Bernabe, A.M. No. MTJ -94-963, J uly 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 120.
164
Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the MeTC, Branch 55, Malolos City, A.M. No. 08-3-
73-MetC, J uly 31, 2009, SCRA.
165
Biggel v. Judge Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ -08-2101, J uly 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 344.
J UDICIAL ETHICS

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decisions are not the only work of a judge, for they also include tasks
relevant to the courts operation. The SC found the respondent judge
guilty of undue delay in transmitting the records of a case and fined him
P11,000.00 with warning.
166

4. Even if the reasons proffered by respondent judge for his failure to
decide several criminal cases on time had been justifiable, he was still
liable for failing to secure an extension to decide the same. He was fined
P2,000.00.
167

5. A judge is ultimately responsible for ensuring that court personnel
perform their tasks and that the parties are promptly notified of his orders
and decisions. A judge cannot take refuge behind the mistakes and
inefficiency of his court personnel.
168

6. The respondent judge was the successor of J udge Pantanosos, J r.
who had retired. When the J udicial Audit Team examined the records of
respondents court, it found that the court had a total case load of 1,654
cases of which 115 cases have been submitted for decision. Of the 155
cases, 140 cases were already beyond the prescribed 90-day period to
decide ordinary cases or the 30-day period to decide cases covered by
the rules on summary procedure. There had been 10 cases with pending
incidents for resolution which had not been acted upon and 428 which had
remained dormant for a considerable length of time. Most of these cases
were left by J udge Pantanosas.

The Supreme Court found both respondent judges (retired and
incumbent) guilty of inefficiency in the performance of their duties for
failure to decide so many cases within the reglementary period. They
were each fined P10,500.00.
169

7. Respondent judge failed to resolve 165 cases for preliminary
investigation (before this task was removed from municipal judges) and 54
cases on the merits within the prescribed period. He also failed to comply
with the OCA order to submit within the time fixed by said office a
complete report of his case docket.

For such gross inefficiency, the SC fined him P100,000.00.
170

166
Lao v. Judge Mabutin, A.M. No. MTJ -06-1646, J uly 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 411.
167
Lagamon v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ -08-2123, J uly 12, 2008, 558 SCRA 50.
168
Torres v. Masamayor, A.M. NO. RTJ -07-2037, J une 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 546.
169
Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the MTCC, Branch 2, Cagayan de Oro City,
A.M. No. 02-8-207-MTCC, J uly 27, 2009, 594 SCRA 20.
170
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Galvez, A.M. No. MTJ -03-1472, October 17, 2007,
536 SCRA 345; Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the MTCC, Branch 2, Cagayan de Oro
City, supra.
J UDICIAL ETHICS

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Gross inefficiency (neglect of duty)

1. Respondent judge was found to have been absent from his station
without official leave of absence. He also issued an Order without his
signature. He has misinterpreted the Resolution of the COMELEC and
despite the motion for clarification, he failed to correct his erroneous
judicial act. All these constitute, according to the Supreme Court, serious
misconduct, gross inefficiency, and gross neglect of duty for which he was
suspended for six (6) months without pay.
171

2. The court of respondent judge found complainant guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced him to imprisonment and to pay the offended
party a civil liability. On appeal, the appellate court modified the penalty
by deleting imprisonment and replacing it with fine. Upon the finality of the
appellate judgment, respondent judge, despite the deletion of the penalty
of imprisonment, issued a Warrant of Arrest and Commitment on Final
Sentence against complainant which resulted in his incarceration in jail.

Respondent judge tried to shift the blame in the issuance of the
erroneous warrant of arrest on the branch clerk of court and court
stenographer. In rejecting said defense, the court reminded the judge that
he is not only responsible for the dispensation of justice but also for
managing his court efficiently. It was, therefore, his duty to meticulously
examine the work of his staff before signing it. This, he failed to do.

What made the case for the respondent judge worse was that after
the filing of the administrative complaint against him, he paid P250,000.00
to the complainant and promised to pay an additional P500,000.00 for him
to withdraw the case. Complainant did withdraw the case but the court
ignored the motion to withdraw and reprimanded the judge stating: The
deplorable act of respondent judge in giving money in exchange for the
withdrawal of the cases filed against him by the complainant cannot be
countenanced, being considered by law as an obstruction of justice.

The Supreme Court found the respondent judge guilty of gross
negligence in causing the wrongful arrest and imprisonment of the
complainant.

However, due to the fact that respondent judge died during the
pendency of the administrative proceeding, the court terminated and
closed the case without imposing any sanction.
172

171
Pangilinan v. Judge Jaungue, A.M. No. RTJ -08-2100, J anuary 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 251.
172
Bayaca v. Judge Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ -07-1676, J anuary 29, 2009, 577 SCRA 93.

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