Interpretation, Theatrical Performance, and Ontology

Author(s): Nol Carroll

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer, 2001), pp. 313-
316
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Symposium: Staging Interpretations Carroll, Interpretation, Performance, Ontology 313
Noel Carroll
Interpretation, Theatrical Performance, and Ontology
Both James Hamilton and David Saltz challenge
the ontological view that theatrical perfor-
mances are interpretations. Saltz even calls the
correlation between theatrical performances and
interpretations a fallacy. Because there are many
different ways to understand the relevant notions
of interpretation and because there are alterna-
tive ways of deploying them in characterizing
the ontological status of theatrical perfor-
mances, Hamilton and Saltz explore a number of
different formulations of the putative fallacy and
spike them one at a time.
I found both of these essays immensely rich
and penetrating, and I learned a great deal from
them. I agree with many of their findings. For
example, I believe that Saltz is absolutely cor-
rect to argue that the assimilation of so-called
theatricallperformative interpretation with criti-
cal interpretation is mistaken.' However, since
interpretation figures in the ontological distinc-
tion that I draw between mass artworks and live
theatrical performances,2 both Saltz and Hamil-
ton fear that I, too, commit the interpretation fal-
lacy. But on that point I have yet to be con-
vinced.
In certain respects, I have backed into this de-
bate. In the offending passages of my writing, I
was not directly concerned with developing an
account of the ontology of theatrical perfor-
mance, but rather an account of the ontology of
film and, then, of mass art. Part of my account of
mass art evolved through a contrast between
token performances of mass artworks, such as
film screenings, and token theatrical perfor-
mances. Both sorts of performances are tokens
generated from types, but I claim that there are
ontologically significant differences in their
manner of generation. Token performances of
mass artworks, such as film screenings, are gen-
erated by templates, such as reels of celluloid,
whereas token theatrical performances are gen-
erated from interpretations. The pertinent tem-
plates with regard to mass artworks are them-
selves tokens, whereas the interpretations that
mediate between theatrical types and token per-
formances thereof are types.
Connected to this distinction, then, is another,
which, though present in my writings, was not
perhaps as salient as it might have been.3 Token
performances of mass artworks, such as a film
screening, are derived from the relevant tem-
plates mechanically, electronically, or somehow
automatically without the intervention of inten-
tional processes. Getting a token performance of
a film onscreen involves essentially setting a
mechanism in motion; the process can be fully
automated.
In contrast, evolving an interpretation of a
theatrical type and implementing it require the
mediation of intentional processes-acts of
imagination and judgment by actors, directors,
set designers, costumers, lighting specialists,
and so on. Put into a rough slogan: token perfor-
mances of mass artworks are mechanically me-
diated; token theatrical performances are
mind-mediated.4
That is, if you want to explain why a character
is physically placed screen left in tonight's
screening/performance of The Phantom Men-
ace, you advert to a causal chain involving pho-
tography, chemistry, and the optics of projec-
tion. If you want to explain how the character
got to be standing stage left in tonight's theatri-
cal performance of Titus Andronicus, you refer
to a network of judgments, intentions, and gov-
erning interpretations, including the actor's be-
lief that that is where he should be standing.
The screen placement of the film actor tonight
is counterfactually dependent (in terms of proxi-
mate causation) on physical processes-the
structure of the relevant template and the projec-
tion system. The stage placement of the theater
actors tonight is counterfactually dependent on
intentional processes, including the actor's be-
liefs, relative to a governing interpretation,
about where he or she should be. All things
being equal, the placement of the film actor to-
night in relation to the overall screen space can-
not be otherwise, whereas the placement of the
theater actor can vary, should the actor judge or
believe that, in accordance with a better inter-
pretation of the scene in this space, he or she
should stand a little more upstage or downstage.
I use the notion of interpretation to label the
intentionally mediated distance between the
theatrical type and the token theatrical perfor-
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314
mance.5 The label "interpretation" was chosen,
not to align theatrical interpretation with critical
interpretation, but in the perfectly unexception-
able sense of "interpretation" as a matter of "fill-
ing something in." "Interpretation," in my sense,
involves going beyond the given; in this context,
it signals going beyond what is given by the play
type. From the perspective of executing a token
theatrical performance, the play type-which
may be specified by a text, or, as in many impro-
visations and rituals, by a mere action plan-is
incomplete. The performers and designers must
fill it in with determinate choices. That is to treat
the theatrical type as a recipe or a set of instruc-
tions or a baseline from which variations, i.e.,
interpretations, are to be spun.
The variations may mesh with or go against
the grain of the theatrical type, but either way
they are interpretations that fill in the recipe.
That is, I count as interpretations both attempts
to get at the authorial meaning of the text, such
as William Poel's production of Hamlet, Andre
Antoine's production of The Power of Darkness,
and Katie Mitchell's production of Henry VI,6 as
well as more radical rereadings, such as Richard
Foreman's of Three Penny Opera, Peter Sellars's
of The Merchant of Venice, and Joan Akalaitis's
of Cymbeline.7
Moreover, interpretations, in my sense, not
only concern the thematic meaning of the type,
but also judgments about the way in which the
actor should wear her hat, lower her sword, light
a cigarette or not, and so on. How that happens
tonight onstage is intentionally mediated, or, as I
would say, "interpretively mediated." How that
happens in a token performance of a motion pic-
ture is mechanically determined by a device run-
ning the template in accordance with the way the
machine was designed to be used. We see the
actor smoking a certain way in an episode of
Melrose Place because that is what the camera
recorded and what the appropriately functioning
projection apparatus (here a TV monitor) ren-
ders.
I further argue that the template-mechanism
model can be generalized across the production
of token performances and presentations of mass
artworks, and that it reveals an ontological dis-
tinction between them and the intention-
alistically or interpretively mediated production
of things like token theatrical performances on-
stage (as opposed to recordings therefrom). I still
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
think that this is a workable distinction, though I
will mention one potential sort of problem case
before concluding.
With these (I hope) clarifications in hand, let
me now turn to the reservations that Saltz and
Hamilton have voiced about my position. First, I
have repeatedly spoken of theatrical perfor-
mance tokens as being generated from interpre-
tations; I do not identify theatrical performance
tokens with interpretations.8 I think that I under-
stand Saltz's reluctance to call Rex Harrison's
three hundredth live, onstage rendition of "I've
Grown Accustomed to Her Face" an interpreta-
tion and his preference for calling Harrison's
theatrical performance an execution of the song.
But I do not think that this inclination compro-
mises my claim that the pertinent theatrical per-
formance token was generated from an interpre-
tation-a set of choices about cadences and
dramatic intonations-that, in this case, were
worked out in advance in concert with the direc-
tor and perhaps others. There is something that
we can call "Rex Harrison's interpretation of
'I've Grown Accustomed to Her Face,"' and his
three hundredth theatrical performance token of
it is counterfactually dependent on that, whereas
the one millionth film performance token of that
song at a screening somewhere in Sri Lanka is
generated by running a template of George
Cukor's My Fair Lady on the right kind of ma-
chine in the right way.
In speaking of the generation of performance
tokens by means of interpretations, I think that I
can acknowledge the distinction Saltz wishes to
maintain between interpretation and execution
without abandoning my central thesis about the
generation of theatrical performance tokens. At
the same time, however, though I agree that inter-
pretations are generally in place before perfor-
mances, I would not wish to preclude the possi-
bility that they may be born during performances.
An actor may discover a new line delivery-an
interpretive act of filling in the play, on my ac-
count-during a performance and then continue
to act in accordance with that interpretation on
subsequent evenings. Although Saltz is right that
not every element of a theatrical performance
token can be called an interpretation, even if it is
dependent on one, I do not think that he should, if
he does, want to deny that interpretations-that
then govern later performances-can emerge
during token theatrical performances.
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Symposium: Staging Interpretations Carroll, Interpretation,
Performance,
Ontology 315
Both Saltz and Hamilton appear to connect
the notion of interpretation pretty strictly to the
excavation of the meaning of a text. Thus, Saltz
correctly reminds us that performances may
challenge the meaning of a text, while Hamilton
helpfully points out that most theatrical perfor-
mances involve a great deal of what might be
called the stimulation of effects rather than the
projection of meanings. However, as already
mentioned, my use of "interpretation" is broader
than that of determining the meaning of a theat-
rical type; it refers to the filling out or fleshing
out of a theatrical text or action plan with effects
as well as implied meanings, whether or not they
correspond to authorial intentions.9 Casting an
actor, planning a lighting scheme, designing a
set, and adopting an "alienation technique" are
all parts of composing an interpretation on my
account and not merely, as Saltz might say,
choices consistent with their interpretation."10
Given the broadness of my concept of inter-
pretation, I resist those criticisms that emphasize
that there is more to theatrical performance than
the determination of meaning, or even canonical
meaning, narrowly construed. For I agree that
there is "more," but I count much of that "more"
as interpretation. Perhaps Saltz and Hamilton
will complain that my conception of interpreta-
tion is too broad. Nevertheless, I find some con-
firmation in my usage in ordinary language,
where the notion of dramatic interpretation, as
found, for example, in theater manuals, often
ranges beyond the decipherment of meaning to
the kinds of choices I count under the rubric of
filling in the theatrical type. And, in any event, if
it turns out that I have misused language here,
then I will be happy to look for another word for
the intentional processes I have located as onto-
logically essential for the generation of theatri-
cal performance tokens.'1
My use of the concept of interpretation
prompts Hamilton to worry that I must be think-
ing exclusively of text-based plays and he
rightly stresses that not all theatrical perfor-
mances are text based. Thus, he suggests that my
distinctions rest too narrowly on recent, espe-
cially western, models. His reasoning seems to
be: if performances are generated from interpre-
tations, these must be interpretations of some-
thing, and the most likely candidates are play
texts. But I think that interpretations in my sense
can also be fillings-in or fleshings-out of sketchy
action plans or oral instructions or traditional,
unwritten scripts passed down through the mem-
ory of a community or a troupe. The theatrical
type that is filled out by an interpretation need
not be a well-made play; therefore, my reliance
on interpretation does not entail an inadvertent
privileging of somewhat recent, arguably paro-
chial forms of western theater.
Saltz objects to my notion that token theatri-
cal performances are generated by interpretation
types on the grounds that actual performances
involve more fine-grained choices than are man-
dated by an interpretation type. That is, the exe-
cution of the performance token is not fully de-
termined by the interpretation. Tonight the wave
in the protagonist's hair is a little flatter than it
was last night. But I do not see why this calls
into question my claim that the actor's coiffure
is governed by an interpretation-in this in-
stance, a predetermined design-type intention-
ally created to fill in the "look" of the character.
Two numerically different coins may differ in
many subtle details (within certain variances)
while still being tokens of the same type.12 Per-
haps the problem here is that Saltz is confusing
my thesis about the generation of token theatri-
cal performances from interpretation types with
the thesis that token theatrical performances are
identical with interpretations.'3
In short, then, I remain fairly satisfied with
the ontological distinction that I drew between
the generation of token theatrical performances
and the generation of token presentations of
mass artworks. However, before concluding, I
should mention, as promised, one possible prob-
lem case.
There is a theatrical performance group called
Survival Research Laboratories. They specialize
in pieces involving machines crashing into and
destroying other machines in what might be
called "metallic gladiatorial spectacles." Since
these machines are directed by remote control
and, therefore, are intentionally mediated, these
performances are token theatrical performances
not only in terms of their distribution venues, but
on my theory as well. Nevertheless, it is easy to
imagine these machines being run automatically
by computers so that one might have congruent
performance tokens of the same program occur-
ring simultaneously at numerous different re-
ception sites in theaters all over the world.
Would such performances-which might
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316 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
pave the way for synchronic, robotic, Disney
productions of Beauty and the Beast every-
where-count as theatrical performance tokens
or as mass art performance tokens? Would they
blur the distinction that I set out earlier? My dis-
position would be to regard them as mass art
performance tokens, rather than theatrical per-
formance tokens, since they are mechanically
mediated rather than mind-mediated. But if intu-
itions lean powerfully in the opposite direction,
that would, of course, weigh heavily against my
theory.
NOEL CARROLL
Department of Philosophy
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Madison, Wisconsin 53706
1. One reason that I concur with Saltz is that whereas al-
ternative, incompatible critical interpretations cannot both
be acceptable, since they cannot both be true, incompatible
theatrical interpretations of the same play may each be theat-
rically acceptable.
2. See Noel Carroll, "Towards an Ontology of the Moving
Image," Film and Philosophy, ed. Cynthia Freeland and Tom
Wartenberg (New York: Routledge, 1995); Noel Carroll,
"Defining the Moving Image," in my Theorizing the Moving
Image (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and
Noel Carroll, "The Ontology of Mass Art," in my A Philoso-
phy of Mass Art (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998).
3. See my "Defining the Moving Image," pp. 68-69, and
"The Ontology of Mass Art," pp. 213-214.
4. This is why I disagree with Saltz's suggestion that the-
atrical productions could be templates in my sense. For the-
atrical performance tokens that are governed by what Saltz
calls "productions" involve the mediation of intentional pro-
cesses, whereas the templates I have in mind are machine in-
struments. I do, however, discuss some similarities between
theatrical productions and film productions in my "Towards
an Ontology of the Moving Image."
5. This, of course, is not intended to deny that interpreta-
tions go into the production of a film type. Certainly inter-
pretation is involved as a background condition in the cre-
ation of the templates that subsequently generate film
performances/screenings. However, once the template has
been fixed, you get to the token performance of the film type
by running the template on a machine, some sort of projec-
tion apparatus. The generation of the token film perfor-
mance, then, is achieved mechanically rather than via an in-
terpretation.
6. Mitchell says that when she works on an old play, she
looks up the etymological root of every word in the text. See
Gabriella Giannachi and Mary Luckhurst, eds., On Di-
recting: Interviews with Directors (New York: St. Martin's
Griffin, 1999), p. 95.
7. For an account of contemporary rereadings such as
these, see Amy S. Green, The Revisionist Stage: American
Directors Reinvent the Classics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
I should also note that my understanding of interpretation
is not so broad as to count Aim6 CUsaire's A Tempest or
Heiner Muller's Hamletmachine as interpretations of Shake-
speare, since each is an original play in its own right.
8. One of the subheadings in Saltz's article asks, "Are
Recipes Interpretations?" I should note that this query can-
not apply to my position, since, on my view, from the per-
spective of performing a play, it is play types and not inter-
pretations of play types that are recipes.
Also, Saltz says something very peculiar in this subsec-
tion of his essay. He maintains that determining with respect
to an apple pie recipe whether "sugar" should be understood
as granulated white sugar or unbleached sugar is a matter of
interpretation, while determining whether to read "apple" as
Granny Smith or Roma apples is a matter of execution. I do
not see the distinction that Saltz is getting at. Both decisions
seem to me to be interpretations, ways of filling in the recipe.
Thus, I am not moved by these examples to abandon my
view of interpretation.
Perhaps Saltz has in mind that the sugar case involves fig-
uring out what the recipe means, while the apple case is con-
cerned with figuring out how to implement the recipe. Nev-
ertheless, since my conception of the pertinent sort of
interpretation is not restricted to determining meaning, but
includes, as well, other kinds of decisions about the ways in
which to embody the play type, Saltz's distinction, if he re-
ally has one, does not threaten what I claim about theatrical
interpretation.
9. Thus, I count Brecht's treatment of the opening scene
of Coriolanus as a theatrical interpretation.
10. One possible counterexample to the claim that plays
are interpretations might be the performance of a drama by a
play-reading group of amateurs which is governed by noth-
ing more than the idea that an attempt be made to read every
word in the text. Here, it might be said, there is no interpreta-
tion. However, in this case, I would argue that the commit-
ment to the rule that every word be read constitutes a theatri-
cal interpretation-a way of filling in the recipe-albeit a
very minimal one.
11. Marking this distinction, of course, does not provide a
real definition of theatrical performance, but it may record
one of its essential characteristics. Thus, there may be room
for some ontology here even if Hamilton is right that a real
definition of theatrical performance is unlikely. That is, it
may not be the case, as Hamilton suggests, that the illumina-
tion of the historical conditions of what counts as a theatrical
performance in a certain tradition is all we can ever hope for.
12. Maybe Saltz's worry is that because of the variability
between theatrical performance tokens, there is no system-
atic way to identify whether a given performance is a token
of the pertinent interpretation type. However, although I
have not worked this out in detail, it seems to me, as a first
approximation, that the pertinent criteria for counting a
token theatrical performance as an instance of an interpreta-
tion type include (1) that it be causally related to (that it be
derived from) the interpretation in question, and (2) that it be
constrained to respect the practice-sensitive similarities be-
tween interpretation types and token performances that are
required to obtain in the relevant performance tradition.
13. But I cannot be taken to hold the latter thesis, since I
maintain that interpretations are types, not tokens.
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