Del Prado vs Manila Electric Railroad Company

FACTS:
Sometime in November 18, 1925, Mr. Teodorico Florenciano, Meralcos motorman, was driving the companys
street car along R. Hidalgo Street.
Mr. Ignacio Del Prado, the plaintiff ran across the street to catch the car. According to one witness, upon
approaching the car, Del Prado raised his hand as an indication to the motorman of his desire to board the car.
In response to the act of the plaintiff, the motorman eased up a little, without stopping Plaintiff was able to get
hold of the front perpendicular handpost and step placed his left foot on the platform. Just when the plaintiff is
about to placed his raised right foot, car accelerated. The sudden movement of the car caused the plaintiff to
loose his grip on the handpost, he then slipped off and fell to the ground causing his right foot to be caught and
crushed by the moving street car. The plaintiff instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant,
Issues:
(1) Whether the motorman was negligent
(2) Whether Meralco is liable for breach of contract of carriage
(3) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff

Held:
(1) We may observe at the outset that there is no obligation on the part of a street railway company to
stop its cars to let on intending passengers at other points than those appointed for stoppage. Nevertheless, although
the motorman of this car was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do no act that would have the
effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car. The premature acceleration of the car
was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty.
(2) The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and a
failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa contractual).
Furthermore, the duty that the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as
to those alighting therefrom.
Where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of positive obligation, an
employer, or master, may exculpate himself by proving that he had exercised due diligence to prevent the damage;
whereas this defense is not available if the liability of the master arises from a breach of contractual duty (culpa
contractual). In the case before us the company pleaded as a special defense that it had used all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage suffered by the plaintiff; and to establish this contention the company
introduced testimony showing that due care had been used in training and instructing the motorman in charge of this
car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that the liability involved was derived from a breach of
obligation.
(3) It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving car was not the proximate
cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on the
power prematurely. Again, the situation before us is one where the negligent act of the company's servant succeeded
the negligent act of the plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must be considered the proximate cause of the
injury. The rule here applicable seems to be analogous to, if not identical with that which is sometimes referred to as the
doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance with this doctrine, the contributory negligence of the party injured will
not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have
avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured party. The negligence of the plaintiff was, however,
contributory to the accident and must be considered as a mitigating circumstance.

Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Railway Company
Facts:
At around 6:00Pm on August 14, 1928, a young man named Juan Diaz Astudillo met his death through
electrocution. The incident happened somewhere near the Sta. Lucia Gate in Intramuros Manila.
Juan Asudillo the son of the plaintiff Teodora Astudillo died almost instantly when he reached out and
grasped a charged electric wire connected with an electric light pole.
Sta. Lucia Gate as the area mentioned was a considerable place which people frequented to stroll, rest and
enjoy themselves.
To keep people from littering the premises, Meralco in 1920 put up electric poles with corresponding electric
wires. The pole was located close enough to the public place here described, so that a person, by
reaching his arm out the full length, would be able to take hold of one of the wires. These wires had fallen
down, there is no obstacle to those desiring and wanting to make use of the place and there were no
prohibitory signs posted in the area.
The plaintiff and mother of the deceased instituted an action in the CFI Manila to secure from the defendant
damages.

Issue:
WON defendant did not exercise due care and diligence so as to render it liable for damages.

Ruling:
Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The SC concludes that the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
It is well established that the liability of electric light companies for damages for personal injuries is governed by
the rules of negligence. Such companies are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public. But considering that
electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate
with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place
where persons have a right to be.
In the case at bar, the cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen and guarded against. The
negligence came from the act of the defendant in so placing its pole and wires as to be w/n proximity to a place
frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a
highly charged and defectively insulated wire.

De Guia Vs MERALCO

FACTS:
The plaintiff Dr. Manuel de Guia is a physician residing in Caloocan City
Sept 4, 1915, at about 8pm, the defendant boarded a car at the end of the line with the intention of coming to
Caloocan
The street car got derailed as its wheels hit a stone about the size of a goose egg which was for unknown reason
found in the car track.
Due to the derailment, the car hit a concrete post. The post was shattered; and as the car stopped the plaintiff
was thrown against the door with some violence, receiving bruises and possibly certain internal injuries


ISSUES
A.) WON the defendant has disproved the existence of negligence
B.) WON the defendant is liable for the damages
C.) If liable for damages, WON the defendant could avail of the last paragraph of Art 1903 on culpa aquiliana (Art
2180)

HELD

A). NO, the existence of negligence in the operation of the car must be sustained, as not being clearly contrary to
the evidence.

Ratio
An experienced and attentive motorman should have discovered that something was wrong and would have
stopped before he had driven the car over the entire distance from the point where the wheels left the track to
the place where the post was struck.

Reasoning
The motorman alleged that he reduced his speed to the point that the car barely entered the switch under its
own momentum, and this operation was repeated as he passed out. Upon getting again on the straight track he put the
control successively at points one, two, three and lastly at point four. At the moment when the control was placed
at point four he perceived that the rear wheels were derailed and applied the brake; but at the same instant the car
struck the post, some 40 meters distant from the exit of the switch. However, testimonial evidence alleged that the rate
of a car propelled by electricity with the control at point "four" should be about five or 6 miles per hour (around 8 kph)
and other evidence showed that the car was behind schedule time and that it was being driven, after leaving the switch,
at a higher rate than would ordinarily be indicated by the control at point four. The car was practically empty (so its
possible that it could run faster???). The court granted that there is negligence as shown by the distance which the car
was allowed to run with the front wheels of the rear truck derailed, aside from the fact that the car was running in
an excessive speed.


B.) YES, the defendant is liable for the damages
Ratio/ Reasoning
Upon failure to comply with that obligation arising from the contract, the company incurred the liability defined in articles 1103-
1107 of the Civil Code.

C.) No, the defendant could not avail of the last paragraph of Art 1903Ratio/ Reasoning
The last paragraph of article 1903of the civil code refers to liability incurred by negligence in the absence of contractual
relation, that is, to the culpa aquiliana of the civil law and not to liability incurred by breach of contract; therefore, it is
irrelevant to prove that the defendant company had exercised due care in the selection and instruction of the
motorman who was in charge of its car and that he was in experienced and reliable servant.

Yamada vs MERALCO

Facts:
Sometime in January 1913, BUTARO YAMADAKENJIRO KARABAYASHI and TAKUTARU UYEHARA hired a taxi
owned and operated by Bachrach Garage so that they may travel to Cavite Viejo. The trip was safely going to
said place but when they were travelling back from said place the taxi they were on was hit by a train owned by
Manila Railroad.
Yamada et al sued the driver, Bachrach Garage, and Manila Railroad. They claimed that the driver was negligent
as he did not slow down while he was approaching the railroad tracks.
The driver of the taxi claimed there was no way for him to see the train coming because of the tall growing
bushes and trees. Bachrach said that it is not liable as an employer because prior to hiring the driver, the driver
has been of good record for 5 years and had had no traffi c infractions prior to the collision; and that the
negligence of the driver is also imputable to Yamada et al they being the ones in control of the vehicle; that
Yamada et al should have controlled the driver and instructed him to slow down. Manila Railroad said that it is
not liable as well because its engineers provided proper warning signals on their approach and that there were
no tall trees or bushes at the time of the accident.
Yamadas counsel presented the president of Bachrach who alleged that all their drivers habitually drove their
taxis over railroad crossings without slowing down or investigating whether a train is coming such practice
being allowed and tolerated by Bachrach.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bachrach Garage Manila railroad should be liable.
HELD:
It was established that the driver was negligent. A prudent driver should have slowed down approaching a
railroad crossing regardless if he could see a train or not regardless of the presence of tall bushes.
Manila Railroad and its employees are not negligent as showed by the evidence which were uncontroverted
hence no liability can be had against them.
Bachrach Garage however is liable for damages as an employer. Although they did establish that they have done
their diligence in properly selecting their driver and in providing said driver with a good car, they have failed to
provide proper supervision and control over their employee. Bachrach Garage did not perform its full duty when
it furnished a safe and proper car and a driver with a long and satisfactory record. It failed to comply with one of
the essential requirements of the law of negligence in this jurisdiction, that of supervision and instruction,
including the promulgation of proper rules and regulations and the formulation and publi cation of proper
instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules and regulations and instructions are necessary.
Bachrachs contention that Yamada et al were also negligent because they failed to properly instruct the driver
is untenable. Those on a cab do not become responsible for the negligence of the driver if they exercise no
control over him further than to indicate the route they wish to travel or the places to which they wish to go.
Note that in order to impute negligence to a passenger, at least one of these two things must exist:
1. That the driver is actually the passengers agent in all respect
2. The passengers have cooperated in producing the injury complained of.


Julian Del Rosario Vs Manila Electric Company
Lessons Applicable: Good Father of a Family

FACTS:
August 4, 1930 2 pm: trouble developed in a wire used by Manila Electric Company on Dimas-Alang Street for
the purpose of conducting electricity used in lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs
Jose Noguera, who had charge of a tienda nearby, first noticed that the wire was burning and its connections
smoking
o the wire parted and one of the ends of the wire fell to the ground among some shrubbery close to the
way
o Noguera went to the nearby garage and asked Jose Soco, the timekeeper, to telephone the Malabon
station of the Manila Electric Company
2.25 p.m.: Soco transmitted the message and the station told him that they would send an inspector
4 p.m.: neighborhood school was dismissed and the children went home
o Saturnino Endrina made a motion as if it touch the wire
o Jose Salvador, happened to be the son of an electrician and his father had cautioned him never to touch
a broken electrical wire, as it might have a current
o Alberto del Rosario said that "I have for some time been in the habit of touching wires" and so feeling
challenged put out his index finger and touch the wire
He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming "Ay! madre"
The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post
A crowd soon collected, and some one cut the wire and disengaged the body
Upon arrival at St. Luke's Hospital he was pronounced dead.
Trial Court: absolved Manila Electric Company


ISSUE:
WON Manila Electric Company should be held liable for negligence that caused the death of Alberto


HELD:
YES. judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and the plaintiff will recover of the defendant the sum of P1,250,
with costs of both instances
The engineer of the company says that it was customary for the company to make a special inspection of these
wires at least once in six months, and that all of the company's inspectors were required in their daily rounds to
keep a lookout for trouble of this kind.
presumption of negligence on the part of the Manila Electric Company from the breakage of this wire has not been
overcome, and it is in our opinion responsible for the accident
It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature
years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that
the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case. But
even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, a
proposition upon which the members of the court do not all agree, yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal
to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident.

US v. Barias
Facts:
On November 2, 1911, defendant Segundo Barias, a motorman for the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, was
driving his car along Rizal Avenue and stopped at an intersection to take on some passengers. He looked backward,
presumably to be sure that all passengers were aboard, and then started the car. At that moment, Fermina Jose, a 3-
year old child, walked or ran in front of the car. She was knocked down and dragged at some distance to death.
Defendant knew nothing of this until his return, when he was informed of what happened. He was charged and found
guilty of homicide resulting from reckless negligence.

Issue:
Whether the evidence shows such carelessness or want of ordinary care on the part of the defendant as to amount to
reckless negligence

Held:
Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and
its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want
of ordinary care under the circumstances.

The evidence shows that the thoroughfare on which the incident occurred was a public street in a densely populated
section of the city. The hour was six in the morning, or about the time when the residents of such streets begin to move
about. Under such conditions a motorman of an electric street car was clearly charged with a high degree of diligence in
the performance of his duties. He was bound to know and to recognize that any negligence on his part in observing the
track over which he was running his car might result in fatal accidents. He had no right to assume that the track before
his car was clear. It was his duty to satisfy himself of that fact by keeping a sharp lookout, and to do everything in his
power to avoid the danger which is necessarily incident to the operation of heavy street cars on public thoroughfares in
populous sections of the city. At times, it might be highly proper and prudent for him to glance back before again setting
his car in motion, to satisfy himself that he understood correctly a signal to go forward or that all the passengers had
safely alighted or gotten on board. But we do insist that before setting his car again in motion, it was his duty to satisfy
himself that the track was clear, and, for that purpose, to look and to see the track just in front of his car. This the
defendant did not do, and the result of his negligence was the death of the child.

We hold that the reasons of public policy which impose upon street car companies and their employees the duty of
exercising the utmost degree of diligence in securing the safety of passengers, apply with equal force to the duty of
avoiding the infliction of injuries upon pedestrians and others on the public streets and thoroughfares over which these
companies are authorized to run their cars. And while, in a criminal case, the courts will require proof of the guilt of the
company or its employees beyond a reasonable doubt, nevertheless the care or diligence required of the company and
its employees is the same in both cases, and the only question to be determined is whether the proofs shows beyond a
reasonable doubt that the failure to exercise such care or diligence was the cause of the accident, and that the
defendant was guilty thereof.

Standing erect, at the position he would ordinarily assume while the car is in motion, the eye of the average motorman
might just miss seeing the top of the head of a child, about three years old, standing or walking close up to the front of
the car. But it is also very evident that by inclining the head and shoulders forward very slightly, and glancing in front of
the car, a person in the position of a motorman could not fail to see a child on the track immediately in front of his car;
and we hold that it is the manifest duty of a motorman, who is about to start his car on a public thoroughfare in a
thickly-settled district, to satisfy himself that the track is clear immediately in front of his car, and to incline his body
slightly forward, if that be necessary, in order to bring the whole track within his line of vision. Of course, this may not
be, and usually is not necessary when the car is in motion, but we think that it is required by the dictates of the most
ordinary prudence in starting from a standstill.

TEAGUE VS. FERNANDEZ
FACTS
- The Realistic Institute, owned and operated by Mercedes M. Teague, was a vocational school for hair and beauty
culture situated on the second floor of the Gil -Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the comer of
Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila. The second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400
square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each of which
was provided with two fire-escape ladders, and the presence of each of the fire exits was indicated on the wall.
- In the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away
from the institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute. Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in
the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant
instructresses of the institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down the students, who
numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to be afraid because the Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it
is made of concrete, and that the fire was anyway, across the street. They told the students not to rush out but just to
go down the stairway two by two, or to use the fire-escapes. The panic, however, could not be subdued and the
students kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing stampede. No part of the Gil -Armi
Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, sister of plaintiffs, were
found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede.
- The CFI of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. The plaintiffs appealed to the CA, which by a divided
vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of five members having been constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal and
sentenced the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the sum of P11,000,plus interest at the legal rate from the
date the complaint was filed.
- The CA declared that Teague was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes
Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section491 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi
building. This provision reads as follows:
"Sec. 491. Fireproof partitions, exits and stairways All buildings and separate sections of buildings or buildings
otherwise known as accessorias having less than three stories, having one or more persons domiciled therein
either temporarily or permanently, d all public or quasi public buildings having less than three stories, such as
hospitals, sanitarium, schools, reformatories, places of human detention, assembly halls, clubs, restaurants or
panciterias, and the like, shall be provided with at least two unobstructed stairways of not less than one meter
and twenty centimeters in width and an inclination of not less than forty degrees from the perpendicular, in case
of large buildings more than two stairways shall likewise be provided when required by the chief of the fire
department, said stairways shall be placed as far apart as possible."
The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted is that the second storey of the building had only one stairway, 1.5
meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a
second stairway under construction.

ISSUES
1. WON Section 491 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila refers only to public buildings and hence did not
apply to the Gil-Armi building which was of private ownership
2. WON the ordinance devolved upon the owners of the building and therefore it is they and not the petitioner, who is a
mere lessee, who should be liable for theviolation
3. WON the failure to comply with the requirement of the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes
Fernandez

HELD
1. NO.
Ratio
it is not ownership which determines the character of buildings subject to its requirements, but rather the use or the
purpose for which a particular building, is utilized.
Reasoning
Thus the same may be privately owned, but if it is devoted to any one of the purposes mentioned in the ordinance - for
instance as a school, which the Realistic Institute precisely was - then the building is within the coverage of the
ordinance. Indeed the requirement that such a building should have two(2) separate stairways instead of only one (1)
has no relevance or reasonable relation to the fact of ownership, but does have such relation to the use or purpose for
which the building is devoted.

2. NO.
Reasoning
It was the use of the building for school purposes which brought the same within the coverage of the ordinance; and it
was the petitioner and not the owners who were responsible for such use.

3. YES.
Ratio
The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another
agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or
ordinance was intended to prevent.
Reasoning
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by settling other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his actor default that an
injury to some person might probabl y result there from. [Citing Bataclan v Medina]- The petitioner relates the chain of
events that resulted n the death of Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1)violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring
place;(3) shouts of "Fire!, Fire!"; (4) panic in the Institute; (5)stampede; and (6) injuries and death. The violation of the
ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote cause, and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of
independent causes which produced the injury complained of.- A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of
an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or
occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such conditi on was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent actor defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which
result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. [Citing
MERALCO v Remoquillo]- According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes
with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance." The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty
juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. It is true that the petitioner's non-
compliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that
it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a
measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building.
That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be
reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available. It is
true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a
fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. But it
was precisely such contingencies or events that the authors of the ordinance had in mind, for under normal conditions
one stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building. - To consider the violation of the ordinance as the
proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that
the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to
prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the
respondents, the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.
Dispositive
Decision appealed from is affirmed.

PICART vs. SMITH, JR.
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way
across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the
bridge he gave two more successi ve blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge
instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get
over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the
road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that
the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing
down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near,
there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the
animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The
horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the Picart recover of
Smith damages
YES
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used i n the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would
constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human
experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it
was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in
these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another
was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly established. A
prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he
was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case
the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent
acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of
the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party.




GAN Vs Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Petitioner Hedy Gan (Gan) was convicted of the Crime of Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence by the trial court in Manila
1. In the morning of July 4, 1972, Hedy Gan was driving a car along North Bay Blvd,Tondo, Manila. While in front of a
house in North Bay Blvd. there were two vehicles (truck and jeepney) parked one side of the road.
2. As the car driven by Gan approached the place where the 2 vehicles are parked, there was a vehicle coming from the
opposite direction, followed by another which tried to overtake and bypass the one in front which then encroached the
lane of the car driven by Gan.
3. To avoid a head-on collision with the oncoming vehicle, defendant swerve to the right, asa result, an old man was hit
by the bumper of his car, who was crossing the boulevard from south to north.
4. The man was pinned against the rear of the parked jeepney. The force of the impact caused the parked jeepney to
move forward hitting the truck ahead of it.
5. The old man was identified as Isidoro Casino, who was immediately brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital but
was pronounced dead on arrival.
6. An information for Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence was filed against petitioner. She entered a plea of not guilty
upon arraignment.
7. Petitioner sought for re-investigation by the City Fiscal, the trial fiscal moved for the dismissal of the case against
petitioner during the resumption of hearing, on the ground of lack of interest on the part of the complaining witness to
prosecute the case as evidence by an affidavit of desistance submitted to trial and lack of eyewitness to sustain the
charge.
8. Trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
9.On appeal, the trial courts decision was modified and petitioner was convicted only of Homicide thru Simple
Imprudence.
10. The CA said that the accused should have stepped on the brakes when she saw the car going in the opposite
direction followed by another which overtook the first. She should have tried to stop or lessen her speed so as not to
bump into the pedestrian and jeepney.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner should be convicted of the crime of Homicide thru Simple Imprudence.
HELD:
No, The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to
the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the
law imposes the duty on the doer to take precaution against its mischievous results and the failure to do so constitutes
negligence.
Emergency Rule On who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds
himself is brought about by his own negligence



NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: An agreement was entered onto between defendants National Development Company (NDC) and Maritime
Company of the Philippines (MCP) in accordance of which, NDC as the first preferred mortgagee of three ocean-giving
vessels including one with the name Dona Nati appointed MCP as its agents to manage and operate said vessel in its
behalf.
The E. Philipp Corporation of the New York loaded on board the vessel Dona Nati at San Francisco, California, a
total of 1,200 bales of American raw cotton consigned to Manila Banking Corporation, Manila and the Peoples Bank and
Trust Company, acting for and in behalf of Pan Asiatic Commercial Company, Inc. who represents Riverside Mills
Corporation.
The vessel figured in a collision at Ise Bay, Japan with a Japanese vessel as a result of which 50 bales of aforesaid
cargo were lost and/or destroyed.
Plaintiff (DISC) as insurer, paid the respective claims of holders of the negotiable bills of lading duly endorsed to
them.
Plaintiff filed complaint for reimbursement from the defendants-NDC and MCP as owner and ship agent
respectively.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering the defendants MCP and NDC to pay jointly and solidarity to DISC. MCP
and NDC interposed their appeals. CA affirmed the RTCs decision.

Issue: Which law shall govern loss or destruction of goods due to collision of vessels outside Philippine waters, and the
extent of liability?

Held: This issue has already been laid to rest by this Court of Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v. IAC (150 SCRA 469-470
[1987])
In the case at bar, it has been established that the goods in question are transported from San Francisco,
California and Tokyo, Japan to the Philippines and that they were lost or due to a collision which was found to have been
caused by the negligence or fault of both captains of the colliding vessels. Under the above ruling, it is evident that the
laws of the Philippines will apply, and it is immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise
Bay, Japan.
It appears, however, that collision falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil Code, so that no
reversible error can be found in respondent courses application to the case at bar of Articles 826 to 839, Book Three of
the Code of Commerce, which deal exclusively wi th collision of vessels.
More specifically, Article 826 of the Code of Commerce provides that where collision is imputable to the
personnel of a vessel, the owner of the vessel at fault, shall indemnify the losses and damages incurred after an expert
appraisal. But more in point to the instant case is Article 827 of the same Code, which provides that if the collision is
imputable to both vessels, each one shall suffer its own damages and both shall be solidarily responsible for the losses
and damages suffered by their cargoes.
Significantly, under the provisions of the Code of Commerce, particularly Articles 826 to 839, the shipowner or
carrier, is not exempt from liability for damages arising from collision due to the fault or negligence of the captain.
Primary liability is imposed on the shipowner or carrier in recognition of the universally accepted doctrine that the
shipmaster or captain is merely the representative of the owner who has the actual or constructive control over the
conduct of the voyage.
The agreement between NDC and MCP shows that MCP is appointed as agent, a term broad enough to include
the concept of ship agent in maritime law. In fact MCP was even conferred all the powers of the owner of the vessel,
including the power to contract in the name of the NDC. Both owner and agent should be declared jointly and severally
liable since the obligation which is the subject of the action had its origin in a fortuitous act and did not arise from
contract.
CA decision is affirmed.